Rule2024-03506
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
February 22, 2024
Effective
February 22, 2024
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) discusses the adoption of an Order on Reconsideration (Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order), which addressed three petitions for reconsideration challenging the orbital debris mitigation rules adopted by the Commission in 2020. In the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order, the Commission declined to modify, withdraw, or otherwise change the orbital debris mitigation rules adopted in 2020 Orbital Debris Order, published August 25, 2020, but also provided some clarification and guidance as relevant for some of the issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 36 (Thursday, February 22, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 36 (Thursday, February 22, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13276-13282]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-03506]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97
[IB Docket No. 18-313; FCC 24-6; FR ID 202994]
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Denial of reconsideration.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) discusses the adoption of an Order on
Reconsideration (Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order), which addressed
three petitions for reconsideration challenging the orbital debris
mitigation rules adopted by the Commission in 2020. In the Orbital
Debris Reconsideration Order, the Commission declined to modify,
withdraw, or otherwise change the orbital debris mitigation rules
adopted in 2020 Orbital Debris Order, published August 25, 2020, but
also provided some clarification and guidance as relevant for some of
the issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration.
DATES: The denial of reconsideration is effective February 22, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alexandra Horn, Space Bureau,
Satellite Programs and Policy Division, 202-418-1376,
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c3a2afa6bba2ada7b1a2edabacb1ad83a5a0a0eda4acb5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e2838e879a838c869083cc8a8d908ca2848181cc858d94">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order
on Reconsideration (Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order), FCC 24-6,
adopted on January 25, 2024, and released on January 26, 2024. The full
text of this document is available at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-6A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-6A1.pdf</a>. To request materials in accessible formats
for people with disabilities, send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#71373232444145311712125f161e07"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="773134344247433711141459101801">[email protected]</span></a> or call
the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice),
202-418-0432 (TTY).
Paperwork Reduction Act. The Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order
did not contain new or modified information collection requirements
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-
13. Therefore, it does not contain any new or modified information
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25
employees, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198,see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, as amended (RFA), requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis
be prepared for notice and comment rulemaking proceedings. As the
Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order does not adopt or otherwise modify
any existing rules, no regulatory flexibility analysis is necessary.
Synopsis
I. Introduction
1. In the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order, the Commission
addressed the issues raised in three petitions for reconsideration of
the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, 86 FR 52422 (August 25, 2020): (1) a
petition filed by the Boeing Company (Boeing), EchoStar Satellite
Services, LLC (EchoStar), Hughes Network Services, LLC (Hughes), Planet
Labs, Inc. (Planet), Spire Global, Inc. (Spire), and Telesat Canada
(Telesat) (collectively, Combined Petition), asking the Commission to
reconsider information disclosure requirements relating to satellite
maneuverability, large system disposal reliability, the use of
deployment devices, and the use of certain types of persistent liquids;
(2) a petition filed by Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX)
seeking reconsideration or clarification of the Commission's orbital
debris mitigation rules as applied to non-U.S.-licensed satellite
systems seeking U.S. market access; and (3) a petition filed by Kuiper
Systems LLC (Kuiper) seeking adoption of a new rule addressing issues
related to the orbital separation of large non-geostationary orbit
(NGSO) constellations.
2. In responding to these petitions, the Commission declined to
modify, withdraw, or otherwise change the information collection
requirements adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order. It also declined
to change its rules as applicable to non-U.S.-licensed systems seeking
U.S. market access, or to adopt new rules governing the orbital
separation of large NGSO constellations. After reviewing the petitions,
the Commission found that the petitioners failed to show any material
errors or omissions in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order or raise any new
or additional facts that would warrant reconsideration under the
Commission's rules. However, the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order
provided some clarification or guidance as appropriate on some of the
issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration.
II. Background
3. On November 19, 2018, the Commission released a notice of
[[Page 13277]]
proposed rulemaking (2018 Orbital Debris NPRM), 84 FR 4742 (February
19, 2019), in IB Docket No. 18-313, concerning the mitigation of
orbital debris in the new space age. It represented the first
comprehensive look at the Commission's orbital debris rules since their
adoption in 2004 and was intended to improve and clarify these rules
based on the experiences gained in the satellite licensing process and
various improvements in mitigation guidelines, practices, and
technologies. After reviewing the record and public comments filed in
response to the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM, including individual comments
filed by some of the parties involved in the petitions for
reconsideration, the Commission adopted the 2020 Orbital Debris Order
on April 23, 2020. At the same time, the Commission also adopted a
further notice of proposed rulemaking, 85 FR 52455 (August 25, 2020)
(2020 Orbital Debris FNPRM), which sought further comment on adopting
rules concerning the probability of accidental explosions, the total
probability of collisions with large objects, maneuverability above a
certain altitude in low-Earth orbit (LEO), post-mission orbital
lifetime, casualty risk, indemnification, and performance bonds for
successful disposal. On September 24, 2020, the petitioners filed their
timely petitions for reconsideration, and by November 24, 2020, five
oppositions and comments to the petitions were filed.
