Rule2024-28993
Spectrum Sharing Rules for NGSO Fixed-Satellite Service Systems
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
December 13, 2024
Effective
January 13, 2025
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) clarifies the methodology to be used in compatibility analyses by non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) fixed-satellite service (FSS) system licensees. The Second Report and Order adopts specific degraded throughput methodology criteria that NGSO FSS systems licensed in a later processing round must include in compatibility analyses, in absence of a coordination agreement, to demonstrate that they can operate compatibly with and protect NGSO FSS systems authorized in earlier processing rounds. The Second Report and Order clarifies these methodologies to promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency through good-faith coordination. The Commission also adopts an Order on Reconsideration dismissing in part and, on alternative and independent grounds, denying a petition for reconsideration.
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 240 (Friday, December 13, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 100898-100917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-28993]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 25
[IB Docket No. 21-456; FCC 24-117; FR ID 265639]
Spectrum Sharing Rules for NGSO Fixed-Satellite Service Systems
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule; denial of reconsideration.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) clarifies the methodology to be used in compatibility
analyses by non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) fixed-satellite
service (FSS) system licensees. The Second Report and Order adopts
specific degraded throughput methodology criteria that NGSO FSS systems
licensed in a later processing round must include in compatibility
analyses, in absence of a coordination agreement, to demonstrate that
they can operate compatibly with and protect NGSO FSS systems
authorized in earlier processing rounds. The Second Report and Order
clarifies these methodologies to promote market entry, regulatory
certainty, and spectrum efficiency through good-faith coordination. The
Commission also adopts an Order on Reconsideration dismissing in part
and, on alternative and independent grounds, denying a petition for
reconsideration.
DATES: Effective on January 13, 2025.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For additional information on this
proceeding, contact Carolyn Mahoney, Satellite Programs and Policy
Division, Space Bureau, at (202) 418-7168 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d6b5b7a4b9baafb8f8bbb7beb9b8b3af96b0b5b5f8b1b9a0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="583b392a373421367635393037363d21183e3b3b763f372e">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Second Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, in IB Docket No.
21-456, FCC 24-117, adopted on November 5, 2024 and released on
November 15, 2024. The full text of this document is available at
<a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf</a>.
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires
that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and
comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will
not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has
prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the
potential impact of the rule changes contained in the Second Report and
Order and Order on Reconsideration. The FRFA is set forth in the
appendix of the document available at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf</a> and a summary is included in the
Procedural Matters section below.
Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
The Second Report and Order contains modified information
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA), Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the
PRA. OMB, other Federal agencies, and the general public will be
invited to comment on the modified information collection requirements
contained in this document.
The Commission assessed the effects of requiring later-round NGSO
FSS grantees to submit compatibility showings with respect to earlier-
round grantees with whom coordination has not yet been reached. The
Commission finds that doing so will serve the public interest and is
unlikely to directly affect businesses with fewer than 25 employees.
Congressional Review Act
The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
concurs that this rule is non-major under the Congressional Review Act,
5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Second Report
and Order and Order on Reconsideration to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
Synposis
I. Introduction
In the Second Report and Order, the Commission continues to refine
the Commission's rules governing spectrum sharing among a new
generation of broadband satellite constellations to promote market
entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency through good-faith
coordination. Specifically, the Commission clarifies certain details of
the degraded throughput methodology that, in the absence of a
coordination agreement, must be used in compatibility analyses by non-
geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS)
system licensees authorized through later processing rounds to show
they can operate compatibly with, and protect, NGSO FSS systems
authorized through earlier processing rounds. The Commission adopts a 3
percent time-weighted average throughput degradation as a long-term
interference protection criterion, a 0.4 percent absolute increase in
link unavailability as a short-term interference protection criterion,
and declines to adopt additional protection metrics or to adopt an
aggregate limit on interference from later-round NGSO FSS systems into
earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. In an accompanying Order on
Reconsideration, the Commission denies a Petition for Reconsideration
(88 FR 58540, August 28, 2023) of the Report and Order (88 FR 39783,
June 30, 2023). These actions continue the Commission's efforts to
promote development and competition in broadband NGSO satellite
services.
II. Background
The Commission is committed to updating and refining its rules
governing NGSO FSS systems, at a time when these systems are being
deployed at unprecedented scale. NGSO FSS satellites traveling in low-
and medium-Earth orbit provide broadband services to industry,
enterprise, and residential customers with lower latency and wider
coverage than previously available by satellite.
Processing Round Procedure Overview. Applications for NGSO FSS
system licenses and petitions for declaratory ruling seeking U.S.
market access for non-U.S.-licensed NGSO FSS systems are considered in
groups based on filing date, under a processing round procedure.
Pursuant to the Commission's rules, a license application for ``NGSO-
like'' satellite operation, including operation of an NGSO FSS system,
that satisfies the acceptability for filing requirements is reviewed to
determine whether it is a ``competing application'' or a ``lead
application.'' A competing application is one filed in response to a
public notice initiating a processing round. Any other application is a
lead application. The public notice for a lead application initiates a
processing round and establishes a cut-off date for competing NGSO-like
satellite system applications. After the close of the processing round,
the Commission grants all the applications for which the
[[Page 100899]]
Commission finds that the applicant is legally, technically, and
otherwise qualified, that the proposed facilities and operations comply
with all applicable rules, regulations, and policies, and that grant of
the application will serve the public interest, convenience and
necessity.
NGSO FSS System Spectrum Sharing Overview. The Commission has
adopted rules for spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS systems. NGSO FSS
space station license applications granted with a condition to abide by
these sharing rules are exempt from frequency band segmentation
procedures that otherwise apply to applications for NGSO-like satellite
operation. Instead, NGSO FSS operators must coordinate with one another
in good faith the use of commonly authorized frequencies. If two or
more NGSO FSS satellite systems fail to complete coordination, a
default spectrum-splitting procedure using a [Delta]T/T of 6 percent
threshold applies, pursuant to Sec. 25.261(c) of the Commission's
rules. In the NGSO FSS Report and Order (82 FR 59972, December 18,
2017), the Commission stated that it would ``initially limit'' sharing
under the [Delta]T/T of 6 percent threshold to qualified applicants in
a processing round. The Commission explained that treatment of
applicants after a processing round would be on a case-by-case basis
and would consider both the need to protect existing expectations and
investments and the benefits of additional entry, as well as any
comments filed by incumbent operators and reasoning presented by the
new applicant.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The NPRM (88 FR 39783, June 30,
2023) in this proceeding sought comment on potential rule changes to
clarify the relative obligations between NGSO FSS systems approved in
different processing rounds. Specifically, the Commission proposed to
limit the existing NGSO FSS spectrum-splitting procedure in Sec.
25.261(c) to those systems approved in the same processing round, and
to require systems approved in a later processing round to coordinate
with, or demonstrate they will protect, earlier-round systems. The
Commission invited comment on how to quantify inter-round protection
and whether it should sunset after a period of time. The Commission
also proposed to require all NGSO FSS grantees, regardless of their
processing round status, to coordinate with each other in good faith,
and sought comment on specific information sharing obligations that
could facilitate operator-to-operator coordination.
Report and Order. In response to the record developed through the
NPRM, the Report and Order adopted rule changes designed to promote
market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency of NGSO FSS
systems. The Commission, for the first time, limited the default
spectrum-splitting procedure in Sec. 25.261(c) to NGSO FSS systems
approved in the same processing round and required NGSO FSS systems
approved in a later processing round to coordinate with, or demonstrate
they will protect, earlier-round systems, subject to a sunsetting
provision. The Commission also required all NGSO FSS grantees to
coordinate with each other in good faith. Regarding the technical
demonstrations of compatibility of later-round NGSO FSS systems with
earlier-round systems, the Commission concluded that an interference
analysis based on a degraded throughput methodology offered the most
technically promising path for NGSO FSS inter-round sharing and
required later-round systems to use such a methodology. In adopting a
sunsetting provision for the inter-round protection requirement, the
Commission concluded that protection of earlier-round NGSO FSS systems
must ensure a stable environment for continued service and investment
but should not hinder later-round systems indefinitely. The Commission
decided that NGSO FSS systems will be entitled to protection from
systems approved in a subsequent processing round until ten years after
the first authorization or market access grant in that subsequent
processing round. After that date, all systems in both processing
rounds will be treated on an equal basis with respect to spectrum
sharing in the absence of a coordination agreement, and the default
spectrum-splitting procedure in Sec. 25.261(c) will also apply between
systems in the two rounds. In sum, prior to commencing operations, an
NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either certify it has
completed a coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system
licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round,
or submit a showing for Commission approval that it will not cause
harmful interference to any such system with which coordination has not
been completed using a degraded throughput methodology.
Further Notice. In conjunction with the decision in the Report and
Order to adopt an inter-round protection requirement described above,
the Commission adopted the Further Notice (88 FR 40142, June 21, 2023)
to finalize the details of the degraded throughput methodology. The
Commission invited specific comment on the appropriate values and
assumptions to be used in this requirement, as well as on whether the
Commission should adopt a rule limiting aggregate interference from
later-round NGSO FSS systems into earlier-round systems. Ten comments,
eight reply comments, and several ex parte presentations were filed in
response to the Further Notice.
Petition. On July 20, 2023, OneWeb filed a Petition for Partial
Reconsideration of the Report and Order concerning the sunset period
adopted with the new inter-round protection requirement. Kuiper opposed
the OneWeb Petition, SpaceX commented on it, and OneWeb replied to
Kuiper's opposition.
III. Discussion
1. Second Report and Order
In this Second Report and Order, after review of the record, the
Commission clarifies certain details of the degraded throughput
methodology that, in the absence of a coordination agreement, must be
used in compatibility analyses by NGSO FSS system grantees, authorized
through later processing rounds, to show they can operate compatibly
with, and protect, NGSO FSS systems, authorized through earlier
processing rounds. Specifically, the Commission adopts a 3 percent
time-weighted average throughput degradation as a long-term
interference protection criterion and a 0.4 percent absolute increase
in link unavailability as a short-term interference protection
criterion. The Commission declines to adopt additional protection
metrics or to adopt an aggregate limit on interference from later-round
NGSO FSS systems into earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. The Commission's
decisions in the Second Report and Order rely on its predictive
judgment in the highly complex and dynamic area of spectrum sharing
among a new generation of innovative NGSO FSS systems. The Commission's
decisions strive to balance its competing goals of providing regulatory
certainty for, and adequate protection of, earlier round systems vis-a-
via later entrants while encouraging new entry and coordination among
NGSO FSS operators.
1. Long-Term Interference Metric
Further Notice. In the Further Notice, the Commission outlined its
expected steps in a degraded throughput analysis and sought comment on
the proposed process. Specifically, noting that 3
[[Page 100900]]
percent had been suggested as an appropriate value for several aspects
of the degraded throughput analysis, including a long-term interference
limit based on reduction in time-weighted average throughput, the
Commission invited comment on the appropriate values for such a limit,
including technical justification.
Comments. Four out of the five commenters proposing a specific
threshold value for degraded throughput support using the 3 percent
value noted in the Further Notice. Kuiper, for example, observes that a
3 percent throughput-degradation threshold has been adopted
internationally to protect V-band GSO networks from NGSO FSS systems
and argues that it provides a conservative measure of protection for
incumbent systems due, in part, to conservatism in the methodology a
new entrant must use to estimate interference. Viasat agrees that use
of the 3 percent threshold should adequately safeguard systems from
adverse performance degradation experienced over an extended period of
time. Telesat, while initially arguing that ``[t]he long-term criterion
is sufficiently stable and there is a sufficient record, including
through recent ITU studies, to support adopting a 3 percent degradation
limit,'' more recently concludes that specific degraded throughput
criteria should be left to coordination discussions among satellite
operators to determine. Telesat now believes that the record is
sufficiently complete to allow the Commission to adopt rules, endorsing
the 3 percent degraded throughput value for the long-term protection
criterion proposed by SpaceX. Intelsat initially indicated that further
study would be required before concluding upon a degraded throughput
value, but now supports the 3 percent value as well. TechFreedom argues
it is premature to adopt protection criteria. Public Knowledge and New
America Open Technology Institute also support adopting a 3 percent
degraded throughput threshold.
SpaceX, which initially commented that a 3 percent degraded
throughput value required further study, subsequently submitted its own
spectrum sharing study evaluating the 3 percent limit. Using publicly
available information and reference standard antenna patterns, SpaceX
performed 123 dynamic (Monte Carlo) simulations of interference from
various 2020 processing-round NGSO systems into various 2016
processing-round NGSO systems. In 112 of the 123 studied cases,
degradation was below 3.12 percent, which SpaceX argues empirically
supports the Commission adopting a 3.0 percent degradation of average
spectral efficiency as a single-entry long-term interference criterion
for compatibility determinations.
