Proposed Rule2023-22421
Guidelines Establishing Standards for Corporate Governance and Risk Management for Covered Institutions With Total Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or More
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
October 11, 2023
Issuing agencies
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Abstract
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is seeking comment on proposed corporate governance and risk management guidelines (Guidelines) that would apply to all insured state nonmember banks, state-licensed insured branches of foreign banks, and insured state savings associations that are subject to Section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more on or after the effective date of the final Guidelines. These proposed Guidelines would be issued as Appendix C to FDIC's standards for safety and soundness regulations in part 364, pursuant to Section 39 of the FDI Act, and would be enforceable under Section 39. The FDIC also proposes to make corresponding amendments to parts 308 and 364 of its regulations to implement the proposed Guidelines.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 195 (Wednesday, October 11, 2023)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 195 (Wednesday, October 11, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 70391-70409]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-22421]
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Parts 308 and 364
RIN 3064-AF94
Guidelines Establishing Standards for Corporate Governance and
Risk Management for Covered Institutions With Total Consolidated Assets
of $10 Billion or More
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and issuance of guidelines.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is seeking
comment on proposed corporate governance and risk management guidelines
(Guidelines) that would apply to all insured state nonmember banks,
state-licensed insured branches of foreign banks, and insured state
savings associations that are subject to Section 39 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), with total consolidated assets of $10
billion or more on or after the effective date of the final Guidelines.
These proposed Guidelines would be issued as Appendix C to FDIC's
standards for safety and soundness regulations in part 364, pursuant to
Section 39 of the FDI Act, and would be enforceable under Section 39.
The FDIC also proposes to make corresponding amendments to parts 308
and 364 of its regulations to implement the proposed Guidelines.
DATES: Comments on the proposed Guidelines must be received by December
11, 2023.
ADDRESSES: The FDIC encourages interested parties to submit written
comments. Please include your name, affiliation, address, email
address, and telephone number(s) in your comment. You may submit
comments to the FDIC, identified by RIN 3064-AF94, by any of the
following methods:
Agency Website: <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-register-publications">https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-register-publications</a>. Follow instructions for submitting comments on
the FDIC's website.
Mail: James P. Sheesley, Assistant Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments/Legal OES (RIN 3064-AF94), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivered/Courier: Comments may be hand-delivered to the guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street NW building (located on F
Street NW) on business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3655595b5b535842457670727f7518515940"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b8dbd7d5d5ddd6cccbf8fefcf1fb96dfd7ce">[email protected]</span></a>. Include RIN 3064-AF94 in the subject line
of the message.
Public Inspection: Comments received, including any personal
information provided, may be posted without change to <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-registerpublications/">https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-registerpublications/</a>.
Commenters should submit only information that the commenter wishes to
make available publicly. The FDIC may review, redact, or refrain from
posting all or any portion of any comment that it may deem to be
inappropriate for publication, such as irrelevant or obscene material.
The FDIC may post only a single representative example of identical or
substantially identical comments, and in such cases will generally
identify the number of identical or substantially identical comments
represented by the posted example. All comments that have been
redacted, as well as those that have not been posted, that contain
comments on the merits of this notice will be retained in the public
comment file and will be considered as required under all applicable
laws. All comments may be accessible under the Freedom of Information
Act.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Division of Risk Management
Supervision: Judy E. Gross, Senior Policy Analyst, 202-898-7047,
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#501a2517223f232310161419137e373f26"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9cd6e9dbeef3efefdcdad8d5dfb2fbf3ea">[email protected]</span></a>; Legal Division: Jennifer M. Jones, Counsel, 202-898-
6768; Catherine Topping, Counsel, 202-898-3975; Nicholas A. Simons,
Senior Attorney, 202-898-6785; Kimberly Yeh, Senior Attorney, 202-898-
6514.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Policy Objectives
Strong corporate governance is the foundation for an insured
depository institution's safe and sound operations. An effective
governance framework is necessary for an insured depository institution
to remain profitable, competitive, and resilient through changing
economic and market conditions. The board of directors serves a
critical role in maintaining an insured depository institution's safety
and soundness and continued financial and operational resilience.
The FDIC observed during the 2008 financial crisis and more recent
bank \1\ failures in 2023 that financial institutions with poor
corporate governance and risk management practices were more likely to
fail.\2\ Reports reviewing the recent 2023 bank failures noted that
poor corporate governance and risk management practices were
contributing factors.\3\ Failures of insured depository institutions
(IDIs) impose costs on the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and negatively
affect a wide variety of stakeholders including the institution's
depositors and shareholders, employees, customers (including consumers
and businesses that rely on the institution's services and the
availability of credit), regulators, and the public as a whole.
Insufficient attention and
[[Page 70392]]
responsiveness to internal controls and governance processes can result
in noncompliance with laws and regulations going undetected or
unaddressed.
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\1\ The term ``bank'' is used to mean the same thing as
``insured depository institution'' as defined in Section 3 of the
FDI Act.
\2\ Lessons Learned and a Framework for Monitoring Emerging
Risks and Regulatory Response, GAO Report to Congress, GAO-15-365,
June 2015; FDIC OIG Reports--Bank Failures, <a href="https://www.fdicoig.gov/reports-publications/bank-failures">https://www.fdicoig.gov/reports-publications/bank-failures</a>; Remarks by Martin J. Gruenberg,
Chairman, FDIC to the American Association of Bank Directors, May
12, 2015, <a href="https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/1717">https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/1717</a>; Review of the
Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank,
April 2023, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf">https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf</a>; FDIC's Supervision of Signature Bank, April
2023, <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23033a.pdf">https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23033a.pdf</a>.
\3\ The FDIC report on the failure of Signature Bank in 2023
found that the root cause of the failure was poor management without
adequate risk management practices and controls. The institution's
management did not prioritize good corporate governance practices
(FDIC's Supervision of Signature Bank, April 28, 2023, p. 2). The
Federal Reserve Board's report on the failure of Silicon Valley Bank
also identified governance and risk management failures that led to
the failure. (Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and
Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, April 2023, p. 1).
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The safety and soundness standards in part 364 currently include
guidelines in Appendix A,\4\ which contain operational and managerial
standards for insured state nonmember banks, state-licensed insured
branches of foreign banks, and insured state savings associations
(together, ``FDIC-supervised institutions'').\5\ In smaller, noncomplex
institutions, risk management processes and internal controls that
generally incorporate these standards may be adequate. However, as the
recent bank failures show, corporate and risk governance structure and
practices should keep pace with the bank's changes in size, business
model, risk profile, and complexity. Larger or more complex
institutions should have more sophisticated and formal board and
management structures and practices to ensure appropriate corporate
governance.
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\4\ See 12 CFR part 364, Appendix A; <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-8630.html#fdic2000appendixatopart364">https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-8630.html#fdic2000appendixatopart364</a>.
\5\ The FDIC is the federal banking regulator for such
institutions set forth in Section 3(q)(1) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C.
1813(q)(1), and has the authority to promulgate safety and soundness
regulations for such institutions pursuant to Section 39 of the FDI
Act, 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1.
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In order to strengthen the corporate governance and risk management
practices of large institutions, the FDIC is proposing to issue
Guidelines as a new Appendix C to part 364 to address corporate
governance and risk management practices and board oversight. The
proposed Guidelines would apply to all FDIC-supervised institutions
with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more on or after the
effective date of the final Guidelines (together ``covered
institutions'' and each, a ``covered institution''). The proposed
Guidelines would apply in addition to any other requirements
established by law or regulation.\6\ The FDIC's supervisory experience
has shown that institutions with assets greater than $10 billion are
larger, more complex and present a higher risk profile. The proposed
Guidelines are intended to raise the FDIC's standards for corporate
governance, risk management, and control to help ensure these larger
institutions effectively anticipate, evaluate, and mitigate the risks
they face.
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\6\ All FDIC-supervised institutions, including covered
institutions, may continue to utilize existing guidance in
establishing appropriate corporate guidance processes. However,
should an inconsistency exist between existing guidance and the
proposed Guidelines, the proposed Guidelines will govern the
activities of a covered institution since any final guidelines will
be codified in Appendix C to part 364.
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In developing the proposed Guidelines, the FDIC considered other
statutory and regulatory authorities that impose requirements and
expectations concerning corporate governance activities and risk
management practices. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) has developed heightened expectations to strengthen the
corporate governance and risk management practices of large national
banks with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. Under
guidelines the OCC issued pursuant to Section 39 of the FDI Act, it
expects larger national banks to establish and implement a risk
governance framework for managing and controlling the bank's risk
taking.\7\ The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Federal Reserve Board) has incorporated corporate governance and risk
management requirements in Regulation YY \8\ and various Supervision
and Regulation (SR) Letters for bank holding companies with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. The Federal Reserve Board
has also noted that the risk management processes of a regional IDI,
which it generally considers to be a midsize IDI with total
consolidated assets between $10 and $100 billion, should typically
contain detailed guidelines that set specific prudent limits on the
principal types of risks relevant to a regional IDI's consolidated
activities.\9\
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\7\ See OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for
Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings
Associations, and Insured Federal Branches; Integration of
Regulations, 79 FR 54518 (Sept. 11, 2014), <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/09/11/2014-21224/occ-guidelines-establishing-heightened-standards-for-certain-large-insured-national-banks-insured">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/09/11/2014-21224/occ-guidelines-establishing-heightened-standards-for-certain-large-insured-national-banks-insured</a>; OCC, Comptroller's Handbook--
Corporate and Risk Governance, <a href="https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-handbook/files/corporate-risk-governance/index-corporate-and-risk-governance.html">https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-handbook/files/corporate-risk-governance/index-corporate-and-risk-governance.html</a>.
\8\ 12 CFR 252.22, subpart C--Risk Committee Requirements for
Bank Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets of $50 Billion
or More and Less Than $100 Billion. The Federal Reserve Board
initially set the application of risk committee requirements under
Regulation YY, among other requirements, for banks with total
consolidated assets of $10 billion or more pursuant to Section 165
of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. 79 FR 17239, 17248 (Mar. 27, 2014).
This threshold was raised from $10 billion to $50 billion pursuant
to changes made under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act of 2018. 84 FR 59032, 59055 (Nov. 1, 2019).
\9\ See SR 16-11: Supervisory Guidance for Assessing Risk
Management at Supervised Institutions with Total Consolidated Assets
Less than $100 Billion (June 8, 2016; revised and reposted February
17, 2021, p. 3). SR letter 95-51, Rating the Adequacy of Risk
Management Processes and Internal Controls at State Member Banks and
Bank Holding Companies (Nov. 14, 1995; revised Feb. 26, 2021)
remains applicable to state member banks and bank holding companies
with $100 billion or more in total assets. The Federal Reserve
Board's Commercial Bank Examination Manual, Community Bank
Supervision Process (Nov. 2020) applies the term ``community bank''
to generally describe a bank with $10 billion or less in total
consolidated assets.
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The proposed Guidelines are drawn from the principles set forth in
the authorities noted above and would therefore align the FDIC's
supervisory framework more closely with the other Federal banking
agencies. Although the proposed Guidelines would apply more broadly to
capture FDIC-supervised institutions with total assets of $10 billion
or more, the FDIC believes that the proposed scope of application
threshold is appropriate, as effective risk management practices should
be tailored to the size of the institution and the nature, scope, and
risk of its activities. These institutions are typically more complex
and present a higher risk profile than community banking organizations
with less than $10 billion in total assets.
II. Background
Prior Supervisory Guidance and Guidelines
Over many years, the FDIC has issued guidance for IDIs on corporate
governance and risk management, and expectations relating to boards of
directors, with all guidance and expectations scaled to the size,
complexity, and risk profile of the IDI. For example, in 1988, the FDIC
issued the Pocket Guide for Directors \10\ to provide guidance to
community bank directors about long-standing, broad principles on
corporate governance and fiduciary responsibilities. In 1992, the FDIC
issued a ``Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of Bank Directors
and Officers.'' \11\ In 2005, the FDIC issued a document, ``Corporate
Codes of Conduct: Guidance on Implementing an Effective Ethics
Program.'' \12\ Further, in 2018 the FDIC published an issue of
Supervisory Insights \13\ as a resource specifically for community bank
directors with an interest in bank
[[Page 70393]]
governance and bank directors' responsibilities.
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\10\ <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/pocket/">https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/pocket/</a>
.
\11\ Financial Institution Letter (FIL--87--92) dated December
3, 1992, <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3300.html">https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3300.html</a>.
\12\ <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2005/fil10505.html">https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2005/fil10505.html</a>.
\13\ This is an informational resource but is not regulatory
guidance: Special Governance Issue; April 2016, revised October
2018, <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sise16/si-se2016.pdf">https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sise16/si-se2016.pdf</a>.
