Use of Supplemental Restraint Systems
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Issuing agencies
Abstract
This rule prohibits civil aircraft operations conducted with supplemental restraint systems (SRS) unless operators meet certain requirements for ensuring passenger and crewmember safety during all phases of the operation. The FAA expects these requirements to increase the safety of individuals on board civil aircraft operations conducted with SRS. This rule addresses recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board and the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General. Additionally, this rule will codify, with updates, an Emergency Order of Prohibition currently in effect addressing safety concerns regarding the use of supplemental restraints. The rule applies to all civil aircraft operations conducted with use of SRS. The rule does not apply to parachute operations, rotorcraft external-load operations, or public aircraft operations.
Full Text
<html>
<head>
<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 163 (Thursday, August 22, 2024)</title>
</head>
<body><pre>
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 163 (Thursday, August 22, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 67834-67851]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-18545]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 1, 11, 91, 135, and 136
[Docket No.: FAA-2023-2250; Amdt. Nos. 1-76, 11-66, 91-376, 135-146,
and 136-3]
RIN 2120-AL37
Use of Supplemental Restraint Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This rule prohibits civil aircraft operations conducted with
supplemental restraint systems (SRS) unless operators meet certain
requirements for ensuring passenger and crewmember safety during all
phases of the operation. The FAA expects these requirements to increase
the safety of individuals on board civil aircraft operations conducted
with SRS. This rule addresses recommendations from the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Department of Transportation Office
of Inspector General. Additionally, this rule will codify, with
updates, an Emergency Order of Prohibition currently in effect
addressing safety concerns regarding the use of supplemental
restraints. The rule applies to all civil aircraft operations conducted
with use of SRS. The rule does not apply to parachute operations,
rotorcraft external-load operations, or public aircraft operations.
DATES: Effective October 21, 2024.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How
to Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Raymond Plessinger, General Aviation
and Commercial Division, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591;
Telephone: (202) 267-1100; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fba99a829694959fd5ab979e888892959c9e89bb9d9a9ad59c948d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b3e1d2cadedcddd79de3dfd6c0c0daddd4d6c1f3d5d2d29dd4dcc5">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
[[Page 67835]]
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
IRFA--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
LOA--Letter of Authorization
NAICS--North American Industry Classification System
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
OEM--Original Equipment Manufacturer
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
PIC--Pilot in Command
RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act
SBA--Small Business Administration
SPRS--Supplemental Passenger Restraint System(s)
SRS--Supplemental Restraint System(s)
STC--Supplemental Type Certificate
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
B. Summary of the Rule
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
III. Background
A. General Overview of Comments
B. Differences Between the NPRM and the Final Rule
IV. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule
A. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed
Flight Operations (Sec. 91.108(a) and (b))
B. Harness and Lanyard (Sec. 91.108(c)(1) and (2))
C. Impede Egress in an Emergency After Being Released (Sec.
91.108(c)(3))
D. Quick Release Requirements (Sec. 91.108(c)(4))
E. Who May Provide the SRS (Sec. 91.108(d))
F. Attachment Points (Sec. 91.108)(e)(1)(i)--(iii))
G. Sizing Criteria (Sec. 91.108(e)(2))
H. SRS Function (Sec. 91.108(e)(3))
I. Pilot in Command (Sec. 91.108(f)(1) Through (5))
J. Passenger Briefing (Sec. 91.108(g)(1) and (2))
K. Passenger Demonstration (Sec. 91.108(h)(1) and (2))
L. Individuals Unable To Meet the Demonstration Requirements of
the Enhanced Safety Briefing (Sec. 91.108(i)(1))
M. Individuals Under the Age of 15 (Sec. 91.108(i)(2))
N. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck (Sec. 91.108(i)(3))
O. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an Approved Child Restraint
System (Sec. 91.108(i)(4))
P. Lap-Held Child (Sec. 91.108(j)(1) and (2))
Q. Excluded Operations (Sec. 91.108(k)(1) Through (3))
R. Definition (Sec. 1.1)
S. Miscellaneous Amendments
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Summary of the Regulatory Impact Analysis
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
VI. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
VII. Additional Information
A. Electronic Access and Filing
B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
This final rule addresses the use of supplemental restraint systems
(SRS) in civil aircraft operations. An SRS is a device used to secure
an individual inside an aircraft when that person is not secured by an
FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or an
approved child restraint system. SRS are not installed on the aircraft
pursuant to a Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, approved
major alteration, or other FAA approval. An SRS consists of a harness
secured around the torso of the individual using the SRS and a lanyard
that connects the harness to an FAA-approved airframe attachment point
inside the aircraft.
On March 11, 2018, five passengers drowned when the open-door
helicopter in which they were traveling ditched \1\ on the East River
in New York, New York. They were unable to exit the aircraft because
the harness/tether system each used hindered their egress. As a result
of preliminary information discovered during the investigation of this
accident, on March 19, 2018, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) issued Urgent Safety Recommendation A-18-012, which recommended
that the FAA prohibit all open-door aircraft operations using passenger
harness systems unless the harness system allows passengers to rapidly
release the harness with minimal difficulty and without having to cut
or forcefully remove the harness.\2\ On March 22, 2018, the FAA issued
an Emergency Order of Prohibition titled ``Operators and Pilots of
`Doors Off' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' \3\ to all operators and
pilots of flights for compensation or hire with the doors opened or
removed in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United
States for doors-off flights. The Emergency Order of Prohibition
prohibits the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS)
that cannot be released quickly in an emergency.\4\ At the time of the
accident, no rules specifically addressed aircraft operations conducted
with the use of SRS,\5\ including during operations with doors opened
or removed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The NTSB final report describes ``ditching'' as ``an
emergency landing that is deliberately executed on water with the
intent of abandoning the helicopter as soon as practical.'' See
NTSB, Aircraft Accident Report: Inadvertent Activation of Fuel
Shutoff Level and Subsequent Ditching at 1, NTSB/AAR-19/04 PB2020-
100100 (Dec. 10, 2019), <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf">https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf</a>.
\2\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-18-012, available at <a href="https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-18-012">https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-18-012</a>.
\3\ Emergency Order of Prohibition, Operators and Pilots of
``Doors Off'' Flights for Compensation or Hire, available at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2018-0243-0001">https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2018-0243-0001</a>.
\4\ The term ``supplemental passenger restraint system,'' as
defined in the March 22, 2018, Emergency Order of Prohibition, means
any passenger restraint that is not installed on the aircraft
pursuant to an FAA approval, including (but not limited to)
restraints approved through a Type Certificate, Supplemental Type
Certificate, or as an approved major alteration using FAA Form 337.
\5\ The FAA uses the term ``supplemental restraint system''
(SRS) to refer to the device in general, but for the purposes of
this rulemaking document, uses the term ``supplemental passenger
restraint system'' (SPRS) when quoting or referring to documents
that use the term ``SPRS'' (e.g., The Emergency Order of
Prohibition). The FAA considers the two terms to be synonymous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Summary of the Rule
On November 21, 2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to prohibit civil aircraft operations
conducted with SRS unless operators meet certain requirements for
ensuring passenger and crewmember safety during all phases of the
operation.\6\ After the comment period closed January 22, 2024, the FAA
reviewed the ten comments to the NPRM. This rule finalizes the NPRM as
proposed, with a few revisions for clarity as discussed throughout this
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Use of Supplemental Restraint Systems NPRM, 88 FR 80997
(Nov. 21, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This final rule addresses recommendations from the NTSB and the
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General.\7\
Additionally, this final rule codifies, with updates, an Emergency
Order currently in effect addressing safety concerns regarding the use
of supplemental restraints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The SRS NPRM provides detailed information regarding the
NTSB and the Department of Transportation's recommendations, and how
the FAA addressed those recommendations. See 88 FR 80999 through
81001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, this final rule prohibits civil aircraft operations when
individuals are secured by SRS except as provided in Sec. 91.108. In
addition, flight operations with doors opened or removed are prohibited
when individuals are using SRS except under two scenarios. The first
scenario is when each individual \8\ occupies an
[[Page 67836]]
FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, properly secured about them or occupies a properly
secured and approved child restraint system during the entire flight.
The second scenario is if each individual occupies an FAA-approved seat
or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness,
properly secured about them during movement on the surface, takeoff,
and landing; during other phases of flight, if permitted by the pilot
in command (PIC),\9\ the individual may use an SRS that meets all
requirements in this rule. The operator generally will provide the SRS
to individuals who seek to use the SRS during the flight, but in some
cases, an individual may opt to provide their own SRS if it meets the
requirements of this rule and the PIC approves use of the SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The FAA uses two categories to define those who travel on
aircraft: crewmember and passenger. In this rule, the agency uses
that distinction when referring specifically to a crewmember or a
passenger. When the distinction between a crewmember and a passenger
is not applicable, the agency uses the word ``individual'' when
referring to anyone who occupies an SRS.
\9\ Under 14 CFR 91.3, the PIC is the final authority as to the
operation of the aircraft. The PIC may determine it is unsafe to
allow the use of SRS during a phase of flight that would otherwise
be allowed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This final rule requires the SRS to have a release mechanism that
can be operated quickly by the passenger using the SRS with minimal
difficulty. The release mechanism must be located on the front or side
of the harness in a place easily accessible to and visible by the
individual using the SRS and must prevent inadvertent release. Also,
the release mechanism cannot require the use of a knife to cut the
restraint, the use of any other additional tool, or the assistance of
any other individual to release the SRS. This final rule also requires
the SRS to not impede egress from the aircraft in an emergency after
being released.
This final rule requires the SRS to be connected to an FAA-approved
airframe attachment point or points rated equal to or greater than the
combined weight of all the individuals using an SRS attached to that
same point, but it cannot be connected to any airframe attachment point
located in the flightdeck. Additionally, the rule requires that the SRS
lanyard secures around the torso of the individual using the SRS and
ensures the torso of the individual remains inside the aircraft at all
times. The rule also prohibits the SRS from connecting to any seatbelt
or shoulder harness attachment point unless the attachment point is
FAA-approved, and nothing may attach to the SRS that is not relevant to
its function. In addition, the SRS must fit the individual using it
based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated.
