Notice2024-27466
Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6); Rescission of Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 98-3(6) and Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6)
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
November 25, 2024
Issuing agencies
Social Security Administration
Abstract
The Commissioner of Social Security is giving notice of Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6) and rescission of Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 98-3(6) and Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 98- 4(6).
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 227 (Monday, November 25, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 227 (Monday, November 25, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 92992-92995]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-27466]
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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
[Docket No. SSA-2022-0002]
Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6); Rescission of Social
Security Acquiescence Ruling 98-3(6) and Social Security Acquiescence
Ruling 98-4(6)
AGENCY: Social Security Administration.
ACTION: Notice of Social Security Acquiescence Ruling (AR) and
rescission of two Social Security ARs.
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SUMMARY: The Commissioner of Social Security is giving notice of Social
Security Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6) and rescission of Social Security
Acquiescence Ruling 98-3(6) and Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 98-
4(6).
DATES: We will apply this ruling on December 2, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mona Ahmed, Office of the General
Counsel, Office of Program Law, Social Security Administration, 6401
Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21235-6401, (410) 965-0600, or TTY
410-966-5609, for information about this notice. For information on
eligibility or filing for benefits, call our national toll-free number,
1-800-772-1213 or TTY 1-800-325-0778, or visit our internet site,
Social Security Online, at <a href="https://www.socialsecurity.gov">https://www.socialsecurity.gov</a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We are rescinding Social Security
Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 98-3(6) and Social Security AR 98-4(6) and
publishing this Social Security AR, in accordance with 20 CFR
402.35(b), 404.985(a), (b), and 416.1485(a), (b), to explain how we
will apply the holding in Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security,
893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018), regarding the effect of prior disability
findings on the adjudication of a subsequent disability claim.
An AR explains how we will apply a holding in a United States Court
of Appeals decision that we determine conflicts with our interpretation
of a provision of the Social Security Act (Act) or regulations when the
Government has decided not to seek further review of that decision or
is unsuccessful on further review.
On June 1, 1998, we issued AR 98-3(6) (63 FR 29770) and AR 98-4(6)
(63
[[Page 92993]]
FR 29771) to explain how we would apply the holdings in Dennard v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 907 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990), and
Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security, 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir.
1997), respectively. Both ARs provided instructions for adjudicating a
subsequent disability claim, with an unadjudicated period, arising
under the same title of the Act as the prior claim, where the claimant
resided within the Sixth Circuit. AR 98-3(6) (for Dennard) stated that
adjudicators must adopt a finding from the final decision by an
administrative law judge (ALJ) or the Appeals Council (AC) of the
demands of the claimant's past relevant work, or a finding of the
claimant's date of birth (for the purposes of ascertaining their age),
education, or work experience unless there is new and material evidence
relating to such a finding or there has been a change in the law,
regulations, or rulings affecting the finding or the method for
arriving at the finding. Similarly, AR 98-4(6) (for Drummond) stated
that adjudicators must adopt certain findings from the final decision
by an ALJ or the AC in determining whether the claimant is disabled
with respect to an unadjudicated period, unless there is new and
material evidence relating to such a finding or there has been a change
in the law, regulations, or rulings affecting the finding or the method
for arriving at the finding. AR 98-4(6) stated that it applied only to
a finding of a claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) ``or other
finding required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
determining disability provided under 20 CFR 404.1520, 416.920 or
416.924, as appropriate, which was made in a final decision by an ALJ
or the Appeals Council on a prior disability claim.''
On June 27, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit issued a decision in Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security,
893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018), in which it clarified its intent in
Drummond and interpreted the holding in Drummond to be more limited
than described in AR 98-4(6). Whereas AR 98-3(6) and AR 98-4(6)
required the adjudicator to adopt findings in an earlier disability
decision unless there is new and material evidence, Earley indicates
that it is fair for the adjudicator to consider prior findings as
legitimate, albeit not binding, in reviewing a subsequent application.
The court in Earley recognizes that a new application covering a new
period deserves a new review, but prior ALJ and AC findings and the
earlier record may have probative value in that review. The court also
indicates that res judicata principles would apply where the new
application covers the same dates, and no new evidence is introduced.
