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Notice2024-02513

Recommendation 2023-01

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Published

February 8, 2024

Issuing agencies

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

Abstract

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy concerning the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) regulatory safety framework related to onsite transportation and safety deficiencies in Los Alamos National Laboratory's transportation safety document. Pursuant to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is publishing the Recommendation and associated correspondence with DOE and requesting comments from interested members of the public.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 27 (Thursday, February 8, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 27 (Thursday, February 8, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8652-8666]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-02513]

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Recommendation 2023-01

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy concerning the U.S.
Department of Energy's (DOE) regulatory safety framework related to
onsite transportation and safety deficiencies in Los Alamos National
Laboratory's transportation safety document. Pursuant to the
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is publishing the Recommendation and
associated correspondence with DOE and requesting comments from
interested members of the public.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or by March 11, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Send comments concerning this notice to: Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington,
DC 20004-2001. Comments may also be submitted by email to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#99faf6f4f4fcf7edd9fdf7ffeafbb7fef6ef"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a8cbc7c5c5cdc6dce8ccc6cedbca86cfc7de">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara Tadlock, Associate Director for
Board Operations, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901, (800) 788-4016.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Recommendation 2023-1 to the Secretary of Energy

Onsite Transportation Safety

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(b)(5)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended
Introduction. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)
has evaluated Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) safety basis for
onsite transportation, detailed in the laboratory's transportation
safety document (TSD); the safe harbors \1\ for onsite transportation
of radioactive materials identified in the U.S. Department of Energy's
(DOE) Nuclear Safety Management rule, 10 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 830; and the ability of DOE's safety oversight framework to
identify and correct safety issues with its safe harbors and the TSDs
at its defense nuclear facilities.
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\1\ Table 1 of Appendix A to Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 lists
acceptable methodologies for developing safety analyses to meet
requirements in 10 CFR 830. Such methodologies are referred to as
``safe harbors.'' Throughout this document the phrase ``onsite
transportation safe harbors'' refers to both DOE Order 460.1D,
Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, and DOE
Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A,
Packaging and Transportation Safety, as they relate to the
preparation of an onsite TSD for radioactive materials that are not
of national security interest.
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The Board identified safety weaknesses in LANL's onsite TSD,
stemming in part from weaknesses in the safe harbors that govern TSD
development, and communicated its safety concerns to the Secretary of
Energy in a January 6, 2022, letter. The National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) management and operating contractor at LANL,
Triad National Security, LLC, implemented compensatory safety measures
for onsite transportation of radioactive materials in March 2023,
following a letter of direction from the NNSA Los Alamos Field Office
(NA-LA). Triad formally incorporated the compensatory measures into
revisions of the LANL TSD and technical safety requirements (TSR),
which NA-LA approved in August 2023, with two conditions of approval
(COA) [2]. These measures and COAs represent an improvement to the
safety of onsite transportation of radioactive materials at LANL;
however, more work is necessary to ensure the LANL TSD appropriately
identifies all hazards, analyzes all pertinent accident scenarios, and
evaluates the effectiveness of all credited safety controls.
NA-LA had approved Triad's deficient TSD on the basis that it met
the applicable safe harbors for safety analysis identified in 10 CFR
830. Until DOE revises the safe harbors for onsite transportation of
radioactive materials to provide clear and effective safety
requirements, the risk remains that LANL or other defense nuclear sites
may regress to inadequate TSDs that fail to provide an effective set of
safety controls. The Board has concluded the following:
(1) The recently approved compensatory safety measures are
welcomed; however, the LANL TSD requirements and their implementation
do not ensure that onsite transportation activities at LANL are
conducted in a manner that ensures adequate protection of public health
and safety;
(2) The requirements of the safe harbors do not ensure that onsite
transportation activities are conducted in a manner that ensures
adequate protection of public health and safety; and
(3) DOE failed to address known safety deficiencies in its safe
harbors for onsite transportation of radioactive materials and
neglected to take timely action to correct the safety issues with the
LANL TSD.
Background. 10 CFR 830 specifies that onsite transportation of
radioactive materials at DOE sites may be conducted either in
accordance with Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations or under
a specific type of documented safety analysis (DSA) known as a TSD.
Table 1 in Appendix A to Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 identifies the
following safe harbor methodology for preparing DSAs/TSDs for onsite
transportation activities:
<bullet> Preparing a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in
accordance with DOE Order 460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety,
October 2, 1996, or successor document; and
<bullet> Preparing a Transportation Safety Document in accordance
with DOE Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A,
Packaging and Transportation Safety, June 5, 1997, or successor
document.
Following a safety review of the LANL TSD, the Board identified
safety issues with both the LANL TSD and the onsite transportation safe
harbors in 10 CFR 830. The Board documented these safety issues in a
letter to the Secretary of Energy dated January 6, 2022. DOE responded
on September 13, 2022, stating its agreement with, and plans to
address, the Board's safety concerns. However, DOE's response only
partially addressed the safety concerns identified by the Board.
Furthermore, DOE did not ensure that LANL took timely action to
implement compensatory measures at LANL that are needed to provide
adequate protection of workers and the public during onsite
transportation activities in the absence of an adequate TSD.
Analysis. Attachment B, Findings, Supporting Data, and Analysis,
provides additional detail and supporting analysis for this
recommendation, the conclusions of which are discussed below.
LANL Transportation Safety Document--10 CFR 830 defines a DSA
(including TSDs) as ``a documented analysis of the extent to which a
nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to workers, the
public, and the

[[Page 8653]]

environment, including a description of the conditions, safe
boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the basis for ensuring
safety'' [3]. The LANL TSD has fundamental flaws in critical safety
areas and thus does not demonstrate that members of the public and
workers are adequately protected during onsite transportation
activities.
The LANL TSD does not adequately (1) identify all potential
hazards, (2) analyze accident scenarios, and (3) demonstrate the
effectiveness of its safety control set. These safety issues are
particularly concerning given the high material-at-risk (MAR) allowed
by the TSD, the proximity of LANL's onsite transportation routes to the
public, and the nature of several credible accident scenarios. These
factors result in high calculated unmitigated dose consequences to the
public without an adequate safety control strategy. On January 31,
2023, Triad informed NA-LA that it would implement compensatory safety
measures by late March 2023 and would submit a revised TSD with updated
TSRs by June 1, 2023. Triad implemented the compensatory measures
procedurally on March 31, 2023, and submitted a revised TSD and TSRs
that incorporated those measures to NA-LA for approval on June 1, 2023.
NA-LA approved the revised TSD and TSRs on August 10, 2023, with two
COAs which require Triad to address additional NA-LA comments in the
2023 and 2024 annual update of the TSD and TSRs [2]. The compensatory
measures and COAs improve the safety of LANL onsite transportation
operations and partially address the LANL-specific safety issues that
the Board raised in January 2022. Therefore, DOE should ensure that
Triad continues to implement these compensatory measures until it
develops a TSD in full compliance with 10 CFR 830 that would resolve
the safety issues of adequate protection identified in this
recommendation.
Onsite Transportation Directives--The Board identified four primary
safety concerns with the DOE directives related to onsite
transportation. First, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not
contain all applicable requirements from 10 CFR 830; therefore, they do
not ensure that TSDs meet all 10 CFR 830 requirements. In DOE's
response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, DOE asserted that 10
CFR 830 requirements apply ``regardless of the methodology for DSA
development that is used,'' and that, consequently, 10 CFR 830
requirements do not need to flow down into the onsite transportation
safe harbors [4]. DOE's assertion is inconsistent with the role of safe
harbors, which is to provide an approved DSA methodology such that if a
contractor follows the safe harbors, then all the requirements of 10
CFR 830 will be fulfilled. This concern is illustrated by the LANL TSD:
although the LANL TSD follows the safe harbor methodology specified in
10 CFR 830, it fails to properly derive hazard controls necessary to
ensure adequate protection of workers and the public. Additionally, the
lack of requirements in the safe harbors has led sites across DOE's
defense nuclear facilities complex to seek supplementary guidance from
other documents. Specifically, several sites supplement guidance from
the onsite transportation safe harbors with methodologies from DOE
Standard 3009-94 Change Notice 3, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department
of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, for
development and analysis of unique, bounding accident scenarios,
including quantitative analysis [5]. Examples include the 2011 Hanford
TSD, the 2015 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) TSD, and
the 2017 Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) TSD. The sites' reliance
on methods from another safe harbor to adequately evaluate accident
conditions highlights the weakness of the onsite transportation safe
harbors in meeting 10 CFR 830 requirements, particularly related to the
evaluation of accident conditions.
Second, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide
specific criteria against which to deterministically evaluate the
effectiveness of the safety control set, leading to an incomplete
understanding of the risk of onsite transportation operations.\2\
Instead, they require that TSDs demonstrate an equivalent level of
safety to DOT and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations for
offsite transportation. However, the onsite transportation safe harbors
do not provide a clear definition of equivalent safety. In DOE's
response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, DOE acknowledged that
an improved methodology ``to better document analyses of equivalent
safety'' was warranted and committed to providing better guidance [4].
DOE has not provided a timeline for that new guidance in its response,
nor in any subsequent communication.
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\2\ By way of comparison, the safe harbor for DOE nonreactor
nuclear facilities, DOE Standard 3009-2014, Preparation of
Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Documented Safety Analysis, applies the
concept of an evaluation guideline (25 rem total effective dose for
a member of the offsite public), which ``the safety analysis
evaluates against,'' and ``is established for the purpose of
identifying the need for and evaluating safety controls'' [16].
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Third, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide
guidance on methods to control public access during onsite transfers
conducted under TSDs. Restricting public access is important from both
regulatory and safety perspectives, because onsite transfers may use
roads open to the public. If public access is not properly restricted,
the public could be closer to onsite transportation activities than
intended. Members of the public could initiate an accident (e.g.,
vehicle crash) and could receive a higher radiation dose by being in
the vicinity of a transport accident if a release occurred.
Additionally, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide
detailed guidance on controlling onsite traffic of site personnel.
Similar to the concern with members of the public, site personnel
traveling onsite in government or personal vehicles could initiate an
accident during onsite transfers of radioactive material. At LANL in
particular, the high operational tempo needed to accomplish its greatly
expanded pit manufacturing mission will inevitably increase onsite
traffic. Therefore, it is incumbent upon DOE to develop requirements
and guidance on the control of site traffic during onsite transfers of
radioactive material to ensure TSDs adequately address that hazard.
Finally, DOE Standard 1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear
Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, does not
contain specific guidance for federal review and approval of TSDs. As a
result, DOE oversight personnel do not have specific criteria to
evaluate whether a TSD ensures safety and complies with the onsite
transportation safe harbors, as they would have for a DOE Standard
3009-compliant DSA. In response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter,
DOE stated it would ``review DOE-STD-1104 to determine whether
improvements are warranted'' [4]. DOE's response did not provide a
timeline for that evaluation. To ensure adequate and consistent reviews
by DOE oversight personnel across the defense nuclear complex, DOE
should add review and approval criteria specific to TSDs to DOE
Standard 1104-2016.
DOE Oversight--DOE and NNSA failed to independently identify
deficiencies in the onsite transportation safe harbors and the LANL
TSD. Additionally, DOE and NNSA did not ensure that timely corrective
actions were taken when the Board identified transportation safety
concerns and have struggled to resolve safety concerns

