Rule2024-00153
Civil Nuclear Credit Program and Recapture of Credits
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
January 8, 2024
Effective
January 8, 2024
Issuing agencies
Energy Department
Abstract
The Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) publishes this interim final rule to establish the procedure for the recapture of credits awarded under the Civil Nuclear Credit Program in accordance with the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 89 Issue 5 (Monday, January 8, 2024)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 5 (Monday, January 8, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 864-872]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2024-00153]
[[Page 864]]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
10 CFR Part 612
RIN 1901-AB57
Civil Nuclear Credit Program and Recapture of Credits
AGENCY: Grid Deployment Office, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Interim final rule and request for comment.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) publishes
this interim final rule to establish the procedure for the recapture of
credits awarded under the Civil Nuclear Credit Program in accordance
with the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
DATES: This rule is effective on January 8, 2024. Written comments must
be received by February 7, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Theodore Taylor, Civil Nuclear
Credit Program Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585, (240) 477-
0458, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#aae9e4e9f5fad8c5cdd8cbc7f5e7cbc3c6c8c5d2eac2db84cec5cf84cdc5dc"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="94d7dad7cbc4e6fbf3e6f5f9cbd9f5fdf8f6fbecd4fce5baf0fbf1baf3fbe2">[email protected]</span></a>.
ADDRESSES: DOE encourages submission of comments electronically through
the Federal eRulemaking Portal: <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments. Alternatively, interested persons
may submit hard copy written comments (preferably an original and two
copies), identified by RIN 1901-AB57, by postal mail to the Grid
Deployment Office, Civil Nuclear Credit Program, Attention: Mr.
Theodore Taylor, Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 20585. Because postal mail may be subject to processing
delay, it is recommended that comments be submitted electronically. All
comments should be captioned with ``Civil Nuclear Credit Program and
Recapture of Credits Interim Final Rule Comments.'' Please include your
name, organization affiliation, address, email address and telephone
number in your comment. In general, comments received will be posted on
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> without change, including any business or personal
information provided. Comments received, including attachments and
other supporting materials, will be part of the public record and
subject to public disclosure. Do not enclose any information in your
comment or supporting materials that you consider confidential or
inappropriate for public disclosure.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Summary of the Interim Final Rule
II. Authority and Background
A. The Statute
B. Recapture of Credits
C. CNC Guidance
III. Notice of Intent and Request for Information
A. Request for Information
B. Comments on Recapture and Annual Adjustment
1. Scope of Recapture Regulation
2. Inclusion in the CNC Program of an Annual Adjustment
Mechanism
3. Relationship of Annual Adjustment Mechanism and Recapture
Regulation
IV. Section by Section Analysis of the Interim Final Rule
A. Purpose, Applicability, and Definitions
B. Recapture
C. Notice and Reconsideration of Recapture Determination
D. Petition to the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals
V. Interim Final Rulemaking
VI. Procedural Requirements
A. Review Under Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094
B. Executive Order 13132
C. Administrative Procedure Act
D. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
E. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
F. Regulatory Flexibility Act
G. Executive Order 12988
H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
I. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999
J. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001
K. Executive Order 13211
L. Congressional Notification
VII. Approval of the Office of the Secretary
I. Summary of the Interim Final Rule
Section 40323 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)
(Pub. L. 117-58), codified at 42 U.S.C. 18753, also known as the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, directs the Department to establish the
Civil Nuclear Credit Program (CNC Program) to prevent premature
closures of nuclear power plants by providing financial support for
existing nuclear reactors projected to cease operations due to economic
factors.
The IIJA also directs the Department to promulgate a regulation to
provide for the recapture of credits awarded to a nuclear reactor if
either (a) the nuclear reactor terminates operations during the 4-year
award period or (b) the nuclear reactor does not operate at an annual
loss in the absence of an allocation of credits. The purpose of this
interim final rule is to establish the procedure for the recapture of
credits for the first 4-year award period, for which applications were
due September 6, 2022. While the elements of the CNC Program are
broadly described below, this interim final rule itself is limited to
the narrow circumstance where a certified nuclear reactor has met the
criteria for the recapture of credits. The rule provides a mechanism
for the Department to enforce the obligation of the nuclear reactor to
continue operation during the 4-year award period and to relinquish its
rights to credits if the nuclear reactor is not operating at a loss in
the absence of the credits. To minimize the likelihood for the need to
recapture credits under the rule, the Department has included in the
CNC Program an audit and annual payment adjustment mechanism at the end
of each award year during the 4-year award period to evaluate the
financial results of operation for that year and to adjust payment of
credits based on that evaluation. The recapture regulation ensures that
a reactor cannot retain the value of credits if, despite the annual
adjustment, the nuclear reactor would not have operated at an annual
loss in the absence of an allocation of credits over the 4-year award
period or if the nuclear reactor terminates operations despite its
contractual obligation to operate for the entire 4-year award period.
II. Authority and Background
A. The Statute
Section 40323 of the IIJA directs the Department to establish the
CNC Program to provide financial support for existing nuclear reactors
projected to cease operations due to economic factors in the form of
credits to be awarded for a 4-year award period. The IIJA appropriates
$6 billion for the CNC Program. The CNC Program will make meaningful
progress towards a carbon pollution-free electricity sector by 2035,
help ``deliver an equitable, clean energy future, and put the United
States on a path to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by no
later than 2050 to the benefit of all Americans.'' \1\ In addition, the
CNC Program--by preventing shutdown of the existing nuclear fleet--
allows the bulk power system to retain firm, reliable capacity that is
urgently needed in the face of extreme weather and drought.\2\
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\1\ Executive Order 14008, ``Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home
and Abroad,'' January 27, 2021.
\2\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2022 Summer
Reliability Assessment at 4 (May 2022), <a href="https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2022.pdf">https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_2022.pdf</a>.