Although the Earley decision does not apply or discuss Dennard, the
court's explanations in Earley also clarify the Sixth Circuit's view on
the issues addressed in AR 98-3(6) (for Dennard). Indeed, in Drummond,
which the Earley decision addresses in depth, the Sixth Circuit relied
in part on Dennard. The Sixth Circuit in Earley interpreted Drummond
more narrowly than the Social Security Administration (SSA) did in AR
98-4(6), and the Sixth Circuit's explanations in Earley clarify the
standard or the approach for the issues addressed in both AR 98-3(6)
and AR 98-4(6). Therefore, we are rescinding ARs 98-3(6) and 98-4(6)
and publishing this single, new AR to provide instructions on the
effect of prior disability findings on the adjudication of a subsequent
disability claim in the Sixth Circuit.
We will apply the holding of the Court of Appeals' decision as
explained in this Social Security AR to claims at all levels of
administrative adjudication within the Sixth Circuit. This Social
Security AR will apply to all determinations and decisions made on or
after December 2, 2024]. If we made a determination or a decision on an
application for benefits between June 27, 2018, the date of the Court
of Appeals' decision in Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 893
F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018), and December 2, 2024, the effective date of
this Social Security AR, an individual may request application of this
Social Security AR to their claim. However, the individual must first
demonstrate, pursuant to 20 CFR 404.985(b)(2) or 416.1485(b)(2), that
application of the ruling could change our prior determination or
decision.
If we later rescind this AR as obsolete, we will publish a notice
in the Federal Register to that effect, as provided in 20 CFR
404.985(e) and 416.1485(e). If we decide to relitigate the issue
covered by this AR, as provided by 20 CFR 404.985(c) and 416.1485(c),
we will publish a notice in the Federal Register stating that we will
apply our interpretation of the Act or regulations and explaining why
we decided to relitigate the issue.
(Federal Assistance Listings, Program Nos. 96.001 Social Security
Disability Insurance; 96.002 Social Security Retirement Insurance;
96.004 Social Security Survivors Insurance; 96.006 Supplemental
Security Income)
The Commissioner of Social Security, Martin O'Malley, having
reviewed and approved this document, is delegating the authority to
electronically sign this document to Erik Hansen, a Federal Register
Liaison for the Social Security Administration, for purposes of
publication in the Federal Register.
Erik Hansen,
Associate Commissioner for Legislative Development and Operations,
Social Security Administration.
Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6)
Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018)
(Interpreting Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security, 126 F.3d 837
(6th Cir. 1997)): Effect of Prior Disability Findings on Adjudication
of a Subsequent Disability Claim--Titles II and XVI of the Act
Issue
Whether, in making a disability determination or decision on a
subsequent disability claim with respect to an unadjudicated period,
the Social Security Administration (SSA) must consider a finding of a
claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) or other finding required
under the applicable sequential evaluation process for determining
disability, made in a final decision by an administrative law judge
(ALJ) or the Appeals Council (AC) on a prior disability claim.
Statute/Regulation/Ruling Citation
Sections 205(a) and (h) and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 405(a) and (h) and 902(a)(5)), 20 CFR 404.900(a),
404.957(c)(1), 416.1400(a), 416.1457(c)(1), AR 98-3(6) (rescinded), AR
98-4(6) (rescinded).
Circuit
Sixth (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee).
Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018)
(Interpreting Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security, 126 F.3d 837
(6th Cir. 1997))
Applicability of Ruling
This ruling applies to determinations and decisions at all
administrative levels (i.e., the initial, reconsideration, ALJ hearing,
and AC levels).
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Earley was based, in part, on
the panel's interpretation of the Sixth Circuit's prior decision in
Drummond. Drummond, in turn, relied in part on the Sixth Circuit's
earlier decision in Dennard. The following summaries of the two earlier
[[Page 92994]]
cases are provided as background material.
Dennard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 907 F.2d 598 (6th Cir.
1990)
Mr. Dennard argued that because SSA found him unable to do his past
relevant work on his first application for benefits, SSA was precluded
from reconsidering this issue and finding in a subsequent decision,
involving an unadjudicated period, that Mr. Dennard could perform the
same past relevant work. The Sixth Circuit observed that it seemed
clear that SSA had reconsidered the nature and extent of Mr. Dennard's
exertional level in his former job. The court stated: ``We are
persuaded that under the circumstances, we must remand this case to
[SSA] . . . to determine whether [Mr.] Dennard is disabled in light of
the prior determination that he could not return to his previous
employment.''
Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security, 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir.
1997)
Ms. Drummond argued that, absent evidence of improvement in her
condition, the ALJ's finding in a prior claim that she was limited to
sedentary work precluded SSA from finding in a subsequent claim that
she could perform medium work. The Sixth Circuit stated that,
``[a]bsent evidence of an improvement in a claimant's condition, a
subsequent ALJ is bound by the findings of a previous ALJ.'' The court
held that SSA could not reexamine issues previously decided, in the
absence of new and additional evidence or changed circumstances. The
court further stated that, ``[j]ust as a Social Security claimant is
barred from relitigating an issue that has been previously determined,
so is the Commissioner.'' After finding that there was not substantial
evidence that Ms. Drummond's condition had improved significantly in
the time between the two ALJ decisions, the court concluded that SSA
was bound by its previous finding that Ms. Drummond was limited to
sedentary work.
Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018)
Description of Case
In 2010, Ms. Earley applied for disability benefits, claiming that
she was disabled starting on June 25, 2010. In 2012, an ALJ found that
she remained capable of light physical exertion and that she was not
disabled for the period from June 25, 2010, through May 15, 2012. Ms.
Earley applied again in July 2012, arguing that she became disabled
after the decision on her last claim. The same ALJ, invoking Drummond
and AR 98-4(6), stated that he was bound by his earlier findings,
unless Ms. Earley offered new and material evidence of a changed
condition. Because the ALJ found that Ms. Earley had failed to do that,
the ALJ again found her not disabled and denied her claim.
On review, the district court reversed. The district court
construed Drummond to apply only if it would lead to a favorable
outcome for the claimant. Since any preclusive effect of the ALJ's
prior findings would make it more difficult for Ms. Earley to be found
disabled, the court found that Drummond did not apply.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined and clarified Drummond. The
court found that the key principles protected by Drummond, consistency
between proceedings and finality with respect to prior adjudicated
claims, apply to both individuals and the government. At the same time,
these principles do not prevent the agency from giving a fresh look to
a new claim containing new evidence or satisfying a new regulatory
threshold that covers a new period of alleged disability while being
mindful of past rulings and the record in prior proceedings.
The court rejected the argument that, ``[i]n reviewing a second
application by the same individual . . . the administrative law judge
should completely ignore earlier findings and applications.'' The court
explained that ``[f]resh review is not blind review'' and that ``a
later administrative law judge may consider what an earlier judge did
if for no other reason than to strive for consistent decision making.''
Further, the court explained that ``it is fair for an administrative
law judge to take the view that, absent new and additional evidence,
the first administrative law judge's findings are a legitimate, albeit
not binding, consideration in reviewing a second application'' and, at
the same time, that ``an applicant remains free to bring a second
application that introduces no new evidence or very little new evidence
after a failed application.'' The court cautioned, however, that a
claimant ``should not have high expectations about success if the
second filing mimics the first one and the individual has not reached
any new age (or other) threshold to obtain benefits.''
Holding
The Sixth Circuit stated that, ``[w]hen an individual seeks
disability benefits for a distinct period of time, each application is
entitled to review.'' The court explained that if an individual files a
subsequent application for the same period and ``offers no cognizable
explanation for revisiting the first decision, res judicata would bar
the second application.'' The court further explained that an ALJ
honors res judicata ``principles by considering what an earlier judge
found with respect to a later application and by considering the
earlier record'' and that, accordingly, ``it is fair for an
administrative law judge to take the view that, absent new and
additional evidence, the first administrative law judge's findings are
a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in reviewing a second
application.'' Ms. Earley's new claim involved a new period; therefore,
the court held that res judicata did not apply. Accordingly, the court
remanded the case for the ALJ to reconsider Ms. Earley's claim for
benefits under the correct standard.
Statement as to How Earley Differs From The Agency's Policy
In a subsequent disability claim, SSA considers the issue of
disability with respect to a period that was not adjudicated to be a
new issue that requires an independent evaluation. Thus, when
adjudicating a subsequent disability claim involving an unadjudicated
period, SSA considers the facts and issues de novo in determining or
deciding disability with respect to the unadjudicated period. SSA does
not consider prior findings made in the final determination or decision
on the prior claim as evidence in adjudicating disability with respect
to the unadjudicated period in the subsequent claim.