Only OneWeb proposes a long-term interference metric other than 3
percent, arguing that a 3 percent time-weighted average degraded
throughput limit will substantially harm NGSO FSS operators and
disincentivize coordination. OneWeb asserts that an aggregate
interference and rain fade criterion of no more than 10 percent
degradation in average throughput is appropriate for an NGSO FSS
system, that apportionment of this allowed percentage of interference
to other NGSO systems should be no more than 2.5 to 3.85 percent, and
that when accounting for the existence of multiple co-frequency NGSO
systems, the single-entry average degraded throughput should be less
than 1 percent for each individual NGSO system. OneWeb further claims
that if a 3 percent limit were adopted per system and six NGSO FSS
systems were operating co-frequency, then a 15 percent degradation in
average throughput would occur from the 5 interfering systems to the
victim system. No other commenter supports OneWeb's proposal; SpaceX,
Kuiper, and Telesat raise numerous technical concerns with it; and
commenters suggest alternative explanations for the results of OneWeb's
analysis.
OneWeb also argues that SpaceX's study purporting to affirm the 3
percent metric relies on flawed assumptions that undermine its
conclusions. Specifically, OneWeb contends that the study fails to
accurately model system-specific details that could impact whether a
previous-round system may experience harmful interference. OneWeb's
analysis incorporating its revised assumptions argues that the 3
percent metric results in substantially higher levels of interference
than projected by both SpaceX and Kuiper, which could exceed 5 percent
when taking into account a small deployment of Kuiper customer
terminals without adding any contribution from the Viasat system. Thus,
OneWeb concludes that SpaceX's study fails to adequately predict the
interference levels prior-round NGSO systems would receive. OneWeb
further highlighted its support for a 1 percent or less average
degraded throughput as the long-term criterion that should be adopted.
Decision. The Commission adopts a 3 percent time-weighted average
degraded throughput threshold as the long-term interference metric that
must be complied with in any inter-round compatibility showing
submitted by a later-round NGSO FSS grantee. The 3 percent time-
weighted average degraded throughput is calculated on a per link basis.
The Commission concludes that adopting this value best furthers its
goals of providing regulatory certainty for, and adequate protection
of, earlier-round NGSO FSS systems while allowing for new entry and
coordination among NGSO FSS operators. First, this value has been
developed and adopted internationally as sufficient for the protection
of GSO satellite networks using adaptive coding and modulation
techniques, which are also used by NGSO FSS systems. Second, the 3
percent throughput-degradation threshold limits the interference
allowed at any location, not the expected average of interference
across all locations. Since the worst-case locations will likely drive
the discussion of appropriate system parameters and any mitigation
measures, actual interference should be less than 3 percent in many
circumstances. Third, the Commission's technical review of the SpaceX
study on the record indicates that the study reliably supports the
conclusion that a 3 percent threshold is achievable by later-round
systems, and therefore encourages competitive new entry, by
demonstrating that the simulated degradation was near or below 3
percent in 112 of the 123 studied cases of later-round systems
protecting earlier-round systems.
The Commission disagrees with OneWeb that a 3 percent degraded
throughput threshold would disincentivize coordination, for three
reasons. First, not all links considered in the SpaceX study meet this
degraded throughput threshold. Additional links or different assumed
parameters might also not meet the threshold, and therefore the 3
percent degraded throughput threshold would incentivize coordination or
require mitigation. Second, this protection requirement is unilateral,
and later-round systems will have an incentive to coordinate to receive
some accommodation, or protection from interference, from earlier-round
systems. And third, the 10-year sunset period ensures that earlier-
round systems and later-round systems will be treated on an equal basis
after the sunset, and any compatibility analyses will no longer permit
the later-round system to operate in cases where it would exceed the
default spectrum-splitting mechanism in Sec. 25.261(c).
In contrast, a criterion of 1 percent or lower has not been
demonstrated to allow for competitive new entry by any study. The
Commission also finds the technical basis for this criterion to be
[[Page 100901]]
flawed. The Commission agrees with Telesat that OneWeb is incorrect in
claiming that Note 3 of Recommendation ITU-R S. 2131-1 provides a 10
percent limit on time-weighted average degraded throughput for an FSS
link employing adaptive coding and modulation (ACM). In addition, the
single-entry interference criterion proposed by OneWeb is based on an
isolated scenario that does not represent the broad variation of
throughput degradation that can occur due to rain fade. Further, the
single-entry throughput degradation values suggested by OneWeb are
based on arbitrary assumptions. And the idea conveyed by OneWeb that
the allowable degradation from one interference source should simply be
computed by considering the degradation allowance from all interference
sources and then dividing by the number of interference sources is
simply incorrect, because it does not take into account the manner in
which ACM is implemented in modern satellite links.
On the other hand, declining to adopt any specific long-term
interference protection criterion could invite unnecessary and lengthy
debates among later-round operators submitting compatibility analyses
and earlier-round operators subject to those analyses with whom a
coordination agreement has not yet been reached. Instead, the
Commission concludes that establishing a specific long-term
interference protection metric, as technically supported on the record,
will provide a clear benchmark for new entrants, around which parties
may tailor any alternative long-term protections mutually agreed in
coordination.
2. Short-Term Interference Metric
i. Relative vs. Absolute Increase in Unavailability
Further Notice. In addition to seeking comment on defining a long-
term interference metric in the degraded throughput analysis, the
Further Notice sought comment on setting a short-term interference
metric expressed as a change in the earlier-round system's link
unavailability time percentage. The Commission invited comment on the
appropriate value for this limit, including technical justification.
Comments. On the issue of defining a short-term interference
metric, commenters differed on whether to use a relative change in link
unavailability, an absolute change in link unavailability, or both.
Ultimately, commenters on this issue support the use of an absolute
metric; no commenter opposes use of an absolute metric or only supports
use of a relative metric. SpaceX, for example, explains that because
next-generation satellite systems are designed to be resilient to
signal degradation, these systems frequently maintain a high degree of
link availability--typically in excess of 99 percent--despite varying
environmental effects and interference from other NGSO systems. This
equates to a typical baseline unavailability of less than 1 percent,
but with such levels of unavailability as the baseline, SpaceX states
that very small changes in link performance can trigger ``wild swings''
in a relative unavailability metric, even if the absolute level of link
availability remains close to its baseline value. O3b and Intelsat each
propose a formula to determine an absolute allowed increase in
unavailability that changes with the baseline availability, reflecting
concerns that a single value for increase in unavailability may not
adequately protect high availability links. OneWeb supports an absolute
increase in unavailability and supports O3b's proposal for a variable
absolute increase in unavailability based on the service requirements
of the link to cover a wider range of use cases.
Decision. The Commission agrees with the general consensus among
commenters on this issue. The Commission concludes that the use of an
absolute increase in link unavailability as the short-term interference
metric provides a more reliable measure of short-term interference that
is not as susceptible to significant fluctuations as a relative
increase metric would be. The Commission therefore adopts an absolute
increase in link unavailability as the sole short-term interference
metric required in an inter-round compatibility showing submitted by a
later-round grantee. As discussed in greater detail below, the
Commission declines to adopt proposals for a formulaic approach for a
variable absolute increase in unavailability in establishing a short-
term interference metric.
ii. Value
Further Notice. The Further Notice also invited specific comment on
the appropriate value for the short-term interference metric, with
accompanying technical justification.
Comments. Commenters are divided on the appropriate value for the
short-term protection criterion. OneWeb asserts that if the Commission
adopts an absolute change in link unavailability as the short-term
metric, the single-entry limit should be ``substantially lower than''
0.01 percent to account for uses which may necessitate higher levels of
availability, such as links designed to meet a 99.99 percent
unavailability requirement. Viasat claims that a 0.05 percent tolerable
packet loss rate from all sources ``is the minimum necessary
requirement'' and states that a smaller value, such as 0.01 percent,
would provide a margin to allow for other sources of short-term packet
loss. Intelsat initially argued that further study would be required
before determining protection criteria values, although now supports an
absolute metric based on a sliding-scale formula, similar to O3b's, for
the short-term protection criterion. Similarly, Telesat had also
initially argued that no single short-term metric is appropriate for
all links in all coordinations based on its own study, but now agrees
that the SpaceX proposal strikes the right balance in protecting
incumbent NGSO systems while supporting the entry of new NGSO systems
and supports the 0.4 percent metric.
SpaceX argues that its study of several 2016 processing-round and
2020 processing-round systems using 123 dynamic (Monte Carlo)
simulations establishes an ``empirical zone of reasonableness'' for the
values of the absolute change in link availability. The values in the
SpaceX study range from 0 to 0.382 percent at a carrier-to-noise (C/N)
threshold of 0 dB, and SpaceX states that the upper end of this range
is appropriate for both uplink and downlink. SpaceX therefore contends
that its study provides empirical support for short-term interference
up to approximately 0.4 percent absolute change in link availability at
a C/N threshold of 0 dB. SpaceX further argues that its conservative
use of a C/N threshold of 0 dB to assess changes in link availability
further supports allowing short-term interference up to 0.4 percent
absolute change. SpaceX suggests that setting such a value will
incentivize a later-round system to try to limit inline events to an
earlier-round system toward achieving this level of short-term
interference or if it cannot, to coordinate with the earlier-round
system to more efficiently use the shared spectrum. Telesat supports
the proposed SpaceX approach, noting that it is the only approach that
encourages coordination amongst operators by establishing a backstop
value to protect incumbent operators while also supporting good faith
coordination and promoting competition.
Kuiper supports the proposed SpaceX 0.4 percent absolute increase
in unavailability metric as well. Kuiper initially proposed the
Commission adopt a 0.1 percent absolute increase in
[[Page 100902]]
link unavailability as a threshold for short-term interference, which
Kuiper argued would offer sufficient room for new entrants to bring
their systems into operation, even in drier climates, while being
highly protective to incumbents. Kuiper now urges the Commission to
adopt an absolute threshold in the range of 0.1 to 0.4 percent for
short-term protection as proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, respectively,
arguing that this would incentivize both new entrants and incumbents to
negotiate in good faith while minimizing impacts on vulnerable links
and operations in both systems. Kuiper also explains that arguments
claiming that a short-term threshold in this range would discourage
coordination between incumbents and new entrants ignore the realities
of coordination, which occurs when both parties are incentivized to
negotiate a more mutually beneficial outcome than an alternative
compatibility showing scenario. Kuiper notes that even with
interference thresholds tilted in favor of new entrants, rather than
with a more balanced approach as proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, new
entrants would retain these incentives and continue to coordinate with
incumbents. Regarding incumbents, Kuiper argues that while incumbents
have incentives to minimize potential impacts of new entrants, an
overly protective short-term threshold, like the O3b proposed formula,
would incentivize incumbents to make unreasonable coordination demands
and leverage those protections against new competition.
O3b proposes the Commission use a formula, rather than a fixed
percentage value, to determine the allowed increase in unavailability
of an earlier-round system link. O3b proposes that the permitted
increase in unavailability = -0.12 * baseline availability + 12.02. O3b
argues that its formula appropriately adjusts protection levels to
service requirements and reflects a broad range of technical
characteristics and protection requirements. OneWeb agrees and argues
the SpaceX proposal would eliminate later round systems' incentive to
coordinate, unacceptably undermine established operators' service
quality, render it impossible for operators to guarantee a defined
quality of service to their customers, and subvert the purpose of the
processing round framework. OneWeb further asserts that a 0.4 percent
absolute increase is ``overly-relaxed'' and risks undermining U.S.
credibility as a stable investment environment and deterring
international coordination with U.S. systems. Intelsat supports O3b's
proposed formula approach and proposes the Commission adopt a slightly
modified version of the formula, increasing the minimum unavailability
degradation value. Intelsat proposes that the permitted increase in
unavailability = -0.12 * baseline availability + 12.05, modifying the
minimum unavailability degradation factor from 12.02 to 12.05 which
Intelsat argues allows for flexibility regarding the percent of link
unavailability for high availability links. OneWeb also supports
adopting O3b's proposed formula, should the Commission decline to issue
a further notice and comment. SpaceX and Kuiper oppose this approach,
arguing that O3b's formula is overly protective of earlier-round
systems and would incentivize those incumbents to leverage strict
limitations on later-round systems, thus discouraging market entry and
innovation and leading to inefficient spectrum sharing. Telesat also
raises concerns, flagging that the O3b formula has not been previously
considered by the Commission or ``related forums such as the ITU'' and
involves granular details that are better addressed in coordination
between parties than by the Commission.
In the alternative, O3b and OneWeb suggest the Commission seek
further comment on an appropriate short-term interference criterion and
each of the corresponding proposals through a second further notice of
proposed rulemaking. O3b argues that the SpaceX and Kuiper proposals
are both untimely and warrant additional inquiry. SpaceX and Kuiper
argue that the record is complete with detailed analyses, and
demonstrates that parties have moved toward a consensus on values and
methodology, and encourage the Commission to move forward with a final
order. Telesat agrees, finding that the record is sufficiently complete
to allow the Commission to finalize the rules for spectrum sharing and
arguing that further delay will not lead to better rules, but rather,
foster lingering uncertainty as to the framework in which NGSO
operators coordinate their activities. Telesat additionally notes that
the record demonstrates that there may never be a perfect formula that
optimally addresses all possible NGSO system interactions which all
parties agree upon, given the nature of the complex analyses and
systems involved in developing specific metrics, and thus the
Commission is justified in moving forward with a final order.
