Notice2023-18311
Ilya Balakaev,
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
August 25, 2023
Issuing agencies
Commerce DepartmentIndustry and Security Bureau
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 164 (Friday, August 25, 2023)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 164 (Friday, August 25, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58238-58242]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18311]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Ilya Balakaev,
Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20-68,
Moscow, Russian Federation;
Radiotester OOO,
a/k/a Radiotester LLC,
Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 11, Building 1,
Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation
and
Volgograd Prospect, House 2,
Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation;
Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ I hereby grant the request of the
Bureau of Industry and Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce,
through its Office of Export Enforcement (``OEE''), to renew the
temporary denial order (``TDO'') issued in this matter on February 24,
2023. I find that renewal of this order is necessary in the public
interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations.
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\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774
(2020), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While section 1766 of
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections
which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall
continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
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I. Procedural History
On February 24, 2023, I signed an order denying the export
privileges of Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC
(collectively, ``the Respondents'') for a period of 180 days on the
ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest
to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order was
issued ex parte pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations and
was effective upon issuance.\2\
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\2\ The TDO was published in the Federal Register on March 1,
2023 (88 FR 12912).
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On July 31, 2023, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for
renewal of the TDO that was issued on February 24, 2023. The written
request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled
expiration. A copy of the renewal request was sent to Respondents in
accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.
II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.''
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24, TDO may also be made
applicable to other persons if BIS has reason to believe that they are
related to a respondent and that applying the order to them is
necessary to prevent its evasion. 15 CFR 766.23(a)-(b) and 766.24(c). A
``related person'' is a person, either at the time of the TDO's
issuance or thereafter, who is related to a respondent ``by ownership,
control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection
in the conduct of trade or business.'' 15 CFR 766.23(a). Related
persons may be added to a TDO on an
[[Page 58239]]
ex-parte basis in accordance with Section 766.23(b) of the Regulations.
15 CFR 766.23(b).
B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal
The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation's (``Russia's) further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a
sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs,
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.
As of February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export
Classification Control Number (``ECCN'') in Categories 3 through 9 of
the Commerce Control List (``CCL'') required a license to be exported
or reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8,
2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded to cover all
items on the CCL. See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These rules were
codified in Title 15 CFR 746.8, which state, ``a license is required,
excluding deemed exports and deemed reexports, to export, reexport, or
transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus any item subject
to the EAR and specified in any Export Control Classification Number
(``ECCN'') on the CCL.''
OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the
issuance of the initial TDO and the evidence developed over the course
of this investigation, which demonstrate the existence of an illicit
procurement network conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws by
unlawfully procuring and shipping controlled counterintelligence items
to Russia and North Korea. As detailed in its July 31, 2023 request for
renewal of the TDO, OEE's investigation, which remains ongoing, has
revealed evidence that this illicit network and its reach remain
ongoing. As a result, the renewal of this order is necessary.
1. The Basis for the Initial TDO
As detailed in the initial TDO issued on February 24, 2023,
Balakaev engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by unlawfully
procuring and exporting from the United States electronic devices
subject to the EAR to the Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation (``FSB''), a BIS-listed entity located in the Russian
Federation (``Russia''), and to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (``North Korea'' or ``DPRK'') without the required U.S.
government authorization. ``Export'' is defined in the EAR as an
``actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, including
the sending or taking of an item out of the United States, in any
manner.'' 15 CFR 734.13(a)(1).\3\
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\3\ ``Item'' means ``commodities, software, and technology.'' 15
CFR 772.1. Further, ``technology'' may be in any tangible or
intangible form, such as written or oral communications, blueprints,
drawings, photographs, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables,
engineering designs and specifications, computer-aided design files,
manuals or documentation, electronic media or information revealed
through visual inspection. Id.
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The FSB is listed on the Commerce Department's Entity List \4\ with
a policy of denial for all items subject to the EAR with certain
exceptions for transactions authorized by the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') pursuant to
General License No. 1B of March 2, 2021.\5\ As a result of this
listing, no item subject to the Regulations may be exported,
reexported, or transferred (in-country) to the FSB without prior
authorization from BIS, and BIS will review any license applications
for the FSB pursuant to a policy of denial.\6\ The FSB was originally
listed on the Entity List on January 4, 2017,\7\ with a license review
policy of presumption of denial for all items subject to the EAR.\8\ As
such, as of January 4, 2017, a license was required to export,
reexport, or transfer (in-country) all items subject to the EAR to the
FSB.
