New Car Assessment Program Final Decision Notice-Advanced Driver Assistance Systems and Roadmap
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Abstract
This final decision notice adds four new advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) technologies--blind spot warning (BSW), blind spot intervention (BSI), lane keeping assist (LKA), and pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB)--to the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) and enhances the performance evaluation of ADAS technologies currently in NCAP. The notice also finalizes a 10-year roadmap for updating NCAP through multiple phases for the period 2024 through 2033. This notice responds in part to the provisions in section 24213 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act.
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 232 (Tuesday, December 3, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 95916-96083]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-27447]
[[Page 95915]]
Vol. 89
Tuesday,
No. 232
December 3, 2024
Part II
Department of Transportation
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
New Car Assessment Program Final Decision Notice--Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems and Roadmap; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 232 / Tuesday, December 3, 2024 /
Notices
[[Page 95916]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2024-0077]
New Car Assessment Program Final Decision Notice--Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems and Roadmap
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA or the
Agency), Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final decision notice.
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SUMMARY: This final decision notice adds four new advanced driver
assistance systems (ADAS) technologies--blind spot warning (BSW), blind
spot intervention (BSI), lane keeping assist (LKA), and pedestrian
automatic emergency braking (PAEB)--to the New Car Assessment Program
(NCAP) and enhances the performance evaluation of ADAS technologies
currently in NCAP. The notice also finalizes a 10-year roadmap for
updating NCAP through multiple phases for the period 2024 through 2033.
This notice responds in part to the provisions in section 24213 of the
Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act.
DATES: Decisions on planned changes to the New Car Assessment Program
are effective for the 2026 model year.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact
Ms. Taryn E. Rockwell, New Car Assessment Program, Office of
Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone: (202) 366-1810). For legal
issues, you may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, or Ms. Natasha D. Reed,
Office of Chief Counsel (Telephone: (202) 366-2992). You may send mail
to these officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Washington,
DC 20590-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Summary of Updates to NCAP and Roadmap for Future Updates
III. Background
IV. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
V. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB) Technology
VI. Adding Blind Spot Technologies
VII. Updating Lane Keeping Technologies
VIII. Self-Reported Data
IX. NCAP Roadmap
X. Economic Analysis
XI. Appendix
I. Executive Summary
Since its launch in 1978, NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
has supported NHTSA's mission to reduce the number of fatalities and
injuries that occur on U.S. roadways. NCAP, like many other NHTSA
programs, has contributed to significant reductions in motor vehicle
related crashes, fatalities, and injuries, with passenger vehicle
occupant fatalities decreasing from 32,043 to 26,325 from 2001 to
2021.\1\ Unfortunately, this reduction was not universal, with
pedestrian fatalities increasing by 51 percent during the same
timeframe, from 4,901 to 7,388.\2\ Despite improvements in automotive
safety since NCAP's implementation, far more work must be done to
reduce the continued high toll to human life on our nation's roads. In
response to this need, on March 9, 2022, NHTSA published a Request for
Comments (RFC) notice outlining proposed NCAP updates.\3\
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\1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2021 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration. NHTSA acknowledges a recent increase
in passenger vehicle occupant fatalities occurring during the COVID-
19 pandemic. In 2019, 22,372 passenger vehicle occupants were killed
in traffic crashes.
\2\ Traffic Safety Facts 2021 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
\3\ Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002. 87 FR 13452 (March 9, 2022).
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After careful consideration of all comments received and applicable
regulatory considerations, this notice announces the Agency's decision
to update NCAP with the enhanced evaluation of advanced driver
assistance systems (ADAS) technologies currently in NCAP \4\ and to add
four new ADAS technologies to NCAP: blind spot warning (BSW), blind
spot intervention (BSI), lane keeping assist (LKA),\5\ and pedestrian
automatic emergency braking (PAEB). This notice also establishes a 10-
year roadmap for updating NCAP through a multi-phased approach, with
RFC notices planned over the next several years. NHTSA will address
comments received on program elements outside the scope of the March
2022 RFC notice in subsequent final decision notices as part of the
multi-phase efforts to update NCAP over the next several years.
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\4\ The ADAS technologies currently evaluated in NCAP are
forward collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW),
dynamic brake support (DBS), and crash imminent braking (CIB).
\5\ ``LKS'' was used for this technology in the March 2022 RFC.
However, in this final decision notice, ``LKA'' is used instead to
maintain consistency with other agency initiatives.
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A. Legal and Policy Considerations
In finalizing its decisions for this notice, in addition to
comments received, the Agency sought to address requirements from the
2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act,\6\ the 2021
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), enacted as the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act,\7\ and the U.S. Department of Transportation's
National Roadway Safety Strategy. The Agency also took into
consideration its May 9, 2024, final rule for FMVSS No. 127,
``Automatic Emergency Braking for Light Vehicles.'' \8\ These
considerations are described below.
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\6\ Public Law 114-94.
\7\ Public Law 117-58.
\8\ Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021. 89 FR 39686 (May. 9, 2024).
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1. 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act
This final decision notice serves as NHTSA's initial step in
fulfilling section 24322 of the FAST Act, which directs the Agency to
promulgate a rule ensuring the display of crash avoidance information
next to crashworthiness information on window stickers that
manufacturers place on motor vehicles.\9\ The Agency is currently
working to develop a crash avoidance rating system based on comments
received in response to several rating system concepts discussed in the
March 2022 RFC, and this notice finalizes additional crash avoidance
technologies that will be included in the future crash avoidance rating
system.
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\9\ Section 24322 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the
``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
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2. 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
This notice also fulfills in part several mandates in section 24213
of the BIL, enacted on November 15, 2021 as the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act.\10\ First, section 24213(a) requires NHTSA to
``finalize the proceeding for which comments were requested'' on
December 16, 2015.\11\ This final decision notice does so by adopting
four new ADAS technologies discussed in the Agency's December 16, 2015
RFC notice,\12\ thus finalizing that proceeding and notice.\13\
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\10\ Public Law 117-58.
\11\ Id. at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015).
\12\ Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119. 80 FR 78591 (Dec. 16, 2015).
\13\ As communicated in the March 2022 RFC, while NHTSA is
adopting a roadmap that includes aspects of the 2015 RFC, this
notice is not an extension of the December 2015 notice.
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Second, this notice addresses the Advanced Crash-Avoidance
Technologies portion of section 24213(b) of the BIL, which directs the
Secretary of the Department of
[[Page 95917]]
Transportation to ``publish a notice, for the purposes of public
comment, to establish a means for providing consumer information
relating to advanced crash-avoidance technologies'' within one year of
enactment that includes an appropriate methodology for: (1) determining
which advanced crash avoidance technologies should be included in the
information, (2) developing performance test criteria for use by
manufacturers in evaluating those technologies, (3) determining a
distinct rating system involving each crash avoidance technology, and
(4) updating overall vehicle ratings to incorporate the advanced crash
avoidance technology ratings. This notice satisfies two of these four
requirements by (1) adopting established criteria for determining which
advanced crash avoidance technology \14\ should be included as
referenced and discussed in the March 9, 2022 RFC notice, and (2)
finalizing test procedures and criteria to evaluate performance for
each of these advanced crash avoidance technologies. Although the
Agency is not yet implementing a rating system for individual crash
avoidance technologies, it has sought comments in this regard and has
detailed plans in its roadmap to finalize such ratings, along with an
updated overall (i.e., crashworthiness and crash avoidance) rating, in
the near future.
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\14\ This notice refers to advanced crash avoidance technology
as ADAS technology.
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Third, this notice addresses the Vulnerable Road User Safety
portion of section 24213(b), which directs the Secretary to publish a
notice meeting similar requirements to those mandated for advanced
crash avoidance technologies ``to establish a means for providing to
consumers information relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other
vulnerable road user safety technologies'' within one year of
enactment. By applying the established inclusion criteria in the
adoption of PAEB technology and the applicable test procedures and
evaluation criteria included in this notice, two of the four
requirements for the Vulnerable Road User Safety portion of section
24213(b) will be met. NHTSA will fulfill the remaining requirements
when it proposes and finalizes a new rating system for the crash
avoidance technologies in NCAP.
Fourth, this final decision notice fulfills the requirements in
section 24213(c) of the BIL. This section states that, within one year
of the law's enactment, the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation shall establish a roadmap, vetted through the public
comment process, identifying and prioritizing safety opportunities and
technologies that could be used in future roadmaps, establishing a plan
for implementation of NCAP changes, and considering the benefits of
consistency with other U.S. and international rating systems. Section
24213(c) further specifies that the roadmap shall span a term of ten
years, with five-year mid-term and five-year long-term components.
Further, it requires updates to the roadmap at least once every four
years to reflect new Agency interests and diverse stakeholder input
(garnered annually), and in consideration of opportunities to benefit
from collaboration and/or harmonization with third-party safety rating
programs. As will be discussed herein, the Agency is taking steps to
harmonize with existing consumer information rating programs, where
possible and when appropriate, both for this NCAP update and future
initiatives included in the program's roadmap. The Agency's proposed
roadmap includes phased updates, as mandated, and was made available
for public comment as part of the March 2022 RFC notice. As all
relevant comments received have been considered prior to this notice's
finalization, the Agency has fulfilled the requirements of section
24213(c). Additional details for the mid-term and long-term five-year
spans are available in the NCAP Roadmap section of this notice.
3. 2022 U.S. Department of Transportation National Roadway Safety
Strategy (NRSS)
The U.S. Department of Transportation published the National
Roadway Safety Strategy (NRSS) in January 2022.\15\ The NRSS announced
key planned departmental actions aimed at significantly reducing
serious roadway injuries and deaths to reach the Department's long-term
zero roadway fatalities goal. At the core of the NRSS is the
Department-wide adoption of the Safe Systems Approach,\16\ which
focuses on building layers of protection to both prevent crashes from
happening and minimize harm when crashes do occur.
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\15\ U.S. Department of Transportation. (2020). ``National
Roadway Safety Strategy, Version 1.1.'' <a href="https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-02/USDOT-National-Roadway-Safety-Strategy.pdf">https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-02/USDOT-National-Roadway-Safety-Strategy.pdf</a>.
\16\ <a href="https://www.transportation.gov/NRSS/SafeSystem">https://www.transportation.gov/NRSS/SafeSystem</a>.
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With respect to NCAP, the NRSS supports program updates emphasizing
safety features that protect people both inside and outside the
vehicle. These safety features may incorporate consideration of
pedestrian protection systems, better understanding of impacts to
pedestrians (e.g., specific considerations for children), and may
include automatic emergency braking and lane keeping assistance to
benefit bicyclists and pedestrians. The NCAP program also works to
identify the most promising vehicle technologies to help achieve NRSS's
safety goals, such as alcohol detection systems and driver distraction
mitigation systems. In addition, the NRSS includes a 10-year roadmap
for the program and lists as a key departmental action the initiation
of rulemaking to update the vehicle Monroney label. As part of that
process, the Agency may also consider including information on features
that mitigate safety risks for people outside of the vehicle.
This final decision notice presents NHTSA's initial actions towards
the implementation of this broad, multi-faceted safety strategy for
NCAP that includes improved road safety for both motor vehicle
occupants and people outside of the vehicle, including pedestrians and
other vulnerable road users. Additionally, the 10-year roadmap for the
program presents a plan for the incorporation of future safety
technologies and provides a projected timeline for updating the
Monroney label to include crash avoidance information.
Relatedly, NRSS lists the initiation of a new rulemaking to require
automatic emergency braking and pedestrian automatic emergency braking
on passenger vehicles as a key departmental action. In response to this
action, NHTSA published a final rule on May 9, 2024, establishing a new
Federal motor vehicle safety standard, FMVSS No. 127, ``Automatic
Emergency Braking for Light Vehicles.'' Similar to the changes adopted
by NCAP in this notice, this final rule aims to reduce the frequency
and associated injury and fatalities of rear-end and pedestrian
crashes. Manufacturers must comply with the final rule by September 1,
2029.\17\ This final decision notice will upgrade NCAP to provide
consumers with additional vehicle safety information on AEB and PAEB
technologies to help them make more informed purchasing decisions.
NHTSA will identify vehicles that are equipped with these recommended
technologies and pass NHTSA's performance criteria by way of check
marks on the NHTSA website starting with model year 2026
[[Page 95918]]
vehicles, as discussed in the following sections. Although the final
rule and this decision on NCAP rely on the agency's separate
authorities, NHTSA has sought to ensure that the revised test
procedures for NCAP and the AEB final rule are compatible with one
another, such that a manufacturer would be able to design a system that
both received NCAP credit and would meet the requirements contained in
the final rule.\18\ NHTSA believes these collective efforts will lead
to more rapid and complete market penetration of AEB and PAEB
technologies.
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\17\ Vehicles produced by small-volume manufacturers, final-
stage manufacturers, and alterers must be equipped with a compliant
AEB system by September 1, 2030.
\18\ See Appendix.
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II. Summary of Updates to NCAP and Roadmap for Future Updates
A brief summary of the updates to NCAP included in this final
decision notice is provided below, along with the finalized 10-year
roadmap for future updates to NCAP.
Updates To Crash Imminent Braking (CIB), Dynamic Brake Support (DBS),
and Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Evaluations
This notice modifies the existing test conditions, evaluation
procedure, and performance criteria for crash imminent braking (CIB)
and dynamic brake support (DBS) systems, subject to the same test
scenarios currently used in NCAP.\19\ An overview of the amended test
scenarios (Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS), Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM), and
Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)) and test conditions (subject vehicle
(SV) speed, principal other vehicle (POV) speed, POV headway, and POV
deceleration) required to receive passing credit for AEB systems (i.e.,
CIB and DBS collectively) in NCAP is shown in Tables 1 and 2. NHTSA
will test vehicles starting with the lowest test speed for a test
scenario and incrementally increase test speed according to the test
matrix in Tables 1 and 2, with only one trial \20\ conducted per test
condition. The passing criterion for a test trial is no contact between
the subject vehicle and principal other vehicle. If the subject vehicle
contacts the principal other vehicle during a test trial, the vehicle
fails the assessed test condition and the AEB test overall, whether CIB
or DBS. In the event of subject vehicle-to-principal other vehicle
contact, testing will cease for the test condition, respective test
scenario, the AEB test being performed (i.e., CIB or DBS), and the AEB
assessment overall.\21\ NHTSA will also continue to conduct the false
positive \22\ test scenario currently used in NCAP, but has modified
the test conditions and requirements for passing performance. This test
scenario evaluates the propensity of a vehicle's DBS system to activate
inappropriately in a non-critical driving scenario that would not
present a safety risk to the vehicle's occupants. A vehicle must pass
each of the 19 required CIB test conditions to obtain credit for CIB
and must also separately pass each of the 17 required DBS test
conditions to obtain credit for DBS.
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\19\ CIB and DBS systems are collectively known as automatic
emergency braking (AEB).
\20\ Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests
conducted under the same test conditions (including test speed) with
the same subject vehicle.
\21\ In essence, because the Agency will provide an overall
assessment for AEB performance, if a vehicle fails a trial run in
the DBS test, testing will cease for the DBS assessment, and CIB
assessments will not be conducted because the vehicle will have
failed the AEB assessment overall.
\22\ For purposes of this document, NHTSA uses ``false
positive'' and ``false activation'' interchangeably, and the Agency
intends for them to refer to the same situations.
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NHTSA is consolidating forward collision warning (FCW) testing to
assess and evaluate FCW functionality during CIB and DBS testing in all
test scenarios except NHTSA's false positive tests. For evaluations
during CIB and DBS testing, the test vehicle must issue an FCW prior to
the onset of automatic braking (as defined by the instant the subject
vehicle deceleration reaches at least 0.15g) for the vehicle to pass
each test trial run conducted as part of NCAP's CIB and DBS testing. If
the required FCW is not issued prior to the onset of automatic braking
imparted by CIB, the vehicle will fail the test trial and CIB/DBS
assessment overall. NHTSA will conduct the AEB evaluation by (1) fully
releasing the subject vehicle's accelerator pedal (at any rate) within
500 milliseconds (ms) after an FCW is issued (during CIB and DBS
evaluations, and whether before or after automatic braking has begun),
and (2) initiating manual (robotic) brake application at a time that
corresponds to 1.0 <plus-minus> 0.1 seconds after issuance of the
required FCW signals (during DBS evaluations). A FCW must be presented
to the vehicle operator via a minimum of two sensory modalities to
receive credit in each of NCAP's CIB and DBS tests (except for the
false positive test). A vehicle must present, at a minimum, an FCW
comprised of visual and auditory signals. Finally, Revision G of the AB
Dynamics (ABD) Global Vehicle Target (GVT) will be used as the
principal other vehicle in NCAP testing instead of the currently used
Strikable Surrogate Vehicle (SSV) test device. Other details of the
test conditions and response to comments on updating CIB, DBS, and FCW
evaluations are provided in relevant sections in this notice.