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The FDIC's safety and soundness standards in part 364 currently
include guidelines in Appendix A that contain operational and
managerial standards.\14\ Appendix A describes the fundamental
governance and risk management standards the FDIC expects FDIC-
supervised institutions to implement in a manner appropriate to the
scope and complexity of their operations. In addition to Appendix A,
the FDIC includes corporate governance and risk management expectations
relevant to specific areas in topical rules, such as for appraisals
\15\ and stress testing,\16\ and in guidance, such as the Interagency
Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management.\17\
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\14\ 12 CFR part 364, Appendix A; <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-8630.html#fdic2000appendixatopart364">https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-8630.html#fdic2000appendixatopart364</a>.
\15\ 12 CFR part 323.
\16\ 12 CFR part 325.
\17\ 88 FR 37920 (Jun. 9, 2023).
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Examinations for Safety and Soundness
Corporate governance and risk management practices are core
considerations in evaluating management at IDIs as part of FDIC's
examinations for safety and soundness. Section 4.1 of the FDIC's Risk
Management Manual of Examination Policies \18\ (Manual) reiterates the
importance of good management:
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\18\ <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/">https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/</a>.
In the complex, competitive, and rapidly changing environment of
financial institutions, it is extremely important for all members of
bank management to be aware of their responsibilities and to
discharge those responsibilities in a manner which will ensure
stability and soundness of the institution, so that it may continue
to provide to the community the financial services for which it was
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created.
Section 4.2 of the Manual discusses the importance of risk
assessment and management:
Risk assessments are conducted in order to identify, measure,
and prioritize risks so that attention is placed first on areas of
greatest importance. Risk assessments should analyze threats to all
significant business lines, the sufficiency of mitigating controls,
and any residual risk exposures.
Although the FDIC has not previously issued supervisory guidelines
or regulations specifically on corporate governance and risk management
for covered institutions, the FDIC expects these larger IDIs to have
more detailed and formal guidance frameworks, given their size and
complexity. The FDIC has implemented a continuous examination process
(CEP) for the largest IDIs that it supervises.\19\ IDIs that are
supervised under a CEP are not directly tied to an asset size; however,
most FDIC-supervised IDIs with assets of $10 billion or more are
supervised through a CEP since they are larger, more complex, or
present a higher risk profile. The CEP includes onsite targeted reviews
of areas the examiner determines are necessary to complete a full-scope
examination; ongoing monitoring and assessment of institution risks,
policies, procedures, and financial condition; and frequent
communication with bank management. A dedicated or designated examiner-
in-charge (EIC) oversees the continuous examination process and may be
supported by additional dedicated examination staff. IDIs with assets
of $10 billion or more are also subject to increased off-site review
activities and more granular risk-based deposit insurance pricing due
to their increased size and complexity.
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\19\ See Section 1.1 of the Manual.
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The requirements in these proposed Guidelines generally reflect
existing principles and what examiners consider necessary for the safe
and sound operation of a covered institution. In addition, these
proposed Guidelines are intended to be generally consistent with the
goals communicated through the OCC's and Federal Reserve Board's
published issuances in an effort to harmonize corporate governance and
risk management requirements for covered institutions that present a
higher risk profile with those applicable to entities supervised by the
other Federal banking agencies.
Most of the risk management practices to be established and
maintained by a covered institution to meet these safety and soundness
standards, including having appropriate loan review and credit
underwriting and administration practices, are already components of
the institution's risk governance framework. As discussed below in
Section III, the FDIC is adding a requirement (consistent with the OCC
and Federal Reserve Board standards) for covered institutions to
establish a three-lines-of-defense model: business units (front line
units), independent risk management unit, and internal audit unit.
Rulemaking Authority
The FDIC is issuing the proposed Guidelines pursuant to Section 39
\20\ of the FDI Act. Section 39 generally prescribes safety and
soundness standards for insured depository institutions. Under
subsection (a) of the statute, the FDIC, as the appropriate Federal
banking agency for insured state nonmember banks, state-licensed
insured branches of foreign banks, and insured state savings
associations, may prescribe such standards, including other operational
and managerial standards, by issuing a regulation or guideline.
Pursuant to Section 39, if a covered institution fails to meet a
standard prescribed by regulation, the FDIC must require the
institution to submit a plan specifying the steps that it will take to
comply with the standard. If a covered institution fails to meet a
standard prescribed by guideline, the FDIC has the discretion to decide
whether to require the submission of a plan.\21\ The issuance of these
standards as Guidelines rather than as a regulation provides the FDIC
with supervisory flexibility to pursue the course of action that is
most appropriate given the specific circumstances of a covered
institution's failure to meet one or more of the standards, and the
covered institution's self-corrective and remedial responses.\22\
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\20\ 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1.
\21\ Pursuant to Section 39, if the FDIC determines that an IDI
fails to meet any standard prescribed in the guidelines issued under
subsection (a) or (b) of Section 39, the FDIC may require the IDI to
submit a plan that specifies the steps that the institution will
take to correct the deficiency (such plan is referred to as a
``Section 39 Plan''). Further, Section 39 provides that if an IDI
fails to submit an acceptable Section 39 Plan or fails in any
material respect to implement an acceptable Section 39 Plan, the
FDIC, by order shall require the institution to correct the
deficiency and may take additional enumerated actions, including
growth restrictions, increased capital requirements, and
restrictions on interest rates paid on deposits.
\22\ The FDIC's procedural rules implementing Section 39 are
contained in 12 CFR part 308, subpart R. As part of this rulemaking,
an amendment to 12 CFR 308.302(a) is being proposed to add a
reference the proposed Guidelines. Similarly, a new paragraph (c) is
being proposed to 12 CFR 364.101 to add a reference to the proposed
Guidelines.
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III. Description of the Proposed Guidelines
The proposed Guidelines contain standards for corporate governance
and risk management for covered institutions. The proposed Guidelines
include a description of the general obligations of the board to ensure
good corporate governance.\23\ The FDIC expects all FDIC-supervised
institutions to have good corporate governance, including the key
component of an active and involved board protecting the interests of
the institution rather than the interests of the parent or affiliate of
[[Page 70394]]
the institution. The proposed Guidelines for covered institutions
emphasize the importance of developing a strategic plan and risk
management policies and procedures and selecting and supervising senior
management so that a covered institution will operate in a safe and
sound manner. The proposed Guidelines also emphasize the importance for
the board and management to adopt a code of ethics, to demonstrate high
ethical standards in the covered institutions' operations, and to act
to ensure the covered institution and its employees adhere to
applicable laws and regulations, including consumer protection laws and
regulations, and the Community Reinvestment Act.
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\23\ Under the proposed Guidelines, the FDIC reserves authority
to modify or extend the time for compliance for any IDI with $10
billion or more in assets and to modify the proposed Guidelines, as
necessary, to address their applicability to insured branches of
foreign banks because those institutions do not have a board.
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A. Section I--Introduction
This section describes the scope of FDIC-supervised institutions
that would be subject to the proposed Guidelines. The proposed
Guidelines would apply to all insured state nonmember banks, state-
licensed insured branches of foreign banks, and insured state savings
associations that are subject to the provisions of Section 39 of the
FDI Act, with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more on or
after the effective date of the final Guidelines. The proposal defines
``total consolidated assets'' for purposes of meeting the $10 billion
threshold as total assets reported on an institution's Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) for the two most recent
consecutive quarters. The institutions which meet these criteria are
``covered institutions'' under the proposed Guidelines. As analyzed
more fully in the discussion of the expected effects of the proposed
Guidelines below, the FDIC believes this proposed $10 billion threshold
will reduce the likelihood of failure and the magnitude of losses in
the event of a failure. As of March 31, 2023, there are 57 covered
institutions.\24\
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\24\ FDIC Call Report Data, March 31, 2023. Count excludes First
Republic Bank, which was closed by the California Department of
Financial Protection and Innovation and the FDIC was appointed
Receiver on May 1, 2023.
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The FDIC proposes to apply the Guidelines to institutions whose
Call Report filings reflect two consecutive quarters of total assets
above $10 billion to provide institutions an ``on-ramp'' for
compliance. This provides a certain amount of time for institutions to
develop the policies, procedures, and programs they need to comply with
the proposed Guidelines before they become a ``covered institution'' on
the as-of date of the Call Report for the second consecutive quarter in
which their total consolidated assets exceed $10 billion. Additionally,
it will allow institutions that may only briefly exceed the threshold
to reduce their total consolidated assets over the following quarter
without needing to comply with the Guidelines. The FDIC expects that
institutions would be well aware in advance if they would exceed the
$10 billion threshold and develop compliance programs in advance or
plan to reduce their assets. Finally, the FDIC proposes to consider an
institution to no longer be a ``covered institution'' if its Call
Report filings show total consolidated assets below $10 billion for
four consecutive quarters. The FDIC believes that these asset
thresholds based on quarterly Call Report filings strike a balance
between application of the Guidelines for larger, more complex
institutions, while not capturing less-complex institutions whose total
assets only exceed $10 billion briefly or whose size is reduced over
time. This proposed asset threshold, however, is subject to the FDIC's
existing authority as described below.
The proposed Guidelines include preservation and reservation of the
FDIC's existing authority to address unsafe or unsound practices of all
FDIC-supervised institutions. The Guidelines preserve the FDIC's
authority to bring any enforcement action available to it independently
of, in conjunction with, or in addition to any action under Section 39
of the FDI Act. Further, the FDIC reserves the authority to apply the
proposed Guidelines, in whole or in part, to institutions with less
than $10 billion in total consolidated assets if the FDIC determines
that the institution's operations are highly complex or present
heightened risk. The FDIC also reserves the authority, for each covered
institution, to extend the time for compliance with these Guidelines or
modify these Guidelines, as necessary, and can determine that
compliance should no longer be required for covered institutions, if
the institution's operations are no longer highly complex or no longer
present a heightened risk. The FDIC's reservation of authority is not
restricted by the asset threshold, as described above.
The Introduction also includes Definitions for terms used
throughout the proposed Guidelines and a description of the role,
responsibility, and structure of certain positions and functions within
a covered institution that have a role in the risk management and
corporate governance of the covered institution. This section defines
both the Chief Audit Officer (CAO) and the Chief Risk Officer (CRO)
within a covered institution, describing their responsibilities and
reporting structure. The CAO and CRO lead the internal audit unit and
the independent risk management unit, respectively. The internal audit
unit and the independent risk management unit maintain independence
from front line units through the structure outlined in their
respective definitions and as further detailed throughout the proposed
Guidelines. Front line units mean those units that, in general,
generate revenue or reduce costs for the covered institution. This
proposed section also defines a covered institution's parent company.
Finally, this proposed section defines the risk appetite and risk
profile for the covered institution.
B. Section II--Corporate Governance
The board of directors of a covered institution has the ultimate
responsibility for the safe and sound operation of the institution,
overseeing management, and fulfilling its fiduciary duties. Effective
corporate governance depends upon a board of directors that is active
and engaged. As noted elsewhere in the discussion of these proposed
Guidelines, the FDIC has observed that institutions with weak corporate
governance are more likely to fail and are more likely to experience
significant losses upon failure. To ensure the safety and soundness of
covered institutions and the stability of the financial system, the
FDIC is proposing these Guidelines for the boards of covered
institutions regarding their obligations, composition, duties, and
committee structure to set expectations for corporate governance.
Subsection A--Board of Directors--General Obligations
Proposed Section II, Subsection A describes the general obligations
of a covered institution's board of directors. The board is ultimately
responsible for the affairs of the covered institution and each
individual member must abide by certain legal duties. These legal
duties flow from the myriad federal and state laws applicable to the
covered institution, securities law and bank regulation, common law,
and other sources that may impose criminal or civil liability on
directors that fail to discharge their duties. Boards should
familiarize themselves with and refer to all applicable federal and
state law requirements.
Subsection B--Board Composition
These proposed Guidelines also establish an expectation for the
composition of the board of directors. There should be at least a
majority of independent directors on the board. An appropriately sized,
diverse board of
[[Page 70395]]
directors promotes effective, independent oversight of a covered
institution and is important to the overall risk management of the
institution. Diversity of demographic representation, opinion,
experience, and ownership level is key to a board composition that can
oversee management, address a variety of risks, and challenge others
when necessary. A board that includes multiple members with similar
experiences, opinions, or interests in the covered institution may
result in a lack of creativity or individual responsibility for
decisions, or gaps in knowledge, experience, or oversight, increasing
risk to the institution.