This final rule also requires operators conducting flight
operations where passengers use an SRS to provide an enhanced passenger
safety briefing. Further, this rule requires passengers who seek to use
an SRS during flight operations to demonstrate their ability to use,
secure, and release the FAA-approved safety belts and, if installed,
shoulder harnesses, as well as their ability to release quickly the SRS
with no assistance and with minimal difficulty. A passenger who cannot
meet the demonstration requirements of the rule is prohibited from
using an SRS; however, they would be permitted to participate in the
flight if they occupy an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt
and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about them during
operations when the doors are opened or removed or when otherwise
required by regulations. Only those passengers who have reached their
fifteenth birthday can use an SRS during flight operations, and no
individual using an SRS can occupy a seat in the flightdeck. In
addition, this final rule prohibits individuals who occupy a child
restraint system from also using an SRS. It also prohibits a child who
is less than two years old from being held (1) by an adult who is using
an SRS or (2) when the aircraft doors are opened or removed even if the
adult is properly secured by an FAA-approved safety belt.
Finally, the rule outlines the responsibilities of the PIC,
including determining whether an SRS complies with the requirements of
the rule and whether SRS may be used during flight operations.
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle I of 49
U.S.C., specifically section 106, describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII of 49 U.S.C., Aviation Programs, describes
in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
The FAA promulgates this rulemaking under the authority described
in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the
Administrator to promulgate regulations and rules, and 49 U.S.C.
44701(a)(5), which requires the Administrator to promote safe flight of
civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and setting
minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedures
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.
III. Background
A. General Overview of Comments
The FAA received and considered 10 comments on the NPRM, four of
which were from organizations: Condon & Forsyth, Helicopter Association
International (HAI), the NTSB, and Tuckamore Aviation. Four of the
commenters supported the rule with no changes, five commenters
expressed support but also proposed changes, and one commenter opposed
the proposed rule in its entirety.
B. Differences Between the NPRM and the Final Rule
This rule finalizes the NPRM as proposed with a few revisions to
maximize clarity or after consideration in response to comments. The
FAA is updating Sec. 91.108 paragraphs (b)(2), (c)(2), (e)(1)(i), and
the definition of ``supplemental restraint system'' to include ``FAA-
approved'' airframe attachment point to ensure that the SRS can only be
attached to an airframe attachment point when the FAA has determined
that point complies with the applicable part 21 approval requirements.
The FAA is also adding a prohibition that the SRS cannot be connected
to any seatbelt or shoulder harness attachment point(s) unless the
attachment is FAA-approved as described in Sec. 91.108 paragraph
(e)(1)(i). The FAA is amending the proposed regulatory text to prohibit
anything from attaching to the SRS that is not relevant to its
function. The FAA also is moving the SRS definition from Sec. 91.108
to Sec. 1.1. Finally, the FAA made some grammatical changes to the
regulatory text that are technical in nature and that do not
substantively change the previous intent of the provisions.
IV. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule
A. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed Flight
Operations (Sec. 91.108(a) and (b))
The FAA proposed in Sec. 91.108(a) that, except as provided in
this rule, no person may conduct a civil aircraft operation in which
any individual on board is secured with an SRS. The FAA also proposed
in Sec. 91.108(b) that no person may operate a civil aircraft with the
doors opened or removed unless (1) each individual on board occupies an
approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder
harness during all phases of flight or (2) each individual occupies an
approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder
harness during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing and is
[[Page 67837]]
secured for the remainder of the flight by an SRS. As part of the
proposal, the FAA applied some of the requirements to all
``individuals'' using an SRS, not just passengers.
Tuckamore Aviation commented that the rule should only apply to
passengers and not crewmembers because it introduces conflicting
definitions and requirements to existing safety guidance, established
equipment use, and practices and procedures established by other
government agencies for crewmembers. Further, Tuckamore Aviation
commented that all public aircraft operations need to be exempt from
proposed 14 CFR 91.108.
The FAA disagrees with Tuckamore Aviation's assertion that the rule
should only apply to passengers and not crewmembers. Applying the rule
to all individuals on board the aircraft will help mitigate the risks
associated with using SRS, particularly during operations with doors
opened or removed, and will ensure the highest level of safety when
conducting such operations. The safety risks involved in operations
using SRS do not apply only to passengers--they apply to all
individuals on board, including the crew. As a result, to ensure the
safety of all individuals secured by an SRS during civil aircraft
operations, the FAA finalizes the language as proposed and applies the
requirements of the rule (with the exception of the passenger briefing
and demonstration) to all individuals, not just passengers onboard the
aircraft.
The FAA agrees with Tuckamore that all public aircraft operations
(PAO) should be exempt from the rule, but it disagrees with Tuckamore's
characterization of PAO. The status of an aircraft operation is either
civil or public. If an aircraft is operating under public status, Sec.
91.108 would not apply. If an aircraft is operating under civil status,
Sec. 91.108 would apply unless the operator applies for an exemption.
Contrary to Tuckamore's assertion, operations conducted by civil
aircraft under contract with a valid government entity do constitute
PAO as long as the contracting entity has filed a declaration letter
with the local Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). Otherwise, the
FAA considers the operator to be operating under civil status.
Moreover, operations by a PAO contractor are, and must be,
distinguishable from their civil aircraft operations. There is no mixed
status of both civil and public aircraft operations. PAO status is
determined on a flight-by-flight basis, and the operator should
determine the nature of the flight prior to the operation to determine
the applicability of Sec. 91.108 to its operation.\10\ As a result of
the foregoing, the FAA adopts the language as proposed and applies
Sec. 91.108 to civil aircraft operations, thereby excluding public
aircraft operations. The FAA removed the word ``registered'' from
proposed Sec. 91.108(a) and (b)(1) as it is redundant to the rule's
application to civil aircraft--this revision does not change the
applicability of this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Public Aircraft Operations statutes, 49 U.S.C.
40102(a)(41) and 49 U.S.C. 40125; see also Public Aircraft
Operations--Manned and Unmanned, AC 00-1.1B (Sept. 21, 2018),
<a href="https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1.1B.pdf">https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1.1B.pdf</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the FAA notes that it amended the language in Sec. 91.108
paragraphs (a) and (b)(2). In paragraph (a), the FAA made a technical
amendment by adding a cross-reference to the definition of
``supplemental restraint system'' under Sec. 1.1, further highlighting
that the term is formally defined under Sec. 1.1.\11\ The FAA also
amended paragraph (b)(2) by adding a reference to an ``FAA-approved''
airframe attachment point. This change reflects a similar change made
in paragraph (e)(1)(i) in response to comments, and it highlights the
fact that an SRS can only be attached to an airframe attachment point
when the FAA has determined that point complies with the applicable
part 21 approval requirements.\12\ As a result, the FAA is adopting the
language in paragraphs (a) and (b)(2) as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For discussion on moving the SRS definition from Sec.
91.108 to Sec. 1.1, see section IV.R (``Definition (Sec. 1.1)'')
of this preamble.
\12\ See section IV.F (``Attachment Points'') for further
discussion on the FAA-approval process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Harness and Lanyard (Sec. 91.108(c)(1) and (2))
The FAA proposed that each SRS have a harness that secures around
the individual's torso and a lanyard that connects the harness to an
airframe attachment point or points, ensuring that the individual's
torso remains inside the aircraft at all times. The FAA did not receive
comments on this proposed provision; however, as with paragraph (b)(2),
the FAA has included ``FAA-approved'' in reference to the attachment
points for the same reasons cited previously. Therefore, the FAA is
adopting the language in paragraph (c)(1) as proposed and the language
in paragraph (c)(2) as amended.
C. Impede Egress in an Emergency After Being Released (Sec.
91.108(c)(3))
The FAA proposed that an SRS must not impede egress from the
aircraft in an emergency after being released. The FAA did not receive
comments on this proposed provision and adopts the language as
proposed.
D. Quick Release Requirements (Sec. 91.108(c)(4))
As part of the SRS design requirements, the FAA proposed an SRS
have a release mechanism that (1) an individual can quickly operate
with minimal difficulty, (2) is attached to the front or side of the
harness in a location easily accessible to and visible by the
individual using it, (3) prevents inadvertent release, and (4) requires
that the supplemental restraint system can be released without the use
of a knife to cut the restraint, any other additional tool, or the
assistance of any other individual to release the SRS.
The NTSB commented that the final rule should include standards
that are specific to the operational environment in which an SRS is
intended to be used to prevent certain quick release mechanisms from
being susceptible to inadvertent release by neighboring occupants if
they are seated close to each other.
The FAA has determined that the language in the rule is
appropriately scoped to encompass any type of inadvertent release and
in any type of operational environment. ``Prevents inadvertent
release'' includes inadvertent release by the occupant of the SRS as
well as any people proximate to the occupant of the SRS. The FAA amends
Sec. 91.108(c)(4)(iv), which previously set forth the requirement in
the negative. This paragraph now states that an SRS must have a release
mechanism that ``can be released without the use of a knife to cut the
restraint, and without any additional tool or the assistance of any
other individual.'' This grammatical change is only technical in nature
and does not substantively change the previous intent of the provision.
The FAA did not make any other changes to paragraph (c)(4) and adopts
the language as amended.
E. Who May Provide the SRS (Sec. 91.108(d))
The FAA proposed to allow an individual to provide an SRS for use
during a flight. The FAA explained that, in some cases, an individual
(e.g., professional photographer, fire suppression technician, wildlife
net gunner, etc.) may have access to an SRS and want to use it on
different operators' aircraft. For an individual providing their own
SRS, the FAA proposed that they must confirm with the PIC, either
verbally or in writing, as determined by the PIC, the SRS's continued
serviceability and readiness for its intended purposes. In addition,
[[Page 67838]]
the FAA proposed to require that each individual providing their own
SRS complies with the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated.
Two commenters, including Tuckamore Aviation, commented that
individuals providing their own SRS for a flight should be required to
present written confirmation of their SRS's serviceability, readiness,
and size rating compliance. The commenters stated it is reasonable to
expect an individual to have a written record of the inspection or an
authorized release certificate under a maintenance release and that it
is unreasonable to expect the aircraft operator or PIC to accept a
verbal confirmation.
The FAA disagrees with the commenters. The rule is intended to
provide the PIC flexibility in determining what method they will use
for confirmation of the system's continued serviceability and readiness
for its intended purposes. If a PIC determines written confirmation is
necessary, they have the discretion to require that type of
confirmation before the individual can occupy the SRS during flight
operations.
