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Rule2024-08813

Revision of Firearms License Requirements

Primary source

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Published

April 30, 2024

Effective

May 30, 2024

Issuing agencies

Commerce DepartmentIndustry and Security Bureau

Abstract

In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to enhance the control structure for firearms and related items. These changes will better protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, which include countering the diversion and misuse of firearms and related items and advancing human rights. This rule identifies semi-automatic firearms under new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs); adds additional license requirements for Crime Control and Detection (CC) items, thereby resulting in additional restrictions on the availability of license exceptions for most destinations; amends license review policies so that they are more explicit as to the nature of review that will accompany different types of transactions and license exception availability (including adding a new list of high-risk destinations); updates and expands requirements for support documentation submitted with license applications; and better accounts for the import documentation requirements of other countries (such as an import certificate or other permit prior to importation) when firearms and related items are authorized under a BIS license exception. BIS is publishing this rule as an IFR to solicit comments from the public on additional changes to export controls on firearms and related items that would better protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

Full Text

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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 84 (Tuesday, April 30, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 34680-34716]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-08813]

[[Page 34679]]

Vol. 89

Tuesday,

No. 84

April 30, 2024

Part V

Department of Commerce

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Bureau of Industry and Security

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15 CFR Parts 732, 734, 738, et al.

Revision of Firearms License Requirements; Interim Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 84 / Tuesday, April 30, 2024 / Rules
and Regulations

[[Page 34680]]

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

15 CFR Parts 732, 734, 738, 740, 742, 743, 748, 750, 758, 762, 772,
and 774

[Docket No. 240419-0113]
RIN 0694-AJ46

Revision of Firearms License Requirements

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
to enhance the control structure for firearms and related items. These
changes will better protect U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests, which include countering the diversion and misuse of
firearms and related items and advancing human rights. This rule
identifies semi-automatic firearms under new Export Control
Classification Numbers (ECCNs); adds additional license requirements
for Crime Control and Detection (CC) items, thereby resulting in
additional restrictions on the availability of license exceptions for
most destinations; amends license review policies so that they are more
explicit as to the nature of review that will accompany different types
of transactions and license exception availability (including adding a
new list of high-risk destinations); updates and expands requirements
for support documentation submitted with license applications; and
better accounts for the import documentation requirements of other
countries (such as an import certificate or other permit prior to
importation) when firearms and related items are authorized under a BIS
license exception. BIS is publishing this rule as an IFR to solicit
comments from the public on additional changes to export controls on
firearms and related items that would better protect U.S. national
security and foreign policy interests.

DATES: This rule is effective May 30, 2024. Comments must be received
by BIS no later than July 1, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this rule may be submitted to the Federal
rulemaking portal (<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>). The <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> ID for
this rule is: BIS-2024-0003. Please refer to RIN 0694-AJ46 in all
comments.
All filers using the portal should use the name of the person or
entity submitting the comments as the name of their files, in
accordance with the instructions below. Anyone submitting business
confidential information should clearly identify the business
confidential portion at the time of submission, file a statement
justifying nondisclosure and referring to the specific legal authority
claimed, and provide a non-confidential version of the submission.
For comments submitted electronically containing business
confidential information, the file name of the business confidential
version should begin with the characters ``BC.'' Any page containing
business confidential information must be clearly marked ``BUSINESS
CONFIDENTIAL'' on the top of that page. The corresponding non-
confidential version of those comments must be clearly marked
``PUBLIC.'' The file name of the non-confidential version should begin
with the character ``P.'' Any submissions with file names that do not
begin with either a ``BC'' or a ``P'' will be assumed to be public and
will be made publicly available through <a href="https://www.regulations.gov">https://www.regulations.gov</a>.
Commenters submitting business confidential information are encouraged
to scan a hard copy of the non-confidential version to create an image
of the file, rather than submitting a digital copy with redactions
applied, to avoid inadvertent redaction errors which could enable the
public to read business confidential information.
The Firearms Guidance Memorandum is available at <a href="http://www.bis.gov/guidance_memorandum">www.bis.gov/guidance_memorandum</a> and at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> under the
<a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> ID BIS-2024-0003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Anthony Christino, Acting Director,
Office of Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Controls; tel. (202) 482-
3825 or email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6e20283e2d3108071c0b0f1c031d2e0c071d400a010d40090118"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b5fbf3e5f6ead3dcc7d0d4c7d8c6f5d7dcc69bd1dad69bd2dac3">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Background

BIS is amending the EAR (15 CFR parts 730-774) by revising the
license requirements and review policies, as well as other aspects of
the control structure (e.g., license exceptions eligibility and export
clearance requirements) for firearms, shotguns and related items (e.g.,
discharge type arms, optical devices, ammunition, and related
technology and software) controlled under the following ECCNs: 0A501,
0A502, 0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509, 0B501, 0B505, 0D501,
0D505, 0E501, 0E504, and 0E505 (collectively referred to as firearms
and related items for the purposes of this IFR). Background regarding
these changes is detailed below.

1. History of EAR Firearms Controls

Firearms and related items have been controlled in the current
structure by the Commerce Department (Commerce) under the EAR since
March 9, 2020, when jurisdiction over certain end-item firearms and
related items was transferred from the State Department's (State)
United States Munitions List (USML) (see 22 CFR part 121) to the
Commerce Control List (CCL), supplement no. 1 to part 774 of the EAR,
maintained by BIS. See the January 23, 2020, BIS final rule, ``Control
of Firearms, Guns, Ammunition and Related Articles the President
Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions
List (USML)'' (85 FR 4136) (January 2020 EAR final rule; effective
date: March 9, 2020) and the January 20, 2020, State final rule,
``International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List
Categories I, II, and III.'' (85 FR 3819; effective date: March 9,
2020). Notably, BIS controlled long barrel shotguns prior to the
publication of those rules. For the past almost four years, BIS has
required that authorization be obtained for all exports and reexports
of these firearms and related items to all destinations, including
Canada. This worldwide license requirement under the EAR for firearms
and certain related items is more restrictive than the license
requirement that applies to other items whose jurisdiction transferred
from the USML to the CCL as part of the Export Control Reform
initiative (i.e., the ``600 series'' military items and 9x515
spacecraft items), as the license requirement for those other items in
most cases does not extend to Canada.
In addition to the worldwide license requirement, since March 9,
2020, BIS has maintained other requirements with respect to firearms
and related items. These include certain export clearance requirements
that provide increased transparency regarding the specific items being
exported; limitations on the availability of license exceptions;
certain recordkeeping requirements; and requirements to address
temporary imports into the United States. As referenced in the January
2020 EAR final rule, these requirements were imposed to ensure, as much
as possible, that the EAR control structure for firearms and related
items would protect U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests, which include countering diversion and misuse of firearms
and related items and advancing human rights. As part of this control
structure, BIS included provisions to ensure that U.S. export

[[Page 34681]]

controls under the EAR account for the firearms-related import controls
of other countries; specifically, the use of BIS licenses is predicated
on having an Import Certificate or other permit (if required) by the
importing country.

2. Firearms Licensing Pause

On October 27, 2023, Commerce paused the issuance of new BIS export
licenses involving certain firearms, related ``parts'' and
``components,'' and ammunition (detailed under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502,
0A504, and 0A505) to non-governmental end users not located in Ukraine,
Israel, and most Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States (i.e.,
Country Group A:1, supplement no. 1 to part 740). During this
``pause,'' Commerce assessed export control review policies for
firearms and related items to determine whether any changes to the
regulatory measures implemented in March 2020 were warranted to advance
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The review focused
on assessing and mitigating the risk of firearms being diverted to
entities or activities that promote regional instability, abuse or
violate human rights, or fuel criminal activities, including terrorism,
extortion, and illicit trafficking of any kind.
This pause followed the identification by Commerce over the past
year of several instances in which lawfully exported firearms and
related items from the United States have been diverted or misused in a
manner contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests;
this includes instances predating the transfer of licensing authorities
from State to the Commerce Department. Because those instances of
diversion largely involved commercial exports to non-governmental end
users, Commerce tailored the pause to apply only to exports involving
non-governmental end users.
Leading up to the pause, Commerce reviewed aggregate data showing
that a substantial number of firearms recovered by foreign law
enforcement agencies were lawfully exported from the United States. For
example, a GAO report published in January 2022 identified concerns
that the U.S. government is licensing firearm exports that fuel
criminal activity and gun violence, enable human rights abuses, and
destabilize government institutions in foreign countries, particularly
in Central America.\1\ The report explained that in Belize, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, transnational criminal organizations
and other violent criminals frequently use firearms to commit murders
for hire, carry out extortion schemes, and resist local police forces.
The report further explained that, between 2015 and 2019, nearly 20% of
approximately 27,000 firearms recovered and traced by law enforcement
agencies in those four countries were U.S.-origin firearms diverted
from legitimate commerce (i.e., they were not illicitly smuggled from
the United States, but rather lawfully exported).
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\1\ United States Government Accountability Office, Firearms
Trafficking: More Information is Needed to Inform U.S. Efforts in
Central America (Jan. 2022) (``GAO Report''), <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104680.pdf">https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104680.pdf</a>.
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The 2023 National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment
provides additional data regarding the diversion of lawfully exported
firearms. As described in that report, participating law enforcement
agencies in foreign countries can submit firearm trace requests to
ATF's eTrace system to help determine the purchase or ownership history
of a recovered crime gun. ATF's analysis of all international crime gun
trace requests received between 2017 and 2021 indicates that at least
11% (18,749) of traced firearms were lawfully exported from the United
States and later recovered in a foreign country. For countries outside
of North America, at least 37% of firearms submitted to ATF were lawful
exports; for countries in Central America, at least 19% of firearms
submitted to ATF were lawful exports.\2\ These data are of particular
concern given that ATF was working with a limited set of international
crime guns for which a trace request was submitted. Together, these
reports indicate that a sizeable portion of international crime guns
are diverted from lawful exports.
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\2\ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
``National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment (NFCTA):
Crime Guns--Volume Two, Part IV: Crime Guns Recovered Outside the
United States and Traced by Law Enforcement,'' January 2023, pg 5,
<a href="https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iv-crime-guns-recovered-outside-us-and-traced-le/download">https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iv-crime-guns-recovered-outside-us-and-traced-le/download</a>.
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Commerce also identified specific cases in which lawful exports of
firearms and related items were misused or diverted in a manner that
adversely impacted U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
In one case, a firearm that was licensed for export to one country was
subsequently diverted to a bordering country and used in a political
assassination. In another, a license exception was used to export parts
for the unlawful assembly of firearms in Taiwan. BIS also identified
instances of firearms and ammunition exports being diverted to Russia
via commercial resellers in third countries; such firearms and
ammunition may be used to support Russia's further invasion of Ukraine.
In addition, partner governments, particularly those in the Western
Hemisphere, have expressed, and have continued to express, concern to
Commerce with respect to illicit firearms trafficking, including the
diversion of lawfully exported firearms. For example, governments in
the Caribbean region expressed concern that individuals are using
license exceptions to bring firearms, particularly semi-automatic
handguns, to their countries, and that those firearms are being
diverted to violent criminals. These partner governments have sought
U.S. assistance in addressing diversion, which is fueling violence,
criminal activity, and instability within their countries or regions.
Commerce takes seriously its responsibility to regulate the export
of firearms and related items consistent with U.S. national security
and foreign policy interests, which include countering diversion and
misuse of firearms and advancing human rights. Given the lethality of
these items, the significant volume and value of the applications being
processed, and the risk of diversion or misuse associated with them,
Commerce is committed to ensuring that controls for these items
appropriately protect the security of the United States and our allies
and partners. Thus, during the pause, Commerce conducted a thorough
review to assess the risk factors that contribute to the diversion and
misuse of firearms and related items, evaluate whether existing review
policies sufficiently account for those factors, and determine whether
those policies could be improved. As part of that review, Commerce
closely reexamined the data and case studies that led to the pause. It
supplemented those data and case studies by studying reports and other
empirical evidence regarding the conditions and risk factors that
enable diversion and misuse of U.S. firearms and related items.
Additionally, Commerce continued to engage with stakeholders and
partner governments to gather different perspectives on addressing the
risks associated with the diversion of firearms and related items.
As part of this review, Commerce, together with interagency export
control partners in the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, as
well as other federal agencies with technical expertise in firearms and
related items, assessed current U.S. firearms export control policies
to determine whether updates to BIS's review process and procedures

[[Page 34682]]

would further U.S. foreign policy and national security interests and
how to appropriately implement those updates. In particular, as
discussed further below, Commerce worked extensively with State, which
is a key participant in the review process for license applications
involving items subject to Commerce's jurisdiction. At the outset of
the review process, Commerce drew upon its extensive experience
reviewing applications for exports and reexports of firearms and
related items and outlined an initial set of factors that increase the
risk of these items being diverted or misused in a manner contrary to
U.S. national security and foreign policy. Commerce consulted with
State about these risk factors and, upon further review of the data and
case studies as informed by State's experience, the agencies determined
the key risk factors. In light of the fact that many of the factors
concern conditions in destination countries, Commerce requested that
State, which has deep expertise in evaluating such conditions,
determine whether there are specific destinations where there is a
substantial risk that firearms and related items will be diverted or
misused in a manner contrary to U.S. national security and foreign
policy. After conducting a thorough analysis that included consultation
with U.S. Government stakeholders, State responded by developing a list
of destinations in which it determined that there is a substantial risk
that lawfully exported firearms sold to non-government end users will
be diverted or misused in a manner contrary to U.S. national security
and foreign policy.
Commerce also engaged with certain counterparts in Country Group
A:1 destinations that export firearms and related items to understand
the export license application requirements and risk factors considered
under their firearms export control authorities and related policies.
Because governments in A:1 destinations have demonstrated a commitment
to export controls as participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies and share our interest in countering diversion or misuse
of firearms and related items, advancing human rights, and promoting
mutual security, BIS found it helpful to consult their processes and
policies in making the regulatory updates outlined in this IFR.
Commerce also continued regular engagement with the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) to identify specific actions the U.S. could take to
minimize the diversion to unauthorized end users of U.S. firearms and
related items that were lawfully exported to end users in CARICOM
member and partner countries. For example, concerns were raised that
certain license exceptions, including License Exception Shipments of
Limited Value (LVS) under Sec. 740.3 and License Exception Baggage
(BAG) under Sec. 740.14, may have been used to bring firearms and
related items into these CARICOM countries that were subsequently
diverted in violation of license exception terms, or to export greater
quantities of firearms and related items than were legally available
under these two license exceptions. Note that License Exception LVS is
not available for end-item firearms but is available for certain
``parts'' and ``components'' of firearms when for export or reexport to
a Country Group B destination. Commerce also engaged with the U.S.
firearms industry, as well as a wide variety of other stakeholders, to
assess current export control processes and policies for firearms and
related items and seek recommendations on effectively addressing
diversion and misuse risks.