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B. Recapture of Credits
Section 40323(g)(2) of the IIJA requires that the Secretary, ``by
regulation, provide for the recapture of the allocation of any credit
to a certified
[[Page 865]]
nuclear reactor that during [the 4-year award period]--(A) terminates
operations; or (B) does not operate at an annual loss in the absence of
an allocation of credits to the certified nuclear reactor.'' \3\ This
interim final rule establishes the procedure for the recapture of
credits in accordance with that requirement. This interim final rule
relates only to the recapture provision. No other provision of the CNC
Program is subject to implementation by regulation.
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\3\ IIJA section 40323(g)(2).
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C. CNC Guidance
The IIJA directed the Secretary to establish the CNC Program.\4\ In
order to meet this direction, the Department on April 19, 2022, issued
Guidance for the Civil Nuclear Credit Program and issued Amended
Guidance on June 30, 2022 (the initial Guidance as revised by the
Amended Guidance, including each of the attachments thereto, is
referred to herein as the Guidance).\5\ The Guidance describes the
timelines, deliverables, and other requirements for owners or operators
of nuclear reactors that are projected to cease operations due to
economic factors to submit certification applications to become
certified nuclear reactors, and instructions on formulating and
submitting sealed bids to receive credit allocations. The Guidance is
applicable to the first in a series of annual award cycles that the
Department will conduct to implement the CNC Program. The deadline for
the first award period certification applications and bid submissions
was September 6, 2022. The Department intends to issue updated Guidance
for each subsequent award period. The Department may enter into a
binding agreement establishing the terms of the award and payment of
credits with each owner or operator whose application is certified and
whose bid is accepted by the Department (referred to herein as the
Award Agreement).
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\4\ IIJA section 40323(b).
\5\ Notice of Availability of Guidance for the First Award
Period of the Civil Nuclear Credit Program, 87 FR 24291 (April 25,
2022). The Guidance, including both the initial Guidance and the
Amended Guidance, is posted at <a href="https://www.energy.gov/ne/civil-nuclear-credit-program">https://www.energy.gov/ne/civil-nuclear-credit-program</a>. Citations herein to specific pages of the
Guidance refer to the Amended Guidance available at Microsoft Word--
US DOE CNC Guidance-Revision 1-June 2022 (<a href="http://energy.gov">energy.gov</a>).
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III. Notice of Intent and Request for Information
A. Request for Information
On February 15, 2022, the Department published a Notice of Intent
and Request for Information Regarding Establishment of a Civil Nuclear
Credit Program (RFI).\6\ The RFI explained DOE's proposed structure of
the CNC Program and included a description of the subjects and the
issues relevant to the recapture requirement. The RFI described the
requirement in the IIJA that DOE provide for recapture of allocated
credits if the nuclear reactor terminated operations or if it did ``not
operate at an annual loss in the absence of an allocation of credits.''
\7\ As the Department explained, it proposed to include an annual
settlement mechanism through which the value of a reactor's credit
allocation would be adjusted if actual economic performance varies from
projections underlying the credits awarded.\8\ The Department
anticipated that an annual adjustment mechanism would reduce the need
for recapture by ensuring that the annual payout of credits would track
the actual operating loss of the nuclear reactor, subject to a cap on
annual value of credits established at the time of award.\9\ The
Department recognized that the recapture of credits would nevertheless
be required ``[i]f an adjustment to allocated credits [pursuant to the
annual adjustment process] is not possible despite material changes in
economic performance, or if the reactor terminates operations.'' \10\
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\6\ 87 FR 8570 (Feb. 15, 2022).
\7\ Id. at 87 FR 8572.
\8\ Id.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Id.
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The RFI requested interested persons to provide feedback on the
elements of the CNC Program, including recapture, and propounded
specific questions on the conduct of periodic audits and the annual
resetting of the value of credits to be paid out based on actual
revenues.\11\ More than 120 responses were received representing a
broad array of interests and viewpoints, including from individuals,
Federal elected officials, State public utility commissions and other
State officials, trade associations, owners and operators of nuclear
generators, uranium suppliers, and a number of public interest groups.
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\11\ Id. at 87 FR 8572 and 8574.
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B. Comments on Recapture and Annual Adjustment
Discussed underneath are comments received in response to the RFI
related to the recapture of credits that is the subject of this interim
final rule.\12\ Although Congress directed the Department to adopt a
regulation only with respect to the recapture provision, the Department
is also addressing comments on the annual adjustment mechanism and
certain other terms identified in the RFI to the extent those
provisions may be relevant to operation of the recapture mechanism.
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\12\ All comments are available at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>.
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1. Scope of Recapture in Regulation
(a) Comments Received
The Department received a number of comments on the recapture
provision in response to the RFI. Some parties suggested that the scope
of the recapture provision should be expanded to mandate recapture for
circumstances in addition to nuclear reactor termination of operations
and failure to operate at an annual loss in the absence of an
allocation of credits. Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS)
recommended that the Department ``include a provision to recapture
credits if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), at a later date,
finds violations or safety performance problems that would have caused
the reactor'' to fail to meet the certification criteria related to
safety.\13\ The Green Scissors coalition made a similar recommendation,
suggesting that the Department ``review any violations and safety
performance findings issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission . . .
, and determine if the award should be discontinued and if any amounts
must be recaptured.'' \14\ Ur-Energy USA Inc. (Ur-Energy) opposed the
use of recapture (as well as any annual adjustment) because the
``[f]ailure to make a fixed 4-year commitment will introduce risk to
the utilities and undermine the Department's intentions.'' \15\ Energy
Harbor Corp. (Energy Harbor) recommended that the Department clarify
that recapture for termination of operations only apply if that
termination occurs during the 4-year allocation period.\16\ Energy
Harbor also stated that recapture should not occur as a result of
change in operating results from the projections used in the nuclear
reactor's application for credits.\17\ However, Energy Harbor
continued, if recapture is used for circumstances other than closure,
the Department should include ``an appeals process for certified
nuclear reactors to challenge the recapture of their credits.'' \18\
Constellation Energy Corporation (Constellation) stated that ``[t]he
recapture process must be known before
[[Page 866]]
credits are allocated in order for nuclear owners to be able to
properly evaluate whether or not to accept the credits.'' \19\
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\13\ NIRS at 6.
