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Rule2023-17774

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

Primary source

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Published

August 21, 2023

Effective

September 25, 2023

Issuing agencies

Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration

Abstract

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report from the supplier of a manufacturing quality escape in which some sensing elements were manufactured with insufficient salt fill. This could result in an inability to detect hot bleed air leaks. This AD requires, depending on airplane serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance records for affected bleed leak detection system sensing elements, testing the sensing elements, replacing those that fail, and witness marking those that pass, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts under certain conditions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 160 (Monday, August 21, 2023)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 160 (Monday, August 21, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56756-56760]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-17774]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2022-1483; Project Identifier MCAI-2022-00435-T;
Amendment 39-22522; AD 2023-16-03]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type
Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership
(CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-
1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report from the supplier of a
manufacturing quality escape in which some sensing elements were
manufactured with insufficient salt fill. This could result in an
inability to detect hot bleed air leaks. This AD requires, depending on
airplane serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance records for
affected bleed leak detection system sensing elements, testing the
sensing elements, replacing those that fail, and witness marking those
that pass, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated
by reference. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts
under certain conditions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective September 25, 2023.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 25,
2023.

ADDRESSES:
AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> under
Docket No. FAA-2022-1483; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
<bullet> For Transport Canada material incorporated by reference in
this AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft
Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada;
telephone 888-663-3639; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0e5a4d204f677c79617c7a6667606b7d7d4a677c6b6d7a67786b7d234d61607d6769606b7d6a6b606f7867696f6c6762677a6b205a4d4e7a6d20696d206d6f">[email&#160;protected]</a> You may find this material on the
Transport Canada website at tc.canada.ca/en/aviation.
<bullet> For Kidde Aerospace & Defense service information
incorporated by reference in this AD, contact Kidde Aerospace &
Defense, 4200 Airport Drive NW, Building B, Wilson, NC 27896;
telephone: 319-295-5000; website: <a href="http://kiddetechnologies.com/aviation.com">kiddetechnologies.com/aviation.com</a>.
<bullet> You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available in the AD docket at
<a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> under Docket No. MCAI-2022-00435-T.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Niczky, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590;
telephone: 516-228-7347; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7c45511d0a0f5112051d1f13511f130f3c1a1d1d521b130a">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus Canada
Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The
NPRM published in the Federal Register on November 25, 2022 (87 FR
72416). The NPRM was prompted by CF-2022-13, dated March 28, 2022,
issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada
(Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13). The MCAI states that Airbus Canada
Limited Partnership received disclosure letters from the supplier that
reported a manufacturing quality escape in which some of the overheat
detection sensing elements were manufactured with insufficient salt
fill. These sensing elements are used by the bleed air leak detection
system for temperature detection in the event of a hot bleed air leak.
Insufficient salt fill can result in an inability to detect hot bleed
air leaks, which can cause damage to surrounding structures and systems
that could prevent continued safe flight and landing.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require, depending on airplane
serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance records for affected
bleed leak detection system sensing elements, testing the sensing
elements, replacing those that fail, and witness marking those that
pass, as specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13. The NPRM also
proposed to prohibit the installation of affected parts under certain
conditions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition
on these products.
Since the NPRM was issued, Transport Canada revised AD CF-2022-13
and issued Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, dated April 18, 2023
(Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1) (also referred to as the MCAI).
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 clarifies the definition of the
affected part. Also, Airbus Canada Limited Partnership issued updated
Service Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and
BD500-362003 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023. These updated service
bulletins removed redundant steps and corrected that only failed
sensing elements and not a failed loop needs to be replaced.
You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at <a href="http://regulations.gov">regulations.gov</a> under
Docket No. FAA-2022-1483.

Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

Comments

The FAA received comments from Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA), who supported the NPRM without change.
The FAA received additional comments from Delta Air Lines (Delta).
The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's
response to each comment.