Table 1--Adopted CIB Test Scenarios and Conditions
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POV
Test no. Test scenario SV speed (kph POV speed (kph POV headway (m deceleration Requirement to pass
(mph)) (mph)) (ft.)) (g)
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1......................................... LVS 40 (24.9) 0 n/a n/a No SV-to-POV contact during
any test trial.
2......................................... 50 (31.1) 0 n/a n/a
3......................................... 60 (37.3) 0 n/a n/a
4......................................... 70 (43.5) 0 n/a n/a
5......................................... 80 (49.7) 0 n/a n/a
6......................................... LVM 40 (24.9) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
7......................................... 50 (31.1) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
8......................................... 60 (37.3) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
9......................................... 70 (43.5) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
10........................................ 80 (49.7) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
11........................................ LVD 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 40 (131.2) 0.3
12........................................ 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 12 (39.4) 0.3
13........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 40 (131.2) 0.3
14........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 12 (39.4) 0.3
15........................................ 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 40 (131.2) 0.5
16........................................ 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 12 (39.4) 0.5
17........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 40 (131.2) 0.5
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18........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 12 (39.4) 0.5
19........................................ False Positive 80 (49.7) n/a n/a n/a SV peak deceleration <0.25g
(STP)
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Table 2--Adopted DBS Test Scenarios and Conditions
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POV
Test no. Test scenario SV speed (kph POV speed (kph POV headway (m deceleration Requirement to pass
(mph)) (mph)) (ft.)) (g)
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1......................................... LVS 70 (43.5) 0 n/a n/a No SV-to-POV contact during
any test trial.
2......................................... 80 (49.7) 0 n/a n/a
3......................................... 90 (55.9) 0 n/a n/a
4......................................... 100 (62.1) 0 n/a n/a
5......................................... LVM 70 (43.5) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
6......................................... 80 (49.7) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
7......................................... 90 (55.9) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
8......................................... 100 (62.1) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
9......................................... LVD 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 40 (131.2) 0.3
10........................................ 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 12 (39.4) 0.3
11........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 40 (131.2) 0.3
12........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 12 (39.4) 0.3
13........................................ 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 40 (131.2) 0.5
14........................................ 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 12 (39.4) 0.5
15........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 40 (131.2) 0.5
16........................................ 80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 12 (39.4) 0.5
17........................................ False Positive 80 (49.7) n/a n/a n/a SV peak deceleration <0.25g
(STP) over the baseline peak
imparted by manual braking.
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Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking Evaluation
NHTSA is adding the evaluation of pedestrian automatic emergency
braking (PAEB) to NCAP using four crossing test scenarios and two in-
path test scenarios to evaluate PAEB in daylight and darkness lighting
conditions with no overhead lights. For the crossing scenarios (S1), a
walking adult or running child pedestrian mannequin crosses
perpendicular to the vehicle's line of travel from either the driver's
left or right side. For the in-path scenarios (S4), an adult pedestrian
mannequin is slightly overlapped with the front of the vehicle and is
either facing away while standing in front of the vehicle, or walking
away from the vehicle, parallel to the flow of traffic.
The subject vehicle's lower beam headlamps will be used during all
NCAP PAEB testing in dark lighting conditions, and the upper beam
headlamps will not be engaged either manually or automatically by way
of an advanced lighting system, such as adaptive driving beams, unless
such a system cannot be deactivated. This requirement will apply even
to those systems that are active by default when low beam headlamps are
first engaged. The performance criterion for NCAP's PAEB tests will be
no contact with the pedestrian mannequin. The 4activePA Adult and
4activePA Child pedestrian test mannequins (articulating mannequins)
will be used for NCAP's PAEB evaluation.
NHTSA will test for each of the adopted PAEB test conditions at a
minimum subject vehicle speed threshold of 10 kph (6.2 mph), increasing
the subject vehicle speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments until the
maximum speed threshold is reached, so long as the test vehicle does
not contact the pedestrian mannequin during each progressive speed
tested. For test conditions S1a, S1b, S1e, S4a, and S4c, the Agency is
adopting a maximum subject vehicle speed threshold of 60 kph (37.3 mph)
for both daylight and darkness testing. For test condition S1d, NHTSA
is adopting a maximum subject vehicle speed threshold of 60 kph (37.3
mph) for daylight testing and 40 kph (24.9 mph) for darkness testing.
Should the subject vehicle contact the pedestrian mannequin during the
initial run for any test speed, testing will cease for the test
condition, respective test scenario, and PAEB testing overall for the
particular lighting condition. Only one trial will be conducted per
test condition and vehicles must pass all required tests (i.e., no
contact with pedestrian mannequin) to receive PAEB credit for the
relevant lighting condition.
An overview of test scenarios and test parameters (pedestrian size,
test speed, pedestrian motion, overlap, and obstruction) is provided in
Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3--Adopted NCAP PAEB Daylight Test Conditions and Variants
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Test speeds (kph (mph))
Test condition Size Movement Path origin Overlap (%) Obstruction Test no. -------------------------------
classification SV Pedestrian
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S4c............................... Adult (Facing Away). Walk................ Right............... 25.................. No.................. 1 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
[[Page 95920]]
2 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
3 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
4 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
5 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
6 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
S4a............................... Adult (Facing Away). Stationary.......... Right............... 25.................. No.................. 7 10 (6.2) 0
8 20 (12.4) 0
9 30 (18.6) 0
10 40 (24.9) 0
11 50 (31.1) 0
12 60 (37.3) 0
S1b............................... Adult............... Walk................ Right............... 50.................. No.................. 13 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
14 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
15 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
16 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
17 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
18 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
S1a............................... Adult............... Walk................ Right............... 25.................. No.................. 19 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
20 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
21 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
22 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
23 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
24 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
S1e............................... Adult............... Run................. Left................ 50.................. No.................. 25 10 (6.2) 8 (5.0)
26 20 (12.4) 8 (5.0)
27 30 (18.6) 8 (5.0)
28 40 (24.9) 8 (5.0)
29 50 (31.1) 8 (5.0)
30 60 (37.3) 8 (5.0)
S1d............................... Child............... Run................. Right............... 50.................. Yes................. 31 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
32 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
33 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
34 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
35 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
36 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
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Table 4--Adopted NCAP PAEB Darkness Test Conditions and Variants
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Test speeds (kph (mph))
Test condition Size Movement Path origin Overlap (%) Obstruction Test no. -------------------------------
classification SV Pedestrian
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S4c............................... Adult (Facing Away). Walk................ Right............... 25.................. No.................. 1 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
2 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
3 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
4 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
5 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
6 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
S4a............................... Adult (Facing Away). Stationary.......... Right............... 25.................. No.................. 7 10 (6.2) 0
8 20 (12.4) 0
9 30 (18.6) 0
10 40 (24.9) 0
11 50 (31.1) 0
12 60 (37.3) 0
S1b............................... Adult............... Walk................ Right............... 50%................. No.................. 13 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
14 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
15 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
16 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
17 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
18 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
S1a............................... Adult............... Walk................ Right............... 25.................. No.................. 19 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
20 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
21 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
22 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
23 50 (31.1) 5 (3.1)
24 60 (37.3) 5 (3.1)
[[Page 95921]]
S1e............................... Adult............... Run................. Left................ 50.................. No.................. 25 10 (6.2) 8 (5.0)
26 20 (12.4) 8 (5.0)
27 30 (18.6) 8 (5.0)
28 40 (24.9) 8 (5.0)
29 50 (31.1) 8 (5.0)
30 60 (37.3) 8 (5.0)
S1d............................... Child............... Run................. Right............... 50.................. Yes................. 31 10 (6.2) 5 (3.1)
32 20 (12.4) 5 (3.1)
33 30 (18.6) 5 (3.1)
34 40 (24.9) 5 (3.1)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* All darkness testing to occur without the use of overhead artificial lighting.
Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW) and Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
Evaluation
This notice adds assessments for two blind spot technologies, BSW
and BSI, to NCAP's crash avoidance program. Blind spot warning (BSW)
and blind spot intervention (BSI) will be evaluated separately in
individual tests conducted in daylight with the principal other vehicle
on the left and right side of the subject vehicle, with the subject
vehicle turn signal indicator activated and not activated. BSW will be
evaluated using tests representing the Straight Lane Converge and
Diverge and Straight Lane Pass-by scenarios,\23\ using an actual
vehicle (representing a high production mid-size passenger car) as the
principal other vehicle. For tests where the turn signal is not
activated, a visual warning signal in the side mirror or the A-pillar
must be issued within a specified time as detailed in the BSW test
procedure. For tests where the turn signal is activated, an additional
warning modality (i.e., a dual-modality warning) or an escalating
visual warning signal (e.g., switches from steady-burning to flashing)
is required within the time specified in the BSW test procedure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The two scenarios for assessing BSW were proposed in the
March 2022 RFC notice and are described in a later section of this
notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the BSW Straight Lane Converge and Diverge scenario, the test
speed for both the subject vehicle and principal other vehicle will be
72.4 kph (45.0 mph). For the BSW Straight Lane Pass-by scenario, NHTSA
will conduct the lowest speed differential condition (subject vehicle/
principal other vehicle speeds of 72.4/80.5 kph (45.0/50.0 mph)) first.
If the subject vehicle issues a passing BSW during the run, the
principal other vehicle speed will be incrementally increased by 8.0
kph (5.0 mph) and testing will continue with one run conducted per
speed differential condition until a principal other vehicle speed of
104.6 kph (65.0 mph) is reached. Testing will then be repeated
following a similar methodology for principal other vehicle movement on
the opposite side of the subject vehicle. If, for any speed
differential condition, the subject vehicle does not issue a passing
BSW, NHTSA will discontinue BSW testing for that vehicle model. Only
one trial per BSW test condition will be conducted. An overview of the
test scenarios and test parameters for the BSW tests is presented in
Table 5. To obtain credit for BSW, the vehicle must pass all 20 tests
for BSW.
Table 5--Blind Spot Warning (BSW) Adopted Test Conditions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SV speed (kph POV speed (kph POV direction of
Test scenario (mph)) (mph)) approach Turn signal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Straight Lane..................... 72.4 (45) 72.4 (45) Right................ Enabled
Converge and Diverge.............. Disabled
Left................. Enabled
Disabled
Straight Lane Pass-by............. 72.4 (45) 80.5 (50) Right................ Enabled
Disabled
Left................. Enabled
Disabled
88.5 (55) Right................ Enabled
Disabled
Left................. Enabled
Disabled
96.6 (60) Right................ Enabled
Disabled
Left................. Enabled
Disabled
104.6 (65) Right................ Enabled
Disabled
Left................. Enabled
Disabled
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 95922]]
BSI will be evaluated using tests representing two lane change
scenarios (Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Constant Headway and
Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Closing Headway) and one false
positive scenario (Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Constant Headway
False Positive Assessment),\24\ using Revision G of the ABD GVT as the
principal other vehicle. All BSI evaluations will be conducted with
adaptive cruise control (ACC), lane centering assistance (LCA), and/or
lane keeping assist (LKA) technologies (if equipped and if the systems
can be disengaged) turned off.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ These three scenarios for assessing BSI were proposed in
the March 2022 RFC notice and are described in a later section of
the notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the BSI Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Constant Headway and
the False Positive tests, the test speed for both the subject vehicle
and principal other vehicle will be 72.4 kph (45.0 mph). For the BSI
Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Closing Headway tests, the subject
vehicle test speed will be 72.4 kph (45.0 mph) and the principal other
vehicle speed will be 80.5 kph (50 mph). In these tests, after a short
period of steady-state driving, the subject vehicle driver (i.e.,
robot) initiates a lane change and follows an 800 m (2,625 ft.) radius
curved path towards the principal other vehicles' travel lane. The
subject vehicle driver then releases the steering wheel upon the
subject vehicle exiting the curve so as to achieve a steady state
lateral velocity of 0.7 <plus-minus> 0.1 m/s (2.3 <plus-minus> 0.3 ft./
s) relative to the line separating the subject vehicle and principal
other vehicle travel lanes. Each test scenario is conducted with turn
signal enabled and disabled and for both left and right lane change
directions.
To pass the Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Constant Headway and
the Subject Vehicle Lane Change with Closing Headway tests, the BSI
system must prevent any contact between the subject vehicle and the
principal other vehicle. The subject vehicle BSI intervention must not
cause a secondary departure on the opposite side of the lane. To pass a
false positive test, the BSI system must not intervene. Only one trial
per BSI test condition will be conducted. An overview of the test
scenarios and test parameters for the BSI tests is presented in Table
6. To obtain credit for BSI, the vehicle must pass all 12 tests.
Table 6--Blind Spot Intervention (BSI) Adopted Test Conditions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SV speed POV speed Lane change
Test scenario (kph (mph)) (kph (mph)) direction Turn signal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SV Lane Change with Constant Headway...... 72.4 (45) 72.4 (45) Left Enabled.
Disabled.
........... ........... Right Enabled.
Disabled.
SV Lane Change with Closing Headway....... 72.4 (45) 80.5 (50) Left Enabled.
Disabled.
........... ........... Right Enabled.
Disabled.
SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, 72.4 (45) 72.4 (45) Left Enabled.
False Positive Assessment. Disabled.
........... ........... Right Enabled.
Disabled.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adding Lane Keeping Assist (LKA) and Enhancing Lane Departure Warning
(LDW) Evaluation
NHTSA is adding the assessment of lane keeping assist (LKA) into
NCAP and integrating the evaluation of lane departure warning (LDW)
with the LKA evaluation. To evaluate a vehicle's LDW sensitivity and
LKA intervention capabilities, NHTSA's testing includes the use of a
single solid white lane line, dashed yellow lane line, or Botts' dots
(raised pavement markers) on either the right or left side of the
vehicle's travel lane, depending on testing direction. Additional tests
will be conducted with two lane lines (solid yellow and dashed white
lines, and dashed white and solid white lines) to evaluate a vehicle's
ability to properly correct its heading to prevent a secondary lane
departure after the initial intervention. For the LDW/LKA tests, the
subject vehicle, traveling at a speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph), heads
towards the lane line using an initial path defined by a 1,200 m (3,937
ft.) radius curve. Tests will be conducted by incrementing the lateral
velocity of the subject vehicle's approach toward the lane line from
0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s) in 0.1 m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments.
To pass the criteria of the LDW/LKA evaluation test, the subject
vehicle must issue a visual signal when the lateral position of the
vehicle, represented by a two-dimensional polygon, is within 0.75 m
(2.5 ft.) of the inboard edge of the lane line and before the lane
departure exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). The LKA intervention itself will serve
as a secondary haptic alert component. Neither an LDW nor LKA
intervention shall occur when a vehicle has not departed its lane and
is farther than 0.75 m (2.5 ft.) from the inboard edge of the lane
line. In addition, the visual warning signal and LKA intervention must
be issued before the lane departure exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.), and the
visual alert must be issued prior to, or concurrent with, the start of
the LKA intervention. Only one trial per test condition is conducted.
An overview of the test scenarios and test parameters for the LDW/LKA
tests is presented in Table 7. To obtain credit for LDW and LKA, the
vehicle must pass all 50 tests performed during the LDW/LKA performance
assessment.
[[Page 95923]]
Table 7--Lane Departure Warning (LDW)/Lane Keeping Assist (LKA) Adopted Test Conditions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passing criteria
Departure Lateral ------------------------------------------------------------
Test scenario Line type direction velocity (m/ Maximum SV excursion
s (ft./s)) (m (ft.)) LDW alert issued (m (ft.))
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Departure..................... Solid White.............. Left 0.2 (0.7) -0.3 (-1.0) 0.75 to -0.3
(Single Straight Lane Line)........... 0.3 (1.0) (2.5 to -1.0).
