Supporting Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Affordable Connectivity Program
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Abstract
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) begins the process of implementing the Safe Connections Act, taking significant steps to improve access to communications services for survivors of domestic abuse and related crimes. We seek comment on the implementation of the Safe Connections Act's statutory requirement that mobile service providers separate the line of a survivor of domestic violence (and other related crimes and abuse), and any individuals in the care of the survivor, from a mobile service contract shared with an abuser within two business days after receiving a request from the survivor. We also seek comment on a proposal to require service providers to omit from consumer-facing logs of calls and text messages any records of calls or text messages to hotlines listed in a central database of hotlines that the Commission would create. We also seek comment on whether to designate the Lifeline program or the Affordable Connectivity Program as a means for providing survivors suffering financial hardship with emergency communications support for up to six months, as required by the Safe Connections Act.
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 48 (Monday, March 13, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 15558-15592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04489]
[[Page 15557]]
Vol. 88
Monday,
No. 48
March 13, 2023
Part III
Federal Communications Commission
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47 CFR Parts 54 and 64
Supporting Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, Lifeline and Link
Up Reform and Modernization, Affordable Connectivity Program; Proposed
Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 48 / Monday, March 13, 2023 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 15558]]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 54 and 64
[WC Docket Nos. 22-238, 11-42, and 21-450; FCC 23-9; FR ID 129141]
Supporting Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, Lifeline
and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Affordable Connectivity Program
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) begins the process of implementing the Safe Connections
Act, taking significant steps to improve access to communications
services for survivors of domestic abuse and related crimes. We seek
comment on the implementation of the Safe Connections Act's statutory
requirement that mobile service providers separate the line of a
survivor of domestic violence (and other related crimes and abuse), and
any individuals in the care of the survivor, from a mobile service
contract shared with an abuser within two business days after receiving
a request from the survivor. We also seek comment on a proposal to
require service providers to omit from consumer-facing logs of calls
and text messages any records of calls or text messages to hotlines
listed in a central database of hotlines that the Commission would
create. We also seek comment on whether to designate the Lifeline
program or the Affordable Connectivity Program as a means for providing
survivors suffering financial hardship with emergency communications
support for up to six months, as required by the Safe Connections Act.
DATES: Comments are due on or before April 12, 2023, and reply comments
are due on or before May 12, 2023. Written comments on the Paperwork
Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements must be
submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before May 12, 2023.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by WC Docket Nos. 22-
238, 11-42, and 21-450, by any of the following methods:
<bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing ECFS: <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/</a>.
<bullet> Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service
mail.
<bullet> Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
<bullet> U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority
mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. All
filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
<bullet> Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings.
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020), <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy">https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy</a>.
People with Disabilities. To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic
files, audio format), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ec8a8f8fd9dcd8ac8a8f8fc28b839a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4d2b2e2e787d790d2b2e2e632a223b">[email protected]</span></a> or call the
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Travis Hahn, Wireline Competition
Bureau, Telecommunications Access Policy Division, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6d391f0c1b041e43250c05032d0b0e0e430a021b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1f4b6d7e69766c31577e77715f797c7c31787069">[email protected]</span></a> or Chris Laughlin, Wireline Competition Bureau,
Competition Policy Division, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6a290218031944260b1f0d020603042a0c0909440d051c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="62210a100b114c2e0317050a0e0b0c220401014c050d14">[email protected]</span></a>. For additional
information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information
collection requirements contained in this document, send an email to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#dc8c8e9d9cbabfbff2bbb3aa"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="164644575670757538717960">[email protected]</span></a> or contact Nicole On'gele at (202) 418-2991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in WC Docket Nos. 22-238, 11-42, and 21-
450, adopted on February 16, 2023 and released on February 17, 2023.
The full text of this document is available at <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-9A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-9A1.pdf</a>. To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities (e.g., braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format, etc.) or to request reasonable
accommodations (e.g., accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0e686d6d3b3e3a4e686d6d20696178"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d2b4b1b1e7e2e692b4b1b1fcb5bda4">[email protected]</span></a> or call the
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules,
47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply
comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this
document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
The proceeding this document initiates shall be treated as a
``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's
ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy
of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral
presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a
different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or
otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte
presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
This document contains proposed new or modified information
collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing
effort to reduce
[[Page 15559]]
paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments
are due May 12, 2023. Comments should address: (a) whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of
the functions of the Commission, including whether the information
shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's
burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
of the information collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on the respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology; and (e) way to further reduce the information collection
burden on small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment
on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Synopsis
I. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Reliable, safe, and affordable connectivity is critical to
survivors leaving a relationship involving domestic violence, human
trafficking, and other related crimes or abuse. This connectivity can
assist survivors in breaking away from their abusers and finding and
maintaining contact with safe support networks, including family and
friends. Survivors whose devices and associated telephone numbers are
part of multi-line or shared plans (commonly referred to as ``family
plans''), however, can face difficulties separating lines from such
plans and maintaining affordable service. Further, having access to an
independent phone or broadband connection is important for survivors to
be able to communicate and access other available services without fear
of their communications, location, or other private information being
revealed to their abusers.
2. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we continue the
work we initiated in July of last year to support the connectivity
needs of survivors. Specifically, we begin the process of implementing
the Safe Connections Act of 2022 (Safe Connections Act), enacted this
past December, which provides important statutory support for specific
measures to benefit survivors. We seek comment on proposed rules that
would help survivors separate service lines from accounts that include
their abusers, protect the privacy of calls made by survivors to
domestic abuse hotlines, and support survivors that pursue a line
separation request and face financial hardship through the Commission's
affordability programs. We believe that these measures will aid
survivors who lack meaningful support and communications options when
establishing independence from an abuser.
A. Separation of Lines From Shared Mobile Service Contracts
3. In this section, we propose new rules to codify and implement
the line separation provisions in the Safe Connections Act. Our
proposed rules largely track the statutory language, with some
additional proposals and requests for comment concerning other issues
that may be implicated by line separations.
1. Definitions
4. We propose to adopt in our rules the definitions of the terms
listed in new section 345 of the Communications Act, as added by the
Safe Connections Act, including ``covered act,'' ``survivor,''
``abuser,'' ``covered provider,'' ``shared mobile services contract,''
and ``primary account holder.'' We seek comment on each proposed
definition and invite commenters to address our specific questions
below.
5. Covered Act. We propose to define ``covered act'' as conduct
that constitutes (1) a crime described in section 40002(a) of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (34 U.S.C. 12291(a)), including, but
not limited to, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault,
stalking, and sex trafficking; (2) an act or practice described in
paragraph (11) or (12) of section 103 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102) (relating to severe forms of
trafficking in persons and sex trafficking, respectively); or (3) an
act under State law, Tribal law, or the Uniform Code of Military
Justice that is similar to an offense described in clause (1) or (2) of
this paragraph. Our proposed definition is identical to the term as
defined in the Safe Connections Act, except that we propose to add the
clause ``but not limited to'' in describing the crimes covered by the
first clause. Section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 describes a number of crimes and abuses in addition to those
crimes enumerated in the Safe Connections Act's definition of ``covered
act,'' including abuse in later life, child abuse and neglect, child
maltreatment, economic abuse, elder abuse, female genital mutilation or
cutting, forced marriage, and technological abuse. Although the Safe
Connections Act describes a covered act as ``a crime described'' in
section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act ``including domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, and sex
trafficking,'' it does not say that only those listed crimes may be
included. We believe the best reading of the definition of ``covered
act'' in the Safe Connections Act includes all crimes listed in section
40002(a); we see no reason why Congress would choose to protect only a
subset of survivors of these crimes. We believe the second clause of
the definition of ``covered act'' in the Safe Connections Act, which
identifies specific subsections (``an act or practice described in
paragraph (11) or (12) of section 103 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000'') also supports our analysis because in
contrast, the first clause of the definition of ``covered act'' does
not limit the definition to specific subsections of section 40002(a) of
the Violence Against Women Act. We seek comment on this proposed
analysis. How should the fact that the Safe Connections Act
specifically mentions ``[d]omestic violence, dating violence, stalking,
sexual assault, human trafficking, and related crimes'' in its findings
in section 3, while not mentioning the other crimes and abuses listed
in section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act, factor into our
analysis? To what extent can we include in our definition abuses
described in section 40002(a) of the Violence Against Women Act that
may not be ``crimes'' under the statute?
6. We seek comment on whether, instead of mirroring the statutory
language in our definition of ``covered act,'' the Commission's rules
should list out the crimes identified in section 40002(a) of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and paragraph (11) or (12) of
section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Would
such an approach help provide additional clarity of the scope of the
Safe Connections Act's protections for covered providers and survivors?
Would adopting such a rule run the risk of our rules becoming
inconsistent with statutory intent if Congress revises either of those
statutes in the future?
7. Finally, consistent with the Safe Connections Act, we propose
that a criminal conviction or any other
[[Page 15560]]
determination of a court shall not be required for conduct to
constitute a covered act. We seek comment on our proposal. The Safe
Connections Act separately addresses the evidence needed to establish
that a covered act has been committed or allegedly committed. We
address those requirements below.
8. Survivor. We propose to define ``survivor'' as an individual who
is not less than 18 years old and (1) against whom a covered act has
been committed or allegedly committed; or (2) who cares for another
individual against whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly
committed (provided that the individual providing care did not commit
or allegedly commit the covered act), mirroring the Safe Connections
Act's definition of ``survivor.'' We seek comment on our proposal. Are
there other situations or circumstances in which an individual should
be considered a ``survivor'' under our rules, and if so, under what
authority would we expand that definition?
9. We seek comment on how we should interpret the Safe Connections
Act's language describing a survivor as an individual ``who cares for
another individual'' against whom a covered act has been committed or
allegedly committed, to provide guidance to both covered providers and
survivors. We observe that the statutory language is broad--Congress
did not limit this provision to only those situations in which an
individual is providing care to family members, minors, dependents, or
those residing in the same household, when it could have chosen to do
so. It also did not provide direction on how to otherwise determine
when an individual is providing ``care'' for another individual. Should
we define what it means to ``care for'' another person or what it means
to be ``in the care of'' another individual, and if so, what should
that definition be? Is there a common understanding of what it means to
``care for'' or be ``in the care'' of another person? Has the meaning
of ``in the care of'' or a comparable phrase been defined elsewhere in
statute or regulation that could appropriately be used for reference in
the present context?
10. Absent a common understanding or similar definition to
reference, we believe that at a minimum, this phrase should be
understood to encompass any individuals who are part of the same
household, including adult children, as well as adults who are older,
and those who are in the care of another individual by valid court
order or power of attorney. To support this interpretation, we
tentatively conclude that ``household'' should have the same meaning as
it does in Sec. 54.400 of our rules. We seek comment on our proposed
interpretation. Is there any reason to conclude that Congress intended
this phrase to be interpreted more narrowly, for example, to include
only those under the age of 18 for whom an individual is the parent,
guardian, or caretaker? We tentatively conclude that the Safe
Connections Act contemplates that an individual who is the parent,
guardian, or caretaker of a person over the age of 18 qualifies as
someone who provides care for another person and, thus, as a
``survivor'' when a covered act is committed against the person for
whom the individual cares. Do commenters agree, or does the Safe
Connections Act contemplate that any such persons over the age of 18
would be considered ``survivors'' in their own right? Would
interpreting the Safe Connections Act, and our rules, in any of the
ways we have discussed narrow or broaden the applicability of the
protections in a way not intended by Congress? If we conclude that
certain persons over the age of 18 can qualify as being in the care of
another individual, should we permit those persons to object to their
line being separated following a line separation request by the
``survivor'' who cares for them? If so, what sort of notice or
opportunity to object must covered providers give to these users? We
seek comment on how best to interpret this statutory language so as to
provide the protections that Congress intended for individuals who are
victims of a covered act.
11. Abuser. We propose to define ``abuser'' for purposes of our
rules as an individual who has committed or allegedly committed a
covered act against (1) an individual who seeks relief under section
345 of the Communications Act and the Commission's implementing rules;
or (2) an individual in the care of an individual who seeks relief
under section 345 of the Communications Act and the Commission's
implementing rules, mirroring the substance of the Safe Connections
Act. We seek comment on our proposal. Can commenters identify any
reason to depart from the statutory definition of ``abuser''? We note
that we do not intend our definition to serve as independent evidence
of, or establish legal liability in regards to, any alleged crime or
act of abuse, and propose to adopt this definition for purposes of
implementing the Safe Connections Act only. We seek comment on this
proposed approach.
12. Covered Provider. We propose to define ``covered provider'' as
a provider of ``a private mobile service or commercial mobile service,
as those terms are defined in 47 U.S.C. 332(d),'' consistent with the
Safe Connections Act. We seek comment on our proposal. Section 332(d)
defines ``commercial mobile service'' as ``any mobile service (as
defined in [47 U.S.C. 153]) that is provided for profit and makes
interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such
classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a
substantial portion of the public, as specified by regulation by the
Commission,'' and defines ``private mobile service'' as ``any mobile
service (as defined in [47 U.S.C. 153]) that is not a commercial mobile
service or the functional equivalent of a commercial mobile service, as
specified by regulation by the Commission.''
13. We tentatively conclude that covered providers would include
both facilities-based mobile network operators, as well as resellers/
mobile virtual network operators. We seek comment on this tentative
conclusion. We also seek comment on whether Congress intended the line
separation obligation to apply to all providers of commercial mobile
service or private mobile service, as the Commission might interpret
and apply those definitions, regardless of underlying technology used
to provide the service (e.g., whether provided through land, mobile, or
satellite stations). We further seek comment on whether we should
interpret the statutory definition of ``covered provider'' to include
providers of mobile broadband service that do not also offer mobile
voice service, and if so, whether implementation of the line separation
obligation would differ for those providers. If so, how would it
differ?
14. Shared Mobile Service Contract. We propose to define ``shared
mobile service contract'' as a mobile service contract for an account
that includes not less than two lines of service and does not include
enterprise services offered by a covered provider. We seek comment on
our proposal, which mirrors the Safe Connections Act's definition
except insofar as it replaces the phrase ``not less than 2 consumers''
with ``not less than two lines of service.'' It is our understanding
that mobile service contracts are typically structured around the
number of lines of service associated with an account rather than the
number of consumers. We invite comment on this proposal. We tentatively
conclude that a ``line'' includes all of the services associated with
that line under the shared mobile
[[Page 15561]]
service contract, regardless of their classification, including voice,
text, and data services, and we seek comment on this tentative
conclusion. We also tentatively conclude that a ``line of service''
under a shared mobile service contract is one that is linked to a
telephone number, even if the services provided over that line of
service are not voice services. We seek comment on our analysis, and
whether we should provide additional guidance on the bounds of ``line
of service'' in implementing the Safe Connections Act.
15. If we do not interpret ``consumers'' to mean ``lines,'' as
proposed, we seek comment on how providers would verify the number of
consumers on an account. Would requiring covered providers to verify
the number of consumers rather than the number of lines possibly hamper
a survivor's ability to obtain a line separation? If we keep the
statutory terminology of ``consumers,'' would there be additional
privacy concerns, e.g., because covered providers would have to collect
information about the additional consumers on shared mobile service
contracts (including minors who may use the line) other than the
primary account holder? How burdensome would such additional
information collection requirements be for covered providers,
particularly small providers?
16. We tentatively conclude that ``shared mobile service contract''
includes mobile service contracts for voice, text, and data services
offered by covered providers, as well as both pre-paid and post-paid
accounts, to the extent that a service contract exists. We seek comment
on these tentative conclusions. Do covered providers offer pre-paid
contracts for accounts that include at least two lines?
17. We observe that the definition of ``shared mobile service
contract'' explicitly excludes ``enterprise services.'' We tentatively
conclude that enterprise services generally entail those products or
services specifically offered to entities to support and manage
business operations, which may provide greater security, integration,
support, or other features than are ordinarily available to mass market
customers, and would exclude services marketed and sold on a
standardized basis to residential customers and small businesses. Do
commenters agree? We believe interpreting the exclusion for
``enterprise services'' in this way would address the needs of
survivors who use a line on a shared mobile service contract that may
be structured under a family-run small business or paid for by a
business account owned by the abuser, for example. We seek comment on
our approach, and whether we should define ``enterprise services''
differently to address the needs of survivors.
18. Primary Account Holder. We propose to define ``primary account
holder'' as ``an individual who is a party to a mobile service contract
with a covered provider,'' mirroring the definition in the Safe
Connections Act. We seek comment on our proposal, and whether there are
any considerations that should cause us to depart from the statutory
definition. Are there situations in which there is more than a single
individual who is party to a mobile service contract?
2. Requirement To Separate Lines Upon Request
19. Processing of Line Separation Requests. Consistent with the
Safe Connections Act, for shared mobile service contracts under which a
survivor and abuser each use a line, our proposed rule would require
covered providers, not later than two business days after receiving a
completed line separation request from a survivor, to (1) separate the
line of the survivor, and the line of any individual in the care of the
survivor, from the shared mobile service contract, or (2) separate the
line of the abuser from the shared mobile service contract.
