Proposed Rule2023-04489

Supporting Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Affordable Connectivity Program

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Published
March 13, 2023

Issuing agencies

Federal Communications Commission

Abstract

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) begins the process of implementing the Safe Connections Act, taking significant steps to improve access to communications services for survivors of domestic abuse and related crimes. We seek comment on the implementation of the Safe Connections Act's statutory requirement that mobile service providers separate the line of a survivor of domestic violence (and other related crimes and abuse), and any individuals in the care of the survivor, from a mobile service contract shared with an abuser within two business days after receiving a request from the survivor. We also seek comment on a proposal to require service providers to omit from consumer-facing logs of calls and text messages any records of calls or text messages to hotlines listed in a central database of hotlines that the Commission would create. We also seek comment on whether to designate the Lifeline program or the Affordable Connectivity Program as a means for providing survivors suffering financial hardship with emergency communications support for up to six months, as required by the Safe Connections Act.

Full Text

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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 48 (Monday, March 13, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 15558-15592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04489]



[[Page 15557]]

Vol. 88

Monday,

No. 48

March 13, 2023

Part III





 Federal Communications Commission





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47 CFR Parts 54 and 64





Supporting Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, Lifeline and Link 
Up Reform and Modernization, Affordable Connectivity Program; Proposed 
Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 48 / Monday, March 13, 2023 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 15558]]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 54 and 64

[WC Docket Nos. 22-238, 11-42, and 21-450; FCC 23-9; FR ID 129141]


Supporting Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, Lifeline 
and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Affordable Connectivity Program

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) begins the process of implementing the Safe Connections 
Act, taking significant steps to improve access to communications 
services for survivors of domestic abuse and related crimes. We seek 
comment on the implementation of the Safe Connections Act's statutory 
requirement that mobile service providers separate the line of a 
survivor of domestic violence (and other related crimes and abuse), and 
any individuals in the care of the survivor, from a mobile service 
contract shared with an abuser within two business days after receiving 
a request from the survivor. We also seek comment on a proposal to 
require service providers to omit from consumer-facing logs of calls 
and text messages any records of calls or text messages to hotlines 
listed in a central database of hotlines that the Commission would 
create. We also seek comment on whether to designate the Lifeline 
program or the Affordable Connectivity Program as a means for providing 
survivors suffering financial hardship with emergency communications 
support for up to six months, as required by the Safe Connections Act.

DATES: Comments are due on or before April 12, 2023, and reply comments 
are due on or before May 12, 2023. Written comments on the Paperwork 
Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements must be 
submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and 
other interested parties on or before May 12, 2023.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by WC Docket Nos. 22-
238, 11-42, and 21-450, by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the internet by accessing ECFS: <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/</a>.
    <bullet> Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must 
file an original and one copy of each filing.
    Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial 
overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service 
mail.
    <bullet> Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, 
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
    <bullet> U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority 
mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. All 
filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
    <bullet> Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the 
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings. 
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety 
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC 
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020), <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy">https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy</a>.
    People with Disabilities. To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic 
files, audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ec8a8f8fd9dcd8ac8a8f8fc28b839a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4d2b2e2e787d790d2b2e2e632a223b">[email&#160;protected]</span></a> or call the 
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Travis Hahn, Wireline Competition 
Bureau, Telecommunications Access Policy Division, at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6d391f0c1b041e43250c05032d0b0e0e430a021b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1f4b6d7e69766c31577e77715f797c7c31787069">[email&#160;protected]</span></a> or Chris Laughlin, Wireline Competition Bureau, 
Competition Policy Division, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6a290218031944260b1f0d020603042a0c0909440d051c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="62210a100b114c2e0317050a0e0b0c220401014c050d14">[email&#160;protected]</span></a>. For additional 
information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information 
collection requirements contained in this document, send an email to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#dc8c8e9d9cbabfbff2bbb3aa"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="164644575670757538717960">[email&#160;protected]</span></a> or contact Nicole On'gele at (202) 418-2991.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in WC Docket Nos. 22-238, 11-42, and 21-
450, adopted on February 16, 2023 and released on February 17, 2023. 
The full text of this document is available at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-9A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-9A1.pdf</a>. To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (e.g., braille, large print, 
electronic files, audio format, etc.) or to request reasonable 
accommodations (e.g., accessible format documents, sign language 
interpreters, CART, etc.), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0e686d6d3b3e3a4e686d6d20696178"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d2b4b1b1e7e2e692b4b1b1fcb5bda4">[email&#160;protected]</span></a> or call the 
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
    Pursuant to Sec. Sec.  1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 
47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply 
comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this 
document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic 
Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in 
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
    The proceeding this document initiates shall be treated as a 
``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's 
ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy 
of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral 
presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a 
different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons 
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda 
summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or 
otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte 
presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and 
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted 
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already 
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other 
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such 
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other 
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where 
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the 
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex 
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must 
be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 
rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of 
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda 
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, 
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available 
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., 
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding 
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
    This document contains proposed new or modified information 
collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing 
effort to reduce

[[Page 15559]]

paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection 
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments 
are due May 12, 2023. Comments should address: (a) whether the proposed 
collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of 
the functions of the Commission, including whether the information 
shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's 
burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity 
of the information collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the 
collection of information on the respondents, including the use of 
automated collection techniques or other forms of information 
technology; and (e) way to further reduce the information collection 
burden on small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In 
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment 
on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for 
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

Synopsis

I. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    1. Reliable, safe, and affordable connectivity is critical to 
survivors leaving a relationship involving domestic violence, human 
trafficking, and other related crimes or abuse. This connectivity can 
assist survivors in breaking away from their abusers and finding and 
maintaining contact with safe support networks, including family and 
friends. Survivors whose devices and associated telephone numbers are 
part of multi-line or shared plans (commonly referred to as ``family 
plans''), however, can face difficulties separating lines from such 
plans and maintaining affordable service. Further, having access to an 
independent phone or broadband connection is important for survivors to 
be able to communicate and access other available services without fear 
of their communications, location, or other private information being 
revealed to their abusers.
    2. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we continue the 
work we initiated in July of last year to support the connectivity 
needs of survivors. Specifically, we begin the process of implementing 
the Safe Connections Act of 2022 (Safe Connections Act), enacted this 
past December, which provides important statutory support for specific 
measures to benefit survivors. We seek comment on proposed rules that 
would help survivors separate service lines from accounts that include 
their abusers, protect the privacy of calls made by survivors to 
domestic abuse hotlines, and support survivors that pursue a line 
separation request and face financial hardship through the Commission's 
affordability programs. We believe that these measures will aid 
survivors who lack meaningful support and communications options when 
establishing independence from an abuser.

A. Separation of Lines From Shared Mobile Service Contracts

    3. In this section, we propose new rules to codify and implement 
the line separation provisions in the Safe Connections Act. Our 
proposed rules largely track the statutory language, with some 
additional proposals and requests for comment concerning other issues 
that may be implicated by line separations.
1. Definitions
    4. We propose to adopt in our rules the definitions of the terms 
listed in new section 345 of the Communications Act, as added by the 
Safe Connections Act, including ``covered act,'' ``survivor,'' 
``abuser,'' ``covered provider,'' ``shared mobile services contract,'' 
and ``primary account holder.'' We seek comment on each proposed 
definition and invite commenters to address our specific questions 
below.
    5. Covered Act. We propose to define ``covered act'' as conduct 
that constitutes (1) a crime described in section 40002(a) of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (34 U.S.C. 12291(a)), including, but 
not limited to, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, 
stalking, and sex trafficking; (2) an act or practice described in 
paragraph (11) or (12) of section 103 of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102) (relating to severe forms of 
trafficking in persons and sex trafficking, respectively); or (3) an 
act under State law, Tribal law, or the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice that is similar to an offense described in clause (1) or (2) of 
this paragraph. Our proposed definition is identical to the term as 
defined in the Safe Connections Act, except that we propose to add the 
clause ``but not limited to'' in describing the crimes covered by the 
first clause. Section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994 describes a number of crimes and abuses in addition to those 
crimes enumerated in the Safe Connections Act's definition of ``covered 
act,'' including abuse in later life, child abuse and neglect, child 
maltreatment, economic abuse, elder abuse, female genital mutilation or 
cutting, forced marriage, and technological abuse. Although the Safe 
Connections Act describes a covered act as ``a crime described'' in 
section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act ``including domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, and sex 
trafficking,'' it does not say that only those listed crimes may be 
included. We believe the best reading of the definition of ``covered 
act'' in the Safe Connections Act includes all crimes listed in section 
40002(a); we see no reason why Congress would choose to protect only a 
subset of survivors of these crimes. We believe the second clause of 
the definition of ``covered act'' in the Safe Connections Act, which 
identifies specific subsections (``an act or practice described in 
paragraph (11) or (12) of section 103 of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000'') also supports our analysis because in 
contrast, the first clause of the definition of ``covered act'' does 
not limit the definition to specific subsections of section 40002(a) of 
the Violence Against Women Act. We seek comment on this proposed 
analysis. How should the fact that the Safe Connections Act 
specifically mentions ``[d]omestic violence, dating violence, stalking, 
sexual assault, human trafficking, and related crimes'' in its findings 
in section 3, while not mentioning the other crimes and abuses listed 
in section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act, factor into our 
analysis? To what extent can we include in our definition abuses 
described in section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act that 
may not be ``crimes'' under the statute?
    6. We seek comment on whether, instead of mirroring the statutory 
language in our definition of ``covered act,'' the Commission's rules 
should list out the crimes identified in section 40002(a) of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and paragraph (11) or (12) of 
section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Would 
such an approach help provide additional clarity of the scope of the 
Safe Connections Act's protections for covered providers and survivors? 
Would adopting such a rule run the risk of our rules becoming 
inconsistent with statutory intent if Congress revises either of those 
statutes in the future?
    7. Finally, consistent with the Safe Connections Act, we propose 
that a criminal conviction or any other

[[Page 15560]]

determination of a court shall not be required for conduct to 
constitute a covered act. We seek comment on our proposal. The Safe 
Connections Act separately addresses the evidence needed to establish 
that a covered act has been committed or allegedly committed. We 
address those requirements below.
    8. Survivor. We propose to define ``survivor'' as an individual who 
is not less than 18 years old and (1) against whom a covered act has 
been committed or allegedly committed; or (2) who cares for another 
individual against whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly 
committed (provided that the individual providing care did not commit 
or allegedly commit the covered act), mirroring the Safe Connections 
Act's definition of ``survivor.'' We seek comment on our proposal. Are 
there other situations or circumstances in which an individual should 
be considered a ``survivor'' under our rules, and if so, under what 
authority would we expand that definition?
    9. We seek comment on how we should interpret the Safe Connections 
Act's language describing a survivor as an individual ``who cares for 
another individual'' against whom a covered act has been committed or 
allegedly committed, to provide guidance to both covered providers and 
survivors. We observe that the statutory language is broad--Congress 
did not limit this provision to only those situations in which an 
individual is providing care to family members, minors, dependents, or 
those residing in the same household, when it could have chosen to do 
so. It also did not provide direction on how to otherwise determine 
when an individual is providing ``care'' for another individual. Should 
we define what it means to ``care for'' another person or what it means 
to be ``in the care of'' another individual, and if so, what should 
that definition be? Is there a common understanding of what it means to 
``care for'' or be ``in the care'' of another person? Has the meaning 
of ``in the care of'' or a comparable phrase been defined elsewhere in 
statute or regulation that could appropriately be used for reference in 
the present context?
    10. Absent a common understanding or similar definition to 
reference, we believe that at a minimum, this phrase should be 
understood to encompass any individuals who are part of the same 
household, including adult children, as well as adults who are older, 
and those who are in the care of another individual by valid court 
order or power of attorney. To support this interpretation, we 
tentatively conclude that ``household'' should have the same meaning as 
it does in Sec.  54.400 of our rules. We seek comment on our proposed 
interpretation. Is there any reason to conclude that Congress intended 
this phrase to be interpreted more narrowly, for example, to include 
only those under the age of 18 for whom an individual is the parent, 
guardian, or caretaker? We tentatively conclude that the Safe 
Connections Act contemplates that an individual who is the parent, 
guardian, or caretaker of a person over the age of 18 qualifies as 
someone who provides care for another person and, thus, as a 
``survivor'' when a covered act is committed against the person for 
whom the individual cares. Do commenters agree, or does the Safe 
Connections Act contemplate that any such persons over the age of 18 
would be considered ``survivors'' in their own right? Would 
interpreting the Safe Connections Act, and our rules, in any of the 
ways we have discussed narrow or broaden the applicability of the 
protections in a way not intended by Congress? If we conclude that 
certain persons over the age of 18 can qualify as being in the care of 
another individual, should we permit those persons to object to their 
line being separated following a line separation request by the 
``survivor'' who cares for them? If so, what sort of notice or 
opportunity to object must covered providers give to these users? We 
seek comment on how best to interpret this statutory language so as to 
provide the protections that Congress intended for individuals who are 
victims of a covered act.
    11. Abuser. We propose to define ``abuser'' for purposes of our 
rules as an individual who has committed or allegedly committed a 
covered act against (1) an individual who seeks relief under section 
345 of the Communications Act and the Commission's implementing rules; 
or (2) an individual in the care of an individual who seeks relief 
under section 345 of the Communications Act and the Commission's 
implementing rules, mirroring the substance of the Safe Connections 
Act. We seek comment on our proposal. Can commenters identify any 
reason to depart from the statutory definition of ``abuser''? We note 
that we do not intend our definition to serve as independent evidence 
of, or establish legal liability in regards to, any alleged crime or 
act of abuse, and propose to adopt this definition for purposes of 
implementing the Safe Connections Act only. We seek comment on this 
proposed approach.
    12. Covered Provider. We propose to define ``covered provider'' as 
a provider of ``a private mobile service or commercial mobile service, 
as those terms are defined in 47 U.S.C. 332(d),'' consistent with the 
Safe Connections Act. We seek comment on our proposal. Section 332(d) 
defines ``commercial mobile service'' as ``any mobile service (as 
defined in [47 U.S.C. 153]) that is provided for profit and makes 
interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such 
classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a 
substantial portion of the public, as specified by regulation by the 
Commission,'' and defines ``private mobile service'' as ``any mobile 
service (as defined in [47 U.S.C. 153]) that is not a commercial mobile 
service or the functional equivalent of a commercial mobile service, as 
specified by regulation by the Commission.''
    13. We tentatively conclude that covered providers would include 
both facilities-based mobile network operators, as well as resellers/
mobile virtual network operators. We seek comment on this tentative 
conclusion. We also seek comment on whether Congress intended the line 
separation obligation to apply to all providers of commercial mobile 
service or private mobile service, as the Commission might interpret 
and apply those definitions, regardless of underlying technology used 
to provide the service (e.g., whether provided through land, mobile, or 
satellite stations). We further seek comment on whether we should 
interpret the statutory definition of ``covered provider'' to include 
providers of mobile broadband service that do not also offer mobile 
voice service, and if so, whether implementation of the line separation 
obligation would differ for those providers. If so, how would it 
differ?
    14. Shared Mobile Service Contract. We propose to define ``shared 
mobile service contract'' as a mobile service contract for an account 
that includes not less than two lines of service and does not include 
enterprise services offered by a covered provider. We seek comment on 
our proposal, which mirrors the Safe Connections Act's definition 
except insofar as it replaces the phrase ``not less than 2 consumers'' 
with ``not less than two lines of service.'' It is our understanding 
that mobile service contracts are typically structured around the 
number of lines of service associated with an account rather than the 
number of consumers. We invite comment on this proposal. We tentatively 
conclude that a ``line'' includes all of the services associated with 
that line under the shared mobile