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Solid White.............. Right 0.2 (0.7)
0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Dashed Yellow............ Left 0.2 (0.7)
0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Dashed Yellow............ Right 0.2 (0.7)
0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Raised Pavement Markers.. Left 0.2 (0.7)
0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Raised Pavement Markers.. Right 0.2 (0.7)
0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Secondary Departure................... Solid Yellow (L)/Dashed Left 0.2 (0.7) -0.3 (-1.0) 0.75 to -0.3
(Dual Straight Lane Line)............. White (R). 0.3 (1.0) (2.5 to -1.0).
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Solid Yellow (L)/Dashed Right 0.2 (0.7)
White (R). 0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Dashed White (L)/Solid Left 0.2 (0.7)
White (R). 0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
Dashed White (L)/Solid Right 0.2 (0.7)
White (R). 0.3 (1.0)
0.4 (1.3)
0.5 (1.6)
0.6 (2.0)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCAP Roadmap 2024-2033
NHTSA has developed a final roadmap to update NCAP through multiple
phases from 2024 through 2033, with mid-term roadmap items spanning the
period 2024-2028, and long-term items spanning the period 2024-2033.
The NCAP roadmap includes four phases for each NCAP initiative, along
with a completion milestone for each phase. The four phases are: (1)
Research phase, if applicable, (2) Request for comment (RFC) phase, (3)
Final decision phase, and (4) Implementation phase. NHTSA plans updates
to NCAP in the following three safety programs: crashworthiness, crash
avoidance, and vulnerable road user safety. A summary of the mid-term
and long-term actions for this roadmap is presented in Tables 8 and 9,
respectively. The timeframe shown for the research, RFC, and final
decision phases is in calendar years. The start of the implementation
phase is in the fourth quarter of the calendar year shown in the two
tables. Note that the implementation phase starts with vehicle models
of the following calendar year shown in Tables 8 and 9. NHTSA plans to
update the NCAP roadmap approximately every four years, with timelines
updated accordingly. Details of the NCAP roadmap are provided in the
roadmap section of this notice.
[[Page 95924]]
Table 8--Roadmap for Mid-Term Upgrades to NCAP
[In calendar years]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Implementation
Potential updates to NCAP evaluations Research RFC phase decision phase start in
phase phase 4th quarter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crash Avoidance Program:
Enhanced FCW, CIB, DBS............................. ........... ........... 2023-2024 2025
LDW+LKA and BSW+BSI................................ ........... ........... 2023-2024 2025
Rear Automatic Braking............................. 2024 2025 2025-2026 2027
Crashworthiness Program:
THOR-50M in Frontal Crash Tests and HIII-05F * in 2024 2024-2025 2025-2026 2027
Driver Position in Frontal Rigid Barrier Crash
Test..............................................
Frontal Oblique Crash Test with THOR-50M........... 2024 2024-2025 2025-2026 2027
WorldSID-50M in Side Impact Tests, and SID-IIs ** 2024 2024-2025 2025-2026 2027
Rib Deflections for Injury Risk Assessment........
Vulnerable Road User (VRU) Safety Program:
PAEB (day and night-time).......................... ........... ........... 2023-2024 2025
Crashworthiness Pedestrian Protection.............. ........... ........... 2023-2024 2025
Unattended Child Alert System (Availability of ........... ........... ........... 2024
Direct Sensing Technologies Noted in Safety
Features Section on Ratings Webpage)..............
Bicyclist and Motorcyclist AEB (along path 2024-2025 2025 2025-2026 2027
scenarios)........................................
Vehicle Safety Rating:
Rating System for Crash Avoidance Technologies..... ........... ........... 2024-2025 2027
Rating Systems for Crashworthiness, VRU Safety, and ........... 2024-2025 2025-2026 2027
Overall Safety....................................
Monroney Label Rulemaking--Crash Avoidance, 2023-2024 2025 2025-2026 2027
Crashworthiness, VRU Safety, and Overall Safety
Ratings...........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The advanced 5th percentile female frontal impact test dummy, THOR-05F, is currently under evaluation/
refinement and is included in the long-term NCAP update in this roadmap. Until THOR-05F is completed and
included in NCAP, NHTSA will use the current HIII-05F dummy in frontal crash tests.
** The advanced 5th percentile female side impact test dummy, WorldSID-05F, is currently under development and
its use in NCAP will be considered in the long-term section of this roadmap. Until WorldSID-05F is included in
NCAP, the SID-IIs will be used in NCAP along with thoracic and abdominal deflection measurements.
Table 9--Roadmap for Long-Term Upgrades to NCAP
[In calendar years]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Implementation
Potential updates to NCAP Evaluations Research RFC phase decision phase start in
phase phase 4th quarter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crash Avoidance Program:
Headlighting System (Advanced Driving Beam, Semi- 2024-2026 2026-2027 2028 2030
Automatic Beam Switching, and Lower Beam Headlamp)
AEB for Intersection Crash Scenarios............... 2025-2027 2028 2029 2031
Enhanced LKA (Higher Speed, Curved Road and/or Road 2024-2026 2027 2028 2030
Edge Detection Scenarios).........................
Enhanced AEB (Speed and Additional Scenarios)...... 2026-2028 2029 2030 2032
Driver Monitoring Systems--Distracted/Drowsy 2023-2027 2028 2029 2031
Driving...........................................
Intelligent Speed Assist........................... 2024-2028
Crashworthiness Program:
THOR-05F in Frontal Crash Tests in Front and Rear 2023-2027 2027-2028 2028-2029 2031
Seating Positions.................................
WorldSID-05F in Side Impact Crash Tests............ 2023-2029 2029-2030 2030-2031 2033
VRU Safety Program:
Enhanced AEB for Bicyclists and Motorcyclists in 2025-2026 2027 2028 2030
Intersection Crashes..............................
BSW and BSI Evaluation for Bicyclists and 2025-2026 2027 2028 2030
Motorcyclists Crash Protection....................
Crashworthiness Pedestrian Protection using aPLI *. 2024-2025 2026 2027 2029
Enhanced PAEB (Speed and Additional Scenarios)..... 2026-2028 2029 2030 2032
Driver Visibility.................................. 2023-2027
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* aPLI is the advanced pedestrian legform impactor. It assesses pedestrian injuries to the knee, upper leg, and
lower leg in impacts with the front of vehicles.
III. Background
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP) supports the Agency's mission to reduce
the number of fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S. roadways by
providing important vehicle safety information to consumers to inform
their purchasing decisions. The last major NCAP upgrade occurred on
July 11, 2008, and took effect with model year 2011 vehicles.\25\ That
program update included the Agency's adoption of new frontal and side
anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) and associated injury
criteria, a new oblique side pole test, and a new overall rating system
combining the individual frontal, side, and rollover ratings. NHTSA
also expanded NCAP to include assessment of three advanced driver
assistance systems (ADAS) technologies: forward collision warning
(FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), and electronic stability
[[Page 95925]]
control (ESC).\26\ Through that expansion, the Agency began to identify
which vehicles were equipped with these technologies and met specified
performance requirements, making this information available on the
NHTSA website. In November 2015, NHTSA also added crash imminent
braking (CIB) and dynamic brake support (DBS) technologies (also known
as automatic emergency braking, or AEB technology) to its ADAS
assessments, with implementation beginning with model year 2018
vehicles.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
\26\ ESC was removed from the Agency's list of recommended ADAS
technologies through NCAP beginning in model year 2014 when the
technology became mandated under Federal motor vehicle safety
standard (FMVSS) No. 126, ``Electronic stability control.'' NHTSA
also included rear video systems in its list of recommended
technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to 2017 and removed
that technology from its list when it became mandated under FMVSS
No. 111, ``Rear visibility.''
\27\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2015, the Agency published a Request for Comments (RFC)
notice with planned changes to the overall NCAP program. The notice
sought comment on NCAP's potential use of enhanced tools and techniques
to evaluate the safety of vehicles, generate star ratings, and
encourage further vehicle safety developments.\28\ The RFC notice also
outlined planned changes for the crashworthiness, crash avoidance, and
ratings categories. Many commenters responding to the December 2015 RFC
notice stated it lacked sufficient detail and supporting information to
allow for thorough review and comment. Commenters also expressed
concern over test procedure repeatability and reproducibility based on
the RFC notice's lack of detail, performance criteria, and non-
standardized test devices. NHTSA hosted a public meeting in October
2018 to re-engage stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the
Agency plan the future of NCAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 9, 2022, NHTSA published an RFC notice proposing changes
to NCAP in response to the comments received from the 2015 RFC and
public meetings, which partially fulfills the Agency's obligations
under the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act
directive and recent mandates included in section 24213 of the November
2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). The proposed changes include:
<bullet> Changes to test procedures and performance criteria,
including an increase in stringency, for the four currently recommended
ADAS technologies in NCAP (FCW, LDW, DBS, and CIB) to enhance
evaluation of the systems' capabilities in current vehicle models,
reduce test burden, and promote harmonization with other consumer
information programs.
<bullet> The addition of four new ADAS technologies--blind spot
warning (BSW), blind spot intervention (BSI), lane keeping assist
(LKA), and pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB)--to those
currently recommended by NCAP and highlighted on the Agency's website.
The Agency proposed to incorporate these four new ADAS technologies
into NCAP because data indicates they satisfy NHTSA's four
prerequisites for inclusion in the program: (1) a known safety need
exists; (2) system designs (countermeasures) exist that can mitigate
the safety problem; (3) existing or new system designs have the
potential to improve safety; and (4) a performance-based objective test
procedure exists that can assess system performance.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ See NCAP Rating FAQ No. 07, <a href="http://nhtsa.gov/ratings">http://nhtsa.gov/ratings</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> A ``roadmap'' of the Agency's plans to update NCAP in
phases over the next ten years, setting forth NHTSA's mid-term and
long-term strategies for upgrading the program using a phased approach.
The roadmap presents an estimated timeframe for the issuance of phased
request for comment notices to incorporate various potential program
components. However, NHTSA would only issue proposals to update the
program as technologies mature and are considered ready for inclusion
such that they meet the program's four prerequisites. Following each
proposal, NHTSA will issue a final decision notice responding to the
comments received and providing the Agency's decisions for that
particular program update, as well as the lead time for implementation.
In addition to these proposed changes, the RFC notice proposed
operational changes to streamline the information provided to
consumers. Specifically, the Agency proposed a process for updating
ADAS-related information provided to consumers to reflect changes made
to vehicles during the middle of a model year. Further, although not
explicitly proposed in the RFC notice, the Agency sought comment on the
following topics to help guide future proposals:
<bullet> The Agency's plan to develop a new ADAS rating system for
NCAP to provide consumers with improved data to compare and shop for
vehicles and spur improved ADAS performance. NCAP currently assigns
ratings to vehicles based on their performance in crashworthiness
(i.e., frontal and side impact) and rollover tests, but the program has
no complementary rating system to differentiate performance among
vehicles' crash avoidance systems. Instead, NCAP only recommends
certain ADAS technologies to shoppers and identifies vehicles that
offer the recommended technologies that pass the program's system
performance criteria.
<bullet> Steps to include crash avoidance rating information on a
vehicle's window sticker (i.e., the Monroney label) at the point of
sale, consistent with the 2015 FAST Act. The Agency noted that it is
currently conducting consumer research to determine how best to present
such information to maximize its effectiveness in informing vehicle
purchasing decisions. NHTSA stated that it would consider the
information gained from this research in conjunction with related
comments received in response to the 2022 RFC to develop a proposal for
a revised label, which will be detailed in a separate RFC notice.
<bullet> Expanding NCAP to include safety technologies that promote
NHTSA's continuing efforts to combat unsafe driving or riding
behaviors, such as speeding and drowsy, impaired, distracted, and
unbelted driving, as well as safety technologies that may prevent
unintentional human behavior that may result in injury or death, such
as vehicular heatstroke.
<bullet> The Agency's ideas for updating several programmatic
aspects of NCAP, including adding new crash test dummies, updating the
rollover risk curve, and enhancing the presentation and dissemination
of safety information provided to consumers to improve the program.
More specifically, NHTSA requested comment on several potential ways to
revise the 5-star safety ratings system, including adopting a points-
based rating system concept, revising the baseline risk, and
incorporating decimal or half-star ratings.
<bullet> Additional considerations that would allow NCAP to remain
effective and relevant to improve vehicle safety, such as proposed
updates to the NCAP website and the development of an NCAP database to
modernize the operational aspects of the program, including a new
vehicle information submission process for vehicle manufacturers.
Following publication of the March 2022 RFC notice, NHTSA received
comments generally supportive of the Agency's proposal to adopt
additional crash avoidance elements. Additional details of NHTSA's
proposal for each of
[[Page 95926]]
the items listed above is provided in later sections.
Summary of General Comments on Proposed Updates to NCAP
NHTSA received over 4,000 comments in response to the March 2022
RFC notice.\30\ The Agency received comments from a wide variety of
commenters including safety advocacy groups, trade associations,
vehicle manufacturers, suppliers and developers, government agencies
and associations, test laboratories, an insurance company, a research/
consulting firm, and individual members of the public. A summary of the
commenters to the March 2022 RFC notice is provided in Table 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The March 2022 RFC notice requested comment on a number of
topics, including emerging technologies, and potential future
updates to NCAP, that have not been proposed, and thus are not
addressed, in the present notice. Details of the comments received
and the Agency's response to these comments will be provided in
future RFC notices relevant to those topics.
Table 10--Commenters to the March 2022 NCAP RFC Notice
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Advocacy Groups....... AAA Inc. (AAA), AARP, Advanced Mobility
Group, Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety (Advocates), American
Motorcyclist Association (AMA), Center
for Auto Safety (CAS), Consortium for
Constituents with Disabilities
Transportation Task Force (CCD
Transportation Task Force), Consumer
Reports (CR), Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety (IIHS), Kids and Car
Safety (KAC), Families for Safe Streets
(FSS), Intelligent Transportation
Society of America (ITS America),
Massachusetts Vision Zero Coalition, The
League of American Bicyclists (The
League), Vision Zero Network (VZN), and
ZF Group.
Industry Trade Associations.. Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto
Innovators), Automotive Safety Council
(ASC), Motor & Equipment Manufacturers
Association (MEMA), Motorcycle Industry
Council and Motorcycle Safety Foundation
(MIC/MSF), National Automobile Dealers
Association (NADA), Specialty Equipment
Market Association (SEMA), The Lidar
Coalition.
Vehicle Manufacturers........ American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda),
BMW of North America, LLC (BMW), FCA US
LLC (FCA), Ford Motor Company (Ford),
General Motors (GM), Hyundai America
Technical Center, Inc. (HATCI), Hyundai
Motor North America (Hyundai), Mercedes-
Benz, LLC, a division of Mercedes-Benz
Automotive Group (Mercedes-Benz), North
American Subaru, Inc. (Subaru), Rivian
Automotive, LLC (Rivian), Tesla, Inc.
(Tesla), Toyota Motor North America
(Toyota).
Suppliers and Developers..... Aptiv PLC (Aptiv), Bosch LLC (Bosch),
DENSO Corporation (DENSO), Intel
Corporation (Intel), Robert Vayyar,
Velodyne Lidar, Inc. (Velodyne).
Government Agencies and American Association of State Highway and
Associations. Transportation Officials (AASHTO),
National Association of City
Transportation Officials (NACTO),
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), New York City Department of
Transportation & New York City
Department of Citywide Administrative
Services, Vision Zero Task Force (NYC
DOT/NYC DCAS, Vision Zero Task Force).
Test Laboratories............ Applus IDIADA (IDIADA), Dynamic Research
Inc. (DRI), Transportation Research
Center, Inc. (TRC).
Insurance Companies.......... State Farm Insurance Companies (State
Farm).
Research/Consulting Companies Safe Streets Research & Consulting (Safe
Streets).