20. Because the Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to
implement line separation requests from survivors for shared mobile
service contracts ``under which the survivor and the abuser each use a
line,'' we propose to interpret this statutory language to mean that
neither the abuser nor the survivor needs to be the primary account
holder for a line separation to be effectuated, regardless of whose
line is separated from the account. We also believe that a person who
does not use a line on an account--but is a ``survivor'' under the
statute because the person is someone who cares for another individual
against whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly committed--
would be able to request a line separation because the definition of
``survivor'' allows that person to stand in for the individual in their
care. Additionally, we also believe that the structure of the Safe
Connections Act gives survivors discretion to request separation from
the account of either the line of the survivor (and the lines of any
individuals in the survivor's care) or the line of the abuser, but we
seek comment on whether the covered provider also retains the
discretion to determine whether to separate the line of the abuser or
the line(s) of the survivor. We seek comment on our proposed
interpretations, and on their potential implications and challenges.
For instance, what implementation challenges will covered providers
face, if any, if the survivor seeks to remove the abuser from the
account but neither the survivor nor the abuser is the primary account
holder? Do covered providers have existing processes to remove a
primary account holder from an account and designate another user as
the primary account holder, such as following the death of a primary
account holder, that could be applied if the survivor seeks to remove
the abuser from the account and the abuser is the primary account
holder?
21. The Safe Connections Act requires covered providers, upon
receiving a completed line separation request from a survivor, to
separate the line of the survivor and the line of any individual in the
care of the survivor. As with the definition of ``survivor,'' the Safe
Connections Act does not explain how to determine who qualifies as ``in
the care of'' the survivor for the purposes of line separation
requests. We believe that we should adopt the same approach for making
this determination as we do for interpreting the definition of
``survivor.'' Unlike the definition of ``survivor,'' however, we
believe that for the purposes of line separation requests, an
individual ``in the care'' of a survivor need not be someone against
whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly committed. As
previously discussed, the Safe Connections Act defines ``survivor'' as
including an individual at least 18 years old who ``cares for another
individual against whom a covered act has been committed or allegedly
committed,'' but it requires covered providers to separate the lines of
both the survivor and ``any individual in the care of the survivor,''
upon request of the survivor. We propose to interpret these provisions
to mean that a covered provider must separate the lines, upon request,
of any individuals in the care of survivors (however that is defined)
without regard to whether a covered act has been committed or allegedly
committed against the individuals in the care of the survivor. We seek
comment on our proposed interpretation of these provisions.
22. Under the Safe Connections Act, covered providers must
effectuate line separations not later than two business days after
receiving a completed line separation request from a survivor. We
tentatively conclude covered providers should have two full business
days following the day the request was made to complete a line
separation request, which aligns with the Commission's
[[Page 15562]]
rules governing computation of time related to Commission actions.
Should we adopt another meaning for what constitutes two business days,
such as 48 hours from the time the request was made for requests made
during business hours, and 48 hours from the start of the next business
day for requests not made during business hours? Should we encourage
covered providers to effectuate separations in less than two business
days, if feasible? We seek comment on whether we should establish a
time limit or other guidelines for how long covered providers have to
determine whether a line separation request is incomplete. Because line
separation requests may be time sensitive, we believe that, if
feasible, covered providers should review requests to make this
determination promptly, and ideally make this determination and either
effectuate a line separation or reject an incomplete request within the
two business day timeframe established by the statute. We believe this
will enable survivors to quickly take steps to correct errors or submit
a new request, if appropriate. Once a covered provider determines a
request is complete and that there is no other basis for rejection, we
believe the statute is clear that the provider has no more than two
business days, however that is calculated, to effectuate the request,
and we seek comment on this conclusion.
23. We also seek comment on the reasons covered providers may
reject a request and what survivors can do upon receiving a rejection.
At a minimum, we expect that covered providers may reject a request
because the provider was unable to authenticate that the survivor is
the user of the specified line, the request is missing required
verification information or documentation, information or documentation
submitted by the survivor is invalid, or the line separation is
operationally or technically infeasible by the provider. We believe
that any corrections, resubmissions, or selected alternatives for
obtaining a line separation should be processed within the two-
business-day timeframe established by the Safe Connections Act. We seek
comment on how to balance our interest in allowing survivors to make
repeated requests to obtain a line separation with our interest in
preventing fraud on multiline shared accounts. Should we require
covered providers to establish procedures for determining whether
repeated requests are fraudulent and decline to effectuate line
separations in those instances?
24. Operational and Technical Infeasibility. Under the Safe
Connections Act, covered providers who cannot operationally or
technically effectuate a line separation request are relieved of the
obligation to effectuate line separation requests. Because this
provision specifies that covered providers are only relieved of the
``requirement to effectuate a line separation request,'' we believe
that all covered providers must offer the ability for survivors to
submit requests for line separations described in the statute even if
the provider may not be able to effectuate such separations in all
instances. We seek comment on this interpretation.
25. We seek comment to understand what operational and technical
limitations covered providers may face. We expect that many covered
providers already have processes in place to effectuate line
separations and seek comment on this belief. We tentatively conclude
that any line separation a covered provider can complete within two
business days under its existing capabilities, as those may change over
time, would not be operationally or technically infeasible under the
Safe Connections Act. We also believe that the Safe Connections Act
requires covered providers to take all reasonable steps to effectuate
any line separation requests they receive in accordance with the
statute and the rules we adopt, and we seek comment on how we would
determine whether the steps taken meet this standard. Must covered
providers change their policies and procedures and invest in equipment
and technology upgrades to be able to effectuate all or a greater
number of line separations? Should we instead simply define what
circumstances qualify as operational and technical limitations and
require covered providers to take steps to effectuate line separations
in all other circumstances? We seek comment on the potential
approaches, including their costs and burdens on covered providers,
including small providers. Regardless of any requirements we establish,
we recognize that there may be instances when operational and technical
limitations prevent covered providers from effectuating the types of
line separations established by the Safe Connections Act or from doing
so precisely as the statute and our rules require. We believe that in
these instances, the Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to
provide the survivor with alternatives to submitting a line separation
request, including starting a new line of service. We also believe that
in these circumstances, covered providers should offer, allow survivors
to elect, and effectuate any alternative options that would allow
survivors to obtain a line separation. For instance, some covered
providers may not be able to separate an abuser's line from an account
if the abuser is the primary account holder, but would be able to
separate the survivor's line from the account. Likewise, some covered
providers may be capable of processing line separation requests, but
not in the middle of a billing cycle.
3. Submission of Line Separation Requests
26. Information Required to Process Line Separation Requests. The
Safe Connections Act requires that survivors submit to covered
providers certain information with their line separation requests, and
we propose to codify those requirements in our rules. First, under our
proposed rule, a survivor submitting a line separation request must
expressly indicate that the survivor is requesting relief from the
covered provider under section 345 of the Communications Act and our
rules and identify each line that should be separated. In cases where a
survivor is seeking separation of the survivor's line, the request must
state that the survivor is the user of that specific line. In cases
where a survivor is seeking separation of a line of an individual under
the care of the survivor, the request must also include an affidavit
setting forth that the individual is in the care of the survivor and is
the user of that specific line. In support of efforts to deter fraud
and abuse, we seek comment on whether we should mandate requirements
for any affidavits that are submitted. At a minimum, we believe that
affidavits should be signed and dated. Should they also be notarized?
Can or must we rely on the alternative declaration mechanism provided
for by 28 U.S.C. 1746? Should affidavits regarding individuals in the
care of a survivor include the individual's name, relationship to the
survivor, or other information? Are there privacy concerns with
potentially requiring this additional information?
27. Consistent with the Safe Connections Act, we also tentatively
conclude that when a survivor is instead requesting that a covered
provider separate the line of the abuser from the shared mobile service
contract, the line separation request should also state that the abuser
is the user of that specific line. We seek comment on this tentative
conclusion. Though not required under the Safe Connections Act, should
we require that the line separation request include an affidavit that
the abuser is the user of a specific line, rather than
[[Page 15563]]
just a statement? We seek comment on whether covered providers need any
other information to effectuate line separation requests. Commenters
should address any privacy concerns from requiring such additional
information.
28. Because the Safe Connections Act requires that covered
providers ``shall'' separate the lines requested by a survivor after
receiving a completed line separation request, we believe that this
statutory language is best read as requiring the covered provider to
complete the line separation as long as the request provides the
information required by the Safe Connections Act and our implementing
rules, and the line separation is operationally and technically
feasible. In other words, we do not believe that the Safe Connections
Act requires covered providers to take any steps to separately verify
the legitimacy of the information provided; we seek comment, however,
on whether the statute permits them to do so, and if so, what the
implications are for both covered providers and survivors. We seek
comment on our proposed interpretation of this provision. What would be
the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach?
29. The Safe Connections Act does not address whether or how
covered providers should authenticate the identity of a survivor to
ensure that a person making a line separation request is actually a
user of a line on the account. We recognize that unless a survivor is
the primary account holder, covered providers may have limited
information about the survivor and therefore fewer methods to
authenticate the survivor's identity. We also appreciate that many
survivors may not be in a position to supply government issued
identification or other official identifying information to covered
providers for authentication purposes. We are concerned that, absent
any form of authentication, line separation requests could be easily
abused by bad actors with significant consequences to consumers,
similar to instances of subscriber identify module (SIM) swap and port-
out fraud. We note, however, that in response to the Notice of Inquiry,
some commenters argued that maximizing the ability of survivors to
access any benefits the Commission establishes should supersede fraud
and abuse concerns, at least absent evidence of widespread fraud or
abuse. We seek comment on the appropriate balance between these two
competing public interests.
30. We seek comment on whether we should require covered providers
to authenticate the identity of a survivor to verify that the survivor
is actually the user of a line on the account before processing a line
separation request. When the survivor is the primary account holder or
a user designated to have account authority by the primary account
holder (designated user), we believe covered providers should
authenticate survivors just as they would any other primary account
holder or designated user, and we seek comment on this proposal. If the
survivor is not the primary account holder or a designated user, we
seek comment on whether we should designate the forms of authentication
that are appropriate for covered providers to use for line separation
requests, and if so, which forms of authentication we should designate.
We believe in this particular context that SMS text-based and app-based
authentications could be useful because they rely on the user having
access to the device associated with the line. We also seek comment on
whether call detail information could be a viable alternative in these
circumstances because it requires knowledge of call history by the
user. Are there other authentication methods that would be both
feasible for survivors and secure? We observe that some comments
received in response to our 2021 SIM Swap and Port-Out Fraud NPRM
discussed security shortcomings of these and other authentication
mechanisms, and several commenters in that proceeding urged us to give
providers flexibility in deciding which forms of authentication to use
to reduce costs and burdens and avoid creating a roadmap for bad
actors. To what extent should the concerns raised in that proceeding
guide our decision making here? Should we allow covered providers
flexibility to determine which forms of authentication to offer? If so,
should we require covered providers to offer multiple forms of
authentication and give survivors the opportunity to authenticate using
any method available? How burdensome would it be for covered providers
if we were to require them to authenticate that survivors are users of
a line on a shared mobile account, particularly for small providers?
How burdensome would such a requirement be on survivors seeking line
separation requests, and would such requirements be consistent with
Congressional intent? Finally, we seek comment on how any
authentication process we establish for line separations should
intersect with any identity verification process survivors must undergo
to access the designated program.
31. We recognize that covered providers may require additional
information to assign the survivor as a primary account holder. Beyond
the information already discussed, what information would covered
providers need from survivors to establish them as primary account
holders? We note that certain information, like full residential
address, billing address, Social Security Number, and financial
information can be extremely sensitive or difficult to provide for
survivors that may be trying to physically and financially distance
themselves from their abusers. Residential address information can be
particularly problematic because survivors may not be residing at one
location or have a fixed address, and if any address information is
exposed, it may allow an abuser to locate a survivor. If a survivor is
unable to provide all the information that is typically required to
establish a primary account holder, should we require covered providers
to modify the information necessary to accommodate survivors? If so,
what information should we permit covered providers to require from
survivors? If not, are there adequate alternative options for survivors
to obtain needed communications services?
32. Additionally, although we appreciate that many survivors may
have limited information about the abuser and the account associated
with the mobile service contract, we seek comment on whether we should
require survivors who are not the primary account holder to submit
other information to ensure that line separations are being processed
for the correct account and to minimize fraudulent line separations. We
specifically seek comment on whether we should require survivors to
submit one or more of the following pieces of information about the
account or primary account holder even if the primary account holder is
the abuser: account number, primary phone number associated with the
account, zip code, address associated with the account, and PIN or
password associated with the account.
33. Documentation Demonstrating Survivor Status. Consistent with
the Safe Connections Act, our proposed rule would require survivors
seeking a line separation to submit information that verifies that an
individual who uses a line under the shared mobile service contract
(i.e., an ``abuser'') has committed or allegedly committed a covered
act against the survivor or an individual in the survivor's care. To
meet this requirement, survivors must submit one or more of the
eligible
[[Page 15564]]
documents prescribed in the Safe Connections Act: (1) a copy of a
signed affidavit from a licensed medical or mental health care
provider, licensed military medical or mental health care provider,
licensed social worker, victim services provider, or licensed military
victim services provider, or an employee of a court, acting within the
scope of that person's employment; or (2) a copy of a police report,
statements provided by police, including military police, to
magistrates or judges, charging documents, protective or restraining
orders, military protective orders, or any other official record that
documents the covered act. At a minimum, we believe that the
documentation provided should clearly indicate the name of the abuser
and the name of the survivor and make an affirmative statement
indicating that the abuser actually or allegedly committed an act that
qualifies as a covered act against the survivor or an individual in the
care of a survivor. Are there circumstances in which a survivor would
not be able to obtain documentation that provides this information?
Should we require that the documentation include any additional
identifying information about the abuser or the survivor, such as an
address or date of birth? What potential privacy implications would
such a requirement raise, and would requiring such information be
consistent with the Safe Connections Act? As a way to minimize fraud
and abuse of the line separation process, we believe that, to the
extent the documentation includes identifying information about the
abuser or the survivor, covered providers should confirm that the
information matches any comparable identifying information in the
covered provider's records when processing a line separation request.
We also seek comment on whether we should set requirements for the
timeliness of evidence showing a covered act was committed. For
instance, should we require that documentation be dated, or show the
covered act occurred within a certain period prior to the request? If
so, how long? We seek comment on these potential approaches and whether
they are consistent with the Congressional intent of the Safe
Connections Act.
34. We acknowledge that survivors may have difficulty securing the
documents specified by the Safe Connections Act to demonstrate that an
individual using a line on a shared mobile service contract has
committed or allegedly committed a covered act, or doing so in a timely
manner. In the Notice of Inquiry, we asked whether allowing survivors
to submit an affidavit regarding their survivor status would provide
sufficient verification and whether we should permit other options if a
survivor cannot obtain the required documents. Some commenters
expressed support for survivor affidavits and also argued that
survivors should be permitted to submit affidavits from other qualified
third parties not prescribed in the Safe Connections Act, such as
shelters and advocacy organizations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Safe Connections Act, which was adopted by Congress after the Notice of
Inquiry, clearly specifies the documents survivors can submit to
demonstrate survivor status while specifically preserving the right of
states to set less stringent requirements. We seek comment on whether
the Safe Connections Act permits the Commission to establish other
forms of verification that a survivor can submit, and if so, whether we
should permit other forms of verification.
35. As discussed above, we believe that the Safe Connections Act is
best read as requiring covered providers to complete a line separation
as long as the line separation request provides the statutorily
required information, without requiring covered providers to separately
verify the information provided. We recognize that many covered
providers may not have the expertise to determine the authenticity of
such documents and that it would undermine the goals of the Safe
Connections Act if a covered provider denied a line separation based on
an incorrect determination that verification documents submitted by a
survivor are not authentic. Nonetheless, we seek comment on whether and
to what extent we should require or permit covered providers to
validate the authenticity of any documents meant to verify survivor
status that they receive in order to minimize the avenues that bad
actors can use to commit fraud through the line separation process.
36. Finally, we propose to include in our rules the Safe
Connections Act's proviso that section 345 of the Communications Act
(establishing the line separation process) ``shall not affect any law
or regulation of a State providing communications protections for
survivors (or any similar category of individuals) that has less
stringent requirements for providing evidence of a covered act (or any
similar category of conduct) than this subsection,'' and seek comment
on our proposal.
37. Election of the Manner of Communication from Covered Providers.
Under the Safe Connections Act, a covered provider must ``allow the
survivor to elect in the manner in which the covered provider may--(i)
contact the survivor, or designated representative of the survivor, in
response to the request, if necessary; or (ii) notify the survivor, or
designated representative of the survivor, of the inability of the
covered provider to complete the line separation.'' We propose to
codify this requirement in our rules and seek comment on how best to
understand it. We tentatively conclude that this requirement simply
obligates covered providers to allow survivors to select, at the time
they are submitting a line separation request, the manner the covered
provider must use to communicate with a survivor after the survivor
submits the request. We further believe that covered providers must ask
survivors to provide the appropriate contact information with their
request, and, if applicable, their designated representative. We seek
comment on these tentative conclusions.
