Notice2023-18297
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE National, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Change To Amend the Connectivity Fee Schedule Regarding Power Allocation
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
August 25, 2023
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 164 (Friday, August 25, 2023)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 164 (Friday, August 25, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58364-58368]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18297]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-98171; File No. SR-NYSENAT-2023-18]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE National, Inc.; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Change To Amend the Connectivity Fee Schedule
Regarding Power Allocation
August 21, 2023.
Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby given
that, on August 17, 2023, NYSE National, Inc. (``NYSE National'' or the
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
\3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend the Connectivity Fee Schedule to
provide an alternative procedure by which the Exchange can allocate
power in the Mahwah Data Center via deposit-guaranteed orders from
Users made within a 90-day ``Ordering Window.'' The proposed change is
available on the Exchange's website at <a href="http://www.nyse.com">www.nyse.com</a>, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of,
[[Page 58365]]
and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it
received on the proposed rule change. The text of those statements may
be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has
prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the
most significant parts of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to amend the Connectivity Fee Schedule to
provide an alternative procedure by which the Exchange can allocate
power in the Mahwah Data Center (``MDC'') \4\ via deposit-guaranteed
orders from Users made within a 90-day ``Ordering Window.''
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\4\ Through its Fixed Income and Data Services (``FIDS'')
business, Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (``ICE'') operates the
MDC. The Exchange and its affiliates NYSE American LLC, NYSE Arca,
Inc., NYSE Chicago, Inc., and NYSE National, Inc. (the ``Affiliate
SROs'') are indirect subsidiaries of ICE. Each of the Exchange's
Affiliate SROs has submitted substantially the same proposed rule
change to propose the changes described herein. See SR-NYSE-2023-29,
SR-NYSEAMER-2023-39, SR-NYSEARCA-2023-53, and SR-NYSECHX-2023-16.
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Background
Shortly after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Exchange
began experiencing unprecedented User \5\ demand for cabinets and power
at the MDC. In order to manage its inventory, in late 2020, the
Exchange filed to create purchasing limits and a waitlist for cabinet
orders.\6\ In early 2021, the Exchange filed to create additional
purchasing limits and a waitlist for orders for additional power in the
MDC.\7\ Pursuant to the terms of those filings, a Combined Waitlist is
currently in place.
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\5\ For purposes of the Exchange's colocation services, a
``User'' means any market participant that requests to receive
colocation services directly from the Exchange. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 83351 (May 31, 2018), 83 FR 26314 (June 6,
2018) (SR-NYSENAT-2018-07). As specified in the Connectivity Fee
Schedule, a User that incurs colocation fees for a particular
colocation service pursuant thereto would not be subject to
colocation fees for the same colocation service charged by the
Affiliate SROs.
\6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90732 (December 18,
2020), 85 FR 84443 (December 28, 2020) (SR-NYSE-2020-73, SR-
NYSEAMER-2020-66, SR-NYSEArca-2020-82, SR-NYSECHX-2020-26, SR-
NYSENAT-2020-28) (establishing the procedures in current Colocation
Note 6(a) and 7(a)).
\7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 91515 (April 8,
2021), 86 FR 19674 (April 14, 2021) (SR-NYSE-2021-12, SR-NYSEAMER-
2021-08, SR-NYSEArca-2021-11, SR-NYSECHX-2021-02, SR-NYSENAT-2021-
03) (establishing the procedures in current Colocation Note 6(b) and
7(b)).
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In 2021 and 2022, the Exchange expanded the amount of space and
power available in the MDC by opening a new colocation hall (i.e., Hall
4), yet User demand for additional power continues to climb. Currently,
the waitlist includes 27 Users collectively requesting in excess of an
additional 700 kilowatts (``kW'') of power. That number, however, may
be a mere fraction of Users' true demand for additional power at the
MDC, since, due to the existing waitlist procedures, the Exchange may
not accept orders for more than 32 kW of power, and a User and its
Affiliates \8\ may have only one order on the waitlist at a time. Of
the 27 Users on the current waitlist, many have mentioned that they are
actually interested in purchasing much more than 32 kW of power, with
several claiming that they are seeking additional power of several
hundred kilowatts.\9\
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\8\ An ``Affiliate'' of a User is defined as ``any other User or
Hosted Customer that is under 50% or greater common ownership or
control of the first User.'' Connectivity Fee Schedule, at 1.
