Presidential DocumentExecutive Order 141272024-22938
Combating Emerging Firearms Threats and Improving School-Based Active-Shooter Drills
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
October 2, 2024
Signed
September 26, 2024
Issuing agencies
Executive Office of the President
Full Text
<html>
<head>
<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 191 (Wednesday, October 2, 2024)</title>
</head>
<body><pre>
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 191 (Wednesday, October 2, 2024)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 80345-80350]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-22938]
[[Page 80343]]
Vol. 89
Wednesday,
No. 191
October 2, 2024
Part III
The President
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Order 14127--Combating Emerging Firearms Threats and
Improving School-Based Active-Shooter Drills
Proclamation 10817--Amending Proclamation 10773
Proclamation 10818--Gold Star Mother's and Family's Day, 2024
Proclamation 10819--National Hunting and Fishing Day, 2024
Proclamation 10820--National Public Lands Day, 2024
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 191 / Wednesday, October 2, 2024 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 80345]]
Executive Order 14127 of September 26, 2024
Combating Emerging Firearms Threats and Improving
School-Based Active-Shooter Drills
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. During 2020, the last year of the
prior administration, homicides in the Nation increased
nearly 30 percent over the previous year--the largest
1-year increase in murders ever recorded. After that,
the Vice President and I took action to reduce gun
crime and other forms of violent crime. By the middle
of 2022, we had already taken more executive action to
reduce gun violence than any other administration at
that point in time. On June 25, 2022, I signed into law
the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (Public Law 117-
159)--the most significant new gun violence prevention
law in nearly 30 years. Rates of homicide in the United
States are falling at one of the fastest rates ever
recorded. Year-over-year comparison shows that 2023 had
one of the largest declines in the homicide rate in
recent history. This life-saving progress has continued
in 2024. While we have made great progress, much more
work remains to be done to reduce gun violence and save
lives.
It is the policy of my Administration to coordinate
across executive departments and agencies (agencies) to
reduce gun violence and save lives. This order directs
enhanced coordination for two key challenges: combating
emerging firearms threats and understanding and
improving school-based active-shooter drills.
One way to continue the progress on reducing gun
violence is to stay ahead of emerging violent crime
threats involving firearms. My Administration has
always taken these threats seriously. In April 2021,
one of my Administration's first executive actions to
reduce gun violence was directed at stopping the
proliferation of firearms without serial numbers, often
referred to as ``ghost guns.'' To expand these efforts,
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) of the Department of Justice
established an Emerging Threats Center, which focuses
ATF's resources on identifying developments in illicit
firearm marketplaces, including the use of new
technologies to make and unlawfully distribute
undetectable firearms and devices that convert
semiautomatic firearms into illegal machineguns. The
Vice President and I strongly disagreed with the
Supreme Court's decision to strike down an important
gun safety regulation on bump stocks--the device used
in the shooting at a crowded music festival in Las
Vegas--and called on the Congress to clarify that this
dangerous accessory is a machinegun.
The Court's decision addressing bump stocks did not
alter the statutory prohibition on machinegun
conversion devices, which are prohibited for non-
governmental possession even when not installed on a
firearm. The threat posed by the continued
proliferation of these devices is particularly acute.
These devices enable semiautomatic firearms, including
easily concealable handguns, to match or exceed the
rate of fire of many military machineguns with a single
engagement of the trigger--up to 20 bullets in one
second and 1,200 rounds in one minute. From 2017
through 2021, ATF recovered 5,454 of these devices--a
570 percent increase over the previous 5-year period.
These devices are often illegally imported or illegally
made on a 3D printer.
[[Page 80346]]
Unserialized, 3D printed firearms--which can be used
for illicit purposes such as gun trafficking,
possession by people convicted of felonies or subject
to domestic violence restraining orders, or unlawful
engagement in the business of manufacturing or selling
firearms--are another emerging threat. These firearms
can be 3D printed from computer code downloaded from
the internet and produced without serial numbers, which
law enforcement uses to trace firearms recovered in
criminal investigations. Some 3D printed firearms can
be rendered undetectable by magnetometers used to
secure airports, courthouses, and certain events. 3D
printing technology is developing quickly, which can
cause the safety threat of 3D printed firearms to
suddenly increase.