III. Discussion
A. Combined Petition Issues
1. Relationship to Other U.S. Government Technical and Policy Documents
4. The petitioners raised concerns about the consistency of the
rules adopted with policies and guidelines developed by expert Federal
agencies, noting in particular the U.S. Government Orbital Debris
Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) and Space Policy Directive-3
(SPD-3), and allege that the disclosure rules ``[diverge] substantially
from the recommendations of other expert federal agencies, including,
in some cases, disregarding the findings of the recently updated multi-
agency Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.'' Both Viasat and
OneWeb challenged this assertion.
5. The petitioners failed to identify any respect in which the
Commission's actions in adopting the 2020 Orbital Debris Order are
fundamentally inconsistent with the policies, goals, and guidelines
identified in SPD-3 and the ODMSP. To the extent they are relying on
the fact that the specific technical matters addressed in the
Commission's rules are not addressed at the same level of specificity
in SPD-3 and the ODMSP, these arguments are not well-founded, and do
not establish a ``divergence.'' As noted by Viasat and OneWeb, both of
these documents invite further action including through the development
of additional standards and best practices. The ODMSP expressly states
that it may be appropriate to ``consider the benefits of going beyond
the standard practices and tak[ing] additional steps to limit the
generation of orbital debris.'' Furthermore, the Commission found the
petitioners have in some instances alleged divergence from these
documents only by ignoring other relevant provisions of those
documents.
6. Even if the Commission were to accept the petitioners'
unsupported allegation of divergence, the Commission observed in
adopting these rules that the ODMSP ``applies, by its terms, only to
government missions that are procured and operated by government
agencies for governmental purposes . . . rather than in the context of
regulatory review,'' and for that reason ``some tailoring'' of the
ODMSP was necessary to fit into the Commission's existing regulatory
structure.
2. Burden on Applicants
7. Throughout the Combined Petition, petitioners argued that the
regulations adopted in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order will be overly
burdensome on applicants. Viasat and Maxar challenged this claim. In
raising concerns with burdens on applicants, the petitioners rely on
generalized concerns that regulation will be ``overly stringent,'' or
that applicants will experience difficulties because of ``staff
conclusions that the substance of the disclosed information was
insufficient or inconsistent with what they thought should be
required.'' These speculative concerns about possible errors in
Commission decision-making do not provide a basis for reconsideration.
In any event, and in an effort to assist applicants in preparing
applications, the Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order offers
additional discussion with respect to some aspects of the specific
disclosure requirements adopted.
3. Maneuverability
8. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission adopted a rule
requiring applicants to disclose the extent of maneuverability of
planned space stations, noting that most commenters addressing this
topic, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), agreed with the adoption of this disclosure. The Commission
provided some examples of the type of information that applicants could
include in their disclosure statements, as suggested by NASA in its
comments on the topic.
9. The Commission also revised a separate rule provision on
avoiding collisions with large objects to require applicants to state
whether the probability that their spacecraft will collide with a large
object during the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft is less than 0.001
(1 in 1,000), in line with the ODMSP. As part of that rule, the
Commission adopted a presumption that the collision risk with large
objects could be assumed zero or near zero during the period of time
when the space station is able to conduct avoidance maneuvers, absent
evidence to the contrary. The Commission noted that in individual cases
where there is evidence that a particular system or operator is unable
to effectively maneuver or is only maneuvering at a risk threshold that
raises reasonable questions about its ability to meet the 0.001
collision risk threshold even with some degree of maneuverability, this
assumption would not be applied and further analysis would be
necessary. The Commission did not adopt a definition of ``effective
maneuverability'' but sought comment in the 2020 Orbital Debris FNPRM
on a definition, as well as on whether to adopt a requirement that
spacecraft must be maneuverable.