General Public............... Individuals.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many commenters stated they support NHTSA's goal of providing
comparative safety information to consumers through NCAP but encouraged
the Agency to further leverage NCAP to ensure consumers have a
comprehensive understanding of vehicle safety. Commenters also stated
that more testing, rating, and information-sharing with consumers about
the functionalities of advanced safety technologies via NCAP will
promote the technologies' use in future vehicles and advance vehicle
safety. The Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators) stated
it supports NHTSA's efforts to modernize NCAP, noting that a key
benefit of a well-developed and technically robust NCAP is the
introduction of advanced safety technologies and performance evaluation
through market incentives (objective ratings) in a structured and
predictable manner via the development of testing procedures,
evaluation metrics, and safety benefits. Auto Innovators stated that
doing so will lead to more vehicles being equipped with new ADAS
technologies, ultimately decreasing technology costs, and bolstering
the case for potential regulation.
Many commenters, including those who have lost loved ones in
automotive accidents, expressed support for the proposed NCAP changes
but stated they do not go far enough, noting the U.S. program is behind
other countries' NCAP programs in updating, implementing, and
``standardizing'' NCAP with proven safety technologies to save more
lives. The Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), the
Consumer Federation of America, and many others expressed concern that
the approach described in the March 2022 RFC is not sufficiently
specific and lacks firm commitments on key updates to the program.
Further, the National Safety Council (NSC) stated that its data
continues to suggest NHTSA is not doing enough to address roadway
safety, with thousands of people dying in preventable crashes each
year.
Several commenters pointed out that fatalities involving
pedestrians and cyclists have been increasing at alarming rates and
urged NHTSA to consider the safety of those outside of the vehicle.
Many cyclist organizations stated that any NCAP updates should include
cyclist AEB testing and tests aimed at increasing cyclist safety. One
individual noted the more than 50 percent increase in annual pedestrian
fatalities in the past decade, stating that safety innovations are
benefiting those inside, not outside, of the vehicle. Many other
individual commenters expressed concern for the safety of pedestrians,
mobility device users, and cyclists amidst rising fatalities from
increasingly large vehicles, suggesting that NHTSA should consider
promoting technologies and performing tests to protect them.
Many commenters expressed support for the Agency's proposed
inclusion of the four new ADAS technologies and for enhancing the
evaluation of ADAS technologies currently in NCAP. However, some
commenters argued the proposal did not go far enough, suggesting that
ADAS technologies (including PAEB) should not just be part of the
voluntary NCAP program but should be mandatory on new vehicles to
reduce fatalities, especially in urban areas. Many commenters also
requested that NHTSA harmonize test procedures and evaluations with
other existing testing protocols like Euro NCAP. While commenters
generally supported the proposed roadmap, some noted that it
[[Page 95927]]
lacked sufficient specificity on future timelines, dates, and required
actions. Commenters requested periodic stakeholder engagement and
collaboration for developing future NCAP roadmaps.
Several commenters also provided detailed responses to questions
NHTSA posed in the March 2022 RFC notice to help guide its decisions.
The following sections discuss in detail: (1) NHTSA's proposal for each
technology, (2) the Agency's response to the comments received to the
questions posed, and (3) final decisions on the proposed changes to
NCAP specific to the technology.
IV. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
NHTSA is updating assessments for FCW and AEB technologies (i.e.,
CIB and DBS) in NCAP's crash avoidance program. As discussed in NHTSA's
March 2022 RFC notice, these technologies, designed to address forward
collisions (rear-end crashes), have the potential to help prevent or
mitigate rear-end pre-crash scenarios representing approximately 1.7
million crashes annually, or 29 percent of all crashes that currently
occur on U.S. roadways.\31\ These crashes result in 1,275 fatalities,
on average, and 883,386 MAIS 1-5 injuries annually, representing 3.8
percent of all fatalities and 32 percent of all injuries,
respectively.\32\ FCW and AEB technologies have proven effective in
reducing crashes, fatalities, and injuries. For instance, as discussed
in the March 2022 RFC notice, the University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute (UMTRI) found that for 3.8 million model year 2013-
2017 GM vehicles, camera-based FCW systems produced an estimated 21
percent reduction in rear-end striking crashes, while the AEB systems
studied (which included a combination of camera-only, radar-only, and
fused camera-radar systems) produced an estimated 46 percent reduction
in the same crash type.\33\ These findings align with a 2017 Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) study,\34\ which concluded that
vehicles equipped with FCW and AEB showed a 50 percent reduction for
the same crash type.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\32\ The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification
system for assessing impact injury severity. AIS ranks individual
injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1=minor,
2=moderate, 3=serious, 4=severe, 5=critical, and 6=maximum
(untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity, or AIS
level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the highest single AIS for a
person with one or more injuries).
\33\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
Motors LLC. UMTRI-2019-6.
\34\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009</a>.
\35\ Low-speed AEB showed a 43% reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Until these technologies are standard equipment on all passenger
vehicles, it is important for NCAP to continue to recommend FCW and AEB
technologies to consumers and to inform them which vehicles have FCW
and AEB technologies meeting NHTSA's performance criteria. Further,
given recent increases in the penetration of FCW and AEB technologies
in the vehicle fleet and improvements to sensors, now is an opportune
time to increase the stringency of the current NCAP performance
requirements for these technologies.
A. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
FCW systems use forward-looking sensors (e.g., radar, lidar, camera
systems, or a combination thereof) that detect objects (e.g., vehicles,
pedestrians) in front of vehicles and issue an alert to the driver. An
FCW system uses the sensors' input to determine the speed of the object
in front of it and the distance between the vehicle and the object. If
the sensing system determines that the closing distance and velocity
\36\ between the driver's vehicle and the object in front of it is such
that a collision may be imminent, the warning system is designed to
induce an immediate crash avoidance response by the vehicle operator.
Warning systems in use today provide drivers with a visual display,
such as an illuminated telltale on or near the instrument panel, an
auditory signal (e.g., buzzer or chime), and/or a haptic signal that
provides tactile feedback (e.g., rapid vibrations of the seat pan or
steering wheel). These signals warn the driver of an impending
collision so the driver may then manually intervene (e.g., apply the
vehicle's brakes or make an evasive steering maneuver) to avoid or
mitigate a crash. FCW systems alone do not brake the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Closing velocity is the rate at which two objects are
getting closer to each other.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA added FCW systems to its NCAP ADAS evaluations in 2008 (with
performance evaluations beginning with model year 2011 vehicles)
because these systems met the Agency's four prerequisites for inclusion
at the time.\37\ In its March 2022 RFC notice, the Agency proposed to
continue to include FCW assessments in NCAP, as it found FCW systems to
be effective, well-accepted by consumers, and widely available in the
current vehicle fleet. For example, in its 2017 study, IIHS \38\ found
that FCW systems reduced rear-end crashes by 27 percent. Further, in a
2019 survey of more than 57,000 Consumer Reports subscribers, 69
percent of vehicle owners reported they were satisfied with their
vehicle's FCW technology.\39\ Currently, manufacturer-submitted data
collected by NHTSA indicates 91 percent of model year 2023 vehicles are
equipped with FCW systems as standard equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
\38\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009</a>.
\39\ Consumer Reports (2019, November), Consumer Perception of
ADAS, <a href="https://data.consumerreports.org/reports/consumer-perceptions-of-adas/">https://data.consumerreports.org/reports/consumer-perceptions-of-adas/</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCAP's Current Forward Collision Warning Test Procedure
The Agency included FCW as a recommended technology in NCAP and
conducted performance evaluations beginning with model year 2011
vehicles. The FCW test procedure adopted at that time is still in use
in the Agency's testing today.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, NCAP's FCW test procedure \41\ consists of three
scenarios that simulate the most frequent types of rear-end crashes.
These include lead vehicle stopped (LVS), lead vehicle decelerating
(LVD), and lead vehicle moving (LVM) scenarios. In each scenario, the
vehicle being evaluated is called the subject vehicle (SV). The SV is
driven by a professional driver who provides the necessary
acceleration, braking, and steering inputs during the test. A
production mid-size passenger car, designated as the principal other
vehicle (POV) during testing, is positioned directly in front of the SV
and is also driven by a professional driver. Time-to-collision (TTC)
criteria are prescribed for each FCW scenario. The TTC for each
scenario is calculated by considering the speed of the SV relative to
the POV at the time of the FCW. If the FCW system fails to issue a
warning within the required time during testing, the SV's professional
test
[[Page 95928]]
driver brakes, or steers away, to avoid a collision with the POV. A
short description of each test scenario and the requirements for a
passing result based on the prescribed TTC is provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013,
February). Forward collision warning system confirmation test.
<a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>. Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0134.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> LVS--The SV encounters a stopped POV directly in front of
it on a straight road. The SV is moving at 72.4 kph (45 mph), and the
POV is stationary. To pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW when the
TTC is at least 2.1 s. See Figure 1 (below) for a scenario diagram.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03DE24.000
<bullet> LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant
deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV
are both driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with an initial headway of 30.0 m
(98.4 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant
deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. To pass this test, the SV must
issue an FCW when the TTC is at least 2.4 s. See Figure 2 (below) for a
scenario diagram.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03DE24.001
<bullet> LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in
front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV are driven at constant
speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. To
pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW when the TTC is at least 2.0
s. See Figure 3 (below) for a scenario diagram.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03DE24.002
Each of these three scenarios is conducted up to seven times. To
pass the NCAP FCW system performance tests, the SV must satisfy the
respective TTC-based performance criteria for at least five out of
seven trials \42\ for each of the three test scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ As noted in the Agency's 2015 AEB final decision notice (80
FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015)), a pass rate of five out of seven tests per
scenario was adopted for NCAP's current FCW test protocol to provide
the Agency with a way to encourage system robustness without
precluding the proliferation of emerging technologies offering the
potential for significant safety benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
One limitation of FCW systems is that, although designed to warn
the driver of an impending rear-end crash, they do not actively and
automatically assist drivers with avoiding rear-end crashes or
mitigating their severity. To address this, CIB and DBS (known
collectively as AEB) both provide significant automatic braking of the
vehicle.\43\ DBS systems provide supplemental braking when sensors
determine that driver-applied braking is insufficient to avoid an
imminent crash. CIB systems provide automatic braking when forward-
looking sensors indicate that a crash is imminent, and the driver has
not braked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Some FCW systems use haptic brake pulses to alert the
driver of a crash-imminent driving situation, but they are not
intended to effectively slow the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research has shown that active safety systems such as AEB provide
greater safety benefits than the corresponding warning systems alone,
such as FCW. In its 2019 study, UMTRI \44\ found that
[[Page 95929]]
AEB systems produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in applicable
rear-end crashes when combined with a forward collision warning, which
alone showed only a 21 percent reduction.\45\ Like FCW systems, AEB
systems are also well-accepted by consumers and widely available in the
current vehicle fleet. In Consumer Reports' 2019 subscriber survey, 81
percent of owners of vehicles equipped with AEB reported they were
satisfied with AEB technology.\46\ Currently, manufacturer-submitted
data collected by NHTSA indicates approximately 91 percent of model
year 2023 vehicles are equipped with AEB systems as standard equipment.
For these reasons, in 2015, NHTSA added CIB and DBS technologies to its
ADAS assessments starting with model year 2018 vehicles, and why the
Agency also proposed to continue to include AEB assessments in NCAP in
its March 2022 RFC notice.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
C.A. (2019, September), Analysis of the field effectiveness of
General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting
systems, The University of Michigan Transportation Research
Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
\45\ The AEB systems studied by UMTRI consisted of camera-only,
radar-only, and fused camera-radar AEB systems, the latter two
systems of which also included adaptive cruise control
functionality.
\46\ Consumer Reports, (2019, November), Consumer Perceptions of
ADAS, <a href="https://data.consumerreports.org/reports/consumer-perceptions-of-adas/">https://data.consumerreports.org/reports/consumer-perceptions-of-adas/</a>.
\47\ Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002. 87 FR 13452. March 9, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
Like FCW (and CIB) systems, DBS systems employ forward-looking
sensors to detect vehicles in the path directly ahead while
simultaneously monitoring the operational state of the driver's vehicle
(e.g., speed, the relative speed of and distance to the lead vehicle,
driver inputs of steering and braking). In response to an FCW or an
imminent crash, a driver may initiate braking to avoid a rear-end
crash. However, research suggests that a driver's brake application may
not take full advantage of the vehicle's foundation braking system in
cases where the driver is inattentive, receives an FCW, and re-engages
in the driving task prior to automatic braking (i.e., CIB) taking
place. In situations where the driver's braking is insufficient to
prevent a collision, DBS can automatically supplement the driver's
braking action to prevent or mitigate the crash.\48\ The NCAP DBS
performance evaluations serve to ensure that the vehicle's supplemental
braking is sufficient to augment the driver's manual brake application
and avoid a collision with the lead vehicle in the tested driving
situations. DBS testing also endeavors to ensure that a vehicle's
automatic brake application (i.e., CIB) is not suppressed in the event
of a driver's manual brake application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ DBS systems differ from traditional brake assist systems
used with the vehicle's foundation brakes. Whereas both systems rely
on brake pedal application rate to determine whether supplemental
braking is required, DBS has a lower activation threshold since it
also uses information from forward-looking sensors to verify that
more braking is needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCAP's Current Dynamic Brake Support Test Procedure
NCAP's current DBS test procedure \49\ consists of the same three
rear-end pre-crash scenarios specified in the FCW system performance
test procedure: LVS, LVD, and LVM. However, most of the test speed
combinations specified in the DBS test procedure differ. The single
exception is that the FCW and DBS test procedures both use an LVM test
performed with SV and POV speeds of 72.4 and 32.2 kph (45 and 20 mph),
respectively. The DBS performance assessment also includes a Steel
Trench Plate (STP) false positive suppression test conducted at two
test speeds. The false positive suppression test series evaluates the
ability of a DBS system to differentiate a steel trench plate, often
found on roadways, from an object presenting a genuine safety risk to
the SV. Although STPs are large and metallic, they are designed to be
driven over without risk of injury to drivers or vehicles. This fourth
test scenario is used to evaluate the propensity of a vehicle's DBS
system to activate inappropriately in this non-critical driving
scenario that would not present a safety risk to the vehicle's
occupants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2015,
October), Dynamic brake support performance evaluation confirmation
test for the New Car Assessment Program, <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>,
Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0006-0026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like NCAP's FCW tests, the vehicle subjected to the DBS test
scenarios is termed the SV. However, unlike NCAP's FCW tests, the DBS
test procedure uses a surrogate vehicle (i.e., a realistic looking
artificial vehicle) as the POV instead of an actual vehicle to limit
the potential for damage to the SV and/or the test equipment in the
event of a collision. Additionally, instead of driver- (human-) based
inputs, like those required in NCAP's FCW tests, a programmable
(robotic) brake controller is used to provide all SV brake pedal
applications made during the DBS system performance evaluations.
The Strikeable Surrogate Vehicle (SSV) is the surrogate vehicle
presently used as the POV by NCAP for the Agency's DBS testing. The
SSV, developed by NHTSA for the purpose of track testing, appears as a
``real'' vehicle to the camera, radar, and lidar sensors used by
existing AEB systems. The SSV system is comprised of (a) a shell,\50\
which is a visually and dimensionally accurate representation of a
compact passenger car; (b) a slider and load frame assembly to which
the shell is attached, (c) a two-rail track on which the slider
operates, (d) a road-based lateral restraint track, and (e) a tow
vehicle, which pulls the SSV and its peripherals down the test track
during the test where the POV (i.e., SSV) must be in motion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ The shell is constructed from lightweight composite
materials with favorable strength-to-weight characteristics,
including carbon fiber, Kevlar[supreg], phenolic, and Nomex
honeycomb. It is also wrapped with a commercially available vinyl
material to simulate paint on the body panels, rear bumper, and a
tinted glass rear window. A foam bumper having a neoprene cover is
attached to the rear of the SSV to reduce the peak forces realized
immediately after an impact from a test vehicle occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the three test scenarios where braking is expected, the SV must
provide enough supplemental braking to completely avoid contact with
the SSV (i.e., POV) to pass a trial run. In the case of the DBS false
positive test scenario, the performance criterion is minimal to no
activation for both test speeds.<SUP>51 52</SUP> A short description of
each DBS system performance test scenario, and the requirements for a
passing result, is provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Minimal activation is defined as a peak SV deceleration
attributable to DBS intervention that is less than or equal to 1.5
times the average of the deceleration recorded for the vehicle's
foundation brake system alone during its approach to the STP. The
1.5 multiplier serves to provide some system flexibility, meaning a
mild DBS intervention is acceptable, but one where the vehicle
thinks it must respond to the STP as if it was a real vehicle is
not.