\14\ Green Scissors Comments at 2.
\15\ Ur-Energy comments at 2.
\16\ Energy Harbor Comments at 19.
\17\ Energy Harbor Comments at 19.
\18\ Energy Harbor Comments at 19-20.
\19\ Constellation Comments at 6.
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(b) The Department's Response
The statute expressly requires recapture both for termination of
operations and for failure to operate at an annual loss in the absence
of an allocation of credits. The recapture regulation satisfies this
requirement. The Department has not included an additional recapture
trigger for violations or safety findings under the nuclear reactor's
NRC license. While adherence by nuclear reactors to the highest safety
standards is critically important, the NRC possesses adequate tools to
enforce its safety requirements and address violations. If the nuclear
reactor is subsequently required to expend incremental funds to remedy
a safety condition or pay a fine, it will not be entitled to reflect
those additional costs in the calculation of credits because each
nuclear reactor's credit amount is capped at the value of credits
awarded in the auction. The Department has included in the recapture
regulation a notice provision and a process to request reconsideration
of a recapture determination. The recapture regulation also allows an
owner or operator of a nuclear reactor that is aggrieved by a decision
on reconsideration to petition the Department's Office of Hearings and
Appeals for review of that decision.
2. Inclusion in the CNC Program of an Annual Adjustment Mechanism
(a) Comments Received
In response to the RFI, the Department received numerous comments
on the use of an annual adjustment mechanism. Generation Atomic stated
that the use of an annual adjustment mechanism is not appropriate
because it is not included in the text of the IIJA, ``or even hinted
at,'' and the only measure for adjustment of credit that has been
authorized by Congress is the recapture mechanism at the end of the 4-
year award period.\20\ This commenter identified the adjustment
mechanisms as being ``several orders of magnitude much more complicated
than Congress intended'' and that as a result ``cash flows will become
far less predictable'' and impair the ability of nuclear reactor to
plan effectively for upgrades.\21\ Energy Harbor did not support the
use of an annual adjustment but instead recommended a recapture
mechanism that uses a three-year rolling average of the forward prices
from the closest trading hub adjusted on an annual basis to determine
if recapture is necessary.\22\ Energy Harbor also noted that each
specific nuclear reactor may have ``a specific contractual agreement
which would make the standardized market price assumption inaccurate,''
in which case the nuclear reactor ``should be able to request an
exception from the standardized market price.'' \23\
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\20\ Generation Atomic Comments at 4.
\21\ Generation Atomic Comments at 5.
\22\ Energy Harbor Comments at 9.
\23\ Energy Harbor Comments at 10.
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Monitoring Analytics, Inc. (Monitoring Analytics) supported use of
an annual adjustment of the credit amount but argued that the
adjustment should be calculated annually in advance, rather than after
the conclusion of the award year. It recommended that a strike price
based on known forward prices should be defined annually for the
following year and that strike price would set the nuclear reactor's
credit level for the following year.\24\ Monitoring Analytics reasoned
that an indexing mechanism like this ``would reduce the need for after
the fact recapture provisions.'' \25\
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\24\ Monitoring Analytics Comments at 15.
\25\ Monitoring Analytics Comments at 14-15.
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Other commenters supported the use of an annual adjustment
conducted at the conclusion of an award year as proposed in the RFI.
For example, Constellation observed that ``[t]he DOE proposal of a
credit price adjustment based on relevant market price indices is a
simple and transparent mechanism which ensures fair after-the-fact
treatment of both suppliers and taxpayers.'' \26\ The Electric Power
Supply Association (EPSA) stated that an annual adjustment mechanism
should be employed and that if the nuclear reactor ``does not operate
at an annual loss in the absence of a CNC credit, those funds must be
recaptured by DOE.'' \27\ NRG Energy, Inc. (NRG Energy) recommended
that the Department perform an annual calculation based on the
reactor's actual revenue, costs, and losses, ``in comparison to and in
substantially the same form as the base projection'' on which the award
was based to measure actual loss and pay out credits.\28\ The Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS) supported an annual adjustment mechanism,
pointing out that an adjustment or indexing mechanism can ``account for
the inherent uncertainties and rapidly changing market conditions that
are often difficult to accurately project,'' as well as ``ensure that
taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and achieve important economic and
emission reduction benefits.'' \29\ However, UCS noted that potential
disadvantages of an annual adjustment or indexing mechanism are that it
may complicate program administration and deter nuclear reactor
participation.\30\ The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) explained that ``a
true-up mechanisms based on transparent and verifiable indicators of
revenues actually realized (i.e., MWh produced and RTO settlements),
relative to the avoided cost threshold for retirement, could result in
no more risk for the reactor and more credits available for the CNC
program.'' \31\
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\26\ Constellation Comments at 6.
\27\ EPSA Comments at 13.
\28\ NRG Energy Comments at 4.
\29\ UCS Comments at 10.
\30\ UCS Comments at 10.
\31\ CATF Comments at 13.
