Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
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Issuing agencies
Abstract
This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a petition submitted on June 7, 2023, by Kimberlyn Hearns (the petitioner) to NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI). The petition requests that the Agency initiate an investigation into alleged remote attacks to the vehicle electrical control system associated with a variety of reported electrical malfunctions that render the petitioner's Model Year 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicle (subject vehicle) allegedly unusable. On August 30, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition DP23-004 to evaluate the petitioner's request. After conducting a technical review of the petitioner's submissions, seeing no other complaints for 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicles related to the types of "remote attacks" described by the petitioner, and reviewing information provided by Toyota in response to an Agency request for information regarding the 2019 Yaris CAN bus, NHTSA has concluded that there is insufficient evidence to pursue further investigation. Accordingly, the Agency has denied the petition.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 226 (Friday, November 22, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 226 (Friday, November 22, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 92734-92735]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-27431]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2024-0086]
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of petition for a defect investigation.
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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition submitted on June 7, 2023, by Kimberlyn Hearns (the
petitioner) to NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI). The
petition requests that the Agency initiate an investigation into
alleged remote attacks to the vehicle electrical control system
associated with a variety of reported electrical malfunctions that
render the petitioner's Model Year 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicle (subject
vehicle) allegedly unusable. On August 30, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect
Petition DP23-004 to evaluate the petitioner's request. After
conducting a technical review of the petitioner's submissions, seeing
no other complaints for 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicles related to the types
of ``remote attacks'' described by the petitioner, and reviewing
information provided by Toyota in response to an Agency request for
information regarding the 2019 Yaris CAN bus, NHTSA has concluded that
there is insufficient evidence to pursue further investigation.
Accordingly, the Agency has denied the petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Tariq Bond, Vehicle Defects
Division--D, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA 1200 New Jersey
Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590. Telephone (202) 366-5472. Email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d387b2a1baa2fd91bcbdb793b7bca7fdb4bca5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="83d7e2f1eaf2adc1ecede7c3e7ecf7ade4ecf5">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Introduction
Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the Agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or an
item of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162; 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a
properly filed petition, the Agency conducts a technical review of the
petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional
information. 49 U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. The technical review may
consist solely of a review of information already in the possession of
the Agency or it may include the collection of information from the
motor vehicle manufacturer or other sources. After conducting the
technical review and considering appropriate factors, which may
include, but are not limited to, allocation of Agency resources, Agency
priorities, and the likelihood of success in litigation that might
arise from a determination of noncompliance or a defect related to
motor vehicle safety, the Agency will grant or deny the petition. See
49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 552.8.
Background Information
In a letter dated June 7, 2023, Kimberlyn Hearns (the petitioner)
submitted a petition attributing electrical malfunctions of his 2019
Toyota Yaris (subject vehicle) to remote attacks by unknown parties
targeted on the subject vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN bus).\1\
The petitioner requested an Agency investigation of the susceptibility
of the subject vehicle to the alleged attacks and for assistance
securing a full refund of the vehicle price. Over four total
submissions from the June 7, 2023 petition to August 2, 2023, the
petitioner supported his request with a chronology of events detailing
the vehicle fault, service history, and a listing of published
cybersecurity articles. In addition, before filing the petition, the
petitioner sent three pieces of related correspondence to the Agency
from late December 2022 to February 2023.
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\1\ Modern automobiles (including the subject vehicle) contain
multitudes of microcontrollers that communicate over a self-
contained computer network known as a Controller Area Network.
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NHTSA has based its decision on a review of the material cited by
the petitioner in his petition, information submitted by Toyota in
response to the Agency's request, and other pertinent information in
NHTSA's databases. Staff from NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center
(VRTC) supported the review at all stages.
Subject Vehicle History
The subject vehicle is a Model Year (MY) 2019 Toyota Yaris LE
equipped with a 1.5L I4 gasoline engine. According to a vehicle history
report, the subject vehicle has only been owned by one person (the
petitioner), started receiving service in August of 2019, and has not
experienced any reported
[[Page 92735]]
collisions or damage. The vehicle history report indicated regular
servicing of the subject vehicle by the Toyota dealership that sold it
to the petitioner, with no atypical problems evident through June of
2022 and after approximately 40,000 miles of service. During this time,
the subject vehicle received remedies related to two Toyota field
campaigns: Service Campaign 20TC03 \2\ (performed September 2020) and
Safety Recall 21V617 \3\ (performed January 2022).
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\2\ 20TC03 was a quality campaign meant to reprogram the Engine
Control Module (ECM) software due to the software installed being
intended for vehicles with a different engine configuration.
\3\ 21V617 is a fuel pump recall meant to remedy a defective
fuel pump by replacement.
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In mid-November of 2022, with 46,136 miles of service,\4\ the
petitioner reported hearing three beeps while driving at low speed,
accompanied by engine shut down. After a delay, the petitioner was able
to restart the vehicle, but a Check Engine Light (CEL) remained
illuminated. The petitioner's dealer diagnosed the problem as a bad
battery and installed a replacement battery.
