Rule2024-00428
Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline; Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications; Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018
Primary source
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Published
January 16, 2024
Effective
February 15, 2024
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) requires covered 988 service providers (a new category of service provider) and cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and interconnected voice over internet protocol (VoIP) providers (originating service providers) to report outages that potentially affect the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline in the Commission's Network Outage Reporting System (NORS). The rules also require these entities to directly notify Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the 988 Lifeline administrator about outages that potentially affect a 988 special facility, and exercise special diligence to maintain accurate, up-to-date contact information for 988 special facilities, just as the Commission's rules require for 911 special facilities. The rules also allow SAMHSA and the VA to have direct read-only access to NORS consistent with the Commission's existing NORS outage information sharing procedures. These rules are adopted with the goal of ensuring that the Commission and those parties that provide life-saving crisis intervention services to people calling the 988 Lifeline receive timely and actionable information about 988 service outages that potentially affect those services' ability to meet the immediate health needs of people in suicidal crisis and mental health distress.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 10 (Tuesday, January 16, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 16, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2503-2514]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-00428]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 4
[PS Docket Nos. 23-5, 15-80; WC Docket No. 18-336; FCC 23-57; FR ID
195997]
Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide &
Crisis Lifeline; Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications;
Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) requires covered 988 service providers (a new category of
service provider) and cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and
interconnected voice over internet protocol (VoIP) providers
(originating service providers) to report outages that potentially
affect the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline in the Commission's Network
Outage Reporting System (NORS). The rules also require these entities
to directly notify Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and
the 988 Lifeline administrator about outages that potentially affect a
988 special facility, and exercise special diligence to maintain
accurate, up-to-date contact information for 988 special facilities,
just as the Commission's rules require for 911 special facilities. The
rules also allow SAMHSA and the VA to have direct read-only access to
NORS consistent with the Commission's existing NORS outage information
sharing procedures. These rules are adopted with the goal of ensuring
that the Commission and those parties that provide life-saving crisis
intervention services to people calling the 988 Lifeline receive timely
and actionable information about 988 service outages that potentially
affect those services' ability to meet the immediate health needs of
people in suicidal crisis and mental health distress.
DATES: Effective February 15, 2024, except for the amendments to 47 CFR
4.9 (amendatory instruction 4), which are delayed indefinitely. The
Commission will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing
the effective dates of these amendments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Shabbir Hamid, Cybersecurity and
Communications Reliability Division, Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau, (202) 418-2328, or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#75261d1417171c075b3d14181c11351316165b121a03"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="70231811121219025e38111d1914301613135e171f06">[email protected]</span></a>.
For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements contained in this document, contact
Nicole Ongele, Office of Managing Director, Performance and Program
Management, 202-418-2991, or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#560604171630353578313920"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0f5f5d4e4f696c6c21686079">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order, PS Docket No. 23-5; PS Docket No. 15-80; WC Docket No. 18-
336; FCC 23-57, adopted July 20, 2023, and released July 21, 2023. The
full text of this document is available by downloading the text from
the Commission's website at: <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-57A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-57A1.pdf</a>. When the FCC Headquarters reopens to the public, the
full text of this document will also be available for public inspection
and copying during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center,
45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request this document in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (e.g., Braille, large
print, electronica files, audio format, etc.) or to request reasonable
accommodations (e.g., accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#feb8bdbdcbcecabe989d9dd0999188"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3d7b7e7e080d097d5b5e5e135a524b">[email protected]</span></a> or call the
FCC's Consumer and Government Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice),
(202) 418-0432 (TTY).
Congressional Review Act
The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget,
concurs, that this rule is non-major under the Congressional Review
Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Order to
Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
801(a)(1)(A).
I. Synopsis
1. In the Report and Order, the Commission requires cable,
satellite, wireless, wireline, interconnected VoIP providers
(originating service providers), and a new category of ``covered 988
service providers'' to report outages that potentially affect the 988
Lifeline to the Commission's Network Outage Reporting System (NORS),
similar to the Commission's existing rules that require the reporting
of outages that potentially affect 911. The Report and Order defines
``outages that potentially affect a 988 special facility'' as events
that result in the loss of the ability of the 988 Lifeline to receive,
process, or forward calls, potentially affecting at least 900,000 user-
minutes and lasting at least 30 minutes duration.
2. The Report and Order also requires that these providers provide
notice to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA), and the 988
Lifeline administrator when an outage that potentially affects a 988
special facility occurs. For outages lasting longer than 2 hours, the
providers would follow-up with subsequent notifications of material
information as soon as possible after discovery of the new material
information, and continue providing additional material information
until the outage is completely repaired and service is fully restored.
These service providers would also be required to maintain up to date
contact information for those individuals identified by SAMHSA, the VA,
and the 988 Lifeline administrator to receive outage notifications.
A. Reporting 988 Outages in NORS
3. In the 988 Outage notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),\1\ the
Commission proposed to require entities that provide the 988 Lifeline
with capabilities such as the ability to receive, process, or forward
calls to report outages that potentially affect the 988 special
facilities to the Commission's NORS. The Report and Order adopts this
proposal, which is overwhelmingly supported by commenters. The
Commission believes this outage reporting requirement will both improve
the resiliency of the 988 Lifeline system, and through the Commission's
NORS information sharing rules, ensure that SAMHSA, the VA, and the
Lifeline administrator have timely outage information so they can
provide the public with alternative ways to access the Lifeline. The
Commission agrees with the Boulder Regional Emergency Telephone Service
Authority that requiring the reporting of 988 outages will enable the
tracking of outage trends, the identification of best practices to help
preemptively address the common causes of outages, and the ability to
anticipate and plan for future outages. The Commission also agrees with
Mental Health America that in helping promote timely access to the 988
Lifeline, these requirements will promote equity for at-risk
populations.
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\1\ Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide &
Crisis Lifeline; Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications;
Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of
2018, 88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023).
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4. The Commission observes that a person in suicidal crisis or
emotional distress who cannot successfully reach
[[Page 2504]]
a crisis center due to an outage continues to be at risk, regardless of
whether the outage occurs before or after a call reaches the 988
Lifeline. This includes outages that prevent calls from being routed to
the intended local crisis center or the Veterans Crisis Line. The
Commission agrees with commenters that it is appropriate to require
covered 988 service providers to report outages in NORS because the
services they offer, which ensure that calls are routed to the correct
destination after they reach the 988 Lifeline, are essential to the
Lifeline's availability. Vibrant, the 988 Lifeline administrator, has
indicated that it can use outage information to quickly update routing
tables used by covered 988 service providers in order to avoid routing
calls to crisis centers that are experiencing an outage. Because this
outage information would be used to increase the availability and
resiliency of 988 services, the Commission therefore disagrees with
CX360 that it is not necessary for the Commission to adopt rules to
provide the Commission and the parties responsible for operation of the
988 Lifeline with timely and actionable information about outages that
occur after those communications reach the Lifeline. While CX360 argues
that ``SAMHSA and the 988 Lifeline Administrator already are capable of
operating the 988 Lifeline effectively'' without such reporting, the
Commission notes that SAMHSA and Vibrant both support the reporting
requirement. The Commission also rejects CX360's argument that
reporting requirements are not necessary because SAMHSA and the VA
already have visibility into outages that occur after calls reach the
988 Lifeline. Because CX360 offers no supporting details as to what
information SAMHSA and the VA are receiving and whether its substance
and timing is comparable to the requirements adopted in the Report and
Order, the Commission is not persuaded that this visibility, if it
exists, undercuts the justification for the rules adopted in the Report
and Order.
5. The Report and Order defines ``covered 988 service providers''
as those providers that provide the 988 Lifeline with capabilities such
as the ability to receive, process, or forward calls. See Ensuring the
Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide &Crisis Lifeline;
Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions
to Communications; Implementation of the National Suicide Hotline
Improvement Act of 2018, PS Docket Nos. 23-5 and 15-80, WC Docket No.
