Notice2023-04415
Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors
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Published
March 3, 2023
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Railroad Administration
Abstract
Preliminary investigation of recent train derailments indicates the cause of, or contributing factor to, the incidents was a mechanical failure, specifically burnt journal bearings. Accordingly, FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory to make recommendations to enhance the mechanical reliability of rolling stock and the safety of railroad operations. This Safety Advisory recommends that railroads: evaluate the thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector (HBD) data; consider the use of real-time trend analyses of HBD data as a criterion for inspection; ensure the proper training and qualification of personnel responsible for the calibration, inspection, and maintenance of HBDs; ensure proper inspection of rolling stock with HBD alerts; and improve the safety culture of their organization, particularly as it pertains to operational decisions based on HBD data.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 42 (Friday, March 3, 2023)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 42 (Friday, March 3, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13494-13497]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04415]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures
Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
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SUMMARY: Preliminary investigation of recent train derailments
indicates the cause of, or contributing factor to, the incidents was a
mechanical failure, specifically burnt journal bearings. Accordingly,
FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory to make recommendations to enhance
the mechanical reliability of rolling stock and the safety of railroad
operations. This Safety Advisory recommends that railroads: evaluate
the thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector (HBD)
data; consider the use of real-time trend analyses of HBD data as a
criterion for inspection; ensure the proper training and qualification
of personnel responsible for the calibration, inspection, and
maintenance of HBDs; ensure proper inspection of rolling stock with HBD
alerts; and improve the safety culture of their organization,
particularly as it pertains to operational decisions based on HBD data.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Alexy, Associate Administrator
for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Office of Railroad
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, (202)-
493-6282.
Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws,
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to
bind the public in any way. This document does not revise or replace
any previously issued guidance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Federal rail safety and hazardous materials transportation
regulations (HMR) set minimum safety standards for the rail
transportation of hazardous materials.\1\ Among other things, those
regulations include packaging, hazard communication, and operational
requirements applicable to the rail transportation of all materials
designated as hazardous materials. The HMR additionally include
provisions specifically applicable to trains transporting large
quantities of certain hazardous materials known as ``high-hazard
flammable trains'' (HHFTs) and ``high-hazard flammable unit trains''
(HHFUTs).\2\ These additional regulations applicable to HHFTs and
HHFUTs include certain safety and security planning requirements,
operational restrictions, and requirements related to ensuring State
and local governments are notified of the types and quantities of
hazardous materials transported through their jurisdictions.\3\
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\1\ 49 CFR parts 200 through 299 and 49 CFR parts 171 through
185.
\2\ An HHFT is ``a single train transporting 20 or more loaded
tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a
single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid throughout the train consist.'' An HHFUT is ``a
single train transporting 70 or more loaded tank cars containing
Class 3 flammable liquid.'' 49 CFR 171.8.
\3\ See 49 CFR part 172, subpart I.
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Although compliance with all applicable Federal regulations is a
critical part of ensuring the safety of rail transportation of
hazardous materials, the use of certain technologies (e.g., wayside
detectors), as FRA has previously acknowledged, has enabled railroads
to develop new methods and processes for identifying defects in rail
equipment and infrastructure as compared to those methods contemplated
under applicable Federal regulations. For example, railroads have
installed wayside detectors to assess the health of rail equipment and
infrastructure to enable the early identification of mechanical or
other defects.
Recognizing the value of wayside detection systems, if they are
appropriately installed, maintained, and utilized, in 2015, FRA issued
Safety Advisory 2015-01 addressing the use of wheel impact load
detectors (WILDs) as
[[Page 13495]]
applied to HHFTs.\4\ WILDs are designed to identify wheels on a railcar
that may have flat spots or other defects. Specifically, FRA
recommended that railroads continue to install and maintain WILDs along
HHFT routes and that railroads lower the impact thresholds of the
detectors that determine when corrective actions are to be taken. FRA
also recommended that railroads use highly qualified individuals to
conduct brake and mechanical inspections on those trains.