[[Page 15561]]

service contract, regardless of their classification, including voice, 
text, and data services, and we seek comment on this tentative 
conclusion. We also tentatively conclude that a ``line of service'' 
under a shared mobile service contract is one that is linked to a 
telephone number, even if the services provided over that line of 
service are not voice services. We seek comment on our analysis, and 
whether we should provide additional guidance on the bounds of ``line 
of service'' in implementing the Safe Connections Act.
    15. If we do not interpret ``consumers'' to mean ``lines,'' as 
proposed, we seek comment on how providers would verify the number of 
consumers on an account. Would requiring covered providers to verify 
the number of consumers rather than the number of lines possibly hamper 
a survivor's ability to obtain a line separation? If we keep the 
statutory terminology of ``consumers,'' would there be additional 
privacy concerns, e.g., because covered providers would have to collect 
information about the additional consumers on shared mobile service 
contracts (including minors who may use the line) other than the 
primary account holder? How burdensome would such additional 
information collection requirements be for covered providers, 
particularly small providers?
    16. We tentatively conclude that ``shared mobile service contract'' 
includes mobile service contracts for voice, text, and data services 
offered by covered providers, as well as both pre-paid and post-paid 
accounts, to the extent that a service contract exists. We seek comment 
on these tentative conclusions. Do covered providers offer pre-paid 
contracts for accounts that include at least two lines?
    17. We observe that the definition of ``shared mobile service 
contract'' explicitly excludes ``enterprise services.'' We tentatively 
conclude that enterprise services generally entail those products or 
services specifically offered to entities to support and manage 
business operations, which may provide greater security, integration, 
support, or other features than are ordinarily available to mass market 
customers, and would exclude services marketed and sold on a 
standardized basis to residential customers and small businesses. Do 
commenters agree? We believe interpreting the exclusion for 
``enterprise services'' in this way would address the needs of 
survivors who use a line on a shared mobile service contract that may 
be structured under a family-run small business or paid for by a 
business account owned by the abuser, for example. We seek comment on 
our approach, and whether we should define ``enterprise services'' 
differently to address the needs of survivors.
    18. Primary Account Holder. We propose to define ``primary account 
holder'' as ``an individual who is a party to a mobile service contract 
with a covered provider,'' mirroring the definition in the Safe 
Connections Act. We seek comment on our proposal, and whether there are 
any considerations that should cause us to depart from the statutory 
definition. Are there situations in which there is more than a single 
individual who is party to a mobile service contract?
2. Requirement To Separate Lines Upon Request
    19. Processing of Line Separation Requests. Consistent with the 
Safe Connections Act, for shared mobile service contracts under which a 
survivor and abuser each use a line, our proposed rule would require 
covered providers, not later than two business days after receiving a 
completed line separation request from a survivor, to (1) separate the 
line of the survivor, and the line of any individual in the care of the 
survivor, from the shared mobile service contract, or (2) separate the 
line of the abuser from the shared mobile service contract.
    20. Because the Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to 
implement line separation requests from survivors for shared mobile 
service contracts ``under which the survivor and the abuser each use a 
line,'' we propose to interpret this statutory language to mean that 
neither the abuser nor the survivor needs to be the primary account 
holder for a line separation to be effectuated, regardless of whose 
line is separated from the account. We also believe that a person who 
does not use a line on an account--but is a ``survivor'' under the 
statute because the person is someone who cares for another individual 
against whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly committed--
would be able to request a line separation because the definition of 
``survivor'' allows that person to stand in for the individual in their 
care. Additionally, we also believe that the structure of the Safe 
Connections Act gives survivors discretion to request separation from 
the account of either the line of the survivor (and the lines of any 
individuals in the survivor's care) or the line of the abuser, but we 
seek comment on whether the covered provider also retains the 
discretion to determine whether to separate the line of the abuser or 
the line(s) of the survivor. We seek comment on our proposed 
interpretations, and on their potential implications and challenges. 
For instance, what implementation challenges will covered providers 
face, if any, if the survivor seeks to remove the abuser from the 
account but neither the survivor nor the abuser is the primary account 
holder? Do covered providers have existing processes to remove a 
primary account holder from an account and designate another user as 
the primary account holder, such as following the death of a primary 
account holder, that could be applied if the survivor seeks to remove 
the abuser from the account and the abuser is the primary account 
holder?
    21. The Safe Connections Act requires covered providers, upon 
receiving a completed line separation request from a survivor, to 
separate the line of the survivor and the line of any individual in the 
care of the survivor. As with the definition of ``survivor,'' the Safe 
Connections Act does not explain how to determine who qualifies as ``in 
the care of'' the survivor for the purposes of line separation 
requests. We believe that we should adopt the same approach for making 
this determination as we do for interpreting the definition of 
``survivor.'' Unlike the definition of ``survivor,'' however, we 
believe that for the purposes of line separation requests, an 
individual ``in the care'' of a survivor need not be someone against 
whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly committed. As 
previously discussed, the Safe Connections Act defines ``survivor'' as 
including an individual at least 18 years old who ``cares for another 
individual against whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly 
committed,'' but it requires covered providers to separate the lines of 
both the survivor and ``any individual in the care of the survivor,'' 
upon request of the survivor. We propose to interpret these provisions 
to mean that a covered provider must separate the lines, upon request, 
of any individuals in the care of survivors (however that is defined) 
without regard to whether a covered act has been committed or allegedly 
committed against the individuals in the care of the survivor. We seek 
comment on our proposed interpretation of these provisions.
    22. Under the Safe Connections Act, covered providers must 
effectuate line separations not later than two business days after 
receiving a completed line separation request from a survivor. We 
tentatively conclude covered providers should have two full business 
days following the day the request was made to complete a line 
separation request, which aligns with the Commission's

[[Page 15562]]

rules governing computation of time related to Commission actions. 
Should we adopt another meaning for what constitutes two business days, 
such as 48 hours from the time the request was made for requests made 
during business hours, and 48 hours from the start of the next business 
day for requests not made during business hours? Should we encourage 
covered providers to effectuate separations in less than two business 
days, if feasible? We seek comment on whether we should establish a 
time limit or other guidelines for how long covered providers have to 
determine whether a line separation request is incomplete. Because line 
separation requests may be time sensitive, we believe that, if 
feasible, covered providers should review requests to make this 
determination promptly, and ideally make this determination and either 
effectuate a line separation or reject an incomplete request within the 
two business day timeframe established by the statute. We believe this 
will enable survivors to quickly take steps to correct errors or submit 
a new request, if appropriate. Once a covered provider determines a 
request is complete and that there is no other basis for rejection, we 
believe the statute is clear that the provider has no more than two 
business days, however that is calculated, to effectuate the request, 
and we seek comment on this conclusion.
    23. We also seek comment on the reasons covered providers may 
reject a request and what survivors can do upon receiving a rejection. 
At a minimum, we expect that covered providers may reject a request 
because the provider was unable to authenticate that the survivor is 
the user of the specified line, the request is missing required 
verification information or documentation, information or documentation 
submitted by the survivor is invalid, or the line separation is 
operationally or technically infeasible by the provider. We believe 
that any corrections, resubmissions, or selected alternatives for 
obtaining a line separation should be processed within the two-
business-day timeframe established by the Safe Connections Act. We seek 
comment on how to balance our interest in allowing survivors to make 
repeated requests to obtain a line separation with our interest in 
preventing fraud on multiline shared accounts. Should we require 
covered providers to establish procedures for determining whether 
repeated requests are fraudulent and decline to effectuate line 
separations in those instances?
    24. Operational and Technical Infeasibility. Under the Safe 
Connections Act, covered providers who cannot operationally or 
technically effectuate a line separation request are relieved of the 
obligation to effectuate line separation requests. Because this 
provision specifies that covered providers are only relieved of the 
``requirement to effectuate a line separation request,'' we believe 
that all covered providers must offer the ability for survivors to 
submit requests for line separations described in the statute even if 
the provider may not be able to effectuate such separations in all 
instances. We seek comment on this interpretation.
    25. We seek comment to understand what operational and technical 
limitations covered providers may face. We expect that many covered 
providers already have processes in place to effectuate line 
separations and seek comment on this belief. We tentatively conclude 
that any line separation a covered provider can complete within two 
business days under its existing capabilities, as those may change over 
time, would not be operationally or technically infeasible under the 
Safe Connections Act. We also believe that the Safe Connections Act 
requires covered providers to take all reasonable steps to effectuate 
any line separation requests they receive in accordance with the 
statute and the rules we adopt, and we seek comment on how we would 
determine whether the steps taken meet this standard. Must covered 
providers change their policies and procedures and invest in equipment 
and technology upgrades to be able to effectuate all or a greater 
number of line separations? Should we instead simply define what 
circumstances qualify as operational and technical limitations and 
require covered providers to take steps to effectuate line separations 
in all other circumstances? We seek comment on the potential 
approaches, including their costs and burdens on covered providers, 
including small providers. Regardless of any requirements we establish, 
we recognize that there may be instances when operational and technical 
limitations prevent covered providers from effectuating the types of 
line separations established by the Safe Connections Act or from doing 
so precisely as the statute and our rules require. We believe that in 
these instances, the Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to 
provide the survivor with alternatives to submitting a line separation 
request, including starting a new line of service. We also believe that 
in these circumstances, covered providers should offer, allow survivors 
to elect, and effectuate any alternative options that would allow 
survivors to obtain a line separation. For instance, some covered 
providers may not be able to separate an abuser's line from an account 
if the abuser is the primary account holder, but would be able to 
separate the survivor's line from the account. Likewise, some covered 
providers may be capable of processing line separation requests, but 
not in the middle of a billing cycle.
3. Submission of Line Separation Requests
    26. Information Required to Process Line Separation Requests. The 
Safe Connections Act requires that survivors submit to covered 
providers certain information with their line separation requests, and 
we propose to codify those requirements in our rules. First, under our 
proposed rule, a survivor submitting a line separation request must 
expressly indicate that the survivor is requesting relief from the 
covered provider under section 345 of the Communications Act and our 
rules and identify each line that should be separated. In cases where a 
survivor is seeking separation of the survivor's line, the request must 
state that the survivor is the user of that specific line. In cases 
where a survivor is seeking separation of a line of an individual under 
the care of the survivor, the request must also include an affidavit 
setting forth that the individual is in the care of the survivor and is 
the user of that specific line. In support of efforts to deter fraud 
and abuse, we seek comment on whether we should mandate requirements 
for any affidavits that are submitted. At a minimum, we believe that 
affidavits should be signed and dated. Should they also be notarized? 
Can or must we rely on the alternative declaration mechanism provided 
for by 28 U.S.C. 1746? Should affidavits regarding individuals in the 
care of a survivor include the individual's name, relationship to the 
survivor, or other information? Are there privacy concerns with 
potentially requiring this additional information?
    27. Consistent with the Safe Connections Act, we also tentatively 
conclude that when a survivor is instead requesting that a covered 
provider separate the line of the abuser from the shared mobile service 
contract, the line separation request should also state that the abuser 
is the user of that specific line. We seek comment on this tentative 
conclusion. Though not required under the Safe Connections Act, should 
we require that the line separation request include an affidavit that 
the abuser is the user of a specific line, rather than

[[Page 15563]]

just a statement? We seek comment on whether covered providers need any 
other information to effectuate line separation requests. Commenters 
should address any privacy concerns from requiring such additional 
information.
    28. Because the Safe Connections Act requires that covered 
providers ``shall'' separate the lines requested by a survivor after 
receiving a completed line separation request, we believe that this 
statutory language is best read as requiring the covered provider to 
complete the line separation as long as the request provides the 
information required by the Safe Connections Act and our implementing 
rules, and the line separation is operationally and technically 
feasible. In other words, we do not believe that the Safe Connections 
Act requires covered providers to take any steps to separately verify 
the legitimacy of the information provided; we seek comment, however, 
on whether the statute permits them to do so, and if so, what the 
implications are for both covered providers and survivors. We seek 
comment on our proposed interpretation of this provision. What would be 
the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach?
    29. The Safe Connections Act does not address whether or how 
covered providers should authenticate the identity of a survivor to 
ensure that a person making a line separation request is actually a 
user of a line on the account. We recognize that unless a survivor is 
the primary account holder, covered providers may have limited 
information about the survivor and therefore fewer methods to 
authenticate the survivor's identity. We also appreciate that many 
survivors may not be in a position to supply government issued 
identification or other official identifying information to covered 
providers for authentication purposes. We are concerned that, absent 
any form of authentication, line separation requests could be easily 
abused by bad actors with significant consequences to consumers, 
similar to instances of subscriber identify module (SIM) swap and port-
out fraud. We note, however, that in response to the Notice of Inquiry, 
some commenters argued that maximizing the ability of survivors to 
access any benefits the Commission establishes should supersede fraud 
and abuse concerns, at least absent evidence of widespread fraud or 
abuse. We seek comment on the appropriate balance between these two 
competing public interests.
    30. We seek comment on whether we should require covered providers 
to authenticate the identity of a survivor to verify that the survivor 
is actually the user of a line on the account before processing a line 
separation request. When the survivor is the primary account holder or 
a user designated to have account authority by the primary account 
holder (designated user), we believe covered providers should 
authenticate survivors just as they would any other primary account 
holder or designated user, and we seek comment on this proposal. If the 
survivor is not the primary account holder or a designated user, we 
seek comment on whether we should designate the forms of authentication 
that are appropriate for covered providers to use for line separation 
requests, and if so, which forms of authentication we should designate. 
We believe in this particular context that SMS text-based and app-based 
authentications could be useful because they rely on the user having 
access to the device associated with the line. We also seek comment on 
whether call detail information could be a viable alternative in these 
circumstances because it requires knowledge of call history by the 
user. Are there other authentication methods that would be both 
feasible for survivors and secure? We observe that some comments 
received in response to our 2021 SIM Swap and Port-Out Fraud NPRM 
discussed security shortcomings of these and other authentication 
mechanisms, and several commenters in that proceeding urged us to give 
providers flexibility in deciding which forms of authentication to use 
to reduce costs and burdens and avoid creating a roadmap for bad 
actors. To what extent should the concerns raised in that proceeding 
guide our decision making here? Should we allow covered providers 
flexibility to determine which forms of authentication to offer? If so, 
should we require covered providers to offer multiple forms of 
authentication and give survivors the opportunity to authenticate using 
any method available? How burdensome would it be for covered providers 
if we were to require them to authenticate that survivors are users of 
a line on a shared mobile account, particularly for small providers? 
How burdensome would such a requirement be on survivors seeking line 
separation requests, and would such requirements be consistent with 
Congressional intent? Finally, we seek comment on how any 
authentication process we establish for line separations should 
intersect with any identity verification process survivors must undergo 
to access the designated program.
    31. We recognize that covered providers may require additional 
information to assign the survivor as a primary account holder. Beyond 
the information already discussed, what information would covered 
providers need from survivors to establish them as primary account 
holders? We note that certain information, like full residential 
address, billing address, Social Security Number, and financial 
information can be extremely sensitive or difficult to provide for 
survivors that may be trying to physically and financially distance 
themselves from their abusers. Residential address information can be 
particularly problematic because survivors may not be residing at one 
location or have a fixed address, and if any address information is 
exposed, it may allow an abuser to locate a survivor. If a survivor is 
unable to provide all the information that is typically required to 
establish a primary account holder, should we require covered providers 
to modify the information necessary to accommodate survivors? If so, 
what information should we permit covered providers to require from 
survivors? If not, are there adequate alternative options for survivors 
to obtain needed communications services?
    32. Additionally, although we appreciate that many survivors may 
have limited information about the abuser and the account associated 
with the mobile service contract, we seek comment on whether we should 
require survivors who are not the primary account holder to submit 
other information to ensure that line separations are being processed 
for the correct account and to minimize fraudulent line separations. We 
specifically seek comment on whether we should require survivors to 
submit one or more of the following pieces of information about the 
account or primary account holder even if the primary account holder is 
the abuser: account number, primary phone number associated with the 
account, zip code, address associated with the account, and PIN or 
password associated with the account.
    33. Documentation Demonstrating Survivor Status. Consistent with 
the Safe Connections Act, our proposed rule would require survivors 
seeking a line separation to submit information that verifies that an 
individual who uses a line under the shared mobile service contract 
(i.e., an ``abuser'') has committed or allegedly committed a covered 
act against the survivor or an individual in the survivor's care. To 
meet this requirement, survivors must submit one or more of the 
eligible

[[Page 15564]]

documents prescribed in the Safe Connections Act: (1) a copy of a 
signed affidavit from a licensed medical or mental health care 
provider, licensed military medical or mental health care provider, 
licensed social worker, victim services provider, or licensed military 
victim services provider, or an employee of a court, acting within the 
scope of that person's employment; or (2) a copy of a police report, 
statements provided by police, including military police, to 
magistrates or judges, charging documents, protective or restraining 
orders, military protective orders, or any other official record that 
documents the covered act. At a minimum, we believe that the 
documentation provided should clearly indicate the name of the abuser 
and the name of the survivor and make an affirmative statement 
indicating that the abuser actually or allegedly committed an act that 
qualifies as a covered act against the survivor or an individual in the 
care of a survivor. Are there circumstances in which a survivor would 
not be able to obtain documentation that provides this information? 
Should we require that the documentation include any additional 
identifying information about the abuser or the survivor, such as an 
address or date of birth? What potential privacy implications would 
such a requirement raise, and would requiring such information be 
consistent with the Safe Connections Act? As a way to minimize fraud 
and abuse of the line separation process, we believe that, to the 
extent the documentation includes identifying information about the 
abuser or the survivor, covered providers should confirm that the 
information matches any comparable identifying information in the 
covered provider's records when processing a line separation request. 
We also seek comment on whether we should set requirements for the 
timeliness of evidence showing a covered act was committed. For 
instance, should we require that documentation be dated, or show the 
covered act occurred within a certain period prior to the request? If 
so, how long? We seek comment on these potential approaches and whether 
they are consistent with the Congressional intent of the Safe 
Connections Act.
    34. We acknowledge that survivors may have difficulty securing the 
documents specified by the Safe Connections Act to demonstrate that an 
individual using a line on a shared mobile service contract has 
committed or allegedly committed a covered act, or doing so in a timely 
manner. In the Notice of Inquiry, we asked whether allowing survivors 
to submit an affidavit regarding their survivor status would provide 
sufficient verification and whether we should permit other options if a 
survivor cannot obtain the required documents. Some commenters 
expressed support for survivor affidavits and also argued that 
survivors should be permitted to submit affidavits from other qualified 
third parties not prescribed in the Safe Connections Act, such as 
shelters and advocacy organizations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 
Safe Connections Act, which was adopted by Congress after the Notice of 
Inquiry, clearly specifies the documents survivors can submit to 
demonstrate survivor status while specifically preserving the right of 
states to set less stringent requirements. We seek comment on whether 
the Safe Connections Act permits the Commission to establish other 
forms of verification that a survivor can submit, and if so, whether we 
should permit other forms of verification.
    35. As discussed above, we believe that the Safe Connections Act is 
best read as requiring covered providers to complete a line separation 
as long as the line separation request provides the statutorily 
required information, without requiring covered providers to separately 
verify the information provided. We recognize that many covered 
providers may not have the expertise to determine the authenticity of 
such documents and that it would undermine the goals of the Safe 
Connections Act if a covered provider denied a line separation based on 
an incorrect determination that verification documents submitted by a 
survivor are not authentic. Nonetheless, we seek comment on whether and 
to what extent we should require or permit covered providers to 
validate the authenticity of any documents meant to verify survivor 
status that they receive in order to minimize the avenues that bad 
actors can use to commit fraud through the line separation process.
    36. Finally, we propose to include in our rules the Safe 
Connections Act's proviso that section 345 of the Communications Act 
(establishing the line separation process) ``shall not affect any law 
or regulation of a State providing communications protections for 
survivors (or any similar category of individuals) that has less 
stringent requirements for providing evidence of a covered act (or any 
similar category of conduct) than this subsection,'' and seek comment 
on our proposal.
    37. Election of the Manner of Communication from Covered Providers. 
Under the Safe Connections Act, a covered provider must ``allow the 
survivor to elect in the manner in which the covered provider may--(i) 
contact the survivor, or designated representative of the survivor, in 
response to the request, if necessary; or (ii) notify the survivor, or 
designated representative of the survivor, of the inability of the 
covered provider to complete the line separation.'' We propose to 
codify this requirement in our rules and seek comment on how best to 
understand it. We tentatively conclude that this requirement simply 
obligates covered providers to allow survivors to select, at the time 
they are submitting a line separation request, the manner the covered 
provider must use to communicate with a survivor after the survivor 
submits the request. We further believe that covered providers must ask 
survivors to provide the appropriate contact information with their 
request, and, if applicable, their designated representative. We seek 
comment on these tentative conclusions.
    38. Confidential and Secure Treatment of Personal Information. We 
propose to require covered providers, including any officers, 
directors, and employees--as well as covered providers' vendors, 
agents, or contractors that receive or process line separation requests 
with the survivor's consent, or as needed to effectuate the request--to 
treat any information submitted by a survivor as part of a line 
separation request as confidential and securely dispose of the 
information not later than 90 days after receiving the information, 
consistent with the Safe Connections Act. Our proposal mirrors the Safe 
Connections Act, except that we propose to clarify that ``vendor'' as 
used in the Safe Connections Act includes ``contractors'' who may 
receive line separation requests in their provision of services to 
covered providers. We believe that this interpretation of ``vendor'' 
reflects the business practices of covered providers and will mitigate 
privacy risks to survivors. We seek comment on our proposal.
    39. The Safe Connections Act requires confidential treatment and 
disposal of information submitted by a survivor ``[n]otwithstanding 
section 222(c)(2)'' of the Communications Act, which in turn requires 
telecommunications carriers to ``disclose customer proprietary network 
information, upon affirmative written request by the customer, to any 
person designated by the customer.'' The Communications Act defines 
``customer proprietary network information'' (or CPNI) as ``information 
that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, 
destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications 
service