18-336, at 9, paragraph 15, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), FCC
23-7 (Jan. 27, 2023), 88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023) (988 Outage NPRM)
(proposing to define ``covered 988 service providers'' as those
providers that provide the 988 Lifeline with capabilities such as the
ability to receive, process, or forward calls). The Commission responds
to commenters that question the scope of the new rules by clarifying
that, consistent with longstanding practice in the 911 context, the new
paragraph (f) of Sec. 4.5 does require outage reporting from those
entities that provide a communications network or service that
facilitates the receipt, processing, or forwarding of the call,
including from the 988 Lifeline to the local 988 crisis center. See New
Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to
Communications, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16873-76,
paragraphs 76 through 81 (2004), 69 FR 70316 (Dec. 3, 2004). The
Commission finds that the scope of this definition is appropriately
limited in that it covers only those providers that are essential to
the capabilities of the 988 Lifeline. The Commission agrees with SAMHSA
that ``covered 988 service providers'' should not include 988 crisis
centers themselves nor the Veterans Crisis Line. Crisis centers do not
receive, process, or forward calls and lack the expertise and access to
information that would be necessary to make such reports. In addition,
a requirement for crisis centers to make such reports would place
significant additional burdens on them during outages, which would run
contrary to the goals of this proceeding. The Commission also finds
that covered 988 service providers should not include originating
service providers that originate 988 calls and deliver calls to the 988
Lifeline but otherwise do not provide services for the Lifeline.
Commenters point out that originating service providers do not
generally provide the 988 Lifeline with capabilities such as receiving,
processing, or forwarding calls, while the service providers that do
offer these capabilities will likely do so through direct contractual
arrangements. The Commission agrees with USTelecom that ``defining
`covered service provider' in this way is consistent with the
Commission's definition in the 911 context, and keeping definitions of
key terms consistent across these public safety contexts will prevent
confusion and facilitate regulatory certainty.'' Finally, the
Commission agrees with Voice on the Net Coalition that covered 988
service providers should not include providers of capabilities that are
provided directly to local crisis centers, as those are not services
that are provided directly to the 988 Lifeline.
6. Although the Commission is excluding them from the definition of
covered 988 service providers, the Commission also finds that
originating service providers are critical in providing 988 service and
thus require cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and interconnected
VoIP providers to report in NORS outages that potentially affect the
988 special facilities. The Commission agrees with Mental Health
America that these originating service providers, like covered 988
service providers, ``have a role to play in ensuring that people get
their responses when they need crisis counseling,'' and agree with
Vibrant that ``having the same requirements for covered service
providers and OSPs [originating service providers] ensures the delivery
of timely, actionable information while also reducing the burden of
reporting by streamlining requirements.'' The Commission also agrees
with the Washington State Department of Health and Health Care
Authority that reporting requirements ``should not be different for
originating service providers that deliver calls to the 988 Lifeline in
the first instance versus the covered 988 service provider that handles
the call thereafter.'' As the Commission states in the Report and
Order, a person in suicidal crisis or emotional distress who cannot
successfully reach a crisis center due to an outage continues to be at
risk, regardless of whether the outage occurs before or after the call
reaches the 988 Lifeline. For that reason, the reporting of outages
that occur in originating service providers' networks are essential to
improving the resiliency of the 988 Lifeline and ensure that SAMHSA,
the VA, and the Lifeline administrator have timely outage information
so they can provide the public with alternative ways to access the
Lifeline. The Commission also finds find, consistent with the views of
the National Alliance on Mental Illness, that ``having more sources of
data regarding outages will enhance the ability of the FCC and the 988
administrator to identify what is needed to create a more reliable
network.''
7. The Commission disagrees with those commenters that argue that
it is premature for the Commission to consider the adoption of 988
outage reporting requirements. The record reflects the serious impact
of the December 2022 covered 988 service provider outage, and nothing
in that record indicates that such an outage could not happen again, or
that
[[Page 2505]]
originating service provider outages do not affect the delivery of 988
calls. The Commission also disagrees with Southern Linc, which argues
that originating service providers should not be required to report 988
outages because they do not have visibility into the delivery of 988
communications after those communications leave their networks.
Originating service providers nonetheless have visibility into whether
988 calls are disrupted due to outages in their own network or the
networks of third parties with which they contract for service before
being delivered to Lifeline. See Amendments to Part 4 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, Improving
911 Reliability, New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket Nos. 15-80, 13-75, 04-35,
Second Report and Order, FCC 22-88 at 7, paragraph 20 (Nov. 18, 2022),
88 FR 9756 (March 17, 2023) (explaining that reliance upon a third-
party service provider to manage, route, or otherwise contribute to 911
call processing does not relieve a service provider of its
obligations--even if the discovery is first made by the third party).
The Commission therefore believes that originating service providers
should be required to report those outages for the reasons explained
above.
8. The record informs the Commission that originating service
providers currently lack the capability to distinguish outages that
prevent the completion of a 988 call from outages on their network that
prevent the completion of other calls. For the purposes of the rules
the Report and Order adopts, this is immaterial because outages that
prevent the completion of all calls are necessarily outages that
potentially affect 988 special facilities. The Commission finds that
reports about service-wide outages, like reports that are specific to
988 Lifeline outages, provide insight into 988's reliability and can
provide information to SAMHSA, the VA, and the Lifeline administrator
that would allow them to effectively respond to outages (e.g., notify
the public of alternate ways to contact the 988 Lifeline). The
Commission also believes that this approach acknowledges the current
capabilities of existing networks, gives service providers flexibility
as to how they can satisfy the requirements, and potentially reduces
compliance costs by leveraging providers' existing technical
capabilities and systems. The Commission notes that originating service
providers are already required to report voice service outages in NORS,
regardless of a call's destination. As a consequence, The Commission
finds that providers complying with this existing outage reporting
requirement will only need to take nominal action to report voice
telephony outages that potentially affect the 988 Lifeline to the
Commission. As recommended by the Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS) and NCTA--The Internet & Television
Association (NCTA), the Commission will add a checkbox to NORS so that
reporting providers can clearly indicate whether a reported outage
potentially affects a 988 special facility. The Commission believes
this field will improve the ability of the Commission and the agencies
with which it shares NORS data to quickly recognize and more
effectively analyze the effects of reported outages.
9. The Report and Order defines ``outages that potentially affect a
988 special facility'' as events that result in the loss of the ability
of the 988 Lifeline to receive, process, or forward calls, potentially
affecting at least 900,000 user-minutes and lasting at least 30 minutes
duration. The Report and Order notes that ``loss of the ability of the
988 Lifeline to receive . . . calls'' includes outages in originating
service providers' networks that prevent successful transmission of
calls to the Lifeline. The majority of commenters support using the
same outage reporting thresholds for 988 as those previously adopted
for 911 outages. The Commission agrees with USTelecom that
``[s]tandardizing the threshold across [988 and 911] will facilitate
efficient, timely compliance, and is consistent with the Notice's
objective of imposing `only minor changes to existing procedures' by
`closely align[ing]' them with rules for 911-related outages.'' The
Commission acknowledges the concerns of the Veterans Crisis Line, which
argues that outages shorter than 30 minutes in duration should be
reported because, statistically, as many as three deaths by suicide may
occur within 30 minutes. However, the Commission believes that the
benefits of awareness and opportunities for action that arise from the
reporting of outages must be balanced against the burden of reporting
those outages. Based on the record before us, the Commission is unable
to determine whether reducing the minimum or user-minute durations of
reportable outages would improve upon that balance. At this time, it is
unclear to what extent reduced thresholds would increase the number of
988 outage reports received, the extent to which additional reporting
would contribute to public safety and the reliability of the 988
Lifeline, and whether those benefits would outweigh the burdens
associated with increased reporting. For these reasons, the Commission
believes it is sensible to adopt 988 outage reporting requirements that
are consistent with existing 911 outage reporting requirements and
providers' existing reporting procedures. As noted by Association of
Public-Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. (APCO), the
Commission has recently directed the Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau (Bureau) to gather information on the volume of 911
outages that may go unreported under the Commission's existing outage
notification thresholds and have sought additional comment on possible
alternative outage reporting thresholds. The Commission directs the
Bureau to add 988 Lifeline outages to its examination.