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\4\ <a href="https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/mechanical-inspections-and-wheel-impact-load-detector-standards-trains-transporting-large">https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/mechanical-inspections-and-wheel-impact-load-detector-standards-trains-transporting-large</a>.
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In Safety Advisory 2015-01, FRA referenced the July 6, 2013,
catastrophic rail accident in Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada, and
its tragic consequences. The Lac-M[eacute]gantic accident made clear
the risk of transporting large amounts of hazardous materials,
including large amounts of flammable liquids. FRA also referenced the
March 5, 2015, derailment of a BNSF Railway Co. train that resulted in
a release of petroleum crude oil, as well as a series of other
derailments involving crude oil and ethanol, both designated as Class 3
flammable liquid hazardous materials under the HMR.
Each of the accidents referenced in Safety Advisory 2015-01
demonstrates the potential consequences of train derailments involving
hazardous materials, even if a train does not meet the definition of a
HHFT or HHFUT.
Since 2021, at least five derailments occurred that were suspected
of being caused by burnt journal bearings.\5\ Three of those five
derailments, all occurring on the Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) are
discussed below. Two other derailments, reported to FRA by the Kansas
City Southern Railway (KCS), occurred on August 2, 2021, and December
3, 2021, and in both cases, wayside detectors, known as HBDs,\6\
flagged a suspect bearing, but the crews were either unable to act in
time to prevent a derailment or were directed to continue the train
move resulting in a derailment. These investigate into each of these
accidents is ongoing, but they demonstrate not only the potential
catastrophic consequences of a train derailment involving hazardous
materials, but also the importance of implementing appropriate
standards, processes, and procedures governing the use of HBDs.
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\5\ The four derailments include two derailments reported to FRA
by the Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS) in 2021 and the Warner
Robins, Georgia, and Sandusky, Ohio, accidents discussed below. The
2021 KCS derailments occurred on August 2, 2021, and December 3,
2021, respectively, and in both cases, an HBD flagged a suspect
bearing, but the crews were either unable to act in time to prevent
a derailment or were directed to continue the train move resulting
in a derailment.
\6\ HBDs are devices used to assess the health of railcar
bearings by monitoring their temperatures. The system consists of
the following: wheel sensors to detect an approaching train and to
turn on the scanning equipment; an axle counter; thermal sensors for
reading axle bearing temperatures (i.e., one sensor on each side of
the train); and thermal sensors for reading bearing temperatures on
each side of the train. HBD systems detect and record infrared
energy (heat) from each roller bearing. The heat signal from each
roller bearing is stored digitally and measured against pre-
established thresholds.
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Warner Robins, GA--July 12, 2022
On July 10, 2022, at 6 a.m. EDT, Train 175, consisting of 2
locomotives and 123 cars, departed Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Macon,
Georgia. During the trip, a series of warnings from HBDs of an
overheated journal bearing on one car in the consist (car PPTX 3293)
were logged into NS's wayside desk system. The dispatcher transmitted
the third alert to the crew. The crew stopped the train and inspected
the journal bearing of concern, reporting that the car behind PPTX 3293
had been sprayed with lubricating grease, which is an indication that
the journal bearing in question was leaking and defective. The crew was
instructed to continue the train movement and to ``keep an eye [on] the
axle over the next couple of detectors.'' The train arrived at Macon,
Georgia, traveling about 75 track miles and passing additional
detectors that did not record any alerts. In Macon, Train 175 was
terminated and a block of cars including PPTX 3293 was added to a
different train, Train 151. PPTX 3293 was not inspected by mechanical
personnel or set out for repair before it was added to Train 151. In
addition, during the same time, the NS system sent an email to all area
dispatchers informing them of a condemnable bearing on PPTX 3293 with a
conflicting message that if the journal bearing is deemed to be safe
for continued movement it is required to be repaired at the next switch
event. A similar message was also sent to mechanical personnel.