The FAA also received a comment from Tuckamore Aviation stating
that verification of continued serviceability and readiness of an SRS
should be the responsibility of whoever is providing the SRS, whether
it is the owner/operator or the individual.
The FAA agrees with Tuckamore Aviation. An individual providing
their own SRS should be responsible for ensuring the system's continued
serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose. That requirement
is outlined in Sec. 91.108(d)(1). The FAA also agrees that an operator
that provides any SRS for their aircraft operations should be
responsible for ensuring the SRS's serviceability and readiness because
they are in the best position to make these determinations. As
mentioned in the NPRM, one way to determine the SRS's serviceability
and readiness is by ensuring the SRS is inspected and maintained in
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.\13\ It would be
unreasonable to place this onus on the PIC, who is not responsible for
maintaining and inspecting SRS that an operator or individual provides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See 88 FR 81005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same rationale for paragraph (d)(1) also applies to paragraph
(d)(2). The FAA determined that, in addition to an individual providing
their own SRS, an operator that provides an SRS should be the
responsible entity for ensuring that the individual who will occupy the
SRS complies with the sizing criteria for which the system is rated.
Whoever provides the SRS is ultimately in the best position to know an
SRS's sizing criteria and to determine whether the individual who will
occupy the system meets those criteria. As a result, the FAA will
require an operator and an individual providing their own SRS to (1)
confirm with the PIC, either verbally or in writing, that the system is
serviceable and ready for its intended purpose, and (2) ensure the
individual who will occupy the SRS complies with the sizing criteria
for which the system is rated. The FAA therefore amends the language in
paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) as described to ensure responsibility is
placed on the appropriate entity.
F. Attachment Points (Sec. 91.108)(e)(1)(i) Through (iii))
The FAA proposed under Sec. 91.108(e)(1)(i) requiring a qualified
individual to attach the SRS lanyard to an airframe attachment point(s)
with a rated strength equal to or greater than the total weight of the
occupant (or the combined weight if there is more than one occupant
attached to an attachment point). The FAA received four comments
regarding attachment points, how they are identified, and if they are
FAA-approved.
Two commenters, including Tuckamore Aviation, commented that an
approved airframe attachment point should be limited to existing hard
points or mooring points identified by aircraft original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) hard point,
or approved through engineering analysis. The commenters noted that
weight of passengers considers only static loading and that the FAA
should use the limit load requirements of either 14 CFR part 27 or part
29.
Another commenter stated that specific language defining exactly
what type of anchor point may be used with an SRS would be beneficial.
The commenter recommended that the FAA only allow ``hard points'' or
``anchor points'' specifically designed for restraint systems to be
used in conjunction with an SRS and to not allow seat mounts, seat
frames, etc., to be used with an SRS.
The FAA agrees with the commenters that clarification on the type
of airframe attachment point is necessary. In order to ensure that an
SRS will provide restraint to the user when in use, pilots and
operators need to know how to identify an approved airframe attachment
point. The FAA has revised the regulatory text to only allow an SRS to
be connected to an FAA-approved airframe attachment point or points
rated equal to or greater than the weight of the individual using the
supplemental restraint system (or the combined weight if there is more
than one supplemental restraint system attached to an attachment
point). Adding ``FAA-approved'' ensures that the SRS can only be
attached to an airframe attachment point when the FAA has determined
that point complies with the applicable part 21 approval
requirements.\14\ The FAA removed the word ``strength'' from paragraph
(e)(1)(i) and instead focuses on the weight of the individual. Focusing
on the weight of the individual reflects the fact that attachment point
ratings are developed for all possible load conditions as long as the
weight of the individual does not exceed the weight for which the
attachment point is rated. Ultimately, the FAA has determined that any
FAA-approved attachment point that is rated for a given individual's
weight may be safely used for all load conditions in accordance with
the airworthiness requirements (e.g., applicable part 21 approval
requirements).\15\ Thus, the attachment point will have sufficient
strength to safely restrain the individual using an SRS for all flight
load conditions. The FAA acknowledges that the commenter suggested that
SRS only be allowed to attach to hard points or anchor points
specifically designed for SRS. The FAA has determined that adding
``FAA-approved'' to the rule language achieves the same objective by
specifying that the attachment points must have been evaluated by the
FAA to allow an SRS to be attached to it. As a result of the foregoing,
the FAA
[[Page 67839]]
finalizes the language in paragraph (e)(1)(i) as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The FAA approval process under the airworthiness
regulations (e.g., parts 27 and 29) would include evaluation of the
design, strength, cabin safety requirements, and any other safety
regulations determined to be applicable by the FAA. FAA approval
confirms that the attachment point complies with the applicable
regulatory requirements. A certificated aircraft must comply with
the applicable airworthiness standards for certification under part
21, and parts installed on a certificated aircraft (e.g., FAA-
approved attachment points) are evaluated to determine whether they
meet the applicable part 21 approval requirements.
\15\ The weight limits for aircraft attachment points are
placarded within the aircraft, and the aircraft weight and center of
gravity limitations are outlined in the aircraft flight manual.
Under Sec. 91.103 (Preflight action), prior to flight, each pilot
is responsible for being familiar with pertinent information
concerning the flight--that typically includes information outlined
in the aircraft flight manual. In addition, Sec. 91.9 (Civil
aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements) requires
persons to comply with the operating limitations specified in the
approved aircraft flight manual. Consequently, it is the PIC's
responsibility to ensure that all occupants on board meet the
attachment point limitations outlined for that aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA proposed under Sec. 91.108(e)(1)(ii) that no SRS may be
connected to any airframe attachment point located in the flightdeck.
The FAA did not receive comments on this specific proposed provision;
however, it did receive comments regarding prohibiting individuals
seated in the flightdeck from using an SRS. For a discussion of those
comments, see section IV.N. of this preamble. Because the FAA did not
receive comments regarding airframe attachment points in the
flightdeck, the FAA is adopting the language as proposed.
In the final comment pertaining to attachment points, the NTSB
expressed concern that operators may use seat belt attachment points
for SRS unless specifically prohibited, which may increase loads on
seat belt and shoulder harness attachment points during emergency
landing conditions. The NTSB urged the FAA to prohibit SRS from being
attached to seat belt attachment points on the airframe.
The FAA agrees. In response to the NTSB's concern about attaching
an SRS to a seatbelt or shoulder harness attachment point, the FAA
added a requirement for FAA approval under Sec. 91.108(e)(1)(iii)
prohibiting an SRS from attaching to any seatbelt or shoulder harness
attachment point(s) unless the attachment point is FAA-approved,
meaning the attachment point or points is rated equal to or greater
than the weight of the individual using the supplemental restraint
system (or the combined weight if there is more than one supplemental
restraint system attached to an attachment point). This change ensures
that an SRS is attached only to attachment points that the FAA has
determined comply with the applicable part 21 approval requirements.
Therefore, the FAA finalizes the new language in paragraph (e)(1)(iii)
as amended.
G. Sizing Criteria (Sec. 91.108(e)(2))
The FAA proposed that the SRS must fit the individual using it
based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated. The FAA did
not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is
adopting the language as proposed.
H. SRS Function (Sec. 91.108(e)(3))
In addition to the other points raised by the NTSB, the NTSB
commented that the proposed rule did not address whether operators and
individuals may secure additional items to the SRS that are not
relevant to its function. The NTSB believed the final rule should
prohibit any items that are not relevant to the function of the SRS
from being secured to it.
The FAA agrees with the NTSB. Any items attached to the SRS that
are not relevant to its function could inhibit proper function of the
SRS, could prevent quick release of the SRS, and could impede egress.
As a result, the FAA has added a new paragraph (e)(3) that states,
``Nothing may attach to the supplemental restraint system that is not
relevant to its function as defined under Sec. 1.1 of this chapter.''
Adding this paragraph will help ensure that nothing is attached to the
SRS that interferes with the system's proper function or interferes
with an individual's ability to quickly egress the aircraft.
I. Pilot in Command (Sec. 91.108(f)(1) Through (5))
The FAA proposed that regardless of who provides the SRS, the PIC
has the overall responsibility to ensure that the SRS meets the
requirements of Sec. 91.108, and the PIC cannot permit an individual
to use an SRS that does not meet the requirements of the rule. The FAA
also proposed that the PIC must ensure the SRS's continued
serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose (if provided by
the operator or PIC) and ensure any individual using an SRS provided by
the operator or PIC complies with the SRS sizing criteria. Finally, the
FAA proposed that the PIC has final authority regarding whether the SRS
may be used during flight operations and whether to authorize an
individual to release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness and remain secured only by the SRS.
As mentioned in section IV.E of this preamble, Tuckamore Aviation
commented that the operator/owner or individual providing the SRS
should be responsible for ensuring its continued serviceability and
readiness for its intended purpose. The FAA agrees for the reasons
cited previously and has revised paragraph (f)(2) accordingly, which
mirrors the amendments in paragraph (d)(1). The FAA amends that
paragraph to indicate that before each takeoff, the PIC must receive
confirmation from the operator or any individual providing an SRS of
the system's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended
purpose. The PIC would no longer be responsible for ensuring the SRS is
adequately maintained and inspected; instead, the PIC is simply
responsible for receiving confirmation from the operator or any
individuals that their SRS are serviceable and ready for use. The FAA
did not receive comments on paragraphs (f)(1), (3), (4), or (5). As a
result of the foregoing, the FAA is adopting the language in paragraphs
(f)(1) and (f)(3) through (5) as proposed and is adopting the language
in paragraph (f)(2) as amended.
J. Passenger Briefing (Sec. 91.108(g)(1) and (2))
The FAA proposed to require a passenger briefing on how to use,
secure, and release an SRS during a flight. The FAA also proposed to
require that each passenger has been briefed on means of direct
communication and notification between crewmembers and passengers. The
FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the
FAA is adopting the language as proposed.
K. Passenger Demonstration (Sec. 91.108(h)(1) and (2))
The FAA proposed a requirement that all passengers using an SRS
demonstrate to the PIC, a crewmember, or other qualified person
designated by the operator their ability to use, secure, and release
the FAA-approved safety belts and, if installed, shoulder harnesses, as
well as their ability to release the SRS quickly without assistance and
with minimal difficulty. The FAA did not receive comments on this
proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as
proposed.
