Notice2022-28336
Safety Advisory 2022-02; Addressing Unintended Train Brake Release
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
December 29, 2022
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Railroad Administration
Abstract
FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2022-02 to make the rail industry aware of a recent issue encountered by a train crew that experienced an unintended brake release of a train's automatic air brakes while stopped at a signal, and to recommend steps addressing the unintended release of train air brakes.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 249 (Thursday, December 29, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 249 (Thursday, December 29, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 80256-80257]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-28336]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2022-02; Addressing Unintended Train Brake
Release
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2022-02 to make the rail
industry aware of a recent issue encountered by a train crew that
experienced an unintended brake release of a train's automatic air
brakes while stopped at a signal, and to recommend steps addressing the
unintended release of train air brakes.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Fairbanks, Staff Director, Motive
Power & Equipment Division, Office of Railroad Infrastructure and
Mechanical, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone: (202) 493-6322, email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#395e584b40175f58504b5b5857524a795d564d175e564f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6d0a0c1f14430b0c041f0f0c03061e2d090219430a021b">[email protected]</span></a>.
Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws,
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to
bind the public in any way. This document does not revise or replace
any previously issued guidance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On June 22, 2022, during a significant thunderstorm, a crew
consisting of a locomotive engineer and conductor operated a
conventionally powered, intermodal train with 3 head-end locomotives,
47 loaded cars, and 6 empty cars, totaling 9,204 feet in length and
7,392 tons in weight. The engineer stopped the train on a downhill
grade of 0.9-1.18% near the signal governing the train's movement, set
the train's air brakes at approximately 12 pounds, and
[[Page 80257]]
fully set the locomotive consist's independent brakes. After being
stopped for approximately 3 hours, the engineer and conductor, located
in the lead locomotive cab, observed the train roll towards the signal
interlocking displaying a stop indication. This train experienced an
unintended automatic brake release. The locomotive consist's
independent brakes remained fully applied but due to the grade, tonnage
and wet rail could not solely hold the train without the automatic air
brakes also being applied.
At that time, an opposing train on the same track was preparing to
cross through the interlocking in front of the rolling train. The
locomotive engineer of the rolling train applied full-service airbrakes
and full dynamic braking but was not satisfied that the brakes were
working effectively or fast enough. The conductor operated the
emergency brake valve and stopped the train short of the signal and the
train that was preparing to cross through the interlocking.
The crew then contacted the dispatcher and railroad management to
report the unintended brake release and the conductor set a sufficient
number of car handbrakes to hold the train on the grade.
FRA's investigation of the rolling train's event recorder, positive
train control (PTC) system, and engine data logs, revealed: the PTC
system had operated properly and would have initiated an emergency
brake application upon reaching the signal; the Trip Optimizer was off;
and the lead locomotive and consist did not cause the unintended brake
release. Instead, FRA determined that, after approximately three hours
with the air brakes set, the air pressure slowly bled down from some of
the cars' auxiliary reservoirs, likely causing localized brake
releases.\1\ The initiation of the brake release would enable the
accelerated release functionality by taking some air from the emergency
brake reservoirs and directing it back into the brake pipe resulting in
a substantial number of adjacent car brakes releasing. Potentially
contributing factors causing the train's unintended movement included
the downhill grade, wet rail, and the train's tonnage.
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\1\ FRA notes this type of prolonged pressure release would
likely not be identified during a periodic single car air brake
test.
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Due to the potential for air brake system leaks, FRA prohibits
unattended trains from depending solely on air brakes to hold
equipment.\2\ While the aforementioned rolling train was attended, it
nevertheless engaged in an unintended movement.
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\2\ 49 CFR 232.103(n)(2).
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Based on FRA's review of this incident, and its awareness of other
train incidents involving an unintended air brake release under similar
circumstances, FRA believes operating guidance is warranted to help
reduce the likelihood of similar unintended air brake releases, and
therefore makes the following recommendations.
Recommendations
1. Train crews should not expect a service rate or emergency brake
application to indefinitely maintain application of a train's air
brakes.
2. If a train is stopped with air brakes set, and the train begins
moving, the crew should immediately apply the emergency brake. After
the train is stopped, the crew should set a sufficient number of
handbrakes to secure the train from further unintended movement before
releasing the brakes and recharging the train's air brake system.
3. Each railroad should adopt and implement an air brake procedure
consistent with Recommendations 1 and 2 that addresses unintended brake
releases.
4. Each railroad should have an operating supervisor conduct a
face-to-face meeting with each locomotive engineer and conductor to
explain and reinforce the contents of this advisory.
FRA may modify Safety Advisory 2022-02, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2022-28336 Filed 12-28-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on December 29, 2022.
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