Request To Delay Final Rule

Delta requested that the FAA delay the final rule until a revised
Transport Canada AD is issued. Delta stated the current definition of
an ``Affected Part'' in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 does not provide
a clear and concise method for compliance for operators to comply with
the proposed AD. Delta stated that it wants to review the new Transport
Canada AD and submit comments on a new NPRM.
The FAA agrees that the definition for ``Affected Part'' should be
revised for

[[Page 56757]]

clarity. As stated previously, Transport Canada has revised Transport
Canada AD CF-2022-13 to update the definition for ``Affected Part.''
The FAA has revised this AD to refer to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-
13R1. However, the FAA disagrees with the request to issue a
supplemental NPRM. The FAA notes that the updated definition does not
result in new requirements and therefore a supplemental NPRM is not
necessary. In addition, the FAA has added paragraph (i) to this AD to
provide credit for actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, if
those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13.

Request To Add Exception To Refer to Affected Parts

Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to specify that where paragraphs a. and b. of Part III.
of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 specify to ``test the sensing
elements,'' replace that text with ``test affected parts.'' Delta
stated that the safety concern is only applicable to an ``Affected
Part'' as identified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 and not all
sensing elements on an airplane. Delta explained that as currently
written, Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 requires operators to test all
sensing elements, regardless of if they are an ``affected part'' or
not. Delta stated that specifying ``affected part'' will allow
operators to initially inspect each sensing element, determine if it is
an ``affected part'', and test (apply corrective actions) only those
affected parts; thereby minimizing labor hours.
The FAA agrees the language in paragraphs a. and b. of Part III of
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 should be revised to specify the
``affected part'' as defined in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13.
Transport Canada has updated paragraphs a. and b. of Part III of
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 to refer to the affected parts. As
stated previously, this AD now refers to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-
13R1. Paragraphs a. and b. of Part III of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-
13R1 now narrow the scope to testing of only affected parts. Therefore,
an exception to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 is not needed in this
AD.

Request To Add an Exception for Replacing Parts

Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to change the replacement parts. Delta stated that
where Appendix A through Appendix J of Airbus Canada Limited
Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18,
2022; and Appendix A through Appendix C of Airbus Canada Limited
Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18,
2022, specify ``remove and replace any failed loop,'' replace with
``remove and replace any failed sensing element.'' Delta stated that,
as written, the appendices specifies that if a sensing element fails,
then the entire loop is to be removed and replaced under the Required
for Compliance (RC) procedure. Delta stated Airbus Canada specified
that more than one sensing element can be within a single loop and that
only sensing elements that fail the test need to be replaced. Delta
concluded that the recommended exception will provide more clarity on
what parts need to be removed and replaced to address the safety
concern.
The FAA agrees that the affected parts are sensing elements and if
a sensing element fails, only that sensing element must be replaced as
specified in paragraphs a. and b. of Part III, Transport Canada AD CF-
2022-13R1. The FAA has added an exception in paragraph (h)(5) of this
AD to state that where the appendixes of Issue 001 of the service
information referenced in ``First SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport
Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 specify steps to remove and replace any failed
loop, this AD requires replacing only any failed sensing element. In
addition, Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletins BD500-
362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and BD500-362003 Issue 002,
dated July 26, 2023, removed the statements ``remove and replace any
failed loop'' and now specify only replacing a failed sensing element.
As defined in ``First SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-
2022-13R1, later revisions of the service information are allowed for
compliance, which includes Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service
Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and BD500-362003
Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023.

Request To Add Exception To Exclude Redundant Marking

Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to exclude redundant steps for adding ``witness
marks.'' Delta listed multiple steps for adding ``witness marks''
within the parts in the procedures of Airbus Canada Limited Partnership
Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022; and
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue
001, dated February 18, 2022. Delta stated those steps are redundant to
a step for adding ``witness marks'' in the appendixes of Airbus Canada
Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated
February 18, 2022; and Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service
Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022. Delta stated
that following completion of an appendix, the associated part procedure
is done. Delta stated both steps cannot be deviated from because both
are within the RC procedure section of the service information. Delta
stated that Airbus Canada confirmed that the marking of sensing
elements only needs to be done once.
The FAA agrees that the steps for adding ``witness marks'' within
the procedures parts in the Accomplishment Instructions are redundant
with the steps in the appendices of Airbus Canada Limited Partnership
Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022; and
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue
001, dated February 18, 2022. The FAA agrees that redundant steps are
not required to be performed. Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service
Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and BD500-362003
Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, removed the redundant marking steps
from the appendices. The FAA has added an exception to paragraph (h)(6)
of this AD to clarify that adding ``witness marks'' is only done once
when using Issue 001 of the service information referenced in ``First
SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1. Paragraph
(h)(6) of this AD also clarifies that replacing an affected part if a
test is unsatisfactory is only done once, which addresses the following
comment about additional redundant steps.