Subsequently, Train 151, consisting of 3 locomotives and 139 cars,
departed Macon, Georgia, on July 12, 2022. At 5:11 p.m., after
traveling approximately 15 track miles, Train 151 passed the first HBD
in Warner Robins, GA. The HBD reported a bearing temperature on PPTX
3293 to be 263 [deg]F above the ambient temperature. After a few
minutes, the HBD emitted a warning ``talker message'' \7\ to the crew
of Train 151. The crew acknowledged that they received the message but
claimed they did not have time to react. At 5:13 p.m., the lead
locomotive of Train 151 reached a grade crossing at MP 15.98G in Warner
Robins. A dash camera from a police car at the crossing captured the
train as it approached the crossing, showing PPTX 3293 being dragged
over the crossing with one of the trucks on the ground. Train 151 then
derailed seconds after PPTX 3293 cleared the crossing.
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\7\ A prerecorded auditory alert that is meant to inform train
crews of imminent hazards pertaining to equipment in their train.
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Sandusky, OH--October 8, 2022
On October 8, 2022, at approximately 4:20 p.m. EDT, NS Train 310-
08, consisting of 3 headend locomotives with 98 freight cars and 3
locomotives in tow (dead-in-tow), derailed 1 of the dead-in-tow
locomotives and 20 freight cars. The train was traveling east from
Elkhart, Indiana to Cleveland, Ohio when the train derailed near MP
240.
Prior to the derailment location, the train crew did not receive
any HBD alarms for an overheated journal bearing, but instead the crew
was contacted by the dispatcher to ensure they were aware of the
suspect bearing in their train. Upon notification from the dispatcher,
the crew stopped the train and noticed smoke coming from the journal
bearing. The crew requested permission to set out the subject car
multiple times and requested support from mechanical inspectors. After
two hours, while the train remained stopped on the mainline, NS sent an
electrician to investigate the crew's report. The electrician reported
the smoke had stopped and the bearing had cooled. The crew was then
directed to move the train. After the train travelled another 7 miles,
it derailed due to a burnt journal bearing. One axle on a ``dead-in-
tow'' locomotive failed catastrophically, causing the derailment.
Initial reports state one tank car placarded UN 3257 ``HOT'' was
punctured and leaked molten paraffin wax into the surroundings. This
derailment caused power outages to approximately 1,200 residents.
East Palestine, OH--February 3, 2023
Most recently, on February 3, 2023, a NS general merchandise train
(i.e., a train not meeting the definition of an HHFT or HHFUT) derailed
in East Palestine, Ohio. The derailment resulted in a release of
hazardous materials, which subsequently fueled extensive fires,
damaging additional rail cars, and resulting in an evacuation that
affected up to approximately 2,000 residents. Although the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is the lead agency for the
investigation into this accident and has not yet reached final
conclusions as to probable cause,
[[Page 13496]]
preliminary information \8\ indicates that a burnt journal bearing \9\
may have played a role in the derailment. Preliminary information also
indicates that the train that derailed in East Palestine (Train 32N)
passed at least three wayside detectors before derailing. That
information indicates that, over the course of approximately 30 miles,
the HBDs recorded an increase of over 200 degrees in the temperature of
a car's journal bearing.\10\
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\8\ <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD23MR005.aspx">https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD23MR005.aspx</a>.
\9\ A journal bearing is the mechanical subassembly on each end
of the axles of a wheel set of railroad rolling stock. The journal
bearing transfers the weight of freight car, coach or locomotive to
the wheels and rails while allowing the axle to spin; the bearing
design is typically roller bearings on newer rolling stock.
\10\ NTSB Preliminary Report, Norfolk Southern Railway Train
Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires,
East Palestine, Ohio, February 3, 2023 (issued Feb. 23, 2023, and
available at <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf">https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf</a>).
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On February 3, 2023, at about 8:54 p.m. EST, eastbound NS Train 32N
(comprised of 2 headend locomotives, 149 freight cars, and 1
distributed power locomotive between the 109th and 110th freight cars
in the consist) derailed 38 railcars in East Palestine, Ohio. The
derailed equipment included 11 tank cars carrying hazardous materials
that subsequently ignited, fueling fires that damaged additional
railcars and resulted in the evacuation of up to 2,000 residents. There
were no reported fatalities or injuries. Preliminary information
indicates that the cause of the derailment may have been a burnt
journal bearing, as noted above.