38. Confidential and Secure Treatment of Personal Information. We
propose to require covered providers, including any officers,
directors, and employees--as well as covered providers' vendors,
agents, or contractors that receive or process line separation requests
with the survivor's consent, or as needed to effectuate the request--to
treat any information submitted by a survivor as part of a line
separation request as confidential and securely dispose of the
information not later than 90 days after receiving the information,
consistent with the Safe Connections Act. Our proposal mirrors the Safe
Connections Act, except that we propose to clarify that ``vendor'' as
used in the Safe Connections Act includes ``contractors'' who may
receive line separation requests in their provision of services to
covered providers. We believe that this interpretation of ``vendor''
reflects the business practices of covered providers and will mitigate
privacy risks to survivors. We seek comment on our proposal.
39. The Safe Connections Act requires confidential treatment and
disposal of information submitted by a survivor ``[n]otwithstanding
section 222(c)(2)'' of the Communications Act, which in turn requires
telecommunications carriers to ``disclose customer proprietary network
information, upon affirmative written request by the customer, to any
person designated by the customer.'' The Communications Act defines
``customer proprietary network information'' (or CPNI) as ``information
that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type,
destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications
service
[[Page 15565]]
subscribed to by a customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that
is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of
the carrier-customer relationship,'' and ``information contained in the
bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll
service received by a customer of a carrier,'' but does not include
subscriber list information. Thus, to the extent that any information a
survivor submits as part of a line separation request would be
considered CPNI, we believe the Safe Connections Act requires that such
information (as well as information submitted by a survivor that would
not be considered CPNI) should be treated confidentially and disposed
of securely. We seek comment on our analysis. How should we implement
the Safe Connections Act's requirement that information submitted by
survivors be treated as confidential and be securely disposed of
``[n]otwithstanding section 222(c)(2) of the [Communications] Act''?
40. We seek comment on how we should interpret the requirement that
covered providers treat information submitted by survivors as
``confidential,'' and what requirements, if any, we should impose to
ensure such information is disposed of ``securely.'' We are mindful
that requiring and identifying specific data protection mechanisms can
provide a roadmap to bad actors and may also be overtaken by new
technological advancements. Given that, what guidance can we provide to
covered providers as to what would be considered ``confidential''
treatment and ``secure'' disposal under the Safe Connections Act? At a
minimum, we believe that treating such information as confidential
means not disclosing or permitting access to such information except as
to the individual survivor submitting the line separation request,
anyone that the survivor specifically designates, or specific types of
third parties (i.e., vendors, contractors, and agents) as needed to
effectuate the request. Do commenters agree? Are there other specific
actions we should require covered providers to take or not take to
ensure that information remains confidential? For instance, should we
require covered providers to maintain line separation request
information in a separate database or restrict employee access to only
those who need access to that information to effectuate the request?
Should we require such information to be stored with encryption? Can we
construe the obligation on providers to ``treat'' information submitted
in connection with a line separation request as ``confidential'' to
include an obligation not to use or process such information for
certain purposes (e.g., marketing)? If so, what should be permissible
purposes for the use or processing of such information, other than
effectuating the request, if any? What mechanisms, if any, should we
require covered providers to use to ensure that confidential
information is disposed of securely? How burdensome would any such
requirements be on covered providers, particularly small providers?
Should unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, information submitted
by survivors as part of a line separation request be considered
evidence that a covered provider does not treat such information
confidentially?
41. Consistent with the Safe Connections Act, we also propose to
make clear that the requirement to securely dispose of information
submitted by a survivor within 90 days does not prohibit a covered
provider from maintaining a record that verifies that a survivor
fulfilled the conditions of a line separation request for longer than
90 days. We believe that the best interpretation of this provision
presumes that any such records will not contain any information
submitted by survivors, which, as discussed, would be deemed
confidential and subject to secure disposal within 90 days.
Nonetheless, we propose that covered providers also treat such records
as confidential and securely dispose of them. We seek comment on our
proposals. Should we require covered providers to dispose of the
records verifying the fulfillment of a line separation request within a
certain timeframe, and if so, what would be an appropriate timeframe?
Are there reasons why a covered provider, or a survivor, would need to
retain such records of fulfilling the conditions of a line separation
request, beyond their potential need for enrollment in the designated
program providing emergency communications support?
42. Means for Submitting Line Separation Requests. The Safe
Connections Act directs covered providers to ``offer a survivor the
ability to submit a line separation request . . . through secure remote
means that are easily navigable, provided that remote options are
commercially available and technically feasible.'' We propose to codify
this requirement in our rules and seek comment on how to implement it.
43. Although the Safe Connections Act does not define what
constitutes ``remote means,'' we tentatively conclude that it is a
mechanism for submitting a line separation request that does not
require the survivor to interact in person with an employee of the
covered provider at a physical location. We seek comment on this
tentative conclusion. For example, we believe that requiring a visit to
a brick and mortar store would not constitute remote means. Conversely,
we believe that a form on a covered provider's website with the ability
to input required information and attach necessary documents would
constitute a remote means. We also believe that submissions via email,
a form on a provider's mobile app, a chat feature on a provider's
website, interactive voice response (IVR) phone calls, and postal mail
would constitute remote means. Would a live telephone interaction, text
message communication, or video chat with a customer service
representative constitute remote means as contemplated by the Safe
Connections Act? We seek comment on our proposed analysis of what
constitutes remote means. In identifying permissible remote means,
should we take into consideration whether the means are consistent with
or similar to the means survivors must use to apply for the designated
program discussed below to minimize the burdens on survivors? We note
that any remote means must permit survivors to submit any necessary
documentation, although we seek comment on whether covered providers
should be able to offer means that allow or require survivors to
initiate a request using one method (such as an IVR phone call) and
submit the documentation through another method (such as via email). We
also seek comment on whether we should require providers to accept
documentation in any format, including, for example, pictures of
documents or screenshots. In addition, we tentatively conclude that the
Safe Connections Act would permit covered providers to offer survivors
means that are not considered remote so long as the provider does not
require survivors to use those non-remote means or make it harder for
survivors to access remote means than to access non-remote means.
44. The Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to offer
remote means for submitting line separation requests only if such means
are ``technically feasible'' and ``commercially available.'' As a
general matter, are there remote means for survivors to submit line
separation requests that are technically feasible to implement and
commercially available for all covered providers, including small
providers? If so, which ones? If not, what steps must covered
providers, including small providers, take to make remote means
technically
[[Page 15566]]
feasible or how long before they are commercially available? Relatedly,
how long will it take covered providers to select, implement, test, and
launch remote means for line separation requests, and how does that
timeline differ depending on the potential requirements we discuss
above? Can covered providers adopt or modify existing systems that they
use in other aspects of their business to provide survivors the ability
to submit remote requests? Additionally, what are the costs associated
with this process and the varying alternative requirements, and do they
differ for small providers?
45. The Safe Connections Act requires that the means of submission,
in addition to being remote, must be ``secure,'' and we seek comment on
the meaning of this term. We tentatively conclude that any means a
covered provider offers survivors to submit a line separation request,
including non-remote means, must be secure, and seek comment on our
tentative conclusion. We believe that, at a minimum, secure means are
those that prevent unauthorized access to or disclosure of the
information and documentation submitted with the line separation
request during the submission process. Should we define what would
constitute ``secure'' in greater detail--and if so, how--or should we
allow covered providers flexibility to adopt means they deem
``secure''? Specifically, should we require that any electronic means
of submission use encrypted transmission? Are there particular means
that we should deem to be unsecure in all instances? As with the
Commission's CPNI rules, should unauthorized disclosure of, or access
to, information submitted as part of a line separation request be
considered evidence that a covered provider does not provide a
``secure'' means of transmission?
46. The means of submitting a request must also be ``easily
navigable,'' and we invite comment on the meaning of this phrase. As an
initial matter, we tentatively conclude the means for submitting a
request must be easily navigable for individuals with disabilities, and
we seek comment on this tentative conclusion. Does easily navigable
also mean that any user interface or forms related to line separation
requests must be easy for survivors to comprehend and use? Does it also
mean that any user interface or form must clearly identify the
information and documentation that a survivor must include with their
request and that survivors must be able to easily insert or attach that
information? Should we develop and mandate a standardized form that
covered providers must use or direct stakeholders to work together to
develop such a form? Additionally, does the phrase ``easily navigable''
place an obligation on covered providers to make the means of making a
line separation request easily findable and accessible by survivors?
47. We seek comment on whether we should adopt additional
requirements concerning the mechanisms for submitting line separation
requests to ensure that all survivors have the ability to submit such
requests and can obtain line separation in a timely manner. To what
extent should covered providers be required to make available remote
means that are accessible to individuals with disabilities? Does the
Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA)
already require that all or certain means for submitting line
separation requests be accessible for individuals with disabilities? To
what extent should the means through which a covered provider permits
survivors to submit line separation requests be made available in the
languages in which a covered provider advertises its services? Should
the means covered providers make available for submitting line
separation requests ask survivors for their preferred language from
among those in which the covered provider advertises? Additionally, we
invite feedback on whether we should require covered providers to offer
more than one means to submit a line separation request and ensure any
such additional means address the needs of survivors who may be using
different technologies or who may have different levels of digital
literacy. Alternatively, should we designate one specific mean or
process that all covered providers must offer to fulfill these
obligations, such as a form on the provider's website, but also allow
covered providers to offer other additional means or processes if they
so choose? We seek comment on how costly and burdensome any such
requirements would be for covered providers, particularly small
providers.
48. Given the difficult circumstances that survivors may be
experiencing at the time they make a line separation request, we
believe that providers should make it easy for survivors to choose the
best communications service offerings for their needs. Accordingly, we
seek comment on whether we should require covered providers to allow
survivors to indicate their service choices when they are submitting a
line separation request. If so, we seek comment on what constitutes the
full scope of service options covered providers should be required to
offer to survivors, but tentatively conclude that the Safe Connections
Act makes clear that survivors can seek to: (1) start a new line of
service; (2) keep the existing service plan, with the abuser's line
separated from the account; (3) select a new plan from among all
commercially available plans the covered provider offers for which the
survivor may be eligible, including any prepaid plans; (4) obtain
benefits through the designated program if available through the
provider; (5) switch providers by porting the lines of the survivor and
anyone on the survivor's account to a new provider selected by the
survivor, if technically feasible; and (6) move the line to an existing
account of another person with service from the covered provider. What
are the pros and cons of our proposed approach? For example, would this
requirement maximize the simplicity for survivors navigating the line
separation process? Conversely, how burdensome would this requirement
be on covered providers, particularly small providers? Are there
commercially available tools that would allow covered providers to
implement this requirement? Is such a requirement otherwise technically
feasible?
49. Assistance with Completing Line Separation Requests. While the
Safe Connections Act requires covered providers to effectuate line
separations after receiving a completed line separation request from a
survivor, we observe that it permits survivors to indicate a designated
representative for communications regarding line separation requests.
Does the Safe Connections Act permit survivors to rely on assistance
from their designated representative or other individuals, such as
employees of victim service providers, to prepare and submit line
separation requests? If not, why not, and practically speaking, how
would covered providers know whether a survivor relied on such
assistance? If the Safe Connections Act does allow such assistance,
should we establish guidelines regarding this practice? For example,
should we require those assisting survivors to include in the request
their name and relationship to the survivor, along with a statement
that the person assisted the survivor? If so, should we require
providers to request this information through the means they make
available for survivors to submit requests? What would be the costs to
covered providers of any such requirements, particularly for smaller
providers?
[[Page 15567]]
4. Notices, Notifications, and Other Communications
50. We next seek comment on the types of information that must or
should be communicated to survivors and other consumers, and on the
ways covered providers may convey this information. We believe the Safe
Connections Act contemplates three ways that covered providers may
communicate information to survivors: (1) a notice that must be made
readily available to all consumers through the covered providers'
public-facing communication avenues, such a notice on a provider's
website (Notice to Consumers); (2) information that must be provided at
the time a survivor is submitting a line separation request, such as in
the instructions for submitting a line separation request or on the
form used for submitting a request (Concurrent Notice to Survivors);
and (3) notifications that must be delivered to survivors after they
submit a line separation request, such as in a confirmation email for
the line separation submission or a later follow-up message regarding
the status of the submission (Post-Request Notifications).
51. Notice to Consumers. Recognizing that the ability to separate a
line from a shared mobile account will only assist those survivors who
are aware of the option, the Safe Connections Act requires covered
providers to ``make information about the options and process'' for a
line separation request ``readily available to consumers: (1) on the
website and the mobile application of the provider; (2) in physical
stores; and (3) in other forms of public-facing consumer
communication.'' We propose to adopt these requirements in our rules as
a Notice to Consumers, and seek comment on our proposal and its
implementation, including the burdens on covered providers.
52. We seek comment on the specific methods and processes covered
providers should use to provide the Notice to Consumers, and on the
costs and burdens associated with each of these proposed requirements,
particularly for small providers. First, we seek comment on whether we
should provide additional guidance to covered providers regarding how
to make the notice readily available to consumers ``on the website and
mobile application of the provider.'' For example, should we provide
guidance regarding where and how this information should be made
available on covered providers' websites and mobile applications?
Should we specifically require covered providers to post a link to the
notice on their website homepage or mobile application home screen?
Would a prominent link under a ``customer service'' page or ``support''
section of a covered provider's website be ``readily available''?
Should we allow covered providers to determine the most appropriate
method for making the notice available, as long as it is prominent and
easy for consumers to locate?
53. Second, we seek comment on whether we should provide additional
guidance to covered providers as to how they should make the Notice to
Consumers readily available in ``physical stores.'' For example, does
this language require covered providers to furnish information only
upon consumer request? Or should we require covered providers to post
prominent signage and/or have handouts explaining availability of the
line separation option? At a minimum, we believe any flyers, signage,
or other handouts should be clearly visible to consumers and easy to
understand and access. We also tentatively conclude that covered
providers should provide the notice in all languages in which the
provider advertises within that particular store and on its website,
and seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
54. Third, we seek comment on how covered providers should
implement the requirement to provide the Notice to Consumers through
``other forms of public-facing consumer communication.'' What other
forms of public-facing communication do covered providers employ? Would
covered provider bills, advertisements, emails, or social media
accounts be covered under this category? If so, how should covered
providers make the notice readily available through these avenues or
other potential public awareness campaigns? We seek comment on what
specific methods will be most effective in helping covered providers
disseminate information to consumers about line separation
availability.
55. We also seek comment on whether we should specify what
information covered providers must include in the Notice to Consumers
``about the options and process'' for line separation requests or
whether we should instead allow covered providers to determine what
information to include. If we should prescribe the content of the
notice, what information would be most useful to consumers? We
tentatively conclude we should require covered providers to inform
consumers that the Safe Connections Act does not permit covered
providers to make a line separation conditional upon the imposition of
penalties, fees, or other requirements or limitations, and seek comment
on this tentative conclusion. Should we require covered providers to
inform consumers about who qualifies as a survivor and how a survivor
can request a line separation, or to explain any operational or
technical limitations for completing line separation requests and
alternative options survivors can choose to obtain a line separation?
Should we require covered providers to inform consumers of the service
options that may be available to them, or what their financial
responsibilities will be after a line separation?
56. Although the Safe Connections Act does not require covered
providers to include information regarding the designated program in
the Notice to Consumers, we tentatively conclude that they should
include at least basic information concerning the availability of the
designated program in the notice. Given that the Safe Connections Act
requires covered providers to give survivors more detailed information
about the designated program upon receiving a line separation request,
do commenters agree with this approach? As we noted in our Notice of
Inquiry, ``[s]urvivors often face severe financial hardship when
attempting to establish financial independence from an abuser,'' and
concerns about affordability could hold back some survivors from
separating their line from an abuser's. We believe that requiring
covered providers to include information about the availability of
emergency communications support to help with the costs of a separated
line in the Notice to Consumers may make the difference for some
survivors in choosing whether or not to pursue a line separation, is
consistent with the goals of the Safe Connections Act, and would be
minimally burdensome for covered providers. We seek comment on our
tentative conclusions and proposed approach. Are there other materials
or information about line separation requests that would be beneficial
for covered providers to share with survivors concurrently with the
Notice to Consumers?