L. Individuals Unable To Meet the Demonstration Requirements of the
Enhanced Safety Briefing (Sec. 91.108(i)(1))
The FAA proposed that if an individual cannot demonstrate that they
are able to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved safety belt and,
if installed, shoulder harness, and able to release quickly the SRS
with no assistance and with minimal difficulty, the individual would be
prohibited from occupying or using an SRS during the flight. The FAA
did not receive comments on this proposed provision; however, the FAA
intended paragraphs (i)(1)(i) and (ii) to be required separately rather
than together and therefore amends the conjunction between (i)(1)(i)
and (ii) from ``and'' to ``or.'' The failure to meet either of the two
conditions is grounds for prohibiting the use of an SRS by that
individual. The FAA therefore amends the regulatory text and is
adopting the language in paragraph (i)(1) as amended. In addition,
because the FAA has moved the definition of SRS from Sec. 91.108 to
Sec. 1.1, the FAA revised the introductory text under Sec. 91.108(i)
to reference Sec. 1.1 instead of
[[Page 67840]]
paragraph (l) and adopts the revised text as final.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ For discussion on moving the SRS definition from Sec.
91.108 to Sec. 1.1, see section IV.R (``Definition (Sec. 1.1)) of
this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
M. Individuals Under the Age of 15 (Sec. 91.108(i)(2))
In Sec. 91.108(i)(2), the FAA proposed prohibiting anyone less
than 15 years of age from using an SRS. Condon & Forsyth recommended
that paragraph (i)(2) be deleted in its entirety because Condon &
Forsyth believed it is arbitrary, overly broad, and unnecessary due to
the requirements of proposed Sec. 91.108(h) (Passenger demonstration)
and Sec. 91.108(e)(2), which requires an SRS to fit the individual
using it based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated.
The FAA disagrees with the commenter. Evacuation in an emergency
landing is a highly stressful event. The purpose of the age restriction
is to ensure that occupants of an SRS are able to release themselves in
an emergency as well as not impede egress from the aircraft for
themselves or the other occupants. In the Exit Row Seating rule, the
FAA determined that 15 years of age is sufficient to perform the
complex task of opening an emergency exit in an exit row and that
younger individuals cannot be relied upon to perform a complex task in
an emergency.\17\ In that final rule, the FAA cited a study entitled
``Survival in Emergency Escape from Passenger Aircraft,'' which
reviewed human factors relating to survival and the behavior of the
passengers.\18\ The final rule also cited a memorandum based on the
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute's (CAMI) ``Accident/Incident Bio-
Medical Data Reports'' containing over 3,000 entries.\19\ The study
concluded that survival depends largely on the ability of the passenger
to exit the aircraft, and the memorandum stated that extreme youth is a
factor that generally impedes rapid evacuation.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Exit Row Seating, final rule, 55 FR 8054, 8066 (Mar. 6,
1990).
\18\ See 55 FR 8058-8059.
\19\ See 55 FR 8059.
\20\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA determined that the scenarios and analysis in the Exit Row
Seating final rule are applicable to the release of an SRS in emergency
conditions. The FAA has ample data from CAMI showing that children may
not have the capacity to act quickly in an emergency, further
supporting the FAA's position that children under 15 years of age
should not be encumbered by an SRS when needing to escape during an
emergency. The inability of a child to egress in an emergency as a
result of an SRS would not only endanger the child, it could also
endanger other individuals in the aircraft. In addition, since the Exit
Row Seating rule took effect over thirty years ago, there have been no
data showing that 15 years of age is an inappropriate metric for
aircraft emergencies. The FAA therefore responds to the commenter that
its determination of 15 years of age was not arbitrary, overly broad,
or capricious because it was based on previous studies, data, and
observations. Moreover, there is no precedent for individuals younger
than 15 to act in an emergency and in a high-stress environment where
critical decisions must be made in a matter of seconds. Because the FAA
does not have other data supporting the proposition that children at
any age younger than 15 possess the capacity to act quickly in an
emergency, prescribing a rule that allows children of any specific age
below 15 years to use an SRS would be arbitrary and capricious.
N. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck (Sec. 91.108(i)(3))
The FAA proposed prohibiting anyone sitting in the flightdeck from
using an SRS. The FAA received three comments regarding these
prohibitions. Condon & Forsyth recommended that proposed Sec.
91.108(i)(3) be deleted in its entirety since Condon & Forsyth believed
it is arbitrary, overly broad, and fails to adequately address the very
narrow and specific issue of flight/engine control interference for
civil aircraft/rotorcraft that utilize floor-mounted engine controls.
Alternatively, Condon & Forsyth proposed Sec. 91.108(i)(3) should be
limited in scope to any aircraft/rotorcraft that utilize floor-mounted
engine controls like those found in the AS350B series helicopter.
Two commenters also stated that in certain aircraft, the flightdeck
(cockpit) is well separated from the PIC position, either by a console
or an aftermarket supplemental type certificated separation barrier
that is designed to ensure no interference with flight or other
controls in the flightdeck. The commenters further noted if there are
no flight controls and/or if they are locked out in the area of the
flightdeck (cockpit), the SRS should be permitted to be attached to an
attachment hard point in this area.
The FAA disagrees with the commenters. In the NPRM, the FAA
specifically stated that the flightdeck prohibition is based on a
review of past accidents and incidents where unsecured items, including
those with straps and lanyards, have a history of interfering with
flight and engine controls. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, a
tether caught on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff
lever, resulting in the in-flight loss of engine power and subsequent
ditching. Further, airworthiness standards codified at 14 CFR parts 23,
25, 27, and 29, which require that flight and engine controls not be
subject to inadvertent operation, do not address circumstances when
carry-on objects, tethers, or straps would inadvertently move a
control. Consequently, crewmembers or passengers in the flightdeck
should not be attached to or carry equipment that could snag on
controls. Inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever is only one
type of accidental interference with flight controls that warrants
concern. Additional examples are discussed in the NPRM preamble.\21\
Modifications to provide separation for a specific instrument or flight
control have not been shown to protect from interference with all
flight instruments or controls. With an SRS, an individual in the
flightdeck has a greater range of motion, allowing many more potential
actions that could interfere with the controls as compared to an
individual restrained only by the FAA-approved safety belt. The FAA has
determined that allowing any seating of an individual occupying an SRS
in the flightdeck imposes an unacceptable level of risk to the aircraft
operation and the individuals on board the aircraft, and it would not
prevent an accident similar to the Liberty Helicopters accident. As a
result, the FAA maintains the prohibition and adopts Sec. 91.108(i)(3)
as final.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See 88 FR 80997, 81006 (Nov. 21, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
O. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an Approved Child Restraint System
(Sec. 91.108(i)(4))
The FAA proposed to prohibit anyone occupying or using a child
restraint system from also using an SRS. The FAA did not receive
comments on this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the
language as proposed.
P. Lap-Held Child (Sec. 91.108(j)(1) and (2))
The FAA proposed prohibiting a child who has not reached their
second birthday from being held by an adult during civil aircraft
operations when the adult uses an SRS or during any operation in which
the doors are opened or removed. The FAA did not receive comments on
this proposed provision. Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as
proposed.
[[Page 67841]]
Q. Excluded Operations (Sec. 91.108(k)(1) Through (3))
The FAA proposed excluding certain operations from complying with
Sec. 91.108. First, under paragraph (k)(1), the FAA proposed excluding
operations conducted under part 105 (``Parachute Operations'') or part
133 (``Rotorcraft External-Load Operations''). Second, under paragraph
(k)(2), operators that are subject to the requirements of this rule,
particularly paragraph (b)(1)--which requires each individual on board
to be properly secured by either a safety belt/shoulder harness or an
SRS--may operate an aircraft with the doors opened or removed even with
flightcrew members on board who are subject to the requirements of
Sec. 91.105 (``Flight crewmembers at stations'') or Sec. 135.171
(``Shoulder harness installation at flight crewmember stations'').
Third, under paragraph (k)(3), the FAA proposed that the requirements
under paragraph (b)(2), requiring an individual to be properly secured
by an SRS before releasing their safety belt/shoulder harness, would
not apply to flightcrew members subject to the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 91.105 or 135.171 to the extent they need to unfasten their
shoulder harnesses in accordance with those sections.
An individual commented that consideration needs to be made for
rotorcraft external load operations (part 133) where a crewmember is
working with an open or removed door, i.e., essential crewmember, e.g.,
spotter, or winch operator for Class D or Class B human external cargo
rotorcraft-load combination (RLC). The FAA intentionally excluded part
133 from this rulemaking because that part has its own unique
certification and operating rules. As a result, changes to part 133 are
not within the scope of this rulemaking.
Another commenter mentioned that for certain parachute operations,
the rule needs to be considered for personnel working unseated and not
belted into a seat or berth if the door is removed or opened. As with
part 133, the FAA intentionally excluded part 105 from this rulemaking
because that part has its own unique operating rules. As a result,
changes to part 105 are not within the scope of this rulemaking.
The FAA makes technical amendments to paragraphs (k)(2) and (k)(3).
Specifically, the FAA determined the regulatory text should state
``Sec. Sec. 91.105 or 135.171'' instead of ``Sec. Sec. 91.105 and
135.171'' (emphasis added). The intent of this provision is to allow an
operator to conduct a flight with doors opened or removed under Sec.
91.108(b)(1) even if there are flight crewmembers on board who are
subject to either Sec. 91.105 or Sec. 135.171--not just those flight
crewmembers who would be subject to both regulations. This grammatical
change is only technical in nature and does not substantively change
the previous intent of the provisions. The FAA did not make any other
changes to paragraph (k). As a result of the foregoing, the FAA adopts
the language in paragraphs (k)(1) through (3) as amended.
R. Definition (Sec. 1.1)
The FAA proposed under Sec. 91.108(l) to define an SRS as any
device that is not installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA
approval, used to secure an individual inside an aircraft when that
person is not properly secured by an FAA-approved safety belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness, or an approved child restraint system. A
supplemental restraint system consists of a harness secured around the
torso of the individual using the SRS and a lanyard that connects the
harness to an approved airframe attachment point inside the aircraft.