10. Boeing, Planet, and Spire argued that the Commission should
withdraw its ``requirements'' regarding effective maneuverability until
this term is adequately defined. These petitioners did not distinguish
between the two distinct portions of the rule, and instead argued
generally that without a more detailed metric for effective
maneuverability, such as the ability to alter the course of a
spacecraft by a certain distance in a particular time period, the FCC
rules cannot be administered fairly. However, they did not take issue
with the assumption of zero or near zero risk for maneuverable
spacecraft. Viasat, OneWeb, and Maxar opposed this request, noting, in
effect, that pending development of a comprehensive definition,
disclosure of maneuverability information serves a valid public
interest objective and provides supporting evidence for addressing the
Commission's collision risk rule.
11. As observed in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, factual
information regarding a satellite or system's maneuverability is useful
not only to the
[[Page 13278]]
Commission when it is assessing applications, but to other operators as
it helps interested parties to better understand how operators plan to
handle predicted collision risks. Moreover, details about spacecraft
maneuverability enhance the Commission's grasp of other data presented
in an applicant's orbital debris mitigation plan and are essential
information for the administration of Commission rules in several key
areas. For example, the satellite's expected lifespan in orbit can be
significantly influenced by its maneuverability and impact an
operator's ability to comply with Commission rules. Additionally, the
information provided by applicants in these disclosures can also be
drawn upon as the Commission works to further refine its rules through
rulemaking. As noted by opposing parties, ``facilitating a thorough
understanding of other operators' ability to maneuver in-orbit is
fundamental to responsible orbital stewardship'' and disclosure fosters
a ``transparent'' and ``predictable'' operating environment.
12. Although the petitioners' request appears to focus on any
disclosure concerning maneuverability, to the extent the petition
sought only removal of the ``not effectively maneuverable'' exception
to the zero or near zero collision risk assumption in the Commission's
large object collision risk rule, the Commission found that the
petitioners provided no valid arguments in support of this approach.
The Commission declined to adopt an approach that could maintain an
assumption of zero or near zero risk even in the face of evidence
suggesting that such an assumption is not warranted because collision
avoidance capabilities are minimal. The Commission expects the
precedent that evolves from a case-by-case approach in evaluating
factual information regarding a satellite or system's maneuverability
will guide applicants and will address petitioners' concerns with
subjective and inconsistent licensing determinations. Finding that the
petitioners have not provided any evidence of a material error,
omission, or reasoning that would warrant reconsideration under the
Commission's rules, the Commission declined to modify its rules
pertaining to maneuverability.
13. Additional Resources for Applicants. During the pendency of
this proceeding, NASA developed the ``NASA Spacecraft Conjunction
Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook'' (Handbook)
and issued a revised version in February of 2023. The Handbook is a
useful resource that applicants may find helpful in developing and
documenting conjunction assessment and collision avoidance
capabilities, including for maneuverable spacecraft. The Handbook makes
some specific recommendations on conjunction assessment and collision
avoidance, including (i) designing spacecraft with capabilities to
facilitate conjunction assessment and mitigation; (ii) providing
ephemeris for conjunction screening at adequate intervals and covering
adequate duration; and (iii) when the probability of collision (Pc)
estimated for a conjunction exceeds the mitigation threshold
(recommended to be 1E-4) at the mitigation action commitment point,
pursuing a mitigation action that will reduce Pc by at least 1.5 orders
of magnitude from the remediation threshold, and ensure that the
mitigation action does not create any additional conjunctions with a Pc
value above the mitigation threshold.
4. Large System Disposal Reliability
14. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission adopted a rule
requiring applicants to provide a statement demonstrating that the
probability of success for their chosen disposal method is 0.9 or
greater for any individual space station. The rule also requires that
for space station systems consisting of multiple space stations, the
demonstration should include additional information regarding efforts
to achieve a higher probability of successful disposal, with a goal,
for large systems, of a probability of success for any individual
station of 0.99 or better. Drawing on provisions in the ODMSP, the
Commission also stated in the 2020 Orbital Debris Order that additional
scrutiny will be given to larger deployments, including consideration
of factors such as mass, collision probability, and orbital location.
15. Boeing, Planet, Spire, and Telesat raised a concern that the
rule will result in the 0.99 probability goal for satellites that are
part of large systems becoming in effect an enforceable requirement.
They also objected to providing ``sensitive'' commercial
considerations, such as satellite mass and orbital location, as part of
the Commission's assessment.