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\4\ The Entity List (supplement no. 4 to part 744 of the EAR)
identifies entities for which there is reasonable cause to believe,
based on specific and articulable facts, that the entities have been
involved, are involved, or pose a significant risk of being or
becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or
foreign policy interests of the United States.
\5\ See 87 FR 34131 (Jun. 6, 2022). See also Sec. Sec.
734.9(g), 746.8(a)(3), and 744.21(b) of the EAR.
\6\ Id.
\7\ See 82 FR 722 (Jan. 4, 2017). See also 82 FR 18219 (Apr. 18,
2017), 86 FR 37903 (Jul. 19, 2021), 87 FR 12240 (Mar. 3, 2022), and
87 FR 34136 (Jun. 6, 2022) for additional listings of FSB-related
entities on the Entity List.
\8\ On March 2, 2021, the Department of State designated the FSB
pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for its contributions to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, exports to the
FSB were also prohibited under 15 CFR 744.8.
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As of January 26, 2007, a license is required for the export or
reexport to North Korea of all items subject to the EAR other than food
or medicine designated as EAR99.\9\ This rule was codified in Title 15
CFR 746.4, which states ``consistent with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718, a license is required to export or reexport
any item subject to the EAR (see part 734 of the EAR) to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), except food and medicines
classified as EAR99 (definitions in part 772 of the EAR).'' \10\
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\9\ See 52 FR 3722 (Jan. 26, 2007).
\10\ Additionally, BIS implemented broad based controls for
items and activities subject to the EAR in support of U.S. national
security and foreign policy. 50 U.S.C. 481 l(l)-(2). These controls
included restrictions on exports and reexports to the DPRK for
United Nations (``UN'') and anti-terrorism reasons. 15 CFR 746.4,
742.19. Consistent with ECRA and UN Security Council Resolutions,
with limited exceptions, a license was required to export or
reexport any item subject to the EAR to North Korea. 15 CFR 746.4.
The DPRK was also subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo, and
thus, militarily sensitive items were also restricted. 15
CFR746.1(b)(2). Furthermore, the Secretary of State designated the
DPRK a state sponsor of terrorism and implemented additional
restrictions on it. 15 CFR 742.19(a)(2)-(3). For example, additional
prohibitions applied to certain items destined for military, police,
intelligence or other sensitive end users or if an item would make a
significant contribution to the military potential of the DPRK. 15
CFR 742.19(a)(3); Supplement No. 2 to part 742.
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As referenced in the initial TDO, on February 21, 2023, Balakaev
was indicted on multiple counts in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. The charges included, but were not
limited to, conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws in
connection with the unlicensed export of electronic spectrum analyzers,
signal generators, and gas detection equipment, among other items, to
Balakaev's company Radiotester, located in Moscow, Russia, for ultimate
end use by officials of the FSB and the DPRK. As described in the
indictment and initial TDO, Radiotester is owned or controlled by
Balakaev. The company is described on its website as ``helping to
quickly resolve issues of supply and repair of foreign-made measuring
equipment'' and as having ``experience of working with large federal,
city-forming, manufacturing enterprises''.
As further detailed in the initial TDO, Balakaev heads an illicit
procurement network consisting of an individual in the United States,
referred to herein as ``Individual 3'', who would assist Balakaev in
purchasing the electronic equipment, as well as two members of the FSB
in Russia, referred to as FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator
2, who worked in FSB Center 8's Military Unit 43753 and who would
publish a request for proposal (``RFP'') to repair a device on publicly
available Russian websites (collectively, the ``Balakaev Network''). In
particular, Balakaev would purchase the electronic devices on the
internet or directly through the United States-based
[[Page 58240]]
manufacturers and ship them to Individual 3's home in Richmond,
Virginia. Then, often traveling through the Eastern District of New
York, Balakaev flew to the United States to pick up the devices and
bring them back to Russia or had Individual 3 and others ship the
electronic devices from the United States to Russia. On occasion,
Balakaev directed others to travel with the electronic devices from the
United States to Russia. Balakaev subsequently used parts from the
electronic devices to repair FSB equipment or provided the equipment
directly to a DPRK official. The electronic devices Balakaev purchased,
repaired, and sold to the FSB and DPRK are subject to the EAR and are
items commonly used as part of sensitive foreign counterintelligence
and military operations, including the transmission of encrypted
communications, the ability to scan a room to determine if it was
bugged, and the detection of hazardous gases.