10. The Report and Order clarifies, as requested by SAMHSA, that
outages that potentially affect the 988 Lifeline include partial
service disruptions, as well as outages with a duration of more than 30
minutes. The Commission notes that Sec. 4.5(a) of its rules defines an
outage as ``a significant degradation in the ability of an end user to
establish and maintain a channel of communications as a result of
failure or degradation in the performance of a communications
provider's network.'' For example, any circumstances in which the
ability of the 988 Lifeline to receive, process, or forward calls is
significantly degraded for at least 30 minutes and potentially affects
at least 900,000 user-minutes must be reported in NORS. This includes
circumstances in which the degradation lasts longer than 30 minutes and
circumstances in which 988 calls are received by a call-taker despite
the degradation. The Commission disagrees with USTelecom's view that
partial outages and service disruptions should not be subject to 988
outage reporting and notification requirements, which it argues would
complicate the outage reporting process and result in over-
notification. Because the Commission's existing outage reporting and
notification rules already define ``outages'' to include partial
service disruptions, exempting partial service disruptions from 988
reporting and notification requirements would make our rules more
complicated, not less complicated. The Commission also finds little
evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that the reporting of
partial outages would result in too many notifications, particularly
since SAMHSA and Vibrant, which are
[[Page 2506]]
two of the three of the entities who would receive notifications under
the rules adopted in the Report and Order, are specifically requesting
notifications about partial outages.
11. The Report and Order requires 988 outage reports be filed with
the Commission in NORS, consistent with the Commission's current
requirements for outage report filing processes and timing. No
commenter objected to the use of NORS for this purpose. The Commission
agrees with ATIS that ``industry is already familiar with NORS and
believes that the use of NORS will reduce implementation costs
associated with 988 outage reporting and would be significantly less
costly and burdensome than the implementation of a new or different
reporting system.'' The Commission further agree with USTelecom that
reporting in NORS ``will streamline the reporting process and allow
providers to devote maximum attention to addressing the outage itself
and getting service back up and running, rather than diverting time and
resources to more complex or cumbersome reporting requirements.''
12. The Commission declines to allow alternatives to NORS
reporting, such as reporting by email, as requested by CX360. The
Commission does not agree that alternatives would reduce administrative
burdens on providers. NORS is a well-established system that
facilitates the filing of outage reports in a streamlined and uniform
manner with all information required by our rules. NORS supports the
filing of outage data through Application Program Interfaces (API),
which can facilitate the automated filing of outage reports. Submission
of outage reports via email would create opportunities for
inconsistently styled filings with incomplete or confusing information,
which would lead to Commission staff taking up providers' time with
numerous calls and questions about their filings. The submission of
reports by email would also greatly diminish the Commission's ability
to record historic outage data, analyze outage trends, and share outage
information with Federal, State, Tribal, and territorial agencies. For
these reasons, both efficiency and effectiveness weigh in favor of
requiring all outage reports to be filed in NORS.
13. The Report and Order allows direct read-only access to NORS
data by SAMHSA and the VA, consistent with our existing NORS outage
information sharing procedures. In the 988 Outage NPRM, the Commission
stated its belief that improving situational awareness of significant
network outage issues affecting 988 Lifeline services would not only
provide the Commission with critical insight into the availability and
reliability of a vital public health service, but would also provide
that insight to the other Federal, State, Tribal, and territorial
agencies with whom NORS data is shared. The Commission agrees with
SAMHSA that having access to outage reports and related analysis on
network reliability will better enable these stakeholders to prepare
and respond to network disruptions and better ensure the 988 Lifeline's
availability. The Commission also agrees with the Washington State
Department of Health and Health Care Authority that these 988
stakeholders would benefit from having access to outage reports that
indicate whether 988 calls affected by an outage are being rerouted to
other crisis centers. The Commission further agrees with the Boulder
Regional Emergency Telephone Service Authority (BRETSA) that improving
the availability of information about 988 network reliability would
empower 988 stakeholders to take additional steps to make the 988
Lifeline even more reliable. For these reasons, the Report and Order
clarifies that the Commission considers the lifesaving services offered
by the 988 Lifeline to be emergency management and first responder
support functions. The Report and Order notes that the national suicide
prevention mental health crisis hotline system operates through the
National Suicide Prevention Lifeline maintained by the Assistant
Secretary for Mental Health and Substance Use, section 520E-3 of the
Public Health Service Act, National Suicide Prevention Lifeline
Program, 42 U.S.C. 290bb-36c, and through the Veterans Crisis Line
maintained by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under the Comprehensive
Program for Suicide Prevention Among Veterans and Members of the
Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, 38 U.S.C. 1720F(h). See also
National Suicide Hotline Designation Act of 2020 (Congress deemed
``life-saving resources'' such as crisis lines ``essential'' and
recognized the need for a 3-digit phone number for such services to be
readily available in emergency situations.). See NORS/Disaster
Information Reporting System (DIRS) Information Sharing Report and
Order (R&O), 36 FCC Rcd 6136 at 6146-47, paragraphs 32 through 39
(2021), 86 FR 22796 (April 29, 2021) (describing the ``need to know''
requirement for eligibility). Accordingly, in order for SAMHSA and the
VA to mitigate the impacts service outages may have on access to the
988 Lifeline and VA Crisis Line, and ensure these services remain
available to support the safety of the general public seeking crisis
support and to prevent suicide among veterans, the Commission finds
that both SAMHSA and the VA have a ``need to know'' and are eligible to
apply for direct access to the Commission's outage reports. While the
988 Lifeline administrator is not itself eligible for direct access to
these reports because it is not a government agency, the Commission
observes that the Commission's outage information sharing rules would
allow SAMHSA and the VA to share information with them about specific
outages, subject to certain confidentiality requirements and other
safeguards.
B. Providing 988 Special Facilities With Notice of Outages
14. The Report and Order requires covered 988 service providers to
directly notify 988 special facilities about outages that potentially
affect those facilities. Commenters generally support the adoption of
such a requirement. The Commission agrees with USTelecom that this
requirement ``strike[s] the right balance of getting relevant,
actionable information to the proposed 988 special facilities'' that
will allow them to take steps to maintain the public's access to crisis
intervention services ``without overloading them.'' The Commission
agrees with BRETSA that 988 outage notifications can help provide
information that will allow 988 special facilities to route calls to
alternative crisis centers and to help those centers make necessary
staffing adjustments. As Vibrant highlights, it can use information
about outages in its capacity as the 988 Lifeline administrator to
quickly update routing tables to avoid routing calls to crisis centers
that are experiencing an outage. Notifications would also allow 988
callers to receive assistance faster, as they would help ensure that
those individuals timely connect to a crisis counselor by reducing the
amount of time they would have to wait for assistance as a result of
having calls fail to be received by a crisis center. The 988 Lifeline
administrator is also able to ``effectively and quickly inform all
centers in the network of an outage that may impact service and lead to
an increase in volume for centers in the areas that are not impacted by
the outage. This insight allows time for those unaffected centers to
quickly scale to the needed capacity in order to handle the anticipated
increased volume that needs to be re-routed.'' The Commission also
continues to believe that timely notice of a 988 Lifeline outage will
assist SAMHSA, the VA,
[[Page 2507]]
and the 988 Lifeline administrator to quickly inform the public of
alternative ways of contacting the Lifeline while one type of
communication is unavailable, such as texting or using the online chat
function if calls are not getting through. The Commission disagrees
with CX360, who implies that 988 outage notifications should be handled
through contracts between the 988 Lifeline administrator and its
service providers rather than by rule. The Commission finds that it is
more efficient and better serves the public interest to establish a
single, uniform rule for 988 outage notifications that will apply to
all service providers with which the Lifeline administrator may
contract in the future rather than make the occurrence, frequency, and
content of those notifications a repeated subject of negotiation. The
Commission further believes that it will not serve the public interest
to make 988 outage notifications dependent on the 988 Lifeline
administrator's renegotiation of contracts that are in place today,
which would have an uncertain result and likely require considerable
time to complete. The notification requirements adopted in the Report
and Order are similar to the notification requirements the Commission
has adopted for covered 911 service providers, which the Commission has
found to be effective.