The FAA did not receive comments on this proposed provision;
however, to reflect a similar change made in paragraph (e)(1)(i) in
response to comments, the FAA has added ``FAA-'' in front of ``approved
airframe attachment point'' to highlight the fact that an SRS can only
be attached to an airframe attachment point that the FAA has determined
complies with the applicable part 21 approval requirements. In
addition, the FAA has moved the definition from Sec. 91.108 to Sec.
1.1 (``General definitions'') because ``supplemental restraint system''
is also referenced in parts 135 and 136. Placing the definition in
Sec. 1.1 will make it easier to find and will clarify that the
definition applies to other parts that use the term, not just part 91.
Therefore, the FAA is adopting the language as amended and placing it
within Sec. 1.1.
S. Miscellaneous Amendments
Tuckamore Aviation commented that there are many unique missions
conducted by helicopters that may require waiver of this proposed rule
and that the proposed regulations should not apply to all SRS being
used in different operations.
The FAA disagrees. As explained in the NPRM, the FAA has determined
that waivers are inappropriate in this rule. The waiver process does
not allow the FAA to conduct the same level of analysis as the
exemption process, which allows the FAA to analyze in more detail
whether a proposed operation outlined in a petition for exemption would
not adversely affect safety or provides an equivalent level of safety
compared to the regulatory requirement. Moreover, the FAA did not
receive comments providing information that would support allowing this
rule to be waivable. As a result, the FAA will not add Sec. 91.108 to
the list of waivable regulations under Sec. 91.905.
The FAA received a comment from an individual proposing the
withdrawal of the proposed rule and not allowing individuals to move
about the aircraft. The commenter instead suggested adding a new
paragraph to existing Sec. 91.107 to prohibit SRS operations.
The FAA disagrees with the commenter. Section 91.108(a) prohibits
persons from conducting a civil aircraft operation with individuals on
board secured with an SRS unless the other requirements of the section
have been met. The FAA has determined that these requirements help
mitigate the identified safety risks during operations when SRS are
used. Under this rule, operations with an SRS will be conducted with an
acceptable level of safety. Finally, a blanket prohibition of SRS would
be overly broad, arbitrary, and capricious because the FAA has already
determined through the Emergency Order of Prohibition that some
aircraft operations may be safely conducted while individuals are using
SRS. As a result, the FAA is finalizing Sec. 91.108 as amended,
allowing operations conducted with SRS under certain circumstances as
long as the requirements in the rule are met.
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Federal agencies consider the impacts of regulatory actions under a
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563, as amended by Executive Order
14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory Review''), direct that each Federal
agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354)
requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Fourth, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other
effects of proposed or final
[[Page 67842]]
rules that include a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure
by State, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any one year. The current threshold after adjustment for
inflation is $183 million using the most current (2023) Implicit Price
Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. The FAA has provided a
detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in the docket for this
rulemaking. This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis
of the economic impacts of this final rule.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
rule: will result in benefits that justify costs; is not an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, as amended; will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; will not
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States; and will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or
Tribal governments, or on the private sector.
A. Summary of the Regulatory Impact Analysis
The FAA estimates that for safety benefits to equal or exceed the
costs of the final rule, based on a 20-year analysis, two accidents of
the same severity as the Liberty Helicopters accident would need to be
mitigated. The estimated safety benefit in present value, from
mitigating one part 91 and one part 135 helicopter accident (i.e., an
accident in year 10 and an accident in year 20 of the analysis period)
will range from $26.8 million to $40.2 million at a 7 percent discount
rate, from $45.4 million to $68.0 million at a 3 percent discount rate,
and from $52.2 million to $78.3 million at a 2 percent discount rate.
The cost of the rule to operators, pilots, and passengers comes
from purchasing harnesses and lanyards that meet specific requirements
as set forth in this rule, conducting a pre-flight safety briefing on
the use of the SRS, and requiring passengers to demonstrate their
ability to remove the SRS in the event of an emergency. The FAA will
also incur costs for periodic surveillance of parts 91 and 135 SRS
operations. The estimated present value cost to the FAA over 20 years
is $1,240 at a 7 percent discount rate, $1,263 at a 3 percent discount
rate, and $1,449 at a 2 percent discount rate. The estimated present
value total cost to industry and the FAA for these requirements over 20
years is $22.3 million at a 7 percent discount rate, $31.7 million at a
3 percent discount rate, and $34.9 million at a 2 percent discount
rate. Estimated safety benefits and costs are shown in the table below.
Table 1--Total Benefits and Costs Over 20 Years
[Millions of USD] *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety benefits Safety benefits Safety benefits
Provisions ------------------ Costs ------------------ Costs ------------------ Costs
Low High Low High Low High
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Percent present value
3 Percent present value
2 Percent present value
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
91.108--Supplemental restraint systems, Part 135................... $17.8 $26.7 $19.4 $26.0 $39.0 $27.5 $28.7 $43.0 $30.4
including operations with doors opened or Part 91.................... 9.0 13.6 2.9 19.4 29.0 4.1 23.5 35.3 4.5
removed (assuming an accident occurs in
year 10).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................. ........................... 26.8 40.2 22.3 45.4 68.0 31.7 52.2 78.3 34.9
Annualized........................ ........................... 2.5 3.8 2.1 3.0 4.6 2.1 3.2 4.8 2.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.
In 2018, in response to the Liberty Helicopters accident, the FAA
issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition, which prohibited the use of
supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS) that cannot be released
quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight operations. The FAA also
estimates the cost and benefit of the rule using the Emergency Order of
Prohibition as the baseline. The FAA estimates that the undiscounted
cost of the rule, above the Emergency Order of Prohibition, is $22.9
million ($11.8 million at 7 percent present value, $16.8 million at 3
percent present value, or $18.9 million at 2 percent present value).
When annualized, at a 7 percent, 3 percent, or 2 percent discount rate,
the cost is approximately $1.1 million. The costs come entirely from
the demonstration by passengers of the ability to release the device.
The FAA considers that a passenger demonstrating the ability to release
themselves from the device adds to the efficacy of the rule above the
Emergency Order of Prohibition. However, the FAA is unable to quantify
the incremental safety benefits gained by the passenger demonstration.
1. Who is potentially affected by this rule?
This rule affects all flights with doors opened or removed and all
operations with individuals on board who choose to use an SRS, except
for operations conducted under part 105, Parachute Operations, or
conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft External-Load Operations, and
public aircraft operations. The FAA identified the following, from
Flight Standards' Web-based Operations Safety System (June 2021), as
the population that could be affected:
Table 2--Potential Affected Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Number of Number of Number of
CFR operators rotorcraft operators aircraft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rotorcraft
Fixed Wing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
91.............................................. 405 1,051 716 1,894
135............................................. 472 2,917 1,728 8,411
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 67843]]
However, based on the number of requests for SRS Letters of
Authorization, the FAA narrowed the population to 26 part 91 operators
and 40 part 135 operators over the next 20 years.
General Assumptions:
<bullet> The present value discount rate of two, three, and seven
percent is used as required by the Office of Management and Budget.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-4 (2023),
guidance for the development of regulatory analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> Period of Analysis: 20 years to capture replacement of an
SRS occurring every 10 years.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ A sample of harnesses provided for consideration of an SRS
LOA, such as Yates 363 and 338, have a maximum life span of 10
years. See Product manuals. Available at <a href="http://yatesgear.com/en/special-forces-full-body-spie-harness">http://yatesgear.com/en/special-forces-full-body-spie-harness</a> and <a href="http://yatesgear.com/en/ars-heli-ops-harness">http://yatesgear.com/en/ars-heli-ops-harness</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> The estimated average number of passengers per flight is
between 3 to 5 passengers. The FAA used 4 passengers in the analysis.
<bullet> Estimated time to create and update content for enhanced
passenger safety briefing: \24\ 2 hours per operator. Assume updates
occur every 10 years to align with the replacement cycle of harnesses
and lanyards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Part 135 Operating Requirements: Commuter and On-Demand
Operations and Rules Governing Persons on Board such Aircraft,
Paperwork Reduction Act Supporting Statement, (OMB No. 2120-0039):
at 8 (Apr. 9, 2019) (estimate of time and volume of operators and
passenger briefings pursuant to Sec. 135.117, Briefing of
passengers before flight), available at <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/05/2022-07066/agency-information-collection-activities-requests-for-comments-clearance-of-a-renewed-approval-of">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/05/2022-07066/agency-information-collection-activities-requests-for-comments-clearance-of-a-renewed-approval-of</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> Estimated pilot time to complete enhanced safety briefing:
\25\ 0.03 hours (2 minutes)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> Estimated time for passenger competency demonstration:
\26\ 0.02 hours (1 minute)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ This estimate is a combination of the time identified in
the Emergency Order and the FAA's assertion that a passenger will
need to release the SRS in under a minute to be able to evacuate a
helicopter in an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline: There were no requirements for an SRS prior to 2018 when
the FAA issued Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243. Since
the Emergency Order of Prohibition is temporary, the baseline used in
this analysis is pre-Emergency Order. However, the Emergency Order
requires harnesses and lanyards that fulfill the same requirements as
the final rule; therefore, operators already incur the cost of the
harness and lanyard. Operators will primarily incur the additional cost
of the passenger demonstration and briefing under the rule. This is
analyzed as a second baseline. The extension of the Emergency Order of
Prohibition was considered as an alternative, and the cost and benefits
are estimated in the alternative section below.
2. Benefits of This Rule
The benefits of this rule include preventing future accidents
similar to the Liberty Helicopters accident. The NTSB final safety
report identified the probable cause of this accident as Liberty
Helicopters' use of an SRS system. The SRS caught on and activated the
engine fuel shutoff lever, located in the flightdeck, and resulted in
the loss of engine power and the subsequent ditching. That same SRS,
worn by passengers on that flight, also contributed to the severity of
the accident by hindering the passengers' quick egress from the
aircraft. This rule will prohibit use of an SRS in the flightdeck,
address the inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever, and
implement SRS requirements that will reduce the likelihood of
passengers being unable to remove an SRS when needed in an emergency.