Decision. After review of the record, the Commission adopts a 0.4
percent absolute increase in link unavailability at a C/N threshold of
0 dB as the short-term interference metric to be used in inter-round
compatibility analyses. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission
concludes that this 0.4 percent value, more so than the 0.1 percent
value, 0.01 percent or less values, or the formulas proposed by O3b or
Intelsat on the record, most closely aligns with the Commission's goals
of providing regulatory certainty for and ensuring adequate protection
of earlier-round incumbents while offering the best opportunities for
later-round new entrants and competition and encouraging coordination.
First, the Commission finds that this criterion will adequately
protect earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. Like the long-term interference
metric adopted above, this short-term interference metric will limit
the increase in link unavailability at any analyzed location. Since the
worst-case locations will likely drive operators' determinations of
appropriate system parameters and any mitigation measures, the actual
increase in unavailability will be less than 0.4 percent in many
circumstances. In addition, the use of a C/N threshold of 0 dB to
assess changes in link availability is at the upper end of the -3 dB to
0 dB range for C/N thresholds supported on the record for compatibility
analyses, and renders the 0.4 percent value more conservative. Because
the C/N threshold is intended to reflect the minimum carrier received
signal, relative to noise, necessary to maintain a link, real values
for the C/N threshold may be closer to -2 dB or -3 dB. At these lower
C/N thresholds, the absolute change in link availability is typically
lower than at the 0 dB threshold. Thus, using a 0 dB C/N threshold may
overestimate the interference from a later-round system to an earlier-
round system's link whose actual C/N threshold is lower. The Commission
further concludes this value will be sufficiently protective of
earlier-round systems because of the decisions below to use simplifying
assumptions in the analysis--such as modeling 50 percent or 100 percent
deployment of an incumbent system even if it has not yet deployed in
those numbers, or using an assumed satellite selection strategy when
the actual satellite selection strategy is not provided by the
incumbent--that may also tend to overestimate the actual interference
caused to an incumbent system by the later round system. These
simplifying assumptions in the analysis itself tend to offer incumbents
more protection. Therefore, the Commission considers the totality of
the analysis when deciding upon the likely real-world interference
caused by a later-
[[Page 100903]]
round system satisfying the 0.4 percent absolute increase in link
unavailability metric at a C/N threshold of 0 dB.
Second, the Commission concludes that adopting a 0.4 percent
absolute increase in unavailability metric will simultaneously support
competitive new entry because it will accommodate several modeled
second-round systems, both uplinks and downlinks, per the 123 dynamic
(Monte Carlo) simulations in the SpaceX study, which the Commission
notes are a better representation of the dynamic nature of NGSO systems
than a static analysis would reflect. Further, the Commission has
reviewed the SpaceX study and find that the data, assumptions, and
methodology employed are reasonable for purposes of adopting a 0.4
percent short-term interference metric to be used in inter-round
compatibility analyses. To be sure, O3b argues that the study is too
limited in the operating metrics considered and is accordingly not
reflective of real-world parameters. Such individualized parameters
will be considered in individual compatibility analyses. In the event
that other system combinations, or the use of different assumed
parameters, result in exceedances of this short-term limit, this will
require mitigation measures to be applied by the later-round operator
or coordination with earlier round operators.
Third, the Commission concludes that adopting this short-term
protection value will support competitive new entry while continuing to
encourage good-faith coordination among both incumbents and new
entrants, which offers the best avenue for efficient spectrum sharing
among NGSO FSS systems. Unlike the requirement for later-round systems
to protect earlier-round systems under the inter-round protection
requirement prior to the sunset period, incumbents have no
corresponding requirement to protect new entrants during this period,
and therefore an overly conservative protection requirement for the
benefit of incumbents may discourage incumbents from negotiating more
lenient limits for new entrants. On the other hand, permitting new
entrants to operate with an overly lenient limit may discourage them
from negotiating with incumbents for more restrictive protections for
the benefit of incumbents. The short-term interference metric the
Commission adopts here strikes the right balance to encourage
coordination among earlier and later-round systems. The Commission
disagrees with assertions that the 0.4 percent absolute increase will
risk investment in U.S. systems by discouraging international systems
from coordinating with U.S. systems. While it is unclear which specific
circumstances are in reference, the Commission reminds both incumbents
and new operators that coordination with the ITU is separate from
coordination within the U.S. and is required of all international
systems under the ITU Radio Regulations. The Commission's rules require
both parties to engage in good faith coordination. Providing an avenue
for meaningful competition by both incumbents and new entrants will
encourage both sides to agree upon any more specific, mutual protection
measures during coordination.
The Commission is not persuaded by alternative proposals. The
Commission disagrees with the proposed 0.01 percent or lower threshold
advocated by Viasat. Unlike the 0.4 percent absolute increase in
unavailability metric, which the SpaceX Monte Carlo study in the record
indicates is achievable for several modeled second-round systems, there
is no evidence in the record from proponents of a 0.01 percent or lower
threshold showing that it is achievable and provides for competitive
new entry. And while a 0.1 percent limit would accommodate most second-
round system links analyzed in the SpaceX study, a 0.4 percent limit
will provide greater opportunities for new entry while still providing
adequate protection of incumbent systems due to the conservative
assumptions incorporated into the standard and the calculation of
increase in unavailability and at the same time providing incentives
for good faith coordination. Stricter limits for particular links can,
of course, be agreed in coordination. The SpaceX study indicates 0.4
percent to be the upper limit in the studied cases in both uplink and
downlink, and accommodates user terminals and gateway earth stations.
Indeed, the Commission notes that Kuiper's initial study, which
proposes the 0.1 percent limit, uses the SpaceX study as partial
justification for its chosen interference limit and nonetheless
acknowledges that ``SpaceX's justification for a higher [0.4 percent]
threshold has merit.'' Further, Kuiper has since advocated for the
Commission to adopt a threshold within the 0.1 and 0.4 percent range as
proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, respectively, noting that these
proposals represent a reasonable range that balances competing
interests and incentives.
The Commission also does not agree with O3b and Intelsat that their
proposals to create a variable, sliding-scale metric for absolute
increase in unavailability would better serve the Commission's goals
than the adoption of a 0.4 percent absolute increase in link
unavailability metric at a C/N threshold of 0 dB. As an initial matter,
both the O3b and Intelsat formulae appear to be based on the protection
of only a narrow set of systems. In addition, the Commission disagrees
with O3b's claim that the proposed formula would not impose additional
complications on operators compared to an established absolute
threshold value. Incorporating a variable, sliding-scale short-term
interference metric would be more burdensome for later round systems to
implement considering that detailed information of the incumbent
system, including the receiver characteristics, would be required in
order to calculate the baseline availability required by the sliding-
scale formula. Absent cooperation from the operator of the incumbent
system, it would be difficult to obtain this information, particularly
for new entrants. The Commission does not find the alleged benefits of
this approach as compared to a non-variable metric outweigh these
burdens. Given the conservative assumptions in the analysis itself, the
Commission is also concerned that O3b and Intelsat's more stringent
formulae may unnecessarily restrict competitive new entry. O3b and
Intelsat's principal objection to the use of a single 0.4 percent
absolute value is that it would create a more noticeable impact on
customers served by higher availability links than on those served by
lower availability links. However, it is precisely a concern about the
overprotection of high availability links that has driven the general
consensus on the record towards using an absolute metric of increase in
unavailability, rather than a relative metric.
Moreover, O3b's assumed baseline availability rates of the
incumbent system may be higher on paper than in reality, to the extent
O3b excludes from the baseline the effects of other existing sources of
interference, such as interference from GSO networks, other NGSO
systems, and intra-system noise. Accordingly, the relative impact on
high availability links may be overstated. In addition, while O3b
argues that a 0.4 percent absolute increase in unavailability metric
would ``make it impossible for operators to guarantee a defined quality
of service to their customers'' because of the additive effect of
short-term interference from multiple later-round systems, the
potential for aggregate interference is not limited to the use of this
value and would exist under O3b's formula as well. Further, just as the
Commission expects the real-world impact of a later-round system
complying with the 0.4
[[Page 100904]]
percent increase in unavailability limit to be less than 0.4 percent in
many cases, given the conservative assumptions in the analysis noted
above, the Commission similarly expects that any cumulative, real-world
effects of two or more later-round systems will likely be less than a
simple multiplication of the 0.4 percent limit by the number of later-
round interferers that O3b assumes because it fails to account for
mitigation techniques or other spectrum-sharing measures that may be
applied by the NGSO FSS systems and reduce their overall aggregate
impact.
While O3b also argues that a 0.4 percent increase in unavailability
limit would ``eliminate later round systems' incentive to coordinate''
because all links in the SpaceX study can be accommodated under this
short-term limit, other links or parameters not included in the SpaceX
study, some of which O3b points out, might exceed the 0.4 percent
short-term limit. In any event, O3b itself notes that not all links in
the SpaceX study meet the 3 percent degraded throughput long-term limit
the Commission adopts above. Cases where a later-round system cannot
meet either the short-term or long-term limit will encourage the later-
round operator to complete coordination with the incumbent operator.
Later-round operators will also be incentivized to coordinate in order
to potentially receive some protection, or accommodation, from earlier-
round operators. Further, the 10-year sunset period the Commission
adopted in the Report and Order ensures that earlier-round systems and
later-round systems will be treated on an equal basis after the sunset
period, and any compatibility analyses will no longer permit the later-
round system to operate in cases where it would exceed the default
spectrum-splitting mechanism in Sec. 25.261(c). Accordingly, later-
round system operators will have several incentives to complete
coordination with earlier-round operators. Moreover, Sec. 25.261(b) of
the Commission's rules requires NGSO FSS licensees and market access
recipients to coordinate in good faith the use of commonly authorized
frequencies regardless of their processing round status.
To the extent an incumbent wishes to ensure the highest
availability for particular use cases, such as when offering its
services to government or enterprise customers, it may discuss such
particular uses during coordination with new entrants and new entrants
will have several incentives to complete the coordination. The
Commission has expressly recognized that the physical realities of
interference in spectrum-based services should guide both system design
and reasonable expectations of operation. The likelihood of harmful
interference should be assessed under a range of operating conditions.
Further, the Commission has encouraged operators, and specifically NGSO
FSS operators, to design systems for a shared and dynamic operating
environment and plan to manage potential interference in such dynamic
environments. Operators providing important communications with 99.5
percent or greater service availability require systems equipped with
redundancy to compensate for potential short-term impacts caused by
inline events. The Commission has detailed best practices for satellite
operator emergency planning and preparedness with specific
recommendations to determine system resiliency and redundancy. To the
extent operators have concerns about protecting particular types of
links operating in the non-federal FSS, such as those they may be
offering to government or enterprise customers, such concerns are best
addressed in coordination agreements rather than in a non-federal
spectrum sharing framework.
In addition, the Commission does not agree with O3b that a 0.4
percent value ``subvert[s] the purpose of the processing round
framework'' because it is higher than the spectrum-splitting trigger,
which O3b calculates for its system would be between 0.01 and 0.04
percent absolute increase in unavailability. Although it is possible
for a very small number of links of the earlier-round systems in which
the [Delta]T/T of 6 percent (I/N of -12.2 dB) (the trigger for
coordination among systems in the same processing round) may be
exceeded, such exceedance would be limited in terms of the number of
links affected and the length of time. The Commission is not convinced
that such short-term impact would be significant on the earlier round
systems. The short-term protection criteria the Commission adopts here
is a unilateral protection of earlier-round systems by later-round
systems and does not require any reduction in spectrum usage or other
operational changes by the earlier-round system. In contrast, exceeding
the more sensitive trigger for spectrum-splitting in Sec. 25.261(c)
for systems approved in the same processing round creates a mutual
obligation for both systems to split their commonly authorized
frequencies for the duration of the potential interference event.
Nevertheless, for links of an earlier-round system in which the
[Delta]T/T is 6 percent or greater, later-round systems are required to
coordinate with the earlier-round systems of these links prior to
commencing operation.
The Commission is further not persuaded by calls to seek comment on
the short-term interference metric through a second further notice of
proposed rulemaking. The Further Notice sought comment on setting a
short-term interference metric. In response to the Further Notice,
interested parties have had ample opportunity to comment on all
proposals, as illustrated by their record submissions. Adopting a
specific limit for increase in unavailability, rather than adopting no
limit or deferring the issue to a later time as some commenters
advocate, will result in a more complete set of required interference
metrics applicable to an inter-round compatibility analysis and
therefore will provide greater regulatory certainty to earlier-round
operators and later-round operators. Conversely, not adopting any
specific acceptable short-term interference threshold or deferring the
issue to a later time would deprive new entrants of the certainty that
they can provide some level of service without the agreement of an
earlier-round operator. The SpaceX study indicates 0.4 percent to be
the upper limit in the studied cases in both uplink and downlink, and
accommodates user terminals and gateway earth stations. Stricter limits
for particular links can, of course, be agreed in coordination.
Therefore, the Commission concludes an absolute increase in
unavailability value of 0.4 percent at a C/N threshold of 0 dB will
appropriately balance the Commission's goals of providing regulatory
certainty for, and adequate protection of, incumbent systems while at
the same time ensuring competitive new entry and encouraging
coordination among NGSO FSS operators.