16. The Commission found that the petitioners provided no valid
basis for reconsideration. With respect to concerns that the 0.99
disposal reliability goal described in the adopted rule is in effect a
firm requirement for all large deployments, these concerns are neither
justified nor supported by any new information. Since the adoption of
this rule, the Commission has authorized several large system
deployments, and in doing so has addressed reliability together with
other relevant factual considerations, such as collision risk for
satellites that are not reliably disposed. While it appears to be the
case based on both authoritative studies and the experience gained in
these decisions that the largest systems will require very high
disposal reliability in order to avoid unacceptably high collision
risks, the approach to disposal reliability discussed in the 2020
Orbital Debris Order does not foreclose in individual cases the
authorization of systems of satellites with individual satellite
disposal reliability of less than 0.99. With respect to concerns raised
about examination of ``sensitive'' information, the Commission noted
that information such as orbital location and satellite mass (as a
component of the area-to-mass ratio of the satellite, necessary for
calculating residual orbital lifetime and related collision risk) are
routinely provided as part of applications, and this information is
routinely publicly available in the Commission's files. Orbital
location is included in all licenses. To the extent examination of the
orbital debris risks presented by a large constellation requires
examination of information for which confidential treatment can be
justified, the Commission's rules provide for such treatment. The
Commission therefore does not consider these concerns as justifying
reconsideration.
5. Deployment Devices
17. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission modified a
rule requiring applicants to provide a statement that the space station
operator has assessed and limited the amount of debris released in a
planned manner during normal operations to specifically require an
orbital debris mitigation disclosure for any separate or ``free-
flying'' deployment devices, distinct from the space launch vehicle,
that may become a source of debris. The Commission also discussed in
the 2020 Orbital Debris Order the scope of any such disclosure, noting
that it should address facts such as the orbital lifetime of the device
and collision risks associated with the device itself, including an
evaluation of collision risk specifically associated with the
deployment of multiple satellites from a deployment device (e.g., re-
contact analysis). The Commission stated that such disclosures would be
largely assessed on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that this approach
provides the flexibility necessary to address new developments in space
station design
[[Page 13279]]
and addresses the difficulty of designing specific disclosure rules for
each different type of device that may be used.
18. Boeing, Planet, Spire, EchoStar, and Hughes argued that this
disclosure requirement should be replaced with the ODMSP standard,
which specified that ``[f]or all planned released debris larger than
5mm in any dimension, the total debris object-time product in low-Earth
orbit . . . should be less than 100 object-years . . . per
spacecraft.'' They also argued that the Commission should not require
re-contact risk analyses because no consensus exists on what is
considered an adequate re-contact risk analysis, it was not proposed
for comment in the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM, and there is not enough
guidance as to how to conduct a re-contact analysis or how it would be
used in the application review process.
The Commission found that the petitioners' argument concerning the
ODMSP provisions on operational debris relies on a selective reading of
those provisions and does not justify reconsideration of the adopted
rule. The sentence in the ODMSP immediately preceding the sentence that
petitioners rely on states that ``[e]ach instance of planned release of
debris larger than 5 mm in any dimension that remains in orbit for more
than 25 years should be evaluated and justified.'' This additional
wording would not be necessary if the rationale for this guideline is
that any release of operational debris of less than 100 object-years
should be routinely considered acceptable. Instead, as a condition
precedent to applying the 100 object-year metric, this guideline
contemplates a determination that the release is evaluated and
justified. The approach adopted by the Commission is in no way
inconsistent with this approach, which identifies a need, for example,
to consider whether alternative methods for deployment might be
utilized that do not result in the potential for debris generation.