In addition to the threat of domestic crime, these
emerging firearms threats pose a significant risk to
the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States. Many foreign countries have heavily
regulated automatic weapons and 3D printed and
undetectable firearms. The wide availability of these
emerging firearms threats would undermine other
nations' gun laws and the safety and security of our
allies. Technical data and software for 3D printed
firearms and machinegun conversion devices can be used
by international gangs, criminals, and terrorists in a
manner contrary to United States national security and
foreign policy interests.
Multiple agencies have the authority to help stop the
proliferation of these emerging threats, and it is the
policy of the United States to work collectively across
agencies to identify threats, engage in information
sharing, and work together to develop and implement
effective strategies to combat these threats.
Authorities that can address emerging firearms threats
extend beyond the Gun Control Act (Public Law 90-618)
and the National Firearms Act (Public Law 73-474).
Focused and enhanced coordination is needed to ensure a
unified and robust strategy for enforcing existing
legal authorities and using every available tool and
resource. This interagency effort will build on the
life-saving work that has occurred to date to stop the
proliferation of machinegun conversion devices,
including the ongoing efforts at the Department of
Justice and ATF.
My Administration also has invested significant
resources in school safety and has taken steps to keeps
firearms out of schools. These steps have focused on
preventing unauthorized access to firearms for youth
and individuals in crisis; supporting schools that are
implementing evidence-based safety and gun-violence
prevention and intervention solutions; and addressing
the mental health needs of students, particularly those
impacted by gun violence.
Keeping students and educators, including teachers and
other school personnel, safe from gun violence in their
schools is a top priority for my Administration, but
there is more to do to make our schools safer. Since
the mass shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado
in 1999, according to one analysis, there have been
more than 400 school shootings that exposed more than
375,000 students to gun violence. Exposure to school
shootings takes a terrible toll on students and
educators. A nationally representative study found that
51 percent of 14- to 17-year-olds in the United States
worry about school shootings.
The majority of States require schools to conduct
active-shooter drills for students and educators. About
95 percent of K-12 public schools in the United States
conduct lockdown drills, which include drills to
prepare for an active-shooter situation. These drills
vary widely in their approach, and many parents,
students, and educators have expressed concerns over
the effectiveness of and trauma caused by some
approaches to these drills.
Despite their ubiquity, there is very limited research
on how to design and deploy these drills to maximize
their effectiveness and minimize any collateral harms
they might cause. While additional research is ongoing,
it is difficult to conclusively determine which
specific practices are most effective in preparing
schools for active-shooter incidents, preventing
injuries
[[Page 80347]]
and fatalities, and minimizing any associated
psychological impacts or traumas. The Department of
Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Department of Education, and the Department of
Homeland Security continue to work together on a range
of school safety issues, including the beginnings of
research into these important questions. It is time for
these agencies to extend their efforts to help schools
better design and conduct effective and age- and
developmentally appropriate active-shooter drills.
Sec. 2. Definitions. For purposes of this order:
(a) The term ``machinegun'' has the meaning given
by 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(24) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(b), and
includes a ``machinegun conversion device,'' which is
any part designed and intended solely and exclusively,
or combination of parts designed and intended, for use
in converting a weapon into a machinegun.
(b) The term ``undetectable firearm'' means a
firearm as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 922(p).
(c) The term ``3D printing'' refers to the additive
manufacturing process, during which producers transmit
digital designs to 3D printers. The computerized design
guides the fabrication of products, building them up
layer by layer rather than cutting away from a large
block of existing material as in most traditional
manufacturing. This term includes additive
manufacturing technology used to produce a firearm,
firearm frame or receiver, or machinegun conversion
device.