57. Concurrent Notice to Survivors. The Safe Connections Act
requires a covered provider to notify a survivor seeking a line
separation ``through remote means, provided that remote means are
commercially available and technically feasible,'' and ``in clear and
accessible language[,] that the covered provider may contact the
survivor, or designated representative of the survivor, to confirm the
line separation, or if the covered provider is unable to complete the
line separation for any
[[Page 15568]]
reason.'' In addition to proposing that we codify this requirement in
our rules, we seek comment on its meaning. We tentatively conclude that
this requirement only establishes an obligation that a covered provider
inform the survivor, at the time the survivor submits a line separation
request, that the provider may contact the survivor, or the survivor's
designated representative, to confirm the line separation or inform the
survivor if the provider is unable to complete the line separation. We
believe covered providers should inform survivors that the covered
provider may contact the survivor as part of any instructional
information provided at the time of a line separation request. To the
extent feasible, we also believe this information should be provided
proximate to the moment when the survivor is asked to provide contact
information and elect the manner the provider must use for future
communications. We believe that this approach will allow survivors to
make an informed choice regarding which contact information and manner
of communication is best given their particular circumstances. We seek
comment on this tentative conclusion and approach. Is there any reason
providers should instead provide this information to survivors in a
Post-Request Notification? If yes, should we require that notification
be delivered immediately upon submission of the request? Should we
require providers to provide this information in both a Post-Request
Notification and as a Concurrent Notice to Survivors? Regardless of how
the information is delivered, should we allow or require covered
providers to deliver it using the same means that the survivor used to
submit the line separation request? Above, we tentatively conclude that
covered providers may offer, and therefore that survivors may use, non-
remote means to submit line separation requests. If a survivor submits
a line separation request using non-remote means, does the statute
allow us to, and should we, allow covered providers to deliver the
required information via non-remote means, such as if the survivor
consents, or must covered providers deliver the information via remote
means?
58. Post-Request Notifications. As noted above, covered providers
must allow survivors to select the manner in which a covered provider
will communicate with the survivor about a submitted line separation
request. We do not believe that covered providers must offer all
manners of contact, but we do believe that covered providers must offer
at least one manner of contact that is remote. Consistent with our
tentative conclusion above regarding remote means of submitting line
separation requests, we believe remote means of communication are those
in which the covered provider does not require the survivor to interact
in person with an employee of the provider at a physical location. We
tentatively conclude that remote means of communication would include
emails, text messages, pre-recorded voice calls, push notifications,
in-app messages, and postal mail. We seek comment on this view. Are
there other forms of communication that would qualify, such as live
phone calls or video chats? We do not expect to prohibit covered
providers from offering non-remote forms of communication. Given the
potentially time-sensitive nature of line separation requests, we do
not believe that covered providers should rely on communications
methods that will not be delivered directly to survivors, such as
notifications or messages that a survivor only may see upon logging
into an online account. Additionally, we tentatively conclude that
covered providers must deliver these communications in the survivor's
preferred language if it is one in which the covered provider
advertises. We seek comment on the costs associated with our proposed
approach for covered providers, particularly for small providers.
59. The Safe Connections Act requires covered providers that
receive a line separation request from a survivor to inform the
survivor of the existence of the designated program that can provide
emergency communications support to qualifying survivors suffering from
financial hardship, who might qualify for the program, and how to
participate in the program. We propose to codify this requirement and
tentatively conclude that covered providers should have the flexibility
to either provide this information in a Concurrent Notice to Survivors
or a Post-Request Notification delivered immediately after a survivor
submits a line separation request. We also seek comment on exactly what
information covered providers must convey regarding the designated
program. At a minimum, we expect that such material would specifically
inform survivors that their participation in the designated program
will be limited to six months unless they can qualify to participate in
the designated program under the program's general eligibility
requirements. We seek comment on whether we should direct the Universal
Service Administrative Company (USAC), in coordination with the
Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), to develop descriptions of the
designated program and ways in which survivors might apply to the
program, which we would share with covered providers to use for the
required notice. What would be the costs to covered providers for these
requirements, particularly for small providers?
60. We also propose to codify the requirement that a covered
provider that cannot operationally or technically effectuate a line
separation request must: (1) notify the survivor who submitted the
request of that infeasibility, and (2) provide the survivor with
information about other alternatives to submitting a line separation
request, including starting a new line of service. We believe the
statute clearly contemplates this will be delivered as a Post-Request
Notification. We further believe that providers should explain, in this
notification, the nature of the operational or technical limitations
that are preventing the provider from completing the line separation as
requested and any alternative options that would allow the survivor to
obtain a line separation. We also believe that covered providers should
be required to promptly notify survivors if a line separation request
is rejected for any other reason. We seek comment on what information
should be provided in rejection notifications, but at a minimum, we
believe that covered providers should deliver a clear and concise
notification that the request has been rejected with the basis for the
rejection and information about how the survivor can either correct any
issues, submit a new line separation request, or select alternative
options to obtain a line separation, if available. The Safe Connections
Act requires that covered providers deliver notifications regarding
operational and technical infeasibility at the time of the request or
for requests made using remote means, not later than two business days
after the covered provider receives the request. We tentatively
conclude that all rejection notifications should be delivered within
the same timeframe. We further tentatively conclude that, if feasible,
covered providers must deliver these notifications through the manner
of communication selected by the survivor immediately after the covered
provider receives the request. We seek comment on our proposed
approach.
61. Finally, we seek comment on whether we should require covered
providers to convey information to survivors regarding the service
options that may be available to them in a Post-
[[Page 15569]]
Request Notification, as a Concurrent Notice to Survivors, or both. We
also seek comment on whether we should require covered providers to
inform survivors that they can choose between keeping the devices
associated with both their line and the lines of individuals in their
care if they assume any payment obligations for those devices or
obtaining other devices to use with the services. If so, we believe
covered providers should be capable of explaining remaining financial
obligations for the devices and the costs and payment options for new
devices the covered provider offers. We also believe that, given the
sensitive and challenging circumstances survivors may be experiencing,
we should require covered providers to minimize their communications to
survivors and prohibit communications that are not directly related to
the line separation request, such as marketing and advertising
communications that are not related to assisting survivors with
understanding and selecting service options. Do commenters agree? Are
there other valid, but unrelated, reasons for which a provider may need
to contact the survivor?
62. Notification to Primary Account Holders and Abusers. The Safe
Connections Act contemplates that primary account holders may be
notified regarding successful line separations on their accounts, and
we believe this notification is likely necessary in most instances,
given associated account changes that will occur, including when the
abuser is the primary account holder. We tentatively conclude that an
abuser who is not the primary account holder must not be notified when
the lines of a survivor and individuals in the care of the survivor are
separated from a shared mobile service contract. At the same time, we
believe it is likely the abuser must necessarily be notified, even if
not the primary account holder, when the abuser's line is separated. We
seek comment on our analysis here, and specifically on how we can best
ensure that survivors are protected in instances when primary account
holders and abusers whose lines are being separated must be informed
about line separations. If a covered provider needs to notify a primary
account holder or abuser whose lines will be separated, should we
require them to set a uniform amount of time after receiving a line
separation request in which they will provide the notice? Is it
feasible to require covered providers to wait until they have approved
and processed a line separation before informing primary account
holders or abusers whose lines will be separated, or will covered
providers need to communicate with them before that point to implement
account changes? Will covered providers be able to process all
necessary account and service plan changes as needed if we implement
such delays? When necessary, how should primary account holders and
abusers whose lines are separated be notified of any account and
billing changes? Additionally, should we prescribe any particular
content of these notifications? Is there any language or terms
providers should avoid using when notifying primary account holders and
abusers whose lines are separated?
63. Informing Survivors When Primary Account Holders and Abusers
Will Receive Notification of Separations. We propose to codify the Safe
Connections Act's requirement that covered providers inform survivors
who separate a line from a shared mobile contract but are not the
primary account holder of the date on which the covered provider
intends to give any formal notification to the primary account holder,
and also tentatively conclude that covered providers inform survivors
when the covered provider will inform the abuser of a line separation
involving the abuser's line. We seek comment on when covered providers
must inform the survivor of the date the covered provider will notify
the primary account holder and abuser (when the abuser's line is being
separated). How soon before the primary account holder and abuser
receive notification must the survivor be informed? Is there any
language or terms providers should avoid using when notifying
survivors?
5. Prohibited Practices in Connection With Line Separation Requests
64. Except as specifically provided, the Safe Connections Act
prohibits covered providers from making line separations contingent on:
(1) payment of a fee, penalty, or other charge; (2) maintaining
contractual or billing responsibility of a separated line with the
provider; (3) approval of separation by the primary account holder, if
the primary account holder is not the survivor; (4) a prohibition or
limitation, including payment of a fee, penalty, or other charge, on
number portability, provided such portability is technically feasible,
or a request to change phone numbers; (5) a prohibition or limitation
on the separation of lines as a result of arrears accrued by the
account; (6) an increase in the rate charged for the mobile service
plan of the primary account holder with respect to service on any
remaining line or lines; or (7) any other requirement or limitation not
specifically permitted by the Safe Connections Act. We propose to
codify these prohibitions and limitations in our rules, and seek
comment on our proposal, as well as implementation of these
prohibitions, as described below.
65. Fees, Penalties, and Other Charges. We believe that the Safe
Connections Act's prohibition on making line separations contingent on
payment of a fee, penalty, or other charge is unambiguous. We also
believe this clause would prohibit covered providers from enforcing any
contractual early termination fees that may be triggered by a line
separation request, if the line separation request was made pursuant to
section 345, regardless of whether a survivor continues to receive
service from the provider as part of a new arrangement upon a line
separation or completely ceases to receive service from the provider.
We seek comment on our proposed interpretation and any burdens it may
impose on covered providers.
66. Number Portability. We believe that the Safe Connections Act
effectively prohibits covered providers from conditioning a line
separation on the customer maintaining service with the provider,
provided that such portability is technically feasible, and that this
prohibition applies to any lines that remain on the original account
and any lines that are separated. We propose to interpret this
provision to mean that both the party that will remain associated with
the existing account and the party that will be associated with the
separated lines must be permitted to port their numbers at the time of
the line separation or after, without fees or penalties, provided such
portability is technically feasible. We seek comment on this view.
Below, we discuss further the contours of technical feasibility of
number porting within the confines of the Safe Connections Act.
67. Changing Phone Numbers. We seek comment on how best to
interpret the Safe Connections Act's provision that prevents a covered
provider from prohibiting or limiting a survivor's ability to request a
phone number change as part of a line separation request. We note that
as a general matter, survivors who are willing to change their phone
numbers can start a new account and obtain a new number without having
to go through the line separation process. Under what circumstances
might a survivor want to both secure a line separation and change phone
numbers, and are there any particular implications of those
circumstances that we should address?
[[Page 15570]]
For example, a survivor who is the primary account owner requesting
separation of an abuser's line from the account might want to keep the
account to maintain any promotional deals, complete device pay-off, or
avoid early termination fees, but change a telephone number for safety
reasons. We believe that this provision of the Safe Connections Act
would bar covered providers from prohibiting such telephone number
change requests or attaching a fee or penalty for doing so. We seek
comment on this analysis, and any other circumstances which we should
address.
68. Rate Increases. The Safe Connections Act prohibits covered
providers from making a line separation request contingent on an
increase in the rate charged for the mobile service plan of the primary
account holder with respect to service on any remaining lines, but also
provides that the prohibitions should not be construed ``to require a
covered provider to provide a rate plan for the primary account holder
that is not otherwise commercially available.'' To reconcile these two
provisions, we make several tentative conclusions and seek comment on
them. First, we believe the provision prohibiting covered providers
from making a line separation contingent on a rate increase means that
a covered provider cannot deny a survivor's line separation request if
the primary account holder for the remaining lines does not agree to a
rate increase. Second, we believe that provision also means that a
covered provider cannot force the remaining primary account holder to
switch to a service plan that has a higher rate, although the person
may elect to switch to a rate plan that has a higher or lower rate from
among those that are commercially available. Third, because the Safe
Connections Act does not require covered providers to offer rate plans
that are not otherwise commercially available, we believe covered
providers are not required to offer survivors or remaining parties a
specialized rate plan that is not commercially available if the party
does not choose to continue the existing rate plan. Are there other
ways to reconcile and interpret these two provisions? We do not read
the Safe Connections Act to restrict covered providers from offering
alternative rate plans to the party who remains associated with the
original account. Additionally, we seek comment on whether we should
require covered providers to provide rate plan options during the line
separation process to the customer who remains associated with the
existing account.
69. Contractual and Billing Responsibilities. We seek comment on
the Safe Connections Act's prohibition on making a line separation
contingent on ``maintaining contractual or billing responsibility of a
separated line with the [covered] provider.'' Specifically, we believe
this prohibition means that the party with the separated line must have
the option to select any commercially available prepaid or non-
contractual service plans offered by the covered provider, whether that
party is a survivor or abuser. Likewise, we believe this prohibition
would also prohibit a covered provider from requiring a survivor who
separates a line from maintaining the same contract, including any
specified contract length or terms, as the account from which those
lines were separated (i.e., continuing a contract for the remainder of
the time on the original account for the new account or requiring the
survivor to maintain all previously-subscribed services (voice, text,
data) under the new account). We also believe this provision can be
interpreted as prohibiting covered providers from requiring that
separated lines remain with that covered provider's service. This is
consistent with our belief that the Safe Connections Act does not allow
covered providers to charge early termination fees to survivors. We
seek comment on these views.
70. Other Prohibited Restrictions and Limitations. Beyond the
issues discussed above, do the prohibited restrictions and limitations
in the Safe Connections Act contain any other ambiguities or raise
other implications for covered providers that we should address?
Additionally, although the Safe Connections Act includes a catch-all
provision that prohibits covered providers from making line separations
contingent on any other requirement or limitation not specifically
permitted by the Safe Connections Act, we seek comment on whether we
should specify any other requirements or limitations as prohibited in
our rules. For example, should we specify that a covered provider must
effectuate a SIM change sought in connection with a valid line
separation request even if the primary account holder has activated
account takeover protections for the account, such as a block on all
SIM changes? Does the catch-all provision give sufficient direction to
covered providers on what else is prohibited?
71. Provider Terms and Conditions. Given the general prohibition on
restrictions and limitations for line separation requests, we seek
comment on whether covered providers can require customers involved in
line separations to comply with the general terms and conditions
associated with using a covered provider's services, so long as those
terms and conditions do not contain the enumerated prohibitions above
and do not otherwise hinder a survivor from obtaining a line
separation. If so, under what legal authority? Are there particular
restrictions in existing terms and conditions that could be used to
prevent line separations that we should explicitly prohibit in our
rules? Are there other ways that providers can use their terms and
conditions to hinder line separations? We note that this approach would
permit covered providers to suspend or terminate the services on the
existing and new accounts for violations of the provider's terms and
conditions at any time after the line separation is completed.
72. Credit Checks. We also seek comment on whether the Safe
Connections Act prohibits covered providers from making a line
separation contingent on the results of a credit check or other proof
of a party's ability to pay. We recognize that providers may currently
require individuals to complete credit checks or demonstrate ability to
pay to ensure that customers can meet their payment obligations for
services and devices. However, we acknowledged in the Notice of Inquiry
that some survivors may not be able to demonstrate their financial
stability as a result of their abusive situation and therefore may be
foreclosed from obtaining services--and the record supported this
finding.
73. Although the designated program may allow some survivors
experiencing financial hardship to obtain services without payment
issues, we are concerned about situations where a survivor does not
qualify for the designated program and also fails to meet the credit
standards deemed acceptable by providers. To account for these
circumstances, we tentatively conclude that we should specify in our
rules that covered providers cannot make line separations contingent on
the results of a credit check or other proof of a party's ability to
pay. Consistent with the approach we took in the ACP Order, we would
still permit covered providers to perform credit checks that are part
of their routine sign-up process for all customers so long as they do
not take the results of the credit check into account when determining
whether they can effectuate a line separation. We also tentatively
conclude that providers should be prohibited from relying on credit
check results to determine the service plans from which a survivor is
eligible to select and whether a survivor
[[Page 15571]]
can take on the financial responsibilities for devices associated with
lines used by the survivor or individuals in the care of the survivor.
We seek comment on these tentative conclusions. We also seek comment on
whether covered providers can use credit check results to determine
which devices may be offered to a survivor for new purchases. We note
that if we allow covered providers to require parties to comply with
standard terms and conditions for services and devices, they would be
able to enforce suspensions, terminations, or other remedies against
customers for violating provisions described in those terms in
conditions, such as failure to meet payment obligations.
74. If commenters believe that we should instead specify that
covered providers should be permitted to rely on credit checks or other
proof of payment capabilities in any of the circumstances described
above, we ask commenters to describe how the Safe Connections Act
provides us with the legal authority to do so, given its prohibition on
making line separations contingent on ``any other limitation or
requirement listed under subsection (c)'' of the Safe Connections Act.
Additionally, if the Safe Connections Act permits covered providers to
make line separations contingent on the result of a credit check or
other proof of payment capabilities, should we require them to inform
customers who fail to meet the provider's standards of other options,
such as assistance through the designated program (if available),
prepaid plans the provider might offer, and the ability to switch to
another provider that may be able to accommodate the survivor? Are
these alternatives adequate to provide survivors with communications
services they need?
6. Financial Responsibilities and Account Billing Following Line
Separations
75. The Safe Connections Act sets out requirements for financial
responsibilities and account billing following line separations.