[[Page 15565]]

subscribed to by a customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that 
is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of 
the carrier-customer relationship,'' and ``information contained in the 
bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll 
service received by a customer of a carrier,'' but does not include 
subscriber list information. Thus, to the extent that any information a 
survivor submits as part of a line separation request would be 
considered CPNI, we believe the Safe Connections Act requires that such 
information (as well as information submitted by a survivor that would 
not be considered CPNI) should be treated confidentially and disposed 
of securely. We seek comment on our analysis. How should we implement 
the Safe Connections Act's requirement that information submitted by 
survivors be treated as confidential and be securely disposed of 
``[n]otwithstanding section 222(c)(2) of the [Communications] Act''?
    40. We seek comment on how we should interpret the requirement that 
covered providers treat information submitted by survivors as 
``confidential,'' and what requirements, if any, we should impose to 
ensure such information is disposed of ``securely.'' We are mindful 
that requiring and identifying specific data protection mechanisms can 
provide a roadmap to bad actors and may also be overtaken by new 
technological advancements. Given that, what guidance can we provide to 
covered providers as to what would be considered ``confidential'' 
treatment and ``secure'' disposal under the Safe Connections Act? At a 
minimum, we believe that treating such information as confidential 
means not disclosing or permitting access to such information except as 
to the individual survivor submitting the line separation request, 
anyone that the survivor specifically designates, or specific types of 
third parties (i.e., vendors, contractors, and agents) as needed to 
effectuate the request. Do commenters agree? Are there other specific 
actions we should require covered providers to take or not take to 
ensure that information remains confidential? For instance, should we 
require covered providers to maintain line separation request 
information in a separate database or restrict employee access to only 
those who need access to that information to effectuate the request? 
Should we require such information to be stored with encryption? Can we 
construe the obligation on providers to ``treat'' information submitted 
in connection with a line separation request as ``confidential'' to 
include an obligation not to use or process such information for 
certain purposes (e.g., marketing)? If so, what should be permissible 
purposes for the use or processing of such information, other than 
effectuating the request, if any? What mechanisms, if any, should we 
require covered providers to use to ensure that confidential 
information is disposed of securely? How burdensome would any such 
requirements be on covered providers, particularly small providers? 
Should unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, information submitted 
by survivors as part of a line separation request be considered 
evidence that a covered provider does not treat such information 
confidentially?
    41. Consistent with the Safe Connections Act, we also propose to 
make clear that the requirement to securely dispose of information 
submitted by a survivor within 90 days does not prohibit a covered 
provider from maintaining a record that verifies that a survivor 
fulfilled the conditions of a line separation request for longer than 
90 days. We believe that the best interpretation of this provision 
presumes that any such records will not contain any information 
submitted by survivors, which, as discussed, would be deemed 
confidential and subject to secure disposal within 90 days. 
Nonetheless, we propose that covered providers also treat such records 
as confidential and securely dispose of them. We seek comment on our 
proposals. Should we require covered providers to dispose of the 
records verifying the fulfillment of a line separation request within a 
certain timeframe, and if so, what would be an appropriate timeframe? 
Are there reasons why a covered provider, or a survivor, would need to 
retain such records of fulfilling the conditions of a line separation 
request, beyond their potential need for enrollment in the designated 
program providing emergency communications support?
    42. Means for Submitting Line Separation Requests. The Safe 
Connections Act directs covered providers to ``offer a survivor the 
ability to submit a line separation request . . . through secure remote 
means that are easily navigable, provided that remote options are 
commercially available and technically feasible.'' We propose to codify 
this requirement in our rules and seek comment on how to implement it.
    43. Although the Safe Connections Act does not define what 
constitutes ``remote means,'' we tentatively conclude that it is a 
mechanism for submitting a line separation request that does not 
require the survivor to interact in person with an employee of the 
covered provider at a physical location. We seek comment on this 
tentative conclusion. For example, we believe that requiring a visit to 
a brick and mortar store would not constitute remote means. Conversely, 
we believe that a form on a covered provider's website with the ability 
to input required information and attach necessary documents would 
constitute a remote means. We also believe that submissions via email, 
a form on a provider's mobile app, a chat feature on a provider's 
website, interactive voice response (IVR) phone calls, and postal mail 
would constitute remote means. Would a live telephone interaction, text 
message communication, or video chat with a customer service 
representative constitute remote means as contemplated by the Safe 
Connections Act? We seek comment on our proposed analysis of what 
constitutes remote means. In identifying permissible remote means, 
should we take into consideration whether the means are consistent with 
or similar to the means survivors must use to apply for the designated 
program discussed below to minimize the burdens on survivors? We note 
that any remote means must permit survivors to submit any necessary 
documentation, although we seek comment on whether covered providers 
should be able to offer means that allow or require survivors to 
initiate a request using one method (such as an IVR phone call) and 
submit the documentation through another method (such as via email). We 
also seek comment on whether we should require providers to accept 
documentation in any format, including, for example, pictures of 
documents or screenshots. In addition, we tentatively conclude that the 
Safe Connections Act would permit covered providers to offer survivors 
means that are not considered remote so long as the provider does not 
require survivors to use those non-remote means or make it harder for 
survivors to access remote means than to access non-remote means.
    44. The Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to offer 
remote means for submitting line separation requests only if such means 
are ``technically feasible'' and ``commercially available.'' As a 
general matter, are there remote means for survivors to submit line 
separation requests that are technically feasible to implement and 
commercially available for all covered providers, including small 
providers? If so, which ones? If not, what steps must covered 
providers, including small providers, take to make remote means 
technically

[[Page 15566]]

feasible or how long before they are commercially available? Relatedly, 
how long will it take covered providers to select, implement, test, and 
launch remote means for line separation requests, and how does that 
timeline differ depending on the potential requirements we discuss 
above? Can covered providers adopt or modify existing systems that they 
use in other aspects of their business to provide survivors the ability 
to submit remote requests? Additionally, what are the costs associated 
with this process and the varying alternative requirements, and do they 
differ for small providers?
    45. The Safe Connections Act requires that the means of submission, 
in addition to being remote, must be ``secure,'' and we seek comment on 
the meaning of this term. We tentatively conclude that any means a 
covered provider offers survivors to submit a line separation request, 
including non-remote means, must be secure, and seek comment on our 
tentative conclusion. We believe that, at a minimum, secure means are 
those that prevent unauthorized access to or disclosure of the 
information and documentation submitted with the line separation 
request during the submission process. Should we define what would 
constitute ``secure'' in greater detail--and if so, how--or should we 
allow covered providers flexibility to adopt means they deem 
``secure''? Specifically, should we require that any electronic means 
of submission use encrypted transmission? Are there particular means 
that we should deem to be unsecure in all instances? As with the 
Commission's CPNI rules, should unauthorized disclosure of, or access 
to, information submitted as part of a line separation request be 
considered evidence that a covered provider does not provide a 
``secure'' means of transmission?
    46. The means of submitting a request must also be ``easily 
navigable,'' and we invite comment on the meaning of this phrase. As an 
initial matter, we tentatively conclude the means for submitting a 
request must be easily navigable for individuals with disabilities, and 
we seek comment on this tentative conclusion. Does easily navigable 
also mean that any user interface or forms related to line separation 
requests must be easy for survivors to comprehend and use? Does it also 
mean that any user interface or form must clearly identify the 
information and documentation that a survivor must include with their 
request and that survivors must be able to easily insert or attach that 
information? Should we develop and mandate a standardized form that 
covered providers must use or direct stakeholders to work together to 
develop such a form? Additionally, does the phrase ``easily navigable'' 
place an obligation on covered providers to make the means of making a 
line separation request easily findable and accessible by survivors?
    47. We seek comment on whether we should adopt additional 
requirements concerning the mechanisms for submitting line separation 
requests to ensure that all survivors have the ability to submit such 
requests and can obtain line separation in a timely manner. To what 
extent should covered providers be required to make available remote 
means that are accessible to individuals with disabilities? Does the 
Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA) 
already require that all or certain means for submitting line 
separation requests be accessible for individuals with disabilities? To 
what extent should the means through which a covered provider permits 
survivors to submit line separation requests be made available in the 
languages in which a covered provider advertises its services? Should 
the means covered providers make available for submitting line 
separation requests ask survivors for their preferred language from 
among those in which the covered provider advertises? Additionally, we 
invite feedback on whether we should require covered providers to offer 
more than one means to submit a line separation request and ensure any 
such additional means address the needs of survivors who may be using 
different technologies or who may have different levels of digital 
literacy. Alternatively, should we designate one specific mean or 
process that all covered providers must offer to fulfill these 
obligations, such as a form on the provider's website, but also allow 
covered providers to offer other additional means or processes if they 
so choose? We seek comment on how costly and burdensome any such 
requirements would be for covered providers, particularly small 
providers.
    48. Given the difficult circumstances that survivors may be 
experiencing at the time they make a line separation request, we 
believe that providers should make it easy for survivors to choose the 
best communications service offerings for their needs. Accordingly, we 
seek comment on whether we should require covered providers to allow 
survivors to indicate their service choices when they are submitting a 
line separation request. If so, we seek comment on what constitutes the 
full scope of service options covered providers should be required to 
offer to survivors, but tentatively conclude that the Safe Connections 
Act makes clear that survivors can seek to: (1) start a new line of 
service; (2) keep the existing service plan, with the abuser's line 
separated from the account; (3) select a new plan from among all 
commercially available plans the covered provider offers for which the 
survivor may be eligible, including any prepaid plans; (4) obtain 
benefits through the designated program if available through the 
provider; (5) switch providers by porting the lines of the survivor and 
anyone on the survivor's account to a new provider selected by the 
survivor, if technically feasible; and (6) move the line to an existing 
account of another person with service from the covered provider. What 
are the pros and cons of our proposed approach? For example, would this 
requirement maximize the simplicity for survivors navigating the line 
separation process? Conversely, how burdensome would this requirement 
be on covered providers, particularly small providers? Are there 
commercially available tools that would allow covered providers to 
implement this requirement? Is such a requirement otherwise technically 
feasible?
    49. Assistance with Completing Line Separation Requests. While the 
Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to effectuate line 
separations after receiving a completed line separation request from a 
survivor, we observe that it permits survivors to indicate a designated 
representative for communications regarding line separation requests. 
Does the Safe Connections Act permit survivors to rely on assistance 
from their designated representative or other individuals, such as 
employees of victim service providers, to prepare and submit line 
separation requests? If not, why not, and practically speaking, how 
would covered providers know whether a survivor relied on such 
assistance? If the Safe Connections Act does allow such assistance, 
should we establish guidelines regarding this practice? For example, 
should we require those assisting survivors to include in the request 
their name and relationship to the survivor, along with a statement 
that the person assisted the survivor? If so, should we require 
providers to request this information through the means they make 
available for survivors to submit requests? What would be the costs to 
covered providers of any such requirements, particularly for smaller 
providers?

[[Page 15567]]

4. Notices, Notifications, and Other Communications
    50. We next seek comment on the types of information that must or 
should be communicated to survivors and other consumers, and on the 
ways covered providers may convey this information. We believe the Safe 
Connections Act contemplates three ways that covered providers may 
communicate information to survivors: (1) a notice that must be made 
readily available to all consumers through the covered providers' 
public-facing communication avenues, such a notice on a provider's 
website (Notice to Consumers); (2) information that must be provided at 
the time a survivor is submitting a line separation request, such as in 
the instructions for submitting a line separation request or on the 
form used for submitting a request (Concurrent Notice to Survivors); 
and (3) notifications that must be delivered to survivors after they 
submit a line separation request, such as in a confirmation email for 
the line separation submission or a later follow-up message regarding 
the status of the submission (Post-Request Notifications).
    51. Notice to Consumers. Recognizing that the ability to separate a 
line from a shared mobile account will only assist those survivors who 
are aware of the option, the Safe Connections Act requires covered 
providers to ``make information about the options and process'' for a 
line separation request ``readily available to consumers: (1) on the 
website and the mobile application of the provider; (2) in physical 
stores; and (3) in other forms of public-facing consumer 
communication.'' We propose to adopt these requirements in our rules as 
a Notice to Consumers, and seek comment on our proposal and its 
implementation, including the burdens on covered providers.
    52. We seek comment on the specific methods and processes covered 
providers should use to provide the Notice to Consumers, and on the 
costs and burdens associated with each of these proposed requirements, 
particularly for small providers. First, we seek comment on whether we 
should provide additional guidance to covered providers regarding how 
to make the notice readily available to consumers ``on the website and 
mobile application of the provider.'' For example, should we provide 
guidance regarding where and how this information should be made 
available on covered providers' websites and mobile applications? 
Should we specifically require covered providers to post a link to the 
notice on their website homepage or mobile application home screen? 
Would a prominent link under a ``customer service'' page or ``support'' 
section of a covered provider's website be ``readily available''? 
Should we allow covered providers to determine the most appropriate 
method for making the notice available, as long as it is prominent and 
easy for consumers to locate?
    53. Second, we seek comment on whether we should provide additional 
guidance to covered providers as to how they should make the Notice to 
Consumers readily available in ``physical stores.'' For example, does 
this language require covered providers to furnish information only 
upon consumer request? Or should we require covered providers to post 
prominent signage and/or have handouts explaining availability of the 
line separation option? At a minimum, we believe any flyers, signage, 
or other handouts should be clearly visible to consumers and easy to 
understand and access. We also tentatively conclude that covered 
providers should provide the notice in all languages in which the 
provider advertises within that particular store and on its website, 
and seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
    54. Third, we seek comment on how covered providers should 
implement the requirement to provide the Notice to Consumers through 
``other forms of public-facing consumer communication.'' What other 
forms of public-facing communication do covered providers employ? Would 
covered provider bills, advertisements, emails, or social media 
accounts be covered under this category? If so, how should covered 
providers make the notice readily available through these avenues or 
other potential public awareness campaigns? We seek comment on what 
specific methods will be most effective in helping covered providers 
disseminate information to consumers about line separation 
availability.
    55. We also seek comment on whether we should specify what 
information covered providers must include in the Notice to Consumers 
``about the options and process'' for line separation requests or 
whether we should instead allow covered providers to determine what 
information to include. If we should prescribe the content of the 
notice, what information would be most useful to consumers? We 
tentatively conclude we should require covered providers to inform 
consumers that the Safe Connections Act does not permit covered 
providers to make a line separation conditional upon the imposition of 
penalties, fees, or other requirements or limitations, and seek comment 
on this tentative conclusion. Should we require covered providers to 
inform consumers about who qualifies as a survivor and how a survivor 
can request a line separation, or to explain any operational or 
technical limitations for completing line separation requests and 
alternative options survivors can choose to obtain a line separation? 
Should we require covered providers to inform consumers of the service 
options that may be available to them, or what their financial 
responsibilities will be after a line separation?
    56. Although the Safe Connections Act does not require covered 
providers to include information regarding the designated program in 
the Notice to Consumers, we tentatively conclude that they should 
include at least basic information concerning the availability of the 
designated program in the notice. Given that the Safe Connections Act 
requires covered providers to give survivors more detailed information 
about the designated program upon receiving a line separation request, 
do commenters agree with this approach? As we noted in our Notice of 
Inquiry, ``[s]urvivors often face severe financial hardship when 
attempting to establish financial independence from an abuser,'' and 
concerns about affordability could hold back some survivors from 
separating their line from an abuser's. We believe that requiring 
covered providers to include information about the availability of 
emergency communications support to help with the costs of a separated 
line in the Notice to Consumers may make the difference for some 
survivors in choosing whether or not to pursue a line separation, is 
consistent with the goals of the Safe Connections Act, and would be 
minimally burdensome for covered providers. We seek comment on our 
tentative conclusions and proposed approach. Are there other materials 
or information about line separation requests that would be beneficial 
for covered providers to share with survivors concurrently with the 
Notice to Consumers?
    57. Concurrent Notice to Survivors. The Safe Connections Act 
requires a covered provider to notify a survivor seeking a line 
separation ``through remote means, provided that remote means are 
commercially available and technically feasible,'' and ``in clear and 
accessible language[,] that the covered provider may contact the 
survivor, or designated representative of the survivor, to confirm the 
line separation, or if the covered provider is unable to complete the 
line separation for any