19. With respect to the concerns raised about re-contact analysis,
the Commission rejected the petitioner's contention that there was
insufficient notice to require a re-contact analysis, stating that the
2018 Orbital Debris NPRM sought comment on the issue of the use of
deployment devices and specifically proposed to require ``information
regarding the planned orbital debris mitigation measures specific to
the deployment device, including the probability of collision
associated with the deployment device itself.'' A re-contact analysis
addresses ``the probability of collision associated with the deployment
device itself.'' The Commission further noted that since adopting the
2020 Orbital Debris Order, it has authorized multiple deployers on a
case-by-case basis. Applicants provided information detailing the ways
in which they plan to mitigate recontact and Commission assessment of
each application took into account the specific re-contact mitigation
measures and overall mission facts that were unique to each mission in
order to condition the licenses accordingly. For example, one applicant
provided a report using a high-fidelity approach based on a Monte Carlo
analysis of deployment sequence in its application, using the current
manifest as the worst-case scenario and incorporating the worst
possible change in manifest subsequent to filing to demonstrate that
the applicant had taken the relevant re-contact risks into account and
the Commission conditioned their license to require the operator to
utilize a deployment sequence that will reduce the probability of re-
contact and ensure that the risk of re-contact specified in its
application does not increase based on this analysis. Another applicant
stated in its Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR) that it would
support at least three re-contact mitigation strategies for deployments
from the spacecraft, including ensuring that each deployment group will
be spaced apart by at least 90 minutes, or one full orbit, optimize
deployment orientation and sequence to minimize re-contact, and use on-
board propulsion as necessary to use for maneuvers to minimize the risk
of re-contact, and the Commission conditioned the license to require
the applicant to optimize customer spacecraft deployment orientation
and sequency to minimize re-contact and utilize on-board propulsion as
necessary for maneuvers to minimize the risk of re-contact as a result.
Each analysis in these examples provides varying levels of specificity
and detail concerning their respective re-contact analyses, but still
offers important context for mission characteristics unique to each
application.
20. As these examples demonstrate, applicants have been able to
address these concerns by drawing on available information, and in some
instances involving additional analysis and modeling. The Commission
anticipates, based on this experience, that this case-by-case approach
will continue to provide a flexible and workable framework for
applicants. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the petitioners'
assertions about potential difficulties in the licensing process have
not been realized and do not justify reconsideration of this particular
rule.
6. Persistent Liquids
21. In the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission updated its
rules to require operators to submit a ``statement that the space
station operator has assessed and limited the probability, during and
after completion of mission operations . . . of release of liquids that
will persist in droplet form.'' The Commission proposed this rule
change in response to increasing interest in use by satellites
(including small satellites) of alternative propellants and coolants,
some of which due to their physical properties might persist in droplet
form. The Commission noted specifically ionic liquids that would
persist if released in droplet form by a deployed satellite and the
substantial debris cloud that resulted from release of such droplets by
Soviet-era satellite operation. At orbital speeds, such droplets can
damage active spacecraft. The Commission noted its expectation that the
orbital debris mitigation plan for any system using persistent liquids
should address the measures taken, including design and testing, to
eliminate the risk of release of liquids and to minimize risk from any
unplanned release of liquids in droplet form.
22. The Combined Petition asserted that no evidence exists that the
use of such liquids is growing in the United States' space industry
while at the same time raising a concern that the Commission did not
provide enough guidance on how information about persistent liquids
will be assessed. The Commission found that the petitioners did not
provide a basis for reconsideration of the rule adopted or demonstrated
how the current rule is unworkable. Contrary to their assertions, there
have been license requests involving spacecraft that would utilize the
types of ionic liquids that could persist in space if released in
droplet form. Ionic liquids offer some benefits such as ease of on-
ground handling as compared to the toxic volatiles often used for
spacecraft propulsion, and so it is also possible that they may be more
frequently utilized in the future. With respect to criteria to be
applied in addressing instances in which use of ionic liquids is
disclosed, the 2020 Orbital Debris Order identified some
considerations. In addition, under a case-by-case approach, the
Commission may consider whether, if released, these debris objects
would remain in orbit for only a short time, perhaps due to deployment
and operation at low
[[Page 13280]]
altitudes such as those below inhabitable space stations, or whether
there are other natural processes that result in dispersion of the
droplets. Other potentially relevant considerations include whether
containment of the liquid can be expected to be effective, established
as appropriate by design, testing data, or flight heritage, and whether
the propulsion system is shielded from micrometeoroid and debris
strikes that might result in leakage. These considerations provide some
examples of the types of information that might support a favorable
public interest finding with respect to individual applications but are
not intended as an exhaustive list.
7. ``Case-by-Case'' Approach
23. Petitioners raised concerns about a ``case-by-case'' approach
for reviewing the information provided in response to disclosure
requirements, and requested that all information disclosure
requirements be coupled with guidance provided by the Commission
regarding the manner in which the information can be used and any
minimum operation or performance requirements that must be demonstrated
in the disclosed information to warrant the grant of a satellite system
authorization. SpaceX argued a ``case-by-case'' approach sets an
inconsistent baseline for assessing orbital debris risk, and imposes
inconsistent rules of the road. Viasat and OneWeb, in opposition,
supported the use of case-by-case analysis. Viasat noted that case-by-
case analysis is an indispensable part of the Commission's licensing
process and that it would make little sense for the Commission to
withdraw its existing information disclosure requirements pending
completion of its further work on additional orbital debris safety
standards because doing so would deprive the Commission of critical
information necessary to evaluate the orbital safety implications of
NGSO systems. Viasat argued that the Commission is obligated to
consider the information elicited by these rules in order to make a
finding that the proposed operations are in the public interest, and
that eliminating the information disclosure requirements adopted in the
2020 Orbital Debris Order would be counter-productive by removing from
the Commission's rules useful guidance for applicants about information
that is relevant in seeking a license, thereby increasing uncertainty.