3. Minimum Link Availability
Further Notice and Comments. In conjunction with the Commission's
consideration of long-term and short-term interference criteria,
SpaceX, on the basis of its study of several 2016 processing-round and
2020 processing-round systems, proposes that the Commission adopt a
99.0 percent link availability without the interferer at a C/N
threshold of 0 dB as a minimum benchmark for an earlier-round system to
show it merits the backstop levels of short-term and long-term
interference protection from a later-round system that the Commission
is considering. SpaceX states this minimum benchmark indicates a well-
designed, efficient
[[Page 100905]]
earlier-round NGSO system with a robust signal-to-noise ratio and that
all first-round links studied by SpaceX achieved this minimum
benchmark, except one link at 98.7 percent. Requiring a minimum 99.0
percent link availability, SpaceX argues, would prevent an incumbent
whose publicly-available information shows its link achieves a 99.9
percent link availability at a C/N threshold of 0 dB, for example, from
claiming that it can actually achieve only a 90 percent link
availability at that threshold. Such a claim would tend to exaggerate
the extent to which the earlier round system is susceptible to
interference from every second-round system. SpaceX also contends that
a rule requiring a first-round system to show a 99.0 percent link
availability without the interferer at a C/N threshold of 0 dB
incentivizes efficient spectrum sharing through coordination, since ``a
first-round system that cannot achieve this minimum benchmark level of
performance on a given link--indicating its inefficient use of
spectrum--would have to coordinate with the second-round system to
determine a more efficient spectrum sharing arrangement.'' O3b, in
proposing its increase in unavailability threshold formula, supports
protection of links with baseline availabilities as low as 97 percent,
and argues the SpaceX proposal would unfairly provide no protection for
links with lower baseline availability levels that meet the needs of
customers with a higher interference tolerance.
Decision. The Commission agrees with SpaceX that an inefficient
incumbent system design should not unreasonably hamper future entry.
Further, the Commission has reviewed the SpaceX study and finds that
the data, assumptions, and methodology employed are reasonable and note
that, although O3b has commented that the study could be expanded upon
using different system parameters, no commenter objects to the data,
assumptions, or methodology SpaceX used. While O3b's formula shows
protection of links with baseline availabilities as low as 97 percent,
its formula inherently recognizes that lower performing links should
receive less protection and does not specifically justify or
technically support requiring protection of links below 99.0 percent
availability. Rather, the Commission concurs with SpaceX that a 99.0
percent link availability without the interferer at a C/N threshold of
0 dB is a reasonable minimum benchmark to guard against the risk of
low-performing incumbent links. The Commission therefore will require
this benchmark as a minimum value to be incorporated into an inter-
round compatibility showing to demonstrate compliance with the long-
term and short-term interference metrics adopted above.
4. Additional Interference Metrics
i. Loss of Synchronization
Further Notice. The Further Notice also asked whether additional
means are needed to protect earlier-round systems against loss of
synchronization due to potentially high levels of short-term
interference.
Comments. Most commenters on this issue oppose including additional
criteria to protect against loss of synchronization. Telesat argues
that doing so is unnecessary because in modern satellite systems the
concept of link unavailability also protects against the loss of
synchronization as long as an appropriate C/N objective is chosen.
Kuiper states that including such a protection criteria would undermine
incentives for a resilient design of modems and receivers and result in
a less efficient spectrum sharing framework. Kuiper additionally
maintains that any issues an incumbent may have regarding
synchronization loss is best addressed in good-faith coordination with
new entrants. Commenters also note that information on the particular
modems used by incumbents, which is required to determine a protection
criteria necessary to prevent loss of synchronization for a particular
system, is not typically disclosed in domestic or international
filings. Kuiper suggests the appropriate way to address particularized
interference concerns of a given incumbent is not through systematic
changes to the methodology but instead through operator-to-operator
coordination.
Two commenters support requiring later-round operators to
specifically protect against an incumbent's loss of synchronization,
arguing that consideration of loss of synchronization does not render
analyses overly complex, and that when information has been shared
pursuant to good-faith coordination, the consideration of these
additional metrics is straightforward and can ensure protection of a
variety of NGSO system designs and service characteristics. OneWeb also
argues the Commission should account for short-term degraded throughput
events where an operator may experience high levels of degradation
causing a modem to lose synchronization or suffer other critical
errors. OneWeb argues that loss of synchronization should be a required
metric in any compatibility showing to ensure that operators have a
complete picture of the interference environment if operators cannot
achieve a coordination agreement.
Decision. The Commission declines to mandate new entrants protect
incumbent systems against loss of synchronization, or incorporate a
short-term degraded throughput metric, beyond the protections afforded
by the long-term and short-term interference protection criteria the
Commission adopts above. The Commission agrees with commenters who
argue that doing so would risk incentivizing inefficient system
designs, including the choices of modems and receivers that are not
capable of quickly re-establishing synchronization in a shared spectrum
environment. The Commission also agrees with Telesat that doing so is
unnecessary because a limit on the increase in link unavailability also
protects against the loss of synchronization. In addition, requiring
new entrants to meet such protection criteria that are defined solely
by incumbents, to address particular interference sensitivities of
incumbent systems, outside of protections mutually agreed in
coordination, would create uncertainty for new entrants and could
unduly restrain new entry and competition.
ii. Carrier-to-Noise Objectives
Further Notice. The Further Notice sought specific comment on
whether an earlier-round operator should be able to specify two C/N
objectives--one relative to the C/N level below which the victim modem
would lose signal lock with the satellite and another relative to the
C/N level below which the victim link would become unavailable because
it is not able to offer the minimum wanted throughput.
Comments. Several commenters on this issue support the Commission
adopting a single minimum C/N objective relative to link
unavailability, rather than include multiple C/N objectives such as one
below which the victim modem would lose lock. SpaceX proposes the
Commission adopt a reference C/N threshold between -3 dB and 0 dB,
because this range accounts for both real modem performance and the
modulation and coding rates of broadband satellite waveforms within a
reasonable margin. O3b suggests the Commission specify 0 dB as the
standard C/N level to account for the threshold performance that
efficient modems should be capable of achieving. Noting that the
commonly used adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) standard DVB-S2X can
demodulate
[[Page 100906]]
signals with C/N levels as low as -3 dB, Intelsat recommends the
required minimum C/N value should align with ACM standards and should
accurately reflect the earlier NGSO system's requirements.
Several commenters also oppose allowing an incumbent to specify an
additional C/N level below which its modem would lose lock, because
doing so could invite gamesmanship, or otherwise require information on
all of the potential modems and receivers used by the incumbent system,
details of which are not typically available through publicly available
filings. Kuiper argues that accounting for this factor in interference
analyses could undermine incentives for a resilient design of modems
and receivers, whereas rejecting proposals to account for link loss
will require operators that choose designs ill-suited for a shared-
spectrum environment to ``internalize the costs of their decisions.''
O3b, however, argues the Commission should allow an earlier-round
operator to justify a system-specific alternative minimum C/N threshold
by identifying, subject to reasonable explanation and support, the
required C/N level needed to maintain link usability. O3b argues these
C/N values would typically be incorporated into coordination
discussions, so later-round systems should be aware of the earlier-
authorized operators' protection requirements.
Decision. The Commission agrees with the general consensus on the
record that reference C/N threshold values of between -3 dB and 0 dB
are appropriate to account for the performance of efficient, modern
modems and receivers. The Commission will adopt a C/N value of 0 dB
that must be used in a compatibility showing with an earlier-round
system as proposed by O3b and within the ranges supported by SpaceX and
Intelsat as it reflects a reasonable, upper-limit for modern NGSO
systems. The Commission also concludes that allowing an incumbent to
specify an additional C/N level below which the victim modem would lose
lock, if it is more sensitive than this range, could reward inefficient
system designs at the expense of more competitive new entry. The
Commission therefore declines O3b's proposal to require later-round
grantees to demonstrate they will meet any alternative incumbent-
specified C/N level needed to maintain lock. Nonetheless, operators in
coordination will be free to discuss and agree upon the use of other C/
N levels when concluding a coordination agreement that leaves both
parties better off than would operating under any submitted
compatibility showing.
iii. Aggregate Interference
Further Notice. The Further Notice also noted concerns about
aggregate interference from multiple NGSO systems. The Commission
invited comment on whether to set a limit on permissible aggregate
interference from later-round systems into earlier-round systems. The
Commission also asked whether the Commission should expect that there
will be a maximum number of NGSO FSS systems that can be accommodated
in a given frequency band and if so, how that should affect any inter-
round protection criteria and the opening of additional processing
rounds. Finally, the Commission inquired as to how the degraded
throughput methodology should accommodate multiple NGSO systems that
span multiple processing rounds.
Comments. Most commenters on the issue of aggregate interference
limits oppose them as unworkable and unnecessary. Commenters argue that
setting aggregate interference limits is unnecessary for several
reasons. As an initial matter, Mangata argues that the primary concern
with respect to interference between NGSO systems is the occurrence of
inline interference events, and the probability of an inline event
involving multiple NGSO systems, with all the varying constellation
designs and the resulting look angles, is very low. As such, Mangata
contends that per-system limits established in this proceeding will be
sufficient to mitigate any such concerns. Second, commenters argue that
both advances in technology and the use of increasingly higher-
frequency bands should make it possible for more operators to coexist
within a band than is otherwise possible today. Third, commenters argue
that required coordination or spectrum-splitting among later-round
operators should further reduce the expected aggregate interference.
Commenters also argue there is no demonstrated need on the record
to adopt aggregate interference threshold for now. Kuiper notes that,
given the long deployment timelines of NGSO FSS systems, such aggregate
interference would not manifest for years--giving the Commission ample
time to address this issue should it actually arise. Some commenters
therefore recommend the Commission defer consideration of aggregate
interference levels for protecting earlier round systems until there is
more real-world data that can be evaluated to determine the effect of
aggregate interference on individual system operations.
Commenters further state that numerous implementation questions
remain unsettled which would also make it difficult to enforce
aggregate interference criteria, and this uncertainty raises the
question of whether and how the Commission would administer an
aggregate framework for NGSO sharing when the number of potential
systems is perpetually in flux. Indeed, commenters state there is
currently no known basis for any later-round applicant even to measure
aggregate interference that might result from the combined operations
of multiple systems.
Commenters also dispute that establishing aggregate interference
limits is a prerequisite to establishing per-system limits, and further
dispute that per-system limits should be derived by simply dividing the
aggregate limit among the number of later-round systems, because doing
so assumes that each system contributes equally to aggregate
interference. They argue such an assumption ``defies reality'' and
``would significantly overstate actual interference'' because
``cumulative interference could only result where multiple satellites
communicate with earth stations at the same location, with the same
frequency, and at the same time.'' Commenters further note that some
authorized systems may not deploy.
Commenters also raise concerns with adopting an aggregate
interference limit in the context of the Commission's licensing regime
for NGSO FSS systems. SpaceX argues the Commission cannot adopt an
aggregate interference cap under its current processing round framework
because the number of NGSO systems that will deploy in a given
processing round and spectrum band is uncertain and highly variable.
Kuiper contends that, given the Commission has adopted a framework
designed to promote coordination and efficient coexistence, it would be
irrational to adopt an aggregate limit on the assumption that parties
neither coordinate nor take measures to efficiently share spectrum.
Kuiper also suggests that the same arguments raised in favor of an
aggregate cap on interference could be made to cap the number of
applicants in a single processing round, where more applicants in a
processing round can mean reduced spectrum access for any given
licensee required to share spectrum on equal terms with
contemporaneously licensed systems. Intelsat warns that adopting an
aggregate interference cap would be an
[[Page 100907]]
end-run around the purposes of the sunset framework the Commission just
adopted, which are to promote competition and to encourage NGSO
operators to innovate and use spectrum more efficiently.
Importantly, SpaceX warns that ``an aggregate cap on interference
would involve arbitrary line-drawing that risks stifling new NGSO
system entry,'' and numerous other commenters make similar statements.
Instead, these commenters argue that NGSO systems can account for the
total interference environment within their private negotiations, and
that the Commission has determined in other contexts that operators
themselves could account for aggregate interference concerns as a part
of good-faith coordination.
A minority of commenters do express support for the adoption of
aggregate interference limits. OneWeb argues the establishment of
aggregate limits on interference into NGSO FSS systems is a
prerequisite to establishing per-system limits, and that failing to
adopt aggregate limits could result in more systems being authorized
than can reasonably be accommodated. OneWeb suggests the Commission
could accept operators in an initial processing round ``up to'' the
established aggregate limit and, once those systems deploy, or fail to
do so, the Commission could determine the number of additional systems
that can be supported in later processing rounds. Considering
degradation due to rain fade and other sources of interference, OneWeb
argues that an aggregate limit of 2.5 to 3.85 percent time-weighted
average degraded throughput should be given to all NGSO FSS systems.
Viasat suggests the Commission develop aggregate interference
limits by defining the total amount of interference that any individual
NGSO system should be expected to tolerate, then allocating this amount
between different NGSO FSS systems and processing rounds, while
ensuring adequate opportunities for additional market entry. Viasat
argues an acceptable aggregate interference limit, including all
interference sources (NGSO, GSO, and terrestrial), would be less than
0.05 percent. ViaSat notes that aggregate interference limits on NGSO
FSS systems have been adopted to protect GSO networks, though there
remains no mechanism for allocating the overall interference budget
between different NGSO operators.