[[Page 15568]]

reason.'' In addition to proposing that we codify this requirement in 
our rules, we seek comment on its meaning. We tentatively conclude that 
this requirement only establishes an obligation that a covered provider 
inform the survivor, at the time the survivor submits a line separation 
request, that the provider may contact the survivor, or the survivor's 
designated representative, to confirm the line separation or inform the 
survivor if the provider is unable to complete the line separation. We 
believe covered providers should inform survivors that the covered 
provider may contact the survivor as part of any instructional 
information provided at the time of a line separation request. To the 
extent feasible, we also believe this information should be provided 
proximate to the moment when the survivor is asked to provide contact 
information and elect the manner the provider must use for future 
communications. We believe that this approach will allow survivors to 
make an informed choice regarding which contact information and manner 
of communication is best given their particular circumstances. We seek 
comment on this tentative conclusion and approach. Is there any reason 
providers should instead provide this information to survivors in a 
Post-Request Notification? If yes, should we require that notification 
be delivered immediately upon submission of the request? Should we 
require providers to provide this information in both a Post-Request 
Notification and as a Concurrent Notice to Survivors? Regardless of how 
the information is delivered, should we allow or require covered 
providers to deliver it using the same means that the survivor used to 
submit the line separation request? Above, we tentatively conclude that 
covered providers may offer, and therefore that survivors may use, non-
remote means to submit line separation requests. If a survivor submits 
a line separation request using non-remote means, does the statute 
allow us to, and should we, allow covered providers to deliver the 
required information via non-remote means, such as if the survivor 
consents, or must covered providers deliver the information via remote 
means?
    58. Post-Request Notifications. As noted above, covered providers 
must allow survivors to select the manner in which a covered provider 
will communicate with the survivor about a submitted line separation 
request. We do not believe that covered providers must offer all 
manners of contact, but we do believe that covered providers must offer 
at least one manner of contact that is remote. Consistent with our 
tentative conclusion above regarding remote means of submitting line 
separation requests, we believe remote means of communication are those 
in which the covered provider does not require the survivor to interact 
in person with an employee of the provider at a physical location. We 
tentatively conclude that remote means of communication would include 
emails, text messages, pre-recorded voice calls, push notifications, 
in-app messages, and postal mail. We seek comment on this view. Are 
there other forms of communication that would qualify, such as live 
phone calls or video chats? We do not expect to prohibit covered 
providers from offering non-remote forms of communication. Given the 
potentially time-sensitive nature of line separation requests, we do 
not believe that covered providers should rely on communications 
methods that will not be delivered directly to survivors, such as 
notifications or messages that a survivor only may see upon logging 
into an online account. Additionally, we tentatively conclude that 
covered providers must deliver these communications in the survivor's 
preferred language if it is one in which the covered provider 
advertises. We seek comment on the costs associated with our proposed 
approach for covered providers, particularly for small providers.
    59. The Safe Connections Act requires covered providers that 
receive a line separation request from a survivor to inform the 
survivor of the existence of the designated program that can provide 
emergency communications support to qualifying survivors suffering from 
financial hardship, who might qualify for the program, and how to 
participate in the program. We propose to codify this requirement and 
tentatively conclude that covered providers should have the flexibility 
to either provide this information in a Concurrent Notice to Survivors 
or a Post-Request Notification delivered immediately after a survivor 
submits a line separation request. We also seek comment on exactly what 
information covered providers must convey regarding the designated 
program. At a minimum, we expect that such material would specifically 
inform survivors that their participation in the designated program 
will be limited to six months unless they can qualify to participate in 
the designated program under the program's general eligibility 
requirements. We seek comment on whether we should direct the Universal 
Service Administrative Company (USAC), in coordination with the 
Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), to develop descriptions of the 
designated program and ways in which survivors might apply to the 
program, which we would share with covered providers to use for the 
required notice. What would be the costs to covered providers for these 
requirements, particularly for small providers?
    60. We also propose to codify the requirement that a covered 
provider that cannot operationally or technically effectuate a line 
separation request must: (1) notify the survivor who submitted the 
request of that infeasibility, and (2) provide the survivor with 
information about other alternatives to submitting a line separation 
request, including starting a new line of service. We believe the 
statute clearly contemplates this will be delivered as a Post-Request 
Notification. We further believe that providers should explain, in this 
notification, the nature of the operational or technical limitations 
that are preventing the provider from completing the line separation as 
requested and any alternative options that would allow the survivor to 
obtain a line separation. We also believe that covered providers should 
be required to promptly notify survivors if a line separation request 
is rejected for any other reason. We seek comment on what information 
should be provided in rejection notifications, but at a minimum, we 
believe that covered providers should deliver a clear and concise 
notification that the request has been rejected with the basis for the 
rejection and information about how the survivor can either correct any 
issues, submit a new line separation request, or select alternative 
options to obtain a line separation, if available. The Safe Connections 
Act requires that covered providers deliver notifications regarding 
operational and technical infeasibility at the time of the request or 
for requests made using remote means, not later than two business days 
after the covered provider receives the request. We tentatively 
conclude that all rejection notifications should be delivered within 
the same timeframe. We further tentatively conclude that, if feasible, 
covered providers must deliver these notifications through the manner 
of communication selected by the survivor immediately after the covered 
provider receives the request. We seek comment on our proposed 
approach.
    61. Finally, we seek comment on whether we should require covered 
providers to convey information to survivors regarding the service 
options that may be available to them in a Post-

[[Page 15569]]

Request Notification, as a Concurrent Notice to Survivors, or both. We 
also seek comment on whether we should require covered providers to 
inform survivors that they can choose between keeping the devices 
associated with both their line and the lines of individuals in their 
care if they assume any payment obligations for those devices or 
obtaining other devices to use with the services. If so, we believe 
covered providers should be capable of explaining remaining financial 
obligations for the devices and the costs and payment options for new 
devices the covered provider offers. We also believe that, given the 
sensitive and challenging circumstances survivors may be experiencing, 
we should require covered providers to minimize their communications to 
survivors and prohibit communications that are not directly related to 
the line separation request, such as marketing and advertising 
communications that are not related to assisting survivors with 
understanding and selecting service options. Do commenters agree? Are 
there other valid, but unrelated, reasons for which a provider may need 
to contact the survivor?
    62. Notification to Primary Account Holders and Abusers. The Safe 
Connections Act contemplates that primary account holders may be 
notified regarding successful line separations on their accounts, and 
we believe this notification is likely necessary in most instances, 
given associated account changes that will occur, including when the 
abuser is the primary account holder. We tentatively conclude that an 
abuser who is not the primary account holder must not be notified when 
the lines of a survivor and individuals in the care of the survivor are 
separated from a shared mobile service contract. At the same time, we 
believe it is likely the abuser must necessarily be notified, even if 
not the primary account holder, when the abuser's line is separated. We 
seek comment on our analysis here, and specifically on how we can best 
ensure that survivors are protected in instances when primary account 
holders and abusers whose lines are being separated must be informed 
about line separations. If a covered provider needs to notify a primary 
account holder or abuser whose lines will be separated, should we 
require them to set a uniform amount of time after receiving a line 
separation request in which they will provide the notice? Is it 
feasible to require covered providers to wait until they have approved 
and processed a line separation before informing primary account 
holders or abusers whose lines will be separated, or will covered 
providers need to communicate with them before that point to implement 
account changes? Will covered providers be able to process all 
necessary account and service plan changes as needed if we implement 
such delays? When necessary, how should primary account holders and 
abusers whose lines are separated be notified of any account and 
billing changes? Additionally, should we prescribe any particular 
content of these notifications? Is there any language or terms 
providers should avoid using when notifying primary account holders and 
abusers whose lines are separated?
    63. Informing Survivors When Primary Account Holders and Abusers 
Will Receive Notification of Separations. We propose to codify the Safe 
Connections Act's requirement that covered providers inform survivors 
who separate a line from a shared mobile contract but are not the 
primary account holder of the date on which the covered provider 
intends to give any formal notification to the primary account holder, 
and also tentatively conclude that covered providers inform survivors 
when the covered provider will inform the abuser of a line separation 
involving the abuser's line. We seek comment on when covered providers 
must inform the survivor of the date the covered provider will notify 
the primary account holder and abuser (when the abuser's line is being 
separated). How soon before the primary account holder and abuser 
receive notification must the survivor be informed? Is there any 
language or terms providers should avoid using when notifying 
survivors?
5. Prohibited Practices in Connection With Line Separation Requests
    64. Except as specifically provided, the Safe Connections Act 
prohibits covered providers from making line separations contingent on: 
(1) payment of a fee, penalty, or other charge; (2) maintaining 
contractual or billing responsibility of a separated line with the 
provider; (3) approval of separation by the primary account holder, if 
the primary account holder is not the survivor; (4) a prohibition or 
limitation, including payment of a fee, penalty, or other charge, on 
number portability, provided such portability is technically feasible, 
or a request to change phone numbers; (5) a prohibition or limitation 
on the separation of lines as a result of arrears accrued by the 
account; (6) an increase in the rate charged for the mobile service 
plan of the primary account holder with respect to service on any 
remaining line or lines; or (7) any other requirement or limitation not 
specifically permitted by the Safe Connections Act. We propose to 
codify these prohibitions and limitations in our rules, and seek 
comment on our proposal, as well as implementation of these 
prohibitions, as described below.
    65. Fees, Penalties, and Other Charges. We believe that the Safe 
Connections Act's prohibition on making line separations contingent on 
payment of a fee, penalty, or other charge is unambiguous. We also 
believe this clause would prohibit covered providers from enforcing any 
contractual early termination fees that may be triggered by a line 
separation request, if the line separation request was made pursuant to 
section 345, regardless of whether a survivor continues to receive 
service from the provider as part of a new arrangement upon a line 
separation or completely ceases to receive service from the provider. 
We seek comment on our proposed interpretation and any burdens it may 
impose on covered providers.
    66. Number Portability. We believe that the Safe Connections Act 
effectively prohibits covered providers from conditioning a line 
separation on the customer maintaining service with the provider, 
provided that such portability is technically feasible, and that this 
prohibition applies to any lines that remain on the original account 
and any lines that are separated. We propose to interpret this 
provision to mean that both the party that will remain associated with 
the existing account and the party that will be associated with the 
separated lines must be permitted to port their numbers at the time of 
the line separation or after, without fees or penalties, provided such 
portability is technically feasible. We seek comment on this view. 
Below, we discuss further the contours of technical feasibility of 
number porting within the confines of the Safe Connections Act.
    67. Changing Phone Numbers. We seek comment on how best to 
interpret the Safe Connections Act's provision that prevents a covered 
provider from prohibiting or limiting a survivor's ability to request a 
phone number change as part of a line separation request. We note that 
as a general matter, survivors who are willing to change their phone 
numbers can start a new account and obtain a new number without having 
to go through the line separation process. Under what circumstances 
might a survivor want to both secure a line separation and change phone 
numbers, and are there any particular implications of those 
circumstances that we should address?

[[Page 15570]]

For example, a survivor who is the primary account owner requesting 
separation of an abuser's line from the account might want to keep the 
account to maintain any promotional deals, complete device pay-off, or 
avoid early termination fees, but change a telephone number for safety 
reasons. We believe that this provision of the Safe Connections Act 
would bar covered providers from prohibiting such telephone number 
change requests or attaching a fee or penalty for doing so. We seek 
comment on this analysis, and any other circumstances which we should 
address.
    68. Rate Increases. The Safe Connections Act prohibits covered 
providers from making a line separation request contingent on an 
increase in the rate charged for the mobile service plan of the primary 
account holder with respect to service on any remaining lines, but also 
provides that the prohibitions should not be construed ``to require a 
covered provider to provide a rate plan for the primary account holder 
that is not otherwise commercially available.'' To reconcile these two 
provisions, we make several tentative conclusions and seek comment on 
them. First, we believe the provision prohibiting covered providers 
from making a line separation contingent on a rate increase means that 
a covered provider cannot deny a survivor's line separation request if 
the primary account holder for the remaining lines does not agree to a 
rate increase. Second, we believe that provision also means that a 
covered provider cannot force the remaining primary account holder to 
switch to a service plan that has a higher rate, although the person 
may elect to switch to a rate plan that has a higher or lower rate from 
among those that are commercially available. Third, because the Safe 
Connections Act does not require covered providers to offer rate plans 
that are not otherwise commercially available, we believe covered 
providers are not required to offer survivors or remaining parties a 
specialized rate plan that is not commercially available if the party 
does not choose to continue the existing rate plan. Are there other 
ways to reconcile and interpret these two provisions? We do not read 
the Safe Connections Act to restrict covered providers from offering 
alternative rate plans to the party who remains associated with the 
original account. Additionally, we seek comment on whether we should 
require covered providers to provide rate plan options during the line 
separation process to the customer who remains associated with the 
existing account.
    69. Contractual and Billing Responsibilities. We seek comment on 
the Safe Connections Act's prohibition on making a line separation 
contingent on ``maintaining contractual or billing responsibility of a 
separated line with the [covered] provider.'' Specifically, we believe 
this prohibition means that the party with the separated line must have 
the option to select any commercially available prepaid or non-
contractual service plans offered by the covered provider, whether that 
party is a survivor or abuser. Likewise, we believe this prohibition 
would also prohibit a covered provider from requiring a survivor who 
separates a line from maintaining the same contract, including any 
specified contract length or terms, as the account from which those 
lines were separated (i.e., continuing a contract for the remainder of 
the time on the original account for the new account or requiring the 
survivor to maintain all previously-subscribed services (voice, text, 
data) under the new account). We also believe this provision can be 
interpreted as prohibiting covered providers from requiring that 
separated lines remain with that covered provider's service. This is 
consistent with our belief that the Safe Connections Act does not allow 
covered providers to charge early termination fees to survivors. We 
seek comment on these views.
    70. Other Prohibited Restrictions and Limitations. Beyond the 
issues discussed above, do the prohibited restrictions and limitations 
in the Safe Connections Act contain any other ambiguities or raise 
other implications for covered providers that we should address? 
Additionally, although the Safe Connections Act includes a catch-all 
provision that prohibits covered providers from making line separations 
contingent on any other requirement or limitation not specifically 
permitted by the Safe Connections Act, we seek comment on whether we 
should specify any other requirements or limitations as prohibited in 
our rules. For example, should we specify that a covered provider must 
effectuate a SIM change sought in connection with a valid line 
separation request even if the primary account holder has activated 
account takeover protections for the account, such as a block on all 
SIM changes? Does the catch-all provision give sufficient direction to 
covered providers on what else is prohibited?
    71. Provider Terms and Conditions. Given the general prohibition on 
restrictions and limitations for line separation requests, we seek 
comment on whether covered providers can require customers involved in 
line separations to comply with the general terms and conditions 
associated with using a covered provider's services, so long as those 
terms and conditions do not contain the enumerated prohibitions above 
and do not otherwise hinder a survivor from obtaining a line 
separation. If so, under what legal authority? Are there particular 
restrictions in existing terms and conditions that could be used to 
prevent line separations that we should explicitly prohibit in our 
rules? Are there other ways that providers can use their terms and 
conditions to hinder line separations? We note that this approach would 
permit covered providers to suspend or terminate the services on the 
existing and new accounts for violations of the provider's terms and 
conditions at any time after the line separation is completed.
    72. Credit Checks. We also seek comment on whether the Safe 
Connections Act prohibits covered providers from making a line 
separation contingent on the results of a credit check or other proof 
of a party's ability to pay. We recognize that providers may currently 
require individuals to complete credit checks or demonstrate ability to 
pay to ensure that customers can meet their payment obligations for 
services and devices. However, we acknowledged in the Notice of Inquiry 
that some survivors may not be able to demonstrate their financial 
stability as a result of their abusive situation and therefore may be 
foreclosed from obtaining services--and the record supported this 
finding.
    73. Although the designated program may allow some survivors 
experiencing financial hardship to obtain services without payment 
issues, we are concerned about situations where a survivor does not 
qualify for the designated program and also fails to meet the credit 
standards deemed acceptable by providers. To account for these 
circumstances, we tentatively conclude that we should specify in our 
rules that covered providers cannot make line separations contingent on 
the results of a credit check or other proof of a party's ability to 
pay. Consistent with the approach we took in the ACP Order, we would 
still permit covered providers to perform credit checks that are part 
of their routine sign-up process for all customers so long as they do 
not take the results of the credit check into account when determining 
whether they can effectuate a line separation. We also tentatively 
conclude that providers should be prohibited from relying on credit 
check results to determine the service plans from which a survivor is 
eligible to select and whether a survivor