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Comments diverged over whether the Department should adjust awarded
credits based on an index established by the Department or an index
selected by the nuclear reactor, or some other factor. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, NRG Energy recommended that the annual adjustment
be based on actual revenue and other results of operation of the
nuclear reactor. EPSA opposed the use of an index, arguing that the
IIJA requires that nuclear reactors awarded credits must ``demonstrate
on an annual basis that they did or did not operate at an annual loss
in the absence of CNC credits.'' \32\ Epoch Energy Advisory Services,
LLC (Epoch Energy) observed that the Department ``should avoid the
credit from creating windfalls for reactors should market prices turn
out to be high.'' \33\ To avoid this outcome, Epoch Energy proposed a
true-up mechanism based on actual market prices.\34\ Dominion Energy
Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion) stated that the Department should
not use an indexing mechanism, because an index ``does not accurately
reflect the actual revenues earned by a unit'' through forward
contracts and other hedging measures.\35\
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\32\ EPSA Comments at 13.
\33\ Epoch Energy Comments at 5.
\34\ Epoch Energy Comments at 5.
\35\ Dominion Comments at 4-5.
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The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) supported the use of an index at
the option of a reactor but observed that ``[t]here can be a
significant disconnect between a real-time or day-ahead locational
marginal pricing and the actual sales at a plant . . . . If DOE were to
require the award to adjust in reaction to short-term market prices,
there is a risk that the expectations formed from those prices may not
actually be reflected in the realized
[[Page 867]]
revenue at the reactor.'' \36\ PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) supported the
use of an annual adjustment based on an indexing mechanism, but
emphasized that each nuclear reactor should be allowed to select its
own index mechanism that reflects its geographic and market location
and that accounts for the nuclear reactor's forward sales and
hedges.\37\ PSEG stated that if an adjustment mechanism is used, the
Department should not place a ceiling on an upwards adjustment.\38\
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\36\ NEI Comments at 13.
\37\ PSEG Comments at 14, 24-25.
\38\ PSEG Comments at 15.
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UCS supported the use of an annual adjustment, settlement and index
mechanism, depending on design,\39\ and supported ``a ceiling on the
adjusted credit value to ensure that DOE does not owe more money than
is available each year.'' \40\ CATF stated that the adjustment to the
credits must not exceed the level of the nuclear reactor's bid, which
bid itself is limited by the IIJA to not exceed the projected operating
loss.\41\ EPSA stated that if economic conditions change materially
during the 4-year award period such that the nuclear reactor's losses
exceed the credits awarded, the nuclear reactor should be required to
submit a revised bid for CNC credits in a re-certification process,
rather than have its credits increased as part of the annual
adjustment.\42\
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\39\ UCS Comments at 5.
\40\ UCS Comments at 10.
\41\ CATF Comments at 13.
\42\ EPSA Comments at 13.
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(b) The Department's Response
As explained in the Guidance, an owner or operator of a nuclear
reactor that is awarded credits must file an annual report to receive
payment of credits and the Department will audit the reported
information.\43\ The value of credits paid to an owner or operator each
year will be adjusted based on the annual adjustment analysis conducted
as part of the annual review.\44\ The IIJA does not specify the
intervals at which credits will be paid to the owner or operator or the
conditions that the Department may establish to determine the amount to
be paid but does direct the Secretary to periodically audit the
certified nuclear reactor during the award period. The Department
believes that an annual payment process is sufficient to provide timely
payment to nuclear reactors for credits awarded. Furthermore, adjusting
the payment based on an annual audit following the conclusion of the
award year ensures that the payment is properly determined. The annual
calculation will compare actual revenues in certain identified
categories to forecasted revenues for those categories and actual costs
in certain identified categories to forecasted costs for those
categories as used to determine the value of credits that were awarded.
The Department concluded that using actual data in these categories
(rather than indices or industry averages) accurately reflects the
financial results of the nuclear reactor and the owner or operator, and
at the same time is administratively straightforward and auditable.
Other elements of the nuclear reactor's costs, including the cost of
operational and market risks, will be held constant in the annual
adjustment calculation. As required by the IIJA, the credits awarded
represent the ceiling on the annual payment that the nuclear reactor
may receive, but the value of the credits can be reduced or eliminated
based on actual financial results as set forth in the Award Agreement.
This mechanism ensures taxpayer funds are expended only to the extent
that the owner or operator would have experienced an annual loss in the
absence of those credits.
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\43\ Guidance at 35.
\44\ Id. at 34-35.
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3. Relationship of Annual Adjustment Mechanism and Recapture Regulation
(a) Comments Received
Commenters recognized the importance of the recapture provision
working in concert with the audit and annual adjustment mechanism and
other related terms of the CNC Program. NEI cautioned that the goal of
the recapture procedure to ensure the effective use of taxpayer money
``must be balanced against the policy objective Congress sought to
achieve'' to support economically at-risk nuclear reactors.\45\ NEI
worried that ``[a]n overly burdensome recapture provision risks
unintended consequences that undermine the intent of Congress,'' and
could cause a nuclear reactor to cease operations rather than
participate in the CNC program.\46\ The United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of
the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (UA) stated that the Department
``must take care when implementing the CNC Program that operation of
this recapture provision is not overly burdensome such that financially
struggling reactors are discouraged from participating.'' \47\
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\45\ NEI Comments at 7.
\46\ NEI Comments at 7.
\47\ UA Comments at 6.
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NEI also stated that the Department should ensure consistency
between the recapture regulations and the other established elements of
the CNC Program.\48\ For example, NEI explained, operational and market
risks that the IIJA explicitly directs be included in the calculation
of the credits awarded should also be included in the recapture
calculation.\49\ PSEG and Constellation similarly noted that risks
incorporated in the calculations supporting the award of credits should
be included in the annual adjustment and the recapture analysis.\50\
Constellation stated that if the recapture mechanism is ``substantially
different from the proposed annual adjustment, it is likely to create a
significant deterrent to participation and undermine the intent of the
program.'' \51\ UCS noted that an adjustment mechanism ``could interact
directly with the recapture provision,'' such that a reduction in
credits based on changes in revenues would reduce the credits to be
recaptured.\52\ NRG Energy observed that by paying credits based only
on actual losses determined after each award year, the need for
recapture at the conclusion of the 4-year award period would be
eliminated.\53\ PSEG suggested that ``any recapture analysis evaluate a
reactor's economic position over the full period of the CNC Program,
and not on a year-by-year basis.'' \54\
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\48\ NEI Comments at 12.