The Liberty Helicopters accident resulted in five fatalities, one
minor injury, and a substantially damaged aircraft. The analysis
assumes that two accidents of similar magnitude would occur in the 20-
year time horizon, one under part 91 and one under part 135. While the
SRS operation requirements, passenger briefing, and passenger
demonstration set forth in the rule would have lessened the severity of
the accident, the NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to
be the inadvertent activation of the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff
lever by the passenger harness/tether system.\27\ Prohibiting the use
of an SRS in the flightdeck will help mitigate the risk factor that
initiated the accident. The benefits include avoided casualties and
aircraft damage. Multiplying the five casualties by a value of
statistical life (VSL) of $11.6 million yields a total of $58.0 million
as the social cost of these fatalities.\28\ The pilot also sustained
minor injuries at an avoided minor injury rate of $34,800, and the
helicopter, an Airbus AS350 B2, suffered substantial damage valued at
$210,243.\29\ Adding the value of avoided casualties, including the
pilot's injuries, to aircraft damage gives a total potential loss of
$58.2 million that enhanced safety measures are expected to avert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ National Transportation Safety Board. (March 11, 2018)
Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent
Ditching Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off
Flight Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH (Report No. NTSB/AAR-19/
04 or PB2020-100100). Retrieved from <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf">https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf</a>.
\28\ Departmental Guidance on Valuation of a Statistical Life in
Economic Analysis, Issued Date: 3/23/2021 <a href="https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis">https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis</a>.
\29\ Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory
Decisions, A Guide: 2021 Update, Section 5, Table 5-10: General
Aviation Restoration Costs ($2018). These numbers are adjusted to
reflect 2020 dollars. <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost">https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention evaluated
how effective the proposed requirements would be at addressing the NTSB
urgent safety recommendation and any other factors that may have
contributed to the Liberty Helicopters accident. Based on that
assessment, the FAA used a range for the effectiveness rate of 0.6 to
0.9.\30\ Multiplying the effectiveness rates by the estimated potential
loss of $58.2 million, mentioned above, yields an estimated range of
$34.9 to $52.4 million for one averted accident. Assuming an accident
occurs every 10 years over a 20-year time horizon (i.e., an accident in
year 10 and year 20 of the analysis period), the present value of
benefits ranges from $26.8 million to $40.2 million at a 7 percent
discount rate, $45.4 million to $68.0 million at a 3 percent discount
rate, and $52.2 to $78.3 million at a 2 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Id. at Appendix A at 61 (stating, High effectiveness--The
JIMDAT-assigned values in which enhancements that are judged to have
a ``low'' probability of preventing an accident receive a numerical
value ranging from 0.1 to 0.4, reflecting a one in ten chance of
preventing the accident to a 40% chance. Similarly, ``medium'' may
receive numerical ratings of 0.4 to 0.6 and ``high'' may receive up
to 0.95).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Costs Relative to Pre-Emergency Order of Prohibition
This rule will prohibit flight operations with an SRS unless the
SRS meets specific requirements. Although these requirements will be
under part 91, they will affect any operation with an SRS except for
operations conducted under part 105, Parachute Operations, and
operations conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft External-Load
Operations. This subsection examines the costs relative to the
regulatory environment before the Emergency Order of Prohibition when
no rules specifically addressed aircraft operations conducted with the
use of SRS.
This rule will require the SRS (which would consist of a harness
and lanyard, at a minimum) to have an accessible front or side release
mechanism that can be quickly operated with minimal difficulty during
an emergency. The rule
[[Page 67844]]
will require the lanyard to be connected to an FAA-approved airframe
attachment point or points that are not in the flightdeck and that are
rated equal to or greater than the weight of the individual (or the
combined weight if there is more than one SRS attached to an attachment
point). The SRS lanyard must ensure the torso of the person using the
SRS remains inside the aircraft at all times. Additionally, for
operations with doors opened or removed, each person will need to
occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, properly secured about the individual during all
phases of flight; or occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the
individual during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing, in
accordance with Sec. 91.107 and during other phases of flight, the
individual will use an SRS.
This rule will also require operators to provide passengers with an
enhanced safety briefing that includes a passenger's satisfactory
demonstration of competency to release quickly the SRS with no
assistance. The rule also implements certain requirements regarding
persons who may seek to participate in such flights. Passengers unable
to demonstrate their ability to use, secure, and release their
seatbelt/shoulder harness or their ability to release quickly from an
SRS; passengers under 15 years of age; individuals seated in the
flightdeck; and passengers occupying an approved child restraint system
will be prohibited from using the SRS. Furthermore, children may not be
held in an adult's lap if the adult uses an SRS or if the aircraft
doors are opened or removed. The FAA intends these requirements to
ensure the safety of all aircraft occupants on such flights.
The cost of the rule to operators, passengers, and pilots will
arise out of purchasing harnesses and lanyards that meet specific
requirements as set forth in this rule, a pre-flight safety briefing on
the use of the SRS, and passengers demonstrating their ability to
remove the SRS in the event of an emergency. The cost to the FAA comes
from approving the addition of SRS to part 135 passenger safety
briefing cards and for periodic surveillance of parts 91 and 135 SRS
operations. The estimated cost of these requirements is $22.3 million
at 7 percent present value, $31.7 million at 3 percent present value,
and $34.9 million at 2 percent present value, as shown in the table
below.
Table 3--Rule Total Cost Over 20 Years *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements Part 91 Part 135 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harness + Replacement.................................. $172,608 $623,616 $796,224
Lanyard + Replacement.................................. 43,152 155,904 199,056
Create Briefing........................................ 14,572 19,774 34,346
Passenger Briefing (Pilot + Passenger)................. 16,840,356 2,139,920 18,980,276
Passenger Demonstration (Pilot + Passenger)............ 20,342,887 2,584,989 22,927,876
FAA costs.............................................. 583 898 1,481
--------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost......................................... 37,414,159 5,525,101 42,939,259
Total Cost at 7 Percent Present Value.............. 19,361,893 2,933,645 22,295,537
Total Cost at 3 Percent Present Value.............. 27,541,440 4,109,635 31,651,075
Total Cost at 2 Percent Present Value.............. 30,365,509 4,500,554 34,866,063
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.
4. Costs Relative to Post-Emergency Order of Prohibition
After the FAA published the Emergency Order of Prohibition,
operators were required to comply with many of the requirements of this
rule. This subsection measures the costs that are above and beyond the
costs of complying with the Emergency Order of Prohibition.
There are three main differences between this rule and the
Emergency Order of Prohibition. First, the Emergency Order of
Prohibition does not prohibit passengers using an SRS from being seated
in the flightdeck, while this rule will prohibit this seating
arrangement. The FAA estimates minimal cost from this prohibition.
Second, the Emergency Order of Prohibition applies only to
operations conducted for compensation or hire. This rule will apply to
all civil operations except operations under parts 105 and 133. The FAA
does not have precise data on operations using an SRS that are not for
compensation or hire, and so assumes there would be a negligible
number.
Finally, the Emergency Order of Prohibition does not require a
passenger demonstration of the passenger's ability to release the SRS.
The FAA estimates the undiscounted costs, beyond the Emergency Order of
Prohibition, to be $22.9 million ($11.8 million at 7 percent present
value, $16.8 million at 3 percent present value, or $18.9 million at 2
percent present value). At any of these three discount rates, the
annualized cost is approximately $1.1 million. These costs come
entirely from the value of passenger and pilot time spent on the
demonstration.
5. Alternatives Considered
The FAA considered proposing the Emergency Order of Prohibition as
the rule but applying it to all civil operations. The Emergency Order
of Prohibition prohibits the use of an SRS that cannot be released
quickly in an emergency during flight operations for compensation or
hire with the doors opened or removed. The Emergency Order of
Prohibition requires: a supplemental harness that meets specific safety
requirements, an application for an LOA to include a link to a video
(roughly 8 seconds long) demonstrating the user's ability to release
themself from the supplemental harness without assistance, a preflight
briefing on the release of the SRS, and FAA review and approval of the
application. The table below summarizes the costs of each of these
requirements.
[[Page 67845]]
Table 4--Emergency Order of Prohibition Total Cost Over 20 Years *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements Part 91 Part 135 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost of Harness + Application + Video + Safety Briefing $4,747,142 $1,225,615 $5,972,757
FAA Cost............................................... 2,399 4,107 6,506
--------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost......................................... 4,749,541 1,229,722 5,979,263
Total Cost at 7 Percent Present Value.............. 4,394,485 986,054 5,380,539
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.
The FAA considered proposing the above requirements in this rule,
but after careful review of the NTSB final accident report and the
information gathered through the Emergency Order of Prohibition, the
FAA determined that it could tailor the requirements to increase the
likelihood that passengers would be able to quickly release the
supplemental restraint in the event of an emergency. For example, the
Emergency Order of Prohibition does not address the use of an SRS in
the flightdeck. Additionally, this rule will require operators to
conduct an enhanced safety briefing and passengers to complete a
demonstration. Passengers in the Liberty Helicopters accident received
a briefing on how to release their supplemental restraints but were
unable to release them during the accident. Requiring passengers to
demonstrate successfully their ability to release the SRS would ensure
passengers not only understand how to release themselves from the SRS
during an emergency but also increase the likelihood that they would be
able to release themselves from the SRS during an emergency. The
passenger demonstration requirement will be necessary to achieve the
effectiveness estimate of 0.6 to 0.9, as discussed in the main analysis
of the rule. However, uncertainty exists regarding the incremental
reduction in the effectiveness of a regulatory alternative that would
not require passengers to demonstrate proficiency in using the SRS.
Please see the RIA available in the docket for more details.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, Public Law 96-354, 94
Stat. 1164 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857, Mar. 29, 1996) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L.
111-240, 124 Stat. 2504 Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal agencies to
consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and
other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact.
The term ``small entities'' comprises small businesses and not-for-
profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are
not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000.
The FAA published an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
in the proposed rule to aid the public in commenting on the potential
impacts to small entities. The FAA considered the public comments in
developing the final rule and this Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (FRFA). A FRFA must contain the following:
(1) A statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule;
(2) A statement of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the IRFA, a statement of the assessment of the
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the
proposed rule as a result of such comments;
(3) The response of the agency to any comments filed by the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA) in
response to the proposed rule, and a detailed statement of any change
made to the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of the
comments;
(4) A description of and an estimate of the number of small
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such
estimate is available;
(5) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the
classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record;
(6) A description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted in the final rule and why each of the other significant
alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the
impact on small entities was rejected.