ITIF suggests the Commission could apply an aggregate limit to
later-round systems, which would be divided equally among the later-
round systems that actually deploy. TechFreedom also argues the
Commission should consider how many NGSO systems a given frequency band
support, but states it is premature to do so based on the current
record.
Decision. The Commission declines to adopt limits on aggregate
interference into an NGSO FSS system. First, there has been no
demonstration of a need for such limits at this time. No second-round
system is required to deploy its full constellation until 2029 at the
earliest. Indeed, some proposed systems may never deploy their
authorized number of satellites, or deploy any satellites at all. Even
if the Commission felt it appropriate to adopt aggregate interference
limits from later-round systems at this time, the Commission agrees
with Kuiper, among others, that unresolved questions remain as to the
derivation of any aggregate limits. The Commission also disagrees with
OneWeb that a simplistic, worst-case assumption of multiplying the
single-entry limit by six operational NGSO FSS systems reflects a
realistic assessment of the interference environment because it fails
to account for mitigation techniques or other spectrum-sharing measures
that may be applied by the NGSO FSS systems and reduce their overall
aggregate impact. Nor does the Commission agree with OneWeb that the
Commission should adopt aggregate interference limits to prevent ``more
operators being granted authorizations to operate in a given band than
can reasonably be accommodated.'' The Commission's experience has shown
that not all authorized systems deploy their fully planned
constellations, if they deploy at all. The recent generation of NGSO
FSS systems has shown to be iterative in nature, with companies filing
for systems in the first and second processing rounds, and using
techniques like adaptive coding and modulation to adapt to changing
spectrum environments. Blocking new entry while the Commission waits to
see which NGSO FSS systems will deploy, out of a fear of future
aggregate interference that may never arise, would artificially and
unreasonably inhibit competition to the benefit of some incumbents but
contrary to the public interest. Should a demonstrated need arise in
the future, the Commission may revisit the question of aggregate
limits. And, of course, operators are free to discuss and agree upon
ways to account for any aggregate interference effects during their
good-faith coordination discussions.
5. Other Sources of Interference in Baseline
Further Notice. The Further Notice invited specific comment on how
to determine the appropriate baseline for the earlier-round system, and
whether it should include existing sources of interference, such as
interference from GSO networks or intra-system interference. The
Commission also inquired whether a degraded throughput methodology
should compare an incumbent's baseline level of performance given only
natural degradation to that same incumbent's expected performance given
only a single new entrant's operations, or whether the comparison
should include the operations of multiple new entrants.
i. GSO Interference
Comments. Most commenters on this issue oppose including GSO
interference in the baseline calculation. Commenters argue that
including additional degradations in the baseline from interference due
to GSO networks could overly complicate the analysis because there is
no standardized model for such interference and no clear way to impute
such interference across all systems given the different approaches
NGSO systems employ to address GSO interference. Commenters also note
that the Commission has set aside certain portions of the Ka-band in
which GSO networks must protect NGSO systems, and argue that
``[e]xisting NGSO operators should not be penalized for being subject
to interference from secondary GSO networks.''
Intelsat, however, supports including GSO interference in the
baseline calculation. Intelsat argues that failing to account for all
noise sources that contribute to the overall noise an NGSO system
experiences will ultimately lead to the overprotection of earlier-round
systems and, as a result, artificially reduce competition among NGSO
satellite services. Intelsat argues the specific level of existing
noise to be accounted for in each frequency range should be as accurate
as possible and based on services deployed in that frequency range,
which will vary depending both on the Commission's rules that apply in
the bands and on the intensity with which the bands are used. While
conceding that GSO noise still needs to be modeled and developed to
ensure that it is accurately represented, Intelsat argues there are
likely baseline metrics that can be used in all or most scenarios to
simulate GSO interference for which NGSO operators must account.
Intelsat suggests the Commission need not define the metric
[[Page 100908]]
for inter-system interference from existing GSO systems because the
party conducting the analysis can determine whether to include this
element and provide any necessary justification for that choice.
Decision. The Commission declines to incorporate GSO interference
into the baseline. The Commission acknowledges that omitting existing
sources of interference in the baseline, such as GSO interference, will
tend to underestimate the interference experienced by an incumbent.
However, the Commission disagrees with Intelsat that parties should be
able to create and use their own metric for GSO interference affecting
the incumbent's baseline in order to ease their burden of demonstrating
compliance with the required interference limits. The Commission is
concerned that Intelsat's proposal, in the absence of an agreed model
or clear way to impute such interference across all NGSO FSS systems,
and the need to carefully consider GSO deployments and regulatory
frameworks in different frequency bands, would create unnecessary
disputes that would be time-consuming for Commission staff to assess
and strain the Commission's limited resources. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that any alleged benefit of incorporating GSO
interference into the baseline does not outweigh the burdens on parties
and Commission staff in determining the appropriate way to incorporate
such interference at this time. Parties are free to explore such
interference effects during the detailed information sharing and
discussions that accompany good-faith coordination among NGSO FSS
operators, and which, the Commission finds, ultimately lead to the most
efficient use of spectrum by the concerned operators.
ii. Intra-System Interference
Comments. Most commenters on this issue also oppose including
intra-system interference in the baseline. These commenters state that
satellite operators do not routinely disclose how they mitigate intra-
system interference because such mitigation techniques have little to
no impact on the operations of other constellations, may be
competitively sensitive, and change with user needs. Kuiper argues that
requiring consideration of intra-system interference would either leave
new entrants to guess how each incumbent addresses intra-system
interference, inviting inaccuracy and dispute, or necessitate an
unnecessary and potentially intrusive mandate to share such
information. Kuiper suggests that an administrable degraded throughput
methodology is likely to omit several existing noise sources, such as
intra-system interference and interference from other NGSO FSS
operators, given the practical difficulties of faithfully incorporating
such factors into the analysis.
Intelsat, however, again argues that the earlier-round system's
performance baseline should consider all realistic sources of noise
degradation, including intra-system degradations. Intelsat contends
that intra-system interference and non-time-varying sources could be
standardized to a single value, and notes that ITU Resolution 770 uses
1 dB of margin to account for these cases. Intelsat asserts that intra-
system noise is a critical factor that should be included in
compatibility analyses and argues there is no technical reason not to
account for intra-system noise as a realistic assumption that would
improve sharing among NGSOs.
Decision. The Commission declines to incorporate intra-system
interference into the baseline. Given that information on intra-system
interference changes with user needs, the Commission is concerned that
incorporating such interference into the baseline would create
additional disputes between parties, and burdens on the Commission's
limited staff resources in resolving those disputes, in the absence of
a clear way to incorporate such interference into the baseline.
Further, the record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether
the 1 dB margin used to account for intra-system interference and non-
time-varying sources with respect to interference into GSO networks in
V-band under ITU Resolution 770 would be appropriate to systems in
other frequency bands. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that any
alleged benefit of incorporating intra-system interference into the
baseline does not outweigh the burdens on parties and Commission staff
in determining the appropriate way to incorporate such interference at
this time. Parties in coordination are free to explore such
interference effects during their detailed information sharing and
discussions.
iii. Interference From Other NGSO FSS Systems
Comments. The only specific comments on this issue supported
comparing an incumbent's baseline against its expected performance
given the operations of a single (rather than multiple) new entrant. In
particular, Kuiper argues that, while accounting for the noise
environment an incumbent faces because of other incumbent NGSO FSS
operators may make the analysis more accurate, the burden of increased
complexity outweighs any benefit of this accuracy. Rather, Kuiper
argues the Commission should follow the path taken by satellite
operators in coordination--to model only the incumbent and new
entrant's systems. Kuiper states that instead of ignoring interference
from other NGSO FSS systems, the Commission can account for it when
establishing an interference threshold and recognize that excluding
this interference makes any threshold that it adopts more conservative
and protective than it appears.
Decision. The Commission declines to require compatibility analyses
to include effects of multiple NGSO FSS systems in the baseline
interference of the incumbent system because doing so could create
uncertainty and disputes, with accompanying strain on the Commission's
limited staff resources to assess those disputes, as to which
additional NGSO FSS systems should be considered in a given analysis
and how their effects should be incorporated in the analysis.
Accordingly, the Commission conclude that any alleged benefit of
incorporating interference from multiple NGSO FSS systems into the
baseline does not outweigh the burdens on parties and Commission staff
in determining the appropriate way to incorporate such interference at
this time. Although including this interference is not common in
operator's own coordination discussions, parties in coordination are
free to explore such interference effects during their detailed
information sharing and discussions.
6. Rain Attenuation
Further Notice. The Commission also asked how rain fade conditions
in different locations should be incorporated into the degraded
throughput analysis, how many locations should be evaluated, and
whether any locations should include sites outside the United States.
Comments. Most commenters on this issue support using three
geographically diverse locations within the United States for
application of a rain attenuation standard, one for each of low, medium
and high rain rates. These commenters assert that using three data
points will provide sufficient scope for an interference assessment,
while at the same time not demanding an analysis that could become
unwieldly with an excessive number of data points. SpaceX contends that
these locations should reflect the actual deployments of earlier-round
systems and, where possible, rely on locations that operators
[[Page 100909]]
jointly establish in good-faith coordination.
Intelsat argues that four to five sites located within the United
States in representative geographic areas with different rain rates
``should suffice.'' O3b proposes that the Commission require parties to
employ at least four different latitudes between 10 degrees and 70
degrees North Latitude as test points in the analysis and consider a
range of rain conditions at each latitude.
Additionally, several commenters recommend that the Commission
require operators to use a common rain-attenuation model that
references attenuation characteristics from the latest versions of
Recommendations ITU-R P.618 and P.676.
SpaceX also argues that the Commission should standardize the rain
fade conditions that represent the low, medium, and high rain
attenuation conditions for NGSO system deployments, and proposes to
define low rain areas as having <=30 mm/hr, moderate rain areas as
having 40-50 mm/hr, and high rain areas as having >=80 mm/hr. O3b
similarly suggests rain rates for 0.01 percent of an average year that
vary between dry (20-30 millimeters/hour) to wet (up to 80 millimeters/
hour).
Finally, Intelsat argues that, to account for other link losses,
the Commission should either calculate the non-precipitation impairment
values using the methodology specified in Recommendation ITU-R P.618 or
use a standardized approach to these additional degradations.
Decision. The Commission declines to mandate specific rain fade
assumptions to be used in an inter-round compatibility analysis.
Rather, the Commission will assess rain fade assumptions on a case-by-
case basis as to whether they are reliable and representative. While
the Commission concludes based upon review of the record that inter-
round compatibility analyses with three geographically diverse
locations at various latitudes within the United States may be
sufficient in many cases for application of a rain attenuation standard
(one for each of low, medium and high rain rates), the Commission will
assess rain fade assumptions, including the number of locations, on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether they are reliable and
representative.
The Commission agrees with the majority of commenters on this issue
that three locations would typically provide sufficient scope for the
analysis without overburdening it because three locations will allow
for the selection of sites with each of low, medium, and high rain
rates. But regardless of the number of locations assumed (whether three
or more or less than three), the operator submitting an inter-round
compatibility analysis must demonstrate that the number of locations
assumed is reliable and representative given the assumed operations of
the earlier-round system. For example, if an earlier-round system
operated only in a geographically limited area, such as at high
latitudes, then a later-round operator might reasonably use location
and rain fade assumptions that reflect the actual service area of the
earlier-round system even if less than three locations. Similarly, to
ensure the most accurate modeling, these locations can reflect the
actual coverage of earlier-round systems and, where possible, rely on
locations that operators jointly establish in good-faith coordination
discussions.
The Commission will also assess the rain attenuation model used in
an inter-round compatibility analysis on a case-by-case basis as to
whether it is reliable and representative. As an illustrative example,
a party preparing an inter-round protection showing may model rain
attenuation as per the current versions of ITU-R Recommendations P.618-
14 and P.676-13, as recommended by commenters, and specify the rain
fade conditions that represent the low, medium, and high rain
attenuation conditions for NGSO system deployments, with rain rates for
0.01 percent of an average year in low rain areas as <=30 mm/hr, in
moderate rain areas as 40-50 mm/hr, and in high rain areas as >=80 mm/
hr. The Commission will assess such rain fade assumptions on a case-by-
case basis as to whether they are reliable and representative. Finally,
as an illustrative example, a party might use Recommendation ITU-R
P.618 to account for other link losses and will assess its
appropriateness on a case-by-case basis, considering how these other
link losses are treated in coordination and similar contexts and their
particular applicability to the cases studied.
7. Standardized Parameters
Further Notice. The Further Notice inquired as to whether the
Commission should use standardized antenna patterns and noise
temperatures for the computation of C/(I+N) in a degraded throughput
method.
Comments. Commenters supporting standardized parameters argue that
the Commission should allow later-round applicants to use certain
default system parameters for earlier-round applicants that reflect a
baseline of accepted system performance, below which the earlier-round
applicant should not be entitled to protection.
SpaceX argues that establishing default parameter values will
ensure that compatibility showings uniformly implement the best
practices of efficient NGSO systems when the parties and the Commission
lack access to operational information. SpaceX also argues that default
parameter values will give notice to operators that any sharing
framework will not accommodate filings or system designs that are based
on inefficiencies intended to block competition.