[[Page 8654]]

when collaboration across program offices is required.
DOE issued DOE Guide 460.1-1, the 10 CFR 830 safe harbor
methodology for preparing TSDs, in 1997 and has not updated it since.
Practitioners at DOE's defense nuclear facilities have at least tacitly
recognized the deficiencies in the guide for many years. As discussed
above, several sites use DOE Standard 3009-94 to supplement the onsite
transportation safe harbors in developing their TSDs.
Additionally, NNSA did not resolve safety issues with the LANL TSD.
In 2007, an NNSA safety basis review team identified several of the
safety issues discussed in this Recommendation. Personnel from the NNSA
Packaging Certification Division, who were part of the safety basis
review team, ``concluded that the TSD as submitted did not provide an
adequate level of analysis to support the conclusions that for non DOT
compliant packages the overall transport system provided an equivalent
level of safety'' [6]. To address these issues, NA-LA directed the
contractor to provide quantitative analysis, which was included in
subsequent revisions of the TSD. However, in Revision 9, which became
effective in November 2012, the LANL management and operating
contractor completely rewrote the safety analysis, removing the
quantitative analysis. When approving the 2012 revision, and each
subsequent revision, NA-LA failed to identify the safety issues that
had previously been corrected. Additionally, NNSA's Office of Packaging
and Transportation conducted an assessment of LANL's packaging and
transportation program in July 2015. This assessment provided an
opportunity for NNSA to identify the weaknesses in the LANL TSD, but it
did not. Finally, DOE's response to the Board's January 6, 2022,
letter, stated that ``NNSA uses the Biennial Review process to review
field office performance in meeting requirements for the review and
approval of TSDs'' [4]. However, these biennial reviews did not
identify the weaknesses in NA-LA's review and approval of the LANL TSD.
The Board brought the safety concerns with the LANL TSD and the
onsite transportation safe harbors to DOE's attention in its January 6,
2022, letter; however, DOE did not take timely action to address them.
It took more than a year for LANL to implement any compensatory
measures to address the Board's safety concerns. More than ten months
passed before NA-LA transmitted a letter requesting that Triad consider
a wide-ranging list of potential compensatory measures. NA-LA
considered Triad's first response on December 9, 2022, unsatisfactory.
After additional discussions between Triad and NA-LA personnel, Triad
sent a new letter to NA-LA on January 31, 2023, in which Triad agreed
to implement a set of compensatory measures that represented an
improvement to the safety posture of onsite transportation operations.
It is noteworthy, however, that Triad's letter did not acknowledge that
the compensatory measures were needed to address any safety issues.
Further, given the safety concerns identified with the onsite
transportation safe harbor and LANL TSD, DOE would greatly benefit from
conducting a complete extent of condition review of all sites' TSDs.
While the DOE Office of Environmental Management did conduct an extent
of condition review for a subset of sites under its purview in 2021, it
was done before the Board's letter highlighted the specific safety
issues, and therefore the review's scope and approach were not informed
by the Board's conclusions. Moreover, the review was not formally
documented.
Finally, the Board is concerned with DOE's ability to address
safety issues that require collaboration across program offices. DOE's
September 13, 2022, letter that responded to the Board's January 6,
2022, letter acknowledged that DOE would need to evaluate ``how we
communicate across offices, engage with the field, and share operating
experiences across the Department.'' The Board concurs with DOE's
recognition and need for such an evaluation, and for DOE to take
corrective actions to ensure effective collaboration in developing
appropriate requirements in the revised onsite transportation safe
harbors.
In summary, DOE's historical management of the safe harbors for
onsite transportation of radioactive materials and the LANL TSD in
particular indicates deficiencies in DOE's ability, as the regulatory
authority, to recognize transportation safety issues and ensure that
timely action is taken to address them.
Recommendations. To ensure adequate protection during onsite
transportation activities at DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities,
the Board recommends that DOE carry out the following actions,
organized by topical area below:
1. LANL Transportation Safety Document
a. Revise the LANL TSD to address the safety concerns identified in
this Recommendation and to comply with a revised safe harbor
methodology per sub-Recommendation 2.a.
b. Ensure compensatory safety measures remain in place until
implementation of the LANL TSD revised per sub-Recommendation 1.a
above.
2. Onsite Transportation Directives
a. Rewrite DOE safe harbors for onsite transportation--DOE Order
460.1D, Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, and
DOE Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A,
Packaging and Transportation Safety--to:
i. Provide requirements and guidance to ensure TSDs comply with all
applicable 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements including requirements
related to accident evaluation and hazard controls.
ii. Include robust evaluation criteria to ensure TSDs demonstrate
that safety controls are effective at reducing risk.
iii. Include implementation guidance for restricting public access
to transportation routes, and controlling onsite traffic, during onsite
transportation of radioactive materials.
b. Change DOE Standard 1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear
Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, to incorporate
requirements and guidance for DOE review and approval of TSDs.
c. Conduct an extent of condition review of TSDs for DOE sites with
defense nuclear facilities to identify any near-term actions necessary
to ensure safety until the safe harbors are revised and implemented.
3. DOE Oversight
a. Perform an independent causal analysis for the safety issues
identified in this Recommendation, including the effectiveness of DOE
oversight of contractor TSDs, DOE's management of its onsite
transportation directives, and DOE's evaluation of and actions in
response to the safety issues identified in prior Board correspondence
on onsite transportation safety. Identify and implement corrective
actions to address appropriate causal analysis results that preclude
recurrence of the safety issues.

Joyce L. Connery
Chair

Attachment A--Risk Assessment for Draft Recommendation 2023-1

In making its recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and in
accordance with 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2286a.(b)(5), the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) shall consider, and
specifically assess risk (whenever sufficient data exists). This
risk assessment supports Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite
Transportation Safety. The Board's Policy Statement 5, Policy
Statement on Assessing Risk, states:

[[Page 8655]]

Risk assessments performed in accordance with the Board's
revised enabling statute will aid the Secretary of Energy in the
development of implementation plans focused on the safety
improvements that are needed to address the Board's recommendations.

This recommendation identifies safety issues with (1) the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) transportation safety document
(TSD), (2) the Department of Energy's (DOE) onsite transportation
safe harbors that contain the methodology for development of the
safety basis for onsite transportation of radioactive materials, and
(3) inadequate oversight from DOE and the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) in identifying and addressing these
deficiencies and safety issues.
Development of a safety basis is one of the primary mechanisms
by which DOE ensures adequate protection of workers and the public.
To that end, DOE Policy 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety
Policy, states that DOE is committed to ``[e]stablishing and
implementing nuclear safety requirements,'' with the ``[k]ey nuclear
safety elements to be addressed [to] include hazard identification,
assessment and control'' [7]. The issues identified in
Recommendation 2023-1 with regard to the onsite transportation safe
harbors demonstrate that DOE has not met this commitment for onsite
transportation of radioactive material.
Therefore, TSDs that are developed following this methodology
may not contain sufficient analysis to establish appropriate hazard
controls. This issue is illustrated by the LANL TSD. The LANL TSD
does not provide adequate analysis to demonstrate that significant
public consequences are not credible and does not identify and
analyze various credible hazards.
Since the current LANL TSD does not calculate the likelihood and
consequence of a vehicle accident, the Board used data from
previously approved LANL TSDs. The July 2007 through March 2012
revisions of the LANL TSD contained quantitative analysis of the
risk of LANL onsite transportation activities [8]. Those older
revisions of the TSD referenced the ``Area G Transuranic [TRU] Waste
Transportation Accident and Fire'' scenario from the Area G safety
basis dated April 2003.\3\ In this accident scenario, a vehicle
crashes or rolls over, causing a fire and spilling the waste
containers [9]. The postulated material-at-risk (MAR) in this
scenario was the maximum inventory for a waste transportation truck
at the time (about 17.7 kg plutonium 239, or Pu-239, equivalent).
The estimated unmitigated dose consequence to the public was about
190 rem total effective dose (TED).
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\3\ The current revision of the Area G safety basis does not
include a similar transportation accident scenario.
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From November 2012 through June 2023, the LANL TSD had a MAR
limit of 20 kg Pu-239 equivalent, the corresponding estimated dose
consequence to the public is about 217 rem TED. The 2003 Area G
accident scenario estimated the unmitigated likelihood of the
accident to be 10<SUP>-</SUP>\3\ instances per year (once per
thousand years). Additionally, the July 2007 through March 2012
revisions of the TSD noted that the distance to the site boundary
for some onsite transportation routes is closer than the distance to
the site boundary for Area G. As a result, as noted in those TSDs,
the unmitigated dose consequence for those transportation activities
could be substantially higher. The current LANL TSD identifies some
engineered controls (e.g., the package and enclosed cargo
compartment \4\) that may provide some confinement in an accident.
However, these safety controls are not designed to withstand the
hypothetical accident conditions described in the relevant
Department of Transportation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulations. Therefore, the reduction in risk they provide is not
known. Additionally, the current LANL TSD allows for transfers of up
to 1.9 kg Pu-239 equivalent without either a package or enclosed
cargo compartment.
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\4\ An enclosed cargo compartment is ``an enclosure with floor,
walls on all sides, and a roof in which materials are transferred''
[22].
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The Area G TRU waste transportation and fire accident scenario
is just one of many potential onsite transportation accidents at
LANL involving significant MAR quantities. From discussions with
NNSA Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA) personnel, the Board
understands that LANL averages between 30 and 40 shipments of hazard
category 2 quantities \5\ of material per year.
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\5\ This term comes from DOE Standard 1027-1992, Hazard
Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with
DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. This standard
determines which of four hazard categories--1, 2, 3, or less than
3--applies to a facility, based on the amount of nuclear material it
contains. In this case, a hazard category 2 quantity equates to
approximately 1 kg or more of plutonium-239, or equivalent.
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In the TSD and technical safety requirements submitted in June
2023 and approved in August 2023, NNSA's management and operating
contractor at LANL, Triad National Security, LLC, established a
reduced MAR limit of 8.8 kg Pu-239 equivalent for onsite transfers
at LANL [10] [11]. Using this value for the Area G TRU waste
transportation accident scenario, the estimated unmitigated dose to
the public would be about 96 rem TED.
Given the high dose consequence and likelihood of potential
accident scenarios for onsite transportation of radioactive
materials at LANL, together with the lack of analysis in the LANL
TSD to show the effectiveness of safety controls, the Board has
determined this recommendation is justified and necessary from a
risk perspective.

