Establishment of Reporting Requirements for the Development of Advanced Artificial Intelligence Models and Computing Clusters
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Abstract
This proposed rule would amend the Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) Industrial Base Surveys--Data Collections regulations by establishing reporting requirements for the development of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models and computing clusters under the Executive order of October 30, 2023, "Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence."
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 176 (Wednesday, September 11, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 176 (Wednesday, September 11, 2024)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 73612-73617]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-20529]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
15 CFR Part 702
[Docket No. 240905-0231]
RIN 0694-AJ55
Establishment of Reporting Requirements for the Development of
Advanced Artificial Intelligence Models and Computing Clusters
AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Proposed rule; request for comment
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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would amend the Bureau of Industry and
Security's (BIS) Industrial Base Surveys--Data Collections regulations
by establishing reporting requirements for the development of advanced
artificial intelligence (AI) models and computing clusters under the
Executive order of October 30, 2023, ``Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy
Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.''
DATES: Comments on this proposed rule must be received by BIS by no
later than October 11, 2024.
ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rule may be submitted to the
Federal rulemaking portal (<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>). The <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> ID
for this proposed rule is: BIS-2024-0047. Please refer to RIN 0694-AJ55
in all comments.
Anyone submitting business confidential information should clearly
identify any business confidential portion of a comment at the time of
submission, file a statement justifying nondisclosure and referring to
the specific legal authority claimed, and provide a non-confidential
version of the submission.
For comments submitted electronically containing business
confidential information, the file name of the business confidential
version should begin with the characters ``BC.'' Any page containing
business confidential information must be clearly marked ``BUSINESS
CONFIDENTIAL'' on the top of that page. The corresponding non-
confidential version of those comments must be clearly marked
``PUBLIC.'' The file name of the non-confidential version should begin
with the character ``P.'' Any submissions with file names that do not
begin with either a ``BC'' or a ``P'' will be assumed to be public and
will be made publicly available through <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>.
Commenters submitting business confidential information are encouraged
to scan a hard copy of the non-confidential version to create an image
of the file, rather than submitting a digital copy with redactions
applied, to avoid inadvertent redaction errors which could enable the
public to read business confidential information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean Delehanty, Office of Strategic
Industries and Economic Security Bureau of Industry and Security,
Department of Commerce. Phone: 202-316-5765; Email:
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#de8dbbbfb0f09abbb2bbb6bfb0aaa79ebcb7adf0bab1bdf0b9b1a8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="712214101f5f35141d1419101f0508311318025f151e125f161e07">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 4.2(a)(i) of Executive Order 14110 of October 30, 2023,
``Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial
Intelligence'' (E.O. 14110), directs the Secretary of Commerce to
require companies developing, or demonstrating an intent to develop,
potential dual-use foundation AI models to provide certain information
to the Federal Government on an ongoing basis. Additionally, section
4.2(a)(ii) of E.O. 14110 directs the Secretary of Commerce to require
companies, individuals, or other organizations or entities that
acquire, develop, or possess a potential large-scale computing cluster
to report any such acquisition, development, or possession, including
the existence and location of these clusters and the amount of total
computing power available in each cluster.
As defined under E.O. 14110, a ``dual-use foundation model'' is
``trained on broad data; generally uses self-supervision; contains at
least tens of billions of parameters; is applicable across a wide range
of contexts; and that exhibits, or could be easily modified to exhibit,
high levels of performance at tasks that pose a serious risk to
security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination of those matters.'' The reporting requirements
proposed in this regulation are intended to apply to dual-use
foundation models that meet technical conditions issued by the
Department. The Department expects to update the technical conditions,
based on technological advancements, as
[[Page 73613]]
necessary and appropriate, as directed by section 4.2(b) of E.O. 14110.
E.O. 14110 directs the Department of Commerce (Department) to
collect information about dual-use foundation models in accordance with
the Defense Production Act (DPA) (50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.). Under the
DPA, the President is authorized to take actions that ensure the U.S.
industrial base is prepared to supply products and services to support
the national defense. In this context, the term ``national defense''
means ``programs for military and energy production or construction,
military or critical infrastructure assistance to any foreign nation,
homeland security, stockpiling, space, and any directly related
activity'' (50 U.S.C. 4552(14)). Additionally, the DPA makes clear that
the international competitiveness of the U.S. industrial base directly
affects its ability to support the national defense (see 50 U.S.C.
4502(a)(7)).