Specifically, unless otherwise ordered by a court, when a survivor
separates lines from a shared mobile service contract, the survivor
must assume any financial responsibilities, including monthly service
costs, for the transferred numbers beginning on the date when the lines
are transferred. Survivors are not obligated to assume financial
responsibility for mobile devices associated with those separated
lines, unless the survivor purchased the mobile devices, affirmatively
elects to maintain possession of the mobile devices, or is otherwise
ordered to by a court. When an abuser's line is separated from an
existing account, the survivor has no further financial
responsibilities for the services and mobile device associated with the
telephone number of that separated line. The statute also gives the
Commission authority to establish additional rules concerning financial
responsibilities and account billing following line separations. We
propose to codify the statutory requirements and seek comment on any
administrative challenges or other issues regarding billing and
financial responsibilities that may arise from line separations that we
should address.
76. We are particularly interested in learning how providers handle
account billing issues following line separations they may perform now
and whether the line separation requirements in the Safe Connections
Act present new administrative challenges. We note that the Safe
Connections Act requires covered providers to effectuate a line
separation no later than two business days after receiving the request,
meaning that account changes may need to occur in the middle of a
billing cycle. If the Safe Connections Act requirements are different
from providers' existing practices, how difficult would it be for
providers to change their practices to meet the requirements? Are there
particular challenges for smaller providers or those providers that may
not conduct their own billing?
77. We recognize that there may be unique challenges with
reassigning or separating contracts for device purchases. We believe
the Safe Connections Act makes clear that, as a general matter, the
individuals who purchased a device will maintain payment obligations
for that device following a line separation. As the Safe Connections
Act specifies, however, the survivor will take on the payment
obligations for any devices the survivor elects to keep following
separation of the survivor's line and the lines of those in the care of
the survivor. We also believe it is clear that when an abuser's line is
separated, the survivor is no longer responsible for the payment
obligation for the device associated with that line. We tentatively
conclude that if the abuser's line is separated and the abuser was the
purchaser of any devices associated with lines that will remain on the
account, the survivor can elect to keep those devices and take on the
payment obligations for them. We seek comment on these proposed
interpretations and the administrative challenges of implementing them.
Do providers have the ability to reassign device payment contracts from
one customer to another? We know anecdotally that some providers offer
multi-device payment contracts, and these contracts often involve
device discounts or associated service plan discounts. Some of the
above separation scenarios may require splitting the payment
obligations for devices that are on the same contract. Do providers
have the ability to do this, especially in cases where the plan is no
longer commercially available? How would they make adjustments to
device or service plan discounts? Aside from reassigning or splitting
contracts, does the Safe Connections Act allow covered providers to
require the parties who are financially responsible for devices
following separations to pay the full remaining balance of any devices
or sign up for a new device payment plan at the time of the separation,
or must they allow those parties to complete existing payment plans? We
are particularly interested if this is permitted under the Safe
Connections Act when it is the survivor taking on the payment
obligation. Additionally, how would providers manage device payments
when a line separation occurs midway through a billing cycle? Does the
Safe Connections Act require them to prorate the payments?
78. Finally, we seek comment on how covered providers can manage
previously-accrued arrears on an account following a line separation.
We tentatively conclude that the arrears should stay with the primary
account holder. For example, if the abuser's line is separated and the
abuser was the primary account holder, the arrears would be reassigned
to the abuser's new account. Similarly, if the survivor was the primary
account holder and separates the abuser's line, the arrears would stay
with the survivor's account. Conversely, if the survivor's line is
separated and the abuser was the primary account holder, the arrears
would stay with the abuser's account. Is this tentative conclusion
administrable by covered providers?
7. Provider Obligations Related to Processing Line Separation Requests
79. In this section we seek comment on several topics concerning
covered providers' obligations related to processing line separation
requests.
80. Number Porting. Because the Safe Connections Act preserves
survivors' ability to port their numbers in connection with line
separation requests, we seek comment on the technical feasibility of
such number ports. Generally, number portability
[[Page 15572]]
allows consumers to keep their telephone numbers when they change
carriers and remain in the same location. Under the Commission's
current rules, wireless carriers must port numbers to other wireless
carriers upon request without regard to proximity of the requesting
carrier's switch to the porting-out carrier's switch, and must port
numbers to wireline carriers within the number's originating rate
center. We believe these same number porting obligations apply for
lines that have been separated pursuant to section 345; we do not
believe that there is anything unique about number ports associated
with line separations that would make such ports more or less
technically feasible than under other circumstances. Accordingly, we
tentatively conclude that any ports that covered providers are
currently required to, and technically capable of, completing would be
technically feasible under the Safe Connections Act. We also
tentatively conclude that should the requirements or capabilities for
porting change in the future, any newly-feasible ports also will be
considered technically feasible when sought in connection with a line
separation. We seek comment on our analysis and tentative conclusions.
81. We separately seek comment on the operational feasibility of
separating lines and porting numbers at the same time. Have providers
developed procedures to handle this already? If not, how burdensome
would it be to do so? Because customers typically initiate port
requests through a new provider, would it be feasible for survivors to
seek a line separation and number port at the same time? Currently,
customers seeking to port a telephone number to a new wireless provider
must provide the new provider with the telephone number, account
number, ZIP code, and any passcode on the account. Many wireless
providers also require customers to authenticate the port request
through a port-out PIN. Is it feasible for a survivor to have this
information to provide to a new carrier to request a port before a line
separation request has been effectuated and a new account established
for the survivor? If a survivor initiates a port request with a new
provider, would that request remain pending and then be processed as
soon as the line separation with the old provider is effectuated? Do we
need to modify our number porting rules to permit these processes? For
instance, because of the complexity of these port requests, would they
fall outside the timelines for processing simple port requests
established by the Commission and industry agreement? What additional
administrative and survivor confidentiality challenges may arise for
processing line separations and port requests if the survivor is also
seeking to qualify for the designated program with the new provider?
82. We also seek comment on steps we can take to prevent port-out
fraud. In the 2021 SIM Swap and Port-Out Fraud NPRM, we asked if we
should require providers to authenticate customers through means other
than the information used to validate simple port requests, such as
through the use of a PIN established with their current provider,
before effectuating a port-out request, and several commenters replied
in the affirmative. Above, we ask if we should require covered
providers to allow survivors to select whether they intend to port
their numbers during the line separation process. If we do, should we
also require covered providers to require survivors to establish a PIN
or another authentication key used by the provider to process port-out
requests if the survivor indicates the intent to port-out numbers?
83. Compliance with CPNI Protections and Other Law Enforcement
Requirements. As discussed above, section 222 of the Communications Act
obligates telecommunications carriers to protect the privacy and
security of information about their customers to which they have access
as a result of their unique position as network operators. Section
222(a) requires carriers to protect the confidentiality of proprietary
information of and relating to their customers. Subject to certain
exceptions, section 222(c)(1) provides that a carrier may use,
disclose, or permit access to CPNI that it has received by virtue of
its provision of a telecommunications service only: (1) as required by
law; (2) with the customer's approval; or (3) in its provision of the
telecommunications service from which such information is derived or
its provision of services necessary to or used in the provision of such
telecommunications service. The Commission's rules implementing section
222 are designed to ensure that telecommunications carriers establish
effective safeguards to protect against unauthorized use or disclosure
of CPNI. Among other things, the rules require carriers to
appropriately authenticate customers seeking access to CPNI. Our CPNI
rules define a ``customer'' as ``a person or entity to which the
telecommunications carrier is currently providing service.'' Our rules
also require carriers to take reasonable measures to both discover and
protect against attempts to gain unauthorized access to CPNI and to
notify customers immediately of certain account changes, including
whenever a customer's password, response to a carrier-designed back-up
means of authentication, online account, or address of record is
created or changed.
84. In light of the protections afforded to CPNI by section 222 and
our implementing rules, we seek comment on how we can design the line
separation rules to preserve those protections. In particular, we seek
to understand who is a ``customer'' under our rules with respect to
plans with multiple lines or users and whether the answer to that
question affects how CPNI on such accounts must be protected following
a line separation. For instance, if the abuser is the primary account
holder, and the abuser's line is separated from the existing account,
should the covered provider prevent the new primary account holder from
accessing any historical CPNI associated with the account? Should the
primary account holder's historical CPNI move with the separated user
to a new account? If a survivor who is not the primary account holder
separates the survivor's line from a shared mobile service contract,
should the historical CPNI from that line be moved over to the new
account? Do covered providers have the technical capability to complete
such moves? Are there other issues that may arise as a result of line
separations concerning the protection of CPNI? For example, our rules
require telecommunications carriers to notify customers ``immediately''
whenever a password, customer response to a back-up means of
authentication for lost or forgotten passwords, online account, or
address of record is created or changed. We tentatively conclude that
this rule should not apply in cases where the changes are made as a
result of a line separation request pursuant to section 345, as it
would run counter to the intentions of the Safe Connections Act. We
seek comment on our tentative conclusion.
85. Aside from CPNI, the Safe Connections Act requires us to
consider the effect of line separations and any rules we adopt on any
other legal or law enforcement requirements. We seek comment on what
other legal or law enforcement requirements may by impacted by line
separations or the rules and proposals we discuss in this NPRM and how
we can ensure our rules align with those requirements.
86. Other Issues Related to Processing Requests. We seek comment on
whether covered providers may face any other issues when processing
line separation requests. For instance, would covered providers face
administrative challenges
[[Page 15573]]
if multiple survivors on an account each seek line separations at the
same time? Are there any changes to processes that providers have to
make with respect to the North America Numbering Plan and Reassigned
Numbers Databases to comply with the Safe Connections Act's
requirements? Would there be any issues if survivors choose to cancel
their requests or submitted multiple requests in the same year? To what
extent are any issues raised unique to the Safe Connections Act's
requirements?
87. Provider Policies and Practices. Given the importance of line
separation to survivors seeking to distance themselves from their
abusers, we seek comment on the extent to which we should require
covered providers to establish policies and practices to ensure that
they process line separation requests effectively. At a minimum, we
tentatively conclude that all employees who may interact with a
survivor regarding a line separation must be trained on how to assist
them or on how to direct them to employees who have received such
training. What would be the burden on covered providers, particularly
small providers, for any potential requirements we may adopt?
88. We also seek comment on what measures covered providers can
take to detect and prevent fraud and abuse. Are there any particular
requirements we should establish in the rules we adopt? Should we
establish rules requiring covered providers to investigate and
remediate fraud and abuse in a timely manner? Should we require
providers to investigate cases where the primary account holder asserts
that a line separation was fraudulent? Should providers create a
process for primary account holders to report allegedly fraudulent line
separations, and what course of action should providers take in
response? What evidence is sufficient to show that a line separation
was fraudulent, given the risk that an abuser may attempt to reverse a
legitimate line separation by claiming it was fraudulent? How difficult
will it be for covered providers to reverse line separations they
discover were fraudulent?
89. Other Measures To Prevent Abusers from Controlling Survivors.
We are concerned that if a survivor's abuser becomes aware that the
survivor is seeking a line separation, the abuser may seek to prevent
the line separation or preemptively cancel the line of service. We seek
comment on steps covered providers can take to hinder those efforts.
For example, should we require covered providers to lock an account to
prevent all SIM changes, number ports, and line cancelations as soon as
possible and no more than 12 hours after receiving a line separation
request from a survivor, to prevent the abuser or other users from
removing the survivor's access to the line before the request is
processed? We also seek comment on whether we should require covered
providers to keep records of SIM changes, number ports, and line
cancelations and reverse or remediate any of those that were processed
shortly before receiving a valid line separation request for numbers in
the request, because the SIM change, number port, or cancelation could
have been an attempt by an abuser to prevent a line separation. Would
these requirements be technically and administratively feasible? If so,
how much time prior to the line separation request should a SIM change,
number port, or line cancelation be considered improper and subject to
this remediation? Additionally, we seek comment on how covered
providers should handle situations where an abuser contacts the covered
provider to attempt to stop or reverse a line separation, such as by
claiming the request is fraudulent. We tentatively conclude that
covered providers should complete or maintain line separations and make
a record of the complaint in the existing and new account in the event
further evidence shows that the request was in fact fraudulent. What
would be the burden on covered providers, particularly small providers,
for implementing any of these requirements? Finally, we seek comment on
what steps covered providers can take, if any, to remove or assist
survivors with removing any spyware that an abuser may have installed
on devices of the survivor or individuals in the survivor's care.
8. Implementation
90. Timeframe. We seek comment on the appropriate implementation
timeframe for the requirements we propose in this NPRM to implement the
new section 345. How long will covered providers need to implement the
necessary technical and programmatic changes to comply with the
requirements under section 345 and our proposed rules? What existing
processes do covered providers have in place that would enable
efficient implementation of our proposed rules? Are there challenges
unique to small covered providers that may require a longer
implementation period than larger covered providers? If so, how should
we define ``small'' covered provider for these purposes? What would be
an appropriate timeframe for small covered providers, balancing the
costs and burdens with implementing our proposed rules against the
critical public safety interests at stake for survivors?
91. Effective Date. The Safe Connections Act states that the line
separation requirements in the statute ``shall take effect 60 days
after the date on which the Federal Communications Commission adopts
the rules implementing'' those requirements, and we propose to make
final rules effective in accordance with that timeline. We note,
however, that some of the rules to be adopted pursuant to this NPRM may
require review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) prior to
becoming effective under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). While we
believe the PRA provisions for emergency processing may facilitate
harmonization of these statutory requirements, we seek comment on the
implications of the Safe Connections Act's effective date provision for
PRA review. Are there any steps we should take to preemptively address
potential inconsistencies between OMB approval of final rules and the
statutory effective date set forth in the Safe Connections Act?
92. Liability Protection. Under the Safe Connections Act, covered
providers and their officers, directors, employees, vendors and agents
are exempt from liability ``for any claims deriving from an action
taken or omission made with respect to compliance'' with the Safe
Connections Act and ``the rules adopted to implement'' the Safe
Connections Act. Congress made clear, however, that nothing in that
provision ``shall limit the authority of the Commission to enforce [the
Safe Connections Act] or any rules or regulations promulgated by the
Commission pursuant to [the Safe Connections Act].'' We seek comment on
how, if at all, our rules should account for these provisions.
93. Enforcement. We seek comment on issues related to enforcement
of the rules contemplated in this NPRM. Should the Commission adopt
rules governing the enforcement of the specific requirements, or should
the Commission employ the general enforcement mechanisms to impose
monetary penalties on noncompliant service providers set forth in
section 503 of the Communications Act, as well as in the Lifeline and
ACP rules? Is there alternative authority for enforcement, such as
derived from the Safe Connections Act, that we should consider? Given
the potentially serious safety issues that could result from a covered
provider's noncompliance with rules implementing the line separation
obligations, we seek comment on appropriate, specific penalties that
[[Page 15574]]
could be adopted to incentivize compliance with program requirements.
B. Ensuring the Privacy of Calls and Texts Messages to Domestic Abuse
Hotlines
94. The Safe Connections Act directs us to consider whether and how
to ``establish, and update on a monthly basis, a central database of
covered hotlines to be used by a covered provider or a wireline
provider of voice service'' and whether and how to ``require a covered
provider or a wireline provider of voice service to omit from consumer-
facing logs of calls or text messages any records of calls or text
messages to covered hotlines in [such a] central database, while
maintaining internal records of those calls and messages.'' Below, we
propose to establish such a central database, but we begin our
discussion of this provision of the statute by proposing to require
covered providers to omit calls or text messages to the relevant
hotlines and analyzing the scope of that obligation.
1. Creating an Obligation To Protect the Privacy of Calls and Text
Messages to Hotlines
95. We propose to adopt a requirement that covered providers and
wireline providers of voice service omit from consumer-facing logs of
calls or text messages any records of calls or text messages to covered
hotlines that appear in a central database, while maintaining internal
records of those calls and text messages. Congress has found that
``perpetrators of [sexual] violence and abuse . . . increasingly use
technological and communications tools to exercise control over,
monitor, and abuse their victims'' and that ``[s]afeguards within
communications services can serve a role in preventing abuse and
narrowing the digital divide experienced by survivors of abuse.'' As
discussed above, these findings are supported by, among other things,
field work with domestic violence survivors demonstrating the risk of
abusers' accessing domestic abuse survivors' digital footprint,
particularly call logs. The NVRDC observed in response to our Notice of
Inquiry how ``[c]all and text records to and from covered organizations
would likely tip off an abuser who is closely monitoring all
communications.'' We are concerned that survivors may be deterred by
the threat of an abuser using access to call and text logs to determine
whether the survivor is in the process of seeking help, seeking to
report, or seeking to flee, particularly given the desire for survivors
to maintain secrecy and privacy. We therefore tentatively conclude that
protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines as
described by the Safe Connections Act is in the public interest, and
seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
96. The Safe Connections Act specifically requires the Commission
to consider certain matters when determining whether to adopt a
requirement for protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to
hotlines. Specifically, section 5(b)(3)(B) of the Safe Connections Act
requires us to consider the technical feasibility of such a
requirement--that is, ``the ability of a covered provider or a wireline
provider of voice service to . . . identify logs that are consumer-
facing . . . and . . . omit certain consumer-facing logs, while
maintaining internal records of such calls and text messages,'' as well
as ``any other factors associated with the implementation of [such
requirements], including factors that may impact smaller providers.''