15. The Commission finds that reliance upon a third-party service
provider to manage, route, or otherwise contribute to 988 call
processing does not relieve providers of the obligation to provide
outage notification to 988 special facilities. The Commission agrees
with National Emergency Number Association (NENA) that ``the fact that
a third party service may specialize in supporting outage
notifications, and may have a business relationship with a provider,
should not change any reporting requirements for the provider.'' The
Commission disagrees with CX360's view that covered 988 service
providers should only be responsible for reporting outages on
facilities over which they have direct control. In this regard, ``[t]he
Commission has long held that licensees and other regulatees are
responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and
independent contractors,'' and has recognized that ``under long
established principles of common law, statutory duties are
nondelegable.'' The Commission notes that this approach mirrors the
requirements it has adopted for outages that potentially affect 911
special facilities, which should promote consistency in how
notifications are made by service providers.
16. The Report and Order designates SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988
Lifeline administrator as the 988 special facilities that must receive
notifications of 988 outages. Commenters agree that it is appropriate
for these three entities to receive outage notifications. The
Commission agrees with USTelecom that this requirement will ``assist
these entities, which oversee and administer the 988 Lifeline, in
quickly informing the public of alternative ways to contact the 988
Lifeline as needed.'' The Commission also notes, as highlighted by
SAMHSA, that such an approach to outage notification will allow the 988
Lifeline administrator to identify and inform the appropriate crisis
centers about outages, as it will have the most updated routing tables
and patterns on any given day.
17. At this time, the Commission finds that 988 special facilities
that are required to receive 988 outage notifications should not
include the local crisis centers to which some 988 calls are routed.
The record establishes that the 988 Lifeline's current approach of
routing calls based on the area code associated with the user's device
makes effective notification of this type extremely challenging. As
commenters explain, many users' mobile devices have an area code that
is different from the area code in which they are located, which would
mean that outages limited to a specific geographic region could
nonetheless potentially affect every single local crisis center across
the country. The Commission agrees with those commenters that argue
that notifications provided to local crisis centers under these
circumstances are likely to be overbroad, too frequent, or not provide
information that the local crisis center would be capable of acting on.
18. Based on the record before us, the Commission finds that
regardless of the scope of an outage, SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988
Lifeline administrator are in the best position to identify what
information about a specific outage may be relevant to local crisis
centers (including changes in local crisis center routing) and use
existing points of contact to convey that information. As Vibrant
explains, crisis centers will be notified about outages by the 988
Lifeline administrator irrespective of contact by a covered 988 service
provider or originating service provider. While several commenters
support notification of local crisis centers in some or all situations,
the record does not offer a convincing explanation of how local crisis
centers would be able to effectively act upon 988 outage notifications
to ensure that 988 callers receive assistance. The record also does not
provide clarity on how any benefits arising from those challenges
should be weighed against the challenges to providers arising from the
need to maintain updated contact information for those centers. While
BRETSA argues that outage notifications could assist local crisis
centers in making decisions about appropriate staffing levels, the
Commission believes that direct notification by service providers would
not supply sufficient information for this purpose because, in addition
to the geographic routing challenges discussed above, the notifications
would not offer any visibility into any related routing changes made by
the 988 Lifeline administrator that would ultimately affect call volume
to those centers. BRETSA also argues that notifications can assist
local crisis centers with making long-term network reliability
decisions, but the Commission observes that outage notifications are
intended to support imminent action during outages rather than long-
term decision-making.
19. The Commission also requires originating service providers,
that is, cable, satellite, wireless, wireline, and interconnected VoIP
providers, to notify 988 special facilities about outages that
potentially affect those facilities. As discussed above, a person in
suicidal crisis or emotional distress that cannot successfully reach a
crisis center due to an outage continues to be at risk, regardless of
whether the outage occurs before or after the call reaches the 988
Lifeline. For that reason, outage notifications are essential to
ensuring that SAMHSA, the VA, and the Lifeline administrator have
timely outage information so they effectively respond to outages. The
Commission therefore agrees with those commenters that argue that
originating service providers should be required to provide
notifications of 988 outages.
20. The Commission disagrees with Southern Linc's opinion that the
area code-based routing of 988 makes it ``highly doubtful that OSPs
would be able to provide any actionable outage information to 988
special facilities.'' As discussed above, the 988 Lifeline
administrator can use outage notifications to update routing tables to
avoid routing calls to crisis centers that are themselves experiencing
outages, as well as inform crisis centers about increases or decreases
of incoming calls so they can appropriately scale capacity. If needed,
SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator could also use
information about an outage to inform the public of alternative ways of
[[Page 2508]]
contacting the Lifeline while a means of communication is unavailable.
These actions are available regardless of whether an outage occurs
within the network of a covered 988 service provider or an originating
service provider. The Commission also disagrees with T-Mobile's
argument that 988 special facilities should not receive notifications,
but should instead obtain outage information from NORS data. NORS data
is generally received two hours after the discovery of an outage and
would have to be actively checked throughout the day by 988 special
facilities to stay aware of outages. The Commission finds that this
approach is far less likely to be effective at providing timely
information than the direct notifications adopted in the Report and
Order, which must be delivered within 30 minutes and are provided
directly to the affected special facilities. This approach is also
consistent with the existing requirement that originating service
providers must notify 911 special facilities, which will help minimize
costs, promote efficiency, and avoid confusion among providers.
21. The Commission acknowledges concerns that a 988 outage
notification requirement for originating service providers could result
in SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator receiving ``tens
of thousands'' of outage notifications annually, which could be
overwhelming and could undermine effective outage response. As Verizon
notes, hundreds of outages occur on originating service providers'
networks every day, and notifications for those outages are split
across thousands of public safety answering points (PSAPs) across the
country. If every one of those outage notifications were sent to
SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator by phone and email
daily, then they presumably would need significant, dedicated resources
to receive and act on those notifications. However, the record supports
the conclusion that 988 special facilities have such resources in place
and will be able to handle the volume of notifications. SAMHSA and
Vibrant state that despite the high volume, Vibrant has access to
continuous monitoring tools and can develop the necessary capabilities
to be able to ingest these notifications. The Commission urges service
providers to collaborate with 988 special facilities to ensure that 988
notifications are provided in a format that best facilitates rapid
analysis and action.
22. The Commission declines to require covered 988 service
providers to notify originating service providers about 988 Lifeline
outages and decline to require originating service providers to notify
covered 988 service providers about 988 Lifeline outages. As some
commenters note, covered 988 service providers often compete with
originating service providers or provide services to their competitors.