3. Findings of Policy Review and Engagement

As a result of this policy review and engagement, Commerce
identified several concerns associated with export controls that apply
under the EAR to firearms and related items. First, Commerce determined
that the existing licensing procedures and requirements did not provide
it with sufficient documentation and data to evaluate national security
and foreign policy risks effectively. In particular, limited
documentation requirements made it challenging to validate that
firearms and related items are exported only to trustworthy foreign
partners. Existing data collection practices also limited visibility of
agencies that participate in the license review process into trade
flows for different types of firearms under its jurisdiction, rendering
it difficult to assess whether lawful exports might be at a
particularly acute risk of diversion. In addition, these practices
limited the US Government's ability to monitor potentially high-risk
sales from distributors to third parties.
Second, Commerce concluded that the existing EAR license
application requirements and review process for firearms and related
items did not sufficiently enable identification of transactions that
pose a heightened risk of diversion or misuse contrary to U.S. national
security and foreign policy. Given that data and case studies show that
exports of U.S. firearm and related items are at significant risk of
being diverted or misused, Commerce conducted an extensive analysis to
determine whether certain types of license applications warrant more
scrutiny than others.
As an initial matter, Commerce determined that the risk of
diversion is significantly higher for exports to non-government end
users than for exports to government end users and that consequently
applications involving non-government end users warrant additional
scrutiny. Data show that ``[g]lobally, the private civilian stockpile
is less accountable, far less strictly guarded and three times as
plentiful as its state counterpart--all qualities that support easy
diversion of weapons to the illegal sector.'' \3\ For example, as ATF
explained in a report on firearm theft in the U.S., ``more than 95% of
stolen guns originate via thefts from private citizens.'' \4\ The case
studies reviewed by BIS provide additional support for these general
trends. Indeed, in each of the case studies described above, the
diverted firearm had originally been exported to a non-governmental end
user.
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\3\ Rebecca Peters, ``Small Arms: No Single Solution,'' United
Nations Chronicle <a href="https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/small-arms-no-single-solution">https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/small-arms-no-single-solution</a>.
\4\ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
``National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment (NFCTA):
Crime Guns--Volume Two, Part V: Firearm Thefts,'' January 2023, pg 1
<a href="https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-v-firearm-thefts/download">https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-v-firearm-thefts/download</a>.
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Commerce also determined that the licensing process would benefit
from clarifying the specific national security and foreign policy
factors considered when license applications are reviewed; such factors
are associated with the risk of diversion or misuse of firearms and
related items and the potential impact to U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests. While national security and foreign policy
concerns have always been considered as part of the review process,
detailing transparent review criteria will enable BIS, its interagency
partners, exporters, and reexporters to more effectively and
consistently assess the potential risks associated with a given
transaction. The factors that will be considered include, but are not
limited to: the nature of the end user; destination-specific national
security and foreign policy risk factors, including firearms
trafficking, terrorism, human rights concerns and political violence,
state fragility, corruption, organized crime or gang activity, and drug
trafficking; instances of past diversion or misuse; and the
capabilities, potential uses, and lethality of the item. These factors
are consistent

[[Page 34683]]

with U.S. National Security Memorandum 18, Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy,\5\ as well as the criteria that the United Kingdom and allies
and partners in European Union member states apply to similar
transactions, including the consideration of human rights; the
preservation of regional peace, security, and stability; internal
repression, tensions, or armed conflicts; terrorism and organized crime
risks; and diversion risks. Notably, these key review factors, which
are set forth in a new regulatory note to Sec. 742.7(b)(3) of the EAR,
apply to applications involving certain exports and reexports of
firearms and related items to both government and non-government end
users in all destinations.
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\5\ U.S. National Security Memorandum 18, Memorandum on United
States Conventional Arms Transfer Polic, (Feb 2023), <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/02/23/memorandum-on-united-states-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/02/23/memorandum-on-united-states-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/</a>.
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Each of the destination-specific factors directly correlates with
the risk of diversion or misuse. In countries with high rates of
firearms trafficking, there is an increased risk that criminals will
seek to divert U.S. firearms and sell them to traffickers. There is a
similar risk in countries with high rates of drug trafficking, as
``illicit drugs are the most common non-firearms-related commodities
seized together with firearms.'' \6\ Drug traffickers and producers
frequently seek to obtain diverted firearms, both to further their core
operations \7\ and to establish illicit firearms markets.\8\
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\6\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Global Study on
Firearms Trafficking 2020,'' page 77 (Mar. 2020) (``UN Global
Study''), <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf">https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf</a>.
\7\ UN Global Study, page 36 (``Firearms are instrumental to
organized crime and gangs as they can convey the sense of threat and
power which allow the protection of the group, the territory and
eventually their illicit markets.'').
\8\ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global trade, local impacts,
page 13 (Aug. 2022) (``GI-TOC Report'') (explaining that ``drugs and
firearms markets tend to benefit and reinforce each other'' because
drug operations ``[use] profits from the drug trade to buy and sell
firearms not only to their members but also other criminal groups at
huge mark-ups''), <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf">https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf</a>.
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Organized crime, human rights abuses, and terrorist activity are
strong indicators of diversion risk because the ``interface between
organized crime, violent extremism and terrorism, as well as state
actors, allows regions to become flush with weapons looted from
government stockpiles and weapons legally procured but sold on the
black market.'' \9\ As discussed, the GAO report on arms trafficking in
Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras provides empirical
evidence that countries with high degrees of organized crime, human
rights abuses, and violent extremism also have high degrees of firearm
diversion.\10\
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\9\ GI-TOC Report, page 3.
\10\ GAO Report, page 16.
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A high degree of corruption in a country also increases diversion
risk.\11\ Specifically, in countries where corruption leads to reduced
funding for law enforcement agencies, those agencies are less equipped
to prevent criminals from diverting U.S. firearms. The risk of
diversion is especially high in countries where corrupt government
officials work directly with criminal organizations to traffic diverted
U.S. firearms.\12\
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\11\ Trevor Thrall and Jordan Cohen, ``2021 Arms Sales Risk
Index'' (Jan. 18, 2022) (``Cato Report''), <a href="https://www.cato.org/study/2021-arms-sales-risk-index#mapping-risk">https://www.cato.org/study/2021-arms-sales-risk-index#mapping-risk</a>.
\12\ GI-TOC Report, page 4.
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Finally, state fragility correlates with diversion risk because
``strong states should have greater ability to manage and to control
legal arms shipments than their weaker counterparts.'' \13\ Diversion
risk is especially high in countries experiencing internal violent
conflict because conflict incentivizes armed groups to stockpile
weapons through any means necessary, including through the diversion of
U.S. firearms.\14\
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\13\ Carla Martinez Machain, Jeffrey Pickering, ``The Human Cost
of the Weapons Trade: Small Arms Transfers and Recipient State
Homicide'' Journal of Global Security Studies (2020) (showing that
state strength mitigates the relationship between small arms trade
and rates of homicide) <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/5/4/578/5592220">https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/5/4/578/5592220</a>.
\14\ UNODC Report page 37 (``In conflict and post-conflict
countries, the accumulation of legal stockpiles of weapons may
create the potential for firearms to reach the hands of non-state
armed groups, other criminal groups or even the general population,
especially if that very conflict weakens the ability of the state
infrastructure to manage those stockpiles properly.'').
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The destination-specific factors also correlate with the risk that
a diverted firearm will be used to commit violent acts that undermine
U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As an initial
matter, in countries with high rates of firearms trafficking, there is
an increased risk that diverted firearms and related items will end up
in the hands of cartels, gangs, terrorists, paramilitary groups, and
other criminal organizations, all of which use firearms and related
items for activities that directly undermine U.S. national security and
foreign policy.
In countries with high rates of drug trafficking and organized
crime, there is an increased risk that the diversion or misuse of
firearms and related items will increase the ability of cartels, gangs,
and other criminal organizations to undermine U.S. national security
and foreign policy by flooding the United States with potentially
deadly substances, sparking regional conflict that has spillover
effects in the United States, and establishing transnational operations
that extend into the U.S.\15\ Similarly, in countries where terrorist
groups have a significant presence, there is an increased risk that the
diversion of firearms and related items will increase the capability of
those groups to carry out attacks that undermine U.S. national
security.\16\ And in countries with high rates of human rights abuses
and political violence, whether by government-sponsored paramilitary
groups or non-state forces, there is an increased risk that the
diversion of firearms and related items will enable further human
rights abuses, which directly undermines a key U.S. foreign policy
objective.\17\
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\15\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``Framework to Counter Drug
Trafficking and Other Illicit Threat Networks,'' page 1 (May 2019),
<a href="https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/DoD%20Framework%20to%20Counter%20Drug%20Trafficking%20and%20Other%20Illicit%20Threat%20Networks%20May%202019.pdf">https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/DoD%20Framework%20to%20Counter%20Drug%20Trafficking%20and%20Other%20Illicit%20Threat%20Networks%20May%202019.pdf</a>; GI-TOC Report, page 10.
\16\ Cato Report.
\17\ GI-TOC Report, page 10; Cato Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The diversion and misuse of firearms and related items in countries
with high degrees of corruption and state fragility poses similar risks
to national security and foreign policy. In countries with high degrees
of corruption, there is an increased risk that the diversion of
firearms and related items to criminal organizations will further
undermine the ability of law enforcement agencies to promote country
stability, which is a central U.S. foreign policy objective. In turn,
in a fragile state experiencing violent internal conflict, ``the influx
of arms not only fuels the fighting but it contributes to the
fragmentation and spreading of conflict; increases the number of
criminal groups and their use of violence as a vehicle for market
control; and strengthens armed groups against state responses.'' \18\
Not only does such conflict undermine U.S. foreign policy by increasing
country instability, it causes spillover effects that directly threaten
U.S. national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\18\ GI-TOC Report, page 3.
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In addition to the destination-specific factors, other important
factors are the capabilities, lethality, and potential uses of
different firearms and related items. BIS controls a diverse range of
firearms and related items, including optics and

[[Page 34684]]

scopes, antique firearms, non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms,
and ammunition. The potential for diversion or misuse of each of these
categories of items should be carefully considered during the review of
an export application.
The capabilities, lethality, and potential use of an item have
numerous implications for U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests. To begin with, certain items under BIS jurisdiction have
characteristics that may render them either more or less dangerous in
criminal, terrorist, or other adversaries' hands. For example,
buckshot, blank ammunition, or antique firearms regulated by BIS under
the EAR, have relatively limited capacity to pose harm to U.S.
interests if they are diverted or misused. By contrast, some items
subject to the EAR, such as certain semiautomatic firearms, may pose a
higher risk to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests if
diverted to criminals, terrorists, and cartels. For example, ATF
studies on the import of semiautomatic rifles and shotguns have found
that certain characteristics can render such firearms ``particularly
suitable for the military or law enforcement'' use.\19\ Firearms that
could be used to give cartels, terrorist organizations, and other non-
state actors parity with law enforcement agencies, including those of
the U.S. and their allies, could pose a unique risk if diverted or
misused. Furthermore, data from ATF indicates that weapons with these
characteristics have, in fact, been diverted and misused in criminal
activities,\20\ and that certain types of weapons may be particularly
appealing to cartels that seek to destabilize regions and engage in
drug trafficking activities. Such factors are important to consider
alongside other indicia of the end user's credibility and a
destination's risk profile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Study
on the Importability of Certain Shotguns,'' January 2011, pages 8-9
\20\ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
``National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment (NFCTA):
Crime Guns--Volume Two, Part IV: Crime Guns Recovered Outside the
United States and Traced by Law Enforcement,'' January 2023, pgs 10-
14, <a href="https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iv-crime-guns-recovered-outside-us-and-traced-le/download">https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/nfcta-volume-ii-part-iv-crime-guns-recovered-outside-us-and-traced-le/download</a>.
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The capabilities, lethality, and potential uses of an item can also
render it more amenable to diversion than other comparable items. In
the context of drug trafficking and other criminal activity in the
CARICOM region, for example, studies have indicated that criminals rely
on access to unlawfully exported or diverted handguns. This is due to
the fact that handguns are ``concealable, easier to use in close
quarters, and just as effective for almost every criminal task'' as
other firearms.\21\ Similarly, a study of diversion in the CARICOM
region showed both that criminals use various methods of concealment
and that there is a prevalence of 9mm semiautomatic handguns in
criminal activity.\22\ These data are consistent with other studies
showing that Central American police recovered and traced pistols at a
greater rate than other types of weapons in that region.\23\ Foreign
government law enforcement agencies have likewise identified instances
in which extraordinarily large quantities of ammunition--which is small
and often can be repurposed for a large variety of firearms--are
illicitly trafficked.\24\ Put simply, some items may be more dangerous
if they are diverted or misused, and others might be easier to divert
or misuse. As such, the capabilities, lethality, and potential uses of
certain items are closely linked to the U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests that should be considered in the context of
reviewing licensing applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\21\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Transnational
Crime in Central America and the Caribbean,'' December 2012, page
59, <a href="http://unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf">unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf</a>.
\22\ Small Arms Survey, ``Weapons Compass: The Caribbean
Firearms Study,'' April 2023, pages 67-85, <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/CARICOM-IMPACS-SAS-Caribbean-Firearms-Study.pdf">https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/CARICOM-IMPACS-SAS-Caribbean-Firearms-Study.pdf</a>.
\23\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Transnational
Crime in Central America and the Caribbean,'' December 2012, page
59, <a href="http://unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf">unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf</a>; GAO report, page
19.
\24\ Alessandro Ford, ``Scandal at Haiti Customs After Over
100,000 Rounds of Smuggled Ammunition Seized,'' Insight Crime, July
2022, <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/scandal-at-haiti-customs-after-over-100000-rounds-of-smuggled-ammunition-seized/">https://insightcrime.org/news/scandal-at-haiti-customs-after-over-100000-rounds-of-smuggled-ammunition-seized/</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, in addition to specifying certain key factors that will be
considered when reviewing license applications to export firearms and
related items to any end user, Commerce determined that destination-
specific factors should be used to identify destinations where firearm
exports to non-government end users entail a substantial risk of
diversion or misuse in a manner adverse to U.S. national security and
foreign policy. Identifying those ``high-risk destinations'' enables
BIS to develop a uniform review policy for license applications,
ensuring that the licensing process consistently accounts for the risks
associated with various transactions; provides transparency and
predictability to exporters, stakeholders, and the public; and
adequately safeguards U.S. foreign policy and national security
interests.
As discussed above, Commerce requested that State, which has
extensive expertise in evaluating country-specific conditions and
associated national security and foreign policy concerns, assist in
developing a list of high-risk destinations. In response, State
provided Commerce with a guidance memorandum, which is available on the
BIS website at <a href="http://www.bis.gov/guidance_memorandum">www.bis.gov/guidance_memorandum</a> and on <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a>,
outlining a methodology to evaluate the risk that firearms exports to
specific destinations will be diverted or misused in a manner contrary
to U.S. national security and foreign policy (hereinafter, the
``Firearms Guidance Memorandum''). As the Firearms Guidance Memorandum
explains, State leveraged its expertise in foreign policy and in
subject matter areas, including human rights, international
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and arms control, and the expertise
of stakeholders from across the U.S. Government in conducting its
analysis.
After working with Commerce to determine the key risk factors,
State gathered data and other empirical evidence relevant to assessing
how those factors apply to specific destinations. That evidence came
from a diverse set of credible sources, including reports produced by
the U.S. Government (e.g., the State Department's Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices and the Presidential Determination on Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries) and reports produced
by reputable non-government organizations (e.g., the Global Terrorism
Index and the Corruption Perceptions Index). State also engaged in
consultations with U.S. Embassy officials, including those with
significant experience working with local law enforcement agencies,
subject matter experts, and regional experts. Finally, State sought
policy guidance from stakeholders across the U.S. Government to ensure
that the assessment incorporated relevant aspects of U.S. national
security and foreign policy interests.
Based on that analysis, State identified 36 countries in which
there is a substantial risk that lawful firearms exports to non-
governmental end users will be diverted or misused in a manner adverse
to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Commerce has
decided to apply a presumption of denial review policy to firearm
license

[[Page 34685]]

applications involving non-government end users in those destinations.
That uniform policy will ensure that the licensing process consistently
accounts for the risks associated with those transactions, provides
transparency to exporters and other stakeholders, and safeguards U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests.

4. Policy Changes

BIS has determined that the changes described in this IFR will
advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. As with
all EAR controls, these changes are designed to be as targeted as
possible to accomplish BIS's mission to protect the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States, including a full
consideration of this IFR's economic impact. The regulatory changes
implemented by this IFR will facilitate more robust data tracking
capabilities for exports and re-exports of firearms and related items.
Updates to license application requirements and applicable review
policies will enhance the ability of BIS and its interagency partners
to review and process license applications consistent with U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests. In addition, this IFR
creates greater transparency for industry by identifying the risk
factors considered during the application review process, as well as
destinations identified in the Firearms Guidance Memorandum as
presenting a substantial risk of diversion or misuse in a manner
contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy.