Intelsat also argues the Commission should also adopt or clarify
the nominal or standard earth station parameters that should be used
where the information is not provided in the operator's authorization
and not already provided for in the Commission's rules.
Commenters propose specific operational assumptions the Commission
could standardize, including: assuming earth stations from the victim
and the interfering systems are collocated for both uplink and downlink
cases; considering satellite beams of the selected satellites as
pointing toward the earth station location in both uplink and downlink
cases; for uplink cases, considering only one interferer location at
each time step; and implementing one-second time step durations in the
analysis.
Intelsat further proposes that, absent information on an
incumbent's tracking strategy, later-round grantees should default to
using random selection as the tracking strategy to determine the
available satellites that meet other operational parameters such as
minimum elevation angle, GSO exclusion angle, and Nco (the maximum
number of beams which can be illuminated simultaneously in the
polarization considered).
SpaceX recommends reference parameters for downlinks and uplinks
that operators should use when operational information is missing or
incomplete. As standardized downlink parameters, SpaceX proposes an
earth station receive noise temperature of 200K and satellite antenna
patterns contained in Recommendation ITU-R S.1528. As standardized
uplink parameters, SpaceX proposes a satellite receive noise
temperature of 500K, earth station antenna diameters of 2.4m (gateway)
and 1.0m (user terminal), and earth station antenna patterns contained
in the ITU Radio Regulations Appendix 8, Annex 3.
Intelsat also suggests the Commission should standardize the method
and waveform used for the conversion from C/N values to spectral
efficiency, and
[[Page 100910]]
suggests using the method defined in Section 2.3 of the Annex of
Recommendation ITU-R S.2131-1, which considers a DVB-S2X waveform and
is widely used in the satellite industry.
OneWeb, however, opposes making use of standardized parameters,
arguing that the parameters for NGSO FSS systems vary widely and
default NGSO system or earth station parameters are unlikely to
effectively protect incumbent operators. In particular, OneWeb
disagrees with considering only collocated earth stations. OneWeb
asserts that this is an oversimplification and that aggregate
interference of multiple stations within the same interfering system
also needs to be addressed. Additionally, OneWeb opposes a standardized
practice of considering only one interferer location at each time step,
claiming that the interference potential could be underestimated if
multiple earth stations are not accounted for and that earth station
deployment models can be addressed in detailed coordination.
Decision. The Commission declines to mandate specific parameters
and assumptions to be used in an inter-round compatibility analysis.
Rather, the Commission will assess these parameters and assumptions on
a case-by-case basis as to whether they are reliable and
representative. To facilitate the work of new entrants in preparing the
showings and Commission staff and incumbents in reviewing them, the
Commission lists below illustrative examples of parameters and
assumptions that operators might consider using in any necessary
compatibility showings:
(1) assume earth stations from the victim and the interfering
systems are collocated for both uplink and downlink cases;
(2) consider satellite beams of the selected satellites as pointing
toward the earth station location in both uplink and downlink cases;
(3) for uplink cases, consider only one interferer location at each
time step;
(4) implement one-second time step durations in the analysis;
(5) use of the method and waveform for the conversion from C/N
values to spectral efficiency method defined in Section 2.3 of the
Annex of Recommendation ITU-R S.2131-1;
(6) assume earth station antenna diameters of 2.4m (gateway) and
1.0m (user terminal);
(7) use the earth station antenna patterns contained in the ITU
Radio Regulations Appendix 8, Annex 3;
(8) assume an earth station receive noise temperature of 200K;
(9) use the satellite antenna patterns contained in Recommendation
ITU-R S.1528;
(10) assume a satellite receive noise temperature of 500K; and
(11) assume random selection as the tracking strategy to determine
the available satellites that meet other operational parameters such as
minimum elevation angle, GSO exclusion angle, and Nco.
The Commission concludes that providing these illustrative examples
of parameters and methodological approaches could make the preparation
and review of compatibility analyses less burdensome and could avert
unnecessary disputes among operators. The Commission emphasizes,
however, that the Commission will assess these parameters and
assumptions on a case-by-case basis as to whether they are reliable and
representative, including by considering any alternative publicly
available information or information that the incumbent provides during
operator-to-operator coordination and any justifications raised by the
parties. For example, the Commission will assess on a case-by-case
basis whether it is appropriate for parties to assume that earth
stations are collocated and to consider only one interferer location at
each time step, including as it may be necessary due to the absence of
detailed earth station deployment models and satellite receiving beams
layout. The Commission believes that a case-by-case approach, in
combination with the list of illustrative example parameters above
taken from the record, will provide parties appropriate flexibility in
tailoring their analyses while facilitating the preparation of these
analyses by new entrants.
8. Use of Information Gained Through Coordination
Further Notice. The Further Notice sought comment on what other
technical data is needed to appropriately evaluate degraded throughput
effects, and how the Commission can ensure that any degraded throughput
analysis appropriately protects the specific characteristics of an NGSO
system's operations, including what role Schedule S information should
play in the analysis.
Comments. Commenters agree that as part of the good faith
coordination among NGSO FSS operators required by the Commission,
operators share technical and operational information about their
systems, which is a better reflection of their actual or planned
operations than can be drawn solely from information in the public
record. Commenters therefore support the Commission allowing later-
round operators to use operational information gained during
coordination to enhance the accuracy of their compatibility showings
with an earlier-round system, and to submit such showings to the
Commission on a confidential basis, allowing the earlier-round operator
to review the showing to ensure the information exchanged in good-faith
coordination is properly represented and analyzed while preventing
competing operators from viewing potentially commercially sensitive
operational data.
Commenters disagree, however, on whether later-round operators
should be required to use more realistic operational information gained
during coordination in their compatibility showings whenever possible,
or whether later-round operators should have the choice of using either
public or private data on the earlier-round system. Both sides raise
the prospect of gamesmanship--if there is a requirement to use private
data, the earlier-round operator could selectively provide system
details that make it appear more sensitive to interference while
omitting details that could facilitate sharing; while if there is the
option, but no requirement, a later-round could choose any combination
of public or private information to ease its compatibility showing,
even public information that, commenters agree, may not reflect actual
operations. Kuiper argues that, if later-round systems are given the
option of using public or private information, the earlier-round
operator will still have the opportunity to review the showing and
comment on the appropriateness of the parameters used. SpaceX also
notes that later-round operators may need to disclose confidential
parameters in any compatibility studies before the Commission to show
compliance with backstop interference values, supporting the disclosure
of parameters as needed to maximize efficient spectrum sharing.
Decision. The Commission agrees with commenters that the use of
operational information shared during coordination should enhance the
accuracy of compatibility showings, and will allow later-round
operators to base their analyses on such information to the extent it
is available and permitted by the incumbent operator to be reflected in
a compatibility analysis submitted to the Commission. Analyses based on
operational information shared during coordination may be submitted on
a confidential basis when satisfying the requirements of the
Commission's confidentiality rules (assuming the
[[Page 100911]]
incumbent operator has permitted this information to be reflected in a
compatibility analysis). However, the Commission agrees with Kuiper
that later-round operators should have the flexibility to use publicly
available parameters of the earlier-round system, even if alternative
parameters are provided in coordination, and to justify that decision
when submitting a compatibility analysis. The Commission will assess
the use of publicly available information in these instances on a case-
by-case basis to determine if the analysis is adequately representative
of the earlier-round system, considering as well any arguments that the
later-round operator has selectively used publicly available
information to its advantage to ease its protection showing. In
addition, because the incumbent's privately shared operational data may
be used in a compatibility analysis submitted to the Commission only if
it consents to such use, the Commission does not believe that allowing
use of such data will disincentivize information sharing during
coordination, especially where the incumbent`s consent may be
contingent upon sharing the information on a confidential basis.
9. Incorporation of Deployment Milestones Into Compatibility Analyses
Comments. Several commenters note that when the operator of a
later-round NGSO FSS system is preparing a compatibility showing for an
earlier-round system, the earlier-round system may not yet be fully
deployed and, indeed, may never fully deploy or deploy at all.
Commenters argue that later-round operators should be given the
flexibility to provide compatibility analyses based either on the
number of satellites at the 50 or 100 percent deployment milestones of
the earlier-round system, whichever has yet to be achieved, or on the
``number of satellites actually deployed'' and operating. Commenters
suggest that later-round operators should not be held to the parameters
of such showings before the actual deployment of the earlier-round
system, and that later-round operators should be able to update their
showings to account for later deployments, if not accounted for in the
initial analysis.
SpaceX, for example, argues that accounting for milestone
requirements in compatibility analyses would better reflect the
operational realities of NGSO systems and better calibrate the need for
regulatory certainty with opportunities for new entry. SpaceX also
argues that accounting for deployment milestones in compatibility
showings better accommodates the interference risk to earlier-round
systems as they grow and change, given that NGSO operators frequently
file modifications as they build out systems that differ from those
initially authorized. SpaceX further asserts that by emphasizing the
deployment milestone requirements, the Commission can encourage
earlier-round systems to share higher-fidelity information about their
near-term deployment plans for new satellite launches to ensure
protection for those satellites.
Decision. The Commission agrees that later-round NGSO FSS operators
should not be restrained by a requirement to protect not yet deployed
earlier-round systems. At the same time, the Commission is cautious
about permitting compatibility analyses considering solely the number
of deployed satellites at a given time, which may need to be updated
with each subsequent launch of an earlier-round system and consume
unnecessary resources for the earlier-round operator, and Commission
staff to review. Therefore, the Commission will permit compatibility
analyses to consider only the deployment configuration of the earlier-
round system at the six-year, 50 percent milestone if this milestone
has not yet been met. If the 50 percent deployment milestone has been
met, compatibility analyses must consider the fully deployed system. In
the event the earlier-round system misses a milestone and its
authorization is automatically reduced to the number of satellites
deployed on the date of the missed milestone, compatibility analyses
need only consider the number of actually deployed satellites.
10. Mitigation Techniques
Further Notice. The Further Notice also asked what mitigation
techniques would be appropriate for a later-round system to implement
in the event that any protection criteria were not otherwise satisfied
in a compatibility showing.
Comments. Commenters on this issue agree that the Commission should
not limit the mitigation techniques available to a new entrant where
its constellation would otherwise exceed the interference thresholds,
though some commenters specifically note that, once an operator commits
to using certain mitigation techniques, it should be held to that
commitment through licensing conditions.
Decision. The Commission concurs that elaborating a list of
appropriate mitigation techniques could unnecessarily restrict operator
flexibility and spectral efficiency, and therefore will not limit the
potential mitigation techniques that can be employed. Further, the
Commission agrees that, when mitigation techniques are used as a basis
for demonstrating compatibility with an earlier-round system, the
later-round system will be required to employ those mitigation
techniques to the extent necessary to protect the earlier-round
system's actual operations.
11. Timing of Acceptance of Compatibility Showings
Comments. Some commenters argue that the Commission should refuse
to accept a compatibility showing from a later-round operator until the
operator makes a ``valid prior coordination attempt'' with the earlier-
round operator, or until ``after coordination has failed.'' Mangata
notes that the Commission's rules already require good faith
coordination among all NGSO FSS grantees and argues the Commission
``need not exclude valid degraded throughput analyses to enforce
coordination since engaging in such coordination efforts is already
required.''
Decision. The Commission declines to adopt any limit on when a
later-round NGSO FSS grantee may submit an inter-round compatibility
analysis based on the state of its coordination with an earlier-round
operator. Later-round grantees are under an obligation to coordinate in
good faith with other NGSO FSS operators, before and after submission
of any compatibility showings. The Commission does not believe it would
be productive to codify, and potentially adjudicate, a requirement that
later-round operators coordinate ``enough'' before the Commission will
review a demonstration that their operations will be compatible with an
earlier-round operator. Rather, to the extent earlier-round operators
may be concerned that its operational data will not be used in the
compatibility showing, they may affirmatively reach out to provide such
information and, a later-round grantee may not refuse such an offer
consistent with its obligation to coordinate in good faith.
12. Post-Sunset Sharing Regime
Further Notice. When adopting a sunset period to accompany the new
inter-round protection requirement in the Report and Order, the
Commission determined that, after sunset, new entrants will be subject
to co-equal spectrum sharing with incumbents. In the absence of a
coordination agreement, this is accomplished through spectrum-splitting
when the [Delta]T/T of 6 percent threshold is exceeded. Nonetheless,
the Further Notice sought
[[Page 100912]]
additional comment on what criteria should be applied among NGSO
systems after the sunset period.
Comments. Most commenters on this issue support the Commission's
initial decision in the Report and Order to apply the default spectrum-
splitting procedure between earlier and later-round systems after
sunsetting occurs. They argue that placing parties on an equal footing
under the Commission's default spectrum-splitting rules represents the
simplest and most reasonable approach to sunsetting, that alternatives
to spectrum splitting do not have a similar ability to incentivize both
sides to reach a coordination agreement, and that not applying the
spectrum-splitting rules equally after sunset would perpetuate a
stratified spectrum-sharing regime that gives incumbents a permanent
advantage over later-round grantees.