Attachment B--Findings, Supporting Data, and Analysis

Background. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1D, Hazardous
Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, states that DOE has
``broad authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as
amended, to regulate activities involving radioactive materials . .
. including the transportation of radioactive materials'' [12]. In
most cases, DOE uses commercial carriers that are regulated by the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and/or the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). However, in some cases, DOE ``exercises its AEA
authority to regulate certain Departmental shipments, including . .
. onsite transfers'' [12].
The order also states that onsite transfers of hazardous
materials must be conducted in accordance either with ``49 CFR [Code
of Federal Regulations] Parts 171-180 and the relevant federal
regulations governing each mode of transportation,'' or a
transportation safety document (TSD) [12]. Per DOE Order 460.1D, a
``TSD must describe the methodology and compliance process to meet
equivalent safety for any deviation from 49 CFR parts 171-180 and 49
CFR parts 350-399'' and ``[f]or onsite transfers involving nuclear
facility Hazard Category 2 or 3 quantities, the TSD must comply with
the Safety Basis Requirements of 10 CFR part 830, subpart B'' [12].
Additionally, 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, requires that each DOE
contractor prepare a documented safety analysis (DSA) for
transportation activities not covered by DOT regulations. Table 1 in
Appendix A of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides the acceptable
methodologies for preparing a DSA; these methodologies are called
``safe harbors.'' For transportation activities not involving
materials of national security interest (MNSI),\6\ Table 1
identifies DOE Order 460.1A and DOE Guide 460.1-1, Implementation
Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging and Transportation
Safety, as the safe harbors [13]. The order contains the methodology
for preparing a safety analysis report for packaging, and the guide
contains the methodology for preparing a TSD.
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\6\ DOE defines MNSI as ``Hazardous materials used in the
development, testing, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons
and other materials that have been designated as critical to the
national security of the United States'' [31].
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The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) conducted a
safety review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) TSD, and
identified safety issues with both the LANL TSD and the onsite
transportation safe harbors.\7\ The Board communicated these safety
concerns in a letter to the Secretary of Energy dated January 6,
2022, and requested that DOE provide a written report and briefing
within 120 calendar days (May 6, 2022). On May 12, 2022, DOE
responded with a letter stating that it was addressing the Board's
safety concerns, but the final report was still in process, and DOE
anticipated transmitting the report by July 6, 2022. On September
13, 2022, the Board received DOE's written report, and DOE

[[Page 8656]]

briefed the Board on its response on November 4, 2022.
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\7\ Table 1 of Appendix A of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, lists
acceptable methodologies for developing safety analyses to meet
requirements in 10 CFR 830. Such directives are referred to as
``safe harbors.'' Throughout this document the phrase ``onsite
transportation safe harbors'' refers to both DOE Order 460.1D,
Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, and DOE
Guide 460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A,
Packaging and Transportation Safety, as they relate to the
preparation of an onsite TSD for radioactive materials that are not
of national security interest.
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DOE's September 13, 2022, cover letter stated that DOE agreed
with and planned to address the Board's safety concerns. However,
the enclosed report only partially addressed the safety concerns
identified by the Board. For instance, the response asserted that it
was unnecessary to flow down requirements from 10 CFR 830 to the
onsite transportation safe harbor, as the requirements apply
regardless. However this is inconsistent with the role of safe
harbors in 10 CFR 830, which describes them as acceptable
methodologies for preparing a DSA (meaning that if a contractor
follows the safe harbors, then all the requirements of 10 CFR 830
will be fulfilled). Further, the response acknowledged that DOE's
safe harbor for development of safety bases for onsite
transportation of radioactive materials was deficient but then
incongruously contended that the LANL TSD was acceptable because it
met the deficient safe harbor.
During this time, the management and operating contractor
responsible for the LANL TSD, Triad National Security, LLC (Triad),
took no compensatory safety actions to ensure the safety of the
public and workers during onsite transfers of radioactive material.
On October 11, 2022, the National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA) sent a memorandum to Triad
requesting that it develop an impact assessment of a list of
potential compensatory measures, propose revisions to those
measures, and propose additional measures, as applicable, within 60
days. Triad responded to the NA-LA memo on December 9, 2022, stating
that there would be ``minimal impact on cost, scope, and schedule of
Laboratory operations,'' because ``the recommended compensatory
measures are already included in the TSD implementation procedures
as part of normal day-to-day operations'' [14]. Triad further stated
that it would provide the revised TSD and associated technical
safety requirements (TSR) to NA-LA by June 1, 2023 [14]. In follow-
up discussions with Board personnel, NA-LA indicated that Triad's
response was unsatisfactory.
Following further engagement with NA-LA, Triad sent a new
response to NA-LA on January 31, 2023 [15]. It discussed what
quantities of radioactive materials would constitute high material-
at-risk (MAR) transfers and provided detailed compensatory measures
for high MAR transfers. Triad implemented these compensatory
measures procedurally on March 31, 2023, and submitted to NA-LA for
approval a revised TSD and TSRs which incorporated those measures on
June 1, 2023 [1], which NA-LA approved in August 2023, with two
conditions of approval (COA) [2].

Findings

1. LANL Transportation Safety Document

Per 10 CFR 830, the purpose of a DSA (or a TSD, which is a
specific type of DSA) is to ``provide reasonable assurance that a
DOE nuclear facility can be operated safely in a manner that
adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment'' [3].
Further, DOE Standard 3009-2014 says ``although all elements of the
DSA preparation are important, three elements--hazard analysis,
accident analysis, and hazard control selection--are fundamental,
because they determine the hazard controls needed to provide
protection for workers, the public, and the environment'' [16]. The
LANL TSD has flaws in all three fundamental elements, and thus it
does not demonstrate that members of the public or workers are
adequately protected during onsite transportation activities.
Inadequate Hazard Identification--10 CFR 830, Subpart B, states
that the safety basis must ``identify and analyze the hazards
associated with the work'' [3]. The LANL TSD does not contain
sufficient analysis for a number of transportation-related hazards.
Cliffs Along Transportation Routes--The LANL TSD acknowledges
that packages used for onsite transportation may not survive a 30-
foot drop and states additional controls are identified to
compensate. Many onsite transfers at LANL occur along the Pajarito
corridor, a specific section of Pajarito Road on the LANL footprint
near facilities such as Area G, the Plutonium Facility, and the
Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF). There are steep cliffs along one
side of the road, with drops of significantly more than 30 feet in
some locations. However, the LANL TSD makes no mention of the
specific hazard of the cliffs [17]. During the Board's review of the
LANL TSD, Triad personnel identified guardrails and run-off
distances along that route and stated that falling down a cliff was
not a credible accident scenario. However, neither the guardrails
nor the run-off distances are identified, credited, or shown to be
sufficient to prevent drops down the cliffs in the LANL TSD.
Therefore, the hazard posed by the cliffs along the transfer route
is neither identified nor adequately controlled with the specific
controls within the LANL TSD.
Incompatible Materials--The LANL TSD identifies incompatible
materials as a potential hazard in Table 7-1, P&T Hazardous
Materials and Associated Design Basis Conditions. However, Table 7-
4, Design Basis Conditions and Packaging Performance Envelope for
P&T Activities, asserts that the packages meet Type B equivalent
level of safety for incompatible materials and thus no additional
safety controls are needed. The Type B requirement in 10 CFR 71.43
states there must be assurance that ``there will be no significant
chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among the packaging
components, among package contents, or between the packaging
components and the package contents'' (emphasis added). To meet this
requirement, the LANL TSD would need to provide assurance that
incompatible materials will not be present in packages, but it
currently does not.
LANL's Packaging Evaluation Program document states ``the
incompatible materials requirements are satisfied through shipper
inspection . . . [and] specified in P&T-WI-001'' [18]. However,
there is no corresponding section of P&T-WI-001 to verify that
package contents meet the requirements under 10 CFR 71.43 [19].
Furthermore, the TWF TSRs state that when a container is found that
contains oxidizing chemicals or chemical incompatibilities, it is to
be removed immediately from TWF, per Limiting Condition of Operation
3.2.3, Condition A, which would rely on onsite transportation to do
so [20], thus violating the Type B requirements.
Given that there is no inspection of package contents prior to
transfer specifically dedicated to ensuring that incompatible
materials are not present, and that the TWF TSR requires removal of
containers containing incompatible materials, it can be assumed that
transfers of incompatible materials may occur. Therefore, the LANL
TSD assertion that no additional safety controls need to be
developed to account for this hazard is not supported.
Pyrophoric Materials--The LANL TSD previously asserted that
pyrophoric materials were not applicable. In other words, the hazard
of pyrophoric materials did not need to be further analyzed and
controlled, because they would never be transported. However, in
August 2020, LANL transported pyrophoric material that was not
recognized as pyrophoric at the time of transfer. In early March
2021, after titanium metal fines caused sparking in the Plutonium
Facility, additional suspect pyrophoric containers were transported
from TWF back to the Plutonium Facility (the originator facility).
After the fact, Triad completed an analysis that concluded the
transported materials were not pyrophoric.
The titanium sparking event resulted in a positive unreviewed
safety question determination, and in July 2021, NA-LA approved an
addendum to the TSD and a revision to the TSRs. The additional
packaging control requires ``that either a 12-inch POC [pipe
overpack container] or a SAVY 4000 container inside a DOT 7A Type A
drum be used to transport potentially pyrophoric material'' \8\
[21]. Triad's analysis concluded the packaging configurations would
not be ``adversely impacted by the oxidation of limited quantities
of pyrophoric material'' [21]. These containers are also limited to
specific quantities of potentially pyrophoric material, per the
specific administrative control (SAC) [22].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ Pipe Overpack Containers (POCs) and SAVY 4000 containers are
two types of robust packages used routinely at LANL in various
applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

However, the analysis which supports the addendum to the TSD,
and the subsequent revision to the TSRs, uses a limited definition
of pyrophoric material that only addresses small pieces of special
nuclear material metal. This definition would not consider other
potentially pyrophoric payloads such as plutonium oxide dispersed
within powdered sodium. In this case, since the special nuclear
material is not metal pieces, the mixture would not be classified as
potentially pyrophoric per the addendum and revised TSRs. Therefore,
additional analysis is needed to ensure that all potentially
pyrophoric materials are analyzed in the TSD.
Inadequate Accident Analysis--10 CFR 830, Subpart B, requires
that a DSA must evaluate ``normal, abnormal, and accident

[[Page 8657]]

conditions,'' which will then support the derivation of controls
[3]. DOE Standard 1104-2016 expands upon what is necessary to
determine that accident analysis is adequate. Namely, the DSA
reviewer must be able to reach the conclusion that the ``accident
analysis methodology is clearly identified and appropriate,
including identification of initial conditions and assumptions'' and
the ``accident analysis clearly substantiates the findings of hazard
analysis for the design/evaluation basis events and demonstrates the
effectiveness of safety class SSCs [structures, systems, and
components]'' [23].
The LANL TSD does not contain any detailed accident analysis.
Instead, the TSD develops Table 7-5, Derived Controls for P&T Design
Basis Conditions. Within this table, ``only drops/impacts, crush,
puncture, and fire conditions were considered'' because these are
the Type B packaging requirements that are not met by the packages
used for transfers under this TSD [17]. These are listed in the
third column of the table in the TSD. The fourth column contains a
brief event description, and the fifth and sixth columns list the
preventive and mitigative controls, respectively, for each of these
events. An example from the table is provided below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN08FE24.034