As a consequence, a notification requirement would mandate the sharing
of competitively sensitive information. The Commission shares this
concern, as well as the concern that the risk of sharing sensitive
information directly with competitors and other individuals
unnecessarily may slow down providers' notification processes or lead
to the removal of information from outage reports that might otherwise
be beneficial to a 988 special facility. The Commission notes that the
Washington State Department of Health and Health Care Authority
supports a requirement that originating service providers provide
notice to covered 988 service providers of 988 outages as ``these
notices would provide for increased coordination between the carriers
for remedying the outage and coordinating workarounds.'' CX360 argues
that originating service providers should be required to notify covered
988 service providers about outages because the latter ``lack[s]
independent insight into the operations on OSPs' networks'' and
notifications will allow it to ``better understand what is happening
upstream so it can react quickly and ensure its service is working
correctly,'' and ``troubleshoot any issues without needing to contact a
provider earlier in the call path, leading to a more efficient
resolution of any problems.'' The Commission disagrees, as the
Commission finds it unlikely that these actions will help ensure the
availability of the 988 Lifeline. If an outage occurs in an originating
service provider's network, the Commission does not see how it would be
beneficial for a covered 988 service provider to begin
``troubleshooting issues'' within its own separate, downstream network,
nor is it clear how those actions would help resolve the originating
provider's outage or otherwise help 988 callers successfully reach the
Lifeline. In any event, the Commission believes the potential negative
impacts on the effectiveness of outage notifications outweigh these
possible benefits.
23. The Commission also declines to require that PSAPs be notified
about 988 outages. While some commenters argue that 988 outage
notifications would prepare PSAPs for potential call volume increases
and give them the necessary situational awareness to handle those calls
in an appropriate manner, our rules already require PSAPs to be
notified about outages that potentially affect 911 special facilities,
including general network outages. In addition, these notifications
will not provide PSAPs with situational awareness about any routing
decisions made by the 988 Lifeline administrator to address the outage.
To the extent that an outage might occur in the network of a covered
988 service provider, it is unclear that the benefit of preparing PSAPs
for potential call volume increases related to an outage would outweigh
the burden of requiring the provider to maintain contact information
and then notify thousands of PSAPs nationwide. Moreover, because call
routing for 988 is currently based on area code of the caller, rather
than geographic location, the ability to identify the appropriate PSAP
for such notice may not be logistically feasible in all instances. The
Commission also declines to adopt the approach supported by APCO, which
would only require 988 outage notifications be made to those PSAPs that
opt-in to receiving them. The Commission believes it would be too
administratively burdensome for each service provider to continuously
track and update the list of PSAPs across the country that have opted-
in to receiving 988 outage notifications, particularly in light of the
limited benefits.
24. The Report and Order requires covered 988 service providers and
originating service providers to notify 988 special facilities with the
same content, by the same means, with the same timing, and with the
same frequency as our rules require for 911 outage notifications. Most
commenters agree that harmonizing these requirements will have the
effect of minimizing the cost and other impacts of the new notification
requirements on service providers by allowing them to make
notifications by efficiently using existing systems and processes. The
Commission further notes that here, as in the 911 context, parties may
mutually agree to alternate means of notification.
25. The Commission declines to require certain modifications to
these requirements proposed by commenters. The Commission rejects
CX360's proposal that it adopt a ``safe harbor'' or otherwise modify
the content of outage notifications to allow providers to merely notify
988 facilities within 30 minutes that ``an issue has been identified
and is being actively investigated, with additional information to be
provided later.'' This approach would greatly reduce the amount of
actionable information available to 988 special facilities and
therefore would not serve as an effective
[[Page 2509]]
notification. The Commission also declines to require notifications to
include contact information for those callers that failed to connect to
the 988 Lifeline since the outage began. The Commission agrees with
commenters that it is important for those individuals to receive the
support they need, but believe more study is needed to determine
whether it is technically feasible to require service providers to
obtain and share that information as part of the outage notification
process, as well as to understand any costs that might be attendant in
obtaining and sharing such information. The Commission acknowledges, as
CTIA--The Wireless Association (CTIA) asserts, that wireless network
equipment affected by an outage often will not be able to identify
devices that cannot connect to the network, which could make compliance
with such a requirement challenging. While several commenters also
argue that the phone numbers of individuals who try, but fail to reach
988 is not currently available to providers, the Commission suspects
that it may be technically feasible for providers to develop these
capabilities, so it plans to continue to explore the matter.
26. The Commission disagrees with those commenters that argue that
a 30-minute timeframe to provide 988 outage notifications is too fast,
as well as those that argue that it is too slow. The Commission finds,
as it previously found for 911 outage notifications, that a 30-minute
timeframe strikes a balance between the need for timely and actionable
988 outage information and the accuracy of that information. The
Commission believes the comments of the Veterans Crisis Line, which
highlights that statistically as many as three deaths by suicide occur
within thirty minutes, and the comments of the Competitive Carriers
Association (CCA), which argues that 30-minute notifications may result
in rushed analysis and inaccurate reporting, illustrate why a balance
must be struck between speed and accuracy. The Commission agrees with
those commenters who argue that 30 minutes is the best way to strike
that balance.
27. The Commission disagrees with CCA that a 30-minute notification
timeframe would be unreasonable and unrealistic, particularly for
originating service providers utilizing vendors for 988 solutions.
Thirty minutes has already proven to be a realistic timeframe for
covered 911 service providers to gather clear and useful information
about network outages to include in a notification, even though such
providers also frequently contract for services from vendors. The
Commission also finds that originating service providers serving fewer
customers will have to experience longer outages to reach the threshold
required for notification, which effectively provides more time for
those providers to investigate the outage. The Commission therefore
sees no reason why it would be overly burdensome for originating
service providers to provide accurate notifications within a similar
timeframe for 988 outages. To the extent that service providers find
that their own vendors' coordination failures are causing them to
violate the Commission's outage notification requirements the
Commission believes that is a matter to be resolved between those
parties and does not change the service provider's obligation to comply
with the Report and Order's notification requirements.
28. As an alternative to the requirement adopted in the Report and
Order, CCA proposes that the Commission adopt at minimum an approach
that sets 988 outage notification deadlines based on the time when
actual originating service providers are notified about outages by
their vendors or underlying providers. This alternative is incompatible
with the goal of providing 988 special facilities with timely outage
notifications because it would excuse originating service providers
from reporting outages that their vendors fail to disclose to them. The
Commission believes this approach would disincentivize originating
service providers from learning about outages on their vendors'
networks, eliminate consistency as to when 988 special facilities can
expect to receive outage reports, and delay 988 special facilities'
receipt of outage reports, which would in turn delay any actions they
may take to ensure the 988 Lifeline's availability. Moreover, the
Commission finds it does not serve the public interest to create a
means for providers to ``contract away'' their obligations by allowing
the use of a vendor to alleviate a regulatory obligation. As stated
above, the Commission has long held that licensees and other regulatees
are responsible for the acts and omissions of their contractors, and
the Commission declines to adopt an approach to 988 outage notification
that would disturb that holding. The findings the Commission makes in
the Report and Order are limited to the 988 outage notification
requirements made in the order. The Commission reserves judgment on the
Petition for Reconsideration filed by CCA regarding the Commission's
November 2022 Report and Order, 88 FR 9756 (March 17, 2023),
harmonizing 911 existing outage notification requirements. See CCA
Petition for Reconsideration, PS Docket Nos. 15-80 and 13-75, ET Docket
No. 4-35 (filed Mar. 17, 2023), <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/filing/1031746539270">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/filing/1031746539270</a>. The Commission also rejects CX360's
proposal that follow-up notifications not be due until seven to
fourteen days after an initial notification is provided, as delaying
critical details about an outage for an entire week, which is likely
long after the outage has been resolved, clearly does not serve the
goals of improving 988 special facilities' awareness and ability to
address outages.
29. The Report and Order requires covered 988 service providers and
originating service providers to exercise special diligence to maintain
accurate, up-to-date contact information for 988 special facilities,
just as our rules require for 911 special facilities. ``Special
diligence'' is the diligence expected from a person practicing in a
particular field of specialty. The Commission has imposed this higher
level of care in circumstances where a failure to take sufficient care
can lead to particularly serious public harms. In these circumstances,
special diligence would require, for example, actively seeking to
confirm the accuracy of contact information and not relying on the
absence of a response. Once providers have a 988 special facility
contact list in place, special diligence would require them to annually
verify the accuracy of their contact list to ensure it is up-to-date.