Among other authorities, the DPA authorizes the President ``by
regulation, subpoena, or otherwise, to obtain such information from,
require such reports and the keeping of such records by, make such
inspection of the books, records, and other writings, premises or
property of, and take the sworn testimony of, and administer oaths and
affirmations to, any person as may be necessary or appropriate, in his
discretion, to the enforcement or the administration of'' the DPA (50
U.S.C. 4555(a)). The DPA further specifies that this grant of authority
``includes the authority to obtain information in order to perform
industry studies assessing the capabilities of the United States
industrial base to support the national defense'' (50 U.S.C. 4555(a)).
To carry out its obligations under section 4.2(a) of E.O. 14110,
BIS is exercising its DPA authority, which was delegated to the
Department by the President in Executive Order 13603, and subsequently
re-delegated within the Department to BIS, to collect information from
U.S. companies that are developing, have plans to develop, or have the
computing hardware necessary to develop dual-use foundation models. AI
models are quickly becoming integral to numerous U.S. industries that
are essential to the national defense. For example, manufacturers of
military equipment (e.g., aircrafts, tanks, and missile launchers) use
AI models to enhance the maneuverability, accuracy, and efficiency of
equipment.\1\ Similarly, manufacturers of signal intelligence devices
(e.g., satellites, cameras, and radar) use AI models to improve how
those devices capture signals and eliminate noise.\2\ As a final
example, developers of cybersecurity software, which can be applied to
protect a wide range of systems and infrastructure that are critical to
the national defense, use AI models to increase the speed at which that
software detects and responds to cyberattacks.\3\
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\1\ Shield AI, ``Shield AI Conducts AI-Piloted Flights on Sixth
Aircraft, the Kratos MQM-178 Firejet'' (Mar. 29, 2024), <a href="https://shield.ai/shield-ai-conducts-ai-piloted-flights-on-sixth-aircraft-the-kratos-mqm-178-firejet/">https://shield.ai/shield-ai-conducts-ai-piloted-flights-on-sixth-aircraft-the-kratos-mqm-178-firejet/</a>; RTX, ``Raytheon Technologies Unveils
Next-Generation Electro-Optical Intelligent-Sensing Capability (Apr.
24, 2023), <a href="https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2023/04/24/raytheon-technologies-unveils-next-generation-electro-optical-intelligent-sensing">https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2023/04/24/raytheon-technologies-unveils-next-generation-electro-optical-intelligent-sensing</a>.
\2\ National Instruments, ``Artificial Intelligence in Software-
Defined SIGINT Systems'' (Feb. 6, 2024), <a href="https://www.ni.com/en/solutions/aerospace-defense/radar-electronic-warfare-sigint/artificial-intelligence-in-software-defined-sigint-systems.html">https://www.ni.com/en/solutions/aerospace-defense/radar-electronic-warfare-sigint/artificial-intelligence-in-software-defined-sigint-systems.html</a>;
Northrop Grumman, ``Artificial Intelligence Helps Protect Troops in
Denied GPS Environments'', <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/artificial-intelligence-helps-protect-troops-in-denied-gps-environments">https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/artificial-intelligence-helps-protect-troops-in-denied-gps-environments</a>.
\3\ NVIDIA, ``NVIDIA and Booz Allen Hamilton Expand Partnership
to Bring AI-Enabled Cybersecurity to Public and Private Sectors''
(Sept. 20, 2022), <a href="https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-and-booz-allen-hamilton-expand-partnership-to-bring-ai-enabled-cybersecurity-to-public-and-private-sectors">https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-and-booz-allen-hamilton-expand-partnership-to-bring-ai-enabled-cybersecurity-to-public-and-private-sectors</a>; IBM, ``AI and
Automation for Cybersecurity'' (June 2022), <a href="https://www.ibm.com/thought-leadership/institute-business-value/en-us/report/ai-cybersecurity">https://www.ibm.com/thought-leadership/institute-business-value/en-us/report/ai-cybersecurity</a>.
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Dual-use foundation models could increase the capabilities of these
products and services to an even greater extent. Specifically,
integrating dual-use foundation models into products like military
equipment, signal intelligence devices, and cybersecurity software
could enable those products to operate more effectively across a wider
range of environments, to respond more effectively to unexpected
signals, and to combat additional types of cyberattacks.