The covered institution's organizational documents or state
chartering authority may have requirements for board members, including
a requirement for a certain number of directors. The proposed
Guidelines expand upon, but do not replace, these requirements by
providing covered institutions various considerations for ensuring an
effective board composition. In determining the appropriate number of
directors and the board's composition in accordance with state law, the
board should consider how the selection of, and diversity among board
members collectively and individually, may best promote effective,
independent oversight of the covered institution's management and
satisfy all legal requirements for outside and independent
directors.\25\
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\25\ For example, the Depository Institutions Management
Interlocks Act (12 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) that generally prohibits a
management official from serving two nonaffiliated depository
organizations in situations where the management interlock likely
would have an anticompetitive effect.
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Subsection C--Duties of the Board
The duties of the board of directors of a covered institution flow
from their responsibilities to fulfill their fiduciary duties, oversee
management, and ensure safe and sound operation of the institution. As
these responsibilities ultimately lie with the board, the FDIC is
proposing the following Guidelines for the minimum duties of the boards
of covered institutions. Each of the following duties is an integral
component of the board's overall responsibility for risk management of
the covered institution, holding executives and management accountable,
and ensuring ethical operations.
The proposed Guidelines state that the board of a covered
institution should set an appropriate tone for the institution. The
``tone at the top'' is integral to promoting a culture and environment
of responsible and ethical behavior that discourages imprudent risk-
taking in pursuit of profit. The proposed Guidelines include this
responsibility for the board, in alignment with similar guidelines
imposed by the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC. The tone set by the
board is closely related to other concepts throughout the proposed
Guidelines, including a Code of Ethics that encourages responsible
behavior and a Compensation and Performance Management Program that
does not incentivize imprudent risk-taking. By adhering to the law,
these proposed Guidelines, and the board's own policies, the board sets
the tone for the covered institution as a whole and reduces the
likelihood or cost of failure.
The proposed Guidelines state that the board is responsible for the
strategic plan and direction of the covered institution. Development
and approval of a strategic plan is a common responsibility of a board
of directors and its inclusion in these proposed Guidelines elaborates
on the FDIC's expectations for such a plan to ensure the board of a
covered institution is engaged with its business objectives while
appropriately managing risk. A strategic plan developed by the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) with input from front-line units, independent
risk management, and internal audit, and ultimately approved by the
board, sets the direction of a covered institution to achieve business
goals and manage the covered institution's risks. The strategic plan
should cover at least a three-year period and be reviewed and approved
annually to account for changing business conditions and risks to the
covered institution.
The board of directors of a covered institution is also responsible
for establishing the policies by which the institution operates, and
these proposed Guidelines provide a high-level overview of such
responsibility. Similar to a strategic plan, the adoption of policies
ensures board engagement, prudent and proper risk management, and safe
and sound operation. These proposed Guidelines do not prescribe the
exact policies that the board of a covered institution may adopt; each
institution varies in its business activities and unique risks and is
responsible for making that determination itself. At a minimum, the
covered institution should adopt policies and procedures to ensure safe
and sound operation and fulfill the responsibilities outlined in
Appendix A of part 364. For example, such policies and procedures may
include a loan and/or credit policy, certain internal controls, and
guides for assets and liabilities. Other statutes, regulations, or
supervisory policies may require adoption of policies and procedures as
well, such as compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, consumer protection
laws, the Community Reinvestment Act, and other legal requirements that
may exist. The board should periodically review and revise its policies
to ensure that they remain applicable and account for new or changing
risks of the institution. Finally, compliance with the board's policies
should be periodically reviewed by the internal audit function of the
institution.
A Code of Ethics, written and adopted by the board, is integral to
establishing an appropriate tone in a covered institution and setting
expectations for behavior that manages risk. The proposed Guidelines
state that the Code of Ethics should apply to all directors,
management, and employees. The proposed Guidelines also state, broadly,
the areas that should be addressed by such a Code, including procedures
and points of contact for reporting illegal or unethical behavior. A
Code of Ethics should include topics addressing legal requirements,
such as insider information, disclosure, and self-dealing.
The board of a covered institution should also provide active
oversight of management. As the body that appoints and compensates the
CEO (and possibly other management as well, either as a whole or by
committee), it is the responsibility of the board of the covered
institution to oversee the management that it has hired. Similarly, the
board is responsible for overseeing compliance with the policies that
it establishes, such as the strategic plan and the Code of Ethics, and
is ultimately responsible for compliance with applicable laws and
regulations. Under these proposed Guidelines, the board should hold
management accountable and challenge and question management as
necessary to ensure safe and sound operation of the covered
institution.
The obligation of an individual board member to exercise
independent judgment is included in the proposed Guidelines. Exercising
sound, independent judgment is integral to a director's responsibility
and duties to a covered institution. In addition, individual directors
and the board as a whole should exercise independent judgment by
ensuring that they are not excessively influenced by a single dominant
policymaker, who may be a director, management, shareholder, or other
individual. Such dominant policymakers present risks to the board
[[Page 70396]]
and covered institutions by inhibiting board members' exercise of
independent judgment, causing a power vacuum if they leave the
institution, and presenting difficulty if mismanagement can be
attributed to a single dominant individual.
The proposed Guidelines provide that the board of a covered
institution must also select and appoint qualified executive officers.
This typically includes the CEO, but may also include other officers
appointed by the board as a whole or by committee. Such selection and
appointment is standard among boards of covered institutions; these
proposed Guidelines provide a minimum expectation for selection
criteria of personnel, grounds for dismissal, succession planning, and
training.
The board of a covered institution should also provide ongoing
training to each of its directors. To that end, the proposed Guidelines
include examples of training that a board may conduct to ensure that it
has the knowledge, abilities, and skills to understand industry trends,
statutory and regulatory developments, and an understanding of the
issues that affect the covered institution. The formal training program
should include, at a minimum, the products, services, lines of
business, and risks of the covered institution; laws, regulations, and
supervisory requirements applicable to the covered institution; and
other topics that the board may identify to ensure that the institution
maintains safe and sound operation and the board can execute its duties
appropriately.
A self-assessment at the board level is necessary for the directors
of a covered institution to examine their own compliance, hold
themselves accountable, and make plans to improve any gaps or
deficiencies in their performance. Identifying and addressing
deficiencies at the board level ensures one more layer of protection
against risk. To that end, these proposed Guidelines state that the
board should conduct such a self-assessment on a regular basis.
The board should also establish Compensation and Performance
Management Programs. The proposed Guidelines include this as a
component of the overall risk management of a covered institution;
incentives and compensation programs may pose safety and soundness
risks if they encourage noncompliance with laws, regulations, or
internal policies to meet business objectives. To safeguard against
those risks, these Guidelines propose that a Compensation and
Performance Management Program be established by the board to ensure
adherence to an effective risk management program, ensure issues
identified by the risk management and internal audit functions are
addressed, and attract and retain competent staff.
Subsection D--Committees of the Board
The board of directors of a covered institution is expected to work
through a committee structure that allows directors to stay informed,
divide labor, and handle matters that require detailed review and in-
depth consideration. These proposed Guidelines set the minimum
expectations for committees of the board that oversee critical elements
of the covered institution's overall risk management. The committees
proposed in these Guidelines are in addition to, not in lieu of, any
committees that may be required by other laws, regulations, or
supervisory requirements.
An Audit Committee must be established as defined in these proposed
Guidelines and as required by Section 36 of the FDI Act \26\ and part
363 of the FDIC's regulations.\27\ The Audit Committee, composed
entirely of outside and independent directors as required by statute
and regulation, oversees financial reporting, independent audits, the
Chief Audit Officer, and the internal audit function. Furthermore, this
Committee should report to the full board regarding the progress of the
covered institution in addressing issues identified by the internal
audit function and recommending further action.
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\26\ 12 U.S.C. 1831m.
\27\ 12 CFR part 363.
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A Compensation Committee established under these proposed
Guidelines must comply with any exchange rules that may be applicable
to publicly traded covered institutions and the FDIC's regulations,
including Appendix A of part 364. The Compensation Committee assists in
managing the risks of a covered institution by ensuring that
compensation and performance management do not reward or encourage
imprudent risk-taking or violations of legal requirements in pursuit of
profit or business objectives. Furthermore, compensation that is
excessive or that could lead to a material financial loss constitutes
an unsafe and unsound practice that this Committee is also designed to
guard against.
These proposed Guidelines include the establishment of a Trust
Committee if the covered institution has trust powers. This Committee
oversees and manages the risks presented by the operation of a trust
department by ensuring that the trust department is separate and apart
from other departments of the covered institution, trust assets are
separated from other assets of the covered institution, assets of each
trust account are separated from the assets of other accounts, and
ensuring overall compliance with applicable laws and regulations. These
proposed Guidelines include these requirements as best practices for
management of a trust department in a covered institution.
These proposed Guidelines also include requirements for a Risk
Committee. The Risk Committee is responsible for approving and
periodically reviewing the risk management policies of a covered
institution and overseeing the risk management framework. To ensure
that the Risk Committee is independent and able to effectively complete
its mission, and to minimize the risk of failure and the magnitude of
losses of a covered institution, these proposed Guidelines include
requirements consistent with that of other Federal banking agencies. By
requiring that the Committee has an independent director as its chair
and be an independent committee of the board that reports directly to
the board, these proposed Guidelines help to ensure that the
individuals responsible for oversight of the covered institution's
overall risks are free to make recommendations to the board and
challenge management as necessary. At least one individual on the
Committee should be experienced in managing the risks of a firm
commensurate with the size, business model, complexity and risk profile
of the covered institution to ensure that the Committee has the
necessary expertise to fulfill its obligations. Reviewing reports from
the CRO and meeting with the Committee not less than quarterly ensures
that the Risk Committee can stay abreast of the risks of the covered
institution, including any internal or external changes that may affect
the institution, and make recommendations accordingly. Finally, the
Risk Committee overseeing the compensation and performance management
of the CRO ensures that the CRO can maintain their independence and
objectively assess the risks of the covered institution. The proposed
Guidelines regarding the Risk Committee ensure proper oversight of the
covered institution's independent risk management function and the
risks of the institution itself. These requirements support the
continued
[[Page 70397]]
safety and soundness of large and complex institutions.
The board should also create other committees as required or
appropriate for the board to perform its duties under these proposed
Guidelines. While the Committees outlined in these proposed Guidelines
represent the FDIC's minimum expectations for division of labor and
expertise among the board of directors of a covered institution, it
does not obviate the institution from creating board committees as
necessary, commensurate with its risk profile and operations of the
institution to ensure safety and soundness. For example, many
institutions find it prudent to have a credit committee that
establishes loan and credit policies of the covered institution and
reviews and approves loans above a certain amount. Other institutions
may be heavily involved in financial technology and determine that it
is necessary to have committees addressing information technology,
cybersecurity, or partnerships. A covered institution should consider
its risk profile and complexity of operations to determine whether a
board committee is necessary to ensure matters requiring detailed
review and in-depth consideration are addressed appropriately.
C. Section III--Board and Management Responsibility Regarding Risk
Management and Audit
Under Proposed Section III, the FDIC would expect a covered
institution to have and adhere to a risk management program for
managing and controlling the covered institution's risk taking. Three
distinct units should have responsibility and be held accountable by
the CEO and the board for monitoring and reporting on the covered
institution's compliance with the risk management program: front line
units, the independent risk management unit, and the internal audit
unit. The proposed Guidelines describe the responsibilities of each of
these units in detail.
The proposed Guidelines provide that for a covered institution that
has a parent company, if the risk profiles of each entity are
substantially similar, the covered institution may adopt and implement
all or any part of its parent company's risk management program that:
satisfies the minimum standards in these Guidelines; ensures that the
safety and soundness of the covered institution is not jeopardized by
decisions made by the parent company's board and management; and
ensures that the covered institution's risk profile is easily
distinguished and separate from that of its parent for risk management
and supervisory reporting purposes. Consideration of these factors may
require the covered institution to have separate and focused governance
and risk management practices.
Under these proposed Guidelines, a covered institution's risk
management program should include a risk profile and a risk appetite
statement. These documents form the foundation of an effective risk
management program by providing an objective assessment of the
institution's risks, and based on that risk profile, the board should
establish written limits and levels of risks that the institution will
accept. The independent risk management unit should develop the risk
management program based on the risk profile of the institution and the
risk appetite statement. At least annually and as the risks of the
institution change, whether by internal or external factors, the risk
management unit should review and update the risk management program.
These proposed Guidelines provide the FDIC's expectations for the scope
of the risk management program, including the risk categories, risk
control infrastructure, and processes and systems for implementing and
monitoring policies and procedures that govern, identify, and report
risk. The risk management program should be effectively communicated
throughout the institution so that all units understand their
respective responsibilities.