As stated in the initial TDO, OEE has presented evidence indicating
that Balakaev and the other above-captioned parties were engaged in
unlawfully purchasing and shipping dual-use items from U.S.
manufacturers to the FSB and DPRK. These items included advanced
electronics and sophisticated testing equipment, some of which can be
used in sensitive foreign counterintelligence and military operations.
The February 2023 indictment charged Balakaev, owner of
Radiotester, with conspiring to defraud, conspiring to violate IEEPA,
conspiring to violate ECRA, and smuggling goods from the United States.
The violations charged in the indictment cover conduct occurring
between at least January 2017 through February 2022, and it alleges
that Balakaev was not only aware of U.S. export control laws but also
took active steps to evade U.S. export controls by illicitly procuring
items subject to the EAR without the required BIS export licenses.
i. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin Electronic Devices to the FSB in
Russia
As stated in the indictment and in the initial TDO issued on
February 24, 2023, Balakaev and his co-conspirators in the Balakaev
Network unlawfully sourced, purchased, shipped and transported spectrum
analyzers and signal generators from vendors and manufacturers in the
United States for the benefit of the FSB in Russia. Spectrum analyzers
are generally used to detect the frequency of radio signals to identify
surveillance devices. The spectrum analyzers that were exported by
Balakaev are classified under ECCN 3A992.a and are controlled for Anti-
Terrorism (AT) reasons. Signal generators are generally used to
securely transmit information, often as part of counterintelligence or
other covert operations. The signal generators that were exported by
Balakaev are classified under ECCN 3A992.a and are controlled for AT
reasons. A license was required to export these items to the FSB in
Russia.
As described in the indictment and in the initial TDO, because many
of the spectrum analyzers and signal generators used by the FSB were
manufactured in the United States, it is difficult for the FSB to
obtain parts to repair these items. Pursuant to the scheme involving
the Balakaev Network, Balakaev conspired with FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and
FSB Co-Conspirator 2, who worked in FSB Center 8's Military Unit 43753.
In particular, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 would
publish a RFP to repair certain devices on publicly available Russian
websites. Balakaev, FSB Co-Conspirator 1, and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 then
negotiated a contract price to repair the devices before Balakaev
submitted a bid in response to the RFP. To ensure that Balakaev won the
bid, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 instructed Balakaev
to submit two higher bids under fictious company names, in addition to
the agreed-upon bid through Balakaev's company, Radiotester.
Once the FSB accepted Radiotester's bid and the contract was
signed, Balakaev traveled to FSB Center 8 in Russia to pick up the
broken device(s). Either FSB Co-Conspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2
would meet Balakaev outside the secure gate of FSB Center 8 to provide
Balakaev with the broken device(s).
As described in the indictment and the initial TDO, Balakaev then
sourced the necessary repair parts from the United States. Balakaev
either purchased the devices over the internet or directly from the
U.S. manufacturers, and had the devices shipped to Individual 3's home
in Richmond, Virginia. Once purchased, Balakaev brought or shipped the
devices to Russia where he then mined the devices for component parts
to use to repair the FSB devices. After Balakaev repaired the devices,
he returned to FSB Center 8, where he met with either FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2 outside the FSB Center 8 gate to
provide the repaired devices. The FSB Military Unit 43753 then wired
payment to Balakaev's Sberbank account.