Request To Add Exception To Exclude Redundant Replacements

Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to exclude redundant replacement steps. Delta listed
multiple steps to remove the sensing element if the test is
unsatisfactory and install a new sensing element within the procedures
of the parts of Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin
BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022; and Airbus Canada
Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated
February 18, 2022. Delta stated those steps are redundant to steps to
``replace a failed sensing element'' as well as steps to ``replace a
failed loop'' (which

[[Page 56758]]

Delta noted it has asked to be revised to ``replace any failed sensing
element'' in its previous comment) in the appendixes of Airbus Canada
Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated
February 18, 2022; and Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service
Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022. Delta stated
that following completion of an appendix, the associated part procedure
is done. Delta stated both steps cannot be deviated from because both
are within the RC procedure section of the service information. Delta
stated that Airbus Canada confirmed that the replacement of failed
sensing elements only needs to be done once.
The FAA agrees that the steps to remove the sensing element if the
test is unsatisfactory and install a new sensing element that are
within the procedures of the parts of the Accomplishment Instructions
are redundant with the steps in the appendices of Airbus Canada Limited
Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18,
2022; and Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-
362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022. The FAA agrees that
redundant steps are not required to be performed. Airbus Canada Limited
Partnership Service Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26,
2023, and BD500-362003 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, removed the
redundant replacement steps from the appendices. As stated previously,
the FAA has added an exception to paragraph (h)(6) of this AD to
clarify that replacing affected parts is only done once when using
Issue 001 of the service information referenced in ``First SB'' and
``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1.

Change to Paragraph (h)(4) of the Proposed AD

The exception in paragraph (h)(4) of the proposed AD to the parts
installation prohibition specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13
referred to ``ACLP SB BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022''
and ``ACLP SB BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022'' for the
prohibited sensing elements. The FAA has revised paragraph (h)(4) of
this AD to specify prohibited sensing elements are identified in either
Issue 001 or Issue 002 of the service information, i.e., ``ACLP SB
BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated
July 26, 2023'' and ``ACLP SB BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February
18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023.''

Conclusion

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to
the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it
has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI
referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the
comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting
this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address
the unsafe condition on this product. Except for minor editorial
changes, and any other changes described previously, this AD is adopted
as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic
burden on any operator.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 specifies procedures for,
depending on airplane serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance
records for affected bleed leak detection system sensing elements,
testing the sensing elements, replacing those that fail, and witness
marking those that pass. Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 also
prohibits the installation of any affected parts unless it is a
serviceable part.
Kidde Aerospace & Defense Service Bulletin CFD-26-1, Revision 6,
dated February 28, 2022, specifies affected continuous fire detector
(CFD) part numbers and testing procedures.
This material is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 69 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to 125 work-hours x $85 per $0 Up to $10,625.............. Up to $552,500.
hour = $10,625 (for Group A, 52
airplanes).
Up to 1 work-hour x $85 per hour $0 Up to $85.................. Up to $1,445.
= $85 (for Group B, 17
airplanes).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition actions that would be required based on the results of any
required actions. The FAA has no way of determining the number of
aircraft that might need these on-condition actions:

Estimated Costs of On-Condition Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to 58 work-hours x $85 per hour = Up to $101,045................... Up to $105,975.
$4,930 (for Group A airplanes).
Up to 183 work-hours x $85 per hour = Up to $101,045................... Up to $116,600.
$15,555 (for Group B airplanes).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate.
According to the manufacturer, however, some or all of the costs of
this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact
on affected operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA

[[Page 56759]]

with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This
regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses
an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products
identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:

2023-16-03 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate
Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP);
Bombardier, Inc.): Amendment 39-22522; Docket No. FAA-2022-1483;
Project Identifier MCAI-2022-00435-T.

(a) Effective Date

This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective September 25,
2023.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

This AD applies to Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-
500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes, certificated in any category, as
identified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, dated April 18, 2023
(Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1).