Section 5(b)(3)(B) also requires us to consider ``the ability of law
enforcement agencies or survivors to access a log of calls or text
messages in a criminal investigation or civil proceeding.''
97. Covered providers and wireline providers of voice service have
the ability to identify consumer-facing call and text logs. In fact,
many service providers openly promote the ability of consumers to
access such logs, and we believe these providers should be able to
identify, and withhold as necessary, the call and text log information.
We seek comment on this belief and whether there are any operational or
technical impediments to any covered providers or wireline providers of
voice service selectively omitting calls and text messages from certain
telephone numbers from call and text logs. We note that there is no
discussion of such concerns in the record in response to the Notice of
Inquiry and it would seem that whatever processes translate internal
service provider data (such as call records) to the web page or billing
output that consumers see can be programmed to also filter out certain
records. Indeed, neither of the two trade associations representing
substantially different segments of what would be covered providers
and/or providers of wireline voice service raise insurmountable issues
relating to selectively omitting calls and text messages from call and
text logs.
98. Further, records of calls and text messages do not appear to
exist solely in the form of call logs, but, rather, independent
records--that is, some processing must be applied to the records to
create call logs. As a result, we expect service providers should be
able to maintain log records of calls and text messages that they omit
from consumer-facing logs when such records are required for any
criminal or civil enforcement proceeding--or for any other reason. As a
safeguard, we propose to explicitly require service providers to
maintain the internal records of calls and text messages omitted from
consumer-facing logs. We seek comment on this approach.
99. We seek comment on our proposal and our consideration of the
matters described in section 5(b)(3)(B) of the Safe Connections Act.
Does the appearance of calls and text messages to hotlines in call and
text logs indeed pose a risk to survivors and also sometimes deter use
of hotlines? Is our tentative conclusion that it is possible for
covered providers and wireline providers of voice service to omit
certain call and text message records from consumer-facing logs while
maintaining such call and text message records for other purposes, such
as when a survivor or law enforcement needs access to them, correct?
How expensive would establishing and maintaining such a system be? What
level of effort would be required?
100. Do service providers using certain transmission technologies
(wireless versus wireline, time division multiplexing versus Voice over
internet Protocol, etc.) or of a certain size (such as smaller service
providers) face unique challenges that we should consider? Are these
concerns great enough to exempt certain service providers? We are
concerned that creating a patchwork of service providers subject to
requirements to protect the privacy of calls and text messages to
hotlines may create confusion for survivors, who may not know if they
can rely on the privacy of their calls and text messages to hotlines.
Do commenters agree? If exemptions or extensions are necessary for some
providers, how can we mitigate these concerns? If commenters believe
that this can be done through service provider communications, we
request that such commenters propose how such communications could be
conducted in instances in which the survivor is not the primary account
holder.
101. Are there any matters and considerations unique to protecting
the privacy of text messages sent to hotlines? Due to the popularity of
text messaging, we believe it reasonable to assume that some survivors
seek to communicate with hotlines through such means, and we also
believe that any requirements should apply equally
[[Page 15575]]
to call and text logs. Several states, localities, and non-profits have
created text messaging hotlines that allow survivors to more discreetly
seek help in the event that making a phone call might jeopardize their
safety. While not all covered hotlines will provide text messaging
options for survivors of domestic violence, we believe that requiring
service providers to omit text messages to hotlines from text logs will
help protect and save survivors. We seek comment on our proposed
analysis.
102. We also seek comment on whether we should establish exceptions
pertaining to particular calls or text messages. If we were to create
exceptions, how should survivors who may otherwise rely on the privacy
of all calls and text messages to hotlines be made aware that certain
calls and text messages may be disclosed in logs due to exceptions? How
often are toll calls or usage-fee-inducing mobile calls and text
messages made to hotlines? Are there any other potentially valid bases
for exceptions based on particular calls and text messages and, if so,
how should such exceptions be implemented?
2. Defining the Scope of the Obligation
103. How we define certain critical terms significantly affects
which service providers are subject to any obligation to protect the
privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines, the extent of such
obligations, and to which hotlines the obligations apply. In addition
to seeking comment on defining the following terms, are there any other
terms that commenters believe we should define and, if so, how should
we define them?
104. Covered Provider. We propose to apply the obligation to
protect the privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines to all
``covered provider(s),'' as defined in the Safe Connections Act.
Therefore, we propose to use the same definition of covered provider
used for the purpose of applying line separation obligations under
section 345 of the Communications Act, as added by the Safe Connections
Act. Do commenters agree that this is the appropriate definition? If
not, we invite commenters to suggest alternative definitions. If we
create exceptions or delayed implementation for smaller covered
providers, should this be reflected in our rules as an exception to the
definition of covered provider or in another manner?
105. Voice Service. In addition to covered providers, we propose to
apply the obligation to protect the privacy of calls and text messages
to hotlines to all ``wireline providers of voice service,'' as
suggested by the Safe Connections Act. We propose to base our
definition of ``voice service'' on the definition in section 5 of the
Safe Connections Act. That provision references section 4(a) of the
TRACED Act, which defines ``voice service'' as ``any service that is
interconnected with the public switched telephone network and that
furnishes voice communications to an end user using resources from the
North American Numbering Plan,'' including transmissions from facsimile
machines and computers and ``any service that requires internet
protocol-compatible customer premises equipment . . . and permits out-
bound calling, whether or not the service is one-way or two-way voice
over internet protocol.'' We note that the Commission has previously
interpreted that provision of the TRACED Act when implementing that
legislation's requirements and mirrored the definition established in
the legislation in the Commission's rules. We seek comment on this
proposal.
106. We tentatively conclude that we need not define the term
``wireline provider'' given what we consider to be its plain meaning
when used in conjunction with ``of voice service,'' as we propose to
define the latter term. Do commenters agree that the words ``wireline
provider'' are sufficiently unambiguous to not require definition? If
not, we request that such commenters suggest an appropriate definition.
If we create exceptions or delayed implementation for smaller wireline
providers of voice service, should this be reflected in our rules as an
exception to the definition of ``wireline provider of voice service,''
or in another manner?
107. Other Potential Service Providers to Include. We seek comment
on whether the public interest would be served by including providers
of voice service that offer service using fixed wireless and fixed
satellite service so that survivors have no doubt that when they call
or text covered hotlines, their calls will not appear in call or text
logs. Neither fixed wireless nor fixed satellite providers of voice
service appear to be ``covered providers'' or ``wireline providers of
voice service.'' The services that they provide are not Commercial
Mobile Radio Service or Private Mobile Radio Service because they do
not meet the definitions in the Communications Act, and, therefore,
providers of such services are not ``covered providers.'' Further,
neither of these services is a ``wireline'' service. Do commenters
agree that neither fixed wireless nor fixed satellite providers are
covered by the terms ``covered provider'' or ``wireline provider of
voice service'' in the Safe Connections Act? Do commenters support
including those types of providers in the obligation to protect the
privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines? If so, under what
authority might the Commission impose such an obligation? Are there
unique burdens that imposing an obligation to protect the privacy of
calls and text messages to hotlines would impose on fixed wireless and
fixed satellite providers of voice service? If commenters support
including these types of providers, we request suggestions for how to
implement this broadened scope in our proposed rules. In addition, we
tentatively conclude that intermediate providers would not be
considered covered providers, consistent with the TRACED Act's
definition of ``voice service'' and seek comment on this tentative
conclusion. Do commenters believe there are additional types of
providers that we should include?
108. Call. The Safe Connections Act does not define the term
``call,'' nor is it defined in the Communications Act. We propose to
define a ``call'' as a voice service transmission, regardless of
whether such transmission is completed. We believe that given the
expansive definition of ``voice service,'' which we propose to define
without regard to whether it be wireline or wireless, such term
sufficiently captures the means by which survivors would use the public
switched telephone network to reach covered hotlines. Although we
suspect that only completed transmissions would appear on call logs,
out of an abundance of caution, we propose to include completed and
uncompleted transmissions in the definition of ``call.'' Do commenters
agree with our proposed definition? Are there any transmissions handled
by covered providers and providers of wireline voice service that we
should consider to be ``calls'' that would be excluded from this
definition?
109. Text Message. We propose to adopt the same definition of
``text message'' as given in the Safe Connections Act. Such term is
defined in the legislation as having the same meaning as in section
227(e)(8) of the Communications Act, which is ``a message consisting of
text, images, sounds, or other information that is transmitted to or
from a device that is identified as the receiving or transmitting
device by means of a 10-digit telephone number'' and includes short
message service (SMS) and multimedia message service (MMS) messages.
The definition explicitly excludes ``message[s] sent over an IP-enabled
messaging service to another user of the same messaging service'' that
do not otherwise meet the general
[[Page 15576]]
definition, as well as ``real-time, two-way voice or video
communication.'' When the Commission interpreted section 227(e)(8) for
purposes of implementation, it adopted a rule that mirrors the
statutory text. We believe that language is also appropriate for
purposes of Safe Connections Act implementation and propose to adopt
it. We seek comment on this proposal.
110. Covered Hotline. The Safe Connections Act defines the term
``covered hotline'' to mean ``a hotline related to domestic violence,
dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, sex trafficking, severe
forms of trafficking in persons, or any other similar act.'' We propose
to adopt this definition in our rules, but believe that we should
further clarify what constitutes a ``hotline'' and how much of the
counseling services and information provided on the ``hotline'' must
relate to ``domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault,
stalking, sex trafficking, severe forms of trafficking in persons, or
any other similar act[s]'' for the ``hotline'' to be a ``covered
hotline.''
111. As an initial matter, we tentatively conclude that in
providing these clarifications, we should strive to meet the broadest
reasonable expectations of a survivor seeking to place calls and send
text messages without fear that they will appear in logs. Do commenters
agree with this general approach to the definition of ``covered
hotline''? Are there any disadvantages to being more rather than less
inclusive in determining what is a ``covered hotline''? Are there any
entities that we should specifically exclude from our definition of
``covered hotlines''? Are there any factors we need to consider that
could lead us to conclude that the scope of ``covered hotlines'' should
be less exhaustive?
112. Turning to the specific definition, to be a ``covered
hotline,'' the service associated with the pertinent telephone number
must be a ``hotline,'' a term not defined in the Safe Connections Act.
Given the Safe Connections Act's definition of ``covered hotline,'' as
well as the potential use of a central database of ``covered hotlines''
(calls and text messages to which would be omitted from logs of calls
and texts), we believe it reasonable to interpret the term ``hotline''
generally to mean a telephone number on which counseling and
information pertaining to a particular topic or topics is provided. We
suspect, however, that certain telephone numbers may serve as
``hotlines'' and also be used for other purposes, such as the main
telephone number for the organization providing the counseling and/or
information service. Further, we tentatively conclude that telephone
numbers should not be excluded from being ``covered hotlines'' because
they do not serve exclusively as ``hotlines.'' Indeed, we believe that
we can best achieve the goal of minimizing hotline hesitancy by
interpreting ``hotline'' as broadly as possible, including telephone
numbers on which an organization provides anything more than a de
minimis amount of information and counseling and propose to use this
standard as a component in our definition of ``covered hotline.'' Do
commenters agree with this approach that we should not require that a
telephone number serve exclusively as a ``hotline''? Are there any
other considerations associated with an expansive definition of
``hotline'' that we should consider?
113. We tentatively conclude that a ``covered hotline'' need not
exclusively provide counseling and information to service domestic
violence survivors because such a requirement would be overly
restrictive and potentially exclude some hotlines that are providing
essential services to domestic violence survivors. Thus, at least
initially, we believe it is best to be as inclusive as possible and
define as a ``covered hotline'' any hotline that provides counseling
and information on topics described in the Safe Connections Act's
definition of ``covered hotline'' as more than a de minimis portion of
the hotlines' operations. Do commenters agree? Should we instead
establish a percentage of the organization's services that need to be
related to covered counseling for the hotline to be a covered hotline?
If so, what percentage?
114. Given the novelty of overseeing a central database of covered
hotlines, and to maximize the efficiency in resolving future matters of
interpretation under these provisions of the Safe Connections Act, we
also propose delegating to the Wireline Competition Bureau the task of
providing further clarification, as necessary, of the scope and
definition of ``covered hotline.'' We invite comment on this proposal.
115. Consumer-Facing Logs of Calls and Text Messages. The Safe
Connections Act does not define the term ``consumer-facing logs of
calls or text messages.'' In light of our goal of minimizing hotline
hesitancy by preventing abusers from being made aware of survivors'
calls and text messages to hotlines, we believe that we should define
the term as broadly as possible. We propose to define such logs as any
means by which a service provider presents to a consumer a listing of
telephone numbers to which calls or text messages were directed,
regardless of, for example, the medium used (such as by paper, online
listing, or electronic file), whether the calls were completed or the
text messages were successfully delivered, whether part of a bill or
otherwise, and whether requested by the consumer or otherwise provided.
In addition, our proposed definition includes oral disclosures (likely
through customer service representatives) and written disclosures by
service providers of individual call or text message records. For
avoidance of doubt, we propose to exclude from this definition any logs
of calls or text messages stored on consumers' wireless devices or
wireline telephones, such as recent calls stored in the mobile device's
phone app or lists of recently dialed numbers on cordless wireline
handsets. We seek comment on our proposed definition. Does it provide
sufficient specificity for service providers to implement our proposed
rules?
3. Creating and Maintaining the Central Database of Hotlines
116. The Safe Connections Act directs the Commission to begin a
rulemaking no later than 180 days after its enactment to consider
whether and how to establish a central database of hotlines related to
domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, sexual assault, human
trafficking, and other related crimes that could be updated monthly and
used by a mobile service provider or a wireline provider of voice
service to omit the records of calls or text messages to such hotlines
from consumer-facing logs of calls or text messages. We satisfy this
obligation by seeking comment here on whether and how to establish such
a central database of covered hotlines. We propose to establish a
central database of covered hotlines that would be updated monthly. We
believe that a central database would provide certainty as to which
records are to be suppressed, thus fulfilling the Safe Connections
Act's objective to protect survivors while making clear service
providers' compliance obligations. We seek comment on this proposal and
ask, as a general matter, whether commenters agree that we should
establish a central database as part of our efforts to protect the
privacy of calls and text messages to covered hotlines. Are there any
reasons not to create a central database of covered hotlines? Are there
any current lists or existing repositories of hotlines maintained by
national organizations seeking to end domestic violence that
[[Page 15577]]
could provide the foundation for such a database?
117. We next explore the issue of who should administer this
database. Should the Commission? Alternatively, should a third party
serve as the central database administrator (in which case all policy
decisions would continue to be made by the Commission)? What are the
advantages and disadvantages of each option? If we were to use a third
party as the database administrator, how should it be selected? Are
there any special requirements that the Commission should seek in a
database administrator? What entities have the expertise needed to be
the administrator of such a database? Do commenters have any
suggestions for the particular manner in which the Commission would
oversee the administrator of the database?
118. We also seek comment on the scope of the database
administrator's role and responsibilities. Should the database
administrator be responsible not only for operating the central
database, but also for initially populating the central database? We
expect it would be more efficient to have a single entity populate the
database initially and also take responsibility for updating the
entries in the database periodically. If the database administrator
will not be responsible for initially populating the database, how
should the Commission establish and populate the system? How should the
initial set of covered hotlines be identified and information about
them collected for the central database? Would it be necessary to
create an entirely new database or would it be possible to expand or
modify an existing database? What role should operators of covered
hotlines play in ensuring their inclusion in the central database, as
well as the accuracy of their information? Should individual hotline
operators be permitted to list multiple numbers in the central
database? How should the Commission and the database administrator work
with hotline operators? Should the database administrator accept
submissions of hotlines from third parties, presumably followed by
verification with the hotline operator?
119. What steps should the Commission and database administrator
take to maximize the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the central
database both initially and after it is established? We believe one
significant step would be making certain fields of the central database
public. At present, we expect the central database to include the name
of the hotline, its telephone number, a contact name (and telephone
number), and an address. We propose to make publicly available the
names of the covered hotlines and their telephone numbers, as well as
any location information that a covered hotline may elect to make
available, such as any geographic area in which they concentrate their
efforts, but we invite commenters to address whether there are other
permissible disclosures of contact information under the Privacy Act
System of Record Notice (SORN) governing our use and disclosure of
contact information that should be restricted given the unique equities
here, to preserve that information as confidential. We believe that it
will substantially improve the accuracy of the list because the public,
including interested support organizations, will be able to inspect it
and report any invalid numbers and/or information listed. This will
have the additional benefit of allowing for a means by which a survivor
who is hesitant about calling a covered hotline can check the list to
determine whether the number they plan to call or text message will
indeed be omitted. Because a hotline needs its telephone number to be
public for the hotline to be effective, we envision few potential
disadvantages of making the central database of covered hotlines
public. Do commenters agree that we should make the central database
public in the manner discussed above? Are there further advantages? Are
there any significant disadvantages? If we do make the central database
of covered hotlines public, should we permit operators of hotlines to
include location information other than street address, such as city,
part of a state, state, etc., if they wish to do so? Are there any
other steps that can be taken to maximize the comprehensiveness and
accuracy of the central database both initially and after it is
established?