SpaceX, which supports applying the Commission's default spectrum-
splitting procedure after the sunset date, nonetheless argues that the
Commission should ensure that systems with deployment milestones after
the sunset date do not avoid good-faith coordination simply because
their deployment commitments extend into the post-sunset regime. While
SpaceX supports applying the Commission's default spectrum-splitting
procedure after the sunset date, it proposes a revision to the
procedure to reward the more efficient system with the first choice in
a spectrum split, and to apply this backstop both to systems within the
same processing round and to different-round systems after protections
sunset.
Telesat asks the Commission to defer consideration of any revisions
of the current regime until a later date, when the Commission has
gained more experience in understanding how NGSO systems can coexist.
ViaSat, SpaceX, and OneWeb reiterate earlier arguments that the
Commission should revise the default spectrum-splitting mechanism as it
applies to systems authorized in the same processing round, but do not
argue that a different sharing regime should apply between earlier and
later-round systems following sunset. OneWeb also argues the Commission
should lengthen the sunset period for later-round operators until they
have deployed their full systems, and only after consider applying the
same metrics between prior-round operators and later-round operators.
Decision. The Commission reaffirms the decision in the Report and
Order to place earlier and later-round operators on an equal footing
after the sunset date by applying the default, spectrum-splitting
mechanism to both sets of operators at that time. Doing so ensures that
earlier-round advantages do not continue indefinitely, and simplifies
the regulatory framework when systems authorized through multiple
processing rounds may be operating. However, the Commission declines to
adopt proposed changes to the default, spectrum-splitting mechanism
itself, as applied to systems within a processing round, because such
changes are beyond the scope of this proceeding. Further, the
Commission notes that no commenter advocates different treatment of
later-round operators post-sunset than among earlier-round operators.
Indeed, the equality of treatment of later-round operators after the
sunset date is a key component of the sunset provision. And while the
proposal to lengthen the sunset period for certain operators is also
beyond the scope of the Further Notice's inquiry, the Commission
retains the authority to enforce its good-faith coordination
requirement in cases where a later-round operator with deployment
milestones after the sunset date is alleged to be avoiding good-faith
coordination. The Commission expects any such cases to be rare,
however, because operators receive benefits of reaching stable
coordination agreements not only in operation but in securing the
necessary funding for constellation deployments.
13. Digital Equity and Inclusion
The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance digital
equity for all, including people of color, persons with disabilities,
persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others who are or have
been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by
persistent poverty or inequality, invited comment on any equity-related
considerations and benefits (if any) that may be associated with the
proposals and issues discussed in the Further Notice.
The Commission did not receive specific comment on this topic.
Nonetheless, the Commission finds that the rule changes in the Second
Report and Order will continue to encourage a more stable and
competitive environment for the development of NGSO FSS systems well
suited to reaching underserved areas with new broadband capacity, and
therefore that this rulemaking will enhance digital equity and
inclusion.
A. Order on Reconsideration
Petition. OneWeb petitions for reconsideration (OneWeb Petition) of
the sunset period adopted with the inter-round protection requirement
in the Report and Order. OneWeb specifically requests that the
Commission partially reconsider the sunset period for first round
operators because it believes that the Commission failed to consider
the evidence in the record and applied an unjustifiable sunset period
to them. In support of its petition, OneWeb makes three principal
arguments.
First, OneWeb argues that the Commission effectively reduced the
sunset period for first-round operators ``by 30 percent'' compared to
operators in later processing rounds because the 10-year sunset period
began on the date of the first authorization in a subsequent processing
round, which occurred in 2020, leading to a sunset period ending in
2030, whereas the Report and Order that established the sunset date was
not adopted and released until 2023. OneWeb states this creates an
``effectively seven-year sunset period for interference protections''
for first-round operators. OneWeb argues that such treatment undermines
the benefit first-round operators should receive for their pioneering
efforts and that, given the time required to implement technical
changes in constellation designs and operations, the sunset period
impairs first-round operators' ability to develop appropriate
mechanisms to co-exist with later-arriving operators, potentially
subjecting first-round operators to harmful interference. OneWeb
further contends that, although the Commission stated in 2017 that it
would consider NGSO FSS applications filed after the first processing
round on a ``case-by-case'' basis, OneWeb had no prior reasonable
expectation that all later-round operators would be entitled to operate
on a co-equal basis with first-round systems eventually. OneWeb claims
that the Commission's decision here is contrary to past precedent,
where it denied Kuiper's waiver request to be treated on an equal basis
with systems that filed applications within a previous processing
round. OneWeb also argues that the Commission failed to consider
relevant information in the record and failed to provide a sufficient
explanation for its decision.
Second, OneWeb argues that the consideration of several questions
in the Further Notice on the technical rules surrounding interference
protections that affect the sunset period ``further cuts into the
already shorter sunset period for First Round operators.'' OneWeb
states these questions include: what protection levels should be
imposed during and after the sunset period; whether there is a maximum
number of NGSO systems that can be accommodated in a given frequency
[[Page 100913]]
band; how the number of NGSO systems accommodated should affect inter-
round protection criteria and the opening of different rounds; and what
``co-equal'' means when established operators are to operate a co-equal
basis with newer entrants.
Finally, OneWeb notes that several second-round applications from
the 2020 processing round remain pending. If granted, the operators
would have up to nine years to deploy their full constellations under
the Commission's milestone rules. Therefore, OneWeb argues, the sunset
of the inter-round protection requirement in 2030 will mean that
``first-round operators would be protected from interference for little
or no time after second-round grantees are fully deployed,''
``effectively placing the later-arriving operators in the first
processing round in the context of interference protections'' and
``remov[ing] any meaningful incentive for second-round operators to
coordinate with First Round operators.'' OneWeb now requests that the
Commission specifically establish the sunset for first-round
protections at ten years from adoption of the Report and Order
consistent with the notice for subsequent rounds, or at ten years from
final adoption of the spectrum sharing framework metrics under the
Further Notice.
Comments. Kuiper opposed the OneWeb Petition. Kuiper contends that
it fails to identify any material error in the Report and Order
warranting reconsideration, and otherwise relies on arguments that the
Commission has fully considered and rejected or that OneWeb could have
but did not present earlier in this proceeding.
Kuiper argues the Commission specifically addressed the question of
whether the sunset should apply to first-round operators and concluded
that, as applied, it gave ``incumbent NGSO FSS grantees sufficient time
to evaluate and adapt to the eventual, equal sharing environment'' and
that not applying the sunset in this way ``would substantially
frustrate the purpose of sunsetting by locking in incumbent protections
that are not assured under the current, case-by-case regime.'' Kuiper
also states that OneWeb has offered no evidence--either now or before
the Report and Order was adopted--that a seven-year period would afford
insufficient time to prepare for co-equal spectrum sharing with second-
round systems, or evidence that the thirteen years OneWeb will have had
between its market access grant in 2017 and the end of the sunset
period in 2030 would be insufficient.
Kuiper states that OneWeb appears to misread the Commission's
reason for discussing the full deployment milestone, stating that at no
point does the Commission suggest that it is choosing that milestone as
a means to protect incumbents--instead, the Commission chose it in
recognition that once a new entrant has fully deployed its
constellation, it should generally have the right to co-equal
treatment. And Kuiper notes that, as the Commission explained in direct
response to OneWeb's argument, the fact that the full deployment
milestone for some (or even many) later-round operators will not occur
until after the 2030 sunset is irrelevant because `` `the speed of
deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the overall time
that the incumbents will be protected by systems approved in the later
processing round.' ''
Kuiper further states that the Report and Order did not premise the
adoption of the sunset period on providing inter-round protections
after second-round systems have fully deployed and are providing
service, instead reasoning that first-round operators would need some
``period of time'' after an application had been granted in a new
processing round to plan for co-equal sharing, and that the ten-year
period, which would run from the grant of the first license in the next
processing round, ``appropriately balance[d] the need for stability for
incumbent operations and the possibility for new entrants to compete on
an equal footing once they have built out their systems.''
Kuiper also argues that OneWeb incorrectly assumes that second-
round operators will delay offering any service until they are fully
deployed, but that even if later-licensed systems did delay offering
service in this manner, such delay would have no impact on the time
given to OneWeb to operate with special protections.
Kuiper further asserts that OneWeb's claim that the decision
removes ``any meaningful incentive for second-round operators to
coordinate'' ignores the Commission's thorough treatment of such
incentives and record evidence that a sunset is likely to enhance the
incentives for all parties to coordinate. And Kuiper argues that
OneWeb's argument that it has invested ``billions of dollars'' and
``made significant financial investments in their next generation
satellites based on the Commission's framework existing prior to the
adoption of a sunset period'' ignores the billions of dollars that
second-round operators have invested in their own systems.
Kuiper finally argues that none of the questions in the Further
Notice implicate the length or application of the sunset period to
first-round operators, and notes that OneWeb itself explicitly told the
Commission that the ``proposed sunset schedule''--that is, a 2030
sunset for second-round operators--``affords the Commission time to
further consider these issues.''
OneWeb replied to Kuiper's opposition, arguing that the opposition
fails to counter the issues raised in its petition and reiterating
arguments in the petition. OneWeb maintains that neither the Report and
Order nor Kuiper have addressed the disparate treatment of first-round
operators who have insufficient time to prepare for co-equal spectrum
sharing. OneWeb contends that Kuiper ignores that the outcome of the
Further Notice further diminishes first-round operators' time to
prepare for the ``fully defined regulatory framework'' given that they
will have to comply with the new rules.
SpaceX also responded to the OneWeb Petition, arguing that the ten-
year sunset period adopted by the Commission ``strikes the appropriate
balance'' between incumbents and new entrants but stating that careful
consideration should be given when incorporating deployment milestones
for later-round systems to minimize any advantages for operators that
refuse to coordinate.
Decision. The Commission dismisses in part and, on alternative and
independent grounds, deny the OneWeb Petition in full on the merits.
Under Sec. 1.429(l)(3) of the Commission rules, the Commission may
dismiss a petition for reconsideration that presents arguments
previously considered and rejected. OneWeb previously raised the issue
that the 10-year sunset period would effectively eliminate advantages
of first-round operators because of the timing of second-round grants,
since first-round operators would be protected from interference for
little or no time after some second-round grantees are fully deployed.
The Commission fully considered and rejected this argument in the
Report and Order, finding that while the sunset may occur before some
later-round systems have reached the full deployment milestone at nine
years, contrary to OneWeb's argument, this would not ``effectively
eliminate'' advantages for first-round operators, since the speed of
deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the overall time
that the incumbents will be protected by systems approved in the later
processing round. Accordingly, the Commission dismisses this part of
the OneWeb Petition pursuant to Sec. 1.429(l)(3).
On alternative and independent grounds, the Commission denies the
[[Page 100914]]
OneWeb Petition on the merits. The Report and Order for the first time
adopted an inter-round protection requirement to replace the
Commission's explicit policy of case-by-case licensing of NGSO FSS
systems after the cutoff date in an initial processing round. In doing
so, the Commission considered numerous sunsetting proposals on the
record, ranging from 6 years after the application cut-off date in a
processing round to 15 years commencing from release of the Report and
Order for the current Ku-/Ka-band processing rounds and 15 years from
the first authorization or market access grant in a subsequent
processing round for future processing rounds.
First, the Report and Order ensured all NGSO FSS operators
authorized through a processing round the same 10-year period of time,
following the first authorization in a subsequent processing round,
during which they are protected by systems approved in that subsequent
processing round under the newly adopted inter-round protection
requirement. The 10-year period, tied to the first authorization in a
later round, balances the Commission's goals to afford later-round
systems equal spectrum sharing opportunities under the spectrum-
splitting procedure once their full service constellations are
operational, while providing earlier-round systems time to adjust to
the constellations ultimately deployed by later-round grantees, with
simplicity and regulatory clarity. While it is true that first-round
operators effectively had notice of seven years of protection from all
second-round grantees under the new inter-round protection requirement,
applying a 10-year sunset provision from the date of the release of the
Report and Order would result in an effective 13-year sunset period for
the first system authorized in the second processing round, contrary to
the Commission's rationales for adopting the 10-year inter-round
protection period and its goal of promoting new entry.
Indeed, the basis for the adoption of a 10-year period was not
because it was the minimum necessary period for earlier-round systems
to adjust to new entrants. Rather, the Commission concentrated on the
deployment timelines of later-round systems and reasoned that sunset
period should ``relieve earlier-round grantees of the uncertainty of
near-term, equal sharing with new entrants'' while giving later-round
systems an equal opportunity to operate with their full service
constellations, which may be completed at the nine-year final
deployment milestone. For OneWeb's first-round system approved in 2017,
and for other first-round systems, the Commission continues to find
that a sunset date in 2030 (ten years after the first grant in the
subsequent processing round, which occurred in 2020) relieves them of
the uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing with new entrants intended
by the sunset period. The Report and Order further noted the iterative
development of NGSO FSS systems and the fact that many earlier-round
grantees, like OneWeb, have proposed updated, second-generation systems
filed in a later processing round that will benefit from the sunsetting
period applied to second-round systems. As Kuiper notes, OneWeb
provided no specific evidence to support its assertion that the sunset
period as adopted is in fact insufficient.
The Report and Order also determined that sunsetting will not upset
existing expectations of interference protection because, under
Commission policy in effect prior to the Report and Order, later-round
applicants were considered on a case-by-case basis as to whether they
will be entitled to share spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-round
systems--as such there was never a guarantee that earlier-round
grantees would be entitled to protection from later-round systems.