The LANL TSD provides no further description of these accidents;
there is no discussion of event frequency, estimated unmitigated or
mitigated dose consequences, either qualitative or quantitative, nor
any discussion of initial conditions or assumptions. Moreover, the
TSD does not discuss how each of the controls listed in the fifth
and sixth columns specifically function in each of the events for
which they are credited (as discussed in the Inadequate Control Set
section below). The LANL TSD, with its brief description of events
and list of controls, does not constitute formal accident analysis
and therefore does not clearly demonstrate alignment with
requirements in 10 CFR 830.
The NNSA safety basis review team for Revision 3 of the LANL TSD
raised a similar concern. NNSA approved Revision 3 of the LANL TSD
with various conditions of approval including the condition that
``LANL shall develop additional analysis . . . that includes
quantitative estimates of the likelihood of credible scenarios
leading to the release of nuclear materials both with and without
TSD controls in place, as well as an estimate of what radiological
dose a member of the public located at the most likely site boundary
could receive'' (emphasis added) [6]. The resulting quantitative
analysis was included until Revision 9 of the LANL TSD, which made
major changes, including an entire rewrite of the safety assessment
section.
Inadequate Control Set--10 CFR 830, Subpart B, requires that
DSAs ``derive the hazard controls necessary to ensure adequate
protection of workers, the public, and the environment'' and
``demonstrate the adequacy of these controls to eliminate, limit, or
mitigate identified hazards'' [3]. The LANL TSD does not evaluate
the effectiveness of hazard controls in relation to each specific
accident scenario for which the controls are credited. Rather, the
LANL TSD describes generic safety functions for each design feature
and SAC, instead of specific safety functions in the context of each
accident scenario. Appendix A to 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, states that
safety SSCs ``require formal definition of minimum acceptable
performance in the documented safety analysis'' which ``is
accomplished by first defining a safety function'' [3]. DOE Standard
3009-2014 expands on the definition of safety functions: ``Safety
function descriptions state the objective of the SSC in a given
accident scenario'' (emphasis added) [16].
Due to the lack of specific evaluation, the LANL TSD credits
controls for accident scenarios where the safety function is unclear
or nonexistent. For example, the LANL TSD credits the straps that
hold the package to the vehicle (i.e., tie-down system) as a
preventive control in fire scenarios not initiated by package
movement, for which the tie-down system appears to provide no
preventive

[[Page 8658]]

safety function. Further, due to the generic evaluation of controls,
the LANL TSD fails to compensate for the absence of the enclosed
cargo compartment \9\ (ECC) design feature and the package design
feature in some allowed transfers. For instance, the LANL TSD
permits transfer of large packages which would not fit within an
ECC. In these cases, the LANL TSD credits a SAC that prohibits all
traffic as a replacement for the ECC safety function. However, the
SAC does not address numerous accidents where prohibition of traffic
would not replace the safety functions of an ECC (e.g., vehicle
drop-off, vehicle impact from other convoy vehicles, fire events
from vehicle malfunctions). Additionally, while the TSD limits the
quantity of MAR for transfers without an ECC to 1.9 kg plutonium
(Pu) 239 equivalent, it provides no quantitative analysis for this
lower MAR limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ An enclosed cargo compartment is ``an enclosure with floor,
walls on all sides, and a roof in which materials are transferred''
[22].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The LANL TSD also permits transfers of large objects that ``may
not fit inside any known package that meets the criteria'' in the
TSD [24]. In this situation, items such as large pieces of equipment
or gloveboxes would be sealed with tape, plastic wrap, or other
means, but this sealing method does not provide the same safety
function as a package. In some cases these items may also be
transported without an ECC. The transfer of large objects then can
involve the loss of at least one, if not two, design features,
without additional analysis, and therefore the remaining control set
for these accident scenarios may not be effective.
Significant Public Consequences--As previously discussed, the
LANL TSD does not adequately identify all potential hazards, does
not adequately analyze accident scenarios, and does not demonstrate
the effectiveness of its safety control set. These safety issues are
particularly concerning given the high MAR limits, the proximity of
transportation routes to the offsite public, and the nature of
several credible accident scenarios (e.g., vehicle fire events).
These factors result in the possibility of high unmitigated dose
consequences to the offsite public.
The July 2007 through March 2012 revisions of the LANL TSD
contained quantitative analysis of the risk of LANL onsite
transportation activities. These older revisions of the TSD
referenced the Area G transuranic (TRU) waste transportation
accident and fire scenario from the Area G safety basis dated April
2003. In this accident scenario, a vehicle crashes or rolls over,
causing a fire and spilling the waste containers. The postulated MAR
in that scenario was the maximum inventory for a truck at the time,
which was about 17.7 kg Pu-239 equivalent, and the estimated
unmitigated dose consequence to the public was about 190 rem. From
November 2012 to June 2023, the LANL TSD allowed up to 20 kg Pu-239
equivalent MAR; therefore, the corresponding estimated dose
consequence to the public would have been about 217 rem. The 2003
Area G accident scenario had an estimated likelihood of 10\-3\
instances per year (once per thousand years). Additionally, the July
2007 through March 2012 revisions of the LANL TSD noted that the
distance to the site boundary for some onsite transportation routes
is closer than the distance to the site boundary for Area G;
therefore, the July 2007 through March 2012 revisions stated the
unmitigated dose consequence for those transportation activities
could be substantially higher.
The MAR limit within the November 2012 to June 2023 versions of
the LANL TSD was based on ``an analysis of historical and potential
future operations,'' with a review of several years of data of
onsite transfers, and the ``maximum amount of material transferred
during this time frame was approximately 18 kg Pu-239 equivalent
material'' [17], thus the ``MAR limit of 20 kg Pu-239 equivalent is
bounding for historical operations, and is expected to be bounding
for future operations'' [22]. However, as stated in DOE Standard
1189-2016, Integration of Safety Into the Design Process, a step in
an inherently safe design process is to consider the ``removal or
reduction of hazards before controls need to be developed,'' for
example, through ``reducing the amount of hazardous material present
at any one time'' [25]. Rather than basing the MAR limit on
historical operations, consideration should be given to reducing MAR
to the lowest practicable amount. Other sites' TSDs contain much
lower MAR limits than LANL's. For example, LLNL and NNSS both
specify a MAR limit of 5 kg Pu-239 equivalent.
Current Compensatory Measures--Given the deficiencies in the
LANL TSD, it cannot be relied upon to ensure adequate protection of
the public or workers during onsite transportation activities.
Therefore, until the LANL TSD is revised to address the above safety
concerns and/or is revised to comply with an improved safe harbor
methodology, compensatory measures are warranted to ensure safety.
As discussed previously, on October 11, 2022, NA-LA transmitted
a memo to Triad, with an enclosure containing proposed compensatory
measures, requesting that Triad develop an impact assessment of the
proposed compensatory measures, propose revisions to those measures,
and propose additional measures, as applicable, within 60 days. The
majority of NA-LA's proposed compensatory measures were related to
improvements to existing SACs that would have minor impact on
overall safety posture. For instance, NA-LA proposed a compensatory
measure to revise the language of the road condition restrictions
SAC to include a requirement to check the weather within two hours.
While more prescriptive wording in SAC language would be an
improvement, this action is already in place per implementing
procedures, and therefore this change would have a minor impact. The
most impactful proposed compensatory measures from NA-LA were
related to MAR limits, packaging, and traffic restrictions. Triad's
second response to the NA-LA letter on January 31, 2023, outlined
the compensatory measures it planned to implement within 60 days and
incorporate in the TSD and TSRs by June 1, 2023. Triad implemented
these compensatory measures procedurally on March 31, 2023, and
submitted for NA-LA approval a revised TSD and TSRs which
incorporated those measures, on June 1, 2023 [10] [11].
NA-LA approved the revised TSD and TSRs on August 10, 2023, with
two COAs [2]. The first COA directed Triad to resolve NA-LA's
comments regarding Type A packaging and the use of functionally
equivalent versions of DOT markings. Triad completed this action and
submitted the newly revised TSD and TSRs on October 4, 2023 [26].
The second COA directed Triad to resolve additional NA-LA comments
on the TSD and TSRs by the 2024 annual update and provide NA-LA with
periodic briefings on the status. These additional NA-LA comments
covered multiple topics, including hazard identification and control
effectiveness, and addressed some of the Board's safety concerns
with the LANL TSD.
In the case of the compensatory measure of reduced MAR limits,
while any reduction in MAR would be an improvement, given the high
unmitigated dose consequences, a significant reduction in MAR would
be preferable. To this end, Triad's January 31, 2023, letter defined
high MAR TRU waste shipments as TRU waste transfers that exceed 1.9
kg Pu-239 equivalent and/or 10 g heat source plutonium. It stated
all TRU waste transfers with greater than this quantity of MAR would
be conducted using an ECC. Previously, transfers of up to 5 kg Pu-
239 equivalent could be conducted without an ECC; therefore, Triad's
compensatory measure effectively lowers the MAR limit for non-ECC
transfers from 5 to 1.9 kg Pu-239 equivalent. Further, Triad stated
that no TRU waste transfers would exceed 8.8 kg Pu-239 equivalent or
80 g heat source plutonium. Previously, the LANL TSD had a limit of
20 kg Pu-239 equivalent for all shipments of radioactive materials.
Triad's letter did not articulate compensatory measures for high MAR
transfers other than TRU waste, and rather stated Triad would engage
with NA-LA to develop transfer-specific controls if there is a need
to perform such transfers before an updated TSD is implemented.
However, the MAR limits approved in August 2023 do not distinguish
between TRU waste and other radioactive materials, apart from the
special case of heat source plutonium, and limit transfers of all
radioactive materials other than heat source plutonium to 8.8 kg Pu-
239 equivalent [10] [11].
Further, NA-LA's list of proposed compensatory measures also
specified that reductions in MAR be considered in conjunction with
packaging. Triad's January 31, 2023, letter stated that heat source
plutonium TRU waste shall be transferred in POCs, a relatively
robust form of package. While Triad also stated that other plutonium
(e.g., non-heat source) TRU waste packages would meet Type A
requirements, this assumption was already part of the TSD package
performance envelope. The TSD and TSR approved in August 2023only
require POCs for packages that contain greater than 10 g of heat
source plutonium [11] [10]. This may allow transfers of up to 80 g
of heat source plutonium in non-POCs as long as

[[Page 8659]]

each individual package within the shipment contains less than 10 g.
Finally, NA-LA's list of proposed compensatory measures included
a traffic restriction for certain (e.g., high MAR) shipments.
Triad's January 31, 2023, letter stated that public access would be
restricted on transfer routes and that all traffic would be
restricted during transfers when an ECC is not used; however, both
of these safety controls were previously in place.
Overall, the compensatory measures incorporated in the TSD and
TSRs approved in August 2023, and the resolution of NA-LA's comments
covered by the two COAs, represent an improvement in the safety
posture of onsite transportation operations. However, to demonstrate
adequate protection of the public and workers at LANL, the hazard
analysis, accident analysis, selection of controls, and development
of TSRs for onsite transportation need to be reevaluated in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 830.