Under the three-lines-of-defense model in these proposed
Guidelines, a covered institution should have three units, held
accountable by the CEO and the board, for monitoring and reporting on
compliance with the risk management program. The front line units,
which are generally business units that generate revenue or save costs
for the covered institution as defined in these Guidelines, are
responsible for ensuring that their activities do not create excessive
risks or exceed the risk appetite of the institution. The independent
risk management unit, under direction of the CRO, should identify,
assess, and oversee the covered institution's risk-taking activities on
an ongoing basis. The independent risk management unit and CRO should
be able to communicate with the CEO and the Risk Committee of the board
of directors to identify and report risks and suspected instances of
noncompliance. The internal audit unit, under direction of the CAO,
should ensure that the covered institution complies with laws and
regulations and adheres to the covered institution's risk management
program. It should establish and adhere to an audit plan and report its
findings, including any recommendations, to the Audit Committee of the
board of directors. This three-lines-of-defense model, when taken as a
whole with the duties and oversight of the board under proposed Section
II of these Guidelines, ensures safety and soundness, reduces the
likelihood of failure, and reduces the magnitude of any loss by
preventing a single point of failure within an organization and
providing for multiple checks within a covered institution's risk
management.
The proposed Guidelines also provide the FDIC's expectations
regarding the board's establishment of, and the covered institution's
adherence to, processes governing breaches to risk limits and
violations of law or regulations. The front line units and independent
risk management unit, consistent with their respective
responsibilities, should identify breaches of the institution's risk
appetite and other risk limits, distinguish breaches based on severity,
report on the breach, its impact, and resolution, and establish
consequences for breaches of risk limits. Similarly, the front line
units and risk management unit should identify known or suspected
violations of law or regulations. All violations of law or regulations
and documentation regarding efforts to return to compliance should be
documented in writing, distributed to relevant parties within the
institution, and records should be retained for FDIC review. Known or
suspected violations of law involving dishonesty, misrepresentation, or
willful disregard for legal requirements must be promptly reported as
required by law and on a timetable acceptable to the agency with
jurisdiction.
IV. Expected Effects of Implementing the Proposed Guidelines
As previously discussed, if approved, the proposed rule would
establish proposed Guidelines that include standards for corporate
governance and risk management for covered institutions. As of the
quarter ending March 31, 2023, the FDIC supervises 3,012 IDIs, of which
57 reported total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more.\28\
Therefore, the FDIC estimates that 57 FDIC-supervised IDIs will be
directly affected by the proposed rule, if approved.
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\28\ FDIC Call Report Data, March 31, 2023. Count excludes First
Republic Bank, which was closed by the California Department of
Financial Protection and Innovation and the FDIC was appointed
Receiver on May 1, 2023.
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The proposed Guidelines contain expectations for roles and
responsibilities of the board, size and makeup of the board,
organization of the
[[Page 70398]]
board, committee structures of the board, development and maintenance
of a strategic plan, development and maintenance of risk management
policies, hiring and oversight of senior management, development and
maintenance of processes for responding to violations of laws,
regulations, or breaches of internal risk limits or other internal
policies and procedures.
As previously discussed, all FDIC-supervised institutions have
existing requirements to establish operational and management standards
to ensure the safe and sound operation of the IDI appropriate to the
size of the IDI and the nature, scope and risk of its activities.\29\
Additionally, certain FDIC-supervised institutions are subject to audit
requirements, including the establishment of an audit committee as well
as its makeup.\30\ Finally, as previously discussed the FDIC has issued
several guidance items related to appropriate risk management and
ethics.\31\
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\29\ 12 CFR 364.101, Appendix A.
\30\ 12 CFR 363.2.
\31\ See footnotes 10-15.
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The FDIC believes that the proposed rule will benefit covered
institutions by reducing the likelihood and magnitude of losses and the
likelihood of failure. The FDIC does not have access to information
that would enable a quantitative estimate of the benefits of the
proposed rule. Although there are existing regulations and guidance
related to corporate governance and risk management, the FDIC has not
previously issued supervisory guidelines or regulations specifically on
corporate governance and risk management for covered institutions. The
FDIC believes that adoption of the proposed Guidelines would benefit
covered institutions by establishing clear expectations for covered
institutions and strengthening corporate governance and risk
management. Additionally, by adopting the proposed Guidelines in
Appendix C to part 364, the FDIC could require a compliance plan or
take other corrective action if warranted further reducing the
likelihood and magnitude of loss, and the likelihood of failure.
The proposed Guidelines would result in some compliance costs for
covered institutions. As previously discussed, FDIC-supervised IDIs
have an existing requirement to establish operational and management
standards to ensure the safe and sound operation of the IDI appropriate
to the size of the IDI and the nature, scope and risk of its
activities. Additionally, the FDIC has issued a number of guidance
items related to appropriate risk management and ethics. However, while
the FDIC has communicated through the supervisory process for larger,
more complex institutions an expectation that corporate governance and
risk management frameworks need to be more robust and suitable for the
IDI's risk profile and business model, the FDIC has not previously
issued supervisory guidance specifically on corporate governance and
risk management for covered institutions. Based on the foregoing
information, the FDIC estimates that the proposed rule, if adopted,
would compel covered institutions to expend 91,375 labor hours in the
first year, and 90,365 labor hours each additional year, to comply with
the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements. At an
estimated wage rate of $139.33 \32\ per hour, this would amount to
total additional estimated reporting, recordkeeping, and disclosure
costs of $12.73 million in the first year, and $12.59 million each
additional year. This estimated annual cost is less than 0.03 percent
of annual noninterest expense for all covered institutions.
Additionally, the FDIC believes that covered institutions are likely to
incur other regulatory costs to achieve compliance with the proposed
rule, if adopted, such as hiring additional staff and changes to
internal systems and processes.
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\32\ The recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure compliance
burden is expected to be distributed between executives, lawyers and
financial analysts. The estimated weighted average hourly
compensation cost of these employees are found by using the 75th
percentile hourly wages reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage
Estimates for the relevant occupations in the Depository Credit
Intermediation sector, as of May 2022. These wages are adjusted to
account for inflation and compensation rates for health and other
benefits, as of March 2023, to provide an estimate of overall
compensation.
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If adopted, the FDIC believes that the proposed rule would benefit
the financial sector and customers by reducing the likelihood of
failure and associated costs. Bank failures impose costs on the DIF and
negatively affect a wide variety of stakeholders, and reduce public
confidence in the financial system. The FDIC believes that adoption of
the proposed rule would help to limit such costs.
V. Alternatives Considered
The FDIC considered three alternatives: (1) maintaining the status
quo with no specific guidance for covered institutions; (2) issuing
guidance specific to covered institutions; and (3) issuing regulations
on corporate governance for covered institutions. The FDIC believes
that the proposed Guidelines, if adopted, would improve upon the status
quo by consolidating and codifying the FDIC's expectations for a
covered institution's effective corporate governance and risk
management practices and potentially reducing future losses or bank
failures and that these benefits outweigh the potential costs.
Additionally, the FDIC believes that the proposed Guidelines are more
appropriate than the status quo alternative because they would further
codify the FDIC's expectations for effective corporate governance and
risk management practices of a covered institution while still allowing
the FDIC to consider appropriate variances in an individual covered
institution's risk profile. The FDIC also considered the alternative of
issuing guidance for covered institutions. However, such guidance would
not provide an enforcement framework to ensure compliance such as
compliance plans under 12 CFR part 308, subpart R, or other actions.
VI. Request for Comments
The FDIC requests comment on all aspects of the proposed rule and
proposed Guidelines, including the following:
1. Should the proposed Guidelines apply to FDIC-supervised
institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets, or
would a higher or lower threshold be appropriate? Alternatively, should
the proposed Guidelines only apply to FDIC-supervised institutions that
are examined under the FDIC's Continuous Examination Process? Please
explain.
2. Is there a need to differentiate corporate governance and risk
management requirements for covered institutions with $50 billion or
more in total consolidated assets (or some other threshold)? Please
explain.
3. Should the proposed Guidelines apply to any insured state
nonmember bank or insured state savings association with total
consolidated assets less than $10 billion if that institution's parent
company controls at least one covered institution?
4. The proposed Guidelines include a reservation of authority
enabling the FDIC to determine that compliance with the proposed
Guidelines should not be, or no longer be, required for a covered
institution based on risk and complexity. Should there be an
application process in accordance with subpart A of part 303 of the
FDIC's regulations for a covered institution to request exemption from
the
[[Page 70399]]
requirements of these proposed Guidelines? If so, what criteria would
be appropriate for FDIC to establish to consider such a request?
5. Should the covered institution and its parent holding company
with other affiliates be required to have separate risk management
officers and staff? Please explain.
6. The proposed Guidelines provide that a covered institution may
use its parent company's risk governance framework to satisfy the
Guidelines based on certain factors. What other factors, if any, should
the FDIC consider?
7. Should the proposed Guidelines include more specific suggestions
for corporate governance? If so, what additional suggestions should be
included?
8. Should the proposed Guidelines include more specific
requirements for risk management? If so, what additional requirements
should be included?
9. Do the proposed Guidelines provide sufficient and appropriate
requirements regarding the role of the board for corporate governance
and risk management? Please explain.
10. Do the proposed Guidelines provide sufficient and appropriate
requirements regarding the role of executive management for managing
the covered institution and its risks? Please explain.
11. Should the CRO or the CAO report to the board or solely to a
board committee? Please explain.
12. Do the CRO or the CAO and their associated functions have
sufficient independence under the proposed Guidelines? Please explain.
13. Would the proposed Guidelines have any costs or benefits that
the FDIC has not identified? If so, please identify and discuss.
14. Are there alternative ways to achieve the objectives of these
proposed Guidelines that would impose lower burdens and costs on
covered institutions? If so, what alternatives would be appropriate?
VII. Regulatory Analysis
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an agency,
in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare and make available for
public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.\33\
However, an initial regulatory flexibility analysis is not required if
the agency certifies that the proposed rule will not, if promulgated,
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Small Business Administration (SBA) has defined ``small
entities'' to include banking organizations with total assets of less
than or equal to $850 million.\34\ Generally, the FDIC considers a
significant economic impact to be a quantified effect in excess of 5
percent of total annual salaries and benefits or 2.5 percent of total
noninterest expenses. The FDIC believes that effects in excess of one
or more of these thresholds typically represent significant economic
impacts for FDIC-supervised IDIs. The proposed rule would only apply to
FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks, savings associations, and state
branches of foreign banks having total consolidated assets of $10
billion or more. As of the quarter ending March 31, 2023, the FDIC
supervised 3,012 depository institutions, of which 2,306 are considered
``small'' for the purposes of RFA. As of the quarter ending March 31,
2023, there are no small, FDIC-insured institutions with $10 billion or
more in total consolidated assets. In light of the foregoing, the FDIC
certifies that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.
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\33\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\34\ The SBA defines a small banking organization as having $850
million or less in assets, where an organization's ``assets are
determined by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly
financial statements for the preceding year.'' See 13 CFR 121.201
(as amended by the SBA [87 FR 69118 (Nov. 17, 2022]), effective
December 19, 2022). In its determination, the ``SBA counts the
receipts, employees, or other measure of size of the concern whose
size is at issue and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates.''
See 13 CFR 121.103. Following these regulations, the FDIC uses an
insured depository institution's affiliated and acquired assets,
averaged over the preceding four quarters, to determine whether the
insured depository institution is ``small'' for the purposes of RFA.
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The FDIC invites comments on all aspects of the supporting
information provided in this RFA section. In particular, would this
proposed rule have any significant effects on small entities that the
FDIC has not identified?
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA).\35\ In accordance with the PRA, the FDIC
may not conduct or sponsor, and an organization is not required to
respond to this information collection, unless the information
collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) control number. The FDIC will request approval from the OMB for
this proposed information collection. OMB will assign an OMB control
number.
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\35\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521.
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OMB Number: 3064-NEW.
Frequency of Response: Periodic--see table below.
Affected Public: FDIC-supervised IDIs.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 91,375 hours.
The FDIC estimates that a covered institution that currently has
strong corporate governance and risk management programs may not need
to significantly increase the number of hours it spends on corporate
governance and risk management to comply with the proposed Guidelines.
Estimated Hourly Burden--2023 Part 364, Appendix C NPR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Information collection Number Number of Time per estimated
Number description and Type of burden Frequency respondents responses per response annual burden
citation respondent (hours)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................ Audit Committee, Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Review and Approval
of the Internal Audit
Unit's Charter
Section I(D)(7)(b)
One-Time.
2................ Audit Committee, Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 1 1 20 20
Annual Review and
Approval of the
Internal Audit Unit's
Charter Section
I(D)(7)(c) Ongoing.
3................ Development of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 120 120
Written Strategic
Plan Section II(C)(2)
One-Time.
4................ Annual Evaluation and Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 60 3,420
Approval of Strategic
Plan Section II(C)(2)
Ongoing.
[[Page 70400]]
5................ Board, Establishment Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
and Approval of
Policies Governing
Operations Section
II(C)(3) One-Time.