Given those potential capabilities, it is essential to the national
defense that the defense industrial base is able to integrate dual-use
foundation models. Indeed, because industries and governments across
the world are actively working to integrate dual-use foundation models
into their defense capabilities, the U.S. defense industrial base will
need to integrate dual-use foundation models to remain internationally
competitive.
Accordingly, the U.S. Government must be ready to take actions that
ensure dual-use foundation models produced by U.S. companies are
available to the defense industrial base. To do so, the U.S. Government
needs information about how many U.S. companies are developing, have
plans to develop, or have the computing hardware necessary to develop
dual-use foundation models, as well as information about the
characteristics of dual-use foundation models under development. Such
information will allow the U.S. Government to determine whether action
is necessary to stimulate development of dual-use foundation models or
to support the development of specific types of models.
The integration of AI models into the defense industrial base also
requires the U.S. Government to take actions as needed to ensure that
dual-use foundation models operate in a safe and reliable manner.
Products integrating these models may operate in unpredictable or
unreliable ways, potentially resulting in dangerous accidents, and a
lack of reliability will make it difficult for the U.S. Government to
use those products in contexts where the margin for error is small,
including defense-related activities where accidents could result in
injury or even loss of life. Thus, the U.S. Government needs
information about how companies developing dual-use foundation models
are training those models to respond to different kinds of inputs and
information about how those companies have tested the safety and
reliability of their models. Such information will allow the U.S.
Government to determine the extent to which certain dual-use foundation
models can be used by the defense industrial base and whether action is
needed to ensure that the defense industrial base produces the safest
and most reliable products and services in the world.
For similar reasons, the U.S. Government must minimize the
vulnerability of dual-use foundation models to cyberattacks. Dual-use
foundation models can potentially be disabled or manipulated by hostile
actors, and it will be difficult for the U.S. Government to rely on a
particular model unless it can determine that the model is robust
against such attacks. Accordingly, the U.S. Government needs
information about the cybersecurity measures that companies developing
dual-use foundation models use to protect those models, as well as
information about those companies' cybersecurity resources and
practices. Under 15 CFR 702.3 all information submitted to the
Department under this rule will be treated as confidential and afforded
all the protections of section 705(d) of the DPA. Such information will
allow the U.S. Government to determine which models are secure enough
to be integrated into products or services that are essential to the
national defense and to assess whether action is needed to ensure that
the defense
[[Page 73614]]
industrial base is producing the most secure products and services in
the world.
Finally, the U.S. Government must prepare the defense industrial
base for the possibility that foreign adversaries or non-state actors
will use dual-use foundation models for activities that threaten the
national defense, including to develop weapons and other dangerous
technologies. Accordingly, the U.S. Government requires information
about the safety and reliability of AI models, including any
potentially dangerous capabilities that developers of dual-use
foundation models have identified with respect to those models. This
includes the results of tests related to reliability as well as the
results of any red-team testing that the company has conducted relating
to lowering the barrier to entry for the development, acquisition, and
use of biological, weapons by non-state actors; the discovery of
software vulnerabilities and development of associated exploits; the
use of software or tools to influence real or virtual events; and the
possibility for self-replication or propagation. Such information will
enable the U.S. Government to determine whether investments in the
defense industrial base are needed to ensure the United States has
access to safe and reliable AI systems, as well as to counteract the
dangerous capabilities identified or to ensure that adequate safeguards
are in place to prevent the theft or misuse of dual-use foundation
models by foreign adversaries or non-state actors.
In short, dual-use foundation models will likely drive significant
advances in numerous industries on which the national defense depends.
These advances require BIS to conduct an ongoing assessment of the AI
industry to ensure that the U.S. Government has the most accurate, up-
to-date information when making policy decisions about the
international competitiveness of the industrial base and its ability to
support the national defense.
Section 4.2(a)(i) of E.O. 14110 mandates that the Secretary shall
require companies developing dual-use foundation AI models to provide
information, reports, or records regarding the following:
1. any ongoing or planned activities related to training,
developing, or producing dual-use foundation models, including the
physical and cybersecurity protections taken to assure the integrity of
that training process against sophisticated threats;
2. the ownership and possession of the model weights of any dual-
use foundation models, and the physical and cybersecurity measures
taken to protect those model weights; and
3. the results of any developed dual-use foundation model's
performance in relevant AI red-team testing, including a description of
any associated measures the company has taken to meet safety
objectives, such as mitigations to improve performance on these red-
team tests and strengthen overall model security.
4. Other information pertaining to the safety and reliability of
dual-use foundation models, or activities or risks that present
concerns to U.S. national security.