\9\ Such demand for increased power is not unique to the MDC.
Customers have told the Exchange that available power is in short
supply at several other data centers as well, including the Equinex-
owned data center in Secaucus, New Jersey, the Equinex-owned data
center in Carteret, New Jersey, and the Digital Realty-owned data
center at Cermak, Illinois. Since none of those data centers is
operated by an exchange or regulated by the Commission, the
operators of those data centers are free to ask customers to
indicate their interest in future build-outs by submitting orders
guaranteed by deposits.
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ICE is currently expanding the amount of colocation space and power
available at the MDC. ICE is already developing a new colocation hall
(i.e., Hall 5) to deliver power that would satisfy all orders currently
on the waitlist with some extra power remaining.
ICE proposes this rule change to address two issues posed by the
current situation. First, while the development of Hall 5 is underway,
ICE must also evaluate whether customer demand would support additional
expansion projects to provide further power. ICE must anticipate future
demand now because each colocation expansion project is a significant
capital project requiring long lead times, especially given current
supply-chain constraints on equipment, and substantial up-front
investment. It may be possible for ICE to leverage certain efficiencies
and economies of scale by planning for future expansion now.
Yet ICE currently lacks any real indication of customers' true
demands. As noted above, the current waitlist of 700 kW may represent a
mere fraction of Users' true power requirements, since waitlist orders
are limited to one order of 32 kW per User. On the one hand, ICE does
not know whether the extra power that will be provided in Hall 5 will
be enough to meet Users' needs. On the other hand, ICE cannot justify
the investment of time and expense that it would take to create
additional colocation space based on only casual indications of
interest from customers. Without firm, guaranteed commitments from
Users to purchase the power if it is made available, ICE runs the risk
of underestimating or overestimating Users' true demand for power and
faces the possibility of undersupplying or oversupplying space and
power.
Second, the existing procedures in the Connectivity Fee Schedule
are not well-tailored to allocating large amounts of power that become
available all at once, such as when a new colocation hall opens. Under
the existing procedures, if less than 350 kW of unallocated power is
available, the Purchasing Limits in Colocation Note 6 restrict all
orders to 32 kW--but any time more than 350 kW of unallocated power is
available, Users can place unlimited orders that the Exchange must
allocate on a first-come, first-served basis. Regarding Hall 5, the
Exchange anticipates large amounts of unallocated power becoming
available at several intervals. This could create a race condition in
which the largest Users place early orders for many hundreds of
kilowatts of power, effectively shutting out other customers with more
modest power needs. The Exchange therefore believes that it needs a
different procedure when allocating substantial amounts of power at one
time due to a hall expansion or other similar expansion of available
power.
Proposed ``Ordering Window'' Procedure
The Exchange proposes to solve these issues by providing a
temporary procedure to permit the Exchange to accept unlimited,
deposit-guaranteed orders from Users for a period of 90 days (the
``Ordering Window''). The Colocation Notes in the Connectivity Fee
Schedule would be amended accordingly.
Based on the total power ordered by Users during the Ordering
Window, ICE would gain insight into whether further expansion beyond
Hall 5 is likely to be required in the future. Requiring Users to
submit deposits with their orders during this Ordering Window would
encourage Users to carefully assess their true power needs and would
protect against Users ordering more power than they actually intend to
purchase. After
[[Page 58366]]
the Ordering Window closes, the Exchange would allocate power to Users
according to terms described below, which would ensure that every User
submitting an order would receive at least some power and no Users
would be shut out of the allocation. Following the Ordering Window, the
existing purchasing limits and waitlist procedures in Colocation Notes
6 and 7 would then resume.
Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend the Connectivity Fee
Schedule to add new Colocation Note 8, entitled ``Ordering Window.''
Paragraph (a) of Colocation Note 8 would provide that the Exchange
may announce, by customer notice, a 90-day Ordering Window during which
the Exchange may accept orders and deposits pursuant to the terms
below. Paragraph (a) would specify that if the Exchange announces an
Ordering Window while the Cabinet and Power Purchasing Limits in
Colocation Note 6 and/or the Cabinet and Combined Waitlist provisions
in Colocation Note 7 are in effect, the terms of the Ordering Window as
set out in Colocation Note 8 would temporarily supersede those
terms.\10\
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\10\ During the Ordering Window, any orders submitted by Users
must meet the requirements of Colocation Note 8. The Exchange would
not accept new orders to the waitlist established under Colocation
Note 7 while the Ordering Window is open.