OneWeb supported case-by-case review, observing that in circumstances
involving complex and quickly evolving technological debris mitigation
capabilities, such review is necessary in order to facilitate a safe
space environment, but at the same time affords operators flexibility
and avoids overly prescriptive regulations.
24. The added disclosure requirements provide factual information
that is relevant in assessing an application and supporting a public
interest determination. The Commission found that the petitioners do
not allege that the factual information elicited by the new disclosure
requirements would never reveal a substantial or disqualifying concern
related to orbital debris, and disagreed with the petitioners'
contention that incorporating such disclosure requirements in the
Commission's rules will lead to ``subjective'' or ``discretionary''
decision-making. The characteristics of satellites or satellite systems
can significantly vary across applications. These rules serve to ensure
that the Commission has sufficient information to only grant those
applications that would serve the public interest, and while the
Commission recognizes the potential benefits of identifying specific
metrics or including the same blanket requirements on all operators for
various aspects of debris mitigation plans, such as providing certainty
to applicants, the development of a specific, one-size-fits-all metric
on a particular point or including blanket requirements that do not
make sense in conjunction with specific satellite or satellite system
characteristics, may in certain cases slow innovation by being overly
prescriptive or otherwise fail to account for innovative aspects of a
particular system design.
25. Moreover, for certain metrics, the Commission found in the
Orbital Debris Reconsideration Order that it does not have a sufficient
record to support a ``one-size-fits-all'' metric on this issue. But,
the absence of a specific metric on a particular point does not
foreclose the need to gather information and evaluate mitigation plans
in light of the larger and well-recognized goals of U.S. Government
policy in this area--ensuring the future of the commercial space
industry by limiting the release of operational debris and avoiding
fragmentation events, whether caused by explosions or collisions. The
development of metrics and refinement of criteria for evaluating
orbital debris mitigation plans is an active and ongoing process. While
consideration of the development of a metric or comprehensive
assessment method continues, the Commission elects to proceed
incrementally and make fact-based decisions on individual applications
on a case-by-case basis. As noted in connection with several of the
specific disclosure requirements to which petitioners objected, the
case-by-case approach has successfully permitted the Commission to
proceed with review and authorization in individual cases. Contrary to
SpaceX's argument that the case-by-case approach threatens space
sustainability by imposing inconsistent rules of the road, experience
with these cases, along with parallel developments in standards
development, will inform future decision-making. In applying this case-
by-case approach, the Commission is committed to ensuring consistency
in application of its rules and to working with applicants to gather
additional information as necessary to ensure that applicants are not
penalized without a prior opportunity to address potential concerns.
The Commission expects the precedent that evolves from a case-by-case
approach will provide contours to guide applicants regarding the extent
to which metrics or comprehensive methods may aid in facilitating a
favorable Commission determination on pending applications. Finally, as
part of the Space Bureau's Transparency Initiative, the Commission
directs the Space Bureau to highlight any developments arising from
this case-by-case approach, providing additional guidance on orbital
debris mitigation information disclosures.
B. SpaceX Petition--Market Access and Orbital Debris Mitigation
Showings
26. In its petition, SpaceX requested that the Commission
reconsiders allowing non-U.S.-licensed space stations to satisfy the
orbital debris mitigation showing requirement by demonstrating that
debris mitigation plans for the space station(s) for which U.S. market
access is requested are subject to direct and effective regulatory
oversight by the national licensing authority. Alternatively, SpaceX
requested the Commission to explicitly delineate the information an
applicant must submit with its application in support of such a
demonstration or disclose where that information may be easily and
publicly found. In particular, SpaceX urged the Commission to require
applicants to include: (i) all materials related to orbital debris
mitigation submitted to the foreign regulator in connection with an
application for a space station authorization; and (ii) all
authorizations that include conditions related to orbital debris
mitigation.