As further noted above, prior to derailing, Train 32N passed HBDs.
First, at milepost (MP) 79.9 in Sebring, Ohio, an HBD recorded a
temperature of 38 [deg]F above ambient temperature for one bearing on
the 23rd car in the consist. Approximately ten miles later, Train 32N
passed a second HBD (at MP 69.01 in Salem, Ohio), which recorded a
temperature of 103 [deg]F above ambient for the same bearing on the
23rd car. Finally, approximately twenty miles later (at MP 49.81 in
East Palestine), the train passed a third HBD, which recorded the
suspect bearing's temperature at 253 [deg]F above ambient.
NS has established the following HBD temperature thresholds (above
ambient) and procedures:
<bullet> Between 170 [deg]F and 200 [deg]F, warm bearing (non-
critical); stop and inspect.
<bullet> A difference between bearings on the same axle greater
than or equal to 115 [deg]F (non-critical); stop and inspect.
<bullet> Greater than 200 [deg]F (critical); set out railcar.
At milepost 49.81, as Train 32N passed the third HBD, which
measured the suspect bearing's temperature as 253 [deg]F above ambient,
the HBD transmitted a critical audible alarm message instructing the
crew to slow and stop the train to inspect a hot axle. The train
engineer attempted to slow and stop the train. During this
deceleration, an automatic emergency brake application initiated, and
Train 32N came to a stop. After the train stopped, the crew observed
fire and smoke and notified authorities.
Journal Bearings and Detecting Journal Bearing Defects
Journal bearings are critical components of freight cars that serve
to transfer the weight of the car and its cargo to the axle while
allowing the axle, and its wheels to rotate. If a journal bearing is
defective (or becomes defective while in use), the temperature of the
bearing may increase and become overheated, to the point where the
bearing ceases to effectively perform its function. In some cases,
journal bearings with relatively large defects can run at normal
operating temperatures for tens of thousands of miles before any
abnormality in their operating temperature is observed. In other cases,
a bearing's raceway (i.e., the path or groove that the bearing moves
along) may deteriorate rapidly and cause excessive roller misalignment.
The misaligned rollers generate frictional heating, which can weaken an
axle in just a few minutes and may lead to a catastrophic derailment
depending on the traveling speed of the train and the weight of the
load the car with the defective bearing is carrying.\11\
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\11\ Defect detection in freight railcar tapered-roller bearings
using vibration techniques [bond] SpringerLink.
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Detecting overheated journal bearings before they fail is critical
to accident prevention. Journal bearings are sealed components, and, as
such, often do not display ``tell-tale signs'' of overheating (e.g.,
leaking lubrication), making defects in journal bearings difficult to
identify through visual inspections. HBDs can serve an important role
in early detection of bearing defects, but the effectiveness of any HBD
system depends on numerous factors, including: (1) the establishment
and adherence to adequate maintenance standards and procedures; (2) the
establishment of safe thresholds at which to act on HBD alerts; and (3)
strict adherence to procedures that prescribe actions to be taken.
Although there are no Federal regulations requiring the use of HBDs
for freight trains, or any regulations related to the inspection,
calibration, and maintenance of this equipment, there are existing
industry standards and manufacturer recommendations that railroads
should incorporate into existing inspection and maintenance practices.
Because defects in journal bearings are difficult to identify visually,
personnel charged with inspecting equipment subject to an HBD alert
should be properly trained and qualified. FRA encourages using
personnel trained and experienced in identifying critically hot
bearings, and with the demonstrated ability to properly evaluate the
condition of a suspect bearing. Further, FRA encourages railroads to
ensure these individuals are available at all hours of operations
across a railroad's network.
Data is critical to identifying effective HBD temperature
thresholds for action (e.g., appropriate thresholds for a stop-and-
inspect requirement, or a mandatory remove-from-service requirement).
Additionally, as the East Palestine accident demonstrates, thresholds
for temperatures measured by HBDs requiring action should be
established for both single measurement and multiple measurements in a
temperature trend analysis.