\49\ NEI Comments at 12.
\50\ PSEG Comments at 21-22; Constellation Comments at 5.
\51\ Constellation Comments at 6.
\52\ UCS Comments at 10. UCS framed this outcome based on the
use of an index in performing the annual adjustment calculation.
\53\ NRG Energy Comments at 4.
\54\ PSEG Comments at 15.
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(b) The Department's Response
The Department has concluded that the use of an effective annual
settlement mechanism to determine the value of credits to be paid to
the owner or operator in each award year will reduce the need for
recapture at the conclusion of the 4-year award period. To do so, the
recapture mechanism must be consistent with the annual adjustment
mechanism because both mechanisms measure the nuclear reactor's
operating results. The Department will evaluate the same revenue and
cost elements in both the annual adjustment and in the recapture
calculation, thereby ensuring that the nuclear reactor receives payment
for credits consistent with the Award Agreement, and at the same time
that taxpayers not fund payments in excess of those required to offset
the nuclear reactor's annual loss.
Following the conclusion of the 4-year award period, the Department
will conduct the recapture analysis to
[[Page 868]]
determine if the nuclear reactor would not have operated at an annual
loss in the preceding 4-year award period in the absence of the credits
that the Department has paid to the owner or operator in accordance
with the annual adjustment mechanism. On the terms to be specified in
the Award Agreement, the Department will adjust the annual payment
based on (i) actual applicable revenues in identified categories
compared to the corresponding revenues projected for that award year
and (b) actual applicable costs in identified categories compared to
the corresponding costs projected for that award year. Operational and
market risks monetized by an applicant and reflected in the Award
Agreement will not be trued up for actual results. The recapture
mechanism will use the same method to determine operating results for
the 4-year award period as is used for the annual adjustment, thereby
providing appropriate certainty to the nuclear reactor of the method
for determining recapture while also meeting the statutory requirement
that the Department recapture credits to the extent that the nuclear
reactor would not have operated at an annual loss in the absence of
those credits.
The Department expects that the annual adjustment mechanism and the
contractual obligation of the nuclear reactor to continue operations
for the entire 4-year award period will limit the need to recapture
credits. Nevertheless, the recapture regulation is required to provide
the Department with a remedy to recover credits if the nuclear would
not have operated at an annual loss in the absence of an allocation of
credits during the 4-year award period. The recapture regulation also
addresses the situation where the nuclear reactor ceases operation
during the 4-year award period. In that circumstance, the Department
will rescind the award of any unpaid credits, including the credits for
the award year in which the termination occurred and for any remaining
award years in the award period. In addition, the Department will
require the owner or operator to repay the value of credits paid with
respect to a prior award year if the Department determines that the
nuclear reactor terminated operations as a result of the owner or
operator's failure to adhere to prudent industry practice in the
operation of the nuclear reactor during the award period. Requiring
forfeiture of credits previously paid for award years where the nuclear
reactor performed as required would not be warranted where the nuclear
reactor in a subsequent award year ceased to operate because of a
mechanical failure, act of nature, or other event that occurred despite
the owner or operator's adherence to prudent industry practice.
IV. Section by Section Analysis of the Interim Final Rule
A. Purpose, Applicability, and Definitions
Section 612.1 of the interim final rule identifies the purpose of
the regulations to set forth the procedure by which the Department may
recapture credits awarded pursuant to the CNC Program. Section 612.2
provides that the regulations will apply to an owner or operator of a
nuclear reactor that is awarded credits under the CNC Program. Section
612.3 contains defined terms used in the regulation.
B. Recapture
Section 612.4(a) of the regulation identifies the two circumstances
in which credits will be recaptured: (1) if the nuclear reactor
terminates operation during the award period or (2) at the conclusion
of the award period if the nuclear reactor would not have operated at
an annual loss in the absence of the credits.
Section 612.4(b) addresses the first circumstance in which
recapture will be pursued, namely termination by the nuclear reactor of
operations during the award period. In that instance, the Secretary
will rescind the award of any unpaid credits, including the credits for
the award year in which the termination occurred and for any remaining
award years in the award period. In addition, the Department will
require the owner or operator to repay the value of credits paid with
respect to a prior award year if the Department determines that the
nuclear reactor terminated operations as a result of the owner or
operator's failure to adhere to prudent industry practice in the
operation of the nuclear reactor during the award period.
Section 612.4(c) addresses recapture in the circumstance in which
the Secretary determines that the nuclear reactor, during the award
period, would not have operated at an annual loss in the absence of the
credits. To make this determination, the Secretary will calculate the
recapture amount in the same manner as the annual adjustment of credits
is calculated. Although this scenario is unlikely because the recapture
analysis will use the same evaluation methodology as the annual
adjustment calculation, it could occur if, for example, subsequent
information became available that differs from the data relied on in
the annual adjustment calculation.
C. Notice and Reconsideration of Recapture Determination
Section 612.5 of the regulation identifies (1) the manner in which
the Secretary will notify an owner or operator of its determination to
recapture credits and payments for previously paid credits, if any, (2)
how an owner or operator may request reconsideration of the recapture
determination, and (3) the effective date of a recapture determination.
This section also specifies that notices issued with respect to
recapture will be public, except that data and supporting documentation
constituting confidential business information will not be disclosed.