\52\ Note that the March 2022 notice specified a multiplier of
1.25. This specification was in error.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)--The SV encounters a stopped
POV directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV is moving at
40.2 kph (25 mph) and the POV is stationary. The SV throttle is
released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW, and the SV brake
pedal is manually applied at a TTC of 1.1 s (i.e., at a nominal headway
of 12.2 m (40 ft.)). To pass this test, the SV must not contact the
POV. See Figure 1 for a scenario diagram.
<bullet> Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)--The SV encounters a POV
slowing with constant deceleration directly in front of it on a
straight road. The SV and POV are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with
an initial headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.). The POV brakes are then
applied to achieve a constant deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV.
The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW,
and the SV brake pedal
[[Page 95930]]
is manually applied at a TTC of 1.4 s (i.e., at a nominal headway of
9.6 m (31.5 ft.)). To pass this test, the SV must not contact the POV.
See Figure 2 for a scenario diagram.
<bullet> Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)--The SV encounters a slower-
moving POV directly in front of it on a straight road. In the first
test, the SV and POV are driven on a straight road at a constant speed
of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second
test, the SV and POV are driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45
mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. In both tests, the SV
throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW, and the
SV brake pedal is manually applied at a TTC of 1 s (i.e., at a nominal
headway of 6.7 m (22 ft.) in the first test, and 11.3 m (37 ft.) in the
second test). To pass these tests, the SV must not contact the POV. See
Figure 3 for a scenario diagram.
<bullet> Steel Trench Plate (STP) false positive suppression test--
The SV is driven over a 2.4 m x 3.7 m x 25.4 mm (8 ft. x 12 ft. x 1
in.) steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 72.4 kph (45 mph). If
an FCW is issued, the SV throttle is released within 500 ms of the
alert. If no FCW is issued by a TTC of 2.1 s, the SV throttle is
released within 500 ms of a TTC of 2.1 s. In both instances, the SV
brakes are applied at a TTC of 1.1 s (i.e., at a nominal distance of
12.3 m (40 ft.) from the edge of the STP at 40.2 kph (25 mph), or 22.3
m (73 ft.) at 72.4 kph (45 mph)). To pass this test, the performance
criterion is minimal to no activation, as defined previously. See
Figure 4 (below) for a scenario diagram.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03DE24.003
Currently, to pass NCAP's DBS system performance criteria, the SV
must pass at least five out of seven trials for each of the six test
conditions.
2. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
If a driver does not manually apply the vehicle's brakes when a
rear-end crash is imminent, CIB systems, using the same forward-looking
sensors as DBS systems, apply the vehicle's brakes automatically to
slow or stop the vehicle. Unlike DBS systems, which provide additional
braking to supplement the driver's brake input, CIB systems activate
when the driver has not applied the brake pedal.
NCAP's Current Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) Test Procedure
The Agency's current CIB test procedure \53\ is comprised of the
same four test scenarios (LVS, LVD, LVM, and the STP false positive
suppression test) and test speeds specified in the DBS test procedure.
However, the performance criteria vary slightly. Whereas collision
avoidance is the performance requirement stipulated for all DBS test
scenarios except the false positive scenario, only the LVM 40.2 kph/
16.1 kph (25 mph/10 mph) CIB test condition requires that the SV not
contact the POV. The LVS, LVD, and the LVM 72.4 kph/32.2 kph (45 mph/20
mph) test conditions permit SV-to-POV contact but require minimum SV
speed reductions prior to the contact being made. For the CIB false
positive tests, the performance criterion is little-to-no activation,
like the comparable DBS tests. Also, like NCAP's DBS tests, the SSV is
the POV presently used in the program's CIB testing. A short
description of each test scenario and the requirements for a passing
result are provided below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2015,
October). Crash imminent brake system performance evaluation for the
New Car Assessment Program. <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>. Docket No.
NHTSA-2015-0006-0025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> LVS--The SV encounters a stopped POV directly in front of
it on a straight road. The SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the
POV (i.e., the SSV) is stationary. The SV throttle is released within
500 ms after the SV issues an FCW. To pass this test, the SV speed
reduction attributable to CIB intervention must be >= 15.8 kph (9.8
mph). See Figure 1 for a scenario diagram.
<bullet> LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant
deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV
are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with an initial headway of 13.8 m
(45.3 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant
deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV, after which the SV throttle is
released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW. To pass this test,
the SV speed reduction attributable to CIB intervention must be >= 16.9
kph (10.5 mph). See Figure 2 for a scenario diagram.
<bullet> LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in
front of it on a straight road. In the first test, the SV and POV are
driven on a straight road at a constant speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and
16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second test, the SV and POV are
driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph),
respectively. In both tests, the SV throttle is released within 500 ms
after the SV issues an FCW. To pass the first test, the SV must not
contact the POV. To pass the second test, the SV speed reduction
attributable to CIB intervention must be >= 15.8 kph (9.8 mph). See
Figure 3 for a scenario diagram.
<bullet> STP test (to assess false positive suppression)--The SV is
driven towards a steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) in one test
and 72.4 kph (45 mph) in the other test. If an FCW is issued, the SV
throttle is released within 500 ms of the alert. If no FCW is issued,
the throttle is not released until the test's validity period (the time
when all test specifications and tolerances must be satisfied) has
passed. To pass these tests, the SV must not achieve a peak
deceleration equal to or greater than 0.5g at any time during its
approach to the steel trench plate. See Figure 4 for a scenario
diagram.
To pass NCAP's CIB system performance criteria, the SV must pass at
least five out of seven trials for each of the six test conditions.
[[Page 95931]]
C. Linking Current FCW and AEB Test Scenarios With Real-World Crashes
NCAP's FCW and AEB test scenarios are directly related to real-
world crash data. From its analysis of 2011 to 2015 Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) and National Automotive Sampling System General
Estimate System (GES) data, the Agency found that crashes analogous to
the LVS test scenario, where a struck vehicle was stopped at the time
of impact, occurred in 65 percent of the rear-end crashes
studied.<SUP>54 55</SUP> The LVD scenario, in which the struck vehicle
was decelerating at the time of impact, occurred in 22 percent of the
rear-end crashes, and the LVM scenario, in which the struck vehicle was
moving at a constant, but slower, speed compared to the striking
vehicle at impact, occurred in 10 percent of the rear-end crashes.
Collectively, these test scenarios represented 97 percent of rear-end
crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\55\ NHTSA notes that the target crash populations reported for
the LVS, LVD, and LVM scenarios encompass all related real-world
rear-end crashes (where the light vehicle is making a critical
action) that could potentially be addressed by a DBS system. As
such, the target crash populations for each crash scenario reflect
crashes exhibiting variations in vehicle overlap, roadway curvature,
environmental conditions, etc.; target crash populations were not
reduced to align exactly with those represented by NCAP's LVS, LVD,
and LVM test scenarios.
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With respect to test speed, in its independent review of the 2011-
2015 FARS and GES data sets, the John A. Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center (Volpe) concluded that, when posted speed limit was
known, 2 percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 6 percent of all rear-
end crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 40.2 kph
(25 mph) or less.<SUP>56 57 58</SUP> Eleven percent of fatal rear-end
crashes and 33 percent of all rear-end crashes where posted speed limit
was known occurred on roads with posted speeds of 56.3 kph (35 mph) or
less. For posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less, Volpe found the
comparable statistics to be 29 percent and 70 percent, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\57\ NHTSA notes that throughout this notice, all crash
statistics cited from Report No. DOT HS 812 745 encompass those
where the light vehicle made the critical action (e.g., losing
control, departing road, changing lanes, striking, maneuvering,
etc.).
\58\ For rear-end crashes, posted speed limit was unknown or not
reported for 2 percent of fatal crashes and 11 percent of injurious
crashes.
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Roadway alignment and grade for the current FCW and AEB test
scenarios are also comparable to those found where real-world rear-end
crashes occur. NHTSA's LVS, LVD, and LVM procedures are to be performed
on straight, level roads. In its review of 2011-2015 FARS and GES data
sets, for rear-end crashes where roadway alignment was known, Volpe
found that 95 percent of both fatal and injurious crashes occurred on a
straight roadway.\59\ For rear-end crashes where roadway grade was
known, 77 percent of fatal crashes and 84 percent of crashes with
injuries occurred on level roads.\60\
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\59\ For rear-end crashes, roadway alignment was unknown or not
reported for 1 percent of fatal crashes and 3 percent of injurious
crashes.
\60\ For rear-end crashes, roadway grade was unknown or not
reported for 4 percent of fatal crashes and 18 percent of injurious
crashes.
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1. AEB Installation Rates, Effectiveness, and Research Tests
a. AEB Installation Rates
When NHTSA's CIB test scenarios were developed, relatively few
vehicles were equipped with this technology; those that were equipped
had systems with limited capabilities. Since then, fitment rates for
CIB systems have increased significantly due in part to a voluntary
industry commitment made in March 2016.\61\ Per this commitment, 20
vehicle manufacturers, representing more than 99 percent of light motor
vehicle sales in the U.S., voluntarily committed to make FCW and CIB
standard on virtually all light-duty vehicles with a gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) of 3,855.5 kg (8,500 pounds) or less beginning no
later than September 1, 2022, and all trucks with a GVWR between
3,856.0 and 4,535.9 kg (8,501 and 10,000 pounds) beginning no later
than September 1, 2025.\62\ Conforming vehicles were required to be
equipped with (1) an AEB system that earned at least an ``advanced''
rating from IIHS in its then-current front crash prevention track LVS
tests and (2) an FCW system that met the performance requirements
specified in two of NCAP's current three FCW test scenarios, LVD and
LVM.\63\ By 2019, participating manufacturers had equipped 75 percent
of their new vehicle fleet with AEB,\64\ and for model year 2023
vehicles, approximately 91 percent of the fleet was equipped with FCW
and AEB systems as standard equipment.
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\61\ The Agency also asserts that its recommendation of AEB
systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) that meet NCAP performance criteria on
its website since the 2018 model year has further encouraged
adoption of these technologies.
\62\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17),
U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to
make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, <a href="https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles">https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles</a>.
\63\ To achieve an advanced rating in IIHS' front crash
prevention track tests, a vehicle's AEB system must show a speed
reduction of at least 16.1 kph (10 mph) in either IIHS's 19.3 or
40.2 kph (12 or 25 mph) tests, or a speed reduction of 8.0 kph (5
mph) in both tests. <a href="https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles">https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles</a>.
\64\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
December 17), NHTSA announces update to historic AEB commitment by
20 automakers, <a href="https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aeb-commitment-20-automakers">https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aeb-commitment-20-automakers</a>.
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As fitment increased, the sensor technology for CIB systems also
advanced significantly. In 2017, many systems were not designed to meet
the voluntary commitment thresholds, whereas by 2021, most vehicles
with FCW and CIB systems could pass all relevant NCAP test scenarios,
most of which are more stringent than those included in the voluntary
agreement.\65\ In its RFC, NHTSA noted that the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM)-reported pass rate for NCAP's FCW and CIB tests for
model year 2021 vehicles \66\ equipped with these technologies, and for
which manufacturers submitted data, was 89 percent and 70 percent,
respectively.\67\ Furthermore, NHTSA mentioned that only 63 percent of
model year 2017 vehicles avoided contacting the POV for at least five
out of seven of the required runs in the LVS CIB scenario during the
Agency's testing, whereas 100 percent of model year 2021 vehicles were
able to repeatedly avoid contact when tested.\68\ It should be noted
that a speed reduction of 15.8 kph (9.8 mph) for at least five out of
seven trial runs is currently required to pass NCAP's CIB LVS test, not
complete crash avoidance. For the model year 2023 vehicle fleet, the
OEM-reported pass rate for the Agency's FCW test was 98 percent of
equipped vehicles, and 86 percent for
[[Page 95932]]
the CIB test. In the Agency's model year 2023 CIB testing, all vehicles
avoided contacting the POV test device for at least five out of seven
runs, and thus received credit for passing performance. For the FCW
assessments, only one vehicle model failed to provide a passing
performance for the LVS and LVD scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ NCAP's CIB test protocol requires a speed reduction of at
least 15.8 kph (9.8 mph) in the program's 40 kph (24.9 mph) LVS
test. However, the voluntary commitment allows a vehicle to comply
with the memorandum for a speed reduction of 8.0 kph (5 mph) in
IIHS's 19.3 and 40.2 kph (12 and 25 mph) LVS tests.
\66\ In this instance, ``vehicles'' refers to the total number
of vehicles in the 2021 fleet, and not the total number of vehicle
models for that year.
\67\ These values assume a 50 percent take rate for vehicles
having optional equipment.
\68\ No contact was assumed if the test vehicle did not contact
the POV in five or more of the seven required trial runs.
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b. Model Year 2019 and 2020 Research Testing
As NHTSA noted in its March 2022 RFC, research testing conducted
for a sample of model year 2019 and 2020 vehicles from various
manufacturers also confirmed advancement of CIB system capabilities in
recent years. The goal of this testing was to characterize the
performance of then-current CIB systems and evaluate the technology's
future potential for the new model years' vehicle fleet. For this
purpose, the Agency chose to focus testing on NCAP's LVS and LVD test
scenarios, as its review of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES rear-end crash
data sets showed that LVS and LVD rear-end scenarios resulted in the
highest number of crashes and MAIS 1-5 injuries.\69\ NHTSA conducted
testing for each scenario in accordance with NCAP's current CIB test
procedure. These tests were then repeated using an ABD GVT as the
surrogate vehicle in lieu of the SSV to verify that little to no change
in performance would result.\70\ The Agency also performed additional
tests for each scenario using the GVT to assess how specific procedural
changes (i.e., increases in test speed and POV deceleration magnitude)
affected CIB system performance.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Per Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, there were 1,099,868 LVS, 374,624 LVD, and 174,217
LVM crashes annually. Furthermore, there were 561,842 MAIS 1-5
injuries resulting from the LVS crash scenario, 196,731 for LVD, and
97,402 for LVM. The LVS scenario also had the second highest number
of fatalities.
\70\ The Agency desired to use the GVT in lieu of the SSV for
its higher speed testing because, given its material properties, the
GVT significantly reduced the potential for damage to the testing
equipment and test vehicles.
\71\ Test reports related to NHTSA's CIB characterization
testing can be found in the docket for the March 2022 RFC notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the additional LVS tests, the Agency incrementally increased
the vehicle speed from 40.2 to 72.4 kph (25 to 45 mph) in 8.0 kph (5
mph) increments to identify when or if the vehicle reached its
operational limits and/or did not react to the POV ahead. When the
vehicle's intervention was insufficient (i.e., the SV's maximum (peak)
deceleration was less than 0.5g), the Agency repeated the test scenario
at a test speed that was 4.0 kph (2.5 mph) lower. This reduced speed
was used to define the system's upper capabilities for the LVS
scenario.
For the additional LVD tests, the Agency evaluated how changes made
to either the SV and POV speed (72.4 kph versus 56.3 kph (45 mph versus
35 mph)) or POV deceleration magnitude (0.5g versus 0.3g) affected CIB
performance. No changes were made to the SV-to-POV headway; it was
retained at 13.8 m (45.3 ft.).
The Agency chose to increase the test speeds for the scenarios
included in its CIB characterization study because, in its independent
analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that, when the
posted speed limit was known, approximately 29 percent of fatalities
and 70 percent of injuries in rear-end crashes occurred when the posted
speed on roadways was 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\72\ The additional
change to increase the POV deceleration in the LVD scenario was
intended to create a more stringent test to address situations where
the driver of a lead vehicle brakes aggressively, causing the driver of
the following vehicle to have even less time to avoid or mitigate the
crash than had the lead vehicle braking been at the 0.3g level
presently specified in the Agency's test procedure. Based on previous
Agency research, when drivers need to apply the brakes in a non-
emergency situation, they do so by decelerating up to approximately
0.306g, while drivers encountering an unexpected obstacle apply the
brakes at 0.48g.\73\ Further, NHTSA noted that a deceleration of 0.5g
falls within the range of deceleration magnitudes prescribed by Euro
NCAP in its AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol, Version 3.0.3, dated
April 2021 for the Car-to-Car rear braking CCRb scenario. In its CCRb
test, Euro NCAP specifies POV deceleration magnitudes of 2 m/s\2\ and 6
m/s\2\ (approximately 0.2 to 0.6 g) for an SV-to-POV headway of 12 m
(39.4 ft.) and SV test speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
\73\ Gregory M. Fitch, Myra Blanco, Justin F. Morgan, Jeanne C.