B. New ECCNs for Semi-Automatic Firearms and Certain Related Parts,
Components, Attachments, and Accessories

Prior to this IFR, ECCN 0A501 controlled rifles, pistols, and
related ``parts,'' ``components,'' and certain ``attachments,'' and
``accessories'' on the CCL, while ECCN 0A502 controlled shotguns and
related ``parts,'' ``components,'' and certain ``attachments,'' and
``accessories.'' Neither ECCN distinguished between non-automatic and
semi-automatic firearms. BIS was unable to readily identify what share
of firearms exports to a country were semi-automatic rifles versus non-
automatic pistols because they were controlled under the same item
paragraph of ECCN 0A501. Accordingly, BIS was unable to readily
disaggregate and review licensing and export data for specific types of
end-item firearms or specific ``parts,'' ``components,''
``attachments'' and ``accessories'' of most concern. This data gap
limited BIS's ability to efficiently evaluate the export, reexport,
transfer (in-country) and diversion of specific types of rifles,
pistols, shotguns, and certain ``parts,'' ``components,''
``attachments,'' and ``accessories'' that may pose risks to U.S.
national security and foreign policy. However, such information is
useful to assess the risk of diversion.
To better track the export, reexport, transfer (in-country) and
diversion of different types of firearms and related items, this IFR
adds four new ECCNs to the CCL. ECCN 0A506 controls semi-automatic
rifles, ECCN 0A507 controls semi-automatic pistols, ECCN 0A508 controls
semi-automatic shotguns, and ECCN 0A509 controls certain ``parts,''
``components,'' devices, ``accessories,'' and ``attachments'' for items
controlled under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, and 0A508. The creation of these
four new ECCNs will enable BIS to better track and more readily
identify exports of end-item semi-automatic firearms and shotguns and
certain related ``parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,'' and
``attachments'' of concern when reviewing the Electronic Export
Information (EEI) that exporters file in the Automated Export System
(AES). Pursuant to Sec. 758.1(g)(1) and (2), an EEI must specify the
ECCN of the exported item. In order to further enhance transparency and
the collection and review of export data on these items, this IFR also
implements export clearance changes as described below under the
heading Changes to make identification of end-item firearms mandatory
in AES.
The addition of ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509 is not
expected to have an impact on the number of license applications
received by BIS, because these items were previously controlled under
different ECCNs. Other changes included in this IFR that are expected
to increase the number of licenses and other support documents are
described elsewhere in this preamble.

1. Addition of ECCN 0A506 for Semi-Automatic Rifles

The commodities controlled under ECCN 0A506 were controlled
previously under ECCN 0A501. BIS, supported by an interagency working
group, consulted the Wassenaar Munitions List (WAML1) as well as ATF's
non-sporting firearm importation criteria to identify specific features
or accessories to delineate in the ECCN 0A506 item paragraphs. The item
paragraph structure will enable better tracking and transparency for
exports of various types of end-item semi-automatic rifles. ECCN 0A506
has two primary item paragraphs. Item paragraph .a details semi-
automatic centerfire (non-rimfire) rifles equal to .50 caliber (12.7
mm) or less that have any of the following characteristics (controlled
under .a.1 through .a.4): the ability to accept a detachable large
capacity magazine (more than 10 rounds) or may be easily modified to do
so; folding, telescoping, or collapsible stock; separate pistol grips;
or a flash suppressor. Item paragraph .b controls all other semi-
automatic rifles equal to .50 caliber (12.7 mm) or less, including all
non-centerfire (rimfire) that are not elsewhere specified (noted as
``n.e.s.'' on the CCL). ECCN 0A506 includes a note to 0A506.a and .b
that ``parts'' and ``components'' that are ``specially designed'' for a
commodity classified under .a or .b of 0A506, except those controlled
under ECCN 0A509, are controlled under ECCN 0A501. ECCN 0A506 also
includes a technical note stating that firearms controlled in 0A506
include those chambered for the .50 BMG cartridge. The reasons for
control for new ECCN 0A506 mirror the reasons for control that apply to
ECCN 0A501 (with the addition of CC Column 2 reason for control
outlined below). Specifically, National Security (NS) Column 1,
Regional Stability (RS) Column 1, Firearms Convention (FC) Column 1, CC
Column 2, United Nations Security Council arms embargo (UN), and Anti-
Terrorism (AT) Column 1 apply to the entire entry. License Exceptions
LVS, Shipments to Country Group B Countries (GBS), and License
Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) are not available for use
with commodities controlled under ECCN 0A506, as discussed in greater
detail below.

2. Addition of ECCN 0A507 for Semi-Automatic Pistols

The commodities controlled under ECCN 0A507 were controlled
previously under ECCN 0A501. BIS, supported by an interagency working
group, consulted the WAML1 and 27 CFR 478.12 to identify specific
features or accessories to delineate in the ECCN 0A507 item paragraphs.
The item paragraph structure will enable better tracking and
transparency for exports of various types of end-item semi-automatic
pistols. ECCN 0A507 has two item paragraphs: paragraph .a controls
semi-automatic centerfire (non-rimfire) pistols equal to .50 caliber
(12.7 mm) or less; and paragraph .b controls semi-automatic (rimfire)
pistols equal to .50 caliber (12.7 mm) or less. ECCN 0A507 includes a
note to 0A507.a and .b to specify that ``parts'' and ``components''
that are ``specially designed'' for a commodity classified under 0A507,

[[Page 34686]]

except those controlled under ECCN 0A509, are controlled under ECCN
0A501.c, .d, .x, or .y. The ECCN also includes a technical note stating
that firearms described in 0A507 includes those chambered for the .50
BMG cartridge, which clarifies that any handgun that may be developed
to fire .50 BMG cartridges will be controlled under this ECCN. The
reasons for control for new ECCN 0A507 mirror the reasons for control
that apply to ECCN 0A501 (with the addition of CC Column 2 reason for
control outlined in D.2 of this preamble in this IFR). Specifically, NS
Column 1, RS Column 1, FC Column 1, CC Column 2, UN, and AT Column 1
apply to the entire entry. License Exceptions LVS, GBS, and STA are not
available for use with commodities controlled under ECCN 0A507, as
discussed in greater detail below.

3. Addition of ECCN 0A508 for Semi-Automatic Shotguns

The commodities controlled under ECCN 0A508 were controlled
previously under ECCN 0A502. BIS, supported by an interagency working
group, consulted both the WAML1 and ATF's non-sporting importation
criteria to identify specific characteristics or attachments and
accessories to delineate in the ECCN 0A508 item paragraphs. The item
paragraph structure will better enable tracking and transparency for
exports of various types of end-item semi-automatic shotguns. ECCN
0A508 has two item paragraphs. Item paragraph .a controls semi-
automatic centerfire (non-rimfire) shotguns with any of the of the
following characteristics (which are detailed in a.1 through a.6):
folding, telescoping, or collapsible stock; magazine over five rounds;
a drum magazine; a flash suppressor; Excessive Weight (greater than 10
lbs. for 12 gauge or smaller); or Excessive Bulk (greater than 3 inches
in width and/or greater than 4 inches in depth). Item paragraph .b
controls all other semi-automatic shotguns, including all non-
centerfire (rimfire) shotguns that are not elsewhere specified. The
reasons for control for new ECCN 0A508 mirror the reasons for control
that apply to ECCN 0A502 (except for CC Column 2, which now applies to
the entire 0A502 and 0A508 entry): Specifically, NS Column 1 and RS
Column 1 for 0A508 commodities (with barrel length less than 18
inches), FC Column 1, CC Column 2, UN for the entire entry, and AT
Column 1 for 0A508 commodities (with barrel length less than 18
inches). LVS, GBS, and License Exception STA are not available for use
with ECCN 0A508, as discussed in greater detail below.

4. Addition of ECCN 0A509 for Certain ``Parts,'' ``Components,''
Devices, ``Accessories,'' and ``Attachments'' for Items Controlled
Under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, and 0A508

The commodities controlled under ECCN 0A509 were controlled
previously under ECCNs 0A501 and 0A502. The commodities controlled
under 0A509 warrant separate tracking under a distinct ECCN due to
their sensitivity, including the potential that these firearms-related
items are used to illicitly assemble firearms or are otherwise used to
convert a non-automatic firearm controlled by 0A501 or 0A502 into a
semi-automatic firearm or to accelerate the rate of fire of a semi-
automatic firearm controlled by 0A506, 0A507, or 0A508. The item
paragraph structure will enable better tracking and transparency for
exports of certain ``parts,'' ``components,'' devices, ``accessories,''
and ``attachments'' separate from the end-item semi-automatic rifles,
pistols, and shotguns controlled under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, and 0A508.
ECCN 0A509 has four item paragraphs. Item paragraph .a controls any
``part,'' ``component,'' device, ``attachment,'' or ``accessory'' not
elsewhere specified on the USML that is designed or functions to
accelerate the rate of fire of a semi-automatic firearm controlled
under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, or 0A508. Item paragraphs .b and .c control
receivers (frames), including castings, forgings, stampings, or
machined items thereof, ``specially designed'' for an item controlled
under ECCNs 0A506 and 0A507, respectively. Item paragraph .d of ECCN
0A509 controls receivers (frames) and ``specially designed'' ``complete
breech mechanisms'' for a commodity controlled under ECCN 0A508. ECCN
0A509 has a note to item paragraphs .b and .c stating that receivers
(frames) under 0A509.b and .c refers to any ``part'' or ``component''
of the firearm that has or is customarily marked with a serial number
when required by law; the ``parts'' and ``components'' in paragraphs
0A509.b and .c are regulated by ATF as firearms (see 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(3); 27 CFR parts 447, 478, and 479). The reasons for control for
commodities controlled under new ECCN 0A509 are as follows: NS Column
1, RS Column 1, FC Column 1, CC Column 2, UN, and AT Column 1 apply to
the entire entry. License Exceptions LVS, GBS, and STA are not
available for use with commodities controlled under ECCN 0A509, as
discussed in greater detail below.

5. Other Changes for Existing 0x5zz ECCNs

BIS also reevaluated the reasons for control for rifles, pistols,
shotguns, ammunition, and related ``parts,'' ``components,''
``accessories,'' ``attachments,'' ``software,'' and ``technologies''
detailed under existing ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504, 0A505, 0D501, 0D505,
0E501, 0E504, and 0E505. BIS is applying or maintaining CC column 2-
based controls on most items under these ECCNs, consistent with BIS
policy to apply CC controls on items to address human rights-related
concerns. Certain specific ``parts'' and ``components'' and ammunition
controlled under ECCNs 0A501.y and 0A505.c, 0A505.d, and 0A505.x are
not controlled for CC reasons (or certain other reasons under the EAR),
because they raise relatively few concerns related to human rights or
other foreign policy objectives. The CC changes described in this
paragraph, along with the other CC changes described in this preamble
section B.5, are expected to result in an increase of 1,115 license
applications received annually by BIS.
Prior to this IFR, either CC Column 1, CC Column 2, or CC Column 3
applied to shotguns controlled under ECCN 0A502 based on the barrel
length and particular end user (specifically, police or law
enforcement). This IFR revises the CC reasons for control on 0A502 to
underscore their significant relationship to U.S. foreign policy
objectives, including human rights. CC Column 2 applies to the entire
entry of 0A502, regardless of barrel length or end user. Similarly, CC
Column 2 applies to the entire entry of 0A508, regardless of barrel
length or end user. These changes implement a new license requirement
for the export of certain shotguns to certain countries and end users.
All other existing reasons for control on 0A502 remain in effect under
this IFR. In particular, consistent with the licensing policy for items
controlled for RS reasons, Sec. 742.6(b)(1)(i), BIS will continue to
review these items to determine whether the transaction is contrary to
U.S. foreign policy interests, including promoting the observance of
human rights throughout the world.
Similarly, this IFR adds CC Column 2 reasons for control to
software controlled under ECCNs 0D501 and 0D505 and technology
controlled under 0E501. Given that these ECCNs control the software and
technology that relate to firearms and related items, the same human
rights concerns apply. Therefore, as noted above, this change aligns
the reason for control for ECCNs 0D501,

[[Page 34687]]

0D505, and 0E501 with BIS policy to apply CC to firearms and related
items.

6. Other EAR conforming changes to reflect the new ECCNs for semi-
automatic firearms and semi-automatic shotguns.

With the exception of those commodities controlled under new ECCNs
0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509 as described above, all firearms,
shotguns, and their ``parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,''
``attachments,'' and equipment remain controlled under ECCNs 0A501 and
0A502 on the CCL. However, the creation of the four new ECCNs requires
conforming changes throughout the EAR to maintain enhanced restrictions
on end-item firearms where only ECCNs 0A501 and 0A502 were previously
referenced. This IFR adds references to semi-automatic firearms and
semi-automatic shotguns controlled under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, and 0A508,
as well as the commodities controlled under 0A509, where appropriate;
these conforming changes ensure that the semi-automatic versions of
end-use firearms and shotguns controlled under these three new ECCNs,
as well as the commodities controlled under 0A509, continue to be
subject to licensing restrictions and limitations on licensing
exception availability.
The conforming changes appear in the following EAR provisions
(referenced here in the order in which they are described under Table
1): Sec. Sec. 732.2(b), 734.7(c), 740.2(a)(21), 740.2(a)(23), 740.9(a)
and (b)(5) introductory text, 740.9(b)(5)(ii), 740.9, Note 1 to
paragraph (b)(5), 740.10(b)(1) introductory text and (b)(4),
740.10(b)(4)(i), 740.10, Note 1 to paragraph (b)(4), 740.11
introductory text, 740.14(e)(1) introductory text, 740.14(e)(1)(i),
740.14(e)(3) introductory text, 740.14(e)(3)(i), 740.14(e)(3)(iv),
740.14(e)(4), 740.20(b)(2)(ii)(A), 740.20(b)(2)(ii)(B), 742.6(b),
742.7(a)(5), 742.17(f), 743.4(c) (redesignated as paragraph (b)),
743.6(a) introductory text, (a)(1) and (2), (b), and (c), 748.12(a)(1),
748.12, Note 2 to paragraph (d)(3), supplement no. 2 to part 748,
paragraph (z), supplement no. 2 to part 748, Note 1 to paragraph (z),
supplement no. 2 to part 748, paragraph (bb) (redesignates as paragraph
(aa)(1)), 758.1(b)(9), Note 1 to paragraph (c)(1), and (g)(4)(i),
758.1(g)(4)(ii), 758.10(a) introductory text, Note 1 to paragraph
(b)(1), and Note 2 to paragraph (b)(1), 758.11(a) and (b)(2),
762.2(a)(11), 762.3(a)(5), as well as ECCNs 0A501 heading, Related
Controls paragraph, Technical Note to 0A501.c, Note 5 to 0A501.e, and
0A501.x and .y, 0A502 heading, and Related Controls paragraph, 0A505.a
and .d, 0B501 heading and 0B501.e, 0D501 heading, 0E501 heading,
0E501.a and .b, 0E502 heading, and ECCN 2B018 text under the heading.
These changes are not expected to have any impact on the number of
license applications received by BIS.
There are a number of references to the 0x5zz ECCNs in existing EAR
provisions that pertain to firearms controls. However, no changes are
required to such references because the four new ECCNs are also
considered 0x5zz ECCNs.