[[Page 15571]]

can take on the financial responsibilities for devices associated with 
lines used by the survivor or individuals in the care of the survivor. 
We seek comment on these tentative conclusions. We also seek comment on 
whether covered providers can use credit check results to determine 
which devices may be offered to a survivor for new purchases. We note 
that if we allow covered providers to require parties to comply with 
standard terms and conditions for services and devices, they would be 
able to enforce suspensions, terminations, or other remedies against 
customers for violating provisions described in those terms in 
conditions, such as failure to meet payment obligations.
    74. If commenters believe that we should instead specify that 
covered providers should be permitted to rely on credit checks or other 
proof of payment capabilities in any of the circumstances described 
above, we ask commenters to describe how the Safe Connections Act 
provides us with the legal authority to do so, given its prohibition on 
making line separations contingent on ``any other limitation or 
requirement listed under subsection (c)'' of the Safe Connections Act. 
Additionally, if the Safe Connections Act permits covered providers to 
make line separations contingent on the result of a credit check or 
other proof of payment capabilities, should we require them to inform 
customers who fail to meet the provider's standards of other options, 
such as assistance through the designated program (if available), 
prepaid plans the provider might offer, and the ability to switch to 
another provider that may be able to accommodate the survivor? Are 
these alternatives adequate to provide survivors with communications 
services they need?
6. Financial Responsibilities and Account Billing Following Line 
Separations
    75. The Safe Connections Act sets out requirements for financial 
responsibilities and account billing following line separations. 
Specifically, unless otherwise ordered by a court, when a survivor 
separates lines from a shared mobile service contract, the survivor 
must assume any financial responsibilities, including monthly service 
costs, for the transferred numbers beginning on the date when the lines 
are transferred. Survivors are not obligated to assume financial 
responsibility for mobile devices associated with those separated 
lines, unless the survivor purchased the mobile devices, affirmatively 
elects to maintain possession of the mobile devices, or is otherwise 
ordered to by a court. When an abuser's line is separated from an 
existing account, the survivor has no further financial 
responsibilities for the services and mobile device associated with the 
telephone number of that separated line. The statute also gives the 
Commission authority to establish additional rules concerning financial 
responsibilities and account billing following line separations. We 
propose to codify the statutory requirements and seek comment on any 
administrative challenges or other issues regarding billing and 
financial responsibilities that may arise from line separations that we 
should address.
    76. We are particularly interested in learning how providers handle 
account billing issues following line separations they may perform now 
and whether the line separation requirements in the Safe Connections 
Act present new administrative challenges. We note that the Safe 
Connections Act requires covered providers to effectuate a line 
separation no later than two business days after receiving the request, 
meaning that account changes may need to occur in the middle of a 
billing cycle. If the Safe Connections Act requirements are different 
from providers' existing practices, how difficult would it be for 
providers to change their practices to meet the requirements? Are there 
particular challenges for smaller providers or those providers that may 
not conduct their own billing?
    77. We recognize that there may be unique challenges with 
reassigning or separating contracts for device purchases. We believe 
the Safe Connections Act makes clear that, as a general matter, the 
individuals who purchased a device will maintain payment obligations 
for that device following a line separation. As the Safe Connections 
Act specifies, however, the survivor will take on the payment 
obligations for any devices the survivor elects to keep following 
separation of the survivor's line and the lines of those in the care of 
the survivor. We also believe it is clear that when an abuser's line is 
separated, the survivor is no longer responsible for the payment 
obligation for the device associated with that line. We tentatively 
conclude that if the abuser's line is separated and the abuser was the 
purchaser of any devices associated with lines that will remain on the 
account, the survivor can elect to keep those devices and take on the 
payment obligations for them. We seek comment on these proposed 
interpretations and the administrative challenges of implementing them. 
Do providers have the ability to reassign device payment contracts from 
one customer to another? We know anecdotally that some providers offer 
multi-device payment contracts, and these contracts often involve 
device discounts or associated service plan discounts. Some of the 
above separation scenarios may require splitting the payment 
obligations for devices that are on the same contract. Do providers 
have the ability to do this, especially in cases where the plan is no 
longer commercially available? How would they make adjustments to 
device or service plan discounts? Aside from reassigning or splitting 
contracts, does the Safe Connections Act allow covered providers to 
require the parties who are financially responsible for devices 
following separations to pay the full remaining balance of any devices 
or sign up for a new device payment plan at the time of the separation, 
or must they allow those parties to complete existing payment plans? We 
are particularly interested if this is permitted under the Safe 
Connections Act when it is the survivor taking on the payment 
obligation. Additionally, how would providers manage device payments 
when a line separation occurs midway through a billing cycle? Does the 
Safe Connections Act require them to prorate the payments?
    78. Finally, we seek comment on how covered providers can manage 
previously-accrued arrears on an account following a line separation. 
We tentatively conclude that the arrears should stay with the primary 
account holder. For example, if the abuser's line is separated and the 
abuser was the primary account holder, the arrears would be reassigned 
to the abuser's new account. Similarly, if the survivor was the primary 
account holder and separates the abuser's line, the arrears would stay 
with the survivor's account. Conversely, if the survivor's line is 
separated and the abuser was the primary account holder, the arrears 
would stay with the abuser's account. Is this tentative conclusion 
administrable by covered providers?
7. Provider Obligations Related to Processing Line Separation Requests
    79. In this section we seek comment on several topics concerning 
covered providers' obligations related to processing line separation 
requests.
    80. Number Porting. Because the Safe Connections Act preserves 
survivors' ability to port their numbers in connection with line 
separation requests, we seek comment on the technical feasibility of 
such number ports. Generally, number portability

[[Page 15572]]

allows consumers to keep their telephone numbers when they change 
carriers and remain in the same location. Under the Commission's 
current rules, wireless carriers must port numbers to other wireless 
carriers upon request without regard to proximity of the requesting 
carrier's switch to the porting-out carrier's switch, and must port 
numbers to wireline carriers within the number's originating rate 
center. We believe these same number porting obligations apply for 
lines that have been separated pursuant to section 345; we do not 
believe that there is anything unique about number ports associated 
with line separations that would make such ports more or less 
technically feasible than under other circumstances. Accordingly, we 
tentatively conclude that any ports that covered providers are 
currently required to, and technically capable of, completing would be 
technically feasible under the Safe Connections Act. We also 
tentatively conclude that should the requirements or capabilities for 
porting change in the future, any newly-feasible ports also will be 
considered technically feasible when sought in connection with a line 
separation. We seek comment on our analysis and tentative conclusions.
    81. We separately seek comment on the operational feasibility of 
separating lines and porting numbers at the same time. Have providers 
developed procedures to handle this already? If not, how burdensome 
would it be to do so? Because customers typically initiate port 
requests through a new provider, would it be feasible for survivors to 
seek a line separation and number port at the same time? Currently, 
customers seeking to port a telephone number to a new wireless provider 
must provide the new provider with the telephone number, account 
number, ZIP code, and any passcode on the account. Many wireless 
providers also require customers to authenticate the port request 
through a port-out PIN. Is it feasible for a survivor to have this 
information to provide to a new carrier to request a port before a line 
separation request has been effectuated and a new account established 
for the survivor? If a survivor initiates a port request with a new 
provider, would that request remain pending and then be processed as 
soon as the line separation with the old provider is effectuated? Do we 
need to modify our number porting rules to permit these processes? For 
instance, because of the complexity of these port requests, would they 
fall outside the timelines for processing simple port requests 
established by the Commission and industry agreement? What additional 
administrative and survivor confidentiality challenges may arise for 
processing line separations and port requests if the survivor is also 
seeking to qualify for the designated program with the new provider?
    82. We also seek comment on steps we can take to prevent port-out 
fraud. In the 2021 SIM Swap and Port-Out Fraud NPRM, we asked if we 
should require providers to authenticate customers through means other 
than the information used to validate simple port requests, such as 
through the use of a PIN established with their current provider, 
before effectuating a port-out request, and several commenters replied 
in the affirmative. Above, we ask if we should require covered 
providers to allow survivors to select whether they intend to port 
their numbers during the line separation process. If we do, should we 
also require covered providers to require survivors to establish a PIN 
or another authentication key used by the provider to process port-out 
requests if the survivor indicates the intent to port-out numbers?
    83. Compliance with CPNI Protections and Other Law Enforcement 
Requirements. As discussed above, section 222 of the Communications Act 
obligates telecommunications carriers to protect the privacy and 
security of information about their customers to which they have access 
as a result of their unique position as network operators. Section 
222(a) requires carriers to protect the confidentiality of proprietary 
information of and relating to their customers. Subject to certain 
exceptions, section 222(c)(1) provides that a carrier may use, 
disclose, or permit access to CPNI that it has received by virtue of 
its provision of a telecommunications service only: (1) as required by 
law; (2) with the customer's approval; or (3) in its provision of the 
telecommunications service from which such information is derived or 
its provision of services necessary to or used in the provision of such 
telecommunications service. The Commission's rules implementing section 
222 are designed to ensure that telecommunications carriers establish 
effective safeguards to protect against unauthorized use or disclosure 
of CPNI. Among other things, the rules require carriers to 
appropriately authenticate customers seeking access to CPNI. Our CPNI 
rules define a ``customer'' as ``a person or entity to which the 
telecommunications carrier is currently providing service.'' Our rules 
also require carriers to take reasonable measures to both discover and 
protect against attempts to gain unauthorized access to CPNI and to 
notify customers immediately of certain account changes, including 
whenever a customer's password, response to a carrier-designed back-up 
means of authentication, online account, or address of record is 
created or changed.
    84. In light of the protections afforded to CPNI by section 222 and 
our implementing rules, we seek comment on how we can design the line 
separation rules to preserve those protections. In particular, we seek 
to understand who is a ``customer'' under our rules with respect to 
plans with multiple lines or users and whether the answer to that 
question affects how CPNI on such accounts must be protected following 
a line separation. For instance, if the abuser is the primary account 
holder, and the abuser's line is separated from the existing account, 
should the covered provider prevent the new primary account holder from 
accessing any historical CPNI associated with the account? Should the 
primary account holder's historical CPNI move with the separated user 
to a new account? If a survivor who is not the primary account holder 
separates the survivor's line from a shared mobile service contract, 
should the historical CPNI from that line be moved over to the new 
account? Do covered providers have the technical capability to complete 
such moves? Are there other issues that may arise as a result of line 
separations concerning the protection of CPNI? For example, our rules 
require telecommunications carriers to notify customers ``immediately'' 
whenever a password, customer response to a back-up means of 
authentication for lost or forgotten passwords, online account, or 
address of record is created or changed. We tentatively conclude that 
this rule should not apply in cases where the changes are made as a 
result of a line separation request pursuant to section 345, as it 
would run counter to the intentions of the Safe Connections Act. We 
seek comment on our tentative conclusion.
    85. Aside from CPNI, the Safe Connections Act requires us to 
consider the effect of line separations and any rules we adopt on any 
other legal or law enforcement requirements. We seek comment on what 
other legal or law enforcement requirements may by impacted by line 
separations or the rules and proposals we discuss in this NPRM and how 
we can ensure our rules align with those requirements.
    86. Other Issues Related to Processing Requests. We seek comment on 
whether covered providers may face any other issues when processing 
line separation requests. For instance, would covered providers face 
administrative challenges

[[Page 15573]]

if multiple survivors on an account each seek line separations at the 
same time? Are there any changes to processes that providers have to 
make with respect to the North America Numbering Plan and Reassigned 
Numbers Databases to comply with the Safe Connections Act's 
requirements? Would there be any issues if survivors choose to cancel 
their requests or submitted multiple requests in the same year? To what 
extent are any issues raised unique to the Safe Connections Act's 
requirements?
    87. Provider Policies and Practices. Given the importance of line 
separation to survivors seeking to distance themselves from their 
abusers, we seek comment on the extent to which we should require 
covered providers to establish policies and practices to ensure that 
they process line separation requests effectively. At a minimum, we 
tentatively conclude that all employees who may interact with a 
survivor regarding a line separation must be trained on how to assist 
them or on how to direct them to employees who have received such 
training. What would be the burden on covered providers, particularly 
small providers, for any potential requirements we may adopt?
    88. We also seek comment on what measures covered providers can 
take to detect and prevent fraud and abuse. Are there any particular 
requirements we should establish in the rules we adopt? Should we 
establish rules requiring covered providers to investigate and 
remediate fraud and abuse in a timely manner? Should we require 
providers to investigate cases where the primary account holder asserts 
that a line separation was fraudulent? Should providers create a 
process for primary account holders to report allegedly fraudulent line 
separations, and what course of action should providers take in 
response? What evidence is sufficient to show that a line separation 
was fraudulent, given the risk that an abuser may attempt to reverse a 
legitimate line separation by claiming it was fraudulent? How difficult 
will it be for covered providers to reverse line separations they 
discover were fraudulent?
    89. Other Measures To Prevent Abusers from Controlling Survivors. 
We are concerned that if a survivor's abuser becomes aware that the 
survivor is seeking a line separation, the abuser may seek to prevent 
the line separation or preemptively cancel the line of service. We seek 
comment on steps covered providers can take to hinder those efforts. 
For example, should we require covered providers to lock an account to 
prevent all SIM changes, number ports, and line cancelations as soon as 
possible and no more than 12 hours after receiving a line separation 
request from a survivor, to prevent the abuser or other users from 
removing the survivor's access to the line before the request is 
processed? We also seek comment on whether we should require covered 
providers to keep records of SIM changes, number ports, and line 
cancelations and reverse or remediate any of those that were processed 
shortly before receiving a valid line separation request for numbers in 
the request, because the SIM change, number port, or cancelation could 
have been an attempt by an abuser to prevent a line separation. Would 
these requirements be technically and administratively feasible? If so, 
how much time prior to the line separation request should a SIM change, 
number port, or line cancelation be considered improper and subject to 
this remediation? Additionally, we seek comment on how covered 
providers should handle situations where an abuser contacts the covered 
provider to attempt to stop or reverse a line separation, such as by 
claiming the request is fraudulent. We tentatively conclude that 
covered providers should complete or maintain line separations and make 
a record of the complaint in the existing and new account in the event 
further evidence shows that the request was in fact fraudulent. What 
would be the burden on covered providers, particularly small providers, 
for implementing any of these requirements? Finally, we seek comment on 
what steps covered providers can take, if any, to remove or assist 
survivors with removing any spyware that an abuser may have installed 
on devices of the survivor or individuals in the survivor's care.
8. Implementation
    90. Timeframe. We seek comment on the appropriate implementation 
timeframe for the requirements we propose in this NPRM to implement the 
new section 345. How long will covered providers need to implement the 
necessary technical and programmatic changes to comply with the 
requirements under section 345 and our proposed rules? What existing 
processes do covered providers have in place that would enable 
efficient implementation of our proposed rules? Are there challenges 
unique to small covered providers that may require a longer 
implementation period than larger covered providers? If so, how should 
we define ``small'' covered provider for these purposes? What would be 
an appropriate timeframe for small covered providers, balancing the 
costs and burdens with implementing our proposed rules against the 
critical public safety interests at stake for survivors?
    91. Effective Date. The Safe Connections Act states that the line 
separation requirements in the statute ``shall take effect 60 days 
after the date on which the Federal Communications Commission adopts 
the rules implementing'' those requirements, and we propose to make 
final rules effective in accordance with that timeline. We note, 
however, that some of the rules to be adopted pursuant to this NPRM may 
require review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) prior to 
becoming effective under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). While we 
believe the PRA provisions for emergency processing may facilitate 
harmonization of these statutory requirements, we seek comment on the 
implications of the Safe Connections Act's effective date provision for 
PRA review. Are there any steps we should take to preemptively address 
potential inconsistencies between OMB approval of final rules and the 
statutory effective date set forth in the Safe Connections Act?
    92. Liability Protection. Under the Safe Connections Act, covered 
providers and their officers, directors, employees, vendors and agents 
are exempt from liability ``for any claims deriving from an action 
taken or omission made with respect to compliance'' with the Safe 
Connections Act and ``the rules adopted to implement'' the Safe 
Connections Act. Congress made clear, however, that nothing in that 
provision ``shall limit the authority of the Commission to enforce [the 
Safe Connections Act] or any rules or regulations promulgated by the 
Commission pursuant to [the Safe Connections Act].'' We seek comment on 
how, if at all, our rules should account for these provisions.
    93. Enforcement. We seek comment on issues related to enforcement 
of the rules contemplated in this NPRM. Should the Commission adopt 
rules governing the enforcement of the specific requirements, or should 
the Commission employ the general enforcement mechanisms to impose 
monetary penalties on noncompliant service providers set forth in 
section 503 of the Communications Act, as well as in the Lifeline and 
ACP rules? Is there alternative authority for enforcement, such as 
derived from the Safe Connections Act, that we should consider? Given 
the potentially serious safety issues that could result from a covered 
provider's noncompliance with rules implementing the line separation 
obligations, we seek comment on appropriate, specific penalties that

[[Page 15574]]

could be adopted to incentivize compliance with program requirements.