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Paragraph (b) of Colocation Note 8 would specify the procedures for
placing orders and paying deposits during the Ordering Window.
Subparagraph (1) would provide that during the Ordering Window, Users
may submit orders for their anticipated power needs, subject to the
following. First, a User and its Affiliates, if any, may finalize only
one order for power during the Ordering Window. Second, the provision
of Colocation Note 7 that prohibits the Exchange from accepting orders
for more than four dedicated cabinets and/or 32 kW of power would not
apply. Third, a User may submit an order during the Ordering Window
even if it already has an order pending on a waitlist pursuant to
Colocation Note 7.
Subparagraph (2) of paragraph (b) would provide that orders
submitted during the Ordering Window are subject to deposits equal to
two months' worth of the monthly recurring costs of the amount of new
power ordered.\11\ The subparagraph would further provide that a User's
order would be finalized when the User's signed order form and deposit
are received by the Exchange, and that orders that are not finalized
before the Ordering Window closes will be considered void. Subparagraph
(2) of paragraph (b) would further provide that the deposit would be
applied to the User's first and subsequent months' invoices after the
power is delivered until the deposit is depleted. If the User withdraws
its order during the Ordering Window, the deposit would be
returned.\12\
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\11\ For instance, the required deposit would be calculated as
the number of kilowatts ordered by the User in its Ordering Window
order, multiplied by the appropriate ``Per kW Monthly Fee'' as
indicated in the Connectivity Fee Schedule. The Per kW Monthly Fee
is a factor of the total number of kilowatts allocated to all of a
User's dedicated cabinets and varies based on the total kilowatts
allocated to a User.
\12\ In the event that a User wishes to reduce an order that it
placed during the Ordering Window, its deposit would not be reduced
or returned, but rather would be applied against the User's first
and subsequent months' invoices after the power is delivered until
the deposit is depleted.
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Subparagraph (3) of paragraph (b) would provide that a User may
modify its order during the Ordering Window, but such modification
would not be finalized until the User's signed modified order form and
any additional deposit are received by the Exchange.
Paragraph (c) of Colocation Note 8 would specify the Exchange's
procedure for allocating available power after the Ordering Window
ends. After determining the total amount of power available to
allocate, the Exchange would allocate the available power as follows.
In Step 1, per subparagraph (1) of paragraph (c), the Exchange would
allocate power to fill any orders on any waitlist in effect pursuant to
Colocation Note 7 (e.g., the current waitlist of 32 kW orders totaling
700 kW).
In Step 2, per subparagraph (2) of paragraph (c), the Exchange
would allocate up to 32 kW of power to each User that finalized an
order during the Ordering Window, subject to the following. If
sufficient power is available, the Exchange would allocate 32 kW of
power to each User, except that orders for less than 32 kW would be
filled only up to the number of kilowatts actually ordered. If
sufficient power is not available to allocate 32 kW of power to each
User, the Exchange would allocate the available power equally among all
Users (rounded to a whole number of kilowatts), except that no User
would be allocated more kilowatts than it actually ordered. If no power
remains to be allocated after Step 2, all orders finalized during the
Ordering Window would be considered to be completed.\13\
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\13\ To illustrate, if a User finalized an order for 100 kW
during the Ordering Window and was allocated 32 kW of power during
Step 2 and no further power remained to be allocated after Step 2,
the User's order would be considered completed. The residual 68 kW
ordered would not be transferred to a waitlist. The User would be
free to submit a new order for additional power after the Ordering
Window (subject to the Purchasing Limits, if then in effect).
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In Step 3, per subparagraph (3) of paragraph (c), if any power
remains to be allocated after Step 2, the Exchange would allocate power
to any orders that were not completely filled during Step 2, as
follows. If sufficient power is available, the Exchange would allocate
power to completely fill all remaining orders finalized during the
Ordering Window. If sufficient power is not available to completely
fill all such orders, the Exchange would allocate power to fill an
identical percentage of each remaining order (rounded to a whole number
of kilowatts). All such orders would then be considered completed.\14\
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\14\ To illustrate, if a User finalized an order for 100 kW
during the Ordering Window and was allocated a total of 90 kW of
power in Steps 2 and 3, the order would be considered completed. The
residual 10 kW ordered would not be transferred to a waitlist. The
User would be free to submit a new order for additional power after
the Ordering Window (subject to the Purchasing Limits, if then in
effect).