As also referenced in the indictment and initial TDO, in total,
between approximately 2017 and February 2022, Balakaev entered into
approximately ten (10) contracts with FSB Military Unit 43753 to repair
approximately forty (40) spectrum analyzers and signal generators. In
furtherance of those contracts, Balakaev purchased approximately forty-
three (43) devices in the United States. Balakaev frequently traveled
between Russia and the United States during this time to obtain the
devices, often through John F. Kennedy International Airport (``JFK
Airport'') in the Eastern District of New York. In furtherance of the
scheme to unlawfully export controlled items from the United States to
the FSB, on or about and between February 2017 and March 2021, Balakaev
traveled from Russia to the United States approximately fourteen (14)
times, typically staying in the United States anywhere from two (2) to
fourteen (14) days on each trip. Included below is one example of the
multiple unlawful exports to the FSB which are described in further
detail in the indictment.
By way of example, on or about December 19, 2019, Balakaev, acting
through Radiotester, entered into a contract with the FSB Military Unit
43753. As described in the indictment, the contract was to repair an
Agilent HP 8562EC and two Agilent HP 8560EC spectrum analyzers.
According to purchase records and shipment notifications, Balakaev
purchased two Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers that were delivered
to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia on or about January 14,
2020 and January 15, 2020. Approximately one month later, on or about
February 10, 2020, Balakaev flew from Russia to the United States,
where he stayed for approximately one week, in order to obtain the two
Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers that he purchased. While in the
United States, on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev emailed FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 with the subject of the email ``Repair Contracts 43753''
and attached a PDF about spectrum analyzers. The following month, in or
about March 2020, Balakaev purchased an Agilent HP 8562EC spectrum
analyzer to fulfill the FSB contract. On or about March 21, 2020, the
device was delivered to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia.
In addition to the example described above, between approximately
April 16, 2020 and March 6, 2021, Balakaev purchased approximately
thirty (30) additional spectrum analyzers, spectrum analyzer parts, and
other radio parts which were shipped to Individual 3's home in
Richmond, Virginia. Balakaev also traveled to the United
[[Page 58241]]
States twice in 2021 to obtain the devices and fulfill his FSB
contracts. Further, in approximately January 2022, Balakaev, through
Radiotester, entered into a new contract with FSB Military Unit 43753
to repair six spectrum analyzers and signal generators, including the
following make and models: HP8648D; Agilent HP 8562E; Agilent HP
8562EC; Rohde & Schwarz FS300; and Rohde & Schwarz SM300. In
approximately February 2022, Balakaev picked up the devices from FSB
Co-Conspirator 1 at FSB Center 8 to begin the process of procuring
spectrum analyzers for use in repairing the devices.
ii. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin Gas Detection Equipment to the
DPRK
Between approximately 2019 and 2020, Balakaev conspired with DPRK
Government Official 1, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the DPRK
to the Russian Federation, to provide the DPRK with U.S.-origin
technology that can detect hazardous gases, in violation of United
States laws.
As described in the indictment and in the initial TDO, in
approximately 2019, DPRK Government Official 1 contacted Balakaev to
discuss business they could engage in together. DPRK Government
Official 1 contacted Balakaev specifically due to connections that
Balakaev had made while working at the Russian Ministry of Culture and
in his travel to North Korea. Balakaev subsequently met DPRK Government
Official 1 multiple times at the North Korean embassy in Moscow,
Russia. On one of those occasions, DPRK Government Official 1 asked
Balakaev to purchase an Altair 4X gas detector for the DPRK. The Altair
4X gas detector is a device manufactured by a company in the United
States that can be used to detect deadly gases such as combustible
gases, oxygen-deficient atmospheres, and toxic gases. The Altair 4X gas
detector is subject to the EAR and designated as EAR99.\11\
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\11\ The Altair 4X gas detector would not fall within the
exception set forth in Sec. 746.4 as it is not EAR99 food or
medicine.
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On approximately December 28, 2019, Balakaev purchased the Altair
4X gas detector on the internet in the United States and had it shipped
to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia. On January 2, 2020, the
shipment arrived at Individual 3's home. Approximately two months
later, on or about February 9, 2020, DPRK Government Official 1 sent
Balakaev a photograph of a broken CD labeled ``Altair 4XR Multigas
Detector.'' Balakaev responded, in sum and substance, that he would
send a link for the gas detector software. As further described in the
indictment and initial TDO, on or about February 10, 2020, Balakaev
traveled from Russia to the United States to obtain the gas detector
that was previously shipped to Individual 3's home. Approximately one
week later, on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev returned to Russia
with the gas detector.