B. Ensuring the Privacy of Calls and Texts Messages to Domestic Abuse 
Hotlines

    94. The Safe Connections Act directs us to consider whether and how 
to ``establish, and update on a monthly basis, a central database of 
covered hotlines to be used by a covered provider or a wireline 
provider of voice service'' and whether and how to ``require a covered 
provider or a wireline provider of voice service to omit from consumer-
facing logs of calls or text messages any records of calls or text 
messages to covered hotlines in [such a] central database, while 
maintaining internal records of those calls and messages.'' Below, we 
propose to establish such a central database, but we begin our 
discussion of this provision of the statute by proposing to require 
covered providers to omit calls or text messages to the relevant 
hotlines and analyzing the scope of that obligation.
1. Creating an Obligation To Protect the Privacy of Calls and Text 
Messages to Hotlines
    95. We propose to adopt a requirement that covered providers and 
wireline providers of voice service omit from consumer-facing logs of 
calls or text messages any records of calls or text messages to covered 
hotlines that appear in a central database, while maintaining internal 
records of those calls and text messages. Congress has found that 
``perpetrators of [sexual] violence and abuse . . . increasingly use 
technological and communications tools to exercise control over, 
monitor, and abuse their victims'' and that ``[s]afeguards within 
communications services can serve a role in preventing abuse and 
narrowing the digital divide experienced by survivors of abuse.'' As 
discussed above, these findings are supported by, among other things, 
field work with domestic violence survivors demonstrating the risk of 
abusers' accessing domestic abuse survivors' digital footprint, 
particularly call logs. The NVRDC observed in response to our Notice of 
Inquiry how ``[c]all and text records to and from covered organizations 
would likely tip off an abuser who is closely monitoring all 
communications.'' We are concerned that survivors may be deterred by 
the threat of an abuser using access to call and text logs to determine 
whether the survivor is in the process of seeking help, seeking to 
report, or seeking to flee, particularly given the desire for survivors 
to maintain secrecy and privacy. We therefore tentatively conclude that 
protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines as 
described by the Safe Connections Act is in the public interest, and 
seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
    96. The Safe Connections Act specifically requires the Commission 
to consider certain matters when determining whether to adopt a 
requirement for protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to 
hotlines. Specifically, section 5(b)(3)(B) of the Safe Connections Act 
requires us to consider the technical feasibility of such a 
requirement--that is, ``the ability of a covered provider or a wireline 
provider of voice service to . . . identify logs that are consumer-
facing . . . and . . . omit certain consumer-facing logs, while 
maintaining internal records of such calls and text messages,'' as well 
as ``any other factors associated with the implementation of [such 
requirements], including factors that may impact smaller providers.'' 
Section 5(b)(3)(B) also requires us to consider ``the ability of law 
enforcement agencies or survivors to access a log of calls or text 
messages in a criminal investigation or civil proceeding.''
    97. Covered providers and wireline providers of voice service have 
the ability to identify consumer-facing call and text logs. In fact, 
many service providers openly promote the ability of consumers to 
access such logs, and we believe these providers should be able to 
identify, and withhold as necessary, the call and text log information. 
We seek comment on this belief and whether there are any operational or 
technical impediments to any covered providers or wireline providers of 
voice service selectively omitting calls and text messages from certain 
telephone numbers from call and text logs. We note that there is no 
discussion of such concerns in the record in response to the Notice of 
Inquiry and it would seem that whatever processes translate internal 
service provider data (such as call records) to the web page or billing 
output that consumers see can be programmed to also filter out certain 
records. Indeed, neither of the two trade associations representing 
substantially different segments of what would be covered providers 
and/or providers of wireline voice service raise insurmountable issues 
relating to selectively omitting calls and text messages from call and 
text logs.
    98. Further, records of calls and text messages do not appear to 
exist solely in the form of call logs, but, rather, independent 
records--that is, some processing must be applied to the records to 
create call logs. As a result, we expect service providers should be 
able to maintain log records of calls and text messages that they omit 
from consumer-facing logs when such records are required for any 
criminal or civil enforcement proceeding--or for any other reason. As a 
safeguard, we propose to explicitly require service providers to 
maintain the internal records of calls and text messages omitted from 
consumer-facing logs. We seek comment on this approach.
    99. We seek comment on our proposal and our consideration of the 
matters described in section 5(b)(3)(B) of the Safe Connections Act. 
Does the appearance of calls and text messages to hotlines in call and 
text logs indeed pose a risk to survivors and also sometimes deter use 
of hotlines? Is our tentative conclusion that it is possible for 
covered providers and wireline providers of voice service to omit 
certain call and text message records from consumer-facing logs while 
maintaining such call and text message records for other purposes, such 
as when a survivor or law enforcement needs access to them, correct? 
How expensive would establishing and maintaining such a system be? What 
level of effort would be required?
    100. Do service providers using certain transmission technologies 
(wireless versus wireline, time division multiplexing versus Voice over 
internet Protocol, etc.) or of a certain size (such as smaller service 
providers) face unique challenges that we should consider? Are these 
concerns great enough to exempt certain service providers? We are 
concerned that creating a patchwork of service providers subject to 
requirements to protect the privacy of calls and text messages to 
hotlines may create confusion for survivors, who may not know if they 
can rely on the privacy of their calls and text messages to hotlines. 
Do commenters agree? If exemptions or extensions are necessary for some 
providers, how can we mitigate these concerns? If commenters believe 
that this can be done through service provider communications, we 
request that such commenters propose how such communications could be 
conducted in instances in which the survivor is not the primary account 
holder.
    101. Are there any matters and considerations unique to protecting 
the privacy of text messages sent to hotlines? Due to the popularity of 
text messaging, we believe it reasonable to assume that some survivors 
seek to communicate with hotlines through such means, and we also 
believe that any requirements should apply equally

[[Page 15575]]

to call and text logs. Several states, localities, and non-profits have 
created text messaging hotlines that allow survivors to more discreetly 
seek help in the event that making a phone call might jeopardize their 
safety. While not all covered hotlines will provide text messaging 
options for survivors of domestic violence, we believe that requiring 
service providers to omit text messages to hotlines from text logs will 
help protect and save survivors. We seek comment on our proposed 
analysis.
    102. We also seek comment on whether we should establish exceptions 
pertaining to particular calls or text messages. If we were to create 
exceptions, how should survivors who may otherwise rely on the privacy 
of all calls and text messages to hotlines be made aware that certain 
calls and text messages may be disclosed in logs due to exceptions? How 
often are toll calls or usage-fee-inducing mobile calls and text 
messages made to hotlines? Are there any other potentially valid bases 
for exceptions based on particular calls and text messages and, if so, 
how should such exceptions be implemented?
2. Defining the Scope of the Obligation
    103. How we define certain critical terms significantly affects 
which service providers are subject to any obligation to protect the 
privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines, the extent of such 
obligations, and to which hotlines the obligations apply. In addition 
to seeking comment on defining the following terms, are there any other 
terms that commenters believe we should define and, if so, how should 
we define them?
    104. Covered Provider. We propose to apply the obligation to 
protect the privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines to all 
``covered provider(s),'' as defined in the Safe Connections Act. 
Therefore, we propose to use the same definition of covered provider 
used for the purpose of applying line separation obligations under 
section 345 of the Communications Act, as added by the Safe Connections 
Act. Do commenters agree that this is the appropriate definition? If 
not, we invite commenters to suggest alternative definitions. If we 
create exceptions or delayed implementation for smaller covered 
providers, should this be reflected in our rules as an exception to the 
definition of covered provider or in another manner?
    105. Voice Service. In addition to covered providers, we propose to 
apply the obligation to protect the privacy of calls and text messages 
to hotlines to all ``wireline providers of voice service,'' as 
suggested by the Safe Connections Act. We propose to base our 
definition of ``voice service'' on the definition in section 5 of the 
Safe Connections Act. That provision references section 4(a) of the 
TRACED Act, which defines ``voice service'' as ``any service that is 
interconnected with the public switched telephone network and that 
furnishes voice communications to an end user using resources from the 
North American Numbering Plan,'' including transmissions from facsimile 
machines and computers and ``any service that requires internet 
protocol-compatible customer premises equipment . . . and permits out-
bound calling, whether or not the service is one-way or two-way voice 
over internet protocol.'' We note that the Commission has previously 
interpreted that provision of the TRACED Act when implementing that 
legislation's requirements and mirrored the definition established in 
the legislation in the Commission's rules. We seek comment on this 
proposal.
    106. We tentatively conclude that we need not define the term 
``wireline provider'' given what we consider to be its plain meaning 
when used in conjunction with ``of voice service,'' as we propose to 
define the latter term. Do commenters agree that the words ``wireline 
provider'' are sufficiently unambiguous to not require definition? If 
not, we request that such commenters suggest an appropriate definition. 
If we create exceptions or delayed implementation for smaller wireline 
providers of voice service, should this be reflected in our rules as an 
exception to the definition of ``wireline provider of voice service,'' 
or in another manner?
    107. Other Potential Service Providers to Include. We seek comment 
on whether the public interest would be served by including providers 
of voice service that offer service using fixed wireless and fixed 
satellite service so that survivors have no doubt that when they call 
or text covered hotlines, their calls will not appear in call or text 
logs. Neither fixed wireless nor fixed satellite providers of voice 
service appear to be ``covered providers'' or ``wireline providers of 
voice service.'' The services that they provide are not Commercial 
Mobile Radio Service or Private Mobile Radio Service because they do 
not meet the definitions in the Communications Act, and, therefore, 
providers of such services are not ``covered providers.'' Further, 
neither of these services is a ``wireline'' service. Do commenters 
agree that neither fixed wireless nor fixed satellite providers are 
covered by the terms ``covered provider'' or ``wireline provider of 
voice service'' in the Safe Connections Act? Do commenters support 
including those types of providers in the obligation to protect the 
privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines? If so, under what 
authority might the Commission impose such an obligation? Are there 
unique burdens that imposing an obligation to protect the privacy of 
calls and text messages to hotlines would impose on fixed wireless and 
fixed satellite providers of voice service? If commenters support 
including these types of providers, we request suggestions for how to 
implement this broadened scope in our proposed rules. In addition, we 
tentatively conclude that intermediate providers would not be 
considered covered providers, consistent with the TRACED Act's 
definition of ``voice service'' and seek comment on this tentative 
conclusion. Do commenters believe there are additional types of 
providers that we should include?
    108. Call. The Safe Connections Act does not define the term 
``call,'' nor is it defined in the Communications Act. We propose to 
define a ``call'' as a voice service transmission, regardless of 
whether such transmission is completed. We believe that given the 
expansive definition of ``voice service,'' which we propose to define 
without regard to whether it be wireline or wireless, such term 
sufficiently captures the means by which survivors would use the public 
switched telephone network to reach covered hotlines. Although we 
suspect that only completed transmissions would appear on call logs, 
out of an abundance of caution, we propose to include completed and 
uncompleted transmissions in the definition of ``call.'' Do commenters 
agree with our proposed definition? Are there any transmissions handled 
by covered providers and providers of wireline voice service that we 
should consider to be ``calls'' that would be excluded from this 
definition?
    109. Text Message. We propose to adopt the same definition of 
``text message'' as given in the Safe Connections Act. Such term is 
defined in the legislation as having the same meaning as in section 
227(e)(8) of the Communications Act, which is ``a message consisting of 
text, images, sounds, or other information that is transmitted to or 
from a device that is identified as the receiving or transmitting 
device by means of a 10-digit telephone number'' and includes short 
message service (SMS) and multimedia message service (MMS) messages. 
The definition explicitly excludes ``message[s] sent over an IP-enabled 
messaging service to another user of the same messaging service'' that 
do not otherwise meet the general

[[Page 15576]]

definition, as well as ``real-time, two-way voice or video 
communication.'' When the Commission interpreted section 227(e)(8) for 
purposes of implementation, it adopted a rule that mirrors the 
statutory text. We believe that language is also appropriate for 
purposes of Safe Connections Act implementation and propose to adopt 
it. We seek comment on this proposal.
    110. Covered Hotline. The Safe Connections Act defines the term 
``covered hotline'' to mean ``a hotline related to domestic violence, 
dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, sex trafficking, severe 
forms of trafficking in persons, or any other similar act.'' We propose 
to adopt this definition in our rules, but believe that we should 
further clarify what constitutes a ``hotline'' and how much of the 
counseling services and information provided on the ``hotline'' must 
relate to ``domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, 
stalking, sex trafficking, severe forms of trafficking in persons, or 
any other similar act[s]'' for the ``hotline'' to be a ``covered 
hotline.''
    111. As an initial matter, we tentatively conclude that in 
providing these clarifications, we should strive to meet the broadest 
reasonable expectations of a survivor seeking to place calls and send 
text messages without fear that they will appear in logs. Do commenters 
agree with this general approach to the definition of ``covered 
hotline''? Are there any disadvantages to being more rather than less 
inclusive in determining what is a ``covered hotline''? Are there any 
entities that we should specifically exclude from our definition of 
``covered hotlines''? Are there any factors we need to consider that 
could lead us to conclude that the scope of ``covered hotlines'' should 
be less exhaustive?
    112. Turning to the specific definition, to be a ``covered 
hotline,'' the service associated with the pertinent telephone number 
must be a ``hotline,'' a term not defined in the Safe Connections Act. 
Given the Safe Connections Act's definition of ``covered hotline,'' as 
well as the potential use of a central database of ``covered hotlines'' 
(calls and text messages to which would be omitted from logs of calls 
and texts), we believe it reasonable to interpret the term ``hotline'' 
generally to mean a telephone number on which counseling and 
information pertaining to a particular topic or topics is provided. We 
suspect, however, that certain telephone numbers may serve as 
``hotlines'' and also be used for other purposes, such as the main 
telephone number for the organization providing the counseling and/or 
information service. Further, we tentatively conclude that telephone 
numbers should not be excluded from being ``covered hotlines'' because 
they do not serve exclusively as ``hotlines.'' Indeed, we believe that 
we can best achieve the goal of minimizing hotline hesitancy by 
interpreting ``hotline'' as broadly as possible, including telephone 
numbers on which an organization provides anything more than a de 
minimis amount of information and counseling and propose to use this 
standard as a component in our definition of ``covered hotline.'' Do 
commenters agree with this approach that we should not require that a 
telephone number serve exclusively as a ``hotline''? Are there any 
other considerations associated with an expansive definition of 
``hotline'' that we should consider?
    113. We tentatively conclude that a ``covered hotline'' need not 
exclusively provide counseling and information to service domestic 
violence survivors because such a requirement would be overly 
restrictive and potentially exclude some hotlines that are providing 
essential services to domestic violence survivors. Thus, at least 
initially, we believe it is best to be as inclusive as possible and 
define as a ``covered hotline'' any hotline that provides counseling 
and information on topics described in the Safe Connections Act's 
definition of ``covered hotline'' as more than a de minimis portion of 
the hotlines' operations. Do commenters agree? Should we instead 
establish a percentage of the organization's services that need to be 
related to covered counseling for the hotline to be a covered hotline? 
If so, what percentage?
    114. Given the novelty of overseeing a central database of covered 
hotlines, and to maximize the efficiency in resolving future matters of 
interpretation under these provisions of the Safe Connections Act, we 
also propose delegating to the Wireline Competition Bureau the task of 
providing further clarification, as necessary, of the scope and 
definition of ``covered hotline.'' We invite comment on this proposal.
    115. Consumer-Facing Logs of Calls and Text Messages. The Safe 
Connections Act does not define the term ``consumer-facing logs of 
calls or text messages.'' In light of our goal of minimizing hotline 
hesitancy by preventing abusers from being made aware of survivors' 
calls and text messages to hotlines, we believe that we should define 
the term as broadly as possible. We propose to define such logs as any 
means by which a service provider presents to a consumer a listing of 
telephone numbers to which calls or text messages were directed, 
regardless of, for example, the medium used (such as by paper, online 
listing, or electronic file), whether the calls were completed or the 
text messages were successfully delivered, whether part of a bill or 
otherwise, and whether requested by the consumer or otherwise provided. 
In addition, our proposed definition includes oral disclosures (likely 
through customer service representatives) and written disclosures by 
service providers of individual call or text message records. For 
avoidance of doubt, we propose to exclude from this definition any logs 
of calls or text messages stored on consumers' wireless devices or 
wireline telephones, such as recent calls stored in the mobile device's 
phone app or lists of recently dialed numbers on cordless wireline 
handsets. We seek comment on our proposed definition. Does it provide 
sufficient specificity for service providers to implement our proposed 
rules?
3. Creating and Maintaining the Central Database of Hotlines
    116. The Safe Connections Act directs the Commission to begin a 
rulemaking no later than 180 days after its enactment to consider 
whether and how to establish a central database of hotlines related to 
domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, sexual assault, human 
trafficking, and other related crimes that could be updated monthly and 
used by a mobile service provider or a wireline provider of voice 
service to omit the records of calls or text messages to such hotlines 
from consumer-facing logs of calls or text messages. We satisfy this 
obligation by seeking comment here on whether and how to establish such 
a central database of covered hotlines. We propose to establish a 
central database of covered hotlines that would be updated monthly. We 
believe that a central database would provide certainty as to which 
records are to be suppressed, thus fulfilling the Safe Connections 
Act's objective to protect survivors while making clear service 
providers' compliance obligations. We seek comment on this proposal and 
ask, as a general matter, whether commenters agree that we should 
establish a central database as part of our efforts to protect the 
privacy of calls and text messages to covered hotlines. Are there any 
reasons not to create a central database of covered hotlines? Are there 
any current lists or existing repositories of hotlines maintained by 
national organizations seeking to end domestic violence that