Rice, Amy Wharton, Walter W. Wierwille, and Richard J. Hanowski
(2010, April) Human Performance Evaluation of Light Vehicle Brake
Assist Systems: Final Report (Report No. DOT HS 811 251) Washington,
DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, p. 13 and p.
101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency's characterization testing showed that many vehicles
were able to repeatedly provide complete crash avoidance at higher test
speeds and generally more aggressive conditions than those specified in
NCAP's current CIB test procedure. For the 56.3 kph (35.0 mph) LVS
tests conducted with a POV deceleration of 0.3g, seven out of the
eleven vehicles avoided contact with the lead vehicle in every test
trial. One of the remaining vehicles avoided contact in six out of
seven test trials and the other three vehicles demonstrated an average
speed reduction that exceeded 30.6 kph (19 mph). For the 72.4 kph (45.0
mph) LVS tests conducted with a POV deceleration of 0.3g, four out of
the eleven vehicles avoided contact in every test trial and two other
vehicles avoided contact in all but one test trial. Three of the
remaining vehicles avoided contact in one or two test trials, while the
two other vehicles could not avoid contact but both demonstrated an
average 21 kph (13 mph) speed reduction. For the 56.3 kph (35.0 mph)
LVD tests conducted at 0.5g rather than 0.3g, as specified in NCAP's
current CIB test procedure, eight vehicles demonstrated the ability to
avoid contact with the lead vehicle in at least one trial and three
vehicles avoided contact in all trials, despite having less time to
avoid the crash.\74\ Similarly, when the speed of the SV and lead
vehicle was increased to 72.4 kph (45 mph), nine vehicles demonstrated
the ability to avoid contact with the lead vehicle in at least one test
while four vehicles avoided contact in all tests. One vehicle avoided
contact in all lead vehicle decelerating trials, including both
increased speeds and increased lead vehicle deceleration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Two vehicles avoided contact with the POV in four out of
five trials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given these findings, the Agency concluded that current CIB systems
are capable of significantly exceeding NCAP's current testing
requirements. Thus, it is feasible to update the program's CIB test
conditions to further safety improvements and address a greater number
of rear-end crashes, particularly those which cause a greater number of
injuries and fatalities in the real world.
c. AEB Effectiveness
In its March 2022 RFC notice, NHTSA discussed findings from several
studies suggesting that AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) have
collectively been effective in reducing rear-end crashes. As noted in
the introductory section, UMTRI \75\ found that AEB systems
[[Page 95933]]
produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in applicable rear-end
crashes when combined with a forward collision alert, which alone
showed only a 21 percent reduction.\76\ Similarly, in a 2017 study,
IIHS found that rear-end collisions decreased by 50 percent for
vehicles equipped with AEB and FCW.\77\ Furthermore, a 2019 study
conducted by IIHS \78\ suggested that the increasing effectiveness of
AEB technology in certain crash situations, particularly those
evaluated by NCAP and other consumer information programs, is changing
the rear-end crash problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
C.A. (2019, September), Analysis of the field effectiveness of
General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting
systems, The University of Michigan Transportation Research
Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
\76\ The AEB systems studied by UMTRI consisted of camera-only,
radar-only, and fused camera-radar AEB systems, the latter two
systems of which also included adaptive cruise control
functionality.
\77\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009</a>.
\78\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), Characteristics
of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles with automatic
emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019, VOL. 20, NO. S1,
S112-S118 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172">https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these studies suggest that AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS)
have collectively been effective in reducing rear-end crashes, NHTSA
stated in its March 2022 notice that it was not clear how effective
each of these systems is independently, or whether their individual
effectiveness may change for certain crash scenarios, environmental
conditions, or driver factors (e.g., poor judgement, distraction,
etc.). The Agency also stated it is not aware of any studies of
current-generation AEB systems that have determined the extent to which
CIB and DBS individually contribute to crash reduction. Since NHTSA
could not differentiate between the individual effectiveness of CIB and
DBS systems, it tentatively concluded that NCAP should continue to
assess CIB and DBS system performance individually and therefore retain
DBS assessments. NHTSA explained that this approach would ensure
vehicles would not suppress AEB operation in situations where the
driver applies the vehicle's foundation brakes.\79\ However, as
discussed later, the Agency also sought comment on removing the DBS
test conditions from NCAP entirely in an effort to reduce test burden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Foundation brake system means all components of the service
braking system of a motor vehicle intended for the transfer of
braking application force from the operator to the wheels of a
vehicle. See 49 CFR 579.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency did not perform DBS testing as part of its
characterization study to evaluate system performance capabilities
beyond what is currently required in NCAP's respective test procedure.
However, DBS systems have historically been shown to impart additional
braking beyond that afforded by CIB systems. NHTSA has observed
complete crash avoidance in DBS tests but only speed reduction in the
equivalent CIB tests conducted for the same vehicle models. Therefore,
it was expected that DBS performance should typically be as good as, if
not better than, CIB performance. NHTSA believed that it was fitting to
align the proposed CIB and DBS evaluations for the assessed situations,
since doing so would allow the Agency to evaluate whether a vehicle's
DBS system would provide sufficient supplemental braking if the driver
brakes but additional braking is warranted. To verify that equivalent
performance requirements and criteria proposed for CIB would also be
appropriate for DBS, NHTSA planned research tests for model year 2021
and 2022 vehicles.
d. Model Year 2021 and 2022 Research Testing
In accordance with its plans expressed in the March 2022 RFC, NHTSA
conducted a series of AEB research tests in 2022 to further analyze
current fleet performance.\80\ This testing, which involved 12 model
year 2021 and 2022 light vehicles, included CIB and DBS testing in a
variety of CIB and DBS test conditions. The goal of this research was
to evaluate NHTSA's AEB proposals (found in subsequent sections) and to
gain further knowledge regarding the capabilities of the current
vehicle fleet.
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\80\ <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2023-0021-0005">https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2023-0021-0005</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both CIB and DBS tests were conducted in the LVS, LVM, LVD, and STP
false positive scenarios. Additionally, NHTSA conducted two other false
positive test scenarios as part of this research: a ``Pass Through''
test, in which the SV approaches two stationary lead vehicles located
to the left and right of the SV forward path, and ``Pass Through +
STP'' test, which is a combination of the STP and Pass Through
scenarios.\81\ See Table 11 for the nominal test parameters used in
this series of research tests. The ABD GVT Revision G, secured to a GST
robotic platform (or carrier), was used as the POV for the model year
2021 and 2022 research testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ In the Pass Through + STP test, the SV approaches a large
steel plate positioned longitudinally on the test surface in the
forward path of the SV. Two stationary lead vehicles are located to
the left and right of the STP in the SV forward path. The SV is
driven over the STP, between the two lead vehicles.
Table 11--Nominal Test Parameters for Model Year 2021 and 2022 Research Testing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test speeds (kph (mph))
Test scenario --------------------------------------------- Headway (m (ft.)) POV decel. CIB DBS
SV POV (g)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)................. 10, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 (6.2, 0 ....................... ........... [check] ...........
24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, 49.7).
70, 80, 90, 100 (43.5, 49.7, 0 ....................... ........... ........... [check]
55.9, 62.1).
Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM).................. 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 (24.9, 20 (12.4) ....................... ........... [check] ...........
31.1, 37.3, 43.5, 49.7).
70, 80, 90, 100 (43.5, 49.7, 20 (12.4) ....................... ........... ........... [check]
55.9, 62.1).
Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)............ 50 (31.1)..................... 50 (31.1) 12, 40 (39.4, 131.2) 0.4, 0.5 [check] [check]
80 (49.7)..................... 80 (49.7) 12, 40 (39.4, 131.2) 0.4, 0.5 [check] [check]
Steel Trench Plate (STP)................... 80 (49.7)..................... ........... ....................... ........... [check] [check]
Pass Through............................... 80 (49.7)..................... 0 ....................... ........... [check] [check]
Pass Through + Steel Trench Plate.......... 80 (49.7)..................... 0 ....................... ........... [check] [check]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the LVS and LVM test series, SV speed was increased from lowest
to highest. One initial trial was conducted per test speed. If no SV-
to-POV contact was observed, the next highest SV speed was run.
However, if SV-to-POV contact
[[Page 95934]]
occurred and the SV speed at the time of impact was less than or equal
to 50 percent of the initial SV speed, up to four additional (repeated)
trials were performed at the same SV speed. If two additional SV-to-POV
impacts were observed during the repeat sequence, the test series was
terminated. Furthermore, if the SV speed at the time of impact was
greater than 50 percent of the initial SV speed during the initial
trial, no repeat runs were performed; testing for that scenario was
terminated. For the LVD test series, testing proceeded in a similar
manner. The SV speed was increased from lowest to highest, and POV
deceleration was iteratively increased from 0.4g to 0.5g for a given
speed combination and headway. Relevant outcomes of this research are
detailed throughout the applicable sections of this notice.
D. NHTSA's Proposals, Summary of Comments, Response to Comments, and
Agency Decisions
1. AEB
a. Forward Collision Prevention Technologies Inclusion in General
Many commenters, including the NTSB, Bosch, HMNA, and NADA,
expressed support for the Agency's proposed updates for NCAP's AEB
testing. Additional proponents, such as the Advocates and QuantivRisk,
Inc., cited the need for increased test stringency to realize
additional safety benefits. In this vein, NTSB specifically asked NHTSA
to ``strive for the performance we want the systems to be able to
reach, not merely evaluate the current capabilities of the systems.''
Auto Innovators expressed a need for consistency between changes to
NCAP and those planned for AEB standards. Other respondents, such as
MEMA, appreciated the Agency's attempts to focus resources on emerging
trends and harmonize its AEB test procedures with those used by
European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) and other consumer
information programs. Toyota also supported the Agency's attempts at
shared global assessments but recommended that NHTSA select (1) tests
that can adequately ensure performance across a range of conditions to
improve overall test efficiency and (2) performance criteria that
reflect real-world benefits. Citing rising fatalities, several
commenters requested that the Agency consider AEB test additions for
cyclists and motorcyclists, while others mentioned current AEB system
limitations, such as systems' inability to detect cyclists and other
vulnerable road users (VRUs) at higher speeds and in low light and
inclement weather.
b. AEB Test Procedure Changes, Including Higher Speeds and POV
Deceleration Magnitude for LVD Test; and Removal of DBS Tests and Only
High-Speed DBS Assessments
NHTSA proposed harmonizing many aspects of changes to NCAP's CIB
and DBS procedures with Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test
protocol. The Agency reasoned this approach was most appropriate based
on requirements of the BIL. The Agency also argued that it would be
beneficial to standardize the current AEB test specifications with
other consumer information programs, as doing so would allow the Agency
and vehicle manufacturers to focus resources on emerging trends for
rear-end crashes as AEB-equipped vehicles become more abundant in the
fleet.\82\ NHTSA also noted it would consider making additional updates
to its AEB test evaluation as the rear-end crash problem evolves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Cicchino, J.B., & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019,
VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172">https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The updated CIB and DBS tests proposed in the 2022 RFC are detailed
below for each test scenario. Tables 12 and 13 summarize the proposed
test scenarios and conditions.
Table 12--CIB Test Scenarios and Conditions Proposed in the 2022 RFC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POV POV
Test scenario SV speed POV speed headway (m deceleration Requirement to pass
(kph (mph)) (kph (mph)) (ft.)) (g)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LVS..................... 40 (24.9) 0 n/a n/a (1) No SV-to-POV contact on
50 (31.1) 0 n/a n/a first trial;
60 (37.3) 0 n/a n/a OR
70 (43.5) 0 n/a n/a (2) Any SV-to-POV contact where
80 (49.7) 0 n/a n/a the relative velocity between
the SV and POV is <= 50% of
initial SV speed
AND
No SV-to-POV contact in 3 out
of 5 total trials.
LVM..................... 40 (24.9) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
50 (31.1) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
60 (37.3) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
70 (43.5) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
80 (49.7) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
LVD *................... 50 (31.1) 50 (31.1) 12 (39.4) 0.5
60 (37.3) 60 (37.3) 12 (39.4) 0.5
70 (43.5) 70 (43.5) 12 (39.4) 0.5
80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 12 (39.4) 0.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For LVD, NHTSA requested comment on whether at least five of seven trials should be required for vehicles
whose contact velocity is <=50 percent of the initial velocity, whether a 40 m headway should be included, and
whether NHTSA should employ a 0.6g POV deceleration in lieu of 0.5g.
Table 13--DBS Test Scenarios and Conditions* Proposed in the 2022 RFC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POV POV
Test scenario SV speed POV speed headway (m deceleration Requirement to pass
(kph (mph)) (kph (mph)) (ft.)) (g)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LVS **................... 70 (43.5) 0 n/a n/a (1) No SV-to-POV contact on
80 (49.7) 0 n/a n/a first trial;
OR
(2) Any SV-to-POV contact where
the relative velocity between
the SV and POV is <=50% of
initial SV speed
AND
No SV-to-POV contact in 3 out of
5 total trials.
LVM **................... 70 (43.5) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
80 (49.7) 20 (12.4) n/a n/a
[[Page 95935]]
LVD ***.................. 70 (43.5) 70 (43.5) 12 (39.4) 0.5
80 (49.7) 80 (49.7) 12 (39.4) 0.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For all DBS conditions, NHTSA requested comment on removal of all DBS test conditions.
** For LVS and LVM, NHTSA requested comment on the additional inclusion of 40, 50, and 60 kph (24.9, 31.1, and
37.3 mph).
*** For LVD, NHTSA requested comment on the additional inclusion of 50 and/or 60 kph (31.1 and/or 37.3 mph) SV/
POV speeds or only 70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph) (if they were adopted for CIB as well). NHTSA also
requested comment on whether at least five of seven trials should be required to satisfy the performance
requirement for vehicles whose relative velocity at contact is <=50 percent of the initial SV speed, whether
40 m headway should be included, and whether NHTSA should employ 0.6g POV deceleration in lieu of 0.5g.
Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)
Currently, NCAP's CIB LVS test is conducted at a speed of 40.2 kph
(25 mph). In its upgrade proposal, the Agency recommended assessing CIB
system performance over a range of test speeds for this test scenario.
Specifically, NHTSA proposed a minimum SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9
mph) (similar to that currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test
procedure) and a maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph). NHTSA also
proposed increasing the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments
from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed for the LVS
assessment, performing one trial per speed. To achieve a passing result
for each speed, NHTSA proposed that the test trial must be valid (all
test specifications and tolerances satisfied), and the SV must not
contact the POV. Further, the Agency proposed that it would conduct
four additional trials for any specific test speed that resulted in a
test failure (i.e., contact) as long as the SV relative velocity at
impact was less than or equal to 50 percent of the initial SV speed.
For these five trials (i.e., one failed trial and four additional
trials), NHTSA proposed that the SV must avoid contact with the POV for
at least three trials to pass the test condition (i.e., combination of
test scenario and test speed).
In justifying its recommendation to incorporate higher test speeds
for the LVS scenario, in addition to Volpe's real-world data analysis,
which illustrated the safety need, the Agency indicated its CIB
characterization testing demonstrated that several vehicles repeatedly
afforded full crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) at speeds up to 72.4
kph (45 mph) when subjected to this test. Further, NHTSA recognized
that Euro NCAP's Car-to-Car Rear stationary (CCRs) scenario, which is
comparable to the Agency's LVS test, is conducted at speeds as high as
80 kph (49.7 mph) in the ``AEB only'' test condition. NHTSA reasoned
that Euro NCAP's use of higher test speeds suggests higher test speeds
are, from the perspective of test conduct, practicable for NCAP's LVS
test as well.\83\ The Agency believed it was appropriate to harmonize
with Euro NCAP on the maximum LVS test speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph), as
this should better address the higher severity, high-speed crash
problem and, in turn, further reduce fatalities and serious injuries.