6................ Board, Annual Review Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Policies Governing
Operations Section
II(C)(3) Ongoing.
7................ Establishment of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Written Code of
Ethics Section
II(C)(4) One-Time.
8................ Annual Review Written Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Code of Ethics
Section II(C)(4)
Ongoing.
9................ Establishment of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Management
Performance Review
Process Section
II(C)(7) One-Time.
10............... Annual Review of Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Management
Performance Review
Process Section
II(C)(7) Ongoing.
11............... Development of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Succession Plan
Section II(C)(7) One-
Time.
12............... Annual Review Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Succession Plan
Section II(C)(7)
Ongoing.
13............... Establishment of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 50 50
Training Program for
Directors Section
II(C)(8) One-Time.
14............... Annual Review Training Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 25 1,425
Program for Directors
Section II(C)(8)
Ongoing.
15............... Board Annual Self- Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Assessment Section
II(C)(9) Ongoing.
16............... Establishment of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 100 100
Compensation and
Performance
Management Program
Section II(C)(10) One-
Time.
17............... Annual Review of Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 50 2,850
Compensation and
Performance
Management Program
Section II(C)(10)
Ongoing.
18............... Establishment of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Written Charter for
Board Committees
Section II(D) One-
Time.
19............... Annual Review of Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Written Charter for
Board Committees
Section II(D) Ongoing.
20............... Board Approval of Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 20 20
Charter of Internal
Audit Function
Section II(D)(1)(e)
One-Time.
21............... Board Annual Review of Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 10 570
Charter of Internal
Audit Function
Section II(D)(1)(f)
Ongoing.
22............... Audit Committee, Recordkeeping......... On Occasion.......... 57 1 40 2,280
Approval of all Audit
Services Section
II(D)(1)(b) Ongoing.
23............... Audit Committee, Recordkeeping......... On Occasion.......... 57 1 40 2,280
Approval all
Decisions Regarding
the Appointment or
Removal and Annual
Compensation and
Salary Adjustment for
the CAO Section
II(D)(1)(d) Ongoing.
24............... Risk Committee, Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Approval of Risk
Management Policies
Section II(D)(4) One-
Time.
25............... Risk Committee, Annual Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Review of Charter of
Internal Audit
Function Section
II(D)(4) Ongoing.
26............... Risk Committee, Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 40 9,120
Quarterly Review of
CRO Reports Section
II(D)(4)(e) Ongoing.
27............... Risk Committee, Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 40 9,120
Quarterly
Documentation of
Proceedings and Risk
Management Decisions
Section II(D)(4)(f)
Ongoing.
28............... Risk Committee, Recordkeeping......... On Occasion.......... 57 1 40 2,280
Approval of Decisions
Regarding Appointment
or Removal of CRO
Section II(D)(4)(g)
Ongoing.
29............... Board Establishment of Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 100 100
a Comprehensive Risk
Management Program
Section III(A) One-
Time.
30............... Board Annual Review of Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 50 2,850
Comprehensive Risk
Management Program
Section III(A)
Ongoing.
31............... Board Establishment of Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
a Risk Profile
Section III(B) One-
Time.
32............... Board Quarterly Review Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 40 9,120
of Risk Profile
Section III(B)
Ongoing.
33............... Establishment of a Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Comprehensive Written
Statement that
Establishes Risk
Appetite Limits
Section III(B) One-
Time.
34............... Board Quarterly Review Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 20 4,560
and Approval of Risk
Appetitive Statement
Section III(B)
Ongoing.
35............... Report Risk Limit Reporting............. On Occasion.......... 57 1 20 1,140
Breaches to the FDIC
Section
III(C)(2)(c)(iii)
Ongoing.
[[Page 70401]]
36............... Front Line Unit, Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Establishment of
Written Policies that
Include Risk Limits
Section
III(C)(3)(a)(ii) One-
Time.
37............... Front Line Unit, Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Annual Review of
Written Policies that
Include Risk Limits
Section
III(C)(3)(a)(ii)
Ongoing.
38............... Front Line Unit, Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Establish Procedures
and Processes, as
Necessary to Ensure
Compliance with Board
Policies Section
III(C)(3)(a)(iii) One-
Time.
39............... Front Line Unit, Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Annual Review of
Procedures and
Processes, as
Necessary to Ensure
Compliance with Board
Policies Section
III(C)(3)(a)(iii)
Ongoing.
40............... Front Line Unit, Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 40 9,120
Quarterly Monitor and
Report Compliance
with Respective Risk
Limits Section
III(C)(3)(a)(v)
Ongoing.
41............... Independent Risk Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 40 9,120
Management Unit,
Quarterly Monitor and
Report on the Covered
Institution's Risk
Profile Relative to
Risk Appetite and
Concentration Limits
Section
III(C)(3)(b)(iii)
Ongoing.
42............... Independent Risk Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Management Unit,
Establishment of
Policies Relative to
Concentration Risk
Limits Section
III(C)(3)(b)(iv) One-
time.
43............... Independent Risk Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 40 2,280
Management Unit,
Review and Update of
Policies Relative to
Concentration Risk
Limits Section
III(C)(3)(b)(iv)
Ongoing.
44............... Independent Risk Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 20 20
Management Unit,
Establishment of
Procedures and
Processes to Ensure
Compliance with Board
Risk Management
Policies Section
III(C)(3)(b)(v) One-
time.
45............... Independent Risk Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 10 580
Management Unit,
Review and Update of
Procedures and
Processes to Ensure
Compliance with Board
Risk Management
Policies Section
III(C)(3)(b)(v)
Ongoing.
46............... Independent Risk Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 10 2,280
Management Unit,
Quarterly Monitor and
Report to CEO and
Risk Committee Front
Line Units'
Compliance with Risk
Limits Section
III(C)(3)(b)(vii)
Ongoing.
47............... Internal Audit Unit, Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
Establishment of an
Audit Plan Section
III(C)(3)(c)(ii)One-
Time.
48............... Internal Audit Unit, Recordkeeping......... Quarterly............ 57 4 10 2,280
Quarterly Report
Changes to Audit Plan
Section
III(C)(3)(c)(ii)
Ongoing.
49............... Board, Establishment Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
of Processes that
Require the Front
Line and Independent
Risk Management Units
to Identify and
Distinguish Breaches,
as well as
Establishment of
Accountability for
Reporting and
Resolving Breaches
Section III(E) One-
Time.
50............... Board, Annual Review Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
Processes that
Require the Front
Line and Independent
Risk Management Units
to Identify and
Distinguish Breaches,
as well as Establish
Accountability for
Reporting and
Resolving Breaches
Section III(E)
Ongoing.
51............... Front Line and Reporting............. On Occasion.......... 57 1 20 1,140
Independent Risk
Management Units
Report to the FDIC
Breach of a Risk
Limit or
Noncompliance with
the Risk Appetite
Statement or Risk
Management Program
Section III(E)(3)
Ongoing.
52............... Board, Establishment Recordkeeping......... One-Time............. 1 1 40 40
of Processes that
Require Front Line
and Independent Risk
Management Units to
Identify,
Distinguish, Document
and Report Violations
of Law or Regulations
Section III(F) One-
Time.
[[Page 70402]]
53............... Board, Annual Review Recordkeeping......... Annually............. 57 1 20 1,140
of Processes that
Require Front Line
and Independent Risk
Management Units to
Identify,
Distinguish, Document
and Report Violations
of Law or Regulations
Section III(F)
Ongoing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Hourly Burden................................................................. .............. .............. .............. 91,375
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Description
Section 39 of the FDI Act requires the FDIC to issue certain safety
and soundness standards by regulation or guideline. In this instance,
the FDIC is proposing guidelines to address corporate governance and
risk management by covered institutions. The FDIC estimates that most,
if not all covered institutions, as part of their standard governance
and risk management practices, maintain procedures discussed in the
proposed Guidelines, so the FDIC is assigning a one placeholder for
implementation burden. However, the FDIC is estimating the burden
associated with what covered institutions need to do going forward to
comply with the proposed Guidelines.
This information collection includes the need for a strategic plan,
a risk committee, board review of information and policies, formal
training program for directors, self-assessments, compensation and
performance management programs, risk profile and risk appetite
statement, a written risk management program, front line units, an
independent risk management unit, an internal audit unit, and processes
for governing risk limit breaches and noncompliance with laws or
regulation.
Comments are invited on:
(a) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions of the FDIC, including whether
the information will have practical utility;
(b) The accuracy of the FDIC's estimate of burden of the proposed
collection of information, including the validity of the methodology
and assumptions used, including the FDIC's estimated implementation
burden;
(c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected;
(d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on
those who are to respond, including appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology (e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses); and
(e) Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on the
collection of information should be sent to the address listed in the
ADDRESSES section of this document. A copy of the comments may also be
submitted to the OMB desk officer by mail to: U.S. Office of Management
and Budget, 725 17th Street NW, #10235, Washington, DC 20503, or by
facsimile to 202-395-6974; or email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#402f2932211f3335222d293333292f2e002f2d226e252f306e272f36"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="244b4d56457b575146494d57574d4b4a644b49460a414b540a434b52">[email protected]</span></a>,
Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk Officer.
C. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
Pursuant to Section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 \36\ (RCDRIA), in determining the
effective date and administrative compliance requirements for new
regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other
requirements on insured depository institutions, each Federal banking
agency must consider, consistent with principles of safety and
soundness and the public interest, any administrative burdens that such
regulations would place on affected depository institutions, including
small depository institutions, and customers of depository
institutions, as well as the benefits of such regulations. In addition,
Section 302(b) of RCDRIA requires new regulations and amendments to
regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosures, or other new
requirements on insured depository institutions generally to take
effect on the first day of a calendar quarter that begins on or after
the date on which the regulations are published in final form.\37\ The
FDIC invites comments that will further inform its consideration of
RCDRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
\37\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act \38\ requires the Federal
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules
published after January 1, 2000. The FDIC invites your comments on how
to make the proposed rule and Guidelines easier to understand. For
example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Public Law 106-102, sec. 722, 113 Stat. 1338, 1471 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> Has the FDIC organized the material to suit your needs? If
not, how could this material be better organized?
<bullet> Are the requirements in the proposed rule and proposed
Guidelines clearly stated? If not, how could the proposed rule and
proposed Guidelines be more clearly stated?
<bullet> Do the proposed rule and proposed Guidelines contain
language or jargon that is not clear? If so, which language requires
clarification?
<bullet> Would a different format (grouping and order of sections,
use of headings, paragraphing) make the proposed rule and proposed
Guidelines easier to understand? If so, what changes to the format
would make the proposed rule and proposed Guidelines easier to
understand?
<bullet> What else could the FDIC do to make the proposed rule and
proposed Guidelines easier to understand?
E. Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act of 2023
The Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act of 2023 (12
U.S.C. 553(b)(4)) requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking include
the internet address of a summary of not more than 100 words in length
of a proposed rule, in plain language, that shall be posted on the
internet website under section 206(d) of the E-Government Act of 2002
(44 U.S.C. 3501 note).
[[Page 70403]]
In summary, the FDIC is proposing to issue Guidelines as a new
Appendix C to part 364 (part 364) to strengthen the corporate
governance and risk management practices and board oversight of FDIC-
supervised institutions with total consolidated assets of $10 billion
or more. The proposed Guidelines are intended to raise the FDIC's
standards for corporate governance, risk management, and control to
help ensure these larger institutions effectively anticipate, evaluate,
and mitigate the risks they face. The proposal and the required summary
can be found at <a href="https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-register-publications/">https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federal-register-publications/</a>.
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 308
Administrative practice and procedure, Bank deposit insurance,
Banks, Banking, Claims, Crime, Equal access to justice, Fraud,
Investigations, Lawyers, Penalties, Safety and soundness compliance
plans, Savings associations.
12 CFR Part 364
Banks, Banking, Information, Safety and soundness guidelines.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation proposes to amend parts 308 and 364 of chapter
III of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 308--RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
0
1. The authority citation for part 308 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 504, 554-557; 12 U.S.C. 93(b), 164, 505,
1464, 1467(d), 1467a, 1468, 1815(e), 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820, 1828,
1829, 1829(b), 1831i, 1831m(g)(4), 1831o, 1831p-1, 1832(c), 1884(b),
1972, 3102, 3108(a), 3349, 3909, 4717, 5412(b)(2)(C), 5414(b)(3); 15
U.S.C. 78(h) and (i), 78o(c)(4), 78o-4(c), 78o-5, 78q-1, 78s, 78u,
78u-2, 78u-3, 78w, 6801(b), 6805(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. 2461 note; 31
U.S.C. 330, 5321; 42 U.S.C. 4012a; Pub. L. 104-134, sec. 31001(s),
110 Stat. 1321; Pub. L. 109-351, 120 Stat. 1966; Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376; Pub. L. 114-74, sec. 701, 129 Stat. 584.