27. In support, SpaceX argued that allowing non-U.S.-licensed
systems to rely on the orbital debris mitigation requirements of other
countries to meet
[[Page 13281]]
Commission requirements creates a ``loophole'' that could undermine the
Commission's space safety objectives by allowing operators to evade
oversight by choosing forums with less stringent rules and little input
from other affected satellite operators. In response, Kepler
Communications Inc., OneWeb, and Viasat submitted oppositions and
comments to the SpaceX petition, stating that there is no ``loophole''
in the Commission's rules and in fact, based on their own experience as
non-U.S.-licensed market access applicants, they have been subject to
the same level of regulatory scrutiny as U.S.-licensed systems. The
Commission agreed that the end result is the same whether a market
access applicant makes an orbital debris mitigation showing under 47
CFR 25.114(d)(14)(i) through (iv) or (d)(14)(v) prior to gaining U.S.
market access, the applicant will have had its orbital debris
mitigation plan subject to a rigorous review to ensure space safety.
28. While Commission rules allow market access applicants to
satisfy the requirement to describe the design and operational
strategies to minimize orbital debris risk by demonstrating that their
debris mitigation plans are subject to direct and effective regulatory
oversight by the national authority that licensed their space station
operations, such a showing requires market access applicants to provide
supporting documentation and respond to inquiries from Commission staff
in order for the staff to compare the non-U.S. regulatory regime,
including its rules and ongoing oversight, and determine whether there
is an effective regulatory regime in place. This information, when
filed with the Commission, becomes a part of the record, and other
interested parties are able to review it too. If the Commission finds
additional information is necessary to complete its review, that
information also becomes part of the record and available for review.
In either case, interested parties will have access to the same
information the Commission relies on to determine whether a grant of
market access is in the public interest, the only exception being if
the applicant is able to demonstrate an overriding public interest need
to keep some of the information confidential.
29. Having a one-size-fits-all disclosure requirement as proposed
by SpaceX can be more burdensome than necessary for the Commission to
determine whether an applicant's debris mitigation plan has been
thoroughly reviewed and whether the applicant will be subject to
effective regulatory oversight. Using a case-by-case approach provides
more flexibility and can serve the public interest better by being less
burdensome. For instance, as Commission staff become familiar with the
requirements and review process of a particular non-U.S. regulator,
they can tailor their information request based on knowledge of how
that regulator conducts an orbital debris mitigation review, and what
regulatory requirements it imposes. The staff may ask for more
information in an area that they have found the regulator does not
require the same level of detail as the Commission, or may likewise ask
for less information in another area where the Commission has already
found sufficient regulatory oversight. In either case, if another party
believes that circumstances have changed with a particular non-U.S.
regulatory oversight process or has reason to believe that an applicant
is not subject to sufficient regulatory oversight, they can raise those
concerns with the Commission and the Commission will factor that in as
part of its overall review process. Ultimately, if the Commission finds
after its review of either the applicant's mitigation plan or the non-
U.S. regulatory regime under which it is licensed, that additional
conditions are necessary to ensure space safety, the Commission can so
condition the grant of market access, similar to what it does for U.S.
licensees in similar situations. The Commission also notes that while
it does accept ``direct and effective'' regulatory oversight showings
under 47 CFR 25.114(d)(14)(v), that rule does not preclude applicants
from providing the same basic orbital debris mitigation information
provided by U.S. licensees, which are detailed in 47 CFR
25.114(d)(14)(i) through (iv). In fact, the provision of such
information can support a showing of direct and effective regulatory
oversight, particularly in instances where the information is provided
to but not routinely made publicly available by the non-U.S. regulator.
And, except for a few cases, applicants have generally found it
preferable to just provide the Commission with a description of the
design and operational strategies for orbital debris mitigation instead
of presenting all of the showings necessary to demonstrate the
effective regulatory oversight of another national authority.
Accordingly, the Commission found SpaceX has not demonstrated a need
for elimination or changes to 47 CFR 25.114(d)(14)(v).
C. Kuiper Petition--Orbital Separation of Large NGSO Systems
30. In the 2018 Orbital Debris NPRM the Commission sought comment
on whether it should adopt an upper limit for variances in orbit for
NGSO systems. After reviewing an extensive record on the issue,
including comments on the related topic of whether, and how, the
Commission should assign orbital altitude ranges for large
constellations of NGSO satellites, in 2020 the Commission said it would
not adopt a maximum orbital variance for NGSO systems, nor a required
separation between orbital locations, and will instead continue to
address these issues on a case-by-case basis. The Commission found that
there were a wide range of considerations in such cases, and while it
was concerned about the risk of collisions between the space stations
of NGSO systems operating at similar orbital altitudes, it found that
these concerns are best addressed in the first instance through inter-
operator coordination.