Section 4.2(a)(ii) of E.O. 14110 also mandates that companies,
individuals, or other organizations or entities that acquire, develop,
or possess a potential large-scale computing cluster must report any
such acquisition, development, or possession, including the existence
and location of these clusters and the amount of total computing power
available in each cluster. To the extent that these entities are
companies developing dual-use foundation models, they are also subject
to obligations 1-3, above.
Discussion of the Proposed Rule
This proposed rule outlines a potential notification and reporting
process for companies developing or intending to develop dual-use
foundation AI models and for companies, individuals or other
organizations or entities that acquire, develop, or possess computing
clusters that meet technical conditions issued by the Department. Such
entities would be required to report the required information to the
BIS on a quarterly basis for activities that occurred during that
quarter or that are planned to occur in the six months following the
quarter.
BIS collected information responsive to the requirements of section
4.2(a) of E.O. 14110 via a mandatory survey of companies identified as
developing or planning to develop potential dual-use foundation models.
That survey was issued on January 26, 2024. Under this proposed rule,
companies that completed the survey and any other companies that have
developed or are in the process of developing dual-use foundation
models or large-scale computing clusters would be required to submit
information about these activities on a quarterly basis.
For companies that have already submitted complete information via
the survey, the reporting requirements will not require that the
company report activity already reported to BIS in the survey but would
require the reporting of any additions, updates, or changes to the
information since the survey. Any company that has filed at least one
report would be required to continue to file reports on a quarterly
basis for as long as it continues to meet the reporting requirements
or, if it no longer meet the requirements, until it has filed seven
quarterly reports affirming that it has no additions, updates, or
changes to the information in the last report. The reporting system
will allow for companies that have no additions, updates, or changes
since the last report to make a simple notification to that effect.
Request for Comments
BIS welcomes public comment on all aspects of this proposed
regulation. While much of the information that entities must report is
dictated by section 4.2(a) of E.O. 14110, BIS is particularly
interested in public comments on the following:
1. Quarterly Notification Schedule: BIS has proposed that all
covered U.S. persons with models or clusters exceeding the technical
thresholds for reporting should notify BIS on a quarterly basis.
Covered U.S. persons would be required to make quarterly notifications
of `applicable activities' that meet the criteria under Sec.
702.7(a)(1)(i) or (ii) planned to occur in the next six months related
to dual-use foundation models and/or computing clusters, as well as
quarterly notifications required for any `applicable activities' (i.e.,
an ``applicable activity'' that meets the criteria under Sec.
702.7(a)(1)(i) or (ii)) and Sec. 702.7(a)(2)(v) (Affirmation of no
applicable activities), as applicable. `Applicable activities' are
defined to include developing, or having the intent to develop within
the next six months, an AI model or computing cluster above certain
technical thresholds specific in this proposed rule. If a covered U.S.
person has any `applicable activities' to report, then they will notify
BIS, and BIS will follow up with more detailed questions, to which the
Covered U.S. person must respond within 30 calendar days. If Covered
U.S. persons have no `applicable activities' to report, they would only
be required to affirm that fact to BIS each quarter. BIS has proposed a
quarterly notification schedule to provide the U.S. Government with
timely information on the safety and security of large AI models and
computing clusters, while offering a regular notification schedule to
facilitate respondent planning and ease respondent burden. BIS welcomes
comments on the frequency of the proposed notification schedule, as
well
[[Page 73615]]
as alternatives for achieving timely reporting of the required
information.
2. Collection and Storage: BIS recognizes that the information
collected through these reporting requirements is extremely sensitive.
In the interest of gathering information on prioritizing the safety of
respondents' data, BIS welcomes comments related to how this data
should be collected and stored.
3. Collection Thresholds: BIS has included the technical conditions
specified in E.O. 14110 for models and computing clusters that would
trigger the proposed reporting requirements. As directed by section
4.2(b) of E.O. 14110, BIS will update these technical conditions as
appropriate. In addition to the technical parameters in E.O. 14110, BIS
is also seeking comments on the following proposed updated collection
parameters. BIS welcomes comments on the following sets of technical
parameters.
<bullet> A dual-use foundation model training run triggers
reporting requirements if it utilizes more than 10[supcaret]26
computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations).
Models trained on primarily biological sequence data, but at the lower
threshold of 10[supcaret]23 computational operations, as specified by
section 4.2(b) of E.O. 14110, will be addressed in a separate survey.
