Notice2024-21949
Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Land, Moscow, Russia; Moscow, Russia; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
September 25, 2024
Issuing agencies
Commerce DepartmentIndustry and Security Bureau
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 186 (Wednesday, September 25, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 186 (Wednesday, September 25, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78280-78283]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-21949]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Land, Moscow,
Russia; Moscow, Russia; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export
Privileges
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (``EAR'' or ``the Regulations''),\1\
I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement
(``OEE'') to renew the temporary denial order (``TDO'') issued in this
matter on September 23, 2023. I find that renewal of this order is
necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of
the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate
because Azur Air (``Azur'') has engaged in a pattern of repeated,
ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.
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\1\ On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C.
4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the
provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. sec.
2401 et seq. (``EAA''), (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent
part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of
administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (``IEEPA''),
and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018),
shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50
U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).
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I. Procedural History
On April 7, 2022, I signed an order denying Azur export privileges
for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was
necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of
the Regulations. The order was issued ex parte pursuant to section
766.24(a) of the Regulations and was effective upon issuance.\2\ The
temporary denial order was subsequently renewed on October 3, 2022,\3\
March 29, 2023,\4\ and September
[[Page 78281]]
23, 2023 \5\ in accordance with section 766.24(d) of the
Regulations.\6\
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\2\ The TDO was published in the Federal Register on April 12,
2022 (87 FR 21614).
\3\ The October 3, 2022 renewal order was published in the
Federal Register on October 7, 2022 (87 FR 60983).
\4\ The March 29, 2023 renewal order was published in the
Federal Register on April 4, 2023 (88 FR 19908).
\5\ The September 23, 2023 renewal order was published in the
Federal Register on September 28, 2023 (88 FR 66805).
\6\ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a
temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods if it
believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent
an imminent violation. In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated,
ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the
renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not
exceeding one year.
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On August 27, 2024, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request
for a fourth renewal of the TDO. The written request was made more than
20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration and, given the temporary
suspension of international mail service to Russia, OEE has attempted
to deliver a copy of the renewal request to Azur by alternative means
in accordance with sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.
II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent
violation'' of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization
issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A violation may
be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 15 CFR
766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to occur,
or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or
case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood
of future violations.'' Id. As to the likelihood of future violations,
BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge ``is
significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather
than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A ``lack of information
establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a
finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient
reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.'' Id.
If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the
public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written
request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR
766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20
days prior to the TDO's expiration, should set forth the basis for
BIS's belief that renewal is necessary, including any additional or
changed circumstances. Id. ``In cases demonstrating a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may
request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional
period not exceeding one year.'' \7\ Id.
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\7\ 88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023).
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B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal
The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation's (``Russia's'') further invasion of Ukraine by implementing
a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs,
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. Effective
February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related
(e.g., Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia,
including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer
(in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in
Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991 (section
746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).\8\ BIS will review any export or reexport
license applications for such items under a policy of denial. See
section 746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft
registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by
Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license
exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (``AVS'') (section 740.15
of the EAR).\9\ Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign
aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content,
and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or
lease by Russia or a national of Russia, is subject to a license
requirement before it can travel to Russia.
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\8\ 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS published a
final rule effective April 8, 2022 which imposed licensing
requirements on items controlled on the Commerce Control List
(``CCL'') under Categories 0-2 that are destined for Russia or
Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require export, reexport,
and transfer (in-country) licenses if destined for or within Russia
or Belarus. 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022).
\9\ 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).
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OEE's request for renewal for a period of one year is based upon
the facts underlying the issuance of the TDO and the renewal orders
subsequently issued in this matter on October 3, 2022, March 29, 2023,
and September 23, 2023, as well as other evidence developed during this
investigation. This evidence demonstrates that Azur has continued, and
continues, to act in blatant disregard for U.S. export controls and the
terms of previously issued TDOs. Specifically, the initial TDO, issued
on April 7, 2022, was based on evidence that Azur engaged in conduct
prohibited by the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to
the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Russia after
March 2, 2022 from destinations including, but not limited to, Nha
Trang, Vietnam, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (``UAE''), and Antalya,
Turkey, without the required BIS authorization.\10\ Further evidence
indicated that Azur also operated aircraft subject to the EAR on
domestic flights within Russia, potentially in violation of section
736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations.
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\10\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on March 6, 2022, serial number (SN) 27612 flew from Nha Trang,
Vietnam to Moscow, Russia and on March 10, 2022, SN 27909 flew from
Dubai, UAE to Vladivostok, Russia. In addition, on March 17, 2022,
SN 21614 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Kazan, Russia.