However, NHTSA did not propose to harmonize with Euro NCAP's protocol
on the minimum SV test speed. Euro NCAP's CCRs scenario specifies a
minimum SV speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) for AEB systems, but the Agency
stated it did not see the need to conduct its updated LVS testing at a
speed less than that which is specified in its existing test procedure
(40.2 kph (25 mph)). As such, a minimum test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph)
was proposed instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
section 8.2.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency sought comment on whether the proposed speeds and
overall assessment approach were appropriate for LVS or whether
alternatives should be considered.
Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)
As mentioned previously, NCAP's CIB test procedure currently
includes two LVM test conditions: a lower speed assessment that
specifies an SV speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and POV speed of 16.1 kph
(10 mph), and a higher speed assessment that prescribes an SV speed of
72.4 kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph). For this NCAP
update, NHTSA proposed to assess CIB system performance over a range of
SV test speeds for the LVM scenario. Similar to its proposal for the
LVS scenario, NHTSA proposed to implement a ``no contact'' performance
criterion for the LVM scenario and to increase the SV test speed for
the LVM assessment in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from a minimum speed
of 40 kph (24.9 mph) to a maximum speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph), with a
POV speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph) for every SV test speed. The Agency also
proposed to perform one trial run per speed and four additional trials
for any specific test speed that resulted in a test failure for initial
runs where the SV had a relative velocity at impact less than or equal
to 50 percent of the initial SV speed. Similar to its proposal for LVS,
the Agency proposed that the SV must not contact the POV for at least
three out of the five test trials performed at that same speed to pass
the LVM test condition.
The Agency noted that the proposed minimum SV test speed of 40 kph
(24.9 mph) is nearly equivalent to the speed currently specified for
its lower speed LVM assessment, 40.2 kph (25 mph), and the proposed
maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph) is only slightly higher than
the speed specified for its higher speed LVM assessment, 72.4 kph (45
mph). Since NCAP's higher speed CIB LVM assessment (conducted at an SV
speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph)) showed
that many vehicles were able to stop without contacting the POV test
device for each of the required test trials, NHTSA believed it was
reasonable to raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVM test even though it had
not performed additional LVM testing as part of its characterization
study. The Agency also noted that Euro NCAP performs its Car-to-Car
Rear moving (CCRm) scenario (which is comparable to NCAP's LVM tests)
at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 mph), further suggesting that higher
SV test speeds are practicable.\84\ Given this, NHTSA believed it was
appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum SV test speed of
80 kph (49.7 mph) for the Agency's LVM test. NHTSA reasoned that
adopting a higher maximum SV test speed than that which is currently
required in the Agency's CIB procedure should encourage improved CIB
system performance at higher speeds, and thus further reduce fatalities
and serious injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
section 8.2.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although it proposed to harmonize with Euro NCAP's protocol with
respect to the maximum SV speed adopted for
[[Page 95936]]
its LVM test, the Agency did not suggest harmonizing with Euro NCAP
with respect to the minimum required SV test speed. Euro NCAP's CCRm
scenario specifies a minimum SV test speed of 30 kph (18.6 mph) for
AEB-equipped vehicles; however, the Agency did not believe there was
not a compelling reason to perform its updated LVM test at a speed that
is less than the current required test speed (i.e., 40.2 kph (25 mph))
since most vehicles have been able to meet NCAP's current LVM test
requirements at 40.2 kph (25 mph) to date with a similar POV test
speed. Accordingly, NHTSA proposed a minimum SV test speed of 40 kph
(24.9 mph).
NHTSA proposed to adopt a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph). The
Agency noted this POV speed is specified in Euro NCAP's CCRm protocol,
and therefore adopting this speed for NHTSA's LVM testing seemed
appropriate since it would further support harmonization efforts.
Comments were requested on whether the SV/POV speeds and assessment
approach proposed for NCAP's CIB LVM tests were appropriate or whether
alternative speeds or approaches should be considered instead.
Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)
For the LVD scenario, NHTSA proposed to reduce the minimum nominal
SV and POV test speeds from 56 kph (34.8 mph), as specified in NCAP's
test procedure, to 50 kph (31.1 mph), as stated in Euro NCAP's AEB Car-
to-Car systems test protocol, Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the
Car-to-Car rear braking (CCRb) scenario.\85\ The Agency stated that,
given additional changes proposed for the SV-to-POV headway and
deceleration magnitude for the LVD scenario, the proposed reduction in
test speed would not lead to an overall reduction in test stringency or
loss of safety benefits. NHTSA requested comment on whether this
proposed test speed change was appropriate for NCAP's LVD testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
section 8.2.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency also sought comment on whether it would be appropriate
to incorporate additional SV and POV test speeds for the LVD test
scenario: 60, 70, and 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph, respectively).
Similar to the proposed CIB LVS and LVM test scenarios, NHTSA proposed
to concurrently increase the SV and POV test speeds in 10 kph (6.2 mph)
increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed for
NCAP's LVD assessment if multiple speeds were adopted. The Agency also
proposed, as discussed in a later section, to perform one trial run per
speed and four additional trials for any specific test speed that
resulted in a test failure (i.e., SV-to-POV contact) where the SV had a
relative velocity at impact less than or equal to 50 percent of the
initial SV speed. Like the other two CIB test scenarios, the Agency
proposed the SV must not contact the POV for at least three out of the
five test trials performed at that same speed to pass the test
condition. Alternatively, the Agency sought comment on whether testing
at only 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph) would be acceptable.
NHTSA acknowledged in its proposal that it had not yet performed
LVD testing at 80 kph (49.7 mph), mainly due to equipment and test
track length limitations, as this test scenario requires that both the
SV and POV be travelling at the same speed at the onset of the test
validity period. However, the Agency recognized that higher speed tests
may be warranted. For instance, Volpe's analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS
data set showed that, when posted speed limit was known, the majority
of fatal rear-end crashes (71 percent) occurred on roads with posted
speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph). Considering the braking performance
observed during the high-speed LVS tests conducted as part of its
characterization study, the Agency noted current vehicles may perform
well in LVD tests conducted at even higher speeds. Additionally, NHTSA
believed that CIB systems may be able to classify POVs more confidently
in the LVD test compared to the LVS test due to the POV's detected
motion (i.e., path history). Accordingly, NHTSA conducted research to
assess vehicles' CIB system performance in the LVD test at SV and POV
speeds ranging from 50 kph (31.1 mph) to 80 kph (49.7 mph) to determine
the feasibility of adopting one or more of these speeds for this test
scenario.\86\
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\86\ The Agency proposed these speeds would each be assessed for
both 12 and 40 m (39.4 and 131.2 ft.) headways and POV deceleration
magnitudes of 0.4g and 0.5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its March 2022 RFC notice, NHTSA also proposed to reduce the
minimum nominal SV-to-POV headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.), currently
specified for the LVD scenario, to 12 m (39.4 ft.) for the proposed
test speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). Although not assessed as part of its
CIB characterization testing, the Agency asserted this change would not
only harmonize with Euro NCAP's CCRb scenario with respect to test
conduct, but also maintain similar stringency to NCAP's current LVD
test scenario, given the proposed test speed reduction from 56 kph
(34.8 mph) to 50 kph (31.1 mph). Euro NCAP also specifies an additional
SV-to-POV headway of 40 m (131.2 ft.); however, the Agency did not
propose to conduct this assessment as part of the RFC, as NHTSA
suggested there would not be a safety benefit in adopting 40 m (131.2
ft.) as an additional, and presumably less stringent, headway.
Therefore, the Agency did not want to increase the test burden
unnecessarily. However, the Agency indicated that it would assess
vehicle performance at both 12 and 40 m (39.4 and 131.2 ft.) headways
as part of its future research for each of the test speeds to be
evaluated. The Agency also sought public comment on which SV-to-POV
headway(s) may be appropriate for adoption not only for the proposed
test speed (i.e., 50 kph (31.1 mph)), but also for each of the
additional test speeds (ranging from 60 kph (37.3 mph) to 80 kph (49.7
mph)) it planned to evaluate and possibly incorporate.
The last change the Agency proposed for the LVD test scenario was
increasing the POV deceleration magnitude currently specified in its
CIB test procedure from 0.3g to 0.5g. In the Agency's CIB
characterization study, three vehicles repeatedly afforded full crash
avoidance (i.e., no contact) for all trials when the POV executed a
0.5g braking maneuver in the LVD condition with an SV test speed of
56.3 kph (35 mph) and SV-to-POV headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.),
demonstrating that the change to POV deceleration for the revised LVD
test conditions (which also includes a slightly lower test speed and
slightly shorter SV-to-POV headway) is likely feasible. The Agency also
noted that, in Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol, the
organization specifies POV deceleration magnitudes of 2 m/s\2\ and 6 m/
s\2\ (approximately 0.2 and 0.6g) for its CCRb scenario.\87\ As such,
NHTSA reasoned that adopting a 0.5g POV deceleration magnitude would be
practicable. To verify this assumption, as part of its research study,
NHTSA committed to evaluating POV deceleration magnitudes of both 0.4
and 0.5g for the range of test speeds considered (i.e., 60, 70, and/or
80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for future LVD testing.\88\ The
Agency also sought comment on what deceleration magnitude(s) would be
appropriate for the proposed test speed (i.e., 50 kph
[[Page 95937]]
(31.1 mph)), as well as each of these additional test speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (), Test
Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See section 8.2.5.
\88\ NHTSA notes that the LVD research tests were conducted only
for 50 and 80 kph (31.1 and 49.7 mph) test speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA did not propose a 0.6g POV deceleration magnitude for use in
its LVD test, even though Euro NCAP specifies 0.6g as the maximum POV
deceleration for its CCRb scenario. In proposing 0.5g as the maximum
POV deceleration in lieu of 0.6g, the Agency stated a lower POV
deceleration may reduce equipment wear, particularly for the tires and
braking components of the POV propulsion system, thus improving test
efficiency. Specifically, NHTSA explained it has observed instances
where the tires of the low-profile robotic vehicle (LPRV) platform \89\
used to move the GVT developed flat spots while performing a braking
maneuver similar to that specified in the Agency's CIB LVD test \90\
but with higher POV decelerations. During this testing, NHTSA also
found it was more difficult to achieve and accurately control POV
deceleration within prescribed tolerances when braking maneuvers higher
than 0.5g were used, even with extensive LPRV tuning efforts.\91\ The
Agency noted that a deceleration of 0.6g is not only very close to the
maximum braking capability of the LPRV, but also very close to the
default magnitude used by the LPRV during an emergency stop (maximum
deceleration). However, NHTSA acknowledged that newer robotic platforms
(i.e., robotic carriers) offering greater capabilities are now becoming
available, and they may resolve the issues observed in the Agency's
testing. Accordingly, NHTSA requested comment on whether it may now be
feasible to adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6g in lieu of 0.5g,
as proposed.
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\89\ The GVT is secured to the top of the LPRV. The LPRV is
responsible for any movement of the GVT during test conduct.
\90\ Fogle, E. E., Arquette, T. E. (TRC), and Forkenbrock, G. J.
(NHTSA), (2021, May), Traffic Jam Assist Draft Test Procedure
Performability Validation (Report No. DOT HS 812 987), Washington,
DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
\91\ From Section 4.1 of DOT HS 812 987: ``POV deceleration
validity check failures occurred during six trials of the eight
LVDAD trials performed. Four of the seven 0.6 g failures were
because the POV was unable to achieve the minimum deceleration
threshold of 0.55 g. The remaining three 0.6 g failures were because
the POV was unable to maintain a minimum average deceleration of at
least 0.55 g.'' Here, LVDAD refers to ``Lead Vehicle Accelerates,
Decelerates, then Decelerates.'' The LVDAD test is a more complex
variant of the LVD test and was used by NHTSA to perform traffic jam
assist research.
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Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
With respect to DBS, the Agency proposed to align all test
conditions (e.g., SV and POV test speed(s), headway(s), POV
deceleration magnitude(s), etc.) for the comparable LVD, LVM, and LVS
test scenarios with those proposed for CIB. Likewise, NHTSA proposed a
similar performance criterion (i.e., no contact) and assessment
approach as well; when applicable, speeds would be increased in 10 kph
(6.2 mph) increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test
speed, with one trial performed per speed, and four additional trials
conducted for any specific test speed that resulted in a test failure
(i.e., contact) as long as the SV had a relative velocity at impact
less than or equal to 50 percent of the initial SV speed. Similar to
CIB, the Agency proposed that the SV must avoid contact with the POV
for at least three out of the five test trials performed at that same
speed to pass the test condition (if the vehicle fails the initial
trial at a given test speed).
Although the Agency had not conducted DBS testing as part of its
characterization study to evaluate system performance capabilities
beyond what is currently required in NCAP's DBS test procedure, NHTSA
believed it was nonetheless fitting to align the proposed CIB and DBS
evaluations, as it would allow NHTSA to assess whether a vehicle's DBS
system will provide supplemental braking if the driver manually applies
a brake pedal input but additional braking is warranted to afford crash
avoidance. Further, the Agency noted its CIB and DBS test procedures
are currently aligned with respect to test scenarios, test speeds,
headways, etc. Differences exist only with respect to the use of manual
brake application (i.e., for the SV in DBS testing) and (most)
performance criteria.\92\ Therefore, the Agency reasoned it would be
appropriate to adopt the CIB test conditions (i.e., test speeds,
headways, etc.) for the comparable DBS test conditions for future
testing as well. NHTSA requested comments on whether this proposal for
future DBS testing, including the assessment method, was appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ NHTSA's DBS test procedure currently specifies ``no
contact'' as the performance criterion for all DBS test conditions,
whereas the Agency's CIB test procedure currently requires a
specified speed reduction for each of the CIB test conditions (with
the exception of the lower speed LVM condition where the POV speed
is 16.1 kph (10 mph) and the SV speed is 40.2 kph (25 mph), which
requires ``no contact.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency also sought comment on removing the LVD, LVM, and LVS
DBS test conditions from NCAP entirely (in addition to the false
positive test conditions, discussed later) to reduce test burden and
associated costs given findings from Volpe's analysis of the 2011-2015
FARS and GES data sets and other changes NHTSA proposed for its CIB
assessments.
Specifically, Volpe found that the driver braked in just 8 percent
of rear-end crashes involving fatalities and in 20 percent of those
crashes involving injuries. The study also showed that the driver made
no attempt to avoid the crash (e.g., no braking, steering,
accelerating) for 56 percent of crashes involving fatalities and for 21
percent of those involving injuries.\93\ These findings were contrary
to those documented by NHTSA during a review of 2003-2009 National
Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness Data System data to define
the target population for rear-end crashes.\94\ For that analysis, the
Agency concluded that the driver braked in approximately half of the
crashes and did not brake in the other half, which lends merit to
performing both CIB and DBS tests. The Agency believed it was possible
the brake application rates differed in the two studies because of (1)
target crash population refinements made for NHTSA's original analysis
and (2) differences in data collection methods between the crash
databases. For instance, high-speed crashes were excluded from NHTSA's
target crash population review because the AEB systems tested at the
time had limited speed reduction capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ The Agency notes that for the rear-end pre-crash scenario
group, the driver avoidance maneuver was unknown in 25 percent and
54 percent of the FARS and GES crashes, respectively. When excluding
cases where a driver avoidance maneuver was unknown, the driver made
no attempt to avoid the crash in 75 percent and 48 percent of the
FARS and GES crashes, respectively. Likewise, when a driver's
avoidance maneuver was known, the driver braked in 11 percent of
FARS crashes and 45 percent of GES crashes.