As it has found in the 911 context, the Commission found that for 988
outage reporting that requiring a higher level of care than reaching
out to the prior contact is imperative to ensure public safety, and
requiring this higher level of care will incentivize providers to
ascertain and update such contact information. The Commission also
finds that this requirement is significantly less burdensome than the
similar requirement pertaining to 911 special facility contact
information because the Report and Order only designates three 988
special facilities for which contact information must be maintained.
The Commission disagrees with ATIS's view that it would be extremely
difficult to apply special diligence to the maintenance of 988 contact
information because ``there are no subject matter experts practicing in
the field of 988 routing or 988 contact information maintenance.'' The
diligence our rules
[[Page 2510]]
require is that of a communications provider that, through their
experience in offering the services that emergency communications
depend on, understands that failure to provide effective notifications
about outages could result in harm to life and property. Accordingly,
the Commission expects that 988 service providers and originating
service providers would take the steps necessary to ensure that the
contact information they maintain for 988 special facilities is
accurate and effective as the failure to provide effective notice to
the appropriate contact could result in harm to life and property.
30. The Commission declines at this time to require covered 988
service providers or originating service providers to file 988
reliability certifications to ensure the network supporting the 988
Lifeline remains resilient and robust. The Commission agrees with ATIS
that 988 is different from 911 in structure and organization; therefore
the Commission's existing 911 network reliability certification
requirements could not easily be applied to 988 reliability. The
Commission believes additional study of threats to the 988 Lifeline is
necessary to determine what next steps should be taken, if any, to
promote reliability. The Commission expects that the 988 outage
reporting requirements adopted in the Report and Order will give it
additional insight to 988 reliability trends and inform future action.
31. The Commission notes that some commenters made recommendations
that they argue would improve the general effectiveness and reliability
of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline. While these recommendations are
outside of the scope of the 988 network outage reporting and
notification requirements adopted in the Report and Order, the
Commission will keep these issues in mind as it continues to support
the 988 Lifeline.
C. Assessing the Benefits and Costs
32. The Commission determined that the rules adopted in the Report
and Order concerning the reporting in NORS of outages that potentially
affect 988 special facilities and the notifying of 988 special
facilities about outages will result in an industry-wide one-time
compliance cost of $56,000 and an annual recurring cost of $1,355,000.
The Commission sought comment on cost estimates in the 988 Outage NPRM
and received no persuasive objections and only one comment offering an
alternative calculation in response, which is addressed in context
below.
33. For the reporting of 988 outages in NORS, the Report and Order
finds that outages that potentially affect 988 special facilities fall
into two categories: outages experienced by the covered 988 service
providers that are responsible for providing the 988 Lifeline with the
capability to receive, process, or forward 988 calls, and outages
experienced by originating service providers that deliver calls to the
Lifeline. Consistent with the estimate stated in the 988 Outage NPRM,
which no commenter challenged, the Commission assumes that one covered
988 service provider experiences a maximum of one reportable outage per
month and estimates an annual compliance cost for that one covered 988
service provider of $1,000. See 988 Outage NPRM at 15, paragraph 37,
n.80 (estimating a maximum of two hours total time to submit all
required reports at a cost of $43 per hour for a total cost estimate of
$1000 ~ $43/hr x 2 hrs x one reportable outage per month x 12 months).
The Commission finds that originating service providers already submit
outage reports to the Commission related to outages that affect voice
telephony, which would be largely or entirely identical to the new
reporting requirements, so initial compliance costs would be
negligible.
34. With regard to the requirements to maintain updated contact
information for 988 special facilities and to notify those facilities
about outages that affect them, the Commission estimates that the costs
of compliance will also be relatively low when compared to the benefits
to the public. It estimates a one-time industry-wide cost of $56,000 to
create an e-mail survey to biannually solicit 988 special facility
contact information. The Commission does not expect more than
incidental costs arising from the creation or updating of outage
notification templates, as the 988 outage notification requirements
that adopted in the Report and Order share the same content and timing
as the 911 outage notification requirements with which service
providers already comply. The Commission estimates maximum annually
recurring costs of $1,354,000, which consist of $1,326,000 for
notifying 988 special facilities of outages that potentially affect
them pursuant to the requirements adopted in the Report and Order and
$28,000 for soliciting appropriate contact information for outage
notification from 988 special facilities. The Commission expects that
no costs will be incurred related to identifying the 988 special
facilities that could potentially be affected by an outage, as the
Commission has required that the same three special facilities (SAMHSA,
the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator) be notified regardless of
the geographic area affected by the outage.
35. The Commission finds that the benefits of the 988 outage
reporting and notification requirements adopted in the Report and Order
outweigh their associated costs. The Commission recognizes that it is
difficult to quantify the value of ensuring the continuity of access to
988 Lifeline services, which includes its capacity to save lives and
mitigate and prevent injuries. However, the Commission believes the
considerable public safety value of the requirements adopted in the
Report and Order as described above will exceed the limited costs of
implementation. As discussed by commenters and in the 988 Outage NPRM,
the 988 Lifeline directly benefits people in crisis and saves lives.
When the 988 Lifeline is interrupted, people's lives are put into
jeopardy. In May 2023, the 988 Lifeline answered 235,292 calls, which
is an average of over 7,500 answered calls per day. The Commission
finds that the outage reporting requirements would improve public
safety by providing the Commission and other impacted entities with
situational awareness of 988 outages, including the magnitude and
causes of those outages, and allow for the identification of network
reliability trends that can help identify best practices that could
improve network reliability by helping to mitigate future outages. The
Report and Order's notice and contact information retention
requirements are intended to ensure that when 988 calling is disrupted,
parties responsible for the varying aspects of the 988 call pathway
notify 988 special facilities, share critical information in a timely
and standardized manner, and hasten the timely restoration of 988
Lifeline services. The Commission describes in the Report and Order how
even a very small increase in the speed of restoration of access to 988
Lifeline services could provide benefits that outweigh the costs of
adopting the requirements.
36. The benefits of reducing suicide via 988 are driven by the
staggering societal costs of deaths by suicide. In 2021, there were
over 48,000 deaths by suicide in the United States, which, as noted
above, averages out to approximately one death every 11 minutes. For
every suicide death, there were 3 hospitalizations for suicide
attempts, 8 suicide-related emergency department visits, and 38 self-
reported suicide attempts. Suicides and suicide attempts annually
impose billions of dollars in medical, first-responder,
[[Page 2511]]
productivity-loss, and lost-quality-of-life costs on society. In
addition to lives saved and injuries avoided, time-saving network
outage protocols will also alleviate the devastating emotional toll
wrought by suicide on victims' families, friends, and communities.
37. Notifying SAMHSA, the VA, and the 988 Lifeline administrator of
the disruption of access to 988 Lifeline services will allow these
parties to manage the impact of outages on their operations, quickly
notify the public of the 988 service outage, and promote alternative
ways for people to access 988 Lifeline services during the outage,
which may include notifying the public of alternative call numbers, or
encouraging people to text to 988 or use the <a href="https://988lifeline.org/">https://988lifeline.org/</a>
link to chat with a crisis management counselor. This, in turn, will
enhance the 988 Lifeline's ability to direct scarce resources toward
mitigating outages rather than seeking out information as to whether an
outage is occurring, the scope of such an outage, or its impact. One of
the benefits of implementing short dialing for calls and text messages
to the Lifeline was to reduce the burdens on 911 and other emergency
services arising from calls related to mental health and suicide. The
Commission believes that the rules adopted in the Report and Order will
further reduce the burden on 911 and other emergency services by
promoting 988 reliability so that 988 calls go through when individuals
need 988 service the most.