Table 1--Identification of Conforming Changes Made to Existing EAR
Regulatory References to Reflect the Addition of ECCN 0A506, 0A507,
0A508, and 0A509

This table identifies the specific EAR provision and type of
conforming changes required for consistency with the addition of these
four new ECCNs. BIS welcomes comments in response to this IFR on these
conforming changes, as well as any other conforming changes that the
public believes would be warranted to reflect the addition of these
four new ECCNs.
BILLING CODE 3510-33-C

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BILLING CODE 3510-33-P

C. Changes to License Exceptions and Related Changes

1. General restrictions on use of license exceptions. Section 740.2
of the EAR details restrictions in place on the use of all License
Exceptions. Paragraph (a) enumerates these restrictions. This IFR makes
two changes to this section. First, as a conforming change to the
addition of the CC control under ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, and 0A507, this
IFR revises the general restriction on the use of license exceptions
under paragraph (a)(4)(iii) in Sec. 740.2 for CC items identified in
Sec. 742.7 to remove the parenthetical phrase that limited the
eligibility of License Exception BAG under paragraph (e) to certain
shotguns and shotgun shells for personal use as the only License
Exception BAG authorization that could overcome the general restriction
in this paragraph (a)(4)(iii). Because the other firearms controlled
under new ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, and 0A508 will require a license for CC
as of the effective date of this IFR, all of these firearms and related
items that are authorized under paragraph Sec. 740.14(e) should be
eligible to overcome this general restriction on the use of license
exceptions under

[[Page 34691]]

Sec. 740.2(a)(4). These changes are not expected to have any impact on
the number of license applications received by BIS.
Second, this IFR adds paragraph (a)(24) in Sec. 740.2. New
paragraph (a)(24) requires exporters to obtain a copy of an import
certificate or equivalent document (if required by the government of
the importing country) before the exporter can use any license
exception for items controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504, 0A505,
0A506, 0A507, 0A508, or 0A509. This new requirement parallels the new
policy detailed below related to obtaining and submitting an import
certificate when applying for a license for certain firearms and
related items. Although BIS anticipates that this requirement could
increase the burden under this collection to some degree, BIS believes
that exporters, as part of their current compliance programs, already
have processes in place to confirm whether the firearms and related
items that are to be exported may be imported into these foreign
countries. Therefore, this recordkeeping requirement likely reflects
practices and processes exporters already have in place and will
therefore be of minimal burden to exporters. As described below under
the Rulemaking section under paragraph 2, BIS welcomes comments from
the public on this aspect of this IFR.
2. LVS additional restrictions. License Exception LVS is detailed
under Sec. 740.3. BIS is further restricting the eligible destinations
for LVS under paragraph (b). As amended by this IFR, LVS is no longer
available for commodities controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504
(except 0A504.g), 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509 when they are
destined for destinations in ``CARICOM'' or destinations specified in
both Country Groups B and D:5. The addition to the EAR of the
``CARICOM'' as a defined term is detailed below. License Exception LVS
remains available only for certain commodity ECCNs. These changes are
expected to result in an increase of five hundred license applications
received annually by BIS.
3. License Exception BAG new restrictions and single trip limit.
i. BAG is detailed under Sec. 740.14. License Exception BAG
authorizes individuals leaving the United States either temporarily
(i.e., traveling) or longer-term (i.e., moving) and crew members of
exporting or reexporting carriers to take, as personal baggage, certain
items. This IFR revises Sec. 740.14 such that destination eligibility
under License Exception BAG for items controlled under ECCNs 0A501,
0A502, 0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509 is limited to
destinations other than those specified in Country Group D:5 (except
for Zimbabwe) or destinations in ``CARICOM.''
This IFR adds ``CARICOM'' as a defined term in Sec. 772.1, which
lists the definitions of terms used in the EAR. The definition of
``CARICOM'' specifies that for purposes of Sec. Sec. 740.3 and 740.14
of the EAR, the term means an intergovernmental organization that
consists of the following member states and associate members: member
states: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, Suriname, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and
Tobago; associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos, as well as any other state or
associate member that has acceded to membership in accordance with
Article 3 or Article 231 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas for members or
associate members, respectively. The definition of ``CARICOM'' includes
a note specifying that Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos are treated as the
United Kingdom under all other EAR provisions that govern licensing
requirements and license exceptions. These changes are expected to
result in an increase of five hundred license applications received
annually by BIS.
ii. Limit BAG to three shotguns and firearms in total for a single
trip. This IFR also revises Sec. 740.14 to limit the number of
shotguns and firearms that an individual may export using BAG.
Previously, paragraphs (e)(1)(i) and (e)(3)(i), read together,
permitted U.S. citizens to export or reexport three shotguns, three
firearms, and 1,000 rounds of ammunition on any one trip. This IFR
limits U.S. citizens to three firearms or shotguns in total on any one
trip. This change is expected to result in an increase of 50 license
applications received annually by BIS.

D. Revisions to License Review Policies

As part of the BIS effort to review firearms-related policies and
address concerns related to misuse or diversion contrary to U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests, including diversion to
entities or activities that promote regional instability, abuse or
violate human rights, and/or fuel criminal activities, two control
policies were identified for revision. This IFR revises the license
review policies under the Regional Stability (RS) and Crime Control
(CC) sections in part 742 of the EAR pursuant to BIS's findings. The
revisions to the RS and CC license review policies, which impose
presumptions of denial for certain high-risk transactions, are expected
to result in a decrease of 650 license applications received annually
by BIS, due to certain applicants likely being deterred from applying
for licenses.
1. Revisions to RS license review policies. Under Sec.
742.6(b)(1), licensing policy for RS column 1 items, this IFR makes
several structural changes to paragraph (b)(1)(i). To make the
paragraph more readily understandable, this IFR sets forth each license
review policy in a separate paragraph, (b)(1)(i)(A) through (G). This
IFR also makes conforming changes to clarify which items are reviewed
under the policies set forth in each paragraph. This IFR also makes
substantive revisions to RS reason for control, as detailed below.
i. Adoption of policy of denial review policy for D:5 for certain
0x5zz ECCNs. BIS reviews applications for exports and reexports of
items classified under any 9x515 or ``600 series'' ECCN destined to
Country Group D:5, destinations subject to a U.S. arms embargo,
consistent with United States arms embargo policies in Sec. 126.1 of
the ITAR (22 CFR 126.1). This IFR amends Sec. 742.6 of the EAR to
extend this licensing policy to include all firearms and related items
in ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, or 0A509 that are
destined for D:5 destinations. This change is detailed in new paragraph
(b)(1)(i)(D).
Furthermore, BIS previously reviewed applications for items
controlled under certain firearms-related ECCNs and any 9x515 ECCN
under a policy of denial when destined for China or a Country Group E:1
country. This IFR amends Sec. 742.6 to extend this stringent review
policy to all items classified under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504, 0A505,
0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509, 0B501, 0B505, 0D501, 0D505, 0E501, 0E504,
or 0E505, or any 9x515 ECCNs. This change is detailed in new paragraph
(b)(1)(i)(F).
2. Revisions to CC license review policies. As stated above, this
IFR also revises the CC licensing policy in Sec. 742.7(b) to apply
stricter scrutiny to exports of firearms and related items to
destinations where diversion risks are particularly acute, such as
destinations in which significant drug trafficking and associated
criminal activity occurs. Previously, Sec. 742.7(a) consisted of
paragraphs (a)(1) through (6). Under this IFR, the firearms and shotgun
related items are listed in paragraph (a)(5) (ECCNs 0A501, 0A502,
0A504, 0A505.b,

[[Page 34692]]

0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0E502, and 0E505). The contents of previous
paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) are removed as a conforming change to the
removal of CC Column 2 and CC Column 3 from shotguns. The non-firearms
and shotgun related items remain in (a)(1). Previous paragraphs (a)(4)
through (6) are now paragraphs (a)(2) though (4). Paragraphs (a)(2) and
(a)(4) contain a sentence showing that controls for these items appear
in each ECCN; a column specific to these controls does not appear in
the Country Chart (supplement no. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
Given that this IFR makes Sec. 742.7(a)(5) solely pertain to
firearms and shotguns related items, BIS is designating these items as
having CC Column 2 reasons for control. As a result of this change, the
public can more easily identify firearms and shotguns related items on
the CCL. To ensure easy understanding of the applicability of license
requirements for CC Column 2 designated items, BIS in this IFR is
putting an X in the box on the Commerce Country Chart (supplement no. 1
to part 738) for all countries except Canada. This change does not
impose licensing requirements on exports or reexports to destinations
for which a license was not previously required, as NS and RS
requirements are already in place for all destinations other than
Canada.
Previously, Sec. 742.7(b) consisted of paragraphs (b)(1) and (2).
Under this IFR, paragraph (b) consists of paragraphs (b)(1) through
(3). Paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) remain, but apply to (a)(1) through (4).
Paragraph (b)(3) applies to items controlled under Sec. 742.7(a)(5).
The review policy for these items is broken out for two types of end
users as described in section D.2.i and D.2.ii:
i. License review policies for government end users. Paragraph
(b)(3)(i) describes policies for license applications when the items
are destined for government end users. These applications will be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine the risk that the items
will be diverted or misused in a manner that would adversely impact
U.S. national security or foreign policy.
ii. License review policies for non-government end users. Paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) describes policies for license applications when the items
are destined for non-government end users. These license applications
will also be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. They will additionally
be reviewed under a presumption of denial if one of two conditions
(detailed in paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B)) are met: (A) the items
are being exported or reexported to a destination identified in the
Firearms Guidance Memorandum as a destination in which it determined
that there is a substantial risk that firearms exports to non-
governmental end users will be diverted or misused in a manner adverse
to U.S. national security and foreign policy, or (B) there is otherwise
a substantial risk that the items will be diverted or misused in a
manner that would adversely impact U.S. national security or foreign
policy.
The presumption of denial review policy for license applications
involving exports and reexports to high-risk destinations identified in
the Firearms Guidance Memorandum ensures that all exports of firearms
and related items to those destinations are consistent with U.S.
national security and foreign policy. As discussed above, to support
Commerce's ongoing efforts to impose export controls that further U.S.
national security and foreign policy, State has developed a list of
destinations in which there is a substantial risk that lawfully
exported firearms sold to non-governmental end users could be diverted
or misused in a manner adverse to U.S. national security and foreign
policy. The Firearms Guidance Memorandum, which is available on the BIS
website at <a href="http://www.bis.gov/guidance_memorandum">www.bis.gov/guidance_memorandum</a> and on <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a>,
outlines the methodology for evaluating destination-specific risks and
identifies 36 high-risk destinations.
Having carefully reviewed the list and methodology, which was
developed by national security and foreign policy experts at State in
consultation with other experts from across the U.S. Government, BIS
has determined that a presumption of denial should apply to
applications for the export and reexport of firearms and related items
involving non-government end users in these 36 destinations. Thus, as
part of this IFR, BIS is adopting the list and adding it to a
supplement to the EAR (see below, in this section of the preamble, for
details).
A presumption of denial review policy for exports and reexports to
non-government end users to the destinations identified in the Firearms
Guidance Memorandum will significantly further U.S. national security
and foreign policy interests. As described above, based on analysis of
destination-specific risk factors and consultations with U.S. Embassy
officials and stakeholders across the U.S. Government, State determined
that firearms and related items exported to non-government end users in
those 36 destinations face a substantial risk of diversion or misuse in
a manner adverse to U.S. national security and foreign policy. In other
words, there is a substantial risk that firearms and related items
exported to those destinations will fall into the hands of
organizations and individuals that will use those items to expand
transnational drug operations, spark regional conflicts, commit acts of
terrorism, abuse human rights, destabilize governments, or harm
communities. Applying a presumption of denial to license applications
for those exports will ensure that the licensing process fully and
consistently accounts for those risks, thereby significantly furthering
and safeguarding U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
In addition, transparency with respect to destinations of concern
will promote predictable and timely review of license applications and
will help industry and other stakeholders understand the licensing
process. It will also make the review process more efficient, thereby
allowing BIS to focus time and resources on other license applications,
including applications for exports to other destinations and
applications to government end users in all destinations. Instead of
reassessing the risks associated with transactions involving
destinations identified in the Firearms Guidance Memorandum as
presenting a substantial risk of diversion or misuse, BIS will be able
to focus on assessing applications that present other, varying risk
factors or indicia of reliability.
Moreover, exporters will have the opportunity to overcome the
presumption of denial by demonstrating that a specific transaction does
not present a substantial risk of diversion or misuse. A presumption of
denial, as opposed to an absolute prohibition, will provide BIS with
the flexibility to tailor its review to the individual facts and
related policy interests. For example, BIS may recommend to approve a
transaction involving a non-government security service charged with
protecting a third-country embassy in a destination identified in the
Firearms Guidance Memorandum as presenting a substantial risk of
diversion or misuse. Notably, a presumption of denial in the firearms
context is generally consistent with BIS's licensing review policies
under the EAR, including in connection with other sensitive items and
destinations of concern.
State has also committed to lead an interagency process to assess
periodically, the risk that exports of firearms and related items to
specific destinations, including those identified on the list, will be
diverted or misused in a manner adverse to U.S. national

[[Page 34693]]

security and foreign policy. State will also lead a periodic
interagency review of the factors and other aspects of in the Firearms
Guidance Memorandum, with the goal of updating both the guidance
memorandum and its list of destinations on an annual basis. State has
also noted that the Firearms Guidance Memorandum and corresponding list
of destinations may be updated outside of the annual window if there
are exigent circumstances (e.g., a coup) or if updates are otherwise
needed to advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
BIS will review any changes recommended as the result of the State-
led, interagency-informed assessment process, and maintain the list in
supplement no. 3 to part 742 of the EAR. BIS will publish any additions
or deletions to the list in the Federal Register. As set forth in new
supp. no. 3 to part 742, the list of countries for which there is a
presumption of denial application review policy for exports and
reexports to non-governmental end users is as follows: The Bahamas,
Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mali,
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
Vietnam, and Yemen.
iii. Addition of factors that will be considered for all 0x5zz
license applications regardless of end user. For all end users,
paragraph (b)(3) details specific factors that BIS will consider in
assessing the risk that firearms and related items will be diverted or
misused in a manner that would adversely impact U.S. national security
or foreign policy. For each license application, BIS will specifically
review concerns in the destination associated with state fragility,
human rights and political violence, terrorism, corruption, organized
crime or gang-related activity, drug trafficking, and past diversion or
misuse of firearms; the nature of the end user; the capabilities,
potential uses, and lethality of the item; and other factors as needed.
As always, license applicants are strongly encouraged to consider
license review factors that are detailed in the EAR when sourcing
potential customers abroad.
3. Revision to license review policies for Exports of Firearms to
Organization of American States (OAS) Member Countries.
Consistent with Commerce's findings during its policy review, this
IFR revises the licensing policies for the export and reexport of most
firearms and related items to all OAS member countries, under Sec.
742.17(b). There continue to be two distinct licensing policies for
exports and reexports of firearms and related items to OAS member
countries: a case-by-case review policy and a policy of denial for
applications linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and criminal
activities. These are further discussed below under this section D.3.
Under this IFR, applications supported by an FC Import Certificate
or equivalent official document issued by the government of the
importing country will now be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, as
opposed to the license review policy of general approval that applied
before. This change matches the text in other provisions in part 742 of
the EAR, which use the ``case-by-case'' text. Previously, applications
supported by an FC Import Certificate or equivalent official document
would ``generally be approved.'' With the increased visibility into
transactions provided by other regulatory changes discussed in this
IFR, a ``case-by-case'' review policy more accurately reflects the
standards under which BIS will assesses these applications going
forward. As part of the license review process, BIS will continue
utilizing a variety of open-source and classified resources and
anticipates that the other regulatory changes implemented by this IFR
will provide increased visibility regarding these applications. These
changes are expected to result in a decrease of 100 license
applications received annually by BIS, due to certain applicants being
deterred from applying for licenses because of the case-by-case license
review policy.
This IFR does not change the review policy of denial for
applications linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and criminal
activities. Applications linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and
transnational organized crime activities will continue to be reviewed
under a policy of denial. This retention of the existing policy is not
expected to have any impact on the number of license applications
received by BIS.