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Paragraph (d) of Colocation Note 8 would specify that any orders
received by the Exchange after the end of the Ordering Window would not
be included in the allocation process described in Colocation Note 8.
Such orders would be subject to the terms of Colocation Notes 6 and 7.
Application and Impact of the Proposed Changes
The Exchange currently anticipates invoking the proposed Ordering
Window procedure to assist in determining Users' power needs and to
allocate power in Hall 5. The procedure could also be used in the
future each time the Exchange or ICE must assess customer demand for
additional space and power in the MDC or allocate large amounts of
power that become available at one time.
The Exchange does not propose to eliminate or alter the existing
purchasing limits and waitlist procedures in Colocation Notes 6 and 7.
Rather, those procedures would be temporarily superseded during the
Ordering Window and would resume immediately after the Ordering Window
ends.
The Exchange expects that the proposed changes would apply equally
to all types and sizes of market participants. All Users would receive
equal notice of the opening of the Ordering Window; the Ordering Window
dates would be the same for all Users; and each order during the
Ordering Window would be secured with a deposit equal to two months of
the monthly recurring costs of the
[[Page 58367]]
power ordered during the Ordering Window.
The proposed Ordering Window procedure would not disadvantage Users
on the current waitlist pursuant to Colocation Note 7, since power
would be allocated to those orders first under the Ordering Window
procedure.
Smaller Users with more modest power needs would not be
disadvantaged by the proposed changes. In Step 2, each User that
finalized an order during the Ordering Window would be allocated up to
32 kW of power (subject to sufficient power being available) before any
User's order for more than 32 kW would be filled. This would ensure
that all Users that participate in the Ordering Window would receive at
least some power and no Users would be shut out of the allocation. In
addition, because the deposit is proportional to the size of the order,
and not a fixed amount, smaller Users would not be disproportionately
affected by the deposit requirement.
The proposed changes are not otherwise intended to address any
other issues relating to colocation services and/or related fees, and
the Exchange is not aware of any problems that Users would have in
complying with the proposed change.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with section 6(b) of the Act,\15\ in general, and furthers the
objectives of section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\16\ in particular, because it
is designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating,
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and
facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest
and because it is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
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\15\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\16\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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The proposed rule change is designed to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market
system by creating an alternative procedure by which the Exchange can
allocate power in the MDC. The current procedures provide for only two
allocation methods: orders that must be limited to 32 kW when the
Purchasing Limits are in effect, and unlimited orders that the Exchange
must fill on a first-come, first-served basis when the Purchasing
Limits are not in effect. Neither of those current procedures gives the
Exchange a way to obtain accurate information from Users about their
actual and anticipated power needs--information that the Exchange
requires in order to properly plan for future hall expansions at the
MDC. The current procedures are not well-tailored to allocating large
amounts of power that become available all at once, such as when a new
colocation hall opens. When a large amount of power becomes available
at one time, such as through a hall expansion, the current procedures
could create a race condition in which the largest Users place early
orders for many hundreds of kilowatts of power that the Exchange must
fill on a first-come, first-served basis, effectively shutting out
other customers with more modest power needs. In contrast, the proposed
alternative procedure would remove impediments and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system by
permitting the Exchange to allocate up to 32 kW of power (subject to
sufficient power being available) to each User before any User's order
for more than 32 kW would be filled. This would ensure that each User
submitting a finalized order during the Ordering Window would be
guaranteed to receive at least some power and no Users would be shut
out of the allocation.
The proposed requirement that orders submitted during the Ordering
Window be guaranteed by a deposit is also designed to remove
impediments and to perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and
a national market system. The current procedures give the Exchange no
way to accurately measure User demand for additional power. The
existing waitlist is no indication of Users' actual demand, since
waitlist orders are capped at 32 kW. Users' comments that they are
interested in purchasing hundreds more kilowatts of power are mere
casual mentions, which, in the Exchange's experience, Users sometimes
walk back when the power actually becomes available. Without firm,
guaranteed commitments from Users to purchase the power if it is made
available, the Exchange runs the risk of underestimating or
overestimating Users' true demand for power. The proposed deposit
requirement would address these issues by discouraging Users from
submitting orders for more power than they actually intend to purchase
and would indicate the true amount of additional power that each User
would agree to purchase if it were made available. The proposed deposit
requirement of two months' worth of the monthly recurring costs of the
amount of new power ordered during the Ordering Window is reasonable
because, on the one hand, it is not so onerous as to dissuade Users
from submitting orders, and, on the other hand, it is not so trivial
that it would fail to deter Users from submitting exaggerated
orders.\17\ The Exchange requires market participants to submit
deposits in other contexts, and as such, the deposit requirement here
would not be novel.\18\
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\17\ To illustrate, for a large User ordering an additional 300
kW of power, the deposit required would be $540,000 (i.e., two times
the monthly recurring cost of $270,000), while a smaller User
ordering an additional 32 kW of power would pay an estimated deposit
of $60,000 (i.e., two times the monthly recurring cost of $30,000),
depending on how much power it already had at the MDC.
