Notice2022-25663
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Investors Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Modify IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)
Primary source
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Published
November 25, 2022
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 226 (Friday, November 25, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 226 (Friday, November 25, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72523-72527]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-25663]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-96352; File No. SR-IEX-2022-10]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Investors Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Modify IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)
November 18, 2022.
Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on November 4, 2022 the Investors Exchange LLC (``IEX'' or the
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in
Items I and II below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange.
The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
Pursuant to the provisions of section 19(b)(1) under the Act,\3\
and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\4\ the Exchange is filing with the
Commission a proposed rule change to provide Members \5\ the option of
having Discretionary Limit orders automatically cancel or re-price in
certain circumstances.
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\3\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\4\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\5\ See IEX Rule 1.160(s).
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The text of the proposed rule change is available at the Exchange's
website at <a href="http://www.iextrading.com">www.iextrading.com</a>, at the principal office of the Exchange,
and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The self-regulatory organization
has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of the
most significant aspects of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The purpose of this proposed rule filing is to amend IEX Rule
11.190(b)(7) to allow Users \6\ to attach an optional instruction to
any Discretionary Limit \7\ (``D-Limit'') order to either re-price or
cancel an order that was price adjusted during a period of quote
instability,\8\ if, ten (10) milliseconds after the most recent quote
instability determination \9\ that resulted in the order being price
adjusted, the order is resting at a price that is less aggressive than
the NBB \10\ (NBO \11\) for buy (sell) orders.
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\6\ See IEX Rule 1.160(qq). Users include both Members and
Sponsored Participants, see IEX Rule 1.160(ll), but the terms
``Member'' and ``User'' are used interchangeably in this filing.
\7\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7).
\8\ See IEX Rule 11.190(g).
\9\ Id.
\10\ See IEX Rule 1.160(u).
\11\ See IEX Rule 1.160(u).
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Background
In October 2020,\12\ IEX introduced the D-Limit order type,\13\
which is designed to help protect liquidity providers from potential
adverse selection during periods of quote instability in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner.\14\ A D-Limit order may be a displayed or
non-displayed limit order that upon entry and when posting to the Order
Book \15\ is priced to be equal to and ranked at the order's limit
price, but will be adjusted to a less-aggressive price during periods
of quote instability, as defined in IEX Rule 11.190(g).\16\
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\12\ See IEX Trading Alert 2020-029, available at <a href="https://iextrading.com/alerts/#/126">https://iextrading.com/alerts/#/126</a>.
\13\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89686 (August 26,
2020), 85 FR 54438 (September 1, 2020) (SR-IEX-2019-15) (``D-Limit
Approval Order'').
\14\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87814 (December 20,
2019), 84 FR 71997, 71998 (December 30, 2019) (SR-IEX-2019-15) (``D-
Limit Proposal'').
\15\ See IEX Rule 1.160(p).
\16\ See IEX Rules 11.190(b)(7) and 11.190(g).
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Specifically, if the System \17\ receives a D-Limit buy (sell)
order during a period of quote instability (i.e., the Crumbling Quote
Indicator or ``CQI'' is on), and the D-Limit order has a limit price
equal to or higher (lower) than the quote instability determination
price level (``CQI Price''), the price of the order will be
automatically adjusted by the System to one (1) minimum price variation
(``MPV'') \18\ lower (higher) than the CQI Price.\19\ Similarly, when
unexecuted shares of a D-Limit buy (sell) order are posted to the Order
Book, if a quote instability determination is made and such shares are
ranked and displayed (in the case of a displayed order) by the System
at a price equal to or higher (lower) than the CQI Price, the price of
the order will be automatically adjusted by the System to a price one
MPV lower (higher) than the quote instability price level.\20\
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\17\ See IEX Rule 1.160(nn).
\18\ See IEX Rule 11.210.
\19\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)(A) and (B).
\20\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)(C) and (D).
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Currently, a D-Limit order that has been subject to an automatic
price adjustment will not revert to the price at which it was
previously ranked and displayed (in the case of a displayed order).
Rather, once the price of a D-Limit order that has been posted to the
Order Book is automatically adjusted by the System, the order will
continue to be ranked and displayed (in the case of a displayed order)
at the adjusted price, unless subject to another automatic adjustment,
or if the order is subject to the price sliding provisions of IEX Rule
11.190(h).\21\ Whenever the price of a D-
[[Page 72524]]
Limit order is adjusted the order will receive a new time priority. If
multiple D-Limit orders are adjusted at the same time, their relative
time priority will be maintained. Further, when the price of a D-Limit
order is adjusted, the Member that entered the order receives an order
restatement message from the Exchange notifying the Member of the price
adjustment.\22\
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\21\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)(E).
\22\ A restatement message is an automated message from the
Exchange System informing the Member that the price of its order has
been adjusted.
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IEX is proposing optional functionality that will facilitate the
ability of some Members to manage their use of D-Limit orders. Some
Members that use D-Limit orders have informed IEX that they cannot
readily configure their trading systems to receive, process, and
respond to the restatement messages IEX transmits to Members after each
price adjustment. They note that their trading systems are not
currently configured to ingest the D-Limit restatement messages (and,
in some cases, other restatement messages), and they would have to
devote significant resources to build the logic in order to ingest, and
respond to, the messages for this one order type. In these cases, the
Members are unable to track whether their D-Limit orders have been re-
priced, and if so, the price at which they are currently resting.
Without this information, IEX understands that such Members are
hindered in their ability to timely cancel or adjust the prices of
their resting D-Limit orders to meet their trading objectives. To
address this issue, some Members have requested that IEX provide
optional functionality allowing a D-Limit order that has been subject
to an automatic price adjustment to be automatically either canceled or
re-priced in certain circumstances. Specifically, this option would
allow the User to elect to automatically cancel or re-price the order
when, ten (10) milliseconds following the quote instability
determination that resulted in a price adjustment, it is resting at a
price less aggressive than the NBBO.
Proposal
Based upon the Member feedback discussed above, IEX proposes to
modify IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7) to allow Users to submit a D-Limit order
with an optional cancel or re-price instruction. As proposed, if a D-
Limit order that is entered with the optional instruction was subject
to an automatic price adjustment pursuant to IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)(A)-
(D) and is resting at a price that is less aggressive than the NBBO ten
(