E. Changes in Support Document Requirements for Firearms License
Applications

1. Import Certificate Requirements

i. Require submission as part of the license application for all
firearms license applications for Organization of American States (OAS)
member countries and other destinations that require an import
certificate or equivalent official document for the importation of
firearms. Previously, BIS required the submission of an import
certificate or other equivalent official document only for OAS member
states; for non-OAS member states that require an import certificate or
equivalent official document, the applicant was required to obtain a
copy of such documentation but was not required to submit it with the
license application unless specifically requested by BIS. Under this
IFR, the requirement that all license applications for firearms and
related items include an import certificate or equivalent official
document as part of the submission will minimize the risk of an
exporter failing to obtain an import certificate or equivalent official
document if required by the importing country. This requirement will
also help ensure that the importing country's government is aware of
the shipment and has confirmed that the import is lawful. This
requirement applies to all firearms and related items described under
0x5zz ECCNs. These changes are expected to result in an increase of 250
import certificates or other equivalent official documents that need to
be submitted with BIS licenses. BIS estimates that the time to submit
each document will be 1 minute. This will result in an increase in
burden hours of 4 hours.
ii. Combining the OAS and non-OAS requirements to simplify the
requirements and improve understanding. To facilitate this support
document requirement, this IFR revises Sec. 748.12, which addresses
requirements for obtaining an import certificate or import permit.
Previously, paragraph (a) specified the requirements for OAS member
states and paragraph (e) specified the requirements for non-OAS member
states. Given the detail set forth regarding the required
documentation, and the fact that all destinations will be treated the
same, this IFR removes previous paragraph (e). All applicable
information in previous paragraph (e) is moved to revised paragraph
(a), and conforming changes are included in revised paragraphs (a)
through (d). These formatting and clarifying changes are expected to
facilitate compliance and are not expected to have any impact on the
number of import certificates or other equivalent official documents
received by BIS. Paragraph (a)(2)(i) details OAS member countries; BIS
is taking this opportunity to add a reference to this paragraph that
OAS member countries includes any member country that has acceded in
accordance with Chapter III of the Charter of the Organization of
American States.

[[Page 34694]]

2. Requiring Purchase Orders for Certain Firearms License Applications

i. Conforming changes to provide clarity and to make the
requirements easier to understand. To facilitate understanding by the
public regarding the changes discussed in sections E.2.ii and E.3 of
this preamble, this IFR redesignates paragraphs (aa) and (bb) to
supplement no. 2 to part 748 (Unique Application and Submission
Requirements), such that previous (aa) paragraph, detailing ``600
Series Major Defense Equipment,'' is redesignated as paragraph (bb).
Previous paragraph (bb) detailing ``semi-automatic firearms controlled
under ECCN 0A501.a'' is redesignated as paragraph (aa), such that it
follows existing paragraph (z) detailing ``exports of firearms and
certain shotguns temporarily in the U.S.'' By making these changes so
that the contents of paragraphs (z) and redesignated paragraph (aa)
appear sequentially, these requirements should be clearer to the
public.
This IFR also revises redesignated paragraph (aa) to include the
unique application and submission requirements that apply to exports of
other firearms, certain shotguns, and related items. The contents of
the original paragraph, ``semiautomatic firearms controlled under ECCN
0A501.a,'' are redesignated under (aa)(1), with conforming revisions
made to the title corresponding to the addition of new ECCNs detailed
above. New paragraph (aa)(2) requires the submission of purchase
documentation for certain applications. New paragraph (aa)(3) requires
the submission of passport or other national identity card information
for certain applications. Requirements in new paragraphs (aa)(2) and
(3) are detailed below. These formatting and clarifying changes are not
expected to have any impact on the number of purchase orders received
by BIS.
ii. Addition of purchase order requirement for non-A:1 countries.
This IFR amends the EAR to require that a purchase order be submitted
for exports and reexports of firearms and related items to non-A:1
countries. Previously, exporters were not required to submit a purchase
order with BIS license applications, unless requested during the course
of BIS's review of a particular application. This practice created a
number of challenges. First, BIS processed and reviewed many
applications that did not result in actual exports, thereby
unnecessarily expending staffing resources. Previously, less than 20%
of licensed quantities were actually exported. In addition, such
licensing that did not result in exports offered limited visibility
into actual demand for U.S. firearms abroad, which in turn made
effective monitoring of diversion risks more difficult. Requiring
purchase orders for exports and reexports to non-A:1 countries will
enable BIS to use licensed quantities to estimate bona fide local
demand, thereby ensuring that BIS can appropriately evaluate the
national security and foreign policy risks associated with a given
transaction and effectively allocate review and processing resources.
This IFR specifies that purchase orders must be dated within 1 year of
their submission with a license application. Purchase orders are
required for certain items controlled under ECCNs 0A501 (except
0A501.y), 0A502, 0A505 (except 0A505.c), 0A505.d, and 0A505.e), 0A506,
0A507, and 0A508, and 0A509. Upon approving a license for these items,
BIS will generally limit the licensed quantity to the quantity
specified on the purchase order. However, applicants may request up to
a 10% increase in quantity from the purchase order amount, which will
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, parties may export
or reexport various model types under the approved license, so long as
the items remain consistent with the ECCN and ECCN item level paragraph
specified on the approved application. These requirements appear in new
paragraph (aa)(2) of supplement no. 2 to part 748. These changes are
expected to result in a net increase of 7,109 purchase orders that will
need to be submitted with license applications. BIS estimates that the
time required to submit each will be 1 minute; this will result in an
increase in burden hours of 116 hours. That estimate factors in that
these changes are expected to result in a decrease of 500 license
applications received annually because some exporters will be unwilling
or unable to provide purchase orders.

3. Requiring Passport or National Identity Card for Firearms License
Applications for Natural Persons Located in Destinations Other Than in
Country Group A:1

Governmental purchasers and commercial distributors constitute the
vast majority of end users identified on firearms license applications.
However, in some cases, an exporter or reexporter may apply for a
license to export or reexport firearms to a natural person (individual)
abroad. This IFR amends the EAR to require that a passport or national
identity card be submitted for exports and reexports of firearms and
related items to natural persons in non-A:1 countries. Previously,
passports or other national identity cards were not required with
submission of applications for export to individuals unless requested
by BIS for a specific license application. Based on its history of
reviewing applications destined for individual recipients, BIS has
determined that a passport or national identity card would help ensure
robust vetting of the appropriate end user identified on the
application, including vetting by local law enforcement in the
recipient country, particularly to address any potential diversion
risks. For example, BIS might use a national identity card to
distinguish between individuals with the same name. Under this IFR,
license applications for items controlled under ECCNs 0A501 (except
0A501.y), 0A502, 0A504, 0A505 (except 0A505.c, 0A505.d, and 0A505.e),
0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509 for individuals in destinations other
than Country Group A:1 require the submission of passport or other
national identity card information for all named individual recipient
end users of those items. This requirement is detailed under new
paragraph (aa)(3) to supplement no. 2 to part 748. These changes are
expected to result in an increase of 3,160 passports or other national
identity card information that will be submitted annually. BIS
estimates that the time required to submit each document is 1 minute;
resulting in an increase in burden hours of 57 hours. That estimate
factors in that these changes are expected to result in a decrease of
100 license applications received annually by BIS, because some
individuals will not want to provide such information to exporters or
reexporters as part of the license application process.

F. Adoption of Formalized Interagency Working Group for Firearms
License Application To Enhance the Existing Interagency License Review
Process

BIS license applications involving 0x5zz items are reviewed by the
longstanding interagency review processes specified under part 750 of
the EAR. Accordingly, BIS has consulted with interagency partners
regarding the review of license applications for exports and reexports
of these items since their respective additions to the CCL.
Additionally, BIS has participated in an informal interagency working
group with representatives from State since summer 2023 to ensure
appropriate focus on firearms license applications. This interagency
review process is an important mechanism in ensuring that U.S. national
security and foreign policy

[[Page 34695]]

interests are adequately considered in all licensing decisions.
This IFR builds on the existing review process by formalizing an
interagency working group, chaired by State, to evaluate firearm
diversion and misuse risks. By formalizing an interagency working group
on the review process for licensing involving firearms and related
items, BIS seeks to ensure proactive tracking across relevant
stakeholder agencies of licensing and export data, ongoing review of
licenses or pending applications of concern, and collaboration on
addressing issues in various countries or with specific end users.
Formalizing this process will help ensure its longevity and showcase
the U.S. Government's commitment to its success. The creation of a
formal interagency working group will help ensure that the risk factors
outlined in this IFR (including terrorism, state fragility, corruption,
human rights, political violence, and past diversion or misuse) are
thoroughly vetted by interagency experts when reviewing firearms-
related license applications. State has also committed to lead
interagency efforts to use this working group to assess the
determinations set out in the Firearms Guidance Memorandum, with the
goal of revising the memorandum and updating its list of high-risk
destinations annually and as needed. Interagency licensing working
groups are detailed under Sec. 750.4(d) of the EAR. This IFR will add
Sec. 750.4(d)(2)(v), which describes a new working group called ``The
Safeguard.'' The Safeguard will be chaired by State and will review
license applications involving firearm-related items controlled under
0x5zz ECCNs. These changes are not expected to have any impact on the
number of license applications received by BIS.

G. Reduction in General License Validity Period (1-Year License
Validity for Firearms Licenses)

This IFR amends the EAR to reduce the general validity period from
four years to one year for all future licenses involving firearms and
related items. Because national security and foreign policy
considerations (including human rights-related considerations) in
destinations abroad can change rapidly, the risks or potential benefits
associated with certain transactions can be difficult to predict
several years in advance. Limiting the length of the license validity
period will lead to more frequent reviews of exports and thus enable
BIS to account for developments and often fluid circumstances in
destinations; doing so enables more precise and timely consideration of
diversion risk and national security and foreign policy interests. A
shortened validity period also reduces the risk of shipments on an
expired import certificate, as well as the risk that BIS has to suspend
or revoke a license based on rapidly developing national security and
foreign policy concerns.
Previously, the general license validity period for a BIS license
(with limited exceptions) was four years. Under this IFR, items
controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508,
and 0A509 are generally limited to a 12-month validity period under
revised Sec. 750.7(g). Licenses extending beyond 12 months for
firearms and related items may still be granted in certain limited
circumstances, such as transactions involving intra-company transfers
of items (e.g., from a subsidiary to a parent company) or government
contracts that require a period of performance longer than 12 months.
This IFR does not make any other changes to Sec. 750.7(g), and all
other aspects of the license validity period (such as expiration date)
continue to apply to firearms and related items. This change is
expected to result in an increase of 500 license applications received
annually by BIS.

H. Changes To Make Mandatory in the Automated Export System the
Identification of End-Item Firearms and Shotguns, Along With Certain
``Parts,'' ``Components,'' Devices, ``Accessories,'' and
``Attachments'' for Semi-Automatic Firearms and Semi-Automatic
Shotguns, and Conforming Changes to Conventional Arms Reporting
Requirements

As referenced above under section C of this preamble, this IFR
creates four new ECCNs, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509, to help
distinguish between non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms exports
in AES EEI filings, along with the export of certain ``parts,''
``components,'' devices, ``accessories,'' and ``attachments'' for semi-
automatic firearms and semi-automatic shotguns. However, in order to
further enhance the export data to distinguish between end-item
firearms exports and other firearms ``parts,'' ``components,'' devices,
``accessories, or ``attachments'' exports, as well as simplify the
conventional arms reporting requirements for firearms under the EAR
(Sec. 743.4), this IFR revises the requirement in Sec.
758.1(g)(4)(ii), which previously allowed exporters to complete their
conventional arms reporting requirements without submitting
conventional arms reports to BIS. This IFR revises this reporting
requirement by making conventional arms reporting information in the
EEI filing in AES mandatory; it does this by specifying that exporters
must include the items-level classification or other items-level
descriptor in the Commodity description block in the EEI filed in AES.
Section I further describes the conventional arms reporting-related
changes to the EAR that are being made by this IFR.
Specifically, this IFR revises paragraph (g)(4)(ii) to expand the
scope of the heading to include certain ``parts,'' ``components,''
devices, ``accessories,'' and ``attachments'' controlled under new ECCN
0A509. Because of the importance of these commodities for semi-
automatic firearms and semi-automatic shotguns, additional visibility
is needed regarding these ``parts,'' ``components,'' devices,
``accessories,'' and ``attachments'' controlled under new ECCN 0A509,
as well as the commodities controlled under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, and
0A508, for the export clearance requirement under paragraph (g)(4)(ii).
This IFR revises the paragraph (g)(4)(ii) introductory text to make
the requirements of this paragraph mandatory instead of optional for
all shipments that meet the specified criteria. It also expands the
scope of this mandatory export clearance requirement to include not
just ECCNs 0A501.a or .b and shotguns with a barrel length less than 18
inches controlled under ECCN 0A502, but also to include items
controlled under ECCNs 0A501.a or .b, 0A506.a or .b, 0A507.a and .b,
shotguns with a barrel length less than 18 inches controlled under
ECCNs 0A502 or 0A508.a. or .b, or ``parts,'' ``components,'' devices,
``accessories,'' or ``attachments'' controlled under 0A509.a, .b, .c,
or .d, as of the effective date of this IFR. To assist exporters in
identifying the information that must be included in the Commodity
description block in the EEI filing in AES, this IFR also adds new
paragraphs (g)(4)(ii)(A) through (F). This information will be
particularly helpful for certain ECCNs, such as new ECCN 0A506.a, which
controls any semi-automatic centerfire (non-rimfire) rifles equal to
.50 caliber (12.7 mm) or less that has any of the characteristics that
will be specified under 0A506.a.1 through .a.6. New paragraph
(g)(4)(ii)(C) specifies that, in that case, .a will appear as the first
text in the Commodity description block in the EEI filing in AES. These
changes are not expected to result in an increase in burden; a
commodity description was already required to be provided in the EEI in
AES prior to the effective date of this IFR, so including this
additional information as part of the commodity

[[Page 34696]]

description will not change the burden hours for exporters.

I. Conventional Arms Reporting--Related Changes

This IFR revises the conventional arms reporting requirements in
Sec. 743.4 to make a conforming change for new ECCNs 0A506.a. and .b
and 0A507.a. and .b. This IFR also revises Sec. 743.4 to specify that
BIS will be relying solely on the alternative submission method for
obtaining the required information for the conventional arms reporting,
as was also referenced above under section F of this preamble.
1. Conforming change to add 0A506.a and .b and 0A507.a and .b to
the conventional arms reporting requirements. This IFR revises Sec.
743.4 to add references to the end-item firearms controlled under ECCNs
0A506.a and .b and 0A507.a, .b, and .c, to specify that these semi-
automatic rifles and pistols are included for the conventional arms
reporting for the Wassenaar Arrangement semi-annual reporting and the
United Nations annual report described under Sec. 743.4. This approach
is consistent with how these items were previously reported when
controlled under ECCN 0A501.a or .b. The changes discussed below
regarding BIS's use of EEI data to meet conventional arms reporting
requirements affect both the existing ECCNs and the newly added ECCNs
referenced in Sec. 743.4 (i.e., ECCNs 0A501.a and .b, 0A506.a and .b,
and 0A507.a. and .b).
2. Specifying that BIS will use AES EEI data to meet the
conventional arms reporting requirements of 0A501.a and .b, 0A506.a and
.b, and 0A507.a and .b.
In preparing this IFR, BIS reevaluated the conventional arms
reporting requirements under existing Sec. 743.4 and the alternative
submission method for ECCN 0A501.a and .b referenced under Sec. Sec.
743.4(h) and 758.1(g)(4)(ii) based on its experience since ECCNs
0A501.a and .b were added to the EAR on March 9, 2020. BIS determined,
based on this review, that the conventional arms reporting requirements
could be simplified by making the alternative submission method the
sole method that exporters use to submit the information to meet the
conventional arms reporting requirement for ECCN 0A501.a or .b, as well
as for semi-automatic rifles controlled under ECCN 0A506.a and .b and
semi-automatic pistols controlled under 0A507.a and .b.
Previously, BIS added the alternative submission method in Sec.
743.4(h) of the EAR as part of the January 2020 EAR final rule to
reflect exporters' recommendation that BIS use AES EEI data to obtain
the information required for these two conventional arms reports. The
alternative submission method gave exporters the option of including
the additional .a or .b information as the first characters to appear
in the commodity description block in AES, rather than requiring
submission of information on end-item firearms under ECCN 0A501.a and
.b in separate reports to BIS. Based on data reviewed by BIS, nearly
all exporters have been using this alternative submission method to
meet their conventional arms reporting requirements since March 9,
2020, the effective date of the January 2020 rule. The alternative
submission method has also been an efficient method for extracting the
data needed by BIS to prepare these reports.
In addition, consistent with BIS's interest in increasing
transparency regarding exports and reexports of the semi-automatic
firearms and related ``parts,'' ``components,'' devices,
``accessories,'' and ``attachments,'' this IFR revises Sec.
758.1(g)(4)(ii), as described above under section F, to include the
``items'' level paragraph classification as the first characters to
appear in the Commodity description block in the EEI filed in AES
mandatory for ECCNs 0A501.a and .b, 0A506.a and .b, 0A507.a and .b,
0A508.a and .b. Given that a commodity description was already
previously required in the EEI filing in AES, including this additional
information as part of the commodity description is not expected to
change the burden hours for exporters.
As a result of the requirement to submit item paragraph information
in AES, the existing provisions in Sec. 743.4 that require exporters
to submit annual and semi-annual reports for the purposes of
conventional arms reporting via email (``standard method'') unless the
exporter provides the item paragraph classification with the exporter's
AES EEI filings (``alternative method'') are no longer necessary,
because BIS will be able to rely on AES data pursuant to the revisions
to Sec. 758.1(g)(4)(ii) addressing conventional arms reporting for
ECCN 0A501.a and .b, as well as for 0A506.a and .b and 0A507.a and .b.
These changes will streamline the exporter's reporting obligations by
limiting them to the AES filing requirement. Because nearly all
exporters that were required to submit conventional arms reports to BIS
were already using the alternative method, the elimination of the
submission of email reports as an available method under revised Sec.
743.4 will not result in a substantive change in the burden on
exporters.