0
2. Revise Sec. 308.302 (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 308.302 Determination and notification of failure to meet a
safety and soundness standard and request for compliance plan.
* * * * *
(a) Determination. The FDIC may, based upon an examination,
inspection or any other information that becomes available to the FDIC,
determine that a covered institution has failed to satisfy the safety
and soundness standards set out in part 364 of this chapter and in the
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness
in appendix A, the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Safeguarding Customer Information in appendix B, and the Guidelines
Establishing Standards for Corporate Governance and Risk Management for
Covered Institutions with Total Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or
More in appendix C to part 364 of this chapter.
* * * * *
PART 364--STANDARDS FOR SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS
0
3. The authority citation for part 364 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1818 and 1819 (Tenth), 1831p-1; 15 U.S.C.
1681b, 1681s, 1681w, 6801(b), 6805(b)(1).
0
4. Add paragraph (c) to Sec. 364.101 to read as follows:
Sec. 364.101 Standards for safety and soundness.
* * * * *
(c) Guidelines Establishing Standards for Corporate Governance and
Risk Management for Covered Institutions with Total Consolidated Assets
of $10 Billion or More. The Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Corporate Governance and Risk Management for Covered Institutions with
Total Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or More pursuant to Section 39
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831p-1), as set forth
as appendix C to this part, apply to all insured state nonmember banks,
state-licensed insured branches of foreign banks that are subject to
the provisions of Section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and
state savings associations with $10 billion or more in total
consolidated assets.
0
5. Add Appendix C to part 364 to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 364--Guidelines Establishing Standards for Corporate
Governance and Risk Management for Covered Institutions With Total
Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or More
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
A. Scope
B. Preservation of Authority
C. Reservation of Authority
D. Definitions
II. Corporate Governance
A. Board of Directors--General Obligations
B. Board Composition
C. Duties of the Board
D. Committees of the Board
III. Board and Management Responsibility Regarding Risk Management
and Audit
A. Risk Management Program
B. Risk Profile and Risk Appetite Statement
C. Risk Management Program Standards
D. Communication Processes
E. Processes Governing Risk Limit Breaches
F. Processes Governing Identification of and Response to
Violations of Law or Regulations
I. Introduction
Section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act)
authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to
establish safety and soundness standards by regulation or by
guidelines. The following Guidelines address standards for corporate
governance, risk management, and boards of directors' oversight for
covered institutions. These standards are in addition to other
standards or requirements in law or regulation.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ The roles and responsibilities provided for in these
Guidelines are in addition to those set forth in existing laws,
regulations, and regulatory guidelines, including in Appendices A
and B in part 364. Many of the risk management practices established
and maintained by a covered institution to meet these standards,
including loan review and credit underwriting and administration
practices, should be components of its risk governance framework,
within the construct of the three distinct units identified herein:
front line unit, independent risk management unit, and internal
audit unit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Scope. These Guidelines apply to all insured state nonmember
banks, state-licensed insured branches of foreign banks, and insured
state savings associations that are subject to the provisions of
Section 39 of the FDI Act, with total consolidated assets of $10
billion or more on or after the effective date of these Guidelines
(together ``covered institutions'' and each, a ``covered
institution''). Total consolidated assets means the covered
institution's total assets, as reported on the covered institution's
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) \40\
filing, for the two most recent consecutive quarters. An insured
state nonmember bank, state-licensed insured branch of a foreign
bank, or an insured state savings association that does not come
within the scope of these Guidelines on the effective date, but
subsequently becomes subject to the Guidelines because total
consolidated assets are $10 billion or more after the effective
date, as reported on the Call Report for the two most recent
consecutive quarters, shall be considered a covered institution and
subject to the Guidelines. If a covered institution under the
Guidelines reports consolidated assets of less than $10 billion in
its Call Report filings for four consecutive quarters, the covered
institution will be classified as a non-covered institution
beginning the following quarter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ For insured branches of foreign banks, the term ``Call
Report'' means the branch's FFIEC 002 filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Preservation of Existing Authority. Neither Section 39 of the
FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831p-1) nor these Guidelines in any way limits
the authority of the FDIC to address unsafe or unsound practices,
unsafe or
[[Page 70404]]
unsound conditions, or violations of law. Action under Section 39
and these Guidelines may be taken independently of, in conjunction
with, or in addition to any other enforcement action available to
the FDIC.
C. Reservation of Authority.
1. Upon notice to the institution, the FDIC reserves the
authority to apply these Guidelines, in whole or in part, to an
institution that has total consolidated assets less than $10
billion, if the FDIC determines such institution's operations are
highly complex or present a heightened risk that warrants the
application of these Guidelines.
2. The FDIC reserves the authority, for each covered
institution, to extend the time for compliance with these Guidelines
or modify these Guidelines as necessary.
3. The FDIC reserves the authority to determine that compliance
with these Guidelines should not be, or should no longer be,
required for a covered institution. The FDIC would generally make
the determination under this paragraph if a covered institution's
operations are not or are no longer highly complex or no longer
present a heightened risk. In determining whether a covered
institution's operations are highly complex or present a heightened
risk, the FDIC will consider factors such as: nature, scope, size,
scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities
of the institution.
D. Definitions.
1. Chief Audit Officer (CAO) means an individual who leads the
covered institution's internal audit unit, possesses the skills and
abilities to effectively implement the internal audit program, and
reports directly to either the covered institution's board of
directors (the board) or the board's audit committee and chief
executive officer (CEO).
2. Chief Risk Officer (CRO) means an individual who leads a
covered institution's independent risk management unit and is
experienced in identifying, assessing, and managing risk exposures
of large financial firms, with unrestricted access to the board and
its committees, and reports directly to the board or the board's
risk committee and, solely for administrative matters, the CEO.
3. Control means the power, directly or indirectly, to direct
the management or policies of a covered institution or to vote 25
percent or more of any class of voting securities of a covered
institution.
4. Corporate governance means the set of processes, customs,
policies, and laws affecting the way a corporation \41\ is directed,
administered, and controlled and how it manages risks and ensures
compliance with laws and regulations, including consumer protection
laws and regulations and the Community Reinvestment Act. Corporate
governance also includes the relationships among the many
stakeholders involved and the corporation's goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ As used in these Guidelines, the term ``corporate'' and
``corporation'', where appropriate, includes alternative forms of
business enterprises, such as limited liability companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Front line unit means any organizational unit within the
covered institution that:
a. Engages in activities designed to generate revenue or reduce
expenses for the covered institution;
b. Provides operational support or servicing to any
organizational unit or function within the covered institution for
the delivery of products or services to customers; \42\ or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Notwithstanding the foregoing, ``front line unit'' does not
ordinarily include an organizational unit or function thereof within
a covered institution when it is providing solely legal services to
the covered institution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Provides technology services to any organizational unit or
function covered by these Guidelines.
6. Independent risk management unit means any organizational
unit within the covered institution that is directed by the CRO and
which has responsibility for identifying, measuring, monitoring, or
controlling aggregate risks. Such unit maintains independence from
front line units through the following reporting structure:
a. The CRO has unrestricted access to the board of directors and
its committees, including the risk committee, to address risks and
issues identified through the independent risk management unit's
activities;
b. The board of directors or the risk committee reviews and
approves the risk governance framework;
c. The independent risk management unit adheres to compensation
and performance management programs that ensure that the covered
institution provides incentives to the independent risk management
unit staff that ensure their independence, are consistent with
providing an objective assessment of the risks taken by the covered
institution, and comply with laws and regulations regarding
excessive or incentive compensation, and complies with the covered
institution's compensation policies; and
d. No front line unit executive oversees the independent risk
management unit.
7. Internal audit unit \43\ means the organizational unit within
the covered institution that is designated to fulfill the role and
responsibilities outlined in part 364, Appendix A, II.B. The
internal audit unit should maintain independence from the front line
and independent risk management units through the following
reporting structure:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See 12 CFR part 364, Appendix A--Section II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. The CAO has unrestricted access to the board's audit
committee to address risks and issues identified through the
internal audit unit's activities;
b. The board's audit committee, in accordance with Section
II.6.a. of these Guidelines, reviews and approves the internal audit
unit's charter, audit plans, and decisions regarding appointment,
removal, and compensation of the CAO;
c. The board's audit committee, in accordance with Section
II.6.a. of these Guidelines, at least annually or more frequently,
as necessary, reviews the internal audit unit's charter, audit
plans, and decisions regarding appointment, removal, and
compensation of the CAO;
d. The CEO or the audit committee oversees the internal audit
unit's administrative activities; and
e. No front line unit executive oversees the internal audit
unit.
8. Parent company means any legal entity that controls the
covered institution as defined in these Guidelines.
9. Risk appetite means the aggregate level and types of risk the
board and management are willing to assume to achieve the covered
institution's strategic objectives and business plan, consistent
with safe and sound operation and compliance with applicable laws
and regulations.
10. Risk profile means a point-in-time assessment of the covered
institution's risks aggregated within and across each relevant risk
category, using methodologies consistent with the risk appetite.
II. Corporate Governance
A. Board of Directors--General Obligations. The board of
directors is ultimately responsible for the affairs of a covered
institution. Each member of the board has a duty to safeguard,
through the lawful, informed, efficient, and able administration of
the covered institution, the interests of the covered institution
and to oversee and confirm that the covered institution operates in
a safe and sound manner, in compliance with all laws and
regulations. The board, in supervising the covered institution,
should consider the interests of all its stakeholders, including
shareholders, depositors, creditors, customers, regulators, and the
public.
1. Governing laws. In the exercise of their duties, directors
are governed by federal and state banking, securities, and antitrust
statutes and by common law (all of which may impose potential
liability on all directors). Directors who fail to discharge their
duties may be subject to removal from office, criminal prosecution,
civil money penalties imposed by covered institution regulators, and
civil liability.
B. Board Composition. The covered institution's organizational
documents or state chartering authority may have requirements for
board members, including the appropriate number of members on its
board of directors. However, in determining the appropriate number
of directors and the board's composition, the board should consider
how the selection of and diversity among board members collectively
and individually may best promote effective, independent oversight
of covered institution management and satisfy all legal requirements
for outside and independent directors.\44\ Important aspects of
diversity may include: social, racial, ethnic, gender, and age
differences; skills, differences in experience, perspective, and
opinion (including professional, educational, and community or
charitable service experience); and differences in the extent of
directors' ownership interest in the covered institution
[[Page 70405]]
(for example, directors who own only the amount of stock required by
state law or those who share ownership interests with family
members, but are not employed by the covered institution).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ For example, 12 CFR part 348 implements the Depository
Institution Management Interlocks Act. That Act prohibits
interlocking relationships of management officials of various
nonaffiliated depository institutions, depending on the asset size
and geographical proximity of the organizations.
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The board should include a majority of outside and independent
directors. An independent director is generally a director that is
(a) not a principal, member, officer, or employee of the
institution, and (b) not a principal, member, director, officer, or
employee of any affiliate or principal shareholder of the
institution.\45\
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\45\ In instances where an affiliate or a principal shareholder
is a holding company, and the holding company conducts limited or no
additional business operations outside the institution, an
independent director of the holding company may also be an
independent director of the institution, as long as they are not a
principal, member, director, officer, or employee of any other
institution or holding company affiliates.
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C. Duties of the Board.
1. Set an Appropriate Tone. The board should establish a
corporate culture and work environment that promotes responsible,
ethical behavior. This culture and environment should not condone or
encourage imprudent risk-taking, unethical behavior, or violations
of law, regulation, or policy in pursuit of profit or other business
objectives, and the board should hold directors, officers, and
employees accountable for such conduct. By adhering to the
requirements of law, regulation, these Guidelines, and the covered
institution's own policies and procedures (including a Code of
Ethics and a Compensation and Performance Management Program under
these Guidelines), the board's actions should reflect its commitment
to integrity, honesty, and ethical conduct.
2. Approve Strategic Plan for the Covered Institution. The board
is responsible for providing clear objectives within which the
covered institution's management can operate and administer the
covered institution's affairs. The board should direct the CEO to
develop a written strategic plan with input from front-line units,
independent risk management, and internal audit. The strategic plan
should implement operating budgets and encompass the covered
institution's philosophy and mission. At least annually, the board
should evaluate and approve the strategic plan, monitor management's
efforts to implement the strategic plan and respond to unanticipated
external developments, and ensure the strategic plan is consistent
with policies the board has approved. The strategic plan should
discuss the covered institution's goals and objectives over, at a
minimum, a three-year period and:
a. Articulate an overall mission statement and strategic
objectives for the covered institution, including an explanation of
how the covered institution will achieve those objectives;
b. Contain a comprehensive assessment of risks that currently
affect the covered institution or that could affect the covered
institution during the period covered by the strategic plan;
c. Explain how the covered institution will update, as
necessary, its risk management program to account for changes in the
covered institution's risks projected under the strategic plan; and
d. Explain how the covered institution will review, update, and
approve the strategic plan, as necessary, if the covered
institution's risk profile, risk appetite, or operating environment
changes in ways not considered in the strategic plan.