D. Petition to the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals
Section 612.6 provides that an owner or operator of a nuclear
reactor that is aggrieved by the Secretary's decision to affirm,
withdraw, or modify the notice of recapture as provided in paragraph
(c) of Sec. 612.5 may file a petition with the Department's Office of
Hearings and Appeals in accordance with 10 CFR 1003.11 not later than
thirty days after notification of the Secretary's decision.
V. Interim Final Rulemaking
This interim final rule is being issued without advance notice and
public comment to allow for immediate implementation of the CNC Program
in accordance with the process described in the Guidance. The
requirements of advance notice and public comment do not apply ``to the
extent that there is involved . . . a matter related to agency . . .
grants, benefits, or contracts.'' 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2). The CNC Program
is a Federal grant or benefit program that awards credits to nuclear
reactors that are selected to receive credits based on a demonstration
that they are projected to cease operations due to economic
factors.\55\ No other aspect of the CNC Program requires regulation for
implementation other than the discrete recapture provision addressed in
this interim final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ In addition, IIJA section 40323(e)(1) provides that the
Secretary will consult with other Federal agencies and select
certified nuclear reactors to be allocated credits,
``notwithstanding section 169 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2209).'' Section 169 of the Atomic Energy Act states that no
funds will be used for the construction or operation of licensed
nuclear facilities ``except under contract or other arrangement
entered into pursuant to section 2051 of this title.'' Section 2051
establishes requirements for contracts and loans for research
activities and grants and contributions. This statutory exception to
section 169 of the Atomic Energy Act provides further evidence that
Congress understood that the CNC Program created an agency ``grant,
benefit, or contract.''
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[[Page 869]]
In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act also provides an
exception to ordinary notice and comment procedures ``when the agency
for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest.'' 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B). This good cause
justification also supports waiver of the 60-day delayed effective date
for major rules under the Congressional Review Act at 5 U.S.C. 808(2).
Although this interim final rule is effective immediately, comments are
solicited from interested members of the public on all aspects of the
interim final rule. The Department intends to issue a final rule
following receipt and review of comments in response to the interim
final rule.
VI. Procedural Requirements
A. Review Under Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' 58 FR
51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), as supplemented and reaffirmed by Executive Order
13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,'' 76 FR 3821 (Jan.
21, 2011) and amended by Executive Order 14094, ``Modernizing
Regulatory Review,'' 88 FR 21879 (April 11, 2023), requires agencies,
to the extent permitted by law, to (1) propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs
(recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify);
(2) tailor regulations to impose the least burden on society,
consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account,
among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of
cumulative regulations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety,
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity); (4) to the
extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying
the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must
adopt; and (5) identify and assess available alternatives to direct
regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the
desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing
information upon which choices can be made by the public. DOE
emphasizes as well that Executive Order 13563 requires agencies to use
the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and
future benefits and costs as accurately as possible. In its guidance,
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has emphasized
that such techniques may include identifying changing future compliance
costs that might result from technological innovation or anticipated
behavioral changes. For the reasons stated in the preamble, this
proposed regulatory action is consistent with these principles.
Section 6(a) of Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to submit
``significant regulatory actions'' to OIRA for review. OIRA has
determined that this proposed regulatory action does not constitute a
``significant regulatory action'' within the scope of Executive Order
12866. Accordingly, this action was not subject to review under that
Executive order by OIRA.
B. Executive Order 13132
Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism,'' 64 FR 43255 (August 4,
1999), imposes certain requirements on agencies formulating and
implementing policies or regulations that preempt State law or that
have federalism implications. Executive Order 13132 requires agencies
to examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any
action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States and
to carefully assess the necessity for such actions. DOE has examined
this interim final rule and has determined that it does not preempt
State law and does not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Moreover, the recapture regulation is required by
statute. No further action is required by Executive Order 13132.
C. Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.,
generally requires public notice and an opportunity for comment before
a rule becomes effective. However, the APA provides that the
requirements of 5 U.S.C. 553 do not apply ``to the extent that there is
involved . . . a matter relating to agency . . . grants, benefits, or
contracts.'' The interim final rule implements the statutory direction
to adopt a regulation to recapture credits awarded under the CNC
Program and addresses the circumstances under which an owner or
operator may forfeit credits for failure to continue to meet the
requirements of the CNC Program pursuant to which the nuclear reactor
has received credits from the United States. The recapture regulation
is thus clearly and directly related to a federal benefits program.
See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Snow, 561 F.2d 227, 232
(D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Alphapointe v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 475 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2020) (``the statutory exemption
still prevails when `grants,' `benefits' or other named subjects are
`clearly and directly' implicated'' (citations omitted)). The
regulation sets forth the ``process necessary to maintain . . .
eligibility for federal funds'', Id., and other ``integral part[s] of
the grant program.'' Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp.
215, 222 (D.D.C. 1976).\56\ As a result, the requirements of 5 U.S.C.
553 do not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Although the CNC Program is not a grant program under the
Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.,
case law treats Federal grants and benefits broadly for purposes of
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The APA also provides an exception to ordinary notice and comment
procedures ``when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued)
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(3)(B); see also 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) (creating an exception to the
requirement of a 30-day delay before the effective date of a rule ``for
good cause found and published with the rule''). Even if 5 U.S.C. 553
applied, the Department would still have good cause under section
553(b)(3)(B) and 553(d)(3) for not undertaking section 553's
requirements. The Department has provided notice and opportunity for
comment on the CNC Program and further pre-publication notice and
comment is unnecessary. In the RFI, the Department identified the
structure of the CNC Program and asked for comment, including on the
relationship of the annual adjustment mechanisms with the recapture
provision. Numerous commenters addressed both the specific structure of
the recapture mechanism, as well as its interaction with the annual
adjustment mechanism. This interim final rule in section III of this
document addresses relevant comments and explains the decisions that
the Department made in preparing the recapture regulation. Although the
Department is seeking further comment on this interim final rule, any
such comments will be addressed in a subsequent regulation and will not
alter the recapture regulation that is
[[Page 870]]
applicable to credits to be awarded for the first award period.
D. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
In this interim final rule, DOE establishes the procedure for the
recapture of credits awarded under the Civil Nuclear Credit Program.
DOE has determined that this rule falls into a class of actions that
are categorically excluded from review under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and DOE's
implementing regulations at 10 CFR part 1021. Specifically, DOE has
determined that promulgating procedures for the recapture of credits
through administrative and audit procedures is consistent with
activities identified in 10 CFR part 1021, appendix A to subpart D, A6.
Therefore, DOE has determined that promulgation of the recapture rule
is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment within the meaning of NEPA and does not require
an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
This interim final rule imposes no information collection
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
F. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires
preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for any rule
that by law must be proposed for public comment. As discussed above,
DOE has determined that prior notice and opportunity for public comment
is unnecessary under the APA. Because a notice of proposed rulemaking
is not required for this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553, or any other
law, no regulatory flexibility analysis has been prepared for this
interim final rule. See 5 U.S.C. 601(2), 603(a).
G. Executive Order 12988
Regarding the review of existing regulations and the promulgation
of new regulations, section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil
Justice Reform,'' 61 FR 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996), imposes on Federal
agencies the general duty to adhere to the following requirements: (1)
eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity; (2) write regulations to
minimize litigation; (3) provide a clear legal standard for affected
conduct rather than a general standard; and (4) promote simplification
and burden reduction. Regarding the review required by section 3(a),
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988 specifically requires that each
executive agency make every reasonable effort to ensure that when it
issues a regulation, the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the
preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on existing
Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for
affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden reduction;
(4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines
key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity
and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney
General. Section 3(c) of Executive Order 12988 requires Executive
agencies to review regulations in light of applicable standards in
sections 3(a) and 3(b) to determine whether they are met or it is
unreasonable to meet one or more of them. DOE has completed the
required review and has determined that, to the extent permitted by
law, this interim final rule meets the relevant standards of Executive
Order 12988.
H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Pub.
L. 104-4) requires each Federal agency to assess the effects of Federal
regulatory actions on State, local, and Tribal governments and the
private sector. For a proposed regulatory action likely to result in a
rule that may cause the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100 million
or more in any one year (adjusted annually for inflation), section 202
of UMRA requires a Federal agency to publish a written statement that
estimates the resulting costs, benefits, and other effects on the
national economy. (2 U.S.C. 1532(a), (b).) UMRA also requires a Federal
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by
elected officers of State, local, and Tribal governments on a proposed
``significant intergovernmental mandate,'' and requires an agency to
plan for giving notice and opportunity for timely input to potentially
affected small governments before establishing any requirements that
might significantly or uniquely affect them. On March 18, 1997, DOE
published a statement of policy on its process for intergovernmental
consultation under UMRA. (62 FR 12820) (This policy is also available
at <a href="http://www.energy.gov/gc/office-general-counsel">www.energy.gov/gc/office-general-counsel</a> under ``Guidance &
Opinions'' (Rulemaking).) DOE examined this interim final rule
according to UMRA and its statement of policy and has determined that
the rule contains neither an intergovernmental mandate, nor a mandate
that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more in any year. Accordingly, no further assessment or
analysis is required under UMRA.
I. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999
Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act, 1999 (Pub. L. 105-277) requires Federal agencies to issue a Family
Policymaking Assessment for any rule that may affect family well-being.
This rule would not have any impact on the autonomy or integrity of the
family as an institution. Accordingly, DOE has concluded that it is not
necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking Assessment.
J. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001
The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44
U.S.C. 3516 note) provides for Federal agencies to review most
disseminations of information to the public under guidelines
established by each agency pursuant to general guidelines issued by
OMB. OMB's guidelines were published at 67 FR 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002), and
DOE's guidelines were published at 67 FR 62446 (Oct. 7, 2002). DOE has
reviewed this interim final rule under the OMB and DOE guidelines and
has concluded that it is consistent with the applicable policies in
those guidelines.
K. Executive Order 13211
Executive Order 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use'' 66 FR 28355
(May 22, 2001), requires Federal agencies to prepare and submit to
OIRA, a Statement of Energy Effects for any proposed significant energy
action. A ``significant energy action'' is defined as any action by an
agency that promulgates or is expected to lead to promulgation of a
final rule and that: (1) is a significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866, or any successor order; and (2) is likely to
have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use
of energy; or (3) is designated by the Administrator of OIRA as a
significant energy action. For any proposed significant energy action,
the agency must give a detailed statement of any adverse effects on
energy supply, distribution, or use should the proposal be implemented,
and of reasonable alternatives to the
[[Page 871]]
action and their expected benefits on energy supply, distribution, and
use. This interim final rule establishes a procedure to recapture
credits awarded under the CNC Program and, therefore, does not meet any
of the three criteria listed above. It is not a significant energy
action because it would not have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy. Accordingly, DOE has not
prepared a Statement of Energy Effects.
L. Congressional Notification
As required by 5 U.S.C. 801, DOE will submit to Congress a report
regarding the issuance of this interim final rule prior to the
effective date set forth at the outset of this interim final rule. The
report will state that it has been determined that this interim final
rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
VII. Approval of the Office of the Secretary
The Secretary of Energy has approved publication of this interim
final rule.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 612
Civil nuclear credit program, Nuclear energy, Nuclear power plants
and reactors, Petition to the Department of Energy's Office of Hearings
and Appeals, Recapture of civil nuclear credits.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on December 8,
2023, by Maria D. Robinson, pursuant to delegated authority from the
Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature is
maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance
with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on January 3, 2024.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE amends chapter II,
subchapter H, of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations by adding
part 612 to read as follows:
PART 612--RECAPTURE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR CREDITS
Sec.