<bullet> Large-scale computing clusters are defined as clusters
having a set of machines transitively connected by networking of over
300 Gbit/s and having a theoretical maximum performance greater than
10[supcaret]20 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-
point operations) per second (OP/s) for AI training, without sparsity.
Rulemaking Requirements
1. This proposed rule has been determined to be a significant
regulatory action for purposes of E.O. 12866.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is
required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty
for failure to comply with, a collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.) (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently
valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This
proposed rule involves a currently approved information collection
National Security and Critical Technology Assessments of the US
Industrial Base (OMB Control Number 0694-0119). The authority for this
collection is section 705 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended and related Executive Orders 12656 and 13603. Under this
information collection, BIS conducts surveys and assessments of
critical U.S. industrial sectors and technologies. Undertaken at the
request of various policy, research and development, and program and
planning organizations within the Department of Defense and the Armed
Services, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), and other agencies, BIS research, data
collection and analysis provide needed information to benchmark
industry performance and raise awareness of diminishing manufacturing
capabilities.
Most surveys include questions necessary to obtain data on
employment, supply chain, financial performance, production, technology
and service capabilities, research and development (R&D), investment,
competitive outlook, export controls and other relevant information.
Some surveys include a few non-standard questions, depending on the
industry and the needs of the partner agency. The number of surveys
required per assessment varies with the size of the sector and the
scope of the project.
Information gathered from these surveys is deemed business
confidential and will be treated in accordance with section 705 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 which prohibits the publication or
disclosure of such information unless the President determines that its
withholding is contrary to the national defense. To review previous
surveys cleared under this generic collection--including all background
materials--please visit at <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain</a>
and use the search function to enter either the title of the collection
or the OMB Control Number.
When this proposed rule is finalized, BIS intends to use this
existing information collection for the collection/reporting
requirement required by E.O. 14110. BIS estimates the specific survey
required by this proposed rule will have an estimated burden of 5,000
hours per year aggregated across all new respondents. BIS believes this
increase in respondent burden does not require a change to the burden
or cost estimates for the overall umbrella clearance. Please see the
request for comment section of the proposed rule for more information
the potential information collection elements BIS is considering for
the final rule and subsequent surveys.
3. These proposed changes do not contain policies with federalism
implications as that term is defined in E.O. 13132.
4. The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), as amended by the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) (5 U.S.C.
601 et seq.) generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis of any rule subject to the notice and comment
rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. 553) or any other statute. Under section 605(b) of the RFA,
however, if the head of an agency certifies that a rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, the
statute does not require the agency to prepare a regulatory flexibility
analysis. Pursuant to section 605(b), the Chief Counsel for Regulation,
Department of Commerce, certified to the Chief Counsel for Regulation,
Small Business Administration that this proposed rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities for the
reasons explained below. No other law requires such an analysis.
Consequently, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required, and none
has been prepared.
Number of Small Entities
Small entities include small businesses, small organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions. For purposes of assessing the impacts
of this proposed rule on small entities, a small business, as described
in the Small Business Administration's Table of Small Business Size
Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) Codes (effective March 17, 2023), has a maximum annual revenue
of $47 million and a maximum of 1,500 employees (for some business
categories, these numbers are lower). A small governmental jurisdiction
is a government of a city, town, school district or special district
with a population of less than 50,000. A small organization is any not-
for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is
not dominant in its field. The most apt code to apply here is NAICS
518--Computing Infrastructure Providers, Data Processing, Web Hosting,
and Related Services.
The reporting requirements in this proposed rule are expected to
apply to only a small number of entities--only those companies
developing or intending to develop a dual-use foundation model and
those companies, individuals, or other organizations or entities that
acquire, develop, or possess potential large-scale computing clusters.
For the purposes of this rulemaking, the term ``covered U.S. persons''
includes
[[Page 73616]]
all U.S. persons subject to the reporting requirements of E.O. 14110,
section 4.2(a), and is defined as any individual U.S. citizen, any
lawful permanent resident of the United States as defined by the
Immigration and Nationality Act, any entity--including organizations,
companies, and corporations--organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person (individual) located in the United States. At
present, BIS assesses that there are between zero and 15 companies
exceed the reporting thresholds for models and computing clusters at
the time of publication. All of these entities are well-resourced
technology companies. Exceeding the technical thresholds for models and
computing clusters requires access to vast computing power, which is
not typically available to small entities. The minimum computational
threshold that would trigger a reporting requirement established in
E.O. 14110 currently exceeds all or virtually all models in use.\4\
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\4\ Rahman, Owen, and You. ``Tracking Large-Scale AI Models''
(April 5, 2024), <a href="https://epochai.org/blog/tracking-large-scale-ai-models">https://epochai.org/blog/tracking-large-scale-ai-models</a>.
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As AI technology development and implementation are expected to
advance over the next few years, the number of covered U.S. persons
involved in it will also increase. However, as directed by E.O. 14110,
the Secretary will update the technical conditions that trigger the
reporting requirements over time, which may limit the number of
additional impacted entities over time.
Impact
For the reasons discussed above, BIS believes that this proposed
rule, which would impose reporting requirements on large technology
companies, would have no significant impact on small entities.
Conclusion
BIS believes that the overall impact of this proposed rule on small
entities would not be significant, as it would only apply to entities
with large monetary and computational resources, which BIS believes are
not small entities. For the reasons set forth above, the Chief Counsel
for Regulations at the Department of Commerce has certified that this
action would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), a summary of this proposed
rule may be found at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>. The <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> ID for
this proposed rule is: BIS-2024-0047.
List of Subjects in 15 CFR Part 702
Business and industry, Confidential business information,
Employment, National defense, Penalties, Research, Science and
technology.
Accordingly, 15 CFR part 702 is proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 702--INDUSTRIAL BASE SURVEYS--DATA COLLECTIONS
0
1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 702 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.; E.O. 13603, 77 FR 16651, 3
CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 225; E.O. 14110, 88 FR 75191, 3 CFR, 2023 Comp.,
p. 657.
0
2. Section 702.7 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 702.7 Special requirements for on-going reporting regarding the
development of advanced artificial intelligence models and computing
clusters.
(a) Reporting requirements. (1) Covered U.S. persons are required
to submit a notification to the Department by emailing
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#adccc4f2dfc8ddc2dfd9c4c3caedcfc4de83c9c2ce83cac2db"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0b6a6254796e7b64797f62656c4b696278256f6468256c647d">[email protected]</span></a> on a quarterly basis as defined in paragraph
(a)(2) of this section if the covered U.S. person engages in, or plans,
within six months, to engage in `applicable activities,' defined as
follows:
(i) Conducting any AI model training run using more than
10[supcaret]26 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-
point operations); or
(ii) Acquiring, developing, or coming into possession of a
computing cluster that has a set of machines transitively connected by
data center networking of greater than 300 Gbit/s and having a
theoretical maximum greater than 10[supcaret]20 computational
operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations) per second (OP/
s) for AI training, without sparsity.
Note 1 to paragraph (a)(1): Consistent with industry conventions,
one multiply-accumulate computation, D = A x B + C, should be counted
as two operations.
(2) Timing of notifications and response to BIS questions--(i)
Notification of applicable activities. Covered U.S. persons subject to
the reporting requirements in paragraph (a)(1) of this section must
notify BIS of `applicable activities' via email each quarter,
identifying any `applicable activities' planned in the six months
following notification. Quarterly notification dates are as follows:
Q1--April 15; Q2--July 15; Q3--October 15; Q4--January 15. For example,
in a notification due on April 15, a covered U.S. person should include
all activities planned until October 15 of the same year.
(ii) Response to BIS questions. Following a notification of
`applicable activities' by a covered U.S. person, the covered U.S.
person will receive questions from BIS. The covered U.S. person must
respond to all questions within 30 calendar days of receiving the
request.
(iii) Corrections. If any notification of `applicable activities'
or response to BIS questions filed under this section is incomplete
when filed, BIS will notify the covered U.S. person and require a
revised resubmission within 14 calendar days after BIS provides notice
of incompletion. BIS will continue to require revisions within 14
calendar days of notification if a resubmission remains incomplete.
(iv) Clarification questions. If, after receipt of responses
described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, BIS has additional
questions to clarify those responses, the covered U.S. person will
provide additional responses to such additional questions within seven
(7) calendar days. If the covered U.S. person needs additional time to
provide an additional response, it can request an extension from BIS.
(v) Affirmation of no applicable activities. For each of the seven
quarters following the quarter covered by a notification of `applicable
activities,' if the covered U.S. person has no `applicable activities'
(i.e., an ``applicable activity'' that meets the criteria under
paragraph (a)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section) to report, they must
submit an affirmation of no applicable activities by emailing
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ddbcb482afb8adb2afa9b4b3ba9dbfb4aef3b9b2bef3bab2ab"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2a4b4375584f5a45585e43444d6a484359044e4549044d455c">[email protected]</span></a> on the quarterly notification date. If the
covered U.S. person submits an affirmation of no applicable activities
for seven consecutive quarters, they need not provide BIS with any
affirmation thereafter until they have `applicable activities' to
report.
(b) Content, form, and manner of response to BIS questions. (1) All
information submitted under this section shall be filed with BIS in the
form and manner that BIS will prescribe in instructions sent to the
covered U.S. person after BIS has received a notification of
`applicable activities.'
(2) BIS will send questions to the covered U.S. person which must
address, but may not be limited to, the following topics:
(i) Any ongoing or planned activities related to training,
developing, or producing dual-use foundation models, including the
physical and cybersecurity protections taken to assure the integrity of
that training process against sophisticated threats;
(ii) The ownership and possession of the model weights of any dual-
use
[[Page 73617]]
foundation models, and the physical and cybersecurity measures taken to
protect those model weights;
(iii) The results of any developed dual-use foundation model's
performance in relevant AI red-team testing, including a description of
any associated measures the company has taken to meet safety
objectives, such as mitigations to improve performance on these red-
team tests and strengthen overall model security; and
(iv) Other information pertaining to the safety and reliability of
dual-use foundation models, or activities or risks that present
concerns to U.S. national security.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of the reports required by paragraph
(a) of this section, apply the following definitions.
AI red-teaming means a structured testing effort to find flaws and
vulnerabilities in an AI system, often in a controlled environment and
in collaboration with developers of AI. In the context of AI, red-
teaming is most often performed by dedicated ``red teams'' that adopt
adversarial methods to identify flaws and vulnerabilities, such as
harmful or discriminatory outputs from an AI system, unforeseen or
undesirable system behaviors, limitations, or potential risks
associated with the misuse of the system.
AI model means a component of an information system that implements
AI technology and uses computational, statistical, or machine-learning
techniques to produce outputs from a given set of inputs.
AI system means any data system, software, hardware, application,
tool, or utility that operates in whole or in part using AI.
Artificial intelligence or AI has the meaning set forth in 15
U.S.C. 9401(3).
Company means a corporation, partnership, association, or any other
organized group of persons, or legal successor or representative
thereof. This definition is not limited to commercial or for-profit
organizations. For example, the term ``any other organized group of
persons'' may encompass academic institutions, research centers, or any
group of persons who are organized in some manner. The term
``corporation'' is not limited to publicly traded corporations or
corporations that exist for the purpose of making a profit.
Covered U.S. person means any individual U.S. citizen, lawful
permanent resident of the United States as defined by the Immigration
and Nationality Act, entity--including organizations, companies, and
corporations--organized under the laws of the United States or any
jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or
any person (individual) located in the United States.
Dual-use foundation model means an AI model that is:
(i)(A) Trained on broad data;
(B) Generally uses self-supervision;
(C) Contains at least tens of billions of parameters;
(D) Is applicable across a wide range of contexts; and
(E) Exhibits, or could be easily modified to exhibit, high levels
of performance at tasks that pose a serious risk to security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination
of those matters, such as by:
(1) Substantially lowering the barrier of entry for non-experts to
design, synthesize, acquire, or use chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear (CBRN) weapons;
(2) Enabling powerful offensive cyber operations through automated
vulnerability discovery and exploitation against a wide range of
potential targets of cyberattacks; or
(3) Permitting the evasion of human control or oversight through
means of deception or obfuscation.
(ii) Models meet this definition even if they are provided to end
users with technical safeguards that attempt to prevent users from
taking advantage of the relevant unsafe capabilities.
Knowledge has the meaning set out in 15 CFR 772.1.
Large-scale computing cluster means a cluster of computing hardware
that meets the technical thresholds provided by the Department in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
Model weights means the numerical parameters used in the layers of
a neural network.
Training or training run refers to any process by which an AI model
learns from data using computing power. Training includes but is not
limited to techniques employed during pre-training like unsupervised
learning and employed during fine tuning like reinforcement learning
from human feedback.
United States (U.S.) includes the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
and the Northern Mariana Islands.
Thea D. Rozman Kendler,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-20529 Filed 9-9-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-JT-P
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</html>This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.