120. Once a potential covered hotline has been identified, what
process should be used for determining whether a hotline is a covered
hotline? Should we require a self-certification by the operator of the
hotline? Should the database administrator conduct additional research?
Should we require operators of hotlines to demonstrate or at least
certify that they meet the definition of a covered hotline? We invite
commenters to identify such considerations and also propose solutions.
121. Central Database Updates. The Safe Connections Act directs the
Commission to consider whether and how to ``. . . update on a monthly
basis, [the] central database of covered hotlines to be used by a
covered provider or a wireline provider of voice service.'' We propose
for the central database to be updated monthly to keep up with the
dynamic nature of support networks for survivors. Do commenters agree?
122. With regard to hotlines already in the central database, we
propose that it be the responsibility of the hotline operators to
notify the database administrator of any changes to their information,
including the telephone number for the hotline. Under our proposal, the
database administrator would also take update submissions from third
parties, subject to verification with the hotline operator. We further
propose that the database administrator should conduct an annual
outreach campaign to hotline operators requesting that they confirm the
accuracy of their current information. Should part of the updating
process include routine certifications and, if so, how frequently? Over
time, should organizations be automatically removed from the central
database if they do not recertify their applications? Do commenters
agree with these proposals regarding updating information already
contained in the central database?
123. We expect the process of adding additional hotlines to the
central database to be different from initially creating the database
because, for example, it may not be practical for the Commission to
issue a formal call for submissions to the database on a monthly basis.
How should new candidates for inclusion in the central database be
identified? Should the database administrator be tasked with performing
routine checks for new hotlines? Are there feasible means of doing so?
How often should this be done? We propose that the database
administrator routinely accept submissions of covered hotline
information both from their operators and third parties, the latter
subject to whatever verification process we may establish for the
initial creation of the central database. Do commenters agree with
these proposals? What other steps could the Commission and the database
administrator take to continue to monitor for potential additions to
the central database of covered hotlines?
124. Funding of the Central Database. Section 5(b)(3) of the Safe
Connections Act does not identify an appropriation to fund the
maintenance and operation of the central database. In light of this,
how should this central database be funded? Is there a legal basis to
use cost recovery from all telecommunications and interconnected VoIP
service providers using revenue or some other indicia, similar to the
Universal Service Fund and funding for the North
[[Page 15578]]
American Numbering Plan? What authority would the Commission rely upon
to use a cost recovery support mechanism for the central database? If a
cost recovery scheme based on revenue is considered, what revenue base
should be used? How often should assessments be made? Who should bill
and collect for such assessments and what process should we use to
select this entity? If the central database's creation and operations
are not funded through an assessment based on service provider revenue,
what alternative do commenters recommend? Commenters should address
whether any proposed funding scheme presents Miscellaneous Receipts Act
or Anti-Deficiency Act concerns? Does the Safe Connections Act
contemplate (and permit) the Commission to establish rules pertaining
to use of the database, but defer actual creation of the database until
we can request and receive specific funding? If so, should we, in fact,
defer actual creation of the database in such a manner? We seek comment
on how the database should be funded at initial implementation and on
an ongoing basis given the Safe Connections Act's requirement that this
database be updated monthly.
4. Using the Central Database of Hotlines
125. Under our proposal and consistent with the Safe Connections
Act, the central database of covered hotlines will serve as the source
of covered hotlines to which calls and text messages must be omitted
from consumer-facing logs. We seek comment on how the required use of
the central database should be operationalized in our rules.
126. As an initial matter, we propose that service providers be
responsible for downloading the central database themselves in light of
our proposal to make it public on a website to be maintained by the
database administrator. This version of the central database would
include only the organization name and telephone number(s) (omitting
addresses and contact information) and would be available in an easily
downloadable and widely used format, such as a delimited text file. We
tentatively conclude that the administrative burdens on service
providers under such a system would be minimal. We seek comment on this
proposal. If commenters disagree with our proposal to make the central
database publicly available, and, thus, downloadable by service
providers from a public website, we request proposals for how we should
control access to the central database.
127. We seek comment on an appropriate amount of time following
adoption of rules by which service providers should be required to
comply with the obligation to protect the privacy of calls and text
messages to hotlines. Should we factor in potential unique challenges
that certain providers (such as those using certain technologies or
those of a certain size) may face when establishing a compliance date?
Should the compliance deadline vary by the type of service provider,
such as by allowing smaller providers more time to comply? If so, how
should we determine the service providers that should be given more
time and how much more time should be provided? Are there any
disadvantages to providing certain service providers a later compliance
deadline, such as potentially creating confusion for survivors in not
knowing when their particular service provider will begin complying?
Are there ways to mitigate these concerns?
128. Should we establish a minimum frequency for service providers
to download updates to the central database? Section 5(b)(3)(D) of the
Safe Connections Act, which provides a safe harbor defense in court
actions if ``a covered provider updates its own databases to match the
central database not less frequently than once every 30 days,'' affect
our requirements in this regard? Should we establish 30 days as the
minimum frequency at which service providers must download updates?
Would downloaded central database updates be immediately implemented in
service provider systems? For example, do service providers expect to
need to test updates? If so, how should our rules account for this,
considering that survivors may expect updates to be implemented
relatively quickly? Should we establish a maximum period of time
between when the administrator makes an update available and when such
an update is implemented in service providers' systems?
129. What measures should we take to ensure and determine
compliance by service providers with any rules that we might adopt for
protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to hotlines? Should
we require regular certifications and, if so, how frequently? Should we
establish specific penalties for failure by service providers to comply
with any rules protecting the privacy of calls and text messages to
hotlines? If so, what should they be? Are there any other aspects of a
compliance framework that we should establish?
130. Are there any potential inconsistencies between the rules that
we might adopt to ensure the privacy of calls and text messages to
hotlines and other Commission rules or state regulations? For example,
would omitting toll calls that incur separate charges from consumers'
bills conflict with our truth-in-billing rules? Are there any other
potential inconsistencies? Should we explicitly resolve them and, if
so, how? What role might disclaimers issued by service providers play?
131. We seek comment on the Commission's legal authority to adopt
rules to establish, and update on a monthly basis, a central database
of covered hotlines and to require covered providers and wireline
providers of voice service to omit from consumer-facing logs of calls
or text messages any records of calls or text messages to covered
hotlines that appear in such central database, while maintaining
internal records of those calls and messages. We tentatively conclude
that Congress directing the Commission to consider how to adopt rules
for these purposes inherently grants the Commission the legal authority
to adopt such rules. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
Further, we seek comment on other potential sources of legal authority
for the adoption of such rules, such as Title I (via ancillary
authority) and section 201(b) of the Communications Act, perhaps in
conjunction with the Commission's purpose under section 1 of the
Communications Act to promote ``safety of life'' and Title III
(sections 301, 303, 307, 309, or 316).
132. Are there any other issues that commenters believe we should
consider with regard to section 5(b)(3) of the Safe Connections Act? We
invite commenters to identify and comment on any other issues relating
to a service provider's ability and obligation to protect the privacy
of calls and text messages to hotlines, the scope of such obligations,
creating and maintaining the central database of hotlines, and how
service providers should be obligated to use such central database.
C. Emergency Communications Support for Survivors
1. The Designated Program for Emergency Communications Support
133. The Safe Connections Act requires the Commission to designate
either the Lifeline program or the Affordable Connectivity Program
(ACP) to provide emergency communications support to qualifying
survivors suffering from financial hardship, regardless of whether the
survivor might otherwise meet the designated program's eligibility
requirements. While
[[Page 15579]]
``emergency communications support'' is not defined by the Safe
Connections Act, we construe the Act's references to emergency
communications support to be the time-limited support offered to
survivors suffering financial hardship through the designated program.
The ACP provides funds for an affordable connectivity benefit
consisting of up to a $30 per month standard discount on the price of
broadband internet access services that participating providers supply
to eligible households and an enhanced discount of up to $75 for ACP
households residing on qualifying Tribal lands. The ACP benefit can be
applied to any internet service offering of a participating provider,
including bundles containing mobile voice, SMS, and broadband. The
Lifeline program is one of the Commission's long-standing Universal
Service Fund programs, providing a benefit of up to a base $9.25 per
month for a discount on the price of voice and broadband service
provided by eligible telecommunications carriers (ETCs). Households
participating in Lifeline that reside on qualifying Tribal lands are
also eligible to receive an additional discount of up to $25.
134. We seek comment on which program, Lifeline or ACP, to
designate to provide emergency communications support to survivors in
accordance with the Safe Connections Act. The Lifeline program allows
participants to receive support for broadband service, bundled service,
or voice-only service. As with Lifeline, ACP offers support for
broadband and broadband service bundled with voice and/or text
messaging, but it does not offer the flexibility to apply the benefit
to voice-only service. While the ACP offers a greater reimbursement
amount for program participants receiving broadband or bundled service
we understand that offering support for a voice option is critical for
survivors, and the Safe Connections Act is particularly focused on the
ability of survivors to establish voice connections independent from
their abusers. Additionally, the ACP relies on an appropriated fund in
a definite amount, whereas the Lifeline program is funded by the
Universal Service Fund, which is a permanent indefinite appropriation.
What are the benefits and limitations of choosing Lifeline as the
designated program? What are the benefits and limitations of choosing
the ACP as the designated program? If we decide to designate the ACP to
provide emergency communications support, how should we handle the
potential wind-down of the program?
135. If the Commission selects Lifeline as the designated program,
to ensure the maximum financial assistance available to survivors, we
seek comment on whether we have authority under the Safe Connections
Act to allow qualifying survivors enrolled in Lifeline through this
pathway provided by the Safe Connections Act to use that enrollment in
Lifeline to also enroll in ACP. Just as with the Consolidated
Appropriations Act that established the Emergency Broadband Benefit
Program, the Infrastructure Act directs that a household qualifies for
ACP if it meets the qualification for participation in Lifeline. Under
the Commission's rules, households that are enrolled in Lifeline can
enroll in ACP without needing to complete an ACP application. However,
the ACP's statute ties qualification for the program to the specific
eligibility criteria of the Lifeline program. If Lifeline is the
designated program for survivors, should survivors who only have access
to the Lifeline program through their status under the Safe Connections
Act be permitted to use their Lifeline participation to also enroll in
the ACP? If we were to modify the eligibility requirements of the
Lifeline program to allow survivors to enter the program with a more
expansive set of criteria, would that address any concerns with the ACP
statute's requirements and allow survivors to participate in both
programs? If such survivors were permitted to participate in the ACP,
should their ACP participation also be limited to the six months
contemplated by the Safe Connections Act? What modifications to current
ACP enrollment processes for current Lifeline subscribers should we
consider if we implement this ACP enrollment pathway?
136. Additionally, we seek comment on ways that we might be able to
enhance the designated program to best serve survivors enrolling
pursuant to the Safe Connections Act. For instance, the Lifeline
program currently allows for base reimbursement of qualifying voice-
only plans up to $5.25 and qualifying broadband or bundled plans are
eligible to receive up to $9.25 in Lifeline support. Recognizing the
critical role that voice service plays in the lives of survivors, would
it be appropriate to allow providers serving qualifying survivors to
provide discounts of, and claim reimbursement for, up to $9.25, the
full Lifeline reimbursement, even for voice-only service plans? We note
that section 5(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Safe Connections Act directs the
Commission to adopt rules that allow a survivor who is suffering from
financial hardship and meets the requirements of section 345(c)(1) to
enroll in the designated program as quickly as feasible and to
``participate in the designated program based on such qualifications
for not more than 6 months.'' We construe the directive to allow
relevant survivors to ``participate'' in the designated program to
mean, among other things, that those survivors can receive the full
subsidy currently available under the designated program for up to six
months. We seek comment on this view. If this were permitted, how
should USAC allow service providers to make such claims while ensuring
survivors' privacy? If we select Lifeline as the designated program,
how might the contribution factor be impacted by an increase in support
for voice-only service, even for a limited population, to ensure
sufficient support benefits for survivors through the Universal Service
Fund? We also note that the Safe Connections Act does not explicitly
discuss survivors' access to the designated program's enhanced benefit
for residents of Tribal lands. However, the enhanced benefit for Tribal
lands is an established component of the ``federal Lifeline support
amount'' and ``affordable connectivity benefit support amount'' as
established by the Commission's rules. Therefore, we tentatively
conclude that survivors who would otherwise be eligible for emergency
communications support under the Safe Connections Act and reside on
qualifying Tribal lands will also be able to receive the designated
program's enhanced Tribal benefit. What are the benefits or drawbacks
associated with allowing survivors to qualify for the Tribal enhanced
benefit?
137. Providers in the Lifeline program must be designated ETCs by
state regulatory agencies or, where a state declines this
responsibility, by the Commission. For the ACP, participating providers
are limited to providers of ``broadband internet access service''.
These requirements are more limiting than the broader definition of
``covered providers'' contemplated by the Safe Connections Act. While
Congress clearly instructed the Commission to designate either the
Lifeline program or ACP as the designated program, we seek comment on
the interplay between the limiting nature of the Lifeline program's ETC
requirement and the broader understanding of ``covered providers.'' We
also seek comment on the interplay between the Safe Connections Act's
definition of ``covered providers'' and
[[Page 15580]]
the definition of ``provider'' used in the ACP.
138. We seek comment on the impact of the designated program's
benefit as it pertains to survivors' access to devices following
completion of a line separation request. The Lifeline program does not
offer any reimbursement for devices, unlike the ACP, which offers
reimbursement for qualifying devices, but such devices are limited to
internet-connected laptops, desktops, and tablets. Does this
significantly impact the Lifeline program's or ACP's effectiveness for
survivors? We seek comment on the impact the one-time ACP connected
device discount may have for survivors, and in particular, those who
qualify to enroll in the designated program under the Safe Connections
Act. While the Commission has not adopted rules that offer device
reimbursement in the Lifeline program, we seek comment on the ways in
which devices are made available to enrolling Lifeline subscribers in
the marketplace. Aside from providers, is there a role for
organizations that work with survivors suffering financial hardship to
help distribute connected devices and mobile phones to those enrolling
in Lifeline as the designated program through the Safe Connections Act?
139. We also propose rules the Commission could adopt to implement
the emergency communications support provisions of the Safe Connections
Act without prejudice as to whether to designate either the Lifeline
program or ACP as the program to provide such support. In this regard,
we seek comment on both the amendments to Part 54 as they appear at the
end of this document (using the Lifeline program as an example), as
well as how such amendments could be adapted to the Commission's
existing ACP rules.
2. Defining Financial Hardship
140. The Safe Connections Act directs the Commission to allow
survivors suffering from financial hardship to enroll in the designated
program ``without regard to whether the survivor meets the otherwise
applicable eligibility requirements.'' We seek comment on how to
interpret this provision of the Safe Connections Act. We propose to
interpret this provision to mean that, if a person meets the criteria
of ``suffering from financial hardship'' and meets the requirements of
section 345(c)(1), then the person may enroll in the designated program
even if they do not meet the qualification requirements for the
designated program, whether Lifeline or the ACP. While the eligibility
requirements of Lifeline are established in the Commission's rules, the
eligibility criteria for the ACP are statutory. If we were to designate
the ACP to provide survivors with emergency communications support,
would we have to use the ACP's eligibility requirements in the
definition of financial hardship, or did Congress intend that the
survivor eligibility requirements in the Safe Connections Act supersede
the ACP's statutory eligibility requirements if the ACP were the
designated program? If Congress did not intend for the Commission to
define financial hardship more expansively than the ACP's statutory
eligibility requirements, then what meaning should the Commission
attribute to section 5(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Safe Connections Act?
141. We also seek comment on how we should interpret and
incorporate section 345(c)(1) of the Communications Act for purposes of
verifying eligibility for the designated program. The Safe Connections
Act states that a survivor seeking to participate in the designated
program must ``meet[ ] the requirements under'' the newly added
``section 345(c)(1),'' which details the process for a survivor
completing a line separation request. As a threshold matter, we
interpret the Safe Connections Act to limit access to ``emergency
communications support'' in the designated program to those survivors
that submit a completed line separation request. Is this interpretation
supported by the statute? If not, how should we interpret the language
in the Safe Connections Act referring to survivors who ``meet the
requirements under section 345(c)(1)''? While we believe that the Safe
Connections Act limits the opportunity for support to survivors that
have submitted a line separation request, can a survivor ``meet the
requirements under section 345(c)(1)'' if they can demonstrate that
they are a survivor of a covered act by producing certain
documentation?