J. Revocations and Modifications to Existing Licenses

Based on the policy rationale identified above, BIS has determined
that it is necessary to revoke or modify certain valid licenses for the
export and reexport of firearms and related items to non-government end
users. As described below, on July 1, 2024, BIS will revoke all
currently valid licenses to non-government end users in High-Risk
Destinations for Firearms and Related Items. (See supplement no. 3 to
part 742.) In addition, on May 30, 2024, BIS will modify certain other
valid licenses with validity periods that end more than one year from
the effective date of this IFR by rendering them invalid one year from
the effective date of this IFR. These modified licenses cover exports
and reexports to non-government end users in destinations outside High-
Risk Destinations for Firearms and Related Items, Country Group A:1,
Israel, and Ukraine.

1. License Revocations

On July 1, 2024, pursuant to Sec. 750.8 of the EAR, BIS will
revoke existing licenses for the export and reexport of firearms and
related items to non-government end users in destinations identified in
supplement no. 3 to part 742 (High-Risk Destinations for Firearms and
Related Items). As discussed above, the Firearms Guidance Memorandum
has identified that there is a substantial risk that firearms and
related items exported or reexported to non-government end users in
these destinations will be diverted or misused in a manner adverse to
U.S. national security and foreign policy, including for use in drug
trafficking, regional conflict, or human rights abuses. Accordingly, as
discussed above, this IFR applies a presumption of denial to all
license applications submitted on or after May 30, 2024 and seeking to
export or reexport firearms and related items to non-government end
users in these destinations. Existing licenses for exports and
reexports to non-government end users in these destinations were issued
under previous review criteria. Accordingly, failure to revoke these
licenses would allow firearms and related items to continue to be
exported to these destinations for up to several more years without
review under the new policy. Such ongoing exports or reexports of
firearms and related items could create a substantial risk of diversion
and stockpiling in a manner contrary to U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests.
BIS will issue these revocations on July 1, 2024, 30 days after the
effective

[[Page 34697]]

date of this IFR, to ensure that planned shipments may be completed
without disruption to ongoing trade. For any license that is revoked,
the license holder may appeal a revocation to the Under Secretary for
Industry and Security pursuant to Sec. 756 of the EAR. Procedures for
filing such an appeal are described in detail in Sec. 756.2(b) of the
EAR and will be included in the letters that BIS will send to notify
license holders of the pending revocation. License holders whose
license(s) are revoked by BIS may reapply to export or reexport the
items covered by the revoked license without prejudice under BIS's new
licensing policy, as described in this IFR.

2. License Modification

In addition to revoking the licenses described above, BIS will,
upon the effective date of this IFR, May 30, 2024, pursuant to Sec.
750.8 of the EAR, modify certain existing licenses for firearms and
related items to non-government end users that have more than one year
remaining of their validity periods to render them invalid on May 30,
2025. These modifications will not affect licenses to non-government
end users in Country Group A:1, Israel, and Ukraine (which implement
export controls consistent with the Wassenaar Arrangement), or to High-
Risk Destinations for Firearms and Related Items. The affected licenses
were not reviewed under the new policies established in this IFR, and
were issued with a four-year validity period rather than the one-year
general validity period established in this IFR. As discussed elsewhere
in this IFR, BIS is shortening the validity period of licenses to
export or reexport firearms and related items to one year to enable
more precise consideration of the risk of diversion or misuse,
consistent with national security and foreign policy interests.
Accordingly, BIS is modifying the validity period of certain existing
licenses, not subject to revocation, in furtherance of this effort.
The revocations and modifications described in section J, are
expected to result in an increase of 270 license applications received
annually by BIS. However, this is anticipated to be a one-time
increase.

K. Request for Public Comment

In addition to seeking public comment on the changes reflected in
this IFR, including the four new ECCNs and conforming changes (see
Table 1 under section B.6 of this IFR), BIS is specifically seeking
public comment on the issues below. See the ADDRESSES section of this
rule for instructions on how to submit comments.
(1) BIS seeks comments on the expected impact on individuals, as
well as industry, should BIS impose a time limit on the use of Sec.
740.14 BAG License Exception for firearms classified under ECCNs 0A501,
0A502, 0A506, 0A507, and 0A508. Such limits would require the items to
be returned to the United States or other country of re-export within
the specified time limit, or to otherwise be disposed of in accordance
with the EAR, e.g., by obtaining a BIS license to authorize a longer
temporary export or a permanent export. For temporary exports or
reexports longer than the BAG time limit, a license would be required
to authorize the export or reexport. In considering revisions to BAG,
BIS identified that imposing a time limit of 45-, 60-, 90-, or 180-days
on how long the exporter is eligible to keep the firearms out of the
country could help address diversion risks.
(2) BIS seeks comments on potential additional revisions to Sec.
740.14 of the EAR to require exporters of applicable firearms and
related commodities authorized under License Exception BAG to submit
EEI filings in AES under Sec. 758.1(b)(9). This IFR does not make
changes to the exemption from the EEI filing requirements for License
Exception BAG authorized exports or the export clearance requirements
under Sec. 758.11, which will continue to require submission of the
CBP Form 4457. However, BIS seeks comments on the potential impact on
individuals if BIS were to remove the requirements in Sec. 758.11 and
instead require mandatory EEI filing in AES. BIS is aware of concerns
about requiring individuals to file EEI in AES for License Exception
BAG authorized exports; because of the benefits to increasing
transparency and reducing the chance of diversion, BIS is considering
whether additional changes may be warranted in this export clearance
area. BIS also welcomes comments that provide alternative suggestions
for increasing transparency and reducing diversion risk without
imposing a mandatory EEI filing requirement in AES for exports
authorized under License Exception BAG.

Export Control Reform Act of 2018

On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which
included the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), 50 U.S.C. 4801-
4852. ECRA, as amended, provides the legal basis for BIS's principal
authorities and serves as the authority under which BIS issues this
IFR.

Rulemaking Requirements

1. BIS has examined the expected impact of this IFR as required by
Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094, which direct agencies to
assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and,
if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental,
public, health, and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity).
This IFR is considered a ``significant regulatory action'' under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Order
14094.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be
required to respond to or be subject to a penalty for failure to comply
with a collection of information, subject to the requirements of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA), unless
that collection of information displays a currently valid Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This regulation involves
five collections currently approved by OMB.
<bullet> OMB Control Number 0694-0088, Simplified Network
Application Processing System;
<bullet> OMB Control Number 0694-0096, Five Year Records Retention
Period;
<bullet> OMB Control Number 0694-0122, Licensing Responsibilities
and Enforcement;
<bullet> OMB Control Number 0694-0137, License Exceptions and
Exclusions; and
<bullet> OMB Control Number 0607-0152, Automated Export System
(AES) Program.
Additional information regarding these collections of information--
including all background materials--can be found at <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain</a> by using the search function to enter
either the title of the collection or the OMB Control Number.
With regard to control number 0694-0088, Simple Network Application
Process and Multipurpose Application Form. BIS expects an increase of
1003 burden hours for this collection; however, 132 hours of this
increase is anticipated to be a one-time increase related to the
revocation and modification of licenses for firearms and related items
described in section J of this IFR. These additional burden hours will
be added during the current renewal approval process for this
information collection.
For OMB control number 0694-0137, License Exceptions and
Exclusions, BIS expects a slight increase in burden

[[Page 34698]]

hours for this collection because of the new restriction on the use of
License Exceptions under Sec. 740.2(a)(24). This requires exporters to
obtain a copy of an import certificate or equivalent document (if
required by the importing country) before the exporter can use any
license exception for items controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504,
0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509. Although BIS anticipates that
this requirement could increase reporting burden to some degree under
this collection, BIS believes that exporters, as part of their existing
compliance programs, likely already have processes in place to confirm
whether the firearms and related items that are to be exported may be
imported into these foreign countries. BIS believes this requirement is
likely reflective of practices and processes exporters already have in
place and will therefore be of a minimal burden to exporters. BIS
welcomes comments on this information collection requirement and on the
assumptions that this confirmation requirement is not a deviation from
exporters' current practices to ensure that exports of firearms and
related items that are authorized under BIS license exceptions may be
imported into the respective countries of import. In order to protect
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests and to ensure that
EAR license exceptions are not used to authorize an export of a firearm
or related commodity when a foreign government requires an import
certificate or other equivalent document that has not been issued, this
IFR imposes a new general restriction on the use of all EAR license
exceptions under Sec. 740.2(a)(24). A similar type of import
certificate or other equivalent document requirement applies for items
authorized under a BIS license.
The AES change included in this rule under Sec. 758.1(g)(4)(ii) is
not anticipated to result in a change in the burden under the OMB
control number 0607-0152, Automated Export System (AES) Program because
exporters are already required to provide a description in the
Commodity description block in the EEI filing in AES. Similarly,
changes impacting OMB control numbers 0694-0096 and 0694-0122, Five
Year Records Retention Period and Licensing Responsibilities and
Enforcement, respectively, are not expected to result in an increase in
burden hours.
3. This rule does not contain policies with federalism implications
as that term is defined under Executive Order 13132.
4. Pursuant to Section 1762 of ECRA (50 U.S.C. 4821), this action
is exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 553)
requirements for notice of proposed rulemaking, opportunity for public
participation, and delay in effective date.
5. Because neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor any other
law requires notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for
public comment for this rule, the analytical requirements of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) are not applicable.
Accordingly, no Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is required and
none has been prepared.

List of Subjects

15 CFR Part 732, 738, 740, 750, and 758

Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Part 734

Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Inventions and
patents, Research, Science and technology.

15 CFR Part 742

Exports, Terrorism.

15 CFR Part 743

Administrative practice and procedure, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

15 CFR Part 748

Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Terrorism.

15 CFR Part 762

Administrative practice and procedure, Business and industry,
Confidential business information, Exports, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

15 CFR Part 772

Exports.

15 CFR Part 774

Exports, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Terrorism.

Accordingly, parts 732, 734, 738, 740, 742, 743, 748, 750, 758,
762, 772 and 774 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts
730-774) are amended as follows:

PART 732--STEPS FOR USING THE EAR

0
1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 732 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852; 50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.; 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p.
228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783.

0
2. Section 732.2 is amended by revising paragraph (b) introductory text
to read as follows:

Sec. 732.2 Steps regarding scope of the EAR.

* * * * *
(b) Step 2: Publicly available technology and software. This step
is relevant for both exports and reexports. Determine if your
technology or software is publicly available as defined and explained
at part 734 of the EAR. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
website at <a href="https://www.bis.doc.gov">https://www.bis.doc.gov</a> contains several practical examples
describing publicly available technology and software that are outside
the scope of the EAR under the FAQ section of the website. See the FAQs
under the heading, EAR Definitions, Technology and Software,
Fundamental Research, and Patents FAQs at <a href="https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/compliance-training/export-administrationregulations-training/1554-ear-definitions-faq/file">https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/compliance-training/export-administrationregulations-training/1554-ear-definitions-faq/file</a>. The
examples are illustrative, not comprehensive. Note that encryption
software classified under ECCN 5D002 on the Commerce Control List
(refer to supplement no. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) is subject to the
EAR even if publicly available, except for publicly available
encryption object code software classified under ECCN 5D002 when the
corresponding source code meets the criteria specified in Sec.
740.13(e) of the EAR. The following also remains subject to the EAR:
``Software'' or ``technology'' for the production of a firearm, or
firearm frame or receiver, controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, 0A507,
or 0A509, as referenced in Sec. 734.7(c) of the EAR.
* * * * *

PART 734--SCOPE OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS

0
3. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 734 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852; 50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.; 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p.
950; E.O. 13020, 61 FR 54079, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 219; E.O. 13026,
61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3
CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; E.O. 13637, 78 FR 16129, 3 CFR, 2014 Comp.,
p. 223; Notice of November 8, 2022, 87 FR 68015 (November 10, 2022).

0
4. Section 734.7 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:

Sec. 734.7 Published.

* * * * *
(c) The following remains subject to the EAR: ``software'' or
``technology'' for the production of a firearm, or firearm

[[Page 34699]]

frame or receiver, controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, 0A507, or
0A509, that is made available by posting on the internet in an
electronic format, such as AMF or G-code, and is ready for insertion
into a computer numerically controlled machine tool, additive
manufacturing equipment, or any other equipment that makes use of the
``software'' or ``technology'' to produce the firearm frame or receiver
or complete firearm.
* * * * *

PART 738--COMMERCE CONTROL LIST OVERVIEW AND THE COUNTRY CHART

0
5. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 738 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852; 50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.; 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. 8720; 10 U.S.C. 8730(e); 22 U.S.C.
287c; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6004;
42 U.S.C. 2139a; 15 U.S.C. 1824; 50 U.S.C. 4305; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et
seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7210; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p.
228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783.