612.1 Purpose.
612.2 Applicability.
612.3 Definitions.
612.4 Recapture.
612.5 Notice of recapture; request for reconsideration;
effectiveness of recapture.
612.6 Petition to the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7254; 42 U.S.C. 18753.
Sec. 612.1 Purpose.
This part implements section 40323(g)(2) of the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (Pub. L. 117-58), codified at 42 U.S.C.
18753(g)(2), to set forth the procedure to recapture credits awarded
pursuant to the civil nuclear credit program.
Sec. 612.2 Applicability.
This part applies to an owner/operator of a nuclear reactor that is
awarded credits pursuant to the civil nuclear credit program.
Sec. 612.3 Definitions.
Award period means the period beginning with the first day of the
award year for which the owner/operator has been awarded credits up to
and including the last day of the fourth award year thereafter.
Award year means a 12-month period beginning on the effective date
of the award of credits and each anniversary thereof during the award
period.
CNC program means the civil nuclear credit program established by
the Secretary pursuant to section 40323 of the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (Pub. L. 117-58) codified at 42 U.S.C. 18753.
Credits means the credits awarded to an owner/operator of a nuclear
reactor projected to cease operations due to economic factors and
certified by the Department as part of the CNC program.
Department means the Department of Energy.
Nuclear reactor means a nuclear power reactor unit with respect to
which an owner/operator has been awarded credits pursuant to the civil
nuclear credit program.
Owner/operator means the owner or operator of a nuclear reactor
that has been awarded credits pursuant to the civil nuclear credit
program.
Secretary means the Secretary of Energy.
Sec. 612.4 Recapture.
(a) Credits allocated to an owner/operator shall be subject to
recapture--
(1) If the nuclear reactor terminates operations during the award
period, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section; or
(2) At the conclusion of the award period, if the nuclear reactor
would not have operated at an annual loss in the absence of the
credits, pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) If the Department determines that a nuclear reactor has
terminated operations during the award period, then the Department will
recapture the award of credits for the award year in which the
termination of operations occurred and for any remaining award years by
rescinding the credits awarded but not paid, and the owner/operator
shall have no further rights to any credits. In addition, the value of
credits that the Department has previously paid to the owner/operator
with respect to a prior award year shall be repaid to the Department by
the owner/operator if the Department determines that the nuclear
reactor terminated operations as a result of the owner/operator's
failure to adhere to prudent industry practice in the operation of the
nuclear reactor during the award period.
(c) Following the conclusion of the award period, the Department
will determine whether, for the award period, the nuclear reactor would
not have operated at an annual loss in the absence of the credits. The
amount subject to recapture following the conclusion of the award
period shall be determined in the same manner that the annual
adjustment of credits is calculated under the terms of the award of
such credits.
Sec. 612.5 Notice of recapture; request for reconsideration;
effectiveness of recapture.
(a) Notice of recapture determination. If pursuant to Sec. 612.4,
the Department determines that:
(1) An amount of credits not yet paid should be recaptured; and
(2) That any credits previously paid to the owner/operator should
be recaptured, the Secretary will provide to an owner/operator a
written notice of the amount of credits subject to the recapture
determination and the value of credits that the Department has
previously paid to an owner/operator and that are subject to recapture,
if any, with an explanation of such amount.
(b) Request for reconsideration. Unless the Department extends the
time period, within 30 calendar days of receipt of a notice of
recapture provided to an owner/operator under paragraph (a) of this
section, an owner/operator may submit a written request to the
Department requesting reconsideration of the recapture determination.
To
[[Page 872]]
request reconsideration of the recapture determination, an owner/
operator must submit to the Department a written request that includes:
(1) An explanation of why the owner/operator believes all or some
of the credits (and the value of any credits previously paid) should
not be subject to recapture; and
(2) Supporting information and calculations.
(c) Notification of final amount subject to recapture. Unless the
Department extends the time period, within 60 days of receipt of an
owner/operator's request for reconsideration provided pursuant to
paragraph (b) of this section, the owner/operator will be notified of
the Department's decision to affirm, withdraw, or modify the notice of
recapture. The notification will include an explanation of the
decision, including responses to the owner/operator's supporting
reasons and consideration of additional information provided.
(d) Effectiveness of recapture. (1) If the owner/operator has not
requested reconsideration as provided in paragraph (b) of this section;
(i) The credits will be deemed to be recaptured as of the date of
the notification provided by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section and the owner/operator will have no further right or claim
to those credits; and
(ii) The owner/operator shall repay to the Department the value of
credits that the Department has paid to the owner/operator and that are
subject to recapture under Sec. 612.4 within 30 calendar days of the
date of notification provided by the Department pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section.
(2) If the owner/operator has requested reconsideration as provided
in paragraph (b) of this section;
(i) The credits will be deemed to be recaptured as of the date of
the notification provided by the Department pursuant to paragraph (c)
of this section and the owner/operator will have no further right or
claim to those credits; and
(ii) The owner/operator shall pay to the Department the value of
credits that the Department has previously paid to the owner/operator
and that are subject to recapture under Sec. 612.4 within 30 calendar
days of the date of notification provided by the Department pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section.
(e) Notice. Notices issued by the Department under this section
shall be made public by the Department, with the exception of any data
or supporting documentation constituting confidential business
information not subject to disclosure.
Sec. 612.6 Petition to the Department's Office of Hearings and
Appeals.
In order to exhaust its administrative remedies, an owner/operator
who is aggrieved by the Secretary's decision to affirm, withdraw, or
modify the notice of recapture as provided in Sec. 612.5(c) may file a
petition with the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals in
accordance with 10 CFR 1003.11 not later than thirty days after
notification of the Department's decision.
[FR Doc. 2024-00153 Filed 1-5-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.