Sec. 3. Combating Emerging Firearms Threats. (a) There
is hereby established an interagency Emerging Firearms
Threats Task Force (Task Force). The Task Force shall
be chaired by the Director of the Office of Gun
Violence Prevention. In addition to the Chair, the Task
Force shall consist of the following members:
(i) the Secretary of State;
(ii) the Attorney General;
(iii) the Secretary of Commerce;
(iv) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(v) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
(vi) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy;
(vii) the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor;
(viii) the Counsel to the President;
(ix) the Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy
Council;
(x) the Deputy Assistant to the President and Domestic Policy Advisor to
the Vice President; and
(xi) the heads of such other agencies and offices as the Chair may from
time to time invite to participate.
(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the
Task Force shall submit to the President, through the
Director of the Office of Gun Violence Prevention, a
report containing a risk assessment and strategy to
stop the proliferation of machinegun conversion
devices, with a particular emphasis on the devices used
to convert a standard, semiautomatic firearm to a
machinegun. The risk assessment and strategy shall
include:
(i) information regarding the use, recovery, origins, and distribution
channels of machinegun conversion devices, including:
(A) the software or technology used for 3D printing machinegun conversion
devices; and
(B) the origins of machinegun conversion devices that are seized at ports
of entry, illegally imported into the United States, or otherwise recovered
by law enforcement agencies in the United States;
[[Page 80348]]
(ii) an assessment of existing applicable legal authorities of the agencies
represented on the Task Force and other agencies identified at the
direction of the Chair to regulate software or technology used to make
machinegun conversion devices, which shall include a review of export and
import laws;
(iii) an assessment of the technological and legal feasibility of 3D
printing companies designing 3D printers that block the functional
capacities of software that can 3D print machinegun conversion devices;
(iv) an assessment of the operational capabilities and legal authorities of
agencies to detect, intercept, and seize machinegun conversion devices that
are illegally imported or illegally produced domestically, including
through 3D printing;
(v) an interagency plan for expanding U.S. Customs and Border Protection
initiatives with Federal, State, Tribal, and local law enforcement to stop
the flow into the United States of machinegun conversion devices;
(vi) an interagency plan for seizing as criminal instrumentalities 3D
printers that are acquired for the purpose of illegally making machinegun
conversion devices and recommendations for additional administrative
actions necessary to facilitate such seizure;
(vii) an interagency plan for expanding partnerships with State, Tribal,
and local law enforcement for Federal training on identifying machinegun
conversion devices, tracing the firearms to which they were attached, and
submitting seizure data to ATF;
(viii) an interagency plan--with input from 3D data providers, technology
companies, and civil society--for voluntary, regulatory, and international
mechanisms to limit the availability on the internet of files used for the
purpose of unlawfully producing machinegun conversion devices;
(ix) an interagency plan for effective coordination to limit the illegal
export and import of software or technology on the internet that can be
readily used to 3D print machinegun conversion devices; and
(x) recommendations for any additional authorities or funding agencies need
from the Congress to more effectively address the proliferation of
machinegun conversion devices.