1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule
This rule addresses safety issues that contributed to the Liberty
Helicopters accident to ensure the safety of similar operations. The
operator-provided harness/tether system the passengers used on that
flight, while intended as a safety measure when the aircraft was in
flight, hindered the passengers' egress from the aircraft. This rule
addresses the safety issue by implementing specific requirements for
individuals using an SRS or participating in flights with doors opened
or removed.
For flights with doors opened or removed, each person will be
required to either occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt
and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the
individual during all phases of flight; or occupy an approved seat or
berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly
secured about the individual during movement on the surface, takeoff,
and landing, and during other phases of flight, the individual uses an
SRS.
For flights using an SRS, this rule will require the harness and
lanyard, at a minimum, to have an accessible front or side release
mechanism that can be operated quickly with minimal difficulty during
an emergency. As proposed, the lanyard must be connected to an FAA-
approved airframe attachment point or points that are not in the
flightdeck and that are rated equal to or greater than the weight of
the occupant (or the combined weight if there is more than one SRS
attached to an attachment point). This rule will require the lanyard to
ensure the torso of the person using the SRS remains inside the
aircraft. Additionally, operators will be required to provide
passengers with an enhanced safety briefing, and passengers must
demonstrate the capability to release quickly the SRS with no
assistance. Passengers under 15 years of age; individuals seated in the
flightdeck; passengers occupying an approved child restraint system; or
passengers unable to demonstrate their ability to use, secure, and
release the safety belt/shoulder harness or their ability to release
[[Page 67846]]
quickly from the SRS will be prohibited from using the SRS.
2. Significant Issues Raised in Public Comments
No comments relating to small entities were raised by the public.
3. Response to SBA Comments
No comments were received from the SBA.
4. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities
This rule will affect flights with doors opened or removed and all
operations with individuals on board who choose to use an SRS. A search
of the Web-based Operations Safety System (WebOPSS) database, as of
June 2021, indicates that the rule will affect 1,121 part 91 operators
and 2,200 part 135 operators. These flights include sightseeing, motion
picture and television filming, electronic news gathering, power line
inspection, game management, and fire suppression, for example. The
Small Business Administration (SBA) defines charter nonscheduled
passenger air transport (NAICS 481211) with less than 1,500 employees
or scenic and sightseeing transportation (NAICS 487990) with less than
$8.0 million in revenue as small businesses.\31\ Census data indicates
that revenue for the scenic and sightseeing transportation industry
(NAICS 4879), which includes airplane and helicopter operations, was
roughly $502.5 million for 220 establishments, and for nonscheduled
chartered passenger air transportation (NAICS 481211), there are 28,261
employees for 1,604 firms.\32\ Based on census data and the SBA
definition of a small business, a substantial number of operators
affected by this rule would be considered small businesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ United States Small Business Administration, Table of Size
Standards (2019)), available at <a href="https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards">https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards</a>.
\32\ United States Census Bureau, Transportation and
Warehousing: Geographic Area Series: Summary Statistics for the
U.S., States, Metro Areas, Counties, and Places (2012), available at
<a href="https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t">https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
The cost of the rule will include purchasing harnesses and lanyards
that meet specific requirements as set forth in this rule, a preflight
safety briefing on the use of the SRS, and passengers' satisfactory
demonstration of their ability to use, secure, and release their safety
belt/shoulder harness and their ability to quickly release their SRS
without assistance and with minimal difficulty. The estimated cost for
these requirements per year for a part 91 operator is $71,949 and
$6,905 for a part 135 operator, as shown in the table below.
Table 5--Estimated Cost per Operator *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provisions Part 91 \33\ Part 135 \34\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harness + Replacement............. $6,639 $15,590
Lanyard + Replacement............. 1,660 3,898
Create + Update Briefing.......... 560 494
Passenger Briefing (Pilot + 647,706 53,498
Passenger).......................
Passenger Demonstration (Pilot + 782,419 64,625
Passenger).......................
Total Over 20 Years............... 1,438,984 138,105
Estimated Yearly Cost Per Operator 71,949 6,905
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.
6. Significant Alternatives Considered
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Total cost per requirement is divided by 26 part 91
operators.
\34\ Total cost per requirement is divided by 40 part 135
operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA considered proposing to codify the requirements of the
Emergency Order of Prohibition applied to all civil operations but
determined to propose adding the requirement for operators to brief
passengers on the SRS and verify that passengers could release the SRS
in an emergency.
The Emergency Order of Prohibition currently prohibits the use of
an SRS during flights with doors opened or removed unless it complies
with the process referenced in FAA Order 8900.4. FAA Order 8900.4
requires harnesses and lanyards that fulfill the same requirements this
rule would require; therefore, operators already incur the cost of the
harness and lanyard. Under this rule, operators will primarily incur
the additional cost of the enhanced safety briefing. However, the
majority of the cost comes from the passenger briefing and the
passenger demonstration and is directly tied to the passenger count.
Based on the foregoing, this rule will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this final rule and determined that it
will have only a domestic impact and, therefore, no effect on
international trade.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $183.0 million in lieu of $100
million.
This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
[[Page 67847]]
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor
may it impose an information collection requirement unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
This action contains the following new information collection
requirement. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted this information collection
requirement to OMB for its review. The FAA notes that when the FAA
submitted this information collection associated with the NPRM to OMB
for its review, OMB assigned control number 2120-0820. The FAA has
submitted information collection 2120-0820 to OMB for final approval to
allow the FAA to collect this information.
Summary: This rule will require operators conducting operations
using SRS, including during operations with doors opened or removed, to
present updated safety information to passengers.
Public Comments: The FAA did not receive any comments on the
information collection requirements.
Use: Part 91 and 135 operators must create and conduct an enhanced
passenger safety briefing.
Respondents: As of June 2019, the FAA estimates that 21 part 91
operators (based on the number of approved Letter of Authorization
holders and the A049 population) and 31 part 135 operators will choose
to offer flights with use of an SRS over the next 20 years.
Frequency: Operators who choose to offer flights using an SRS must
initially develop an enhanced passenger safety briefing pertaining to
the SRS. The FAA also anticipates that operators will need to
periodically update their briefings every ten years based on a typical
SRS replacement period.
Annual Burden Estimate: The total burden hours are calculated by
multiplying the number of enhanced passenger safety briefings and
subsequent updates by 2 hours per briefing. As shown in the table
below, this sums to 90 hours for part 91 operators and 134 hours for
part 135 operators over 3 years.
Table 6--Information Collection Burdens
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of operators Time to develop or Total hour burden
Year -------------------------------- update briefing -------------------------------
Part 91 Part 135 (hours per briefing) Part 91 Part 135
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................................................. 21 31 2 42 62
2................................................................. 0 0 2 0 0
3................................................................. 0 1 2 0 2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total......................................................... .............. .............. .................... 42 64
Average Over 3 Years...................................... .............. .............. .................... 14 21
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For part 91 operators, the FAA assumes that a pilot, with an hourly
wage of $75.90, will be the person developing and updating the content
of the briefing. At $75.90, the total cost burden is $3,188 ($2,602 at
7 percent present value) over a 3-year period. For part 135 operators,
the Director of Operations, at an hourly wage of $68.66, can be the
person responsible for developing the briefing. The total cost burden
for part 135 operators over a 3-year period is $4,394 ($3,578 at 7
percent present value) for developing the content of the briefing.
Pilots will also brief passengers on the content of the enhanced
passenger briefing prior to each flight. The estimated number of
flights per year is multiplied by 2 minutes per briefing for parts 91
and 135 annual burden hours to brief passengers. The total burden hours
over 3 years, as shown in the table below, sums to 8,177 hours for part
91 operators and 962 hours for part 135 operators.
Table 7--Total Hour Burden for Enhanced Safety Briefing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of flights Time to present the Total hour burden
-------------------------------- enhanced safety -------------------------------
Year briefing (hours per
Part 91 Part 135 briefing) Part 91 Part 135
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................................................. 89,935 10,475 0.03 2,698 314
2................................................................. 90,845 10,684 0.03 2,725 321
3................................................................. 91,780 10,897 0.03 2,753 327
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total......................................................... .............. .............. .................... 8,177 962
Average Over 3 Years...................................... .............. .............. .................... 2,726 321
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A pilot presenting the briefing is estimated to earn an hourly wage
of $75.90. At $75.90, the total cost burden over a 3-year period for
part 91 operators is $620,598 ($506,593 at 7 percent present value) and
$72,989 ($59,581 at 7 percent present value) for part 135 operators.
F. International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) to the maximum extent practicable. The
FAA has reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices and has identified no conflicts with these regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental
[[Page 67848]]
assessment or environmental impact statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. The FAA has determined this rulemaking action qualifies
for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6f for
regulations and involves no extraordinary circumstances.
This rulemaking action provides a framework for civil aircraft
operations conducted with SRS, including during operations with doors
opened or removed. It does not affect the frequency of aircraft
operations in the airspace of the United States. The FAA has reviewed
the implementation of the rulemaking action and determined it is
categorically excluded from further environmental review. Possible
extraordinary circumstances that would preclude the use of a
categorical exclusion have been examined, and the FAA has determined
that no such circumstances exist. After careful and thorough
consideration of the rulemaking action, the FAA finds that it does not
require preparation of an Environmental Assessment or Environmental
Impact Statement in accordance with the requirements of NEPA, Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, and FAA Order 1050.1F.
VI. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The FAA has determined
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and, therefore, will not have federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use. The FAA has determined that it is not a
``significant energy action'' under the executive order and is not
likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609 and has determined that this action will have no
effect on international regulatory cooperation.
VIII. Additional Information
A. Electronic Access and Filing
A copy of the NPRM, all comments received, this final rule, and all
background material may be viewed online at <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>
using the docket number listed above. A copy of this final rule will be
placed in the docket. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov">https://www.federalregister.gov</a> and the Government Publishing Office's website
at <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov">https://www.govinfo.gov</a>. A copy may also be found on the FAA's
Regulations and Policies website at <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies">https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies</a>.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.
Commenters must identify the docket or amendment number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this final rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed in
the electronic docket for this rulemaking.
B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this
document may contact its local FAA official or the person listed under
the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the
preamble. To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/">https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/</a>.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 1
Air transportation.