3. Approve Policies. The board is responsible for establishing
and approving the policies that govern and guide the operations of
the covered institution in accordance with its risk profile and as
required by law and regulation. These policies ensure that the board
has a fundamental understanding of the business of banking and the
covered institution's associated risks, the risks undertaken by the
institution are prudently and properly managed, and the covered
institution is operating in a safe and sound manner. Such policies
may include, but are not limited to, applicable internal controls,
loan and credit policies, asset and liability management, and other
operational and managerial standards to fulfill the responsibilities
outlined in part 364, Appendix A, II. Such policies should also
address other legal requirements, including but not limited to
statutes and regulations regarding real estate lending, Anti Money
Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)
compliance, consumer protection laws, anti-fraud, and the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA). Policies should be written and reviewed at
least annually to ensure that they remain applicable and up-to-date
as the covered institution's risks may change based on internal or
external circumstances. Compliance with the covered institution's
policies and procedures should be periodically reviewed by internal
audit.
4. Establish a Code of Ethics. The board should establish a
written code of ethics for the covered institution, covering
directors, management, and employees, addressing areas such as:
a. Conflicts of interest, self-dealing, protection and proper
use of covered institution assets, integrity of financial
recordkeeping, and compliance with laws and regulations;
b. How to report illegal or unethical behavior, and forbidding
retaliation for such reporting (also known as a whistleblower
policy); and
c. Identifying officials, such as an ethics officer or the
covered institution's counsel, employees can contact to seek advice
in the event ethical issues arise and to whom and under what
circumstances (including those that do not disclose the employee's
identity) the ethics officer or counsel must report ethical issues
affecting the covered institution to senior management and the
board.
At least annually, the board should review and update, as
necessary, the code of ethics.
5. Provide active oversight of management. The board should
actively oversee the covered institution's activities, including all
material risk-taking activities. The board should hold management
accountable for adhering to the strategic plan and approved policies
and procedures to ensure the covered institution's compliance with
safe and sound banking practices and all applicable laws and
regulations. In providing active oversight, the board should
question, challenge, and when necessary, oppose recommendations and
decisions made by management that are not in accordance with the
covered institution's risk appetite, could jeopardize the safety and
soundness of the covered institution, or undermine compliance with
applicable laws or regulations. The board also must ensure that
management corrects deficiencies that auditors or examiners identify
in a timely manner.
6. Exercise independent judgment. When carrying out his or her
duties, each director should exercise sound, independent judgment.
To the extent possible, the board should ensure that it is not
excessively influenced by a dominant policymaker, whether
management, a director, a shareholder, or any combination thereof.
Risks inherent in such a situation include, but are not limited to:
a. A dominant policymaker may inhibit the directors' exercise of
independent judgment or prevent the board from fulfilling its
responsibilities;
b. Loss of a dominant officer with concentrated authority may
deprive the covered institution of competent management; and
c. Problems resulting from mismanagement are more difficult to
solve because the covered institution's problems are often
attributed to the one individual that dominates the covered
institution.
7. Select and Appoint Qualified Executive Officers. The board
must select and appoint executive officers who are qualified to
administer the covered institution's affairs effectively and
soundly. The selection criteria should include integrity, technical
competence, character, and experience in financial services. In
addition, the board should implement a formal appraisal process to
periodically review management performance. If any executive
officer, including the CEO, is unable to meet reasonable standards
of executive ability or ethical standards, the board should dismiss
and replace that officer. The board should develop a succession plan
to address the possible or eventual loss of the CEO and other key
personnel, and at least annually, such plan should be reviewed and
updated, as necessary, by the board. The board should also require
the covered institution to implement adequate training and personnel
activities so that there is continuity of qualified management and
competent staff.
8. Provide Ongoing Training to Directors. To ensure each member
of the board has the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to stay
abreast of general industry trends and any statutory and regulatory
developments pertinent to their institution and to meet the
standards set forth in these Guidelines, the board should establish
and adhere to a formal, ongoing training program for directors. This
program should include training on:
a. Products, services, lines of business, and risks that have a
significant impact on the covered institution;
[[Page 70406]]
b. Laws, regulations, and supervisory requirements applicable to
the covered institution; and
c. Other topics identified by the board.
9. Self-assessments. The board should conduct an annual self-
assessment evaluating its effectiveness in meeting the standards of
these Guidelines.
10. Compensation and Performance Management Programs. If not
properly structured, incentive compensation arrangements for
executive and non-executive employees may pose safety and soundness
risks by providing incentives to take imprudent risks that are not
consistent with the long-term health of the organization. Some
incentive programs may inadvertently encourage noncompliance with
laws or regulations. To avoid these risks, the board should
establish, and the covered institution should adhere to compensation
and performance management programs that are consistent with
applicable laws and regulations and are appropriate to:
a. Ensure the CEO, front line, independent risk management, and
internal audit units implement and adhere to, an effective risk
management program;
b. Ensure front line unit compensation plans and decisions
appropriately consider the level and severity of issues and concerns
identified by the independent risk management and internal audit
units, even if the covered institution has not or will not realize a
loss; and
c. Attract and retain competent staff needed to design,
implement, and maintain an effective risk management program.
At least annually, the board should review and update, as
necessary, the compensation and performance management programs.
D. Committees of the Board. The board should implement an
organizational structure to keep members informed and provide an
adequate framework to oversee the covered institution. Establishing
board committees allows for a division of labor and enables
directors with expertise to handle matters that require detailed
review and in-depth consideration. In addition, certain laws and
regulations or supervisory policies may require the covered
institution to establish certain board committees. Each committee
should have a board-approved written charter outlining its purpose
and responsibilities:
1. Audit Committee: The covered institution must have an Audit
Committee that complies with Section 36 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act and part 363 of the FDIC's regulations.\46\ The audit
committee of a covered institution must be composed entirely of
outside and independent directors. The audit committee:
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\46\ See 12 CFR part 363 Annual Independent Audits and Reporting
Requirements; see also part 364, Appendix A--Section II.B. If
permitted under Section 36 and part 363 of the FDIC's regulations,
the audits of the financial statements and of internal control over
financial reporting may be done at the consolidated holding company
level and not the covered institution level.
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a. Oversees the covered institution's accounting and financial
reporting processes and audits of its financial statements and its
internal control over financial reporting;
b. Approves all audit services; assists board oversight of the
integrity of the covered institution's financial statements and
disclosures;
c. Appoints, compensates, and retains any public accounting firm
to prepare any audit report and oversees the work of such firms in
preparing or issuing any audit report;
d. Approves all decisions regarding the appointment or removal
and annual compensation and salary adjustment for the CAO;
e. Approves the charter of and oversees the covered
institution's internal audit function, including reviewing and
approving audit plans and reports of the internal audit function
regarding the effectiveness of the risk management program and
identified or suspected violations of law or regulations,
determining whether and how identified issues are being addressed,
and making recommendations, as necessary, to the board for further
corrective action;
f. At least annually, reviews and updates, as necessary, the
charter of the covered institution's internal audit function; and
g. Satisfies all other requirements of law, regulation, and
applicable exchange rules.
2. Compensation Committee: A covered institution's Compensation
Committee must comply with applicable laws and regulations,\47\
including the FDIC's regulations.\48\ The committee should monitor
adherence to a compensation and performance management program,
review compensation packages for executives, and consider executive
officer performance evaluations. Compensation includes all direct
and indirect payments or benefits, both cash and non-cash as defined
in part 364, Appendix A, I.B.3. A covered institution is prohibited
from paying compensation that constitutes an unsafe and unsound
practice (including excessive compensation or compensation that
could lead to material financial loss) and should ensure that their
incentive compensation arrangements do not encourage imprudent risk-
taking behavior or create incentives for violations of legal
requirements.
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\47\ For example, any covered company that has securities
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must
have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent
directors, 15 U.S.C 78j-3; 17 CFR parts 229 and 240; see, e.g., NYSE
Listed Company Manual Section 303A.04(a), Nasdaq Equity Rule
5605(e), and any other or successor corporate governance rules
prescribed by the exchange's governing body.
\48\ See 12 CFR part 364, Appendix A--Section II.B.
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3. Trust Committee: If the covered institution has trust powers,
it should have a trust committee to ensure that operation of the
trust department is separate and apart from every other department
of the covered institution, trust assets are separated from assets
owned by the covered institution, assets of each trust account are
separated from the assets of every other trust account, and the
trust department otherwise complies with all applicable laws and
regulations.
4. Risk Committee: The covered institution must have a risk
committee that approves and at least annually reviews and updates,
as necessary, the risk management policies of the covered
institution's operations and that oversees the operation of the
covered institution's risk management framework. The risk committee
must:
a. Be chaired by an independent director;
b. Be an independent committee of the board that has, as its
sole function, responsibility for the risk management policies of
the covered institution and oversight of the covered institution's
risk management framework;
c. Report directly to the covered institution's board of
directors;
d. Include at least one member experienced in identifying,
assessing, and managing risk exposures of large firms;
e. Receive and review regular reports on not less than a
quarterly basis from the CRO;
f. Meet at least quarterly, or more frequently as necessary, and
fully document and maintain records of its proceedings, including
risk management decisions;
g. Review and approve all decisions regarding the appointment or
removal of the CRO, and ensure that the CRO's compensation is
consistent with providing an objective assessment of the risks taken
by the covered institution.
5. Other Committees as Required to Perform Duties: The covered
institution should establish other committees, as necessary, in
accordance with its risk profile such as compliance, lending,
information technology, cybersecurity, and investments.
At least annually, the board should review and update, as
necessary, the written charter for each committee.
III. Board and Management Responsibilities Regarding Risk Management
and Audit
The board of a covered institution should establish, and
management should implement and manage, a comprehensive and
independent risk management function and effective programs for
internal controls, risk management, and audit.
A. Risk Management Program. The covered institution should have
and adhere to a risk management program that identifies, measures,
monitors, and manages risks of the covered institution through a
framework appropriate for the current and forecasted risk
environment and that meets the minimum standards of these
Guidelines. The risk management program should cover the following
risk categories as applicable: credit, concentration, interest rate,
liquidity, price, model, operational (including, but not limited to,
conduct, information technology, cyber-security, AML/CFT compliance,
and the use of third parties to perform or provide services or
materials for the institution), strategic, and legal risk. The risk
management program should ensure that the covered institution's
activities are conducted in compliance with applicable laws and
regulations. At least annually, the board should review and update,
as necessary, the risk management program.
For a covered institution that has a parent company, if the risk
profiles of each entity are substantially similar, the covered
institution may adopt and implement all or any part of its parent
company's risk management program that:
[[Page 70407]]
1. Satisfies the minimum standards in these Guidelines;
2. Ensures that the safety and soundness of the covered
institution is not jeopardized by decisions made by the parent
company's board and management;
3. Ensures that the covered institution's risk profile is easily
distinguished and separate from that of its parent for risk
management and supervisory reporting purposes; and
4. Consideration of these factors may require the covered
institution to have separate and focused governance and risk
management practices.
B. Risk Profile and Risk Appetite Statement. The covered
institution should create and quarterly review and update, as
necessary, a risk profile that identifies its current risks. Based
upon its risk profile, the covered institution should have a
comprehensive written statement, that is reviewed quarterly and
updated, as necessary, that establishes risk appetite limits for the
covered institution, both in the aggregate and for lines of business
and material activities or products. The risk appetite statement
should:
1. Reflect the level of risk that the board and management are
willing to accept.
2. Include both qualitative components and quantitative limits:
a. The qualitative components should describe a safe and sound
risk culture and how the covered institution will assess and accept
risks, including those that are difficult to quantify.
b. Quantitative limits should explicitly constrain the size of
risk exposures relative to the covered institution's earnings,
capital, and liquidity position that management may accept without
board approval.
3. Set limits at levels that take into account appropriate
capital and liquidity buffers and that prompt management and the
board to reduce risk before the covered institution's risk profile
jeopardizes the adequacy of its earnings, liquidity, or capital.
The board should review and approve the risk appetite statement
at least quarterly, or more frequently, as necessary, based on the
size and volatility of risks and any material changes in the covered
institution's business model, strategy, risk profile, or market
conditions. The covered institution's management, front line units,
and independent risk management unit should incorporate the risk
appetite statement, concentration risk limits, and front line unit
risk limits into:
a. Strategic and annual operating plans;
b. Capital stress testing and planning processes;
c. Liquidity stress testing and planning processes;
d. Product and service risk management processes, including
those for approving new and modified products and services;
e. Decisions regarding acquisitions and divestitures; and
f. Compensation and performance management programs.