\94\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2012,
June), Forward-looking advanced braking technologies research
report, <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0001">https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0001</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As previously mentioned, NHTSA proposed to adopt a more stringent
``no contact'' performance criterion for each of NCAP's CIB test
conditions. The Agency's existing CIB test procedure requires a
specified speed reduction for each of the CIB test conditions (with the
exception of the lower speed LVM condition, which requires ``no
contact''), whereas the DBS test procedure currently specifies ``no
contact'' as the performance criterion for all DBS test conditions. The
proposed change for CIB would effectively align the CIB performance
requirements with those currently specified for DBS, and NHTSA
questioned whether it was necessary to continue performing DBS tests in
NCAP given public comments previously
[[Page 95938]]
received. For example, in its comments to NCAP's December 2015 notice,
the Alliance \95\ stated that since crash avoidance (i.e., no SV-to-POV
contact) is the desired outcome for all imminent rear-end crash events,
if an SV avoids contact with the POV in all CIB tests, DBS testing
should not be necessary. The Agency agreed with the Alliance's
rationale in principle but questioned whether there would be merit to
ensuring both AEB systems perform as designed and help the driver to
mitigate or prevent the crash. NHTSA hypothesized that it may be
possible for the driver to apply the brakes but with a magnitude that
does not result in achieving the vehicle's maximum crash avoidance
potential (i.e., deceleration). Further, the Agency explained that, in
the past, some manufacturers had assumed the driver was in control when
the brake pedal was depressed, and designed CIB systems such that
automatic braking was overridden by the driver's input, even when the
driver's braking was insufficient to avoid a crash. Based on this
reasoning, NHTSA explained it was hesitant to assume that if a
vehicle's CIB system works effectively during testing, its DBS system
would automatically do so as well.
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\95\ Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (The Alliance) merged
with Global Automakers in January 2020 to create the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators). Both automotive industry
groups separately submitted comments to the December 2015 notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, as an alternative to removing the DBS performance evaluations
from NCAP entirely (or retaining the LVD, LVM, and LVS DBS tests in
NCAP, as proposed), the Agency concluded that it might be more
reasonable to conduct only LVS and LVM DBS tests in NCAP at the highest
two test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph,
respectively)--to ensure (1) the DBS system functions properly at these
speeds and (2) the SV will not suppress AEB operation when the driver
applies the vehicle's foundation brakes. The Agency further noted that
it would also consider conducting the DBS LVD test at only 70 and 80
kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph, respectively) if it decided to adopt those same
higher test speeds for the CIB LVD test. Comments were requested on
this alternative proposal and whether an alternative assessment method
would be more appropriate if any or all of the DBS test scenarios were
conducted only at the two highest test speeds.
Summary of Comments
Regarding NHTSA's AEB Proposal, In General
Several commenters, including BMW, FCA, and Honda, supported the
Agency's proposal for CIB and DBS with respect to SV and POV speeds,
headway distances, and POV deceleration magnitudes. FCA stated that the
proposal was appropriate because it reflects current system
capabilities and real-world crashes. With the exception of suggested
changes for the LVD scenario, discussed later, Tesla also generally
agreed with the Agency's proposal with respect to test speeds, headway,
and deceleration magnitudes for CIB testing and the general intent to
harmonize with Euro NCAP test protocols. Specifically, Tesla supported
conducting LVS and LVM scenarios at test speeds ranging from 40 to 80
kph (24.9 and 49.7 mph) with 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, as proposed.
Auto Innovators also generally agreed with the proposed test
requirements but suggested the Agency harmonize with Euro NCAP and
conduct CIB testing up to 50 kph (31.1 mph) and DBS testing at speeds
over 50 kph (31.1 mph).
Like Tesla, Advocates and Bosch also supported generally
harmonizing the Agency's CIB testing with that performed by Euro NCAP,
but with small variations. Advocates supported aligning the LVM and LVS
POV and SV speeds with those used by Euro NCAP but did not support the
Agency's justification for not aligning minimum test speeds for these
two scenarios with those prescribed by Euro NCAP (10 kph, or 6.2 mph)
as being sufficient. Bosch also mentioned harmonization with respect to
test speeds but suggested the Agency should further investigate whether
there is merit to increasing test speeds to assess AEB systems.
Conversely, GM opposed any change to the test conditions prescribed
in the Agency's current CIB test procedure. The automaker stated that
the current AEB test speeds show significant real-world safety benefits
\96\ and, as documented in DOT HS 811 521A, ``Objective Tests for
Automatic Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) Systems,'' the current test
parameters are ``well-supported by field crash scenarios most relevant
to these features and associated with the highest societal harm, as
measured by Functional Years Lost.''
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\96\ See GM Appendix 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other commenters suggested that the Agency remove certain test
conditions. Auto Innovators suggested that the Agency remove one of the
two original LVM scenarios, preferably the lower speed condition (i.e.,
SV and POV speeds of 40 and 16 kph (25 and 10 mph), respectively),
since real-world data shows only 2 percent of fatalities and 6 percent
of injuries occur on roads having posted speed limits of 40 kph (25
mph) or less. Similarly, Toyota stated that the Agency should adopt
only the number of test conditions sufficient to communicate accurate
performance information to consumers. The automaker suggested that, if
testing only at a certain speed would ensure performance for a large
speed range, then that approach was acceptable for testing.
With respect to other procedural considerations, Subaru recommended
that NHTSA adopt a speed increment of 20 kph (12.4 mph) in lieu of 10
kph (6.2 mph) for LVM testing. A few other respondents also generally
supported the test parameters, but suggested slight modifications,
which are addressed later in this section.
Adopt Higher AEB Test Speeds Than Those Proposed
State Farm, IIHS, and Uhnder supported CIB and DBS testing at
higher speeds, stating that such speeds better reflect real-world
driving conditions. Uhnder supported adoption of test speeds that
exceed 88.5 kph (55 mph), citing a May 2022 study from IIHS finding
nearly 70 percent of fatal rear-end crashes occurred when the speed
limit was 88.5 kph (55 mph) or higher.\97\ Similarly, IIHS noted that
nearly 80 percent of police-reported rear-end crashes occurred on roads
having speed limits ranging from 48.3 to 104.6 kph (30 to 65 mph),\98\
and the speed of the striking vehicle was more than 40 kph (24.9 mph),
even on roads with speed limits of 40.2 kph (25 mph).\99\
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\97\ See footnote 11 of Uhnder response.
\98\ Kidd, 2022a.
\99\ Kidd, 2022b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adasky, NTSB, and CAS also favored higher speed AEB assessments
than those proposed. CAS asserted that NHTSA should conduct CIB tests
at the highest speeds possible to still afford safe testing so that
consumers may identify vehicles offering superior CIB performance at
each test speed. Similarly, NTSB encouraged NHTSA to consider more
challenging test speeds to drive desired (i.e., ideal) system
performance instead of testing to current system capabilities. Finally,
Rivian also suggested adopting higher speeds for DBS tests than those
proposed if the Agency continued DBS testing in the future.
[[Page 95939]]
Test Speeds and Headway for the LVD Test Scenario Specifically
Several commenters favored adopting AEB test speeds up to 80 kph
(49.7 mph) for the LVD test scenario, with BMW and Honda stating that
these test speeds were appropriate since they were supported by crash
data.
Tesla, along with Subaru, recommended conducting LVD scenarios at
50 kph (31.1 mph), as proposed (similar to Euro NCAP), and also at 80
kph (49.7 mph), as suggested by NHTSA. Subaru added that, if a test
failure occurs at 80 kph (49.7 mph), the test speed should then be
reduced by 10 kph (6.2 mph). Advocates favored harmonization with Euro
NCAP with respect to test speed, headway, and deceleration for the LVD
scenario, but preferred NHTSA's alternative proposal of adopting
multiple higher test speeds (above 50 kph (31.1 mph)), suggesting NHTSA
should also include a ``range of test speeds'' based on crash data and
the Agency's testing.
Toyota encouraged NHTSA to conduct additional feasibility studies
and research, particularly for the LVD test scenario, to: (1) resolve
possible GVT stability issues; (2) study the possible conflict with
human driver steering avoidance maneuver timing; and (3) research the
effectiveness of FCW and DBS based on the physical limitations imposed
by the proposed LVD DBS test condition, and, considering driver
reaction times, determine whether such higher-speed testing is feasible
and appropriate before modifying the AEB test conditions. With respect
to the first request, Toyota noted the Agency's statement that it has
not conducted CIB/DBS LVD testing at 80 kph (49.7 mph) because of
equipment and test track length limitations. Regarding its second
point, the automaker asserted that the time required to steer to avoid
a collision at higher speeds is less than the time required to brake,
and that by imposing the suggested high speed CIB test conditions, the
Agency may create a challenging `braking' situation that could
interfere with a driver's ability to avoid the crash by steering
instead. Lastly, Toyota voiced concern that the SV and POV dynamics for
DBS LVD testing at higher speeds may pose physical limitations.\100\
More specifically, for speeds of 50 kph (31.1 mph) and greater, the
manufacturer asserted that, given the (constant) headway prescribed,
the time (i.e., TTC) required to activate the brake to avoid impact,
and the proposed brake application timing of 1.0 s after issuance of
the FCW, it is possible the FCW would have to be issued before the POV
test device begins to decelerate in the DBS test for the SV to avoid
contact with the POV. Toyota was supportive of DBS testing at higher
speeds for the LVS test scenario.
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\100\ See case study included in Toyota's comments.
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Intel shared Toyota's concerns about the LVD DBS tests, explaining
the proposed headway (12 m (39.4 ft.)) may be too small given a POV
deceleration of 0.5 to 0.6g, such that it may not be possible to issue
the FCW early enough to achieve brake activation one second after the
issuance of the FCW as NHTSA proposed for the test procedure. Intel
also cautioned the Agency that it should ensure it is feasible for test
labs to conduct LVD tests at the proposed higher speeds considering the
GVT platform experiences performance degradation at high speeds. Intel
further noted many automakers limit speed reductions to approximately
60 kph (37.3 mph) per Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)
considerations.
Auto Innovators did not support the Agency's adoption of test
speeds exceeding the capabilities afforded by current systems for the
LVD test condition because it may induce false positives under real-
world driving conditions, which may in turn discourage AEB use. The
group, like Toyota, also cautioned that the proposed high-speed testing
may cause unexpected interactions between the SV and POV during
testing. Auto Innovators recommended that the Agency consider the
proposed changes for CIB and DBS for future program updates to (1)
allow additional time to investigate the field relevance of the
proposed changes for both technologies and (2) provide sufficient time
for system capabilities to improve.
To better align with Euro NCAP testing, Intel suggested that LVD
testing should be limited to 50 kph (31.1 mph) and should be performed
only for vehicles equipped with both AEB and FCW. HATCI recommended
that the Agency harmonize with the test speeds prescribed in Euro
NCAP's protocol for the LVD test scenario if it ultimately adopts
higher test speeds, and asked that the SV-to-POV headway be increased
for each higher speed test condition based on field-representative
distances or TTCs. Subaru recommended that the Agency maintain vehicle
headway in LVD testing at a spacing equivalent to 1.0 second (instead
of 12 m (39.4 ft.), as proposed) regardless of test speed. FCA also
favored higher speed assessments for the LVD test scenario. However,
FCA stated that the SV-to-POV headway should be adjusted for each speed
to reflect a 0.9 second following distance, asserting this following
distance is typical of real-world driving.
POV Deceleration Magnitude for LVD Test Scenario
Most commenters addressing this issue favored a 0.5g POV
deceleration for the LVD CIB test instead of 0.6g, with TRC citing
issues with repeatability when attempting to tune the GVT braking
system to operate at a deceleration greater than 0.5g. Although it
acknowledged that new robotic platforms make tuning easier, TRC also
suggested that they are expensive and require modification of existing
equipment before they can be utilized. BMW also cited robotic platform
operational limits and tire wear as reasons not to adopt a 0.6g POV
deceleration requirement. HATCI favored a 0.5g deceleration magnitude
because of proven repeatability and minimal equipment damage. The
commenter recommended that the Agency increase the vehicle headway if
it chooses to adopt a 0.6g POV deceleration instead.
GM and Auto Innovators supported a 0.5g deceleration, asserting
that this is a ``common'' deceleration level (based on crash data
reviewed by NHTSA) and therefore ``realistic.'' Both commenters
mentioned that a 0.6g deceleration has not been shown to induce
differences in vehicle performance, but can cause problems with test
equipment (based on experience in conducting Euro NCAP tests at 6 m/
s\2\). In a similar vein to the repeatability concerns mentioned by
others, GM also noted that China NCAP no longer generally performs LVD
tests (and other consumer groups are expected to follow suit) because
they are difficult to conduct and test results for a given vehicle
model are often widely variable.
A few commenters expressed conditional support for the higher POV
deceleration. Specifically, Honda and Auto Innovators offered support
for adoption of a 0.6g deceleration if crash data indicates such a
limit is more representative of driver braking in real-world crashes.
Auto Innovators added that the Agency must also ensure testing
tolerances. FCA suggested that a 0.6g deceleration may be acceptable if
NHTSA wanted to ``reduce validation effort.''
Intel expressed support for adopting a 0.6g deceleration criterion
for the LVD CIB test to harmonize with other entities and regulations
and thus reduce test burden. The company stated that, considering the
tolerance currently prescribed for the POV deceleration, the
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difference between 0.5g and 0.6g is small. Bosch also supported
adoption of a 0.6g deceleration magnitude, as did Tesla. However, Tesla
suggested that in lieu of a single POV deceleration of 0.5 or 0.6g, as
proposed, the Agency should adopt deceleration magnitudes of -2 m/s\2\
and -6 m/s\2\ (approximately 0.2 and 0.6g), respectively, for each test
speed to harmonize with Euro NCAP. Advocates shared this opinion.
Agree With Removal of DBS Tests
MEMA, Subaru, and HATCI agreed with the Agency's proposal to remove
the DBS test scenarios from NCAP's AEB test matrix, with the latter
commenter suggesting that CIB and DBS functionality may overlap at
certain speeds such that DBS functionality would be redundant when CIB
is activated. HATCI therefore suggested that, if the Agency decided to
continue conducting separate DBS assessments in NCAP, such tests should
only be performed when a vehicle exhibits a test failure during CIB
testing for that condition, as this would reduce test burden. Rivian
remarked that the DBS testing was unnecessary because a vehicle's CIB
system will activate and slow the vehicle when the braking imparted by
DBS is insufficient. Subaru recommended removal or replacement of any
ADAS test that currently has a high rate of passing results if adoption
rates for the related ADAS technology are also high.
Retain Some or All DBS Tests
Several commenters expressed that the Agency should continue to
conduct DBS assessments in NCAP because DBS affords additional safety
benefits compared to CIB. ZF Group favored retaining the DBS tests to
ensure that vehicles continue to be equipped with DBS, noting that DBS
systems ``can react earlier in critical situations.'' Similarly, CAS
asserted that DBS ``can provide additional safety margin.''
Other commenters recommended that NHTSA continue DBS testing to
ensure system functionality. Advocates, GM, and Auto Innovators
suggested the Agency should (Advocates and GM), or could (Auto
Innovators), continue to conduct DBS tests to ensure that brake pedal
application does not override AEB system functionality in general. NTSB
also agreed that DBS functionality should be verified and supported
NHTSA's alternative proposal to retain DBS testing in NCAP and conduct
LVM and LVS testing at higher speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
mph)).
GM and Auto Innovators also recommended other options centered on
performing DBS tests only at certain speeds that NHTSA could adopt to
reduce the burden of DBS testing. GM noted that China NCAP performs CIB
tests at lower speeds and DBS tests at higher speeds. The automaker
suggested that for speeds higher than 40 kph (24.9 mph) the Agency
could alternate between CIB and DBS testing. Auto Innovators stated
that DBS testing would be unnecessary in situations where the CIB
system provides complete avoidance in all tests, noting that the Agency
could simply assume DBS performance and apply points for both systems
equally. Auto Innovators also stated that each assessed test speed
should afford equal weighting for both CIB and DBS, noting it should
not be the case that one test speed carries twice the weight simply
because both systems are assessed at that speed, whereas another test
speed carries less weight because only one of the two systems is
assessed at that speed. Both GM and Auto Innovators noted, similar to
HATCI, that NHTSA could conduct CIB tests until the system can no
longer provide full avoidance and then begin DBS testing for the next
subsequent higher test speed. If the CIB system was able to provide
complete avoidance at all test speeds, then the commenters suggested
that DBS testing could be repeated for only the maximum test speed to
ensure system functionality. GM also noted that for 2023 Euro NCAP
removed the DBS tests for LVM and LVD from their assessment and going
forward it will only perform the DBS test for the LVS scenario.
Finally, Auto Innovators encouraged the Agency to reduce the number of
test scenarios and evaluate FCW during DBS testing (i.e., record the
time of the FCW) to further reduce test burden.
Like other com
[…truncated; see source link]This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.