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\4\ Based on a contemporaneous service invoice.
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Over the ensuing two weeks, and approximately 700 miles, the
petitioner reported several instances of engine power loss,
malfunctioning indicator lights, and a head unit delayed start
malfunction, leading to service at a different Toyota dealer in early
December 2022. That dealer's invoice reported that no problem had been
identified after several service checks, inspection of the ECU wiring,
and after approximately 30 miles of test driving over a two-day period.
At the time of its release from this dealership, the invoice reported
that the subject vehicle had an odometer reading of 47,009 miles.
Toyota reported that the dealership had also contacted its Technical
Assistance Center for further guidance.
The vehicle history report indicates that the subject vehicle
traveled only 44 miles over the following three months, returning to
its regular servicing dealership in late March 2023, about a week after
another report from the petitioner of flashing warning lights and
repeated horn activation while the petitioner was inside his house. The
petitioner reported that this mid-March incident coincided with a
suspicious vehicle driving by his house. The petitioner also stated
that in late March, a service visit to his regular servicing dealership
included the removal of an aftermarket vehicle security system
manufactured by Rockledge Securities.\5\
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\5\ The model, capabilities, and installer of this device are
unknown. However, the Rockledge Securities website advertises
several vehicle security devices that may be wired into the vehicle
and identifies the subject vehicle sales servicing dealership as one
of several affiliated dealerships.
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No further service records from Toyota or the vehicle history
report appear after March 27, 2023. The petitioner reported eleven
instances of continued malfunctions from March 30 through June 3, 2023
related to horn activation, inoperative key-fob, no-start condition,
and fuel gauge inaccuracies. The petitioner also reported that two of
these malfunctions coincided with suspicious vehicles driving by his
house. The petitioner then began documenting various additional events,
including a no-start condition followed by a jump-start, inaccurate/
slowly responding fuel gauge, intermittent CEL, ``nearly unreadable''
instrument cluster, an inability to turn off the engine, and
inoperative fan, wipers, and signals. Petitioner also cited attempts to
maintain the battery state of charge by idling the subject vehicle in
his driveway. At the time of the petitioner's last contact with NHTSA
in August 2023, the petitioner reported that his subject vehicle was
unusable, despite efforts to maintain the charge of its battery.
Subject Vehicle Connectivity
Although the petitioner asserts that his vehicle is under remote
electronic attack, and stipulates that the subject vehicle is not
defective; the Agency is still treating the submitted document as a
part of a defect petition as initially requested.\6\ The Agency
requested that Toyota describe the subject vehicle's CAN bus and
connectivity to outside wireless data sources. In response to the
Agency's request, Toyota stated:
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\6\ Petitioner's letter to ODI dated February 28, 2023 states:
``my opinion and belief is that my 2019 Toyota Yaris is not
defective. It was remotely hacked.''
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<bullet> This vehicle is not equipped with a cellular communication
module; therefore, it is not capable of communicating with a cellular
network.
<bullet> This vehicle's multimedia system is capable of connecting
a cellular phone to support hands-free features, such as hands-free
calling and streaming audio from the phone.
<bullet> This vehicle does not have advanced connectivity features,
such as Apple CarPlay or Android Auto.
<bullet> The multimedia system, which includes Bluetooth
connectivity, operates on a local CAN bus network dedicated
communication for the vehicle's multimedia system.
ODI Analysis
ODI reviewed complaint data and information in NHTSA's databases
concerning all 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicles and identified no other
cyberattack allegations similar to those reported by the petitioner.
This body of information also did not show any potential trend of
similar electrical or power loss symptoms regardless of reported cause.
The symptoms reported by the petitioner could not be duplicated by
the Toyota dealer in three separate service visits and may have
originated from any number of sources. Beyond these service visits, the
effects of other influences such as the Rockledge aftermarket security
system (including its installation and removal), and battery
maintenance via external charger or driveway idling cannot be assessed
at this time. Toyota has reported that difficulty communicating with
the petitioner \7\ inhibits further efforts to inspect the vehicle.
After assessing the material submitted by the petitioner, information
submitted by Toyota in response to an Agency request regarding the
petitioner's allegation, and other information in NHTSA's possession,
NHTSA concludes that:
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\7\ The petitioner has insisted to the Agency and Toyota that
only written communications are accepted and that he will refuse
phone calls, emails, and in person visits.
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<bullet> Notwithstanding the conditions cited by the petitioner,
the 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicle lacks the external cellular connectivity
needed to make it vulnerable to remote cyberattacks.
<bullet> The subject vehicle's Bluetooth connectivity ability is
limited to multimedia and hands-free communication.
<bullet> The Agency has uncovered no other evidence of related
cyberattacks or similar symptoms in 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicles.
Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all
potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any
new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) and 49 CFR part 552; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.95(a).\8\
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\8\ The authority to determine whether to approve or deny defect
petitions under 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) and 49 CFR part 552 has been
further delegated to the Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
Eileen Sullivan,
Associate Administrator, Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2024-27431 Filed 11-21-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
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</html>This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.