[[Page 15577]]

could provide the foundation for such a database?
    117. We next explore the issue of who should administer this 
database. Should the Commission? Alternatively, should a third party 
serve as the central database administrator (in which case all policy 
decisions would continue to be made by the Commission)? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of each option? If we were to use a third 
party as the database administrator, how should it be selected? Are 
there any special requirements that the Commission should seek in a 
database administrator? What entities have the expertise needed to be 
the administrator of such a database? Do commenters have any 
suggestions for the particular manner in which the Commission would 
oversee the administrator of the database?
    118. We also seek comment on the scope of the database 
administrator's role and responsibilities. Should the database 
administrator be responsible not only for operating the central 
database, but also for initially populating the central database? We 
expect it would be more efficient to have a single entity populate the 
database initially and also take responsibility for updating the 
entries in the database periodically. If the database administrator 
will not be responsible for initially populating the database, how 
should the Commission establish and populate the system? How should the 
initial set of covered hotlines be identified and information about 
them collected for the central database? Would it be necessary to 
create an entirely new database or would it be possible to expand or 
modify an existing database? What role should operators of covered 
hotlines play in ensuring their inclusion in the central database, as 
well as the accuracy of their information? Should individual hotline 
operators be permitted to list multiple numbers in the central 
database? How should the Commission and the database administrator work 
with hotline operators? Should the database administrator accept 
submissions of hotlines from third parties, presumably followed by 
verification with the hotline operator?
    119. What steps should the Commission and database administrator 
take to maximize the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the central 
database both initially and after it is established? We believe one 
significant step would be making certain fields of the central database 
public. At present, we expect the central database to include the name 
of the hotline, its telephone number, a contact name (and telephone 
number), and an address. We propose to make publicly available the 
names of the covered hotlines and their telephone numbers, as well as 
any location information that a covered hotline may elect to make 
available, such as any geographic area in which they concentrate their 
efforts, but we invite commenters to address whether there are other 
permissible disclosures of contact information under the Privacy Act 
System of Record Notice (SORN) governing our use and disclosure of 
contact information that should be restricted given the unique equities 
here, to preserve that information as confidential. We believe that it 
will substantially improve the accuracy of the list because the public, 
including interested support organizations, will be able to inspect it 
and report any invalid numbers and/or information listed. This will 
have the additional benefit of allowing for a means by which a survivor 
who is hesitant about calling a covered hotline can check the list to 
determine whether the number they plan to call or text message will 
indeed be omitted. Because a hotline needs its telephone number to be 
public for the hotline to be effective, we envision few potential 
disadvantages of making the central database of covered hotlines 
public. Do commenters agree that we should make the central database 
public in the manner discussed above? Are there further advantages? Are 
there any significant disadvantages? If we do make the central database 
of covered hotlines public, should we permit operators of hotlines to 
include location information other than street address, such as city, 
part of a state, state, etc., if they wish to do so? Are there any 
other steps that can be taken to maximize the comprehensiveness and 
accuracy of the central database both initially and after it is 
established?
    120. Once a potential covered hotline has been identified, what 
process should be used for determining whether a hotline is a covered 
hotline? Should we require a self-certification by the operator of the 
hotline? Should the database administrator conduct additional research? 
Should we require operators of hotlines to demonstrate or at least 
certify that they meet the definition of a covered hotline? We invite 
commenters to identify such considerations and also propose solutions.
    121. Central Database Updates. The Safe Connections Act directs the 
Commission to consider whether and how to ``. . . update on a monthly 
basis, [the] central database of covered hotlines to be used by a 
covered provider or a wireline provider of voice service.'' We propose 
for the central database to be updated monthly to keep up with the 
dynamic nature of support networks for survivors. Do commenters agree?
    122. With regard to hotlines already in the central database, we 
propose that it be the responsibility of the hotline operators to 
notify the database administrator of any changes to their information, 
including the telephone number for the hotline. Under our proposal, the 
database administrator would also take update submissions from third 
parties, subject to verification with the hotline operator. We further 
propose that the database administrator should conduct an annual 
outreach campaign to hotline operators requesting that they confirm the 
accuracy of their current information. Should part of the updating 
process include routine certifications and, if so, how frequently? Over 
time, should organizations be automatically removed from the central 
database if they do not recertify their applications? Do commenters 
agree with these proposals regarding updating information already 
contained in the central database?
    123. We expect the process of adding additional hotlines to the 
central database to be different from initially creating the database 
because, for example, it may not be practical for the Commission to 
issue a formal call for submissions to the database on a monthly basis. 
How should new candidates for inclusion in the central database be 
identified? Should the database administrator be tasked with performing 
routine checks for new hotlines? Are there feasible means of doing so? 
How often should this be done? We propose that the database 
administrator routinely accept submissions of covered hotline 
information both from their operators and third parties, the latter 
subject to whatever verification process we may establish for the 
initial creation of the central database. Do commenters agree with 
these proposals? What other steps could the Commission and the database 
administrator take to continue to monitor for potential additions to 
the central database of covered hotlines?
    124. Funding of the Central Database. Section 5(b)(3) of the Safe 
Connections Act does not identify an appropriation to fund the 
maintenance and operation of the central database. In light of this, 
how should this central database be funded? Is there a legal basis to 
use cost recovery from all telecommunications and interconnected VoIP 
service providers using revenue or some other indicia, similar to the 
Universal Service Fund and funding for the North

[[Page 15578]]

American Numbering Plan? What authority would the Commission rely upon 
to use a cost recovery support mechanism for the central database? If a 
cost recovery scheme based on revenue is considered, what revenue base 
should be used? How often should assessments be made? Who should bill 
and collect for such assessments and what process should we use to 
select this entity? If the central database's creation and operations 
are not funded through an assessment based on service provider revenue, 
what alternative do commenters recommend? Commenters should address 
whether any proposed funding scheme presents Miscellaneous Receipts Act 
or Anti-Deficiency Act concerns? Does the Safe Connections Act 
contemplate (and permit) the Commission to establish rules pertaining 
to use of the database, but defer actual creation of the database until 
we can request and receive specific funding? If so, should we, in fact, 
defer actual creation of the database in such a manner? We seek comment 
on how the database should be funded at initial implementation and on 
an ongoing basis given the Safe Connections Act's requirement that this 
database be updated monthly.
4. Using the Central Database of Hotlines
    125. Under our proposal and consistent with the Safe Connections 
Act, the central database of covered hotlines will serve as the source 
of covered hotlines to which calls and text messages must be omitted 
from consumer-facing logs. We seek comment on how the required use of 
the central database should be operationalized in our rules.
    126. As an initial matter, we propose that service providers be 
responsible for downloading the central database themselves in light of 
our proposal to make it public on a website to be maintained by the 
database administrator. This version of the central database would 
include only the organization name and telephone number(s) (omitting 
addresses and contact information) and would be available in an easily 
downloadable and widely used format, such as a delimited text file. We 
tentatively conclude that the administrative burdens on service 
providers under such a system would be minimal. We seek comment on this 
proposal. If commenters disagree with our proposal to make the central 
database publicly available, and, thus, downloadable by service 
providers from a public website, we request proposals for how we should 
control access to the central database.
    127. We seek comment on an appropriate amount of time following 
adoption of rules by which service providers should be required to 
comply with the obligation to protect the privacy of calls and text 
messages to hotlines. Should we factor in potential unique challenges 
that certain providers (such as those using certain technologies or 
those of a certain size) may face when establishing a compliance date? 
Should the compliance deadline vary by the type of service provider, 
such as by allowing smaller providers more time to comply? If so, how 
should we determine the service providers that should be given more 
time and how much more time should be provided? Are there any 
disadvantages to providing certain service providers a later compliance 
deadline, such as potentially creating confusion for survivors in not 
knowing when their particular service provider will begin complying? 
Are there ways to mitigate these concerns?
    128. Should we establish a minimum frequency for service providers 
to download updates to the central database? Section 5(b)(3)(D) of the 
Safe Connections Act, which provides a safe harbor defense in court 
actions if ``a covered provider updates its own databases to match the 
central database not less frequently than once every 30 days,'' affect 
our requirements in this regard? Should we establish 30 days as the 
minimum frequency at which service providers must download updates? 
Would downloaded central database updates be immediately implemented in 
service provider systems? For example, do service providers expect to 
need to test updates? If so, how should our rules account for this, 
considering that survivors may expect updates to be implemented 
relatively quickly? Should we establish a maximum period of time 
between when the administrator makes an update available and when such 
an update is implemented in service providers' systems?
    129. What measures should we take to ensure and determine 
compliance by service providers with any rules that we might adopt for 
protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines? Should 
we require regular certifications and, if so, how frequently? Should we 
establish specific penalties for failure by service providers to comply 
with any rules protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to 
hotlines? If so, what should they be? Are there any other aspects of a 
compliance framework that we should establish?
    130. Are there any potential inconsistencies between the rules that 
we might adopt to ensure the privacy of calls and text messages to 
hotlines and other Commission rules or state regulations? For example, 
would omitting toll calls that incur separate charges from consumers' 
bills conflict with our truth-in-billing rules? Are there any other 
potential inconsistencies? Should we explicitly resolve them and, if 
so, how? What role might disclaimers issued by service providers play?
    131. We seek comment on the Commission's legal authority to adopt 
rules to establish, and update on a monthly basis, a central database 
of covered hotlines and to require covered providers and wireline 
providers of voice service to omit from consumer-facing logs of calls 
or text messages any records of calls or text messages to covered 
hotlines that appear in such central database, while maintaining 
internal records of those calls and messages. We tentatively conclude 
that Congress directing the Commission to consider how to adopt rules 
for these purposes inherently grants the Commission the legal authority 
to adopt such rules. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion. 
Further, we seek comment on other potential sources of legal authority 
for the adoption of such rules, such as Title I (via ancillary 
authority) and section 201(b) of the Communications Act, perhaps in 
conjunction with the Commission's purpose under section 1 of the 
Communications Act to promote ``safety of life'' and Title III 
(sections 301, 303, 307, 309, or 316).
    132. Are there any other issues that commenters believe we should 
consider with regard to section 5(b)(3) of the Safe Connections Act? We 
invite commenters to identify and comment on any other issues relating 
to a service provider's ability and obligation to protect the privacy 
of calls and text messages to hotlines, the scope of such obligations, 
creating and maintaining the central database of hotlines, and how 
service providers should be obligated to use such central database.

C. Emergency Communications Support for Survivors

1. The Designated Program for Emergency Communications Support
    133. The Safe Connections Act requires the Commission to designate 
either the Lifeline program or the Affordable Connectivity Program 
(ACP) to provide emergency communications support to qualifying 
survivors suffering from financial hardship, regardless of whether the 
survivor might otherwise meet the designated program's eligibility 
requirements. While

[[Page 15579]]

``emergency communications support'' is not defined by the Safe 
Connections Act, we construe the Act's references to emergency 
communications support to be the time-limited support offered to 
survivors suffering financial hardship through the designated program. 
The ACP provides funds for an affordable connectivity benefit 
consisting of up to a $30 per month standard discount on the price of 
broadband internet access services that participating providers supply 
to eligible households and an enhanced discount of up to $75 for ACP 
households residing on qualifying Tribal lands. The ACP benefit can be 
applied to any internet service offering of a participating provider, 
including bundles containing mobile voice, SMS, and broadband. The 
Lifeline program is one of the Commission's long-standing Universal 
Service Fund programs, providing a benefit of up to a base $9.25 per 
month for a discount on the price of voice and broadband service 
provided by eligible telecommunications carriers (ETCs). Households 
participating in Lifeline that reside on qualifying Tribal lands are 
also eligible to receive an additional discount of up to $25.
    134. We seek comment on which program, Lifeline or ACP, to 
designate to provide emergency communications support to survivors in 
accordance with the Safe Connections Act. The Lifeline program allows 
participants to receive support for broadband service, bundled service, 
or voice-only service. As with Lifeline, ACP offers support for 
broadband and broadband service bundled with voice and/or text 
messaging, but it does not offer the flexibility to apply the benefit 
to voice-only service. While the ACP offers a greater reimbursement 
amount for program participants receiving broadband or bundled service 
we understand that offering support for a voice option is critical for 
survivors, and the Safe Connections Act is particularly focused on the 
ability of survivors to establish voice connections independent from 
their abusers. Additionally, the ACP relies on an appropriated fund in 
a definite amount, whereas the Lifeline program is funded by the 
Universal Service Fund, which is a permanent indefinite appropriation. 
What are the benefits and limitations of choosing Lifeline as the 
designated program? What are the benefits and limitations of choosing 
the ACP as the designated program? If we decide to designate the ACP to 
provide emergency communications support, how should we handle the 
potential wind-down of the program?
    135. If the Commission selects Lifeline as the designated program, 
to ensure the maximum financial assistance available to survivors, we 
seek comment on whether we have authority under the Safe Connections 
Act to allow qualifying survivors enrolled in Lifeline through this 
pathway provided by the Safe Connections Act to use that enrollment in 
Lifeline to also enroll in ACP. Just as with the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act that established the Emergency Broadband Benefit 
Program, the Infrastructure Act directs that a household qualifies for 
ACP if it meets the qualification for participation in Lifeline. Under 
the Commission's rules, households that are enrolled in Lifeline can 
enroll in ACP without needing to complete an ACP application. However, 
the ACP's statute ties qualification for the program to the specific 
eligibility criteria of the Lifeline program. If Lifeline is the 
designated program for survivors, should survivors who only have access 
to the Lifeline program through their status under the Safe Connections 
Act be permitted to use their Lifeline participation to also enroll in 
the ACP? If we were to modify the eligibility requirements of the 
Lifeline program to allow survivors to enter the program with a more 
expansive set of criteria, would that address any concerns with the ACP 
statute's requirements and allow survivors to participate in both 
programs? If such survivors were permitted to participate in the ACP, 
should their ACP participation also be limited to the six months 
contemplated by the Safe Connections Act? What modifications to current 
ACP enrollment processes for current Lifeline subscribers should we 
consider if we implement this ACP enrollment pathway?
    136. Additionally, we seek comment on ways that we might be able to 
enhance the designated program to best serve survivors enrolling 
pursuant to the Safe Connections Act. For instance, the Lifeline 
program currently allows for base reimbursement of qualifying voice-
only plans up to $5.25 and qualifying broadband or bundled plans are 
eligible to receive up to $9.25 in Lifeline support. Recognizing the 
critical role that voice service plays in the lives of survivors, would 
it be appropriate to allow providers serving qualifying survivors to 
provide discounts of, and claim reimbursement for, up to $9.25, the 
full Lifeline reimbursement, even for voice-only service plans? We note 
that section 5(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Safe Connections Act directs the 
Commission to adopt rules that allow a survivor who is suffering from 
financial hardship and meets the requirements of section 345(c)(1) to 
enroll in the designated program as quickly as feasible and to 
``participate in the designated program based on such qualifications 
for not more than 6 months.'' We construe the directive to allow 
relevant survivors to ``participate'' in the designated program to 
mean, among other things, that those survivors can receive the full 
subsidy currently available under the designated program for up to six 
months. We seek comment on this view. If this were permitted, how 
should USAC allow service providers to make such claims while ensuring 
survivors' privacy? If we select Lifeline as the designated program, 
how might the contribution factor be impacted by an increase in support 
for voice-only service, even for a limited population, to ensure 
sufficient support benefits for survivors through the Universal Service 
Fund? We also note that the Safe Connections Act does not explicitly 
discuss survivors' access to the designated program's enhanced benefit 
for residents of Tribal lands. However, the enhanced benefit for Tribal 
lands is an established component of the ``federal Lifeline support 
amount'' and ``affordable connectivity benefit support amount'' as 
established by the Commission's rules. Therefore, we tentatively 
conclude that survivors who would otherwise be eligible for emergency 
communications support under the Safe Connections Act and reside on 
qualifying Tribal lands will also be able to receive the designated 
program's enhanced Tribal benefit. What are the benefits or drawbacks 
associated with allowing survivors to qualify for the Tribal enhanced 
benefit?
    137. Providers in the Lifeline program must be designated ETCs by 
state regulatory agencies or, where a state declines this 
responsibility, by the Commission. For the ACP, participating providers 
are limited to providers of ``broadband internet access service''. 
These requirements are more limiting than the broader definition of 
``covered providers'' contemplated by the Safe Connections Act. While 
Congress clearly instructed the Commission to designate either the 
Lifeline program or ACP as the designated program, we seek comment on 
the interplay between the limiting nature of the Lifeline program's ETC 
requirement and the broader understanding of ``covered providers.'' We 
also seek comment on the interplay between the Safe Connections Act's 
definition of ``covered providers'' and

[[Page 15580]]

the definition of ``provider'' used in the ACP.
    138. We seek comment on the impact of the designated program's 
benefit as it pertains to survivors' access to devices following 
completion of a line separation request. The Lifeline program does not 
offer any reimbursement for devices, unlike the ACP, which offers 
reimbursement for qualifying devices, but such devices are limited to 
internet-connected laptops, desktops, and tablets. Does this 
significantly impact the Lifeline program's or ACP's effectiveness for 
survivors? We seek comment on the impact the one-time ACP connected 
device discount may have for survivors, and in particular, those who 
qualify to enroll in the designated program under the Safe Connections 
Act. While the Commission has not adopted rules that offer device 
reimbursement in the Lifeline program, we seek comment on the ways in 
which devices are made available to enrolling Lifeline subscribers in 
the marketplace. Aside from providers, is there a role for 
organizations that work with survivors suffering financial hardship to 
help distribute connected devices and mobile phones to those enrolling 
in Lifeline as the designated program through the Safe Connections Act?
    139. We also propose rules the Commission could adopt to implement 
the emergency communications support provisions of the Safe Connections 
Act without prejudice as to whether to designate either the Lifeline 
program or ACP as the program to provide such support. In this regard, 
we seek comment on both the amendments to Part 54 as they appear at the 
end of this document (using the Lifeline program as an example), as 
well as how such amendments could be adapted to the Commission's 
existing ACP rules.
2. Defining Financial Hardship
    140. The Safe Connections Act directs the Commission to allow 
survivors suffering from financial hardship to enroll in the designated 
program ``without regard to whether the survivor meets the otherwise 
applicable eligibility requirements.'' We seek comment on how to 
interpret this provision of the Safe Connections Act. We propose to 
interpret this provision to mean that, if a person meets the criteria 
of ``suffering from financial hardship'' and meets the requirements of 
section 345(c)(1), then the person may enroll in the designated program 
even if they do not meet the qualification requirements for the 
designated program, whether Lifeline or the ACP. While the eligibility 
requirements of Lifeline are established in the Commission's rules, the 
eligibility criteria for the ACP are statutory. If we were to designate 
the ACP to provide survivors with emergency communications support, 
would we have to use the ACP's eligibility requirements in the 
definition of financial hardship, or did Congress intend that the 
survivor eligibility requirements in the Safe Connections Act supersede 
the ACP's statutory eligibility requirements if the ACP were the 
designated program? If Congress did not intend for the Commission to 
define financial hardship more expansively than the ACP's statutory 
eligibility requirements, then what meaning should the Commission 
attribute to section 5(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Safe Connections Act?
    141. We also seek comment on how we should interpret and 
incorporate section 345(c)(1) of the Communications Act for purposes of 
verifying eligibility for the designated program. The Safe Connections 
Act states that a survivor seeking to participate in the designated 
program must ``meet[ ] the requirements under'' the newly added 
``section 345(c)(1),'' which details the process for a survivor 
completing a line separation request. As a threshold matter, we 
interpret the Safe Connections Act to limit access to ``emergency 
communications support'' in the designated program to those survivors 
that submit a completed line separation request. Is this interpretation 
supported by the statute? If not, how should we interpret the language 
in the Safe Connections Act referring to survivors who ``meet the 
requirements under section 345(c)(1)''? While we believe that the Safe 
Connections Act limits the opportunity for support to survivors that 
have submitted a line separation request, can a survivor ``meet the 
requirements under section 345(c)(1)'' if they can demonstrate that 
they are a survivor of a covered act by producing certain 
documentation?
    142. The Safe Connections Act also requires that a survivor be 
``suffering from financial hardship'' to obtain emergency 
communications support from the designated program. For survivors who 
leave abusive environments, experiencing financial instability is a 
common occurrence as a result of increased expenses and economic 
dependency on former partners. Given the common connection between 
domestic violence and financial instability, we seek comment on whether 
we should presume that survivors of domestic violence are suffering 
from financial hardship and therefore accept documentation of domestic 
violence as demonstrative of financial hardship. Does the Safe 
Connections Act allow us to adopt such an approach? Would this 
interpretation give sufficient meaning to the Safe Connections Act's 
reference to ``financial hardship''? Alternatively, does the Safe 
Connections Act require us to prescribe demonstration of actual, rather 
than presumed, financial hardship for purposes of participation in the 
designated program? Would it be more appropriate to establish criteria 
allowing a survivor to demonstrate that their abuser had cut them off 
from prior financial resources to substantiate financial hardship? If 
so, what should we require to substantiate this claim when the 
survivor's existing financial documentation may not otherwise 
demonstrate financial hardship?
    143. In response to our Notice of Inquiry, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) and other advocacy groups proposed that the 
Commission allow survivors to self-certify financial hardship. They 
suggest that because survivors who leave abusive situations often lack 
access to financial documentation, the Commission should not require 
survivors to submit any income-verifying documentation. This approach 
would reduce the barriers of participation for survivors and help 
survivors access the benefits of the designated program. We believe 
that, under this approach, any waste, fraud, and abuse concerns could 
be mitigated by the requirement that survivors also demonstrate that 
they have met the requirements of section 345(c)(1) and the six-month 
limitation on receiving emergency communications support. We seek 
comment on this proposal to allow survivors to self-certify financial 
hardship. What are the benefits and disadvantages of this approach? If 
we adopted this approach, should we require survivors to submit an 
affidavit, as suggested by the NVRDC, as part of the self-certification 
of financial hardship status? Should any such affidavit or self-
certification be submitted under penalty of perjury? Would requiring an 
affidavit be a barrier preventing survivors from accessing emergency 
communications support? Should we require that any certification or 
affidavit be notarized to ensure the veracity of the identity of the 
signer, and what burdens would a notarization requirement impose on 
survivors? Alternatively, would allowing trusted third parties such as 
shelters or social workers to certify the financial hardship status of 
survivors allow survivors to access emergency communication services 
while mitigating any risk of