The procedures governing the use of HBD systems should be
sufficient to ensure all employees understand the meaning of any HBD
alert and are empowered to take appropriate action in response to those
alerts. The response procedures governing any HBD system should be
commensurate with the risk (specifically consequences) of a derailment.
For trains containing hazardous materials, the potential consequence of
a derailment is catastrophic, and allowing a train transporting a
hazardous material to continue to operate, without restriction, after
an HBD alert is likely not appropriate.
FRA recommends that railroads consider expanding application of
Association of American Railroads (AAR) Circular OT-55 (Recommended
Railroad Operating Practices for the Transportation of Hazardous
Materials).\12\ According to Circular OT-55, if a defect in a ``Key
Train'' \13\
[[Page 13497]]
bearing is reported by a wayside detector, but a visual inspection
fails to confirm evidence of the defect, OT-55 prohibits the train from
exceeding 30 MPH until it has passed over the next wayside detector or
it is delivered to a terminal for a mechanical inspection. If the same
car again sets off the next detector or is found to be defective, it
must be set out from the train. This also provides the railroads the
opportunity to define a defect based on new/lower thresholds for HBD
alerts.
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\12\ AAR Circular No. OT-55 (CPC-1348) (available at <a href="https://public.railinc.com/documents/ot-55pdf">https://public.railinc.com/documents/ot-55pdf</a>).
\13\ AAR Circular OT-55 defines a ``Key Train'' as a train with:
(1) one tank car load of a Poison Inhalation Hazard, anhydrous
ammonia, or ammonia solutions; or
(2) 20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any
combination of hazardous material; or
(3) One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel or High Level
Radioactive Waste.
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Accordingly, FRA encourages the industry to continue to utilize
wayside detection technologies such as HBDs, but notes that to realize
the benefits of these technologies, railroads should identify
appropriate HBD impact thresholds for action, and implement and adhere
to appropriate procedures for action in the event of an HBD alert,
particularly on trains transporting hazardous materials.
Recommended Railroad Actions
In light of the above discussion, FRA recommends that railroads
take the following actions:
1. Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies
and procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and
manufacturer recommendations for HBDs.
2. Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel
responsible for installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure
they have the appropriate knowledge and skills. Railroads should also
develop and implement appropriate training on the inspection and
maintenance requirements for HBDs and provide that training at
appropriate intervals to ensure the required knowledge and skill of
inspection and maintenance personnel. Further, railroads should
evaluate their training content and training frequency to ensure any
employee who may be called upon to evaluate a suspect bearing has the
necessary training, experience, and qualifications. FRA also encourages
railroads to ensure these individuals are available at all hours of
operations across a railroad's network.
3. Review current HBD detector thresholds in light of recent
derailments, and all other relevant available data (including data from
any close calls or near misses), to determine the adequacy of the
railroad's current thresholds. Thresholds should be established for
single measurement as well as multiple measurements of individual
bearings to enable temperature trend analysis.
4. Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD
alerts to ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the
operation involved. With regard to trains transporting any quantity of
hazardous materials, FRA recommends railroads adopt the procedures
outlined in AAR's OT-55 for key trains as an initial measure.
Conclusion
In general, the issues identified in this Safety Advisory are
indicators of a railroad's safety culture. Implementing procedures that
ensure safety, and training personnel so those procedures become second
nature, is vital. Equally important is the commitment, throughout the
organization, to safety and empowerment of personnel to live up to that
commitment. Specifically, personnel should be encouraged and empowered
to develop procedures that may temporarily impact operations, but
maximize safety, just as those executing the procedures should be
empowered to strictly adhere to those procedures, even if it delays a
train. The railroads should evaluate their safety culture not only as
it relates to the issues indicated in this Safety Advisory, but to all
aspects of their operations.
FRA encourages railroads to take actions consistent with the
preceding recommendations, and any other complementary actions, to
ensure the safety of rail transportation. FRA may modify this Safety
Advisory, issue additional safety advisories, or take other actions
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its
authority.
Issued in Washington, DC.
Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-04415 Filed 3-2-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
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