0
6. Supplement no. 1 to part 738 is revised to read as follows:

Supplement No. 1 to Part 738--Commerce Country Chart
[Reason for control]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemical and biological Nuclear National security Missile Regional stability Firearms Crime control Anti- terrorism
weapons nonproliferation -------------------- tech -------------------- convention -------------------------------------------------
Countries -------------------------------------------------- ---------- --------------
CB 1 CB 2 CB 3 NP 1 NP 2 NS 1 NS 2 MT 1 RS 1 RS 2 FC 1 CC 1 CC 2 CC 3 AT 1 AT 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan................. X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Albania 2 3................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ ........ X ........
Algeria..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Andorra..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Angola...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Antigua and Barbuda......... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Argentina................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ X X X X
Armenia..................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Aruba....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Australia \3\............... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Austria 3 4................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Azerbaijan.................. X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Bahamas, The................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Bahrain..................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Bangladesh.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Barbados.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Belarus \6\................. X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X ........
Belgium \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Belize...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Benin....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Bhutan...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Bolivia..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Bosnia and Herzegovina...... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Botswana.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Brazil...................... X X ........ ........ ........ X X X X X X X X X
Brunei...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Bulgaria \3\................ X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Burkina Faso................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Burma....................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Burundi..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Cambodia.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Cameroon.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Canada...................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ ........ ........
Cape Verde.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Central African Republic.... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Chad........................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Chile....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
China....................... X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X X
Colombia.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Comoros..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Congo (Democratic Republic X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
of the) \1\................
Congo (Republic of the)..... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Costa Rica.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Cote d'Ivoire............... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Croatia \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuba........................ See part 746 of the EAR to determine whether a license is required in order to export or reexport to this destination.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cura[ccedil]ao.............. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Cyprus 2 3 4................ X ........ ........ ........ ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Czech Republic \3\.......... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Denmark \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Djibouti.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Dominica.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Dominican Republic.......... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Ecuador..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Egypt....................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
El Salvador................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea........... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Eritrea \1\................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Estonia \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Ethiopia.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Fiji........................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Finland 3 4................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
France \3\.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Gabon....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Gambia, The................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Georgia..................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Germany \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Ghana....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Greece \3\.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Grenada..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Guatemala................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X

[[Page 34700]]

Guinea...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Guinea-Bissau............... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Guyana...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Haiti....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Honduras.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Hungary \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Iceland \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
India \7\................... X ........ ........ X ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Indonesia................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran \1\.................... See part 746 of the EAR to determine whether a license is required in order to export or reexport to this destination..
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq \1\.................... X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X ........
Ireland 3 4................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Israel...................... X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X X
Italy \3\................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Jamaica..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Japan\3\................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Jordan...................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Kazakhstan.................. X X X ........ ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Kenya....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Kiribati.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Korea, North \1\............ See Sections 742.19 and 746.4 of the EAR to determine whether a license is required in order to export or reexport to this destination.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Korea, South 3 4............ X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Kosovo...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Kuwait...................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Kyrgyzstan.................. X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Laos........................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Latvia \3\.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Lebanon \1\................. X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Lesotho..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Liberia..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X ........ X
Libya \1\................... X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X X
Liechtenstein \5\........... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Lithuania \3\............... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Luxembourg \3\.............. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Macau....................... X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X X
Macedonia (The Former X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Yugoslav Republic of)......
Madagascar.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Malawi...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Malaysia.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Maldives.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Mali........................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Malta 2 3 4................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Marshall Islands............ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Mauritania.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Mauritius................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Mexico...................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ X X X X
Micronesia (Federated State X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
of)........................
Moldova..................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Monaco...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Mongolia.................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Montenegro.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Morocco..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Mozambique.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Namibia..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Nauru....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Nepal....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Netherlands \3\............. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
New Zealand \3\............. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Nicaragua................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Niger....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Nigeria..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Norway \3\.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Oman........................ X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Pakistan.................... X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X X
Palau....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Panama...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Papua New Guinea............ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Paraguay.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Peru........................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Philippines................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Poland \3\.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Portugal \3\................ X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Qatar....................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Romania \3\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Russia \6\.................. X X X X X X X X X X ............ X X ........
Rwanda...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
St. Kitts and Nevis......... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
St. Lucia................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
St. Vincent and the X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Grenadines.................
Samoa....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
San Marino.................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Sao Tome and Principe....... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Saudi Arabia................ X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X

[[Page 34701]]

Senegal..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Serbia...................... X X ........ ........ ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Seycheles................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Sierra Leone................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Singapore................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Sint Maarten (the Dutch two- X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
fifths of the island of
Saint Martin)..............
Slovakia \3\................ X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Slovenia \3\................ X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Solomon Islands............. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Somalia \1\................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
South Africa 2 3 4.......... X X ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ X X X
South Sudan, Republic of.... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Spain \3\................... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Sri Lanka................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Sudan \1\................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Suriname.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Swaziland................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Sweden 3 4.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Switzerland 3 4............. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syria....................... See Sec. 746.9 of the EAR to determine whether a license is required in order to export or reexport to this destination.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taiwan...................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Tajikistan.................. X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Tanzania.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Thailand.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Timor-Leste................. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Togo........................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Tonga....................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Trinidad and Tobago......... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Tunisia..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Turkey \3\.................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Turkmenistan................ X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Tuvalu...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Uganda...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Ukraine \8\................. X ........ ........ ........ ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
United Arab Emirates........ X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
United Kingdom \3\.......... X ........ ........ ........ ........ X ........ X X ........ ............ ........ X ........
Uruguay..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X X X X X
Uzbekistan.................. X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Vanuatu..................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Vatican City................ X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Venezuela................... X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Vietnam..................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X ........
Western Sahara.............. X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Yemen....................... X X X X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Zambia...................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
Zimbabwe.................... X X ........ X ........ X X X X X ............ X X X
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Sec. 746.1(b) for United Nations Security Council Sanctions under the EAR. See Sec. 746.3 for United Nations Security Council-related license requirements for exports and reexports
to Iraq or transfer within Iraq under the EAR, as well as regional stability licensing requirements not included in the Country Chart.
\2\ See Sec. 742.4(a) for special provisions that apply to exports and reexports to these countries of certain thermal imaging cameras.
\3\ See Sec. 742.6(a)(3) for special provisions that apply to military commodities that are subject to ECCN 0A919.
\4\ See Sec. 742.6(a)(2) and (4)(ii) regarding special provisions for exports and reexports of certain thermal imaging cameras to these countries.
\5\ Refer to Switzerland for licensing requirements for Liechtenstein under the EAR.
\6\ See Sec. 746.5 of the EAR for additional license requirements under the Russian Industry Sector Sanctions for ECCNs 0A998, 1C992, 3A229, 3A231, 3A232, 6A991, 8A992, and 8D999 and items
identified in supplement no. 2 to part 746 of the EAR. See Sec. 746.8 of the EAR for Sanctions against Russia and Belarus, including additional license requirements for items listed in any
ECCN on the CCL.
\7\ Note that a license is still required for items controlled under ECCNs 6A003.b.4.b and 9A515.e for RS column 2 reasons when destined to India.
\8\ See Sec. 746.6 of the EAR for additional license requirements for exports and reexports to the Crimea region of Ukraine and the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk
People's Republic (LNR) regions of Ukraine and transfers (in-country) within the Crimea, DNR, and LNR regions of Ukraine for all items subject to the EAR, other than food and medicine
designated as EAR99 and certain EAR99 or ECCN 5D992.c software for internet-based communications.

PART 740--LICENSE EXCEPTIONS

0
7. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 740 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852; 50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.; 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; E.O. 13026, 61 FR
58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR,
2001 Comp., p. 783.

0
8. Section 740.2 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a)(4)(iii), (a)(21) and (23); and
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(24).
The revisions and addition read as follows:

Sec. 740.2 Restrictions on all License Exceptions.

* * * * *
(a) * * *
(4) * * *
(iii) Authorized by Sec. 740.14(e) of the EAR; or
* * * * *
(21) The reexport or transfer (in-country) of firearms classified
under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A506, 0A507, or 0A508 with either an ITAR-
defined ``foreign defense article'' (22 CFR 120.39) that is not subject
to Department of State jurisdiction that is incorporated into the
firearm or ``knowledge'' that an ITAR-defined ``defense article'' (22
CFR 120.31) will be subsequently incorporated into the firearm, where
the ``(foreign) defense article'' is described in USML Category
I(h)(2). In such instances, no license exceptions are available except
for License Exception GOV (Sec. 740.11(b)(2)(ii)).
* * * * *
(23) Exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of semi-
automatic firearms or shotguns controlled under ECCNs 0A506, 0A507, or
0A508 sold under a contract or otherwise part of an export that
includes $4,000,000 or more of such items are not eligible for any
license exceptions except to personnel and agencies of the U.S.
Government

[[Page 34702]]

under License Exception GOV (Sec. 740.11(b) of the EAR), for official
use by an agency of NATO, or where a license exception would otherwise
be available for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of such
items to a destination specified in Country Groups A:5 or A:6 (see
supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) except Mexico, South Africa,
or Turkey.
(24) Exporters of items controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504,
0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, or 0A509 wishing to use an EAR license
exception for such items must first have the consignee obtain and
provide to the exporter an import certification or equivalent document,
if the importing country requires one, prior to using an EAR license
exception.
* * * * *

0
9. Section 740.3 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as
follows:

Sec. 740.3 Shipments of limited value (LVS).

* * * * *
(b) Eligible destinations. This License Exception is available for
all destinations in Country Group B (see supplement no. 1 to this
part), provided that the net value of the commodities included in the
same order and controlled under the same ECCN entry on the CCL does not
exceed the amount specified in the LVS paragraph for that entry.
However, License Exception LVS is not available for 0x5zz items (except
0A504.g) when destined for countries in ``CARICOM'' or countries in
Country Group D:5.
* * * * *

0
10. Section 740.9 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) introductory
text, (b) introductory text, and (b)(5) to read as follows:

Sec. 740.9 Temporary imports, exports, reexports, and transfers (in-
country) (TMP).

(a) Temporary exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country).
License Exception TMP authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-
country) of items for temporary use abroad (including use in or above
international waters) subject to the conditions specified in this
paragraph (a). No item may be exported, reexported, or transferred (in-
country) under this paragraph (a) if an order to acquire the item, such
as a purchase order, has been received before shipment; with prior
knowledge that the item will stay abroad beyond the terms of this
License Exception; or when the item is for subsequent lease or rental
abroad. The references to various countries and country groups in these
TMP-specific provisions do not limit or amend the prohibitions in Sec.
740.2 of the EAR on the use of license exceptions generally, such as
for exports of 9x515 or ``600 series'' items to destinations in Country
Group D:5. This paragraph (a) does not authorize any export of a
commodity controlled under ECCNs 0A501.a or .b, 0A506 or 0A507, or
shotguns with a barrel length less than 18 inches controlled under ECCN
0A502 or 0A508 to, or any export of such an item that was imported into
the United States from, a country in Country Group D:5 (supplement no.
1 to this part), or from Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, or Uzbekistan. The only provisions of
this paragraph (a) that are eligible for use to export such items are
paragraph (a)(5) of this section (``Exhibition and demonstration'') and
paragraph (a)(6) of this section (``Inspection, test, calibration, and
repair''). In addition, this paragraph (a) may not be used to export
more than 75 firearms per shipment. In accordance with the requirements
in Sec. 758.1(b)(9) and (g)(4) of the EAR, the exporter or its agent
must provide documentation that includes the serial number, make,
model, and caliber of each firearm being exported by filing these data
elements in an EEI filing in AES. In accordance with the exclusions in
License Exception TMP under paragraph (b)(5) of this section, the entry
clearance requirements in Sec. 758.1(b)(9) do not permit the temporary
import of: Firearms controlled in ECCNs 0A501.a or .b, 0A506, or 0A507
that are shipped from or manufactured in a Country Group D:5 country,
or that are shipped from or manufactured in Russia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, or Uzbekistan
(except for any firearm model designation (if assigned) controlled by
ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, or 0A507 that is specified under annex A in
supplement no. 4 to this part); or shotguns with a barrel length less
than 18 inches controlled in ECCNs 0A502 or 0A508 that are shipped from
or manufactured in a Country Group D:5 country, or from Russia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, or
Uzbekistan, because of the exclusions in License Exception TMP under
paragraph (b)(5) of this section.
* * * * *
(b) Exports of items temporarily in the United States. No provision
of this paragraph (b), other than paragraph (b)(3), (4), or (5), may be
used to export firearms controlled by ECCN 0A501.a, .b, 0A506, 0A507,
or shotguns with a barrel length less than 18 inches controlled in ECCN
0A502 or 0A508.
* * * * *
(5) Exports of firearms and certain shotguns temporarily in the
United States. This paragraph (b)(5) authorizes the export of no more
than 75 firearms per shipment controlled by ECCN 0A501.a or .b, 0A506,
0A507, or shotguns with a barrel length less than 18 inches controlled
in ECCN 0A502 or 0A508 that are temporarily in the United States for a
period not exceeding one year, provided that:
(i) The firearms were not shipped from or manufactured in a U.S.
arms embargoed country, i.e., destination listed in Country Group D:5
in supplement no. 1 to this part;
(ii) The firearms were not shipped from or manufactured in Russia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, or
Uzbekistan, except for any firearm model controlled by 0A501, 0A506, or
0A507 that is specified under annex A in supplement no. 4 to this part;
and
(iii) The firearms are not ultimately destined to a U.S. arms
embargoed country, i.e., destination listed in Country Group D:5 in
supplement no. 1 to this part;
(iv) When the firearms entered the U.S. as a temporary import, the
temporary importer or its agent:
(A) Provided the following statement to U.S. Customs and Border
Protection: ``This shipment will be exported in accordance with and
under the authority of License Exception TMP (15 CFR 740.9(b)(5))'';
(B) Provided to U.S. Customs and Border Protection an invoice or
other appropriate import-related documentation (or electronic
equivalents) that includes a complete list and description of the
firearms being temporarily imported, including their model, make,
caliber, serial numbers, quantity, and U.S. dollar value; and
(C) Provided (if temporarily imported for a trade show, exhibition,
demonstration, or testing) to U.S. Customs and Border Protection the
relevant invitation or registration documentation for the event and an
accompanying letter that details the arrangements to maintain effective
control of the firearms while they are in the United States; and
(v) In addition to the export clearance requirements of part 758 of
the EAR, the exporter or its agent must provide the import
documentation related to paragraph (b)(5)(iv)(B) of this section to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the time of export.

Note 1 to paragraph (b)(5): In addition to complying with all
applicable EAR

[[Page 34703]]

requirements for the export of commodities described in paragraph
(b)(5) of this section, exporters and temporary importers should
contact U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the port of
temporary import or export, or at the CBP website, for the proper
procedures for temporarily importing or exporting firearms
controlled in ECCNs 0A501.a or .b, 0A506, or 0A507, or shotguns with
a barrel length less than 18 inches controlled in ECCN 0A502 or
0A508, including regarding how to provide any data or documentation
required by BIS.

Note 2 to paragraph (b): A commodity withdrawn from a bonded
warehouse in the United States under a `withdrawal for export'
customs entry is considered as `moving in transit'. It is not
considered as `moving in transit' if it is withdrawn from a bonded
warehouse under any other type of customs entry or if its transit
has been broken for a processing operation, regardless of the type
of customs entry.

Note 3 to paragraph (b): Items shipped on board a vessel or
aircraft and passing through the United States from one foreign
country to another may be exported without a license provided that
(a) while passing in transit through the United States, they have
not been unladen from the vessel or aircraft on which they entered,
and (b) they are not originally manifested to the United States.

Note 4 to paragraph (b): A shipment originating in Canada or
Mexico that incidentally transits the United States en route to a
delivery point in the same country does not require a license.

* * * * *

0
11. Section 740.10 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to
read as follows:

Sec. 740.10 License Exception Servicing and replacement of parts and
equipment (RPL).

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) The provisions of this paragraph (b) authorize the export and
reexport to any destination, except for 9x515 or ``600 series'' items
to destinations identified in Country Group D:5 (see supplement no. 1
to this part) or otherwise prohibited under the EAR, of commodities and
software that were sent to the United States or to a foreign party for
servicing and replacement of commodities and software ``subject to the
EAR'' (see Sec. 734.2(a) of the EAR) that are defective or that an end
user or ultimate consignee has found unacceptable. The export of
firearms controlled by ECCNs 0A501.a or .b, 0A506, or 0A507 or shotguns
with a barrel length less than 18 inches controlled in ECCN 0A502 or
0A508 temporarily in the United States for servicing and replacement
may be exported under paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this section only if
the additional requirements in paragraph (b)(4) of this section are
also met.
* * * * *
(4) This paragraph (b)(4) authorizes the export of firearms
controlled by ECCNs 0A501.a or .b, 0A506, 0A507 or shotguns with a
barrel length less than 18 inches controlled in ECCNs 0A502 or 0A508
that are temporarily in the United States for servicing or replacement
for a period not exceeding one year or the time it takes to service or
replace the commodity, whichever is shorter, provided that the
requirements of paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this section are met and:
(i) The firearms were not shipped from or manufactured in Russia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, or
Uzbekistan, except for any firearm model controlled by 0A501, 0A506, or
0A507 that is specified under Annex A in Supplement No. 4 to this part;
(ii) When the firearms entered the U.S. as a temporary import, the
temporary importer or its agent:
(A) Provided the following statement to U.S. Customs and Border
Protection: ``This shipment will be exported in accordance with and
under the authority of License Exception RPL (15 CFR 740.10(b))'';
(B) Provided to U.S. Customs and Border Protection an invoice or
other appropriate import-related documentation (or electronic
equivalents) that includes a complete list and description of the
firearms being temporarily imported, including their model, make,
caliber, serial numbers, quantity, and U.S. dollar value; and
(C) Provided (if temporarily imported for servicing or replacement)
to U.S. Customs and Border Protection the name, address and contact
information (telephone number and/or email) of the organization or
individual in the U.S. that will be receiving the item for servicing or
replacement; and
(iii) In addition to the export clearance requirements of part 758
of the EAR, the exporter or its agent must provide the import
documentation related to paragraph (b)(4)(iii)(B) of this section to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the time of export.