2. Onsite Transportation Directives

The onsite transportation safe harbors do not ensure that TSDs
meet 10 CFR 830 requirements or that TSDs contain sufficient
analysis and hazard controls for safe operations. Additionally, DOE
Standard 1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety
Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, does not contain specific
guidance for federal review and approval of TSDs.
Noncompliance with 10 CFR 830--The onsite transportation safe
harbors lack requirements or guidance for several 10 CFR 830
requirements, most significantly those pertaining to accident
evaluation and hazard controls. The table in Attachment C shows an
analysis of missing or inadequate requirements and guidance in the
onsite transportation safe harbors.
On September 13, 2022, DOE responded to the Board's January 2022
letter. DOE asserted that 10 CFR 830 requirements apply ``regardless
of the methodology for DSA development that is used,'' and
consequently stated that 10 CFR 830 requirements do not need to flow
down into the onsite transportation safe harbors [4]. However, this
assertion is inconsistent with the purpose of safe harbors, which is
to ``provide approved methodologies for meeting the DSA requirements
of 10 CFR part 830,'' as stated in DOE Standard 1104-2016 [23]. This
means that if a contractor follows the safe harbors, then the
contractor is assured that all the requirements of 10 CFR 830 will
be fulfilled. Given that the onsite transportation safe harbors do
not clearly address several 10 CFR 830 requirements, TSDs will not
meet the fundamental 10 CFR 830 requirements by solely following the
safe harbor methodologies. This is illustrated in the LANL TSD,
discussed earlier in this report.
This section will discuss the most important 10 CFR 830
requirements that are not covered by DOE Guide 460.1-1, and then
will illustrate how other sites' TSDs have supplemented the guide
with methodology from DOE Standard 3009-94. Additionally, this
section includes discussion of several DOE directives in comparison
to the onsite transportation safe harbors. These include DOE Order
461.2, Onsite Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National
Security Interest, and DOE Order 461.1C, Packaging and
Transportation for Offsite Shipment of Materials of National
Security Interest.
Evaluation of Accident Scenarios--10 CFR 830 requires evaluation
of ``normal, abnormal, and accident conditions, including
consideration of natural and man-made external events,
identification of energy sources or processes that might contribute
to the generation or uncontrolled release of radioactive and other
hazardous materials'' [3]. Systematic evaluation of accident
conditions is a necessary component of safety bases to demonstrate
adequate protection of the public and workers, as the safety bases
are used to determine the need for safety controls. However, the
onsite transportation safe harbors do not have requirements or
detailed guidance related to the development and evaluation of
specific or detailed accident scenarios.
DOE Guide 460.1-1 mentions accidents when discussing how TSDs
should develop safety controls. It states that TSDs should include
``control requirements appropriate for the level of containment and
communication provided that take into account the possibility and
consequences of credible accidents'' [13]. However, the guide does
not elaborate on how TSDs should determine the credibility of
accidents or consider their risks.
Instead of evaluating accidents, there is vague guidance related
to the development and evaluation of ``design basis conditions''
(DBC), which are the conditions that packages should be able to
withstand for certain insults (e.g., fall, fire, penetration).\10\
While determining the conditions that packages can withstand is
important, this evaluation is not the same as evaluating accident
scenarios. The guide does not discuss identifying initial
conditions, assumptions, or specific initiators of various package
insults. Further, the guide does not advise that TSDs consider
scenarios where multiple package insults could occur (e.g., a
vehicle crash with fire that results in a package both falling down
some distance and being exposed to fire).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ For instance, the guide provides an example of hazardous
material that is required to be in a package where the DBC for a
fall is 30 feet (i.e., the package can survive a 30-foot drop). The
TSD would then evaluate whether the package can survive a 30-foot
drop; otherwise, ``additional administrative controls would need to
be imposed on the transport system to ensure an adequate level of
safety during transport'' [13]. The guide further describes how TSDs
can include site- and route-specific information in developing and
evaluating DBCs. Continuing from the previous example, an evaluation
of onsite transportation activities may determine that the greatest
fall possible on the transfer route is 10 feet. In this case, if the
TSD also imposed a control prohibiting lifting the package above 10
feet during handling, then the DBC would be a fall of 10 feet. From
there, the guide includes an expectation that either the package
will be shown to survive a 10-foot drop, or additional
administrative controls would be needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Evidence of the lack of requirements and guidance for accident
analysis in the safe harbors can be seen in TSDs across the complex.
Several sites supplement guidance from the onsite transportation
safe harbors with methodologies from DOE Standard 3009-94 for
development and analysis of unique, bounding accident scenarios,
including quantitative analysis. Examples include the 2011 Hanford
TSD, the 2015 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) TSD, and
the 2017 Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) TSD. For instance, the
Hanford TSD states that ``the accident analysis demonstrates
consistency with the guidance in DOE-STD-3009-94'' [27]. The LLNL
TSD states that DOE-STD-3009-94 was used in ``the development of the
hazard analysis, accident analysis, selection of controls, and
development of'' TSRs [28]. The NNSS TSD states that the ``analysis
process used to evaluate NNSS onsite transportation hazards is
patterned after the approach of DOE-STD-3009'' [29]. The sites'
reliance on methods from another safe harbor to adequately evaluate
accident conditions highlights the weakness of the onsite
transportation safe harbors.
A comparison of the onsite transportation safe harbors to the
DOE order for onsite transfers of MNSI further illuminates the
weaknesses in the safe harbors. For onsite transfers of MNSI, DOE
Order 461.2 states that the ``safety assessment must document all
credible onsite accident conditions'' [30]. Additionally, it states,
``[f]or higher hazard (e.g., hazard category II [sic]) transfers, it
is recommended that a more quantitative analysis be applied (i.e.,
DOE-STD-3009). For lower hazard transfers the assessment may be
considerably more qualitative'' [30]. In contrast, DOE Guide 460.1-1
does not include specific requirements and guidance for accident
evaluation, such as that in DOE Standard 3009-2014.
Comparing DOE Guide 460.1-1 to DOE Order 461.1C illustrates this
issue further. This order establishes the requirements for offsite
shipments of MNSI that do not comply with DOT and NRC regulations.
Regarding accident analysis, it states, ``the DSA must include
analysis of the bounding accidents that could occur (i.e., design
basis accidents or DBAs), per the requirements of DOE Standard 3009-
2014'' [31].
Hazard Controls--The onsite transportation safe harbors have no
guidance related to the 10 CFR 830 requirement to demonstrate the
adequacy of hazard controls ``to eliminate, limit, or mitigate
identified hazards'' [3]. While DOE Guide 460.1-1 states that
controls ``should ensure that the packaging operates within its
established performance envelope,'' it provides no guidance or
direction on how to evaluate the effectiveness of a control to do so
[13]. LLNL and NNSS supplemented their TSDs with guidance from DOE
Standard 3009-94 and demonstrated the effectiveness of controls to
reduce risk through mitigated hazard and accident analyses. In these
analyses, the sites documented the reduction in frequency or
consequence caused by applying the safety controls. Further, unlike
the onsite transportation safe harbors, both DOE Order 461.1C and
DOE Order 461.2 provide additional guidance on the 10 CFR 830
requirement to demonstrate the adequacy of controls for transport of
MNSI. DOE Order 461.1C refers to the methodology in DOE

[[Page 8660]]

Standard 3009-2014 to meet this requirement. DOE Order 461.2 is less
specific but does state that the safety assessment portion of the
TSD may select controls and ``provide analysis, factoring in the
control application'' [30].
Appendix A to 10 CFR 830, Subpart B also states that developing
functional requirements and applicable performance criteria provides
assurance that the hazard control will perform its safety function.
There is no discussion in DOE Guide 460.1-1 on functional
requirements or performance criteria for controls. However, LLNL and
NNSS, both of which used DOE Standard 3009-94 to supplement their
TSDs, documented specific functional requirements for their credited
controls.
Finally, 10 CFR 830 requires a safety basis to ``define the
process for maintaining the hazard controls current at all times and
controlling their use'' [3]. The onsite transportation safe harbors
do not contain guidance for implementing this requirement. DOE Guide
421.1-2A, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented
Safety Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, states an
``expectation associated with any of the safe harbors is that the
safety classification guidance for safety SSCs (i.e., safety class
and safety significant SSCs) and specific administrative controls
(SACs) of DOE-STD-3009 will be used in developing the DSA'' [32].
Unlike the onsite transportation safe harbors, DOE Order 461.1C
provides several requirements to meet this expectation for transport
of MNSI. Due to the proximity to the public for offsite shipments,
DOE Order 461.1C requires all such controls to be identified as
safety SSCs and requires the application of ``the requirements
associated with safety-class controls for these `safety SSCs' ''
[31]. In comparison, the safe harbors for onsite transportation have
no discussion of, or requirements related to, the applicability of
other DOE directives' requirements for TSD controls (e.g.,
applicability of the design criteria for safety SSCs from DOE Order
420.1C, Facility Safety). Additionally, DOE Order 461.1C requires
identification of SACs for administrative controls necessary for
public safety, worker safety, or defense in depth for transport of
MNSI. In comparison, the safe harbors for onsite transportation do
not mention SACs, and therefore have no discussion of, or
requirements related to, the applicability of requirements contained
in DOE Standard 1186-2016, Specific Administrative Controls.
Inadequate Evaluation Criteria--An important component of
evaluating the level of safety documented in a safety basis is
having an objective metric to assess the effectiveness of safety
controls at reducing risk. For instance, both the 1994 and 2014
revisions of DOE Standard 3009 apply the concept of an evaluation
guideline (25 rem total effective dose for a member of the offsite
public), which ``the safety analysis evaluates against'' and ``is
established for the purpose of identifying the need for and
evaluating safety class controls'' [16]. For non-reactor facilities,
NRC has criteria similar to DOE Standard 3009, namely for credited
controls to reduce the frequency of an event to highly unlikely or
its consequence to less severe than 100 rem for the worker and 25
rem for the offsite public. For DOT transportation regulations
pertinent to DOE's offsite shipments of radioactive materials, the
evaluation criteria apply to the package design itself. For
instance, for Type B packages,\11\ 10 CFR 71, Subpart E, has a
requirement to demonstrate ``no loss or dispersal of radioactive
contents,'' during normal conditions of transport, and to limit
radioactive material releases to less than specific amounts during
defined hypothetical accident conditions [33].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\11\ `` `Type A package' means a packaging that, together with
its radioactive contents limited to A<INF>1</INF> or A<INF>2</INF>
as appropriate, meets the requirements of Sec. Sec. 173.410 and
173.412 and is designed to retain the integrity of containment and
shielding required by this part under normal conditions of transport
as demonstrated by the tests set forth in Sec. 173.465 or Sec.
173.466, as appropriate.'' [39]
`` `Type B package' means a packaging designed to transport
greater than an A<INF>1</INF> or A<INF>2</INF> quantity of
radioactive material that, together with its radioactive contents,
is designed to retain the integrity of containment and shielding
required by this part when subjected to the normal conditions of
transport and hypothetical accident test conditions set forth in 10
CFR part 71.'' [39]
``A<INF>1</INF> and A<INF>2</INF> values are given in in Sec.
173.435 or are determined in accordance with Sec. 173.433.'' [39]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The onsite transportation safe harbors, in contrast, do not
provide specific quantitative criteria to evaluate the effectiveness
of the safety control set, and thus to understand the risk of onsite
transportation operations. Instead, they require that TSDs
demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to DOT and NRC regulations
for offsite transportation. Specifically, DOE Order 460.1D states
that the TSD must ``describe the methodology and compliance process
to meet equivalent safety for any deviation from 49 CFR parts 171-
180 and 49 CFR parts 350-399'' [12]. As noted above, DOT and NRC
offsite transportation regulations primarily rely on credited
packages to provide containment for radioactive materials during
pre-defined normal transport and hypothetical accident conditions.
DOE Guide 460.1-1 elaborates on this expectation of containment:
``For hazardous materials, such as Type B radioactive materials, the
transport system would be expected to prevent loss of containment
both for normal handling and for all credible onsite accidents''
[13]. However, while the guide allows for options other than the use
of credited Type B packages (i.e., it does not mandate the use of
Type B packages), it does not describe specifically how to
demonstrate an equivalent level of safety for this containment
expectation for transportation of packages that cannot survive
normal handling or credible onsite accidents (i.e., non-equivalent
packages).
In the absence of clear guidance on what constitutes equivalent
safety, several sites across the DOE defense nuclear facility
complex used quantitative accident analysis to demonstrate that
credited controls sufficiently reduced the risk from credible
accidents. Sites varied in the thresholds they used; some used 25
rem, and others used 5 rem for the dose to the public. Sites that
included a co-located worker analysis used a threshold of either 5
rem or 100 rem. Notably, one site that used the 5 rem threshold
stated that this demonstrated equivalent safety to DOT/NRC
transportation regulations. The 2017 NNSS TSD states that it
achieves equivalent safety by accomplishing several things,
including ``no release of contents under `credible accident'
scenarios,'' and if a ``release is possible, radiological dose
consequences cannot exceed 5 rem to any person in close proximity to
the accident within 30 minutes of the incident'' [29].
Additionally, the DOE order for offsite transportation of MNSI
instructs analysts to perform quantitative accident analyses, rather
than demonstrating equivalent safety. DOE Order 461.1C states that
safety bases ``must include analysis of the bounding accidents that
could occur (i.e., design basis accidents or DBAs), per the
requirements of DOE Standard 3009-2014'' [31]. The requirements of
DOE Standard 3009-2014 include using 25 rem as the evaluation
guideline for accident analysis. Similarly, the order for onsite
transportation of MNSI recommends analysts perform quantitative
accident analyses, rather than demonstrating equivalent safety. DOE
Order 461.2 states that the TSD ``must substantiate the conclusion
that a credible accident must not cause individuals to receive a
total effective dose (TED) greater than the levels referenced in
DOE-STD-1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, public
protection criteria per Appendix A, section A.2.1'' [30]. The cited
section defines 25 rem to the public as exceeding the evaluation
guideline and 5 rem to the public as challenging the evaluation
guideline.
The Board communicated the concern with the lack of a clear
definition of equivalent safety in its January 6, 2022, letter. In
response, DOE acknowledged that improved methodology ``to better
document analyses of equivalent safety'' was warranted and committed
to providing better guidance [4]. While this is one method to
resolve the concern of inadequate evaluation criteria (i.e., by
better defining equivalent safety), other options exist for
providing evaluation criteria, such as using the quantitative
methodology provided in DOE Order 461.1C, DOE Order 461.2, and DOE
Standard 3009-2014.
Methods to Restrict Public Access--The onsite transportation
safe harbors do not provide clear guidance on methods to control
public access during onsite transfers conducted under TSDs. Multiple
correspondences between LANL contractors and DOT have yielded
different interpretations of how to restrict public access. This
suggests the need for the DOE onsite transportation safe harbors to
clearly specify methods for restricting public access.
DOE Guide 460.1-1, Attachment 2, is a copy of a 1991 letter from
the DOT chief counsel to the director of the Transportation
Management Division of DOE. The crux of this letter is defining what
constitutes a ``public highway'' and when transportation of
hazardous materials is considered ``in commerce.'' This is important
because ``government agencies offering hazardous

[[Page 8661]]

materials for transportation in commerce or transporting hazardous
materials in furtherance of a commercial enterprise are subject to''
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, which includes all of
the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) [13]. In other words, if a
road is considered in commerce, it would not be permissible to
conduct onsite transfers of radioactive material in accordance with
a TSD; instead, all HMRs would need to be met.
A road on government property may still constitute a road in
commerce if public access is not controlled. As the 1991 DOT letter
states, ``[i]f a road is used by members of the general public
(including dependents of Government employees) without their having
to gain access through a controlled access point, transportation on
(across or along) that road is in commerce. On the other hand, if
access to a road is controlled at all times through the use of gates
and guards, transportation on that road is not in commerce'' [13].
The letter provides several examples and specifically states that
relying on signs alone to restrict public usage would not be enough
to consider the road not in commerce.
During the Board's review of the LANL TSD, it became apparent
that the guidance contained in the 1991 DOT letter did not provide
enough clarity for implementation. The issues raised in the 1991
letter continue to be discussed. For instance, in 2006, a member of
the LANL Packaging and Transportation group requested DOT to clarify
whether the 1991 letter was still valid ``[g]iven the vintage of
this correspondence'' [34], and the chief of standards development
in the DOT Office of Hazardous Materials Standards responded
affirmatively [35].
Additionally, LANL personnel provided the Board with a letter
that the president of Regulatory Resources (a subcontractor located
in Los Alamos) sent to DOT in 2018 to request that DOT ``confirm the
use of signage as a means to achieve public access restriction''
[36], and DOT's response [21]. This 2018 letter did not refer to the
1991 DOT letter. DOT responded that ``[s]hipments that occur on
private roads whose access is restricted to the public (e.g.,
limited to authorized personnel), whether by signage (as you
described and presented in your letter) or physical barriers, are
not subject to the requirements of the HMR'' [37]. This response
appears to contradict the 1991 letter included in DOE Guide 460.1-1.
However, LANL personnel stated that they currently use flaggers to
continuously restrict public access to roads during onsite
transfers. They further stated that if they decided to apply the
guidance in the 2018 letter, they would first declare an Unreviewed
Safety Question and obtain DOE approval prior to relying solely on
signs to restrict public access.
These communications between individual entities and DOT suggest
the need for the DOE onsite transportation safe harbors to be more
specific regarding the methods necessary to restrict public access.
Adequately restricting public access is important from both
regulatory and safety perspectives. If public access is not properly
restricted, then the public could be closer to onsite transportation
activities than analyzed. Therefore, a member of the public could
initiate an accident (e.g., vehicle crash), and could receive a
higher radiation dose by being in the vicinity of a transport
accident if a release occurred.
Additionally, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not
provide detailed guidance on controlling onsite traffic of site
personnel. Similar to the concern with members of the public, site
personnel traveling onsite in government or personal vehicles could
initiate an accident during onsite transfers of radioactive
material. At LANL in particular, the high operational tempo needed
to accomplish its greatly expanded pit manufacturing mission will
inevitably increase onsite traffic. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
DOE to develop requirements and guidance on the control of site
traffic during onsite transfers of radioactive material.
DOE Review and Approval of TSDs--DOE Standard 1104-2016, Review
and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design
Basis Documents, does not contain guidance for the review and
approval of TSDs. The standard mentions transportation only once as
an example of other safe harbors allowed by 10 CFR 830 and states
that the format of the safety evaluation report (SER) should be
based on the safe harbor methodology used. DOE Standard 1104-2016 is
divided into topical areas and these ``areas and associated criteria
established in this Standard form the foundation for reviewing and
documenting DSA and TSR approval in an SER'' [23]. The lack of
guidance related to TSDs is problematic, because field office
personnel do not have a set of specific criteria to evaluate whether
a TSD ensures safe operations and complies with the onsite
transportation safe harbors, as they would have for a DOE Standard
3009-compliant DSA.
In response to the Board's January 6, 2022, letter, DOE stated
that it would ``review DOE-STD-1104 to determine whether
improvements are warranted'' [4]. The Board concludes that adding
criteria specific to TSDs to DOE Standard 1104-2016 is necessary to
ensure adequate and consistent reviews by field office personnel
across the DOE defense nuclear complex.

3. DOE Oversight

DOE and NNSA failed to identify safety deficiencies in both the
DOE directives related to onsite transportation and the LANL TSD.
Additionally, DOE and NNSA neglected to ensure that timely
corrective actions were taken when the Board identified safety
concerns and have struggled to resolve safety concerns when
collaboration across program offices is required.
DOE Oversight of Directives--DOE issued DOE Guide 460.1-1, the
10 CFR 830 safe harbor methodology for preparing TSDs for onsite
transfers of radioactive materials, in 1997 and has not updated it
since then. DOE initially issued 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, in 2001,
four years after the guide was written. As noted in previous
sections, the guide does not contain sufficient guidance to meet
several 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements, which is probably due
to being written before 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, was established. As
discussed below, DOE did not act on indications of weaknesses with
the onsite transportation safe harbors that presented themselves
over many years, and its process for revising directives likewise
failed to identify these weaknesses.
Safety basis personnel at DOE's defense nuclear facilities have
at least tacitly recognized the safety deficiencies in DOE Guide
460.1-1 for many years, but DOE has not taken action to improve the
guide. For example, many DOE sites supplemented guidance from the
onsite transportation safe harbors with methodologies from DOE
Standard 3009-94 for development and analysis of unique, bounding
accident scenarios, including quantitative analysis. DOE Guide
421.1-2A states that DOE Standard 3009 ``is a safe harbor for any of
the specialized areas covered by the other safe harbors (with the
exception of Hazard Category 1 nuclear reactors) and can be used in
lieu of any of them'' [32]. While there is no issue with using DOE
Standard 3009 methodology when developing TSDs, DOE failed to
recognize that its widespread use to supplement the onsite
transportation safe harbors' methodology indicated safety
deficiencies in the safe harbors. Field offices responsible for
reviewing and approving these TSDs could have reached out to the
Office of Primary Interest (OPI) for DOE Guide 460.1-1, alerting
them to the safety issues with the guide.
As another example, DOE revised DOE Order 461.1C in 2016.
Previous to this revision, the methodology for developing TSDs for
offsite shipments of MNSI was similar to the current DOE Guide
460.1-1. One key change was the addition of an appendix that states
that ``DOE Standard 3009-2014 . . . is an approved methodology for
demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR part 830. DSAs developed by OST
[Office of Secure Transport] must comply with the requirements of
DOE Standard 3009-2014, except for deviations that are specifically
identified in this Appendix'' [31]. DOE failed to recognize the
corresponding weaknesses in the onsite transportation safe harbors
and take action to address them.
Additionally, DOE's process for revising directives failed to
identify the weaknesses in the onsite transportation safe harbors.
DOE's directives review process described in DOE Order 251.1,
Departmental Directives Program, assumes the OPI for each directive
will review them periodically and propose revisions, as needed, to
the Directives Review Board; however, DOE does not require these
reviews to be done with a specific periodicity, and OPIs are not
required to actively reach out to field elements to solicit
feedback. In the case of onsite transportation safety directives,
with the DOE Office of Environmental Management designated as the
OPI for DOE Guide 460.1-1, this process failed to identify and
correct the safety deficiencies in the onsite transportation safe
harbors.
NNSA Oversight of the LANL TSD--In addition to DOE's failure to
correct the safety deficiencies in the transportation directives,
NNSA has not resolved safety issues with the LANL TSD specifically.
NA-LA and NNSA headquarters packaging and transportation
organizations have had multiple