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As discussed in the prior renewal orders, BIS presented evidence
indicating that, after the initial TDO issued, Azur continued to
operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b
on flights both into and out of Russia, in violation of the Regulations
and the TDO itself.\11\ The October 3, 2022 renewal order detailed
flights into and out of Russia from/to Antalya, Turkey, Dalaman,
Turkey, and Bodrum, Turkey.\12\ The March 29, 2023 order detailed
flights into and out of Russia from/to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Goa,
India, Male, Maldives, Rayong, Thailand, and Adana, Turkey.\13\
Similarly, the September 23, 2023 order detailed flights into and out
of Russia from/to Hurghada, Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh,
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Egypt, Phuket, Thailand, Antalya Turkey, and Dalaman, Turkey.\14\
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\11\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
\12\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on September
21, 2022. In addition, on September 20, 2022, SN 26271 flew from
Bodrum, Turkey to Moscow, Russia and SN 30045 flew from Dalaman,
Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.
\13\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
SN 29377 flew from Adana, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on March 13, 2023
and from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Moscow, Russia on March 14, 2023.
In addition, SN 30045 flew from Goa, India to Perm, Russia on March
3, 2023 and from Rayong, Thailand to Kemerovo, Russia on March 6,
2023. On February 18, 2023, SN 24947 flew from Male, Maldives to
Moscow, Russia.
\14\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on September
19, 2023 and from Phuket, Thailand to Vladiovostok, Russia on August
15, 2023. In addition, SN 26271 flew from Hurghada, Egypt to Moscow,
Russia on August 31, 2023 and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Perm, Russia
on September 20, 2023. On September 12, 2023, SN 24947 flew from
Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.
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Since that time, Azur has continued to engage in conduct prohibited
by the applicable TDO and Regulations. In its August 27, 2024 request
for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that Azur continues to
operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b,
both on flights into and within Russia, in violation of the September
23, 2023 renewal order and/or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS's
evidence and related investigation demonstrates that Azur continues to
operate aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on
flights into and out of Russia from/to Hurghada, Egypt, Antalya,
Turkey, and Dalaman, Turkey. Information about those flights includes,
but is not limited to, the following:
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Departure/
Tail No. Serial No. Aircraft type arrival cities Dates
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RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ September 13, 2024.
Sochi, RU.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Hurghada, EG/ September 5, 2024.
Samara, RU.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ August 14, 2024.
Perm, RU.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Perm, RU/ August 12, 2024.
Antalya, TR.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Hurghada, EG/ August 2, 2024.
Perm, RU.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Perm, RU/ September 13, 2024.
Hurghada, EG.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ September 10, 2024.
Moscow, RU.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ August 14, 2024.
Sochi, RU.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Surgut, RU/ August 9, 2024.
Antalya, TR.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Hurghada, EG/ July 14, 2024.
Samara, RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ September 11, 2024.
Moscow RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Sharm el-Sheikh, September 7, 2024.
EG/Ufa, RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ August 31, 2024.
Astrakhan, RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Perm, RU/ August 12, 2024.
Hurghada, EG.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Novosibirsk, RU/ July 2, 2024.
Moscow, RU.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Moscow, RU/ September 13, 2024.
(B763). Antalya, TR.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Dalaman, TR/ September 3, 2024.
(B763). Yekaterinburg,
RU.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Moscow, RU/ August 14, 2024.
(B763). Antalya, TR.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Sharm el-Sheikh, August 13, 2024.
(B763). EG/Kazan, RU.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Dalaman, TR/ August 11, 2024.
(B763). Kazan, RU.
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III. Findings
Under the applicable standard set forth in section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that Azur has acted
in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that such violations have
been significant and deliberate; and that given the foregoing and the
nature of the matters under investigation, there is a likelihood of
imminent violations. Moreover, I find that renewal for an extended
period is appropriate because Azur has engaged in a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.
Therefore, renewal of the TDO for one year is necessary in the public
interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give
notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad
that they should avoid dealing with Azur, in connection with export and
reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in
connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Lane,
Moscow, Russia, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or
assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR
including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly
related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control
document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2)
of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the
EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS
pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of
Azur any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of
flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by Azur of the ownership, possession, or control of any
item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the
United States, including financing or other support activities related
to a transaction whereby Azur acquires or attempts to acquire such
ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of
flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from Azur of any item subject to the EAR that
has been
[[Page 78283]]
exported from the United States except directly related to safety of
flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations;
D. Obtain from Azur in the United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is
intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related
to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by Azur, or service any item, of
whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur if such
service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been
or will be exported from the United States except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2)
of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to Azur by ownership, control, position
of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of
trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this
Order.
In accordance with the provisions of sections 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Azur may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be
opposed by Azur as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing a written
submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before
the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided to Azur, and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
one year.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2024-21949 Filed 9-24-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on September 25, 2024.
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