(c) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the
Task Force shall submit to the President, through the
Director of the Office of Gun Violence Prevention, a
report containing a risk assessment and strategy to
address the emerging threat related to 3D printed
firearms, including unserialized or undetectable 3D
printed firearms. The risk assessment and strategy
shall include:
(i) information regarding the usage, recovery, origins, and distribution
channels of 3D printed unserialized firearms and 3D printed undetectable
firearms, including the software or technology used for 3D printing
unserialized firearms or undetectable firearms;
(ii) an assessment of how 3D printing of firearms can facilitate violation
of the Undetectable Firearms Act (18 U.S.C. 922(p));
(iii) an assessment of existing authorities, including export and import
laws, that regulate software or technology used for 3D printing firearms,
including undetectable firearms;
(iv) an assessment of the technological feasibility of 3D printers
proactively blocking the functional capacities of software used to 3D print
undetectable firearms;
(v) an interagency plan for seizing as criminal instrumentalities 3D
printers acquired for the purpose of illegally producing or dealing in
firearms, including unserialized or undetectable firearms, or for the
purpose of producing firearms for criminal purposes, and recommendations
for additional administrative actions that may be necessary to facilitate
such seizures;
[[Page 80349]]
(vi) an interagency plan for effective coordination between the Department
of Justice and the Department of Commerce to limit the illegal export or
import of software or technology on the internet that can be readily used
to illegally 3D print firearms, including unserialized or undetectable
firearms;
(vii) an interagency plan for expanding partnerships with Federal, State,
Tribal, and local law enforcement to train them on identifying undetectable
or unserialized firearms made with 3D printing software or technology and
reporting recoveries of such firearms to ATF; and
(viii) recommendations for any additional authorities or funding the
agencies need from the Congress to more effectively address the problem of
3D printed firearms, including unserialized or undetectable firearms.
(d) The Task Force shall be responsible for
interagency coordination necessary to facilitate
agencies' implementation of the recommendations and
strategies in the reports described in subsections (b)
and (c) of this section.
(e) At the direction of the Chair, the Task Force
may coordinate interagency efforts to address
additional emerging firearms threats.
Sec. 4. Understanding and Improving School-Based
Active-Shooter Drills. (a) Within 110 days of the date
of this order, the Secretary of Education and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Surgeon General, shall develop and
publish information about school-based active-shooter
drills for schools, including institutions of higher
education, and for State, Tribal, and local educational
agencies. Such information shall include:
(i) a summary of existing research and recommendations on active-shooter
drills, including information on:
(A) how educators can collaborate within schools--as well as with
families; communities; State, Tribal, and local law enforcement; and other
emergency response officials--to implement drills that effectively prepare
a response to school-based active-shooter situations, including by
accounting for the particular needs of educators and students with
disabilities; sharing evidence-informed age- and developmentally
appropriate practices, such as those that prevent or limit trauma and
psychological harm to those participating in drills; and facilitating
effective and timely communication with students, educators, first
responders, family members, and other relevant stakeholders; and
(B) how schools must comply with Federal civil rights laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and
disability when creating, implementing, and evaluating active-shooter
drills, including by effectively serving educators and students with
disabilities as well as ensuring that communications with educators and
students consider their language-related needs (e.g., communicating in a
manner and language that educators and students are able to understand);
and
(ii) resources on school-based active-shooter drills, including information
on:
(A) the types of drills that may be appropriate to prepare students and
educators for school-based active-shooter situations; and
(B) how to create, implement, and evaluate evidence-informed, effective,
and age- and developmentally appropriate school-based drills, including:
(1) how best to engage with students, family members, educators, law
enforcement, and other relevant stakeholders on the process for creating,
implementing, and evaluating these drills;
(2) how best to communicate with students, family members, educators, and
other relevant stakeholders before, during, and after the drill, including
through the use of notification plans for students, educators, parents, and
other parties;
[[Page 80350]]
(3) how to prevent or limit trauma or psychological distress associated
with active-shooter drills and support students and educators who may
experience such trauma or psychological distress; and
(4) how best to serve people with disabilities and those with unique
language-related needs.
(b) Within 110 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
Surgeon General, shall develop and publish information
on recommended areas for future research that can help
inform policymakers, educators, students, parents, and
other relevant stakeholders about different types of
school-based active-shooter drills, the appropriate
frequency of such drills, and the effects of such
drills on students and educators. This information
shall include potential funding sources that could help
advance research on, and inform improvements to,
active-shooter drills.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order
shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or
the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subject to the availability of
appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any
other person.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 26, 2024.
[FR Doc. 2024-22938
Filed 10-1-24; 11:15 am]
Billing code 3395-F4-P
</pre></body>
</html>Indexed from Federal Register on October 2, 2024.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.