Note 1 to paragraph (b)(4): In addition to complying with all
applicable EAR requirements for the export of commodities described
in this paragraph (b)(4), exporters and temporary importers should
contact U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the port of
temporary import or export, or at the CBP website, for the proper
procedures for temporarily importing or exporting firearms
controlled in ECCN 0A501.a or .b, 0A506, 0A507 or shotguns with a
barrel length less than 18 inches controlled in ECCN 0A502 or 0A508,
including regarding how to provide any data or documentation
required by BIS.

* * * * *

0
12. Section 740.11 is amended by revising the introductory text to read
as follows:

Sec. 740.11 Governments, international organizations, international
inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the
International Space Station (GOV).

This License Exception authorizes exports and reexports for
international nuclear safeguards; U.S. government agencies or
personnel; agencies of cooperating governments; international
inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the
International Space Station. Commodities listed in ECCNs 0A501, 0A506,
0A507, 0A508, and 0A509 are eligible only for transactions described in
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section. Any item listed in a
0x5zz ECCN for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to an E:1
country is eligible only for transactions described in paragraphs
(b)(2)(i) and (ii) solely for U.S. Government official use of this
section.
* * * * *

0
13. Section 740.14 is amended by revising paragraph (e) to read as
follows:

Sec. 740.14 Baggage (BAG).

* * * * *
(e) Special provisions for firearms and ammunition. (1) A United
States citizen or a permanent resident alien leaving the United States
may export or reexport shotguns with a barrel length of 18 inches or
over controlled under ECCN 0A502 and 0A508 and shotgun shells
controlled under ECCN 0A505.b and .c under this License Exception,
subject to the following limitations:
(i) Not more than three firearms may be taken on any one trip (this
includes shotguns in ECCNs 0A502 or 0A508, as well as firearms in ECCNs
0A501, 0A506, or 0A507).
(ii) The shotguns and shotgun shells must be with the person's
baggage.
(iii) The shotguns and shotgun shells must be for the person's
exclusive use for legitimate hunting or lawful sporting purposes,
scientific purposes, or personal protection, and not for resale or
other transfer of ownership or control. Accordingly, except as provided
in (e)(2) of this section, shotguns may not be exported permanently
under this License Exception. All shotguns and unused shotgun shells
must be returned to the United States. Note that since certain
countries may require an Import Certificate or a U.S. export license

[[Page 34704]]

before allowing the import of a shotgun, you should determine the
import requirements of your country of destination in advance.
(2) A nonresident alien leaving the United States may export or
reexport under this License Exception only such shotguns and shotgun
shells as he or she brought into the United States under the provisions
of the Department of Justice Regulations (27 CFR 478.115(d)).
(3) A United States citizen or a permanent resident alien leaving
the United States may export under this License Exception firearms,
``parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,'' or ``attachments''
controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, 0A507, and 0A509 and ammunition
controlled under ECCN 0A505.a, subject to the following limitations:
(i) Not more than three firearms may be taken on any one trip (this
includes firearms in ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, or 0A507, as well as shotguns
in ECCNs 0A502 or 0A508), and no more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition
may be taken on any one trip.
(ii) ``Parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,'' and
``attachments'' exported pursuant to this paragraph (e)(3) must be of a
kind and limited to quantities that are reasonable for the activities
described in paragraph (e)(3)(iv) of this section or that are necessary
for routine maintenance of the firearms being exported.
(iii) The commodities must be with the person's baggage.
(iv) The commodities must be for the person's exclusive use and not
for resale or other transfer of ownership or control. Accordingly,
except as provided in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, firearms,
``parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,'' ``attachments,'' and
ammunition, may not be exported permanently under this License
Exception. All firearms, ``parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,'' or
``attachments'' controlled under ECCN 0A501, 0A506, 0A507, and 0A509
and all unused ammunition controlled under ECCN 0A505.a exported under
this License Exception must be returned to the United States.
(v) Travelers leaving the United States temporarily are required to
declare the firearms, ``parts,'' ``components,'' ``accessories,''
``attachments,'' and ammunition being exported under this License
Exception to a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer prior to
departure from the United States and present such items to the CBP
officer for inspection, confirming that the authority for the export is
License Exception BAG and that the exporter is compliant with its
terms.
(4) A nonimmigrant alien leaving the United States may export or
reexport under this License Exception only such firearms controlled
under ECCN 0A501, 0A506, 0A507, and ammunition controlled under ECCN
0A505 as he or she brought into the United States under the relevant
provisions of Department of Justice regulations at 27 CFR part 478.
(5) Destination eligibility under this License Exception for items
controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508,
or 0A509 is limited to countries other than those in Country Group D:5
(except for Zimbabwe) and ``CARICOM'' countries.
* * * * *

0
14. Section 740.20 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read
as follows:

Sec. 740.20 License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA).

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) License Exception STA may not be used for:
(A) Any item controlled in ECCNs 0A501.a, .b, .c, .d, or .e; 0A506;
0A507; 0A509; 0A981; 0A982; 0A983; 0A503; 0E504; 0E982; or
(B) Shotguns with barrel length less than 18 inches controlled in
0A502 or 0A508.
* * * * *

PART 742--CONTROL POLICY--CCL BASED CONTROLS

0
15. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 742 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852; 50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.; 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 22
U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7210; Sec. 1503, Pub. L. 108-11, 117
Stat. 559; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O.
12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR
59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR,
1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p.
783; Presidential Determination 2003-23, 68 FR 26459, 3 CFR, 2004
Comp., p. 320; Notice of November 8, 2022, 87 FR 68015 (November 10,
2022).

0
16. Section 742.6 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(1)(i) to read as
follows:

Sec. 742.6 Regional stability.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) Applications for exports and reexports of ECCN 0A501, 0A502,
0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509, 0B501, 0B505, 0D501, 0D505,
0E501, 0E504, and 0E505 items, 9x515, and ``600 series'' items will be
reviewed under the following policies:
(A) Applications for exports and reexports of ECCN 0A501, 0A502,
0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509, 0B501, 0B505, 0D501, 0D505,
0E501, 0E504, and 0E505 items; 9x515 and ``600 series'' items will be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the transaction
is contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the
United States, including the foreign policy interest of promoting the
observance of human rights throughout the world.
(B) Other applications for exports and reexports described in
paragraph (a)(1), (2), (6), or (8) of this section will be reviewed on
a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport could
contribute directly or indirectly to any country's military
capabilities in a manner that would alter or destabilize a region's
military balance contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United
States.
(C) Applications for reexports of items described in paragraph
(a)(3) of this section will be reviewed applying the policies for
similar commodities that are subject to the ITAR.
(D) Applications for export or reexport of items classified under
ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, or 0A509, or any 9x515
or ``600 series'' ECCN requiring a license in accordance with paragraph
(a)(1) or (9) of this section, will also be reviewed consistent with
United States arms embargo policies in Sec. 126.1 of the ITAR (22 CFR
126.1), if destined to a country set forth in Country Group D:5 in
Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR.
(E) Applications for export or reexport of ``parts,''
``components,'' ``accessories,'' ``attachments,'' ``software,'' or
``technology'' ``specially designed'' or otherwise required for the F-
14 aircraft will generally be denied.
(F) Applications for exports and reexports of items classified
under ECCNs 0A501, 0A502, 0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509,
0B501, 0B505, 0D501, 0D505, 0E501, 0E504, or 0E505, or any 9x515 ECCN
will be subject to a policy of denial, when destined to China or a
country listed in E:1 in Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR.
(G) Applications for exports and reexports of ECCNs 0A501, 0A502,
0A504, 0A505, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509, 0B501, 0B505, 0D501, 0D505,
0E501, 0E504, and 0E505 items will be subject to a policy of denial
when there is reason to believe the transaction involves criminal
organizations, rebel groups, street gangs, or other similar

[[Page 34705]]

groups or individuals, that may be disruptive to regional stability,
including within individual countries. * * *
* * * * *

0
17. Revise Sec. 742.7 to read as follows:

Sec. 742.7 Crime control and detection.

(a) License requirements. In support of U.S. foreign policy to
promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, a license
is required to export and reexport crime control and detection
equipment, related technology and software as follows:
(1) Crime control and detection instruments and equipment and
related ``technology'' and ``software'' identified in the appropriate
ECCNs on the CCL under CC Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the
``License Requirements'' section. A license is required to countries
listed in CC Column 1 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR). Items
affected by this requirement are identified on the CCL under the
following ECCNs: 0A977, 0A978, 0A979, 0D977, 0E977, 1A984, 1A985,
3A980, 3A981, 3D980, 3E980, 4A003 (for fingerprint computers only),
4A980, 4D001 (for fingerprint computers only), 4D980, 4E001 (for
fingerprint computers only), 4E980, 6A002 (for police-model infrared
viewers only), 6E001 (for police-model infrared viewers only), 6E002
(for police-model infrared viewers only), and 9A980.
(2) Items designed for the execution of human beings as identified
in ECCN 0A981 require a license to all destinations including
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Controls for these items
appear in each ECCN; a column specific to these controls does not
appear in the Country Chart (supplement no. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
(3) Certain crime control items require a license to all
destinations, except Canada only. These items are identified under
ECCNs 0A982, 0A503, and 0E982. Controls for these items appear in each
ECCN; a column specific to these controls does not appear in the
Country Chart (supplement no. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
(4) See Sec. 742.11 of the EAR for further information on items
controlled under ECCN 0A983, which require a license to all
destinations, including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Controls for these items appear in each ECCN; a column specific to
these controls does not appear in the Country Chart (supplement no. 1
to part 738 of the EAR).
(5) Items detailed under this paragraph are specific to certain
firearms, shotguns, and related items. Crime control and detection
instruments and equipment and related ``technology'' and ``software''
identified in the appropriate ECCNs on the CCL under CC Column 2 in the
Country Chart column of the ``License Requirements'' section. A license
is required to countries listed in CC Column 2 (supplement no. 1 to
part 738 of the EAR). Items affected by this requirement are identified
on the CCL under the following ECCNs: 0A501 (except 0A501.y), 0A502,
0A504, 0A505. a, .b, and .x, 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, 0A509, 0D501, 0D505,
0E501, 0E502, 0E504, and 0E505.
(b) Licensing policy. (1) Applications for items controlled under
paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section will generally be
considered favorably on a case-by-case basis, unless there is civil
disorder in the country or region or unless there is a risk that the
items will be used to violate or abuse human rights. The judicious use
of export controls is intended to deter human rights violations and
abuses, distance the United States from such violations and abuses, and
avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country or region.
(2) BIS will review license applications in accordance with the
licensing policy in paragraph (b)(1) of this section for items that are
not controlled under this section but that require a license pursuant
to another section for any reason other than short supply and could be
used by the recipient Government or other end user specifically to
violate or abuse human rights.
(3) Applications for items controlled under paragraph (a)(5) of
this section will be reviewed under the following license review
policies:
(i) Applications destined for government end users will be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether there is a risk of
diversion or misuse of the items in a manner that would adversely
impact U.S. national security or foreign policy.
(ii) Those applications destined for non-government end users will
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, unless one of the following apply,
in which case they will be reviewed under a presumption of denial:
(A) The destination is identified in supplement no. 3 to this part;
or
(B) There is a substantial risk that the items will be diverted or
misused in a manner that would adversely impact U.S. national security
or foreign policy.

Note 1 to paragraph (b)(3): In reviewing applications under
this paragraph, BIS will consider the following risks in the
destination country or region: firearms trafficking or diversion,
terrorism, corruption, human rights concerns and political violence,
state fragility, organized crime or gang-related activity, and drug
trafficking. BIS will also consider prior instances of diversion or
misuse; the capabilities, potential uses, and lethality of the item;
the nature of the end user; and other factors as appropriate.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity date: August 22, 2000.
Contract sanctity applies only to items controlled under ECCNs 0A982,
0A503, and 0E982 destined for countries not listed in CC Column 1 of
the Country Chart (supplement no. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).
(d) U.S. controls. In maintaining its controls on crime control and
detection items, the United States considers international norms
regarding human rights and the practices of other countries that
control exports to promote the observance of human rights. However,
these controls are not based on the decisions of any multinational
export control regime and may differ from controls imposed by other
countries.

0
18. Section 742.17 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (f) to
read as follows:

Sec. 742.17 Exports of firearms to OAS member countries.

* * * * *
(b) Licensing policy. Applications will be reviewed on a case-by-
case basis when supported by an FC Import Certificate or equivalent
official document issued by the government of the importing country.
However, there is a policy of denial for applications to export items
linked to such activities as drug trafficking, terrorism, and
transnational organized crime.
* * * * *
(f) Items/Commodities. Items requiring a license under this section
are ECCNs 0A501 (except 0A501.y), 0A502, 0A504 (except 0A504.f), 0A505
(except 0A505.d), 0A506, 0A507, 0A508, and 0A509. (See supplement no. 1
to part 774 of the EAR).
* * * * *

0
19. Add supplement no. 3 to part 742 to read as follows:

Supplement No. 3 to Part 742--High-Risk Destinations for Firearms and
Related Items

Bahamas,
The Bangladesh
Belize
Bolivia
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Chad
Colombia

[[Page 34706]]

Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Malaysia
Mali
Mozambique
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Tajikistan
Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda
Vietnam
Yemen

PART 743--SPECIAL REPORTING AND NOTIFICATION

0
20. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 743 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852; 50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.; 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p.
783; E.O. 13637, 78 FR 16129, 3 CFR, 2014 Comp., p. 223; 78 FR
16129. (January 23, 2020).

0
21. Section 743.4 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 743.4 Conventional arms reporting.

(a) Scope. This section outlines special reporting requirements for
exports of certain items included in the UN Register of Conventional
Arms (UNRoCA) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Munitions List. These
reports cover substantially similar arms. States participating in the
UNRoCA report annually on all transfers of arms (see
<a href="http://www.disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/register/">www.disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/register/</a>); Participating States of
the Wassenaar Arrangement exchange information every six months on
deliveries and transfers to non-WA governments of conventional arms set
forth in the Wassenaar Arrangement's Basic Documents under Part II
``Guideline and Procedures, including the Initial Elements'', Appendix
3: ``Specific Information Exchange on Arms Content by Category''.
Public Documents, Vol. 1--Founding Documents at <a href="https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2021/12/Public-Docs-Vol-I-Founding-Documents.pdf">https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2021/12/Public-Docs-Vol-I-Founding-Documents.pdf</a>). BIS obtains the information needed for such
conventional arms reporting from the information exporters are required
to submit in the EEI submission in AES, pursuant to Sec. 758.1(b)(9)
and (g)(4)(ii) of the EAR. No additional reporting to BIS is required
for purposes of this section. BIS does not submit reports for reexports
or transfers (in-country) under this section. BIS does not include
exports to Wassenaar member countries, identified in supplement no. 1
to part 743 in the Wassenaar reports. required under this section.
(b) Information included in the reports--(1) Authorizations
reported. Exports authorized under BIS licenses, License Exceptions
TMP, RPL, STA, or GOV (see part 740 of the EAR) and under the Validated
End User authorization (see Sec. 748.15 of the EAR).
(2) ECCNs reported. ECCNs 0A501.a and .b, 0A506.a. and .b, and
0A507.a and .b.
(3) Quantity and recipient state reported. The quantity and the
name of the recipient state.
(c) Contacts. Information concerning the reporting requirements for
items identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section is available from
the Office of Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Controls (NFPC),
Tel.: (202) 482-4188, Fax: (202) 482-4145.

0
22. Section 743.6 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b), and (c)
to read as follows:

Sec. 743.6 Prior notifications to Congress of exports of certain
semi-automatic firearms.

(a) General requirement. Applications to export semi-automatic
firearms controlled by ECCNs 0A506 or 0A507 will be notified to
Congress as provided in this section before licenses for such items are
issued, except as specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this

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