\18\ For example, since 2012, the Exchange has required
prospective issuers to pay a $25,000 initial application fee as part
of the process for listing a new security on the exchange. This fee
functions as a deposit that is credited toward the issuer's listing
fees after it is listed on the exchange. The deposit functions as
``a disincentive for impractical applications by issuers.'' The
deposit is forfeited if the issuer does not ultimately list on the
exchange. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68470 (December
19, 20212), 77 FR 76116 at 76117 (December 26, 2012) (SR-NYSE-2012-
68).
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Under the proposed procedure, if a User wishes to reduce an order
that it placed during the Ordering Window, its deposit would not be
reduced or returned, but rather would be applied against the User's
first and subsequent months' invoices after the power is delivered
until the deposit is completely depleted. The Exchange believes that
this would remove impediments and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market system because it would ensure that a
User would be reimbursed for all of its deposit even if it reduces its
order after the Ordering Window closes. This would remove any incentive
a User otherwise might have to understate its needs for power out of a
concern that it would not be reimbursed for the full amount of its
deposit.
The proposed rule change would protect investors and the public
interest in that it would provide the Exchange with accurate insight
into Users' true power requirements. It is in the public interest for
the Exchange to take User demand into account and to make reasoned,
informed decisions about whether and how to expand the MDC.
The proposed rule change is not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers. The
proposed changes would apply equally
[[Page 58368]]
to all types and sizes of market participants. All Users would receive
equal notice of the opening of the Ordering Window; the Ordering Window
dates would be the same for all Users; and each order during the
Ordering Window would be secured with a deposit equal to two months of
the monthly recurring costs of the power ordered. Smaller Users with
more modest power needs would not be disadvantaged by the proposed
changes. In Step 2, each User that finalized an order during the
Ordering Window would be allocated up to 32 kW of power (subject to
sufficient power being available) before any User's order for more than
32 kW would be filled. This would ensure that all Users that
participate in the Ordering Window would receive at least some power
and no Users would be shut out of the allocation. In addition, because
the deposit is proportional to the size of the order and not a fixed
amount, smaller Users would not be disproportionately affected by the
deposit requirement. Finally, the proposed Ordering Window procedure
would not disadvantage Users on the current waitlist pursuant to
Colocation Note 7, since power would be allocated to those orders first
under the Ordering Window procedure.
For all these reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposal is
consistent with the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
In accordance with section 6(b)(8) of the Act,\19\ the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change will not impose any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
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\19\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
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The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change would not place
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The proposed rule change would
provide an alternative procedure by which the Exchange can allocate
power in the MDC that both provides the Exchange with reliable
information about Users' true power needs and allows all Users that
submit deposit-guaranteed orders during the Ordering Window to be
assured of receiving at least some additional power. The Exchange does
not expect the proposed rule change to impact intra-market or
intermarket competition between exchanges, Users, or any other market
participants.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
(A) by order approve or disapprove the proposed rule change, or
(B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
<bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>); or
<bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a6d4d3cac38bc5c9cbcbc3c8d2d5e6d5c3c588c1c9d0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="82f0f7eee7afe1edefefe7ecf6f1c2f1e7e1ace5edf4">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include
file number SR-NYSENAT-2023-18 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
<bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to file number SR-NYSENAT-2023-18. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10
a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. Do not
include personal identifiable information in submissions; you should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. We
may redact in part or withhold entirely from publication submitted
material that is obscene or subject to copyright protection. All
submissions should refer to file number SR-NYSENAT-2023-18 and should
be submitted on or before September 15, 2023.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\20\
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\20\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2023-18297 Filed 8-24-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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