C. Risk Management Program Standards.
1. Governance. The independent risk management unit should
design a formal, written risk management program that implements the
covered institution's risk appetite statement and ensures compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. The unit should review the
risk management program at least annually, and as often as
necessary, to address changes in the covered institution's risk
profile caused by internal or external factors or the evolution of
industry risk management practices. The board or the Risk Committee
should review and approve the risk management program and any
changes to the program.
2. Scope of risk management program. The risk management
program, at a minimum, should cover the following risk categories as
applicable: credit, concentration, interest rate, liquidity, price,
model, operational (including, but not limited to, conduct,
information technology, cyber-security, AML/CFT compliance, and the
use of third parties to perform or provide services or materials for
the institution), strategic, and legal risk. The risk management
program should be commensurate with the covered institution's
structure, risk profile, complexity, activities, and size and should
include:
a. Policies and procedures establishing risk-management
governance, risk management procedures, and risk control
infrastructure for its operations; and
b. Processes and systems for implementing and monitoring
compliance with such policies and procedures, including those for:
i. Identifying and reporting risks (including emerging risks)
and risk management deficiencies and ensuring effective and timely
implementation of actions to address emerging risks and risk
management deficiencies for its operations;
ii. Identifying and reporting to the Risk Committee and to the
internal audit unit known or suspected noncompliance with applicable
laws or regulations;
iii. Establishing managerial and employee responsibility for
risk management;
iv. Ensuring the independence of the risk management function;
v. Integrating risk management and associated controls with
management goals and its compensation structure for operations; and
vi. Identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling the
covered institution's concentration of risk.
c. Policies, procedures, and processes designed to ensure that
the covered institution's risk data aggregation and reporting
capabilities are appropriate for its size, complexity, and risk
profile and support supervisory reporting requirements.
Collectively, these policies, procedures, and processes should
provide for:
i. The design, implementation, and maintenance of a data
architecture and information technology infrastructure that supports
the covered institution's risk aggregation and reporting needs
during normal and stressed times;
ii. The capturing and aggregating of risk data and reporting of
material risks, concentrations, breaches of risk limits, and
emerging risks in a timely manner to the board and the CEO;
iii. The establishment of protocols for when and how to inform
board, front line unit management, independent risk management, and
the FDIC of a risk limit breach that takes into account the severity
of the breach and its impact on the bank, with a requirement to
provide a written description of how a breach will be resolved; and
iv. The distribution of risk reports to all relevant parties at
a frequency that meets their needs for decision-making purposes.
3. Responsibilities. Three distinct units should have
responsibility and be held accountable by the CEO and the board for
monitoring and reporting on the covered institution's compliance
with the risk management program: front line units, the independent
risk management unit, and the internal audit unit.\49\ Monitoring
and reporting should be performed, as often as necessary, based on
the size and volatility of risks and any material change in the
covered institution's business model, strategy, risk profile, or
market conditions.
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\49\ These roles and responsibilities are in addition to any
roles and responsibilities set forth in Appendices A and B to part
364.
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The responsibilities for each of these units are:
a. Front Line Units. Front line units should appropriately
assess and effectively manage all of the risks associated with their
activities to ensure that front line units do not create excessive
risks and, when aggregated across front line units, these risks do
not exceed the limits established in the covered institution's risk
appetite statement. In fulfilling this responsibility, each front
line unit should:
i. Assess, on an ongoing basis, the material risks associated
with its activities and products and use such risk assessments as
the basis for fulfilling its responsibilities under this paragraph
3(a) and for determining needed actions to strengthen risk
management or reduce risk because of changes in the unit's risk
profile, products, or other conditions.
ii. Establish and adhere to a set of written policies that
include front line unit risk limits as approved by the board. Such
policies should ensure risks associated with the front line unit's
activities are effectively identified, measured, monitored, and
controlled, consistent with the covered institution's risk appetite
statement, concentration risk limits, and all policies established
within the risk management program.
iii. Establish and adhere to procedures and processes, as
necessary, to ensure compliance with board policies, including risk
policies and applicable laws and regulations, and at least annually,
update, as necessary, such procedures and processes.
iv. Adhere to all applicable policies, procedures, and processes
established by independent risk management.
v. Monitor compliance with their respective risk limits and
report at least quarterly to the independent risk management unit.
vi. Develop, attract, train, retain, and maintain competent
staff at levels required to carry out the unit's role and
responsibilities effectively.
vii. Adhere to compensation and performance management programs
that
[[Page 70408]]
comply with laws and regulations regarding excessive or incentive
compensation and covered institution compensation policies.
At least annually, each front line should review and update, as
necessary, the written policies that include risk limits.
b. Independent Risk Management Unit. Under the direction of the
CRO, the independent risk management staff should oversee the
covered institution's risk-taking activities and assess risks and
issues independent of the CEO and front line units. In fulfilling
these responsibilities, independent risk management should:
i. Take primary responsibility and be held accountable by the
CEO and the board for designing a comprehensive written risk
management program that meets these Guidelines.
ii. Identify and assess, on an ongoing basis, the covered
institution's material risks, in the aggregate and for lines of
business and material activities or products, and use such risk
assessments as the basis for fulfilling its responsibilities under
these Guidelines and for determining needed actions to strengthen
risk management or reduce risk given changes in the covered
institution's risk profile, products, or other conditions.
iii. Monitor the covered institution's risk profile relative to
the covered institution's risk appetite and compliance with
concentration risk limits and report on such monitoring to the Risk
Committee at least quarterly.
iv. Establish and adhere to policies that include concentration
risk limits. Such policies should ensure that risks, both in the
aggregate and for lines of business and material activities or
products, within the covered institution are effectively identified,
measured, monitored, and controlled, and are consistent with the
covered institution's risk appetite statement and all policies and
processes established within the risk management program. At least
annually, such policies should be reviewed and updated, as
necessary.
v. Establish and adhere to procedures and processes, as
necessary, to ensure compliance with the board risk management
policies and with applicable laws and regulations. At least
annually, such procedures and processes should be reviewed and
updated, as necessary.
vi. Ensure that front line units meet the standards in paragraph
3(a).
vii. When necessary due to the level and type of risk, monitor
front line units' compliance with front line unit risk limits,
engage in ongoing communication with front line units regarding
adherence to these limits, and report at least quarterly any
concerns to the CEO and the Risk Committee.
viii. Identify and communicate to the CEO and the Risk
Committee:
a. Material risks and significant instances where independent
risk management's assessment of risk differs from that of a front
line unit;
b. Significant instances where a front line unit is not adhering
to the risk governance program; and
c. Identified or suspected instances of noncompliance with laws
or regulations.
ix. Identify and communicate to the Risk Committee:
a. Material risks and significant instances where independent
risk management's assessment of risk differs from the CEO's
assessment; and
b. Significant instances where the CEO is not adhering to, or
holding front line units accountable for adhering to, the risk
governance program.
x. Develop, attract, train, retain, and maintain competent staff
at levels required to carry out the unit's role and responsibilities
effectively.
xi. Adhere to compensation and performance management programs
that ensure that the covered institution provides compensation and
other incentives to the independent risk management unit staff that
ensure their independence, are consistent with providing an
objective assessment of the risks taken by the covered institution,
and comply with applicable laws and regulations regarding excessive
or incentive compensation, and covered institution compensation
policies.
c. Internal Audit Unit. In addition to meeting the standards for
and fulfilling its obligations of internal audit otherwise required
the internal audit unit should ensure that the covered institution's
risk management program complies with these Guidelines and is
appropriate for the size, complexity, and risk profile of the
covered institution. In carrying out its responsibilities the
internal audit unit should:
i. Maintain a complete and current inventory of all of the
covered institution's material businesses, product lines, services,
and functions, and assess the risks associated with each, which
collectively provide a basis for the audit plan required in
paragraph 3(c)(ii).
ii. Establish and adhere to an audit plan, updated quarterly or
more often, as necessary, that takes into account the covered
institution's risk profile and emerging risks and issues. The audit
plan should require the internal audit unit to evaluate the adequacy
of and compliance with policies, procedures, and processes
established by front line units and the independent risk management
unit under the risk management program. Changes to the audit plan
should be communicated to the Audit Committee as they occur.
iii. Report in writing, conclusions, issues, recommendations,
and management's response from audit work carried out under the
audit plan described in paragraph 3(c)(ii) to the Audit Committee.
The internal audit unit's reports to the Audit Committee should
identify the root cause of any investigated issue and include:
1. A determination of whether the root cause creates an issue
that has an impact on one organizational unit or multiple
organizational units within the covered institution; and
2. A determination of the effectiveness of the front line units
and the independent risk management unit in identifying and
resolving issues in a timely manner.
iv. Establish and adhere to processes for independently
assessing, at least annually, the design and effectiveness of the
risk management program. The internal audit unit, an external party,
or the internal audit unit in conjunction with an external party may
conduct the assessment. The assessment should include a conclusion
regarding the covered institution's compliance with the standards
set forth in these Guidelines.
v. Identify and communicate to the Audit Committee significant
instances where front line units or independent risk management are
not adhering to the risk management program. This communication
should document instances of identified or suspected non-compliance
with applicable laws or regulations.
vi. Establish and adhere to a quality assurance process that
ensures internal audit's policies, procedures, and processes comply
with applicable regulatory and industry guidance, are appropriate
for the size, complexity, and risk profile of the covered
institution, are updated to reflect changes to internal and external
risk factors, and are consistently followed.
vii. Develop, attract, train, retain, and maintain competent
staff at levels required to carry out the unit's role and
responsibilities effectively.
viii. Adhere to compensation and performance management programs
that comply with applicable laws and regulations regarding excessive
or incentive compensation and covered institution compensation
policies.
D. Communication Processes. The risk management program should
require that the covered institution initially communicate and
provide ongoing communication and reinforcement of the covered
institution's risk appetite statement and risk management program
throughout the covered institution in a manner that ensures
management and all employees align their risk-taking decisions with
applicable aspects of the risk appetite statement.
E. Processes Governing Risk Limit Breaches. The board should
establish, and the covered institution should adhere to, processes
that require front line units and the independent risk management
unit, consistent with their respective responsibilities to:
1. Identify breaches of the risk appetite statement,
concentration risk limits, and front line unit risk limits.
2. Distinguish breaches based on the severity of their impact on
the covered institution.
3. Inform front line unit management, the CRO, the Risk
Committee, the Audit Committee, the CEO, and the FDIC in writing of
a breach of a risk limit or noncompliance with the risk appetite
statement or risk management program describing the severity of the
breach, its impact on the covered institution, and how the breach
will be, or has been, resolved.
4. Establish accountability for reporting and resolving breaches
that include consequences for risk limit breaches that take into
account the magnitude, frequency, and recurrence of breaches, even
if the covered institution did not realize a loss from such
breaches.
At least annually, the board should review and update, as
necessary, the processes related to risk limit breaches.
[[Page 70409]]
F. Processes Governing Identification of and Response to
Violations of Law or Regulations.
The board should establish, and the covered institution should
adhere to, processes \50\ that require front line units and the
independent risk management unit, consistent with their respective
responsibilities to:
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\50\ The covered institution may seek legal advice (from in-
house or outside legal advisors) regarding any breach, including
known or suspected violation of law, but the covered institution's
policies and processes should state that seeking legal advice does
not abrogate the requirement to report any breach.
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1. Identify known or suspected violations of law or regulations
applicable to the activities conducted by their units.
2. Distinguish between violations of law or regulations that
appear largely technical, inadvertent, or insignificant and those
that appear willful or may involve dishonesty or misrepresentation.
3. Document all violations of law or regulations in writing and
notify the CEO, Audit Committee, and the Risk Committee, including
information about actions that are being taken to return the
institution to compliance with the applicable law or regulatory
requirement.
4. Ensure that known or suspected violations of law involving
dishonesty, misrepresentation or willful disregard for requirements,
whether by a customer or by any covered institution's director,
manager, employee, or person or entity performing services for the
covered entity, are promptly reported as required by law or
regulation \51\ and to relevant law enforcement and federal and
state agencies, and take prompt action to cease such activity and
prevent its recurrence.
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\51\ See, e.g., 12 CFR part 353.
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5. Report all violations of law or regulation in a manner and on
a timetable acceptable to the agency with jurisdiction over that law
or regulation and establish accountability for resolving violations,
even if the covered institution did not realize a loss from such
violations.
At least annually, the board should review and update, as
necessary, the processes related to identification of and response
to violations of law or regulations.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, on October 3, 2023.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-22421 Filed 10-10-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>Indexed from Federal Register on October 11, 2023.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.