[[Page 15581]]

waste, fraud, or abuse? In contrast, would requiring a third-party 
certification present a barrier to survivor participation in the 
designated emergency communication support program, as EPIC argues? If 
we allowed for other methods of demonstrating financial hardship beyond 
income, what documentation should we require from survivors to explain 
their financial hardship? How could we standardize the reviews of such 
submissions to ensure that the Commission and USAC operate 
consistently? Should we direct the Wireline Competition Bureau to work 
with USAC to develop a standardized certification form, which would 
clearly define financial hardship to survivors and other entities, for 
any self-certification efforts? Does the fact that the emergency 
communications support contemplated by the Safe Connections Act is 
temporary reduce the risk of waste, fraud, or abuse connected with 
survivor self-certification?
    144. We also seek comment on whether we should allow survivors who 
are facing temporary financial hardship to receive emergency 
communications support. Some survivors who have reliable sources of 
income nevertheless face financial instability or hardship as a result 
of high temporary or short-term expenses associated with leaving an 
abusive relationship. Survivors may need to pay expensive medical 
bills, cover new housing and transportation costs, and find new 
childcare arrangements, all of which can lead to financial instability. 
If we allow survivors to qualify for emergency communications support 
who are facing temporary financial hardship, how should we define 
temporary financial hardship? Would showings of temporary financial 
hardship have to be tied to the survivor's income at a particular point 
in time, or are there other types of documentation that survivors could 
submit to demonstrate temporary financial hardship? Are there benefit 
programs that are available to survivors experiencing temporary 
financial hardship, the participation in which we should accept as 
qualifying a survivor to participate in the designated program? Does 
the Safe Connections Act permit us to establish a process for survivors 
who are experiencing temporary financial hardship to obtain emergency 
communications support?
    145. Alternatively, we could define financial hardship to mirror 
the ACP eligibility requirements, which are broader than the Lifeline 
eligibility requirements, even if we deem Lifeline the designated 
program. This approach would allow many survivors who participate in 
qualifying programs to have their eligibility automatically confirmed, 
allowing them to ``enroll in the designated program as quickly as 
feasible'' as required by the Safe Connections Act. Moreover, the more 
expansive eligibility criteria for the ACP will provide additional ways 
for survivors to demonstrate financial hardship, and will allow 
providers and USAC to leverage existing connections and documentation 
requirements to confirm eligibility. We seek comment on this approach. 
What are the benefits associated with this approach? What are the 
burdens or barriers that this approach might impose on survivors? Is 
the income threshold of 200% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines used in 
the ACP consistent with the Safe Connections Act's goal to allow 
survivors to get emergency access to the designated program? Are there 
federal or state benefit programs targeted to survivors whose 
eligibility standards we could use as a model? Are there any other 
qualifying benefit programs that we should consider including as part 
of our definition of financial hardship, and in particular programs 
targeted at survivors? Are there other approaches that we can use to 
define financial hardship that are not directly tied to survivors' 
income?
    146. Both Lifeline and the ACP typically require subscribers to 
demonstrate their eligibility by submitting either proof of income or 
participation in a qualifying benefit program. The Lifeline program and 
the ACP have similar approaches for consumers to document their income. 
For instance, subscribers can demonstrate eligibility on the basis of 
income by submitting documentation such as tax returns or pay-stubs. If 
we were to keep a similar approach for survivors entering the 
designated program, we seek comment on whether and what income 
documentation we should require survivors to submit to demonstrate they 
are experiencing financial hardship. Given the unique challenges faced 
by many survivors in accessing financial information, should we require 
survivors to submit documents to demonstrate financial hardship prior 
to enrollment in the designated program, within a certain amount of 
time after enrollment, or at all? If we adopted a delayed documentation 
approach, should we permit service providers to claim reimbursement 
before documentation is confirmed? Would a delayed documentation 
approach limit service providers' willingness to provide support to 
survivors if they were unable to claim reimbursement until survivor 
documentation was approved? If we require survivors to submit 
documentation to demonstrate financial hardship, what documentation 
should we collect? Are there other types of income verifying documents 
that we could allow survivors to submit beyond tax returns and pay 
stubs?
3. Program Application and Enrollment
    147. The Safe Connections Act also directs the Commission to allow 
a survivor suffering from financial hardship to ``enroll in the 
designated program as quickly as is feasible.'' We therefore seek 
comment on ways in which we can improve (1) the application process for 
survivors suffering from financial hardship that have successfully gone 
through the line separation process; (2) the application process for 
such survivors that were unable to obtain a line separation because of 
some technical infeasibility; and (3) the application and enrollment 
process for survivors generally. We also seek comment on how to best 
approach enrollments for emergency communications support in the NLAD 
opt-out states or through the ACP's alternative verification process 
(AVP).
    148. We first seek comment on the eligibility determination process 
for survivors who have successfully completed the line separation 
process. We propose that survivors should be able to submit 
documentation of a successful line separation request to qualify for 
the emergency communications support. Given the potential for variation 
across service providers, we anticipate that USAC may need to engage in 
reviews of information documenting a successful line separation 
request. Is there a way in which the Commission and USAC can 
standardize confirmation of line separation requests such that USAC 
will be able to more quickly review such documentation and confirm that 
a subscriber can participate in the designated program? Should the 
service provider be required to provide to USAC certification or other 
documentation confirming the successful line separation request? Would 
confirmation of a line separation request alone be too ambiguous as 
lines can be separated for reasons not contemplated by the Safe 
Connections Act? Might there be ways in which USAC could confirm that a 
line separation request was tied to an individual's status as a 
survivor? If a survivor had a line separated by a service provider that 
also participates in the designated program, would it be appropriate to 
not require line

[[Page 15582]]

separation information from the survivor at the time of application and 
instead rely upon the service provider to maintain that documentation 
and share it with USAC as part of any program integrity or audit 
inquiries?
    149. The Safe Connections Act also requires the Commission to 
consider how it might support survivors suffering from financial 
hardship who attempted to complete a line separation request but were 
unable to complete that request because of some technical 
infeasibility. In such situations, should documentation of that outcome 
be sufficient for a survivor to confirm their status as a survivor and 
enroll in the designated program? How can USAC best assess the veracity 
of these notices of technical infeasibility that survivors receive from 
service providers? Are there ways in which the Commission or USAC can 
work with service providers to standardize such notices? If the line 
separation request was processed but confirmed unsuccessful, can it be 
presumed that the survivor submitted all appropriate documentation to 
the service provider to confirm their survivor status, or should USAC 
require that documentation and independently review these materials? 
Are there ways in which service providers might share confirmation of 
unsuccessful line separation requests directly with USAC? After USAC 
has confirmed that a line separation request was submitted but unable 
to be completed because of a technical infeasibility, how might the 
survivor be able to enter the designated program? Should the survivor 
be able to receive the designated program's benefit on their existing 
account, even if shared with an abuser? We presume that survivors 
should be permitted to apply the designated program's benefit on any 
new qualifying service not tied to the abuser, but does that present 
any unique challenges for survivors and service providers?
    150. As part of the process for applying to either Lifeline or the 
ACP, consumers are required to submit information to USAC's National 
Verifier that will allow for confirmation of the consumer's identity. 
By gathering this information, USAC is better able to confirm the 
identity of a consumer and prevent duplicate enrollments in the 
Commission's affordability programs. We recognize, however, that 
providing this type of identity information could be difficult for 
survivors that may be trying to physically and financially distance 
themselves from their abusers. As such, we seek comment on whether and 
how we might gather similar identity information for the process of 
verification while being sensitive to the privacy and safety needs of 
survivors. Would the type of information that survivors need to provide 
as part of the line separation process typically include all of the 
information that the Commission already collects for its affordability 
programs? Would this make providing the same information to USAC less 
concerning for survivors suffering financial hardship, particularly if 
such survivors will need to provide details of their line separation 
request? Under the Privacy Act of 1974, the Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), and applicable guidance, 
the Commission and USAC already have strong privacy protections in 
place for consumer information; are those measures sufficient for 
information collected from survivors? Are there best practices that 
governmental organizations and businesses use for dealing with survivor 
information, which USAC should implement here, that go above and beyond 
standard privacy protections? Are there ways in which we can modify the 
information collected, perhaps by allowing a consumer to submit their 
identity information with an alias name? If we allow survivors to 
submit less identity information as part of their application to the 
designated program, how might we effectively manage program integrity, 
administration, and audit efforts?
    151. Current address information can also be very sensitive 
information for survivors to share. If such location information is 
disclosed, it may allow an abuser to locate a survivor, and because of 
this concern, survivors may not be residing at one location or have a 
fixed address. They also may be hesitant to seek emergency 
communications support if they believe their location may be disclosed. 
To meet these challenges, we seek comment on how we might adjust the 
address requirements for the designated program to best support 
survivors suffering from financial hardship. Should USAC rely 
exclusively on any address information provided as part of the line 
separation documentation it might receive from survivors suffering 
financial hardship? Might such address information be inaccurate if the 
account, after the completion of a line separation request, is no 
longer tied to a specific address? Our Lifeline rules already 
contemplate temporary or duplicate addresses for applicants. Does this 
approach sufficiently resolve the potential risks to survivors 
suffering from financial hardship? Would it be appropriate to require 
no address if the applicant can confirm their identity through 
providing other personal information like their full actual name or 
date of birth? Would it be appropriate to allow the address of a 
survivor support organization or other alias address to stand in as an 
applicant's residential address? Are these types of methods used in 
other areas and for other services where survivors might seek support?
    152. Aside from the issues detailed above, we also seek comment on 
how the Commission and USAC should modify the designated program's 
forms to allow survivors suffering from financial hardship to receive 
support. As noted, we are interested in learning more about what 
information service providers might have about survivors by virtue of 
the line separation process and whether such information can be 
provided to USAC directly from service providers. We are sensitive to 
the possibility that survivors who would benefit most from 
participation in the designated program may be experiencing sudden and 
traumatic hardship, and we seek to make participation readily 
accessible without compromising the integrity of our programs. Thus, 
rather than requiring survivors to complete the designated program's 
full application process and provide their line separation material, 
would it be appropriate to require survivors to self-certify that they 
completed a line separation request, regardless of the outcome, as part 
of their application to participate in the designated program? If we 
were to adopt such a self-certification approach, we anticipate the 
need to require more identity information to confirm identity. Under 
this self-certification approach, we also anticipate needing 
information consistent with the Safe Connections Act to substantiate 
that the applicant is a survivor. Would that be appropriate? If we did 
not collect such information, how might the Commission and USAC confirm 
that only survivors suffering from financial hardship are enrolling in 
the program? Even if we do not adopt a self-certification approach for 
confirming that the survivor went through the line separation process, 
should we explore a more streamlined application for such survivors? If 
so, what information that is currently collected might not be 
appropriate for this community? Alternatively, are there questions or 
information that should be added to the current program application 
forms? Should such information be placed on a new supplemental form, 
similar to the Lifeline program's Household Worksheet? Would it be more

[[Page 15583]]

appropriate to develop an entirely new application process for 
survivors seeking to enter the designated program?
    153. As part of the Lifeline and ACP enrollment process, consumers 
are required to have their eligibility confirmed before they can be 
enrolled into either program by a service provider. This is typically 
done by the consumer either interacting directly with the National 
Verifier or by working through a service provider system that confirms 
information through an application programming interface (API) 
connection to the National Verifier. After a consumer's qualification 
has been confirmed, including confirmation that the consumer is not 
already receiving the Lifeline or ACP benefit, then a service provider 
can enroll the consumer in NLAD and begin providing discounted service 
to that consumer. We do not intend to change this general process for 
survivors suffering financial hardship and seeking to participate in 
the designated program. However, we do seek comment on ways in which 
USAC can communicate to survivors and service providers that a survivor 
has been qualified to participate in the designated program. Should 
USAC provide survivors with anything different from what is currently 
provided to confirm qualification? Would it be preferable for USAC to 
provide a qualification number that will confirm a survivor's ability 
to participate in the designated program while also allowing them to 
minimize the amount of personal information they need to provide to 
their service provider? This approach might result in a qualification 
number that would allow the service provider to enroll the subscriber 
in NLAD without seeing the level of personal information that service 
providers currently see in NLAD. Would such an approach be too 
administratively burdensome for service providers to monitor and ensure 
compliance with the designated program's rules? How else might USAC 
work to categorize survivors in NLAD such that service providers will 
be aware that a particular subscriber might not be able to participate 
in the program longer than six months? Is such a categorization 
necessary?
    154. As stated above, we seek comment on whether the Lifeline 
program or ACP should be the designated program for impacted survivors, 
and we further propose that survivors seeking to enroll in the 
designated program under the Safe Connection Act be qualified and 
enrolled using USAC's application and eligibility confirmation process 
throughout the country. In California, Texas, and Oregon, the state 
administrators currently confirm Lifeline eligibility and take measures 
to prevent duplicate enrollments. As such, consumers in these states 
apply through the state program administrators for state and federal 
Lifeline benefits. USAC partners with these states to ensure that their 
processes are in accordance with the federal Lifeline program's 
guidelines. Here, however, we propose that survivors in these states 
apply to participate in Lifeline as the designated program, through 
USAC's systems directly. USAC would confirm the eligibility of 
survivors to participate in the program and would work to address any 
potential duplicates. This would be similar to how broadband-only 
Lifeline subscribers apply and enroll in California, where the National 
Verifier stands in for the state administrator. By requiring USAC to 
review such enrollments we will ensure a standardized process for 
survivor documentation, greater flexibility to be responsive to 
survivor needs, a centralized repository for any potential line 
separation materials that might come from service providers, and a 
unified process around potential customer transition efforts after the 
end of the six-month period. In proposing to adopt this approach, we 
would still permit those with system access to support survivors in the 
application process through access to USAC's systems. Should we also 
permit such access to be expanded to community-based organizations that 
work with survivors? If we did expand access to USAC's systems beyond 
what is currently permitted, should that access be limited in any 
particular ways to protect the personal information of survivors and 
other program participants? We seek comment on these proposals.
    155. If the Commission were to choose the ACP as the designated 
program, we propose that all survivor eligibility determinations should 
be completed through the National Verifier. As discussed above with 
Lifeline, we believe that this approach will improve the process for 
survivors. As such, we propose that providers with approved AVPs would 
be obligated to accept determinations from the National Verifier. This 
would be limited to survivors seeking to enter the ACP as the 
designated program and would not impact the general processes in place 
for AVP enrollment beyond that group. We seek comment on this proposal.
    156. General Program Requirements. The Lifeline program and the ACP 
both have general requirements to which program participants and 
service providers must adhere throughout their participation in the 
programs. For instance, both programs are limited to one benefit per 
household and both programs also allow a provider to claim 
reimbursement only for subscribers who actually use their service. We 
propose that the general rules and requirements of the designated 
program will remain in effect for survivors and service providers 
except to the extent that they are in conflict with the statutory and 
regulatory requirements established specifically for the emergency 
communications support. This would include such requirements as the 
programs' non-usage de-enrollment requirements, record retention 
requirements, and audit requirements. We note that we do not expect 
annual recertification to be an issue because survivors must qualify 
through the regular program processes to participate in the designated 
program beyond their initial six-month period. Our proposal reflects 
our understanding that the programs' rules were established to ensure 
that the limited resources of each program go towards individuals that 
genuinely need the service and will use the service, and that a number 
of these rules, such as those that deal with enrollment representatives 
and the payment of commissions, were adopted to address specific 
program integrity concerns that we think will continue to be relevant 
in the context of our efforts to offer emergency communications 
support. As such, we do not believe it would be appropriate to modify 
these types of requirements. However, we seek comment on this proposal 
and are particularly interested in whether survivors would be 
significantly and negatively impacted by the continuation of certain 
generally applicable programmatic rules in our affordability programs.
    157. While we propose to maintain the programs' rules largely in 
place, we seek comment on how the programs' limit of one benefit per 
household would interact with a definition of survivors that may 
implicate ind

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Indexed from Federal Register on March 13, 2023.

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