OneWeb's citation to a grant condition in which a later-round licensee
was required to protect NGSO FSS systems authorized through an earlier
processing round does not create a reasonable expectation that OneWeb
would be protected indefinitely from all later-round applicants. The
Report and Order acknowledged the Commission's then-existing policy of
case-by-case licensing of NGSO FSS systems filed after a processing
round, including licensing conditions, and based on the record in the
proceeding decided to adopt a generally applicable inter-round
protection requirement with an accompanying sunset provision. While
OneWeb argues the Commission ``provided no notice that all such later-
round operators would be entitled to co-equal operations,'' the policy
of case-by-case licensing meant that any future applicant--or all
future applicants--could be afforded co-equal status with earlier-round
systems. The sunset period also does not effectively create an open-
ended processing round because the sunset guarantees a period of time
of unequal protection for earlier-round systems, during which earlier-
round systems are not required to protect later-round systems, while an
open-ended processing round would immediately treat all NGSO FSS
systems on an equal basis.
Second, the Report and Order tied the 10-year sunset date to the
date of the first authorization in a later processing round. In doing
so, the Commission acknowledged that ``the sunset may occur before some
later-round systems have reached the full deployment milestone at nine
years'' but reasoned, contrary to OneWeb's argument, this would not
``effectively eliminate'' advantages for first-round operators, since
the speed of deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the
overall time that the incumbents will be protected by systems approved
in the later processing round. Similarly, the Commission does not share
OneWeb's concern that some ``second-round operators' fully-deployed
systems would never have to protect First Round operators, effectively
placing the later-arriving operators in the first processing round,''
``contrary to the Commission's acknowledgement that First Round
operators should have some benefits, and remov[ing] any meaningful
incentive for second-round operators to coordinate with First Round
operators.'' The basis for the 10-year sunset period was not to lock in
coordination advantages for earlier-round systems. Rather, the
Commission determined that fully deployed later-round systems should be
able to operate on an equal basis with earlier-round systems; not that
they must protect earlier-round systems for a specific period of time
after full deployment. Further, the benefit to earlier-round operators
is that they are entitled to a 10-year period after the initial grant
in a later processing round in which later-round systems must protect
the earlier-round system while accepting any interference caused by the
earlier-round system, unless a coordination agreement has been reached.
And as explained in the Report and Order, the Commission does not
expect the sunset period to introduce significant coordination delays
because the period is long enough that a later-round grantee would not
wish to operate for years without an agreement with earlier-round
grantees.
Finally, the Commission disagrees that the exploration of issues in
the Further Notice, some of which OneWeb itself requested, justifies
changing the sunset provision. Specifically, OneWeb argues that having
as open issues ``what protection levels should be imposed during and
after the sunset period'' and ``what `co-equal' means when established
operators are to operate a co-equal basis with newer entrants''
shortens the time period for it to prepare for new entrants at the end
of the sunset
[[Page 100915]]
period. In the Second Report and Order above, the Commission reaffirms
the decision in the Report and Order to apply the default, spectrum-
splitting mechanism between earlier and later-round systems after
sunset. Therefore, there is no change in the post-sunset regime from
what was adopted in the Report and Order. In addition, the Second
Report and Order declines to adopt any cap on the number of NGSO FSS
systems that can operate in a given frequency band, negating OneWeb's
concern that doing so may render the sunset period superfluous.
Similarly, the Second Report and Order does not place any restrictions
on ``the opening of different processing rounds,'' nor limit ``the
number of NGSO systems accommodated.'' The changes the Commission has
adopted in the Second Report and Order to the inter-round protection
requirement also do not ``shorten'' the sunset period for first-round
systems because, while they will apply immediately upon the effective
date of the rule changes, they will not apply between first and second-
round systems after the sunset period.
IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was
incorporated in the Further Notice released in April 2023. The
Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the
Further Notice, including comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed
addressing the IRFA. The Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)
conforms to the RFA.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Second Report and Order
The Second Report and Order continues to facilitate the deployment
of non-geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO
FSS) systems capable of providing broadband and other services on a
global basis, by refining the Commission's rules governing spectrum
sharing among a new generation of broadband satellite constellations to
promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency
through good-faith coordination. The Commission amends its rules
governing the treatment of NGSO FSS systems filed in different
processing rounds clarifying certain details of the degraded throughput
methodology that, in the absence of a coordination agreement, must be
used in compatibility analyses by NGSO FSS system licensees authorized
through later processing rounds to show they can operate compatibly
with, and protect, NGSO FSS systems authorized through earlier
processing rounds.
Specifically, the Second Report and Order clarifies details
regarding the implementation of a degraded throughput methodology by
adopting a 3 percent throughput degradation as a long-term interference
protection criterion, a 0.4 percent absolute increase in link
unavailability as a short-term interference protection criterion, and
declining to adopt additional protection metrics or to adopt an
aggregate limit on interference from later-round NGSO FSS systems into
earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. It also affirms that the default,
spectrum-splitting mechanism will be applied among NGSO systems in
different processing rounds after the sunset period. The actions the
Commission takes in this proceeding further its efforts to promote
development, and competition among broadband NGSO FSS system
proponents, including the market entry of new competitors.
B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response
to the IFRA
There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the
proposed rules and policies presented in the IRFA.
C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration
Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the
RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA),
and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the proposed
rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not file any
comments in response to the proposed rules.
D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities To Which
the Rules Will Apply
The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this
industry classifies a business with $44 million or less in annual
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Consequently, using the
SBA's small business size standard most satellite telecommunications
service providers can be considered small entities. The Commission
notes however, that the SBA's revenue small business size standard is
applicable to a broad scope of satellite telecommunications providers
included in the U.S. Census Bureau's Satellite Telecommunications
industry definition. Additionally, the Commission neither requests nor
collects annual revenue information from satellite telecommunications
providers, and is therefore unable to more accurately estimate the
number of satellite telecommunications providers that would be
classified as a small business under the SBA size standard. For
purposes of this proceeding it is likely that there are very few
entities meeting the SBA's definition of small satellite
telecommunications providers that are small satellite system operators
involved in designing, manufacturing, and launching a satellite due to
the generally a high fixed cost of these activities.
All Other Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications
services, such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and
radar station operation. This industry also includes establishments
primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and
associated facilities connected with one or more terrestrial systems
and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving
telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of internet
services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP)
services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also
included in this
[[Page 100916]]
industry. The SBA small business size standard for this industry
classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million or less as small.
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 1,079 firms in
this industry that operated for the entire year. Of those firms, 1,039
had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on this data, the
Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other
Telecommunications'' firms can be considered small.
E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
The Second Report and Order amends rules that are applicable to
space station operators requesting a license or grant of U.S. market
access from the Commission. Specifically, the Second Report and Order
adopts changes to the spectrum sharing requirements among NGSO FSS
satellite systems approved in different processing rounds, and
specifies details of the technical demonstration that space station
licensees and market access grantees that were authorized through a
later processing round must submit to show that they will not cause
harmful interference to space station licensees and market access
grantees that were authorized through an earlier processing round,
prior to the sunsetting period, if the later-round grantees have not
certified that they have reached a coordination agreement with the
earlier-round grantees. The technical demonstration of compatibility
between the later-round system and the earlier-round system is based on
a degraded throughput methodology and assessing absolute increase in
link unavailability.
The adopted metrics, values, and assumptions to finalize degraded
throughput methodology will impact information later-round NGSO FSS
system operators are required to report in compatibility analysis
submissions. However, because of the costs involved in developing and
deploying an NGSO FSS satellite constellation, the Commission
anticipates that few NGSO FSS operators affected by this rulemaking
would qualify under the SBA definition of ``small entity,'' and
therefore small entities are not likely to have to hire professionals,
or incur any compliance costs as a result of the Second Report and
Order.
F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
The RFA requires an agency to provide, ``a description of the steps
the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on
small entities . . . including a statement of the factual, policy, and
legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule
and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule
considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was
rejected.''
The Second Report and Order defines specific metrics for long-term
interference and short-term interference that must be used in
compatibility analyses demonstrating that a later-round NGSO FSS system
will adequately protect an earlier-round system. Agreeing with the
general consensus of commenters, the Second Report and Order adopts a 3
percent degraded throughput threshold as the long-term interference
metric for inter-round compatibility analyses and a 0.4 percent
absolute increase in link unavailability as the short-term interference
metric based on the technical record developed in this proceeding. The
Commission concludes that establishing a specific long-term
interference protection metric consistent with the technical evidence
in the record provides the benefit of a clear standard for new
entrants, and a benchmark that parties can use to negotiate any
alternative long-term protections mutually agreed to in coordination.
The Commission specifically considered, and declined, adopting
additional protection metrics for loss of synchronization, multiple
carrier-to-noise (C/N) objectives, or aggregate interference limits in
part because of the additional complexities and costs that complying
with such additional metrics could entail. Similarly, the Commission
considered, and rejected, incorporating interference from additional
sources in the baseline calculation, such as from GSO networks, other
NGSO FSS systems, and intra-system noise, in part to simplify the
analysis required of new entrants in the absence of a coordination
agreement. Moreover, to lower burdens on later-round operators, the
Commission provides illustrative examples of parameters that may be
used when preparing compatibility analyses and which will be considered
on a case-by-case basis as to whether they are reliable and
representative. The Commission also considered and reaffirmed its
decision from the Report and Order to apply the default, spectrum-
splitting mechanism to earlier and later-round operators after the
sunset date to place them on equal footing, noting that facilitating
equal treatment of later-round operators after the sunset date was a
key component of the sunset provision. Additionally, by reaffirming
this decision the Commission ensures that earlier-round advantages do
not continue indefinitely, and simplifies the regulatory framework when
systems authorized through multiple processing rounds may be operating.
G. Report to Congress
The Commission will send a copy of the Second Report and Order,
including this FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy
of the Second Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA.
V. Ordering Clauses
Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 7(a),
10, 303, 308(b), and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
47 U.S.C. 154(i), 157(a), 160, 303, 308(b), 316, that is the Second
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration is adopted, the policies,
rules, and requirements discussed herein are adopted, and Part 25 of
the Commission's rules is amended.
It is further ordrered that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j),
and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151,
154(i), 154(j), 405, and 47 CFR 1.429(b), (l)(3), that the petition for
reconsideration filed by WorldVu Satellites Limited in IB Docket No.
21-456, is dismissed in part and, on alternative and independent
grounds, denied.
It is further ordered that the Second Report and Order and Order on
Reconsideration shall be effective 30 days after publication in the
Federal Register, except that Sec. 25.261(d), which may contain new or
modified information collection requirements, will not become effective
until the Office of Management and Budget completes review of any
information collection requirements that the Space Bureau determines is
required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Commission directs the
Space Bureau to announce the effective date of Sec. 25.261(d) by
subsequent Public Notice.
It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of Secretary
shall send a copy of the Second Report and Order and Order on
Reconsideration, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the Managing
Director, Performance Program
[[Page 100917]]
Management, shall send a copy of the Second Report and Order and Order
on Reconsideration in a report to be sent to Congress and the
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 25
Satellites.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 25 as follows:
PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319,
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Amend Sec. 25.261 by revising paragraphs (d) and (e) to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.261 Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.
* * * * *
(d) Protection of earlier-round systems. Prior to commencing
operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either
certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with any
operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in
an earlier processing round, or submit for Commission approval a
compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded
throughput methodology that it will not cause harmful interference to
any such system with which coordination has not been completed. If an
earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round system has
commenced operations, the later-round licensee or market access
recipient must submit a certification of coordination or a
compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no later
than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations as
notified pursuant to Sec. 25.121(b) or otherwise.
(1) Compatibility showings must contain the following elements:
(A) A demonstration that the later-round system will cause no more
than 3 percent time-weighted average degraded throughput of the link to
the earlier-round system, for links with a baseline link availability
of 99.0 percent or higher at a C/N threshold of 0 dB;
(B) A demonstration that the later-round system will cause no more
than 0.4 percent absolute change in link availability to the earlier-
round system using a C/N threshold value of 0 dB, for links with a
baseline link availability of 99.0 percent link availability or higher;
and
(C) With respect to an earlier-round system that has not yet
satisfied its 50 percent deployment milestone pursuant to Sec.
25.164(b)(1), the compatibility showing may consider only 50 percent
deployment of the earlier-round system; if the 50 percent deployment
milestone has been satisfied, the showing must consider 100 percent
deployment of the authorized system.
(2) Compatibility showings will be placed on public notice pursuant
to Sec. 25.151(a)(13).
(3) While a compatibility showing remains pending before the
Commission, the submitting NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient
may commence operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis with
respect to the operations of the system that is the subject of the
showing.
(4) A later-round NGSO FSS system will be required to conform its
operations to its compatibility showing submitted for the protection of
an earlier-round system to the extent necessary to protect the actual
number of deployed and operating space stations of the earlier-round
system.
(e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of
market access in a processing round, the systems approved in that
processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds
systems under paragraph (d) of this section, and instead will be
required to share spectrum with earlier-round systems under paragraph
(c) of this section.
[FR Doc. 2024-28993 Filed 12-12-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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