[[Page 8662]]

opportunities throughout the years to do so, and yet lasting
corrective actions were not taken.
The NNSA safety basis review team tasked with review and
approval of Revision 3 of the LANL TSD in 2007 consisted of subject
matter experts from the Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) (the
predecessor organization to NA-LA), the NNSA Service Center, and an
independent contractor [6]. Personnel from the NNSA Packaging
Certification Division, who were part of the safety basis review
team, ``concluded that the TSD as submitted did not provide an
adequate level of analysis to support the conclusions that for non
DOT compliant packages the overall transport system provided an
equivalent level of safety'' [6]. The associated SER therefore
contained several conditions of approval, which included requiring
additional analysis supporting the basis for the MAR limit in
subsequent TSDs. This additional analysis was to include
``quantitative estimates of the likelihood of credible scenarios
leading to the release of nuclear materials both with and without
TSD controls in place, as well as an estimate of what radiological
dose a member of the public located at the most likely site boundary
could receive as a result of these release scenarios with the TSD
controls in place'' [6]. Subsequent revisions of the TSD included
such quantitative analysis. However, Revision 9, which became
effective in November 2012, contained an entire rewrite of the
safety analysis which removed the quantitative analysis. When
approving this revision, and each subsequent revision, NA-LA failed
to identify the same safety issues that had previously been
corrected.
Subsequent reviews by NNSA years later failed to detect and
correct the same safety issues. NNSA's Office of Packaging and
Transportation conducted an assessment of LANL's packaging and
transportation program in 2015. While its assessment was primarily
focused on MNSI, it also reviewed the LANL TSD. During this review,
the team concluded that ``LANL has an approved 10 CFR 830 compliant
TSD and TSRs that meet 460.1C requirements'' [38].
Finally, as discussed in DOE's response to the Board's January
6, 2022, letter, on the safety deficiencies in DOE's onsite
transportation safety harbors and the LANL TSD, NNSA stated that it
``use[s] the Biennial Review process to review field office
performance in meeting requirements for the review and approval of
TSDs'' [4]. However, despite these biennial reviews, NNSA did not
identify the safety deficiencies in the LANL TSD.
In conclusion, despite multiple instances of NNSA engagement
with the LANL TSD, both at the field office level and NNSA
headquarters level, NNSA failed to resolve issues with the LANL TSD.
DOE Oversight of Identified Safety Issues--Even after the Board
expressed safety concerns with the LANL TSD and the onsite
transportation safe harbors in its January 6, 2022, letter to the
Secretary of Energy, DOE did not take timely action to address these
safety concerns.
Regarding the LANL TSD, more than a year elapsed between the
Board issuing its letter identifying safety deficiencies and Triad
issuing its letter informing NA-LA that it would institute
compensatory measures for its onsite transportation activities. NA-
LA did not begin work on developing proposed compensatory measures
through a baseline assessment of TSDs at other NNSA sites until July
2022, six months after the Board sent its letter. NA-LA then
transmitted a letter to Triad on October 12, 2022, over 10 months
after DOE received the Board's letter, which contained a wide-
ranging list of potential compensatory measures for Triad to
evaluate. Triad's first response on December 9, 2022, was
unsatisfactory. After additional discussions with NA-LA personnel,
Triad sent a new letter to NA-LA on January 31, 2023, that agreed to
implement a set of compensatory measures that represented an
improvement to the safety posture of onsite transportation
operations. Nevertheless, this letter did not acknowledge that the
compensatory measures were needed to address any safety issues.
Further, given the safety concerns identified with the onsite
transportation safe harbor, it would have been prudent for DOE to
conduct a complete extent of condition review of all sites' TSDs.
While DOE's Office of Environmental Management had previously
conducted an extent of condition review for a subset of sites under
its purview in 2021, it was not formally documented and was done
prior to receiving the Board's letter highlighting the specific
safety issues.
Finally, the Board is concerned with DOE's ability to address
safety issues that require collaboration across program offices.
DOE's September 13, 2022, letter that responded to the Board's
January 6, 2022, letter frankly acknowledged that it would need to
evaluate ``how we communicate across offices, engage with the field,
and share operating experiences across the Department.''

Attachment C--Analysis of Gaps in Onsite Transportation Safe Harbors
Related to 10 CFR 830 Requirements

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 830, subpart B DOE order 460.1D and/or DOE
Topical area requirement guide 460.1-1 reference Analysis of gaps
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard Identification........ 830.204(b)(2)--``Provide DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section The order does not
a systematic 5.3.1.d. states that the TSD contain requirements or
identification of both is expected to include ``a guidance for this
natural and man-made description of the process requirement. While the
hazards associated with and analysis [that] is used guide discusses
the facility''. to ensure that equivalent identifying
safety requirements are transportation hazards
established. This should on maps and lists
include a technically hazard analysis as one
justified basis for part of an acceptable
equivalency. For example, way to establish
this could include a hazards equivalent safety, the
analysis associated with the guide does not discuss
transfer.'' (emphasis how to systematically
added). identify hazards,
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section including natural and
5.3.2.c: ``This section man-made hazards.
should identify the physical Further, while the
location of the site and guide discusses
associated facilities on developing a hierarchy
legible maps . . . All of hazardous materials,
features of the site which it does not describe
are mentioned in any part of how to use this process
the document, such as . . . to identify hazards.
transportation hazards,
should be clearly identified
on one or more maps.''.
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section
5.4.1: ``A site seeking to
establish a graded approach
to compliance with DOE O
460.1A should develop a
hierarchy in which hazardous
material are grouped into a
series of hazard levels.''
The Guide then discusses
``low hazards'', ``higher
hazards'', and ``hazardous
materials, such as Type B
radioactive materials.''.

[[Page 8663]]

Hazard Categorization........ 830.202(b)(3)--``Categor DOE Order 460.1D 4.b.(3)(b): By requiring that TSDs
ize the facility ``For onsite transfers for transfers of Hazard
consistent with DOE-STD- involving nuclear facility Category 2 and 3
1027-92''. Hazard Category 2 or 3 quantities follow the
quantities, the TSD must Safety Basis
comply with the Safety Basis Requirements in 10 CFR
Requirements of 10 CFR 830, Part 830, Subpart B,
Subpart B.''. the order implicitly
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section requires TSDs to
5.1.2: ``Such an integrated categorize the
approach should include operations under the
hazard classification of the hazard categorization
material.''. scheme of DOE Standard
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section 1027-92. However, the
5.4.1: ``A site seeking to guide does not discuss
establish a graded approach or invoke the hazard
to compliance with DOE O categorization scheme
460.1A should develop a in DOE Standard 1027-
hierarchy in which hazardous 92. Instead, the guide
material are grouped into a allows sites to develop
series of hazard levels.'' their own hierarchy of
The guide then discusses hazard classification
``low hazards'', ``higher or levels. The guide
hazards'', and ``hazardous frames these levels in
materials, such as Type B terms of low hazards,
radioactive materials.''. higher hazards, and
hazardous materials
such as Type B
radioactive materials,
which is not the same
type of framework as
the DOE Standard 1027-
92 hazard
categorization scheme.
Hazard Controls.............. 830.204(b)(4)--``Derive DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section While the guide
the hazard controls 5.1.2 ``Such an integrated indicates that hazard
necessary to ensure approach should include controls should be
adequate protection of hazard classification of the developed as needed, it
workers, the public, material, hazard does not present or
and the environment, containment, hazard require a method to
demonstrate the communication, and control determine adequacy of
adequacy of these measures commensurate with these controls to
controls to eliminate, the hazard of the material eliminate, limit, or
limit, or mitigate being transported, such as . mitigate hazards.
identified hazards, and . . control requirements The guide does not
define the process for appropriate for the level of define a process for
maintaining the hazard containment and maintaining the hazard
controls current at all communication provided that controls or controlling
times and controlling take into account the their use.
their use''. possibility and consequences The guide states that
of credible accidents. These TSDs should establish
control requirements should control requirements
result in minimal acceptance that will result in
of risk above the risks ``minimal acceptance of
accepted in the context of risk above those
existing Hazardous Materials accepted in the context
Regulations'' (emphasis of existing Hazardous
added). Materials
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section Regulations.'' However,
5.3.1.d. states that the TSD the guide does not
is expected to include ``a include a clear and
description of the process consistent definition
and analysis [that] is used of what equivalency to
to ensure that equivalent these regulations
safety requirements are entails.
established. This should
include a technically
justifiable basis for
equivalency. For example,
this could include . . . a
discussion of mitigating
measures proposed to ensure
the equivalent safety
requirements will be
employed.''.
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section
5.4.2 ``Before non-
equivalent packaging may be
used for onsite transport, a
performance envelope should
be established for the
packaging and specific
control and communication
requirements should be
developed which ensure that
the transport system will
operate safely within the
performance envelope.''.
DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section
5.4.2.c. ``controls should
be commensurate with the
hazard represented by the
package being transported,
and should ensure that the
packaging operates within
its established performance
envelope. The hazard levels
and associated performance
requirements documented in
Chapter VII of the TSD will
greatly facilitate
development and
justification of appropriate
transport controls. Controls
may include establishment of
special communication
requirements (e.g., radio
contact with emergency
response personnel) which
are required to compensate
for packaging
inadequacies.''.

[[Page 8664]]

Evaluation of Accident 830.204(b)(3)--``Evaluat DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section The order does not
Conditions. e normal, abnormal, and 5.1.2 ``Such an integrated contain requirements or
accident conditions, approach should include guidance for this
including consideration hazard classification of the requirement.
of natural and man-made material, hazard The guide discusses
external events, containment, hazard including control
identification of communication, and control requirements that
energy sources or measures commensurate with consider the frequency
processes that might the hazard of the material and consequence of
contribute to the being transported, such as . credible accidents, but
generation or . . control requirements does not require such
uncontrolled release of appropriate for the level of evaluation of
radioactive and other containment and accidents. Further, the
hazardous materials, communication provided that guide does not describe
and consideration of take into account the what type of accidents
the need for analysis possibility and consequences must or should be
of accidents which may of credible accidents'' included.
be beyond the design (emphasis added). The guide also discusses
basis of the facility''. DOE Guide 460.1-1 Section analyzing transport
5.4.2.b. ``To establish the conditions and ensuring
performance envelope of the that packages are not
packaging, evaluation of exposed to conditions
design basis conditions they cannot survive,
(DBCs) is recommended. DBCs such as a large drop-
should be site-specific and off. While this could
possibly route-specific constitute an analysis
conditions under which the of transportation
packaging should be able to conditions, such
provide containment during analysis does not
onsite transport. DBCs to be necessarily evaluate
considered for a particular the initiators,
hazardous materials frequency, or
transport will depend on the consequences of
hazard level of the accident conditions.
material.''.
``Chapter VII of the TSD
should include guidance on
which DBCs should be
developed for each hazard
level, and should establish
minimum performance
requirements for each hazard
level. Examples of DBCs
which may be appropriate for
some hazard levels are
shock, vibration, collision,
fall, fire, penetration, and
immersion. Others may also
be appropriate.''.
``To illustrate how the
performance requirements
established in Chapter VII
of the TSD can be used to
develop an appropriate DBC,
a particular hazardous
material may be grouped into
a hazard level that requires
a packaging to be able to
survive a 3-ft drop with no
loss of containment. For
this hazardous material, a 3-
ft drop would then become
the DBC for falls, without
regard to conditions along
the transport route or
during handling which might
expose the packaging to a
fall from a higher distance.
If the packaging could not
survive a 3-ft drop,
additional administrative
controls would need to be
imposed on the transport
system to ensure an adequate
level of safety during
transport. Guidance
regarding appropriate
administrative controls
should be provided in
Chapter VII of the TSD.''.
``As an example of how
physical limitations of a
site may be incorporated
into a DBC, a particular
hazardous material may be
grouped into a hazard level
that requires a packaging to
be able to survive a 30-ft
drop. For this particular
hazardous material shipment,
an evaluation of the
transport route may show
that, for any accident which
could occur along the
transport route, the
packaging could never fall
more than 10 ft. If a
control on the packaging is
also imposed requiring that
the packaging never be
elevated more than 10 ft
during handling, the DBC
need only consider a 10-ft
fall.''
Technical Safety Requirements 830.205(a)(1)--``Develop No requirement or guidance in The order and the guide
technical safety the order or guide. Neither lack requirements and
requirements that are document mentions technical guidance regarding
derived from the safety requirements. technical safety
documented safety requirements. While DOE
analysis''. has other directives
830.205(a)(2)--``Prior related to technical
to use, obtain DOE safety requirements
approval of technical (e.g., DOE Guide 423.1-
safety requirements and 1B, Implementation
any change to technical Guide for Use in
safety requirements''. Developing Technical
Safety Requirements),
the safe harbors do not
reference those other
relevant DOE
directives.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

[1] Triad National Security, LLC, Submittal of PT-SA-002-R15, P&T
Transportation Safety Document, and PT-TSR-001-R13, Technical Safety
Requirements, NSP-23-042, 2023.
[2] Los Alamos Field Office, Approval of Submittal of PT-SA-002-R15
Packaging and Transportation Safety Document and PT-TSR-001-R13
Technical Safety Requirements, NNSA-2023-004544, August 10, 2023.
[3] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Nuclear Safety
Management.
[4] J. Hruby, Department letter responding to the Board letter of
January 6, 2022, regarding the adequacy of the LANL onsite
transportation safety document and the onsite transportation safe
harbors, September 13, 2022.
[5] Department of Energy, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, DOE
Standard 3009-94 Change Notice 3, 1994.
[6] Los Alamos Site Office, Transmittal of Safety Evaluation Report
Approving Annual Update of Transportation Safety Document (TSD) and
Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), March 22, 2007.
[7] Department of Energy, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety
Policy, DOE P 420.1, 2011.
[8] Los Alamos National Laboratory, Transportation Safety Document,
P&T-SA-002, R8.1, 2012.
[9] Los Alamos National Laboratory, TA-54 Area G Documented Safety
Analysis, ABD-WFM-001, R.0, April 2003.
[10] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging and Transportation
Transportation Safety Document, P&T-SA-002-R15, 2023.
[11] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging and Transportation
Technical Safety Requirements, PT-TSR-001-R13, 2023.
[12] Department of Energy, Hazardous

[[Page 8665]]

Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety, DOE Order 460.1D Chg
1, June 2022.
[13] Department of Energy, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O
460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, DOE G 460.1-1, June
1997.
[14] Triad National Security, LLC, P&T Transportation Safety
Document Impact Assessment, NSP-22-094, December 9, 2022.
[15] Triad National Security, LLC, P&T Transportation Safety
Document Compensatory Measures, January 31, 2023.
[16] Department of Energy, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear
Facility Documented Safety Analysis, DOE-STD-3009-2014, November
2014.
[17] Triad National Security, LLC, Transportation Safety Document
(TSD), P&T-SA-002, R12, April 2017.
[18] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging Evaluation Program,
P&T-PLAN-018, R12, May 7, 2020.
[19] Triad National Security, LLC, Transportation Safety Document
Authorized Shipper/Transfer Evaluator Instructions, P&T-WI-001, R19,
July 24, 2020.
[20] Triad National Security, LLC, Technical Safety Requirements for
Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF), TSR-TWF-002, Rev 2.4, April 2020.
[21] Los Alamos Field Office, Approval of P&T-SA-002-R12 Addendum 3-
R0, Analysis of Transport of Pyrophoric Material, and P&T-TSR-001-
R10-.1, Technical Safety Requirements, NNSA-2021-002752, July 2021.
[22] Triad National Security, LLC, Packaging and Transportation
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[23] Department of Energy, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility
Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, DOE-STD-1104-2016,
December 2016.
[24] Los Alamos National Laboratory, Packaging Evaluation Program,
P&T-PLAN-018, R12, May 2020.
[25] Department of Energy, Integration of Safety into the Design
Process, DOE-STD-1189-2016, December 2016.
[26] Triad National Security, LLC, Submittal of P&T-SA-002-R16, P&T
Transportation Safety Document and PT-TSR-001-R14, Technical Safety
Requirements, NSP-23-091, October 4, 2023.
[27] Hanford Site, Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document,
DOE/RL-2001-36, Revision 1-E, May 2011.
[28] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory Transportation Safety Document, UCRL-MA-152462-
REV-5, December 2015.
[29] National Security Technologies, LLC, Nuclear Onsite
Transportation Safety Document for the Nevada National Security
Site, OTSD-NSAF.100, Rev. 3, June 2017.
[30] Department of Energy, Onsite Packaging and Transfer of
Materials of National Security Interest, DOE O 461.2, November 2010.
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Shipment of Materials of National Security Interest, DOE O 461.1C,
December 2019.
[32] Department of Energy, Implementation Guide for Use in
Developing Documented Safety Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR
830, DOE G 421.1-2A, December 2011.
[33] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Subpart E,
Package Approval Standards.
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Standards at U.S. Department of Transportation, Los Alamos: Los
Alamos National Laboratory Packaging and Transportation, May 17,
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[35] J. A. Gale, Response Letter to Joseph Lowery, Ref. No. 06-0135,
Washington: Standards Development, Office of Hazardous Materials
Standards, U.S. Department of Transportation, July 11, 2006.
[36] W. Winters, Letter to Standards and Rulemaking Division,
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Department of Transportation, Los Alamos: Regulatory Resources Inc.,
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[39] Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 173, Shippers--
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Correspondence With the Secretary of Energy

Department of Energy Request for Extension of Time

September 15, 2023
The Honorable Joyce L. Connery Chair
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Chair Connery:

The Department of Energy (DOE) received the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) draft Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite
Transportation Safety, on August 3, 2023. The draft Recommendation
spans multiple DOE program, staff, and site offices, and DOE is
currently coordinating our review among the relevant offices.
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a)(2), the Department
requests a 60-day extension through November 2, 2023, to provide
comments. This extension will afford DOE sufficient time to assess
the findings, supporting data, and analyses of the draft
Recommendation.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ahmad M. Al-Daouk,
National Nuclear Security Administration Associate Administrator for
Environment, Safety, and Health, at (505) 845-4607.

Sincerely,
Jennifer Granholm

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Response to Extension
Request

September 19, 2023
The Honorable Jennifer Granholm Secretary of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585-1000
Dear Secretary Granholm:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has received
the Department of Energy's September 15, 2023, letter requesting an
extension until November 2, 2023, to provide comments regarding the
Board's draft Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite Transportation Safety.
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a)(2), the Board grants this
request.
Please note that the Atomic Energy Act allows the Board to issue
a final recommendation after the expiration of a 30-day period for
the Secretary to provide comments on a draft recommendation. 42
U.S.C. 2286d(a)(3). In this instance, the 30-day period expired on
September 2, 2023. The Board respectfully requests that, in the
future, if the Department wishes to seek an extension of the 30-day
period, it do so before that period elapses, so that the Board
receives and can consider extension requests in a timely manner.

Sincerely,
Joyce L. Connery Chair

Department of Energy Comments on Draft Recommendation

November 1, 2023
The Honorable Joyce L. Connery
Chair, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana NW,
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Chair Connery:

The Department of Energy (DOE) received the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB/Board) Draft Recommendation 2023-1,
Onsite Transportation Safety, dated August 3, 2023. This letter
discusses DOE's recent efforts for improving onsite transportation
safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and provides
comments on Draft Recommendation 2023-1.
As captured in DOE's September 2022 response \12\ to the Board's
January 2022 letter,\13\ the Department has already agreed to take
actions to address some of the items in Draft Recommendation 2023-1.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) previously
agreed to identify near-term improvements to the LANL Transportation
Safety Document (TSD) controls, and on

[[Page 8666]]

August 10, 2023, the Los Alamos Field Office approved an update to
the LANL TSD and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The approved
LANL TSD and TSRs elevate the compensatory measures to TSRs as
discussed in Draft Recommendation 2023-1 and directs LANL to
address, as conditions of approval, NNSA comments that are
consistent with the concerns raised by the Board in your
observations and previous letters. NNSA will ensure the Los Alamos
Field Office and LANL address the remaining conditions of approval
in the TSD and TSRs by the next annual update in August 2024.
Correcting these issues will strengthen onsite transportation safety
at Los Alamos until the regulatory framework is updated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ DOE letter and report to Joyce Connery, Board Chair,
responding to DNFSB January 6, 2022, letter regarding onsite
transportation safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities, dated
September 13, 2022.
\13\ Letter to Jennifer Granholm, Secretary of Energy, from
Joyce Connery, Board Chair, dated January 6, 2022, requesting a
report and briefing regarding onsite transportation safety at DOE
defense nuclear facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the report attached to DOE's September 2022 letter, DOE
stated that it ``plans to review the requirements of 10 CFR part
830, subpart B, and will determine whether an improved methodology
and/or guidance for performing 10 CFR part 830, subpart B-compliant
[documented safety analysis] and TSR development for onsite
transportation at DOE defense nuclear facilities is warranted.'' DOE
also agreed to ``update the discussion in DOE Standard (STD) 1104-
2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and
Safety Design Basis Documents, to clarify the expectations for DOE
to review and approve TSDs.''
The Department previously agreed to improving interfaces for how
we communicate, engage, and share expertise with the field after the
near-term and long-term actions for onsite transportation safety are
completed, and we intend to share operating experiences across the
defense nuclear facility complex.
DOE has the following two comments on Draft Sub-Recommendations
2.c and Draft Recommendation 3:
1. In Draft Sub-Recommendation 2.c, the Board recommends DOE
``[c]onduct an extent of condition review of TSDs for DOE sites with
defense nuclear facilities to identify any near-term actions
necessary to ensure safety until the safe harbors are revised and
implemented.'' As identified in the Draft Recommendation, the DOE
Office of Environmental Management conducted an extent of condition
assessment in 2021. Therefore, DOE suggests the Board change Sub-
Recommendation 2.c to limit the extent of condition review to NNSA
sites. NNSA would commit to complete these reviews in a timely
manner.
2. DOE believes that Departmental resources for ensuring safety
of onsite transportation activities are best used to support the
actions encompassed in Draft Recommendations 1 and 2. Sub-
Recommendation 3a appears to recommend analysis and review that will
be an essential part of the approach to developing improved safe
harbor(s) required as part of Recommendation 2. Sub-Recommendation
3b appears to require a second parallel process that would replicate
corrective action activities that will be required for
Recommendation 1. DOE suggests removing Draft Recommendation 3, or
at least Sub- Recommendation 3b.
Thank you for providing Draft Recommendation 2023-1 for our
review. We appreciate the Board's insights and advice on this
important topic. DOE remains committed to sharing information with
the Board and offers to brief the Board or DNFSB staff on the status
of these issues as we progress. With the consideration of the
comments above, DOE believes that these actions adequately address
the Board's concerns. If you have any questions, please contact Mr.
Ahmad M. Al-Daouk, NNSA Associate Administrator for Environment,
Safety, and Health, at (505) 845-4607.

Sincerely,
Jennifer Granholm

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b)(2).

Dated: February 1, 2024.
Joyce Connery,
Chair.
[FR Doc. 2024-02513 Filed 2-7-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-P

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