142. The Safe Connections Act also requires that a survivor be
``suffering from financial hardship'' to obtain emergency
communications support from the designated program. For survivors who
leave abusive environments, experiencing financial instability is a
common occurrence as a result of increased expenses and economic
dependency on former partners. Given the common connection between
domestic violence and financial instability, we seek comment on whether
we should presume that survivors of domestic violence are suffering
from financial hardship and therefore accept documentation of domestic
violence as demonstrative of financial hardship. Does the Safe
Connections Act allow us to adopt such an approach? Would this
interpretation give sufficient meaning to the Safe Connections Act's
reference to ``financial hardship''? Alternatively, does the Safe
Connections Act require us to prescribe demonstration of actual, rather
than presumed, financial hardship for purposes of participation in the
designated program? Would it be more appropriate to establish criteria
allowing a survivor to demonstrate that their abuser had cut them off
from prior financial resources to substantiate financial hardship? If
so, what should we require to substantiate this claim when the
survivor's existing financial documentation may not otherwise
demonstrate financial hardship?
143. In response to our Notice of Inquiry, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) and other advocacy groups proposed that the
Commission allow survivors to self-certify financial hardship. They
suggest that because survivors who leave abusive situations often lack
access to financial documentation, the Commission should not require
survivors to submit any income-verifying documentation. This approach
would reduce the barriers of participation for survivors and help
survivors access the benefits of the designated program. We believe
that, under this approach, any waste, fraud, and abuse concerns could
be mitigated by the requirement that survivors also demonstrate that
they have met the requirements of section 345(c)(1) and the six-month
limitation on receiving emergency communications support. We seek
comment on this proposal to allow survivors to self-certify financial
hardship. What are the benefits and disadvantages of this approach? If
we adopted this approach, should we require survivors to submit an
affidavit, as suggested by the NVRDC, as part of the self-certification
of financial hardship status? Should any such affidavit or self-
certification be submitted under penalty of perjury? Would requiring an
affidavit be a barrier preventing survivors from accessing emergency
communications support? Should we require that any certification or
affidavit be notarized to ensure the veracity of the identity of the
signer, and what burdens would a notarization requirement impose on
survivors? Alternatively, would allowing trusted third parties such as
shelters or social workers to certify the financial hardship status of
survivors allow survivors to access emergency communication services
while mitigating any risk of
[[Page 15581]]
waste, fraud, or abuse? In contrast, would requiring a third-party
certification present a barrier to survivor participation in the
designated emergency communication support program, as EPIC argues? If
we allowed for other methods of demonstrating financial hardship beyond
income, what documentation should we require from survivors to explain
their financial hardship? How could we standardize the reviews of such
submissions to ensure that the Commission and USAC operate
consistently? Should we direct the Wireline Competition Bureau to work
with USAC to develop a standardized certification form, which would
clearly define financial hardship to survivors and other entities, for
any self-certification efforts? Does the fact that the emergency
communications support contemplated by the Safe Connections Act is
temporary reduce the risk of waste, fraud, or abuse connected with
survivor self-certification?
144. We also seek comment on whether we should allow survivors who
are facing temporary financial hardship to receive emergency
communications support. Some survivors who have reliable sources of
income nevertheless face financial instability or hardship as a result
of high temporary or short-term expenses associated with leaving an
abusive relationship. Survivors may need to pay expensive medical
bills, cover new housing and transportation costs, and find new
childcare arrangements, all of which can lead to financial instability.
If we allow survivors to qualify for emergency communications support
who are facing temporary financial hardship, how should we define
temporary financial hardship? Would showings of temporary financial
hardship have to be tied to the survivor's income at a particular point
in time, or are there other types of documentation that survivors could
submit to demonstrate temporary financial hardship? Are there benefit
programs that are available to survivors experiencing temporary
financial hardship, the participation in which we should accept as
qualifying a survivor to participate in the designated program? Does
the Safe Connections Act permit us to establish a process for survivors
who are experiencing temporary financial hardship to obtain emergency
communications support?
145. Alternatively, we could define financial hardship to mirror
the ACP eligibility requirements, which are broader than the Lifeline
eligibility requirements, even if we deem Lifeline the designated
program. This approach would allow many survivors who participate in
qualifying programs to have their eligibility automatically confirmed,
allowing them to ``enroll in the designated program as quickly as
feasible'' as required by the Safe Connections Act. Moreover, the more
expansive eligibility criteria for the ACP will provide additional ways
for survivors to demonstrate financial hardship, and will allow
providers and USAC to leverage existing connections and documentation
requirements to confirm eligibility. We seek comment on this approach.
What are the benefits associated with this approach? What are the
burdens or barriers that this approach might impose on survivors? Is
the income threshold of 200% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines used in
the ACP consistent with the Safe Connections Act's goal to allow
survivors to get emergency access to the designated program? Are there
federal or state benefit programs targeted to survivors whose
eligibility standards we could use as a model? Are there any other
qualifying benefit programs that we should consider including as part
of our definition of financial hardship, and in particular programs
targeted at survivors? Are there other approaches that we can use to
define financial hardship that are not directly tied to survivors'
income?
146. Both Lifeline and the ACP typically require subscribers to
demonstrate their eligibility by submitting either proof of income or
participation in a qualifying benefit program. The Lifeline program and
the ACP have similar approaches for consumers to document their income.
For instance, subscribers can demonstrate eligibility on the basis of
income by submitting documentation such as tax returns or pay-stubs. If
we were to keep a similar approach for survivors entering the
designated program, we seek comment on whether and what income
documentation we should require survivors to submit to demonstrate they
are experiencing financial hardship. Given the unique challenges faced
by many survivors in accessing financial information, should we require
survivors to submit documents to demonstrate financial hardship prior
to enrollment in the designated program, within a certain amount of
time after enrollment, or at all? If we adopted a delayed documentation
approach, should we permit service providers to claim reimbursement
before documentation is confirmed? Would a delayed documentation
approach limit service providers' willingness to provide support to
survivors if they were unable to claim reimbursement until survivor
documentation was approved? If we require survivors to submit
documentation to demonstrate financial hardship, what documentation
should we collect? Are there other types of income verifying documents
that we could allow survivors to submit beyond tax returns and pay
stubs?
3. Program Application and Enrollment
147. The Safe Connections Act also directs the Commission to allow
a survivor suffering from financial hardship to ``enroll in the
designated program as quickly as is feasible.'' We therefore seek
comment on ways in which we can improve (1) the application process for
survivors suffering from financial hardship that have successfully gone
through the line separation process; (2) the application process for
such survivors that were unable to obtain a line separation because of
some technical infeasibility; and (3) the application and enrollment
process for survivors generally. We also seek comment on how to best
approach enrollments for emergency communications support in the NLAD
opt-out states or through the ACP's alternative verification process
(AVP).
148. We first seek comment on the eligibility determination process
for survivors who have successfully completed the line separation
process. We propose that survivors should be able to submit
documentation of a successful line separation request to qualify for
the emergency communications support. Given the potential for variation
across service providers, we anticipate that USAC may need to engage in
reviews of information documenting a successful line separation
request. Is there a way in which the Commission and USAC can
standardize confirmation of line separation requests such that USAC
will be able to more quickly review such documentation and confirm that
a subscriber can participate in the designated program? Should the
service provider be required to provide to USAC certification or other
documentation confirming the successful line separation request? Would
confirmation of a line separation request alone be too ambiguous as
lines can be separated for reasons not contemplated by the Safe
Connections Act? Might there be ways in which USAC could confirm that a
line separation request was tied to an individual's status as a
survivor? If a survivor had a line separated by a service provider that
also participates in the designated program, would it be appropriate to
not require line
[[Page 15582]]
separation information from the survivor at the time of application and
instead rely upon the service provider to maintain that documentation
and share it with USAC as part of any program integrity or audit
inquiries?
149. The Safe Connections Act also requires the Commission to
consider how it might support survivors suffering from financial
hardship who attempted to complete a line separation request but were
unable to complete that request because of some technical
infeasibility. In such situations, should documentation of that outcome
be sufficient for a survivor to confirm their status as a survivor and
enroll in the designated program? How can USAC best assess the veracity
of these notices of technical infeasibility that survivors receive from
service providers? Are there ways in which the Commission or USAC can
work with service providers to standardize such notices? If the line
separation request was processed but confirmed unsuccessful, can it be
presumed that the survivor submitted all appropriate documentation to
the service provider to confirm their survivor status, or should USAC
require that documentation and independently review these materials?
Are there ways in which service providers might share confirmation of
unsuccessful line separation requests directly with USAC? After USAC
has confirmed that a line separation request was submitted but unable
to be completed because of a technical infeasibility, how might the
survivor be able to enter the designated program? Should the survivor
be able to receive the designated program's benefit on their existing
account, even if shared with an abuser? We presume that survivors
should be permitted to apply the designated program's benefit on any
new qualifying service not tied to the abuser, but does that present
any unique challenges for survivors and service providers?
150. As part of the process for applying to either Lifeline or the
ACP, consumers are required to submit information to USAC's National
Verifier that will allow for confirmation of the consumer's identity.
By gathering this information, USAC is better able to confirm the
identity of a consumer and prevent duplicate enrollments in the
Commission's affordability programs. We recognize, however, that
providing this type of identity information could be difficult for
survivors that may be trying to physically and financially distance
themselves from their abusers. As such, we seek comment on whether and
how we might gather similar identity information for the process of
verification while being sensitive to the privacy and safety needs of
survivors. Would the type of information that survivors need to provide
as part of the line separation process typically include all of the
information that the Commission already collects for its affordability
programs? Would this make providing the same information to USAC less
concerning for survivors suffering financial hardship, particularly if
such survivors will need to provide details of their line separation
request? Under the Privacy Act of 1974, the Federal Information
Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), and applicable guidance,
the Commission and USAC already have strong privacy protections in
place for consumer information; are those measures sufficient for
information collected from survivors? Are there best practices that
governmental organizations and businesses use for dealing with survivor
information, which USAC should implement here, that go above and beyond
standard privacy protections? Are there ways in which we can modify the
information collected, perhaps by allowing a consumer to submit their
identity information with an alias name? If we allow survivors to
submit less identity information as part of their application to the
designated program, how might we effectively manage program integrity,
administration, and audit efforts?
151. Current address information can also be very sensitive
information for survivors to share. If such location information is
disclosed, it may allow an abuser to locate a survivor, and because of
this concern, survivors may not be residing at one location or have a
fixed address. They also may be hesitant to seek emergency
communications support if they believe their location may be disclosed.
To meet these challenges, we seek comment on how we might adjust the
address requirements for the designated program to best support
survivors suffering from financial hardship. Should USAC rely
exclusively on any address information provided as part of the line
separation documentation it might receive from survivors suffering
financial hardship? Might such address information be inaccurate if the
account, after the completion of a line separation request, is no
longer tied to a specific address? Our Lifeline rules already
contemplate temporary or duplicate addresses for applicants. Does this
approach sufficiently resolve the potential risks to survivors
suffering from financial hardship? Would it be appropriate to require
no address if the applicant can confirm their identity through
providing other personal information like their full actual name or
date of birth? Would it be appropriate to allow the address of a
survivor support organization or other alias address to stand in as an
applicant's residential address? Are these types of methods used in
other areas and for other services where survivors might seek support?
152. Aside from the issues detailed above, we also seek comment on
how the Commission and USAC should modify the designated program's
forms to allow survivors suffering from financial hardship to receive
support. As noted, we are interested in learning more about what
information service providers might have about survivors by virtue of
the line separation process and whether such information can be
provided to USAC directly from service providers. We are sensitive to
the possibility that survivors who would benefit most from
participation in the designated program may be experiencing sudden and
traumatic hardship, and we seek to make participation readily
accessible without compromising the integrity of our programs. Thus,
rather than requiring survivors to complete the designated program's
full application process and provide their line separation material,
would it be appropriate to require survivors to self-certify that they
completed a line separation request, regardless of the outcome, as part
of their application to participate in the designated program? If we
were to adopt such a self-certification approach, we anticipate the
need to require more identity information to confirm identity. Under
this self-certification approach, we also anticipate needing
information consistent with the Safe Connections Act to substantiate
that the applicant is a survivor. Would that be appropriate? If we did
not collect such information, how might the Commission and USAC confirm
that only survivors suffering from financial hardship are enrolling in
the program? Even if we do not adopt a self-certification approach for
confirming that the survivor went through the line separation process,
should we explore a more streamlined application for such survivors? If
so, what information that is currently collected might not be
appropriate for this community? Alternatively, are there questions or
information that should be added to the current program application
forms? Should such information be placed on a new supplemental form,
similar to the Lifeline program's Household Worksheet? Would it be more
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appropriate to develop an entirely new application process for
survivors seeking to enter the designated program?
153. As part of the Lifeline and ACP enrollment process, consumers
are required to have their eligibility confirmed before they can be
enrolled into either program by a service provider. This is typically
done by the consumer either interacting directly with the National
Verifier or by working through a service provider system that confirms
information through an application programming interface (API)
connection to the National Verifier. After a consumer's qualification
has been confirmed, including confirmation that the consumer is not
already receiving the Lifeline or ACP benefit, then a service provider
can enroll the consumer in NLAD and begin providing discounted service
to that consumer. We do not intend to change this general process for
survivors suffering financial hardship and seeking to participate in
the designated program. However, we do seek comment on ways in which
USAC can communicate to survivors and service providers that a survivor
has been qualified to participate in the designated program. Should
USAC provide survivors with anything different from what is currently
provided to confirm qualification? Would it be preferable for USAC to
provide a qualification number that will confirm a survivor's ability
to participate in the designated program while also allowing them to
minimize the amount of personal information they need to provide to
their service provider? This approach might result in a qualification
number that would allow the service provider to enroll the subscriber
in NLAD without seeing the level of personal information that service
providers currently see in NLAD. Would such an approach be too
administratively burdensome for service providers to monitor and ensure
compliance with the designated program's rules? How else might USAC
work to categorize survivors in NLAD such that service providers will
be aware that a particular subscriber might not be able to participate
in the program longer than six months? Is such a categorization
necessary?
154. As stated above, we seek comment on whether the Lifeline
program or ACP should be the designated program for impacted survivors,
and we further propose that survivors seeking to enroll in the
designated program under the Safe Connection Act be qualified and
enrolled using USAC's application and eligibility confirmation process
throughout the country. In California, Texas, and Oregon, the state
administrators currently confirm Lifeline eligibility and take measures
to prevent duplicate enrollments. As such, consumers in these states
apply through the state program administrators for state and federal
Lifeline benefits. USAC partners with these states to ensure that their
processes are in accordance with the federal Lifeline program's
guidelines. Here, however, we propose that survivors in these states
apply to participate in Lifeline as the designated program, through
USAC's systems directly. USAC would confirm the eligibility of
survivors to participate in the program and would work to address any
potential duplicates. This would be similar to how broadband-only
Lifeline subscribers apply and enroll in California, where the National
Verifier stands in for the state administrator. By requiring USAC to
review such enrollments we will ensure a standardized process for
survivor documentation, greater flexibility to be responsive to
survivor needs, a centralized repository for any potential line
separation materials that might come from service providers, and a
unified process around potential customer transition efforts after the
end of the six-month period. In proposing to adopt this approach, we
would still permit those with system access to support survivors in the
application process through access to USAC's systems. Should we also
permit such access to be expanded to community-based organizations that
work with survivors? If we did expand access to USAC's systems beyond
what is currently permitted, should that access be limited in any
particular ways to protect the personal information of survivors and
other program participants? We seek comment on these proposals.
155. If the Commission were to choose the ACP as the designated
program, we propose that all survivor eligibility determinations should
be completed through the National Verifier. As discussed above with
Lifeline, we believe that this approach will improve the process for
survivors. As such, we propose that providers with approved AVPs would
be obligated to accept determinations from the National Verifier. This
would be limited to survivors seeking to enter the ACP as the
designated program and would not impact the general processes in place
for AVP enrollment beyond that group. We seek comment on this proposal.
156. General Program Requirements. The Lifeline program and the ACP
both have general requirements to which program participants and
service providers must adhere throughout their participation in the
programs. For instance, both programs are limited to one benefit per
household and both programs also allow a provider to claim
reimbursement only for subscribers who actually use their service. We
propose that the general rules and requirements of the designated
program will remain in effect for survivors and service providers
except to the extent that they are in conflict with the statutory and
regulatory requirements established specifically for the emergency
communications support. This would include such requirements as the
programs' non-usage de-enrollment requirements, record retention
requirements, and audit requirements. We note that we do not expect
annual recertification to be an issue because survivors must qualify
through the regular program processes to participate in the designated
program beyond their initial six-month period. Our proposal reflects
our understanding that the programs' rules were established to ensure
that the limited resources of each program go towards individuals that
genuinely need the service and will use the service, and that a number
of these rules, such as those that deal with enrollment representatives
and the payment of commissions, were adopted to address specific
program integrity concerns that we think will continue to be relevant
in the context of our efforts to offer emergency communications
support. As such, we do not believe it would be appropriate to modify
these types of requirements. However, we seek comment on this proposal
and are particularly interested in whether survivors would be
significantly and negatively impacted by the continuation of certain
generally applicable programmatic rules in our affordability programs.
157. While we propose to maintain the programs' rules largely in
place, we seek comment on how the programs' limit of one benefit per
household would interact with a definition of survivors that may
implicate ind
[…truncated; see source link]This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.