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 36, Pneumatic.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a report from the supplier of overheat
detection sensing elements that there was a manufacturing quality
escape in which some sensing elements were manufactured with
insufficient salt fill. The FAA is issuing this AD to address
insufficient salt fill of the overheat detection sensing elements.
The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in an inability
to detect hot bleed air leaks, which can cause damage to surrounding
structures and systems that could prevent continued safe flight and
landing.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Requirements

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1.

(h) Exception to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1

(1) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 refers to April 11,
2022 (the effective date of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13, dated
March 28, 2022), or to its effective date, this AD requires using
the effective date of this AD.
(2) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 refers to hours air
time, this AD requires using flight hours.
(3) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 defines ``Affected
part'' and refers to part numbers in a certain service bulletin, for
this AD, operators must use Kidde Aerospace & Defense Service
Bulletin CFD-26-1, Revision 6, dated February 28, 2022, to determine
the part number.
(4) Where ``Part I'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1
specifies the parts installation prohibition for certain airplanes,
replace the text ``associated with Part A through Part J of the
first SB or Part A through Part C of the second SB'' with
``associated with Part A through Part J of ACLP SB BD500-362002
Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated July 26,
2023; or Part A through Part C of ACLP SB BD500-362003 Issue 001,
dated February 18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023.''
(5) Where the appendixes of Issue 001 of the service information
referenced in ``First SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD
CF-2022-13R1 specify steps to ``remove and replace any failed
loop,'' this AD requires replacing only any failed sensing element
as specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1.
(6) Where the appendixes and the procedure sections of Issue 001
of the service information referenced in ``First SB'' and ``Second
SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 specify redundant steps to
remove and replace any failed loops or any failed sensing elements
and steps to add ``witness marks (dots),'' this AD requires those
steps be performed only once. Also, as stated in paragraph (h)(5) of
this AD only the failed sensing element must be replaced and not a
failed loop.

(i) Credit for Previous Actions

This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraph
(g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective
date of this AD using Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13, dated March
28, 2022.

(j) Additional AD Provisions

The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR
39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your
principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the
International Validation Branch, send it to ATTN: Program Manager,
Continuing Operational Safety, FAA, International Validation Branch,
1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-
228-7300. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International
Validation Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Airbus Canada
Limited Partnership's Transport Canada Design Approval Organization
(DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-
authorized signature.
(3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except as required by
paragraph (j)(2) of this AD, if any service information contains
procedures or tests that are identified as RC, those procedures and
tests must be done to comply with this AD; any procedures or tests
that are not identified as RC are recommended. Those procedures and
tests that are not identified as RC may be deviated from using
accepted methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or
inspection program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided
the procedures and tests identified as RC can be done and the
airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition. Any
substitutions or changes to procedures or tests identified as RC
require approval of an AMOC.

(k) Additional Information

For more information about this AD, contact Thomas Niczky,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite

[[Page 56760]]

410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone: 516-228-7347; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f2cbdf938481df9c8b93919ddf919d81b2949393dc959d84">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, dated April 18, 2023.
(ii) Kidde Aerospace & Defense Service Bulletin CFD-26-1,
Revision 6, dated February 28, 2022.
(3) For Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, contact Transport
Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159
Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888-663-
3639; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6a3e29442b03181d05181e0203040f19192e03180f091e031c0f194729050419030d040f190e0f040b1c030d0b080306031e0f443e292a1e09440d0944090b">[email&#160;protected]</a>. You may find this Transport
Canada AD on the Transport Canada website at tc.canada.ca/en/
aviation.
(4) For Kidde Aerospace & Defense service information, contact
Kidde Aerospace & Defense, 4200 Airport Drive NW, Building B,
Wilson, NC 27896; telephone: 319-295-5000; website:
<a href="http://kiddetechnologies.com/aviation.com">kiddetechnologies.com/aviation.com</a>.
(5) You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability
of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(6) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, email
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ccaabee2a5a2bfbca9afb8a5a3a28ca2adbeade2aba3ba">[email&#160;protected]</a>, or go to: <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html">www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html</a>.

Issued on August 3, 2023.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-17774 Filed 8-18-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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Indexed from Federal Register on August 21, 2023.

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