38. The Commission disagrees with Southern Linc's argument that the
rules adopted in the Report and Order place unnecessary regulatory
burdens on smaller non-nationwide providers, which they assert will be
strained due to the same personnel being responsible for both reporting
and responding to outages, as well as complying with other regulatory
requirements. As explained above, the Commission finds that the
significant public safety benefits arising from the requirements
adopted in the Report and Order outweigh their associated burdens,
particularly since the cost of these requirements is likely to be
relatively low due to commonalities with existing outage reporting
requirements. The Commission again notes that the outages experienced
by smaller providers with fewer subscribers would generally take longer
to meet the required reporting thresholds, which would effectively
provide more time to investigate an outage before it is required to be
reported. Southern Linc further accuses the Commission of ``assuming
that all employees of a provider's affiliates--no matter how distant--
should be considered `available resources' to support the provider's
compliance efforts, regardless of whether the employees of those
affiliates have any responsibility to support wireless network
operations.'' The Commission does not make this assumption. If the
Commission were to assume that service providers already had available
staff to implement the requirements adopted in the Report and Order,
then the costs to service providers would be estimated to be zero. To
the contrary, the cost estimates that the Commission makes in the
Report and Order are grounded in the additional labor hours and wages
needed to comply with the Report and Order's adopted rules.
D. Legal Authority
39. In the 988 Outage NPRM, the Commission sought comment on
potential sources of legal authority under titles II and III and
section 4(i) of the Communications Act and section 104 of the Twenty-
First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA) for
Commission action to promote the reliability and resiliency of the 988
Lifeline. The Commission noted that Congress amended section 251 of the
Communications Act of 1934 to specify 988 as the universal telephone
number for the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline and that the
proposed rules were intended to ensure that the Lifeline remains
operational in accordance with the policies identified by Congress in
that 2020 legislation and that any outages are quickly identified and
reported, thus promoting the safety of life and property. The
Commission now finds that section 4 and section 251 provide ample
authority for the reporting and notice obligations adopted in the
Report and Order.
40. Title II of the Communications Act gives the Commission clear
authority over service providers, including covered 988 service
providers, to the extent that they provide interstate common carrier
service. The statute provides that ``practices'' for and in connection
with interstate common carrier services must be ``just and
reasonable,'' and that a common carrier must ``provide itself with
adequate facilities for the expeditious and efficient performance of
its service as a common carrier.'' The Commission is also authorized to
``inquire into the management of the business of all carriers and
obtain from them full and complete information necessary to enable the
Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it
was created.''
41. The Commission further notes that the Communications Act
directs that ``[f]or the purpose of obtaining maximum effectiveness
from the use of radio and wire communications in connection with safety
of life and property,'' the Commission ``shall investigate and study
all phases of the problem and the best methods of obtaining the
cooperation and coordination of these systems.'' Both originating
service providers and covered 988 service providers play critical roles
in ensuring the cooperation and coordination of the 988 system, and the
Commission has previously relied on section 4(n) as providing authority
to require reporting of interconnected VoIP outages, and to require
emergency alerting plans to allow the Commission and other stakeholders
``to more easily review and identify gaps'' in emergency alerting
architecture, ``detect problems, and take measures to address these
shortcomings.'' By requiring reporting of outages affecting access to
988 by both originating service providers and covered 988 service
providers the Commission is enabling the Commission's ongoing review of
sources of disruption to this critical emergency service, which in turn
will contribute to greater reliability going forward. The Commission
concludes that these sources provide it with sufficient authority for
the 988 outage reporting requirements adopted in the Report and Order.
42. Additionally, the Commission finds that imposing outage
reporting requirements on covered 988 service providers is reasonably
ancillary to our responsibility to ensuring that the 988 Lifeline
service operates effectively. To exercise ancillary authority ``two
conditions [must be] satisfied: (1) the Commission's general
jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act] covers
the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary
to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities.'' The functions at issue here involve communications
by wire or radio in that they either take the form of such transmission
or involve the use of equipment for purposes of facilitating
transmission by wire or radio. The Commission concludes that these
reporting requirements are necessary to carry out our responsibility
for the proper functioning of the 988 Lifeline service under section
251(e)(4). Obtaining outage information from covered 988 service
providers is necessary because only the covered 988 service provider
has visibility into
[[Page 2512]]
outages that occur at the point where the covered 988 service provider
processes and forwards the call. Adopting outage reporting and notice
requirements for entities that have the ability to receive, process, or
forward calls to the 988 Lifeline furthers the Commission's goals to
strengthen the 988 Lifeline's reliability and help save the lives of
those who may be experiencing a suicidal crisis or mental health-
related distress.
43. The Commission disagrees with CX360, a company that contracts
with the 988 Lifeline administrator to provide voice and SMS-based
services for communications after they reach the 988 Lifeline, that the
Commission lacks authority to require the reporting of outages by
entities that provide the 988 Lifeline with the capability to receive,
process, or forward calls. As outlined above, the Commission clearly
has authority to impose these reporting and notice requirements on
CX360, on any entities that offer to the public for a fee
``transmission between points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information as sent and received,'' and on entities that route calls
from the 988 Lifeline to the appropriate crisis center(s), following
routing instructions provided by the 988 Lifeline administrator. Even
though the responsibilities of an originating service provider may
conclude once a call reaches the 988 Lifeline, this does not mean that
the services offered by other communications providers within the 988
call path that are necessary to connect the caller to their local
crisis center, the Veterans Crisis Line, or other call taker, a service
which CX360 states that it provides, cannot be regulated by the
Commission.
44. The Commission specifically rejects CX360's argument that
entities that ``process'' calls for the 988 Lifeline cannot be
regulated by the Commission. The Commission finds that the processing
of 988 calls--that is to say, conducting the necessary technical steps
to prepare the call for forwarding to a crisis center or the Veterans
Crisis Line and then transmitting those calls to that crisis center--
falls within our authority to regulate via the reporting and notice
requirements adopted in the Report and Order. To the extent that an
entity uses an interactive voice response system to support these
capabilities, the Commission acknowledges that such an offering may
acquire, store, or process information related to how the call should
be routed. But the Commission concludes that it has authority to
require outage reporting and notice under the specific circumstances
here from entities performing functions like CX360.
E. Timelines for Compliance
45. The Report and Order adopts deadlines for originating service
providers to comply with the Report and Order's revisions to Sec. 4.9
as the latest of (1) 30 days after the Commission issues a Public
Notice announcing that OMB has completed review of any new information
collection requirements associated with the adopted Report and Order;
(2) 90 days after the publication of the summary of the Report and
Order in the Federal Register, or (3) the date the Commission's updated
911 outage reporting and notification rules go into effect. Consistent
with the Commission's proposal in the 988 Outage NPRM, the Commission
agrees with Vibrant that the first two elements of this timeline
provide sufficient time for compliance, as the Commission finds that
the revisions constitute only minor changes to existing notice and
reporting requirements for 911 network outages, and it will take a
modest amount of time for originating service providers to adjust their
processes to satisfy the proposed rules. The Commission also agrees
with USTelecom that it is sensible to harmonize the compliance timeline
for the rules adopted in the Report and Order with the compliance
timeline for the 911 outage notification requirements adopted in
November 2022 given the similarities between them.
46. The Commission is persuaded by CX360 that some covered 988
service providers may not have existing NORS filing or outage
notification obligations and would need additional time to develop the
capabilities and processes necessary to comply with the rules adopted
in the Report and Order. Accordingly, the Commission agrees with CX360
that covered 988 service providers should be granted six additional
months to come into compliance. The Report and Order adopts deadlines
for covered 988 service providers to comply with the Report and Order's
rules as the latest of (1) 30 days after the Commission issues a Public
Notice announcing that OMB has completed review of any new information
collection requirements associated with the adopted Report and Order;
(2) nine months after the publication of the summary of the Report and
Order in the Federal Register; or (3) the date the Commission's updated
911 outage reporting and notification rules go into effect.