As the indictment and initial TDO further demonstrate, Balakaev was
aware of the applicable U.S. export control laws which prohibited him
from purchasing the electronic devices in the United States for
ultimate end use by the FSB and DPRK. As described in the indictment,
on or about November 5, 2019, Individual 3 emailed Balakaev a hyperlink
to a BIS document titled ``Don't Let This Happen To You!: Actual
Investigations of Export Control and Antiboycott Violations.'' In the
email, Individual 3 wrote to Balakaev to ``Take a look just in case.''
The BIS document provided ``an introduction to the consequences of
violating U.S. export control law.'' In addition to explaining U.S.
export control laws, the document noted specific examples of
individuals who violated U.S. sanctions regulations by exporting items
to Russia without a BIS license. Balakaev subsequently downloaded the
document and saved the document to his computer.
2. Basis for Renewal of TDO
i. Recent Procurement Attempts
As noted in OEE's request for renewal, OEE's investigation, which
remains ongoing, has identified evidence of multiple transactions
involving Balakaev and the Balakaev Network dating back to 2017. As
described in the indictment, Balakaev has demonstrated a pattern of
conduct involving the illicit procurement and unauthorized exports of
EAR-controlled items for end use by the FSB and DPRK. Further, on
October 18, 2022, Balakaev made statements to law enforcement that he
intended to continue to procure EAR-controlled items through other
means and is still obtaining contracts through the FSB.
In addition, Balakaev informed agents that he had fulfilled FSB
contracts he had obtained in January 2022 for the repair of six
devices, and that he was currently negotiating with FSB Co-Conspirators
for new contracts in January or February 2023. According to Balakaev,
the new contracts were not public yet and the FSB Co-Conspirators would
advise Balakaev to review the contracts. Accordingly, OEE has reason to
believe that Balakaev and the other above-captioned parties continue to
engage in unlawfully purchasing and shipping dual-use items from U.S.
manufacturers to the FSB and DPRK. These items include advanced
electronics and sophisticated testing equipment, some of which can be
used in sensitive foreign counterintelligence and military operations.
ii. Risk of Continued Evasion
Since the issuance of the TDO on February 24, 2023, an arrest
warrant has been issued for Ilya Balakaev. Ilya Balakaev is presently a
fugitive from U.S. law enforcement and resides in the Russian
Federation. Because he has not yet been apprehended, OEE has reason to
believe that his illicit procurement efforts will remain ongoing, given
the length and nature of the conduct identified to date. Moreover,
because Balakaev is familiar with methods of concealment, he is likely
to use increasingly sophisticated methods to avoid detection by law
enforcement, absent the renewal of the TDO.
III. Findings
I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that a
violation of the Regulations by the above-captioned parties is imminent
in both time and degree of likelihood. As such, a TDO is needed to give
notice to persons and companies in the United States and abroad that
they should cease dealing with Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a
Radiotester LLC in export or reexport transactions involving items
subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with the public interest
to preclude future violations of the Regulations given the deliberate,
covert, and determined nature of the misconduct and clear disregard for
complying with U.S. export control laws.
This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with
Section 766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations.
It Is Therefore Ordered:
First, that ILYA BALAKAEV, with an address at
Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20-68 Moscow, Russian Federation; RADIOTESTER
OOO A/K/A RADIOTESTER LLC, with an address at Sharikopodshipnikovskaya
11, Building 1, Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation, and Volgograd
Prospect, House 2, Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation; and when acting
for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees
(each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may
not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction
involving any commodity, software or technology
[[Page 58242]]
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be
exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License
Exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity
subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of a
Denied Person any item subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/
a Radiotester LLC by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of
responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be
made subject to the provisions of this Order.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC may, at any
time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support
of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S.
Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Respondents Ilya
Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC may oppose a request
to renew this Order by filing a written submission with the Assistant
Secretary for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than
seven days before the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served on each denied person and
shall be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-18311 Filed 8-24-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on August 25, 2023.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.