14 CFR Part 11
Administrative practice and procedure, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 91
Air carrier, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
14 CFR Part 135
Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
14 CFR Part 136
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, National parks,
Recreation and recreation areas, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 1--DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 1 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 44701.
0
2. Amend Sec. 1.1 by adding in alphabetical order the definition of
``Supplemental restraint system'' to read as follows:
Sec. 1.1 General definitions.
* * * * *
Supplemental restraint system means any device that is not
installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval, used to secure
an individual inside an aircraft when that person is not properly
secured by an FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder
harness, or an approved child restraint system. It consists of a
harness secured around the torso of the individual using the
supplemental restraint system and a lanyard that connects the harness
to an FAA-approved airframe attachment point inside the aircraft.
* * * * *
PART 11--GENERAL RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
0
3. The authority citation for part 11 is revised to read as follows:
[[Page 67849]]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40109, 40113,
44110, 44502, 44701-44702, 44711, 46102, and 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
0
4. Amend Sec. 11.201 in the table in paragraph (b) by revising the
entry for part 91 to read as follows:
Sec. 11.201 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control numbers
assigned under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 CFR part or section identified
and described Current OMB control number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
Part 91........................... 2120-0005, 2120-0026, 2120-0027,
2120-0573, 2120-0606, 2120-0620,
2120-0631, 2120-0651, 2120-0820.
* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
5. The authority citation for part 91 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120,
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716,
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508,
47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 U.S.C. 44703
note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).
0
6. Amend Sec. 91.107 by revising paragraph (a)(3)(i) to read as
follows:
Sec. 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child
restraint systems.
(a) * * *
(3) * * *
(i) Be held by an adult, except as outlined in Sec. 91.108(j), who
is occupying an approved seat or berth, provided that the person being
held has not reached his or her second birthday and does not occupy or
use any restraining device;
* * * * *
0
7. Add Sec. 91.108 to read as follows:
Sec. 91.108 Use of supplemental restraint systems.
(a) Use of supplemental restraint systems. Except as provided in
this section, no person may conduct an operation in a civil aircraft in
which any individual on board is secured with a supplemental restraint
system, as defined in Sec. 1.1 of this chapter.
(b) Doors opened or removed flight operations. Except as provided
under paragraph (k) of this section:
(1) No person may operate a civil aircraft with the doors opened or
removed unless--
(i) Each individual on board occupies an approved seat or berth
with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly
secured about the individual or an approved child restraint system
properly secured to an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and,
if installed, shoulder harness in accordance with Sec.
91.107(a)(3)(iii) or Sec. 135.128(a)(2) of this chapter, during all
phases of flight; or
(ii) Each individual on board--
(A) Occupies an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the individual
during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing; and
(B) Is secured during the remainder of the flight using a
supplemental restraint system in accordance with, and that meets the
requirements of, this section.
(2) Prior to releasing an FAA-approved safety belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness during an operation with the doors opened
or removed, an individual must be properly secured by a supplemental
restraint system that is connected to an FAA-approved airframe
attachment point. An individual cannot release their safety belt and,
if installed, shoulder harness until the pilot in command authorizes
them to do so.
(c) Supplemental restraint system design requirements. Each
supplemental restraint system must:
(1) Have a harness that secures around the torso of the individual
using the supplemental restraint system;
(2) Have a lanyard that connects the harness to an FAA-approved
airframe attachment point or points inside the aircraft and that
ensures the torso of the individual using the supplemental restraint
system remains inside the aircraft at all times;
(3) Not impede egress from the aircraft in an emergency after being
released; and
(4) Have a release mechanism that--
(i) Can be quickly operated by the individual using the
supplemental restraint system with minimal difficulty;
(ii) Is attached to the front or side of the harness in a location
easily accessible to and visible by the individual using the
supplemental restraint system;
(iii) Prevents inadvertent release; and
(iv) Can be released without the use of a knife to cut the
restraint, and without any additional tool or the assistance of any
other individual.
(d) Who may provide the supplemental restraint system. The
supplemental restraint system may be provided by the operator or by the
individual using the supplemental restraint system. An operator or
individual providing a supplemental restraint system must:
(1) Confirm with the pilot in command, either verbally or in
writing, as determined by the pilot in command, the system's continued
serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose; and
(2) Ensure the individual who will occupy the supplemental
restraint system complies with the sizing criteria for which the system
is rated.
(e) Supplemental restraint system operational requirements. The
following are supplemental restraint system operational requirements:
(1) A qualified person designated by the operator must--
(i) Connect the supplemental restraint system to an FAA-approved
airframe attachment point or points rated equal to or greater than the
weight of the individual using the supplemental restraint system (or
the combined weight if there is more than one supplemental restraint
system attached to an attachment point);
(ii) Not connect the supplemental restraint system to any airframe
attachment point located in the flightdeck; and
(iii) Not connect the supplemental restraint system to any safety
belt or shoulder harness attachment point(s) unless the attachment
point is FAA-approved as described in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this
section.
(2) A supplemental restraint system must fit the individual using
it based on the sizing criteria for which the supplemental restraint
system is rated.
(3) Nothing may attach to the supplemental restraint system that is
not relevant to its function as defined under Sec. 1.1 of this
chapter.
[[Page 67850]]
(f) Pilot in command. The pilot in command--
(1) Has the overall responsibility to ensure that the supplemental
restraint system meets the requirements of this section and must not
permit an individual to use a supplemental restraint system that does
not meet the requirements of this section;
(2) Must receive confirmation from the operator or any individual
providing the supplemental restraint system of the system's continued
serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose before each
takeoff;
(3) May only permit an individual to use a supplemental restraint
system provided by the operator or the pilot in command if that
individual complies with the sizing criteria for which the supplemental
restraint system is rated;
(4) Has final authority regarding whether the supplemental
restraint system may be used during flight operations; and
(5) Has final authority to authorize an individual to release the
FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness and remain
secured only by the supplemental restraint system.
(g) Passenger briefing. Before each takeoff, the pilot in command
must ensure that each passenger who intends to use a supplemental
restraint system has been briefed on:
(1) How to use, secure, and release the supplemental restraint
system properly. This requirement is not necessary for an individual
providing their own supplemental restraint system, but that individual
must meet the passenger demonstration requirements in paragraph (h) of
this section.
(2) Means of direct communication between crewmembers and
passengers during normal and emergency operating procedures regarding--
(i) The use of headset and intercom systems, if installed;
(ii) How passengers will be notified of an event requiring action,
including emergencies, egress procedures, and other unforeseen
circumstances;
(iii) How each passenger will be notified when the passenger is
permitted to release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed,
shoulder harness, and move within the aircraft using the supplemental
restraint system;
(iv) How each passenger will be notified when the passenger must
return to their seat and secure the FAA-approved safety belt and, if
installed, shoulder harness; and
(v) When and how to notify a crewmember of safety concerns.
(h) Passenger demonstration. After the briefing required by
paragraph (g) of this section, prior to ground movement, any passenger
intending to use a supplemental restraint system must demonstrate to
the pilot in command, a crewmember, or other qualified person
designated by the operator, the following:
(1) The ability to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved safety
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, and
(2) The ability to accomplish all actions required for quick
release of the supplemental restraint system without assistance and
with minimal difficulty.
(i) Individuals not permitted to use supplemental restraint
systems. The following individuals are not permitted to use a
supplemental restraint system, as defined in Sec. 1.1 of this chapter:
(1) Any passenger who cannot demonstrate--
(i) That they are able to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved
safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness; or
(ii) That they are able to release quickly the supplemental
restraint system with no assistance and with minimal difficulty.
(2) Any individual who is less than 15 years of age.
(3) Any individual seated in the flightdeck.
(4) Any passenger who occupies or uses an approved child restraint
system.
(j) Lap-held child. Notwithstanding any other requirement of this
chapter, a child who has not reached their second birthday may not be
held by an adult during civil aircraft operations when:
(1) The adult uses a supplemental restraint system; or
(2) The aircraft doors are opened or removed.
(k) Excluded operations. Unless otherwise stated:
(1) This section does not apply to operations conducted under part
105 or 133 of this chapter and does not apply to the persons described
in Sec. 91.107(a)(3)(ii) of this chapter.
(2) Operators subject to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of
this section may operate an aircraft with doors opened or removed,
notwithstanding any flight crewmembers on board who are subject to the
requirements of Sec. Sec. 91.105 or 135.171 of this chapter and who
need to unfasten their shoulder harnesses in accordance with those
sections.
(3) Paragraph (b)(2) of this section does not apply to any flight
crewmembers subject to Sec. Sec. 91.105 or 135.171 of this chapter to
the extent that the flight crewmembers need to unfasten their shoulder
harnesses in accordance with those sections.
PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATIONS
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT
0
8. The authority citation for part 135 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 41706, 44701-44702, 44705,
44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722, 44730, 45101-45105; Pub. L.
112-95, 126 Stat. 58 (49 U.S.C. 44730).
0
9. Amend Sec. 135.117 by adding paragraph (g) to read as follows:
Sec. 135.117 Briefing of passengers before flight.
* * * * *
(g) If any passengers on board a flight conducted under this part
are secured with a supplemental restraint system, the pilot in command
of that flight must ensure those passengers are briefed in accordance
with Sec. 91.108(g) of this chapter.
0
10. Amend Sec. 135.128 by revising paragraph (a)(1) to read as
follows:
Sec. 135.128 Use of safety belts and child restraint systems.
(a) * * *
(1) Be held by an adult, except as outlined in Sec. 91.108(j) of
this chapter, who is occupying an approved seat or berth, provided the
child has not reached his or her second birthday and the child does not
occupy or use any restraining device; or
* * * * *
PART 136--COMMERCIAL AIR TOURS AND NATIONAL PARKS AIR TOUR
MANAGEMENT
0
11. The authority citation for part 136 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-44904,
44912, 46105.
0
12. Amend Sec. 136.7 by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 136.7 Passenger briefings.
* * * * *
(c) If any passengers on board a flight conducted under this part
are secured with a supplemental restraint system, the pilot in command
of that flight must ensure those passengers are briefed in accordance
with Sec. 91.108(g) of this chapter.
[[Page 67851]]
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and
44703 in Washington, DC.
Michael Gordon Whitaker,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2024-18545 Filed 8-21-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.