31. Kuiper petitioned the Commission to reconsider its decision to
not establish an orbital separation requirement, including for large
NGSO constellations, and associated limits. Kuiper stated that the
Commission should expressly require a later-filed large NGSO
constellation to maintain sufficient orbital separation from an
earlier-filed large NGSO constellation. In support, Kuiper stated that,
since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission has
received a number of applications and license modifications for large
NGSO constellations to operate in orbits that are already occupied, or
proposed to be occupied, by other large NGSO constellations. Therefore,
Kuiper argued the Commission's expectation that applicants' own desire
for space safety would lead them to voluntarily choose non-overlapping
orbits has proven false, and these new applications constitute facts
that did not exist at the time the Commission adopted its 2020 Orbital
Debris Order and therefore warrant reconsideration.
32. OneWeb, ARCLab, and Maxar filed comments in support of Kuiper's
petition. OneWeb argued that the time is ripe for the Commission to
reconsider the potential for orbital separation rules to help ensure a
safe space environment. ARCLab argued that operating large
constellations with overlapping orbits sharply increases systemic risk,
and if those orbits are not explicitly designed for compatibility it
would result in sharp increases in conjunctions and collision avoidance
maneuvers. Maxar added that since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris
Order, the increase of large constellations with overlapping orbital
variances has become an issue of broad applicability and therefore ripe
for Commission consideration.
[[Page 13282]]
33. Both Viasat and Kepler opposed Kuiper's petition, arguing that
Kuiper's proposed rule would undermine the incentive for an operator to
engage in the type of inter-system coordination anticipated by the 2020
Orbital Debris Order and in essence create a first-come, first-serve
priority system for orbital regions in LEO, which would advantage the
largest, most established satellite operators, and potentially lead to
a monopolization of certain sections of LEO. Viasat also stated that
Kuiper has not established that an orbital overlap rule is necessary to
promote space safety, and that there are alternative approaches the
Commission could consider.
34. The Commission continues to take space safety issues seriously,
and the 2020 Orbital Debris Order recognized that issues may arise with
respect to large NGSO systems, and the orbits at which they operate.
Notably, the 2020 Orbital Debris Order advises that applicants for
large systems may be asked to provide specific information about their
planned orbital variance as well as how their system operations would
accommodate other spacecraft traveling through or operating in the same
region. While Kuiper supported its petition with the ``new'' fact that
applications for large NGSO systems with competing orbits have been
filed since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris Order, the Commission
found that this circumstance alone is not sufficient justification for
it to revisit its decision to allow in the first instance parties to
work on an inter-operator coordination agreement. At the time the
Commission adopted its 2020 Orbital Debris Order it had already
considered that parties may want to use similar orbits, but it also
found that inter-operator coordination could resolve any space safety
concerns, and no party has introduced evidence that any such concerns
remain unresolved. The Commission has continued to monitor the
situation since adoption of the 2020 Orbital Debris Order and continues
to believe that the best solution for maintaining space safety is for
operators to have the flexibility to coordinate in a manner that works
best for their situation, rather than have the Commission dictate how
that coordination should proceed. In addition, the Commission reviews
closely applications for new licenses or modifications that may raise
overlapping orbital shell issues and works with the applicants and
other interested parties to ensure that either coordination has
occurred to minimize space safety issues, or changes are made to the
proposed operating parameters to address any remaining concerns. The
Commission will continue to monitor the overall orbital separation
environment, and to the extent it sees a breakdown in the coordination
process or other space safety issues, it will consider at that time
whether new general rules are needed to either improve the coordination
process or address space safety concerns. Accordingly, the Commission
declined to establish an orbital separation requirement, including for
large NGSO constellations.
IV. Ordering Clauses
35. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i),
154(j), 405, and 47 CFR 1.429(b) that the petitions for reconsideration
filed by Boeing, EchoStar, Hughes, Planet, Spire, Telesat, SpaceX, and
Kuiper in IB Docket No. 18-313, are denied.
36. It is further ordered that the Orbital Debris Reconsideration
Order shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-03506 Filed 2-21-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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