In Earley, the Sixth Circuit agreed with SSA's policy that res
judicata does not apply with respect to an unadjudicated period. Yet,
the Sixth Circuit disagreed with SSA's policy that prior disability
findings are not to be considered in the adjudication of disability for
a previously unadjudicated period in a subsequent claim. Rather, Earley
indicates that such prior findings made at the ALJ hearing or AC level
should be considered in the adjudication of disability for an
unadjudicated period in a subsequent claim, stating that ``it is fair
for an administrative law judge to take the view that, absent new and
additional evidence, the first administrative law judge's findings are
a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in reviewing a second
application.'' Earley indicates that an adjudicator honors the
principles of res judicata ``by considering what an earlier judge found
with respect to a later application and by considering that earlier
record.''
[[Page 92995]]
SSA interprets Earley to require that, where a final decision after
a hearing on a prior disability claim contains a finding of a
claimant's RFC or other finding required under the applicable
sequential evaluation process for determining disability, SSA must
consider such finding(s) as evidence when adjudicating a subsequent
disability claim, arising under the same or a different title of the
Act, involving an unadjudicated period.
Explanation of How We Will Apply The Earley Decision Within The Circuit
This Ruling applies only to disability findings in cases involving
claimants who reside in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, or Tennessee at the
time of the determination or decision on the subsequent claim at the
initial, reconsideration, ALJ hearing, or AC level. Additionally, it
applies only to a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is
required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
adjudicating disability (provided under 20 CFR 404.1520, 416.920, or
416.924, as appropriate), made in a final decision (favorable or
unfavorable) by an ALJ or the AC on a prior disability claim.\1\
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\1\ In making a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding
that is required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
adjudicating disability, an ALJ or the AC may have made certain
subsidiary findings, such as an assessment of the claimant's
symptoms. A subsidiary finding does not constitute a finding that is
required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for
adjudicating disability, as provided under 20 CFR 404.1520, 416.920,
or 416.924.
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When a claimant seeks disability benefits for a new period in a
subsequent claim, that subsequent claim is entitled to review following
the applicable sequential evaluation process. However, such review does
not exist in a vacuum. When adjudicating a subsequent claim (arising
under the same or a different title of the Act as the prior claim), an
adjudicator deciding whether a claimant is disabled during a previously
unadjudicated period must consider findings from the decision on the
prior claim. As the Court recognized in Earley, things change with the
passage of time, such as age and physical condition. As a result, each
claim covering a different period should be reviewed as a new claim.
However, when a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding required
under the sequential evaluation process for determining disability
differs from that in the prior decision, the adjudicator must make
clear that they considered the prior finding as evidence in light of
all relevant facts and circumstances.\2\
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\2\ For example, an adjudicator might consider such factors as:
(1) whether the fact on which the prior finding was based is subject
to change with the passage of time, such as a fact relating to the
severity of the claimant's medical condition; (2) the likelihood of
such a change, considering the amount of time between the period
adjudicated in the prior claim and the unadjudicated period in the
subsequent claim; and (3) the extent to which evidence that was not
considered in the final decision on the prior claim provides a basis
for making a different finding for the unadjudicated period in the
subsequent claim. These are only examples and not intended to create
specific requirements as part of the sequential evaluation.
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Where the prior finding was about a fact that is subject to change
with the passage of time, such as a claimant's RFC or the severity of
an impairment(s), the likelihood that the fact has changed generally
increases as the time between the previously adjudicated period and the
subsequent period increases. An adjudicator generally should pay
particular attention to the lapse of time between the earlier claim and
the later claim and the impact of the passage of time on the claim. In
situations where minimal time has passed, and no or very little new
evidence has been introduced, it is more likely that the prior finding
will remain the same. But the adjudicator must consider all relevant
facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, a change
in the law, regulations, or rulings affecting a relevant finding or the
method for arriving at the finding may be a reason why the prior
finding, considered as evidence, is properly departed from in the
current determination or decision.
[FR Doc. 2024-27466 Filed 11-22-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4191-02-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on November 25, 2024.
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