II. Procedural Matters
47. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This document
requires covered 988 service providers and originating service
providers to adopt 988 reporting and notice procedures which represent
new and modified information collection requirements subject to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. The document
will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review under section 3507(d) of the PRA and, with the exception of the
revision to 47 CFR 4.9(e)(1)(iv), will not take effect until approved
by OMB. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be
invited to comment on the new or modified information collection
requirements contain in this proceeding. This document will be
submitted to OMB for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. In
addition, the Commission notes that, pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), the Commission previously sought, but did not receive,
specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer
than 25 employees. The Commission does not believe that the new or
modified information collection requirements adopted in the Report and
Order will be unduly burdensome on small businesses.
48. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis. The Regulatory Flexibility
Act of 1980, as amended (RFA) requires that an agency prepare a
regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings,
unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated,
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' As required by the RFA, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the 988 Outage NPRM adopted January
26, 2023 (88 FR 20790 (Apr. 7, 2023)). The Commission sought written
public comment on the proposals in the 988 Outage NPRM, including
comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the IRFA. The
Commission prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)
concerning the potential impact of the rule and policy changes adopted
in the Report and Order on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in
Appendix B of the Report and Order.
III. Ordering Clauses
49. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to the authority
contained in
[[Page 2513]]
sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(n), 201(b), 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 251(e)(4),
301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 332, and 403, of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and sections 3(b) and 6 of the
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j) 154(n), 201(b), 214, 218, 251(e)(3),
251(e)(4), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 332, 403, 615,
615a-1, the National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018, Public
Law 115-233, 132 Stat. 2424 (2018), and the National Suicide Hotline
Designation Act of 2020, Public Law 116-172 (2020), the Report and
Order IS hereby adopted.
50. It is further ordered that the amendments of the Commission's
Rules as set forth in Appendix A of the Report and Order are adopted,
effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, except for
the amendments to 47 CFR 4.9. The amendments to 47 CFR 4.9 will not
become effective until OMB completes any review that the Public Safety
and Homeland Security Bureau determines is required under the Paperwork
Reduction Act and the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
announces an effective date consistent with section III.E of the Report
and Order by subsequent Public Notice.
51. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a
copy of the Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.
52. It is further ordered that the Office of the Managing Director,
Performance and Program Management, shall send a copy of the Report and
Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4
Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Telecommunications.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 4 as follows:
PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 34-39, 151, 154, 155, 157, 201, 251, 307,
316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b); 5 U.S.C. 301, and Executive Order
no. 10530.
0
2. Section 4.3 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the heading from paragraph (i); and
0
b. Adding paragraph (j).
The addition reads as follows:
Sec. 4.3 Communications providers covered by the requirements of this
part.
* * * * *
(j) Covered 988 service providers are providers that provide the
988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline with capabilities such as the ability to
receive, process, or forward calls. ``Covered 988 service provider''
shall not include any entity that constitutes a crisis center that
participates in the 988 Lifeline, or any entity that offers the
capability to originate 988 calls where another service provider
delivers those calls to the appropriate crisis center.
0
3. Section 4.5 is amended by revising the section heading and adding
paragraph (f) to read as follows:
Sec. 4.5 Definitions of outage, special offices and facilities, 911
special facilities, and 988 special facilities.
* * * * *
(f) An outage that potentially affects a 988 special facility
occurs whenever there is a loss of the ability of the 988 Suicide &
Crisis Lifeline to receive, process, or forward calls, potentially
affecting at least 900,000 user-minutes and lasting at least 30 minutes
duration.
0
4. Delayed indefinitely, Sec. 4.9 is amended by revising paragraphs
(a)(4), (c)(2)(iv), (e)(1)(v), (f)(4), and (g)(1)(i) and adding
paragraph (i) to read as follows:
Sec. 4.9 Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.
(a) * * *
(4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in Sec.
4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined in
Sec. 4.5(f)), in which case they also shall notify the affected
facility in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this
section, respectively. Not later than 72 hours after discovering the
outage, the provider shall submit electronically an Initial
Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than 30 days
after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically
a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission. The
notification and the initial and final reports shall comply with all of
the requirements of Sec. 4.11.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(iv) Potentially affecting a 911 special facility (as defined in
Sec. 4.5(e)) or potentially affecting a 988 special facility (as
defined in Sec. 4.5(f)), in which case the affected facility shall be
notified in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this
section, respectively.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(1) * * *
(v) That potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in
Sec. 4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined
in Sec. 4.5(f)), in which case they also shall notify the affected
facility in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this
section, respectively.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in Sec.
4.5(e)) or potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined in
Sec. 4.5(f)), in which case they also shall notify the affected
facility in the manner described in paragraph (h) or (i) of this
section, respectively. Not later than 72 hours after discovering the
outage, the provider shall submit electronically an Initial
Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than 30 days
after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically
a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission. The
Notification and the Initial and Final reports shall comply with all of
the requirements of Sec. 4.11.
(g) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) Within 240 minutes of discovering that they have experienced on
any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an
outage of at least 30 minutes duration that potentially affects a 911
special facility (as defined in Sec. 4.5(e)) or potentially affects a
988 special facility (as defined in Sec. 4.5(f)), in which case they
also shall notify the affected facility in the manner described in
paragraph (h) or (i) of this section, respectively; or
* * * * *
(i) 988 Special facility outage notification. All cable, satellite,
wireless, wireline, interconnected VoIP, and covered 988 service
providers shall notify any official at a 988 special facility who has
been designated by the affected 988 special facility as the
[[Page 2514]]
provider's contact person(s) for communications outages at the facility
of any outage that potentially affects that 988 special facility (as
defined in Sec. 4.5(f)) in the following manner:
(1) Appropriate contact information. To ensure prompt delivery of
outage notifications to 988 special facilities, covered 988 service
providers shall exercise special diligence to identify, maintain, and,
on an annual basis, confirm current contact information appropriate for
outage notification for each 988 special facility that serves areas
that the service provider serves.
(2) Content of notification. Covered 988 service providers' outage
notifications must convey all available material information about the
outage. For the purpose of this paragraph (i), ``material information''
includes the following, where available:
(i) An identifier unique to each outage;
(ii) The name, telephone number, and email address at which the
notifying 988 service provider can be reached for follow up;
(iii) The name of the covered 988 service provider experiencing the
outage;
(iv) The date and time when the incident began (including a
notation of the relevant time zone);
(v) The types of communications service(s) affected;
(vi) The geographic area affected by the outage;
(vii) A statement of the notifying covered 988 service provider's
expectations for how the outage potentially affects the special
facility (e.g., dropped calls or missing metadata);
(viii) Expected date and time of restoration, including a notation
of the relevant time zone;
(ix) The best-known cause of the outage; and
(x) A statement of whether the message is the notifying covered 988
service provider's initial notification to the special facility, an
update to an initial notification, or a message intended to be the
service provider's final assessment of the outage.
(3) Means of notification. Covered 988 service providers' outage
notifications must be transmitted by telephone and in writing via
electronic means in the absence of another method mutually agreed upon
in writing in advance by the special facility and the service provider.
(4) Timing of initial notification. Covered 988 service providers
shall provide an outage notification to a potentially affected 988
special facility as soon as possible, but no later than within 30
minutes of discovering that they have experienced on any facilities
that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an outage that
potentially affects a 988 special facility (as defined in Sec.
4.5(f)).
(5) Follow-up notification. Covered 988 service providers shall
communicate additional material information to potentially affected 988
special facilities in notifications subsequent to the initial
notification as soon as possible after that information becomes
available, but providers shall send the first follow-up notification to
potentially affected 988 special facilities no later than two hours
after the initial contact. After that, covered 988 service providers
are required to continue to provide material information to the special
facilities as soon as possible after discovery of the new material
information until the outage is completely repaired and service is
fully restored.
[FR Doc. 2024-00428 Filed 1-12-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
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