Proposed Rule2024-19329
Special Conditions: Skyryse, Robinson Helicopter Company Model R66 Helicopter; Interaction of Systems and Structures
Primary source
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Published
August 28, 2024
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration
Abstract
This action proposes special conditions for the Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R66 helicopter. This helicopter, as modified by Skyryse, will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for normal category helicopters. This design feature is a novel control input and fly-by-wire (FBW) system. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 167 (Wednesday, August 28, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 167 (Wednesday, August 28, 2024)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 68833-68837]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-19329]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. FAA-2024-0875; Notice No. 27-24-01-SC]
Special Conditions: Skyryse, Robinson Helicopter Company Model
R66 Helicopter; Interaction of Systems and Structures
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions.
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SUMMARY: This action proposes special conditions for the Robinson
Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R66 helicopter. This helicopter, as
modified by Skyryse, will have a novel or unusual design feature when
compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for normal category helicopters. This design feature is a
novel control input and fly-by-wire (FBW) system. The applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain
[[Page 68834]]
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These
proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.
DATES: Send comments on or before October 15, 2024.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by Docket No. FAA-2024-0875 using
any of the following methods:
Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> and follow
the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> at any time. Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Moore, Airframe Section, AIR-
622, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft
Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, MO 64106; telephone (303) 342-1066; email
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f2b6939c9b979edcb7dcbf9d9d8097b2949393dc959d84"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d99db8b7b0bcb5f79cf794b6b6abbc99bfb8b8f7beb6af">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking
by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the proposed special conditions,
explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting
data.
The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date for
comments, and will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do
so without incurring delay. The FAA may change these special conditions
based on the comments received.
Privacy
Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in title
14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 11.35, the FAA will post all
comments received without change to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>, including any
personal information you provide. The FAA will also post a report
summarizing each substantive verbal contact received about these
special conditions.
Confidential Business Information
Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552),
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to
these special conditions contain commercial or financial information
that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as
private, and that is relevant or responsive to these special
conditions, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and the indicated comments will not be
placed in the public docket of these proposed special conditions. Send
submissions containing CBI to the individual listed in the For Further
Information Contact section above. Comments the FAA receives, which are
not specifically designated as CBI, will be placed in the public docket
for these proposed special conditions.
Background
On April 10, 2023, Skyryse applied for a supplemental type
certificate for removal of the mechanical control system and
installation of a computer controlled flight control system in the
Model R66 helicopter. The Robinson Model R66 helicopter, currently
approved under Type Certificate No. R00015LA, is a single engine normal
category rotorcraft. The maximum take-off weight is 2,700 pounds, with
a maximum seating capacity of five passengers.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, Skyryse must show that the
Robinson Model R66 helicopter, as changed, continues to meet the
applicable provisions of the regulations listed in Type Certificate No.
R00015LA or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of
application for the change, except for earlier amendments as agreed
upon by the FAA.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for
the Robinson Model R66 helicopter because of a novel or unusual design
feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of
Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on the same type
certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature,
these special conditions would also apply to the other model under
Sec. 21.101.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Robinson Model R66 helicopter must comply with the
fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the
noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Feature
The Robinson Model R66 helicopter will incorporate the following
novel or unusual design feature:
Novel control input and FBW system.
Discussion
Skyryse is proposing to install an FBW flight control system (FCS)
intended to replace the current hydraulicly boosted mechanical primary
FCS, on a Robinson Model R66 helicopter. FBW systems are new to part 27
rotorcraft and as such, the rotorcraft FCS will now contain control
functions that affect the static strength of rotorcraft structure.
These proposed special conditions would give the applicant an
option to offset the structural factor of safety based on the
probability of system failure. These proposed special conditions apply
to systems that can induce loads on the airframe or change the response
of the rotorcraft to maneuvers or to control inputs, as a result of
failure. Some potential examples include part 27 rotorcraft equipped
with FBW or fly-by-light FCSs, autopilots, stability augmentation
systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control systems, fuel
management systems, and other systems that either directly or as a
result of failure or
[[Page 68835]]
malfunction affect structural performance.
The FAA has issued special conditions for the interaction of
systems and structures to other aircraft in the past (parts 23, 25, and
29). Active flight control systems are capable of providing automatic
responses to inputs from sources other than the pilots. These automatic
systems may become inoperative or may operate in a degraded mode, which
could impact the loads envelope and rotorcraft static strength.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine the structural factors of
safety and operating margins such that the joint probability of
structural failures due to application of loads during system
malfunctions is not greater than that found in rotorcraft equipped with
earlier technology control systems. To achieve this objective, it is
necessary to define the failure conditions with their associated
frequency of occurrence in order to determine the structural factors of
safety and operating margins that will ensure an acceptable level of
safety.
The proposed special conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
Applicability
As discussed above, these proposed special conditions are
applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the applicant
apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model
included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or
unusual design feature, these special conditions would apply to the
other model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only a certain novel or unusual design feature
on one model of helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability
and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of
these features on the helicopter.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Authority Citation
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, and
44704.
The Proposed Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the
following special conditions as part of the type certification basis
for Robinson Model R66 helicopters, as modified by Skyryse.
Interaction of Systems and Structures
For rotorcraft equipped with systems that affect structural
performance, either directly or as a result of a failure or
malfunction, the influence of these systems and their failure
conditions must be taken into account when showing compliance with the
requirements of subparts C and D of part 27 of title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR).
The following criteria must be used for showing compliance with
these special conditions:
(a) The criteria defined herein only address the direct structural
consequences of the system responses and performance. They cannot be
considered in isolation but should be included in the overall safety
evaluation of the rotorcraft. These criteria may, in some instances,
duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These
criteria are only applicable to structures whose failure could prevent
continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria that define
acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability
requirements, when operating in the system degraded or inoperative
mode, are not provided in these special conditions.
(b) Depending upon the specific characteristics of the rotorcraft,
additional studies may be required that go beyond the criteria provided
in these special conditions in order to demonstrate the capability of
the rotorcraft to meet other realistic conditions such as alternative
gust or maneuver descriptions for a rotorcraft equipped with a load
alleviation system.
(c) The following definitions are applicable to these special
conditions.
(1) Structural performance: Capability of the rotorcraft to meet
the structural requirements of 14 CFR part 27.
(2) Flight limitations: Limitations that can be applied to the
rotorcraft flight conditions following an in-flight occurrence and that
are included in the flight manual (e.g., speed limitations, avoidance
of severe weather conditions, etc.).
(3) Operational limitations: Limitations, including flight
limitations that can be applied to the rotorcraft operating conditions
before dispatch (e.g., fuel, payload, and master minimum equipment list
limitations).
(4) Failure condition: The term failure condition is the same as
that used in Sec. 27.1309; however, these special conditions apply
only to system failure conditions that affect the structural
performance of the rotorcraft (e.g., system failure conditions that
induce loads, change the response of the rotorcraft to inputs such as
gusts or pilot actions, or lower flutter margins).
Effects of Systems on Structures
(a) General. The following criteria will be used in determining the
influence of a system and its failure conditions on the rotorcraft
structure.
(b) System fully operative. With the system fully operative, the
following apply:
(1) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating
configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in
subpart C (or used in lieu of those specified in subpart C), taking
into account any special behavior of such a system or associated
functions or any effect on the structural performance of the rotorcraft
that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant
nonlinearity (rate of displacement of control surface, thresholds, or
any other system nonlinearities) must be accounted for in a realistic
or conservative way when deriving limit loads from limit conditions.
(2) The rotorcraft must meet the strength requirements of part 27
(static strength, residual strength), using the specified factors to
derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of
nonlinearities must be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure
the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the behavior
below limit conditions. However, conditions beyond limit conditions
need not be considered when it can be shown that the rotorcraft has
design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit
conditions.
(3) The rotorcraft must meet the flutter requirements of Sec.
27.629.
(c) System in the failure condition. For any system failure
condition not shown to be extremely improbable, the following apply:
(1) At the time of occurrence. Starting from 1-g level flight
conditions, a realistic scenario, including pilot corrective actions,
must be established to determine the loads occurring at the time of
failure and immediately after the failure.
(i) For static strength substantiation, these loads multiplied by
an appropriate factor of safety that is related to the probability of
occurrence of the failure, are ultimate loads to be considered for
design. The factor of safety is defined in Figure 1.
[[Page 68836]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28AU24.498
(ii) For residual strength substantiation, the rotorcraft must be
able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph
(c)(1)(i) of these special conditions.
(iii) Freedom from flutter and divergence must be shown under any
condition of operation including:
(A) Airspeeds up to 1.11 V<INF>NE</INF> (power on and power off).
(B) Main rotor speeds from 0.95 x the minimum permitted speed up to
1.05 x the maximum permitted speed (power on and power off).
(C) The critical combinations of weight, center of gravity
position, load factor, altitude, speed, and power condition.
(iv) For failure conditions that result in excursions beyond
operating limitations, freedom from flutter and divergence must be
shown to increased speeds, so that the margins intended by paragraph
(c)(1)(iii) of these special conditions are maintained.
(v) Failures of the system that result in forced structural
vibrations (oscillatory failures) must not produce loads that could
result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.
(2) For the continuation of the flight. For the rotorcraft in the
system failed state, and considering any appropriate reconfiguration
and flight limitations, the following apply:
(i) The loads derived from the following conditions (or used in
lieu of the following conditions) at speeds up to V<INF>NE</INF> (power
on and power off) (or the speed limitation prescribed for the remainder
of the flight) and at the minimum and maximum main rotor speeds (if
applicable) must be determined:
(A) the limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in
Sec. Sec. 27.337 and Sec. 27.339;
(B) the limit gust conditions specified in Sec. 27.341;
(C) the limit yaw maneuvering conditions specified in Sec. 27.351;
(D) the limit unsymmetrical conditions specified in Sec. 27.427;
and
(E) the limit ground loading conditions specified in Sec. 27.473.
(ii) For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure
must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of these
special conditions multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the
probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety is
defined in Figure 2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28AU24.499
[[Page 68837]]
Qj = (Tj)(Pj)
Where:
Qj = Probability of being in failure condition j
Tj = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)
Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)
Note: If Pj is greater than 10<SUP>-3</SUP> per flight hour,
then a 1.5 factor of safety must be applied to all limit load
conditions specified in subpart C.
(iii) For residual strength substantiation, the rotorcraft must be
able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph
(c)(2)(ii) of these special conditions.
(iv) If the loads induced by the failure condition have a
significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance, then their effects
must be taken into account.
(v) Freedom from flutter and divergence must also be shown up to
1.11 V<INF>NE</INF> (power on and power off), including any probable
system failure condition combined with any damage required or selected
for investigation by either Sec. 27.571(e) or Sec. 27.573(d).
(3) Consideration of certain failure conditions may be required by
other sections of 14 CFR part 27 regardless of calculated system
reliability. Where analysis shows the probability of these failure
conditions to be extremely improbable, criteria other than those
specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation
to show continued safe flight and landing.
(d) Failure indications. For system failure detection and
indication, the following apply:
(1) The system must be checked for failure conditions, not shown to
be extremely improbable, that degrade the structural capability below
the level required by part 27 or that significantly reduce the
reliability of the remaining operational portion of the system. As far
as reasonably practicable, the flight crew must be made aware of these
failures before flight. Certain elements of the control system, such as
mechanical and hydraulic components, may use special periodic
inspections, and electronic components may use daily checks, in lieu of
detection and indication systems to achieve the objective of this
requirement. These other means of detecting failures before flight are
considered certification maintenance requirements and must be limited
to components that are not readily detectable by normal detection and
indication systems, and where service history shows that inspections
will provide an adequate level of safety.
(2) The existence of any failure condition, not shown to be
extremely improbable, during flight that could significantly affect the
structural capability of the rotorcraft and for which the associated
reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by suitable flight
limitations, must be signaled to the flight crew. For example, failure
conditions that result in a factor of safety between the rotorcraft
strength and the loads of subpart C below 1.25, or flutter and
divergence margins below 1.11 V<INF>NE</INF> (power on and power off),
must be signaled to the crew during flight.
(e) Dispatch with known failure conditions. If the rotorcraft is to
be dispatched in a known system failure condition that affects
structural performance, or that affects the reliability of the
remaining operational portion of the system to maintain structural
performance, then the provisions of these special conditions must be
met, including the provisions of paragraph (b) for the dispatched
condition and paragraph (c) for subsequent failures. Expected
operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing Pj as
the probability of failure occurrence for determining the safety margin
in Figure 1. Flight limitations and expected operational limitations
may be taken into account in establishing Qj as the combined
probability of being in the dispatched failure condition and the
subsequent failure condition for the safety margins in Figure 2. These
limitations must be such that the probability of being in this combined
failure state and then subsequently encountering limit load conditions
is extremely improbable. No reduction in these safety margins is
allowed if the subsequent system failure rate is greater than
10<SUP>-3</SUP> per flight hour.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on August 22, 2024.
Patrick R. Mullen,
Manager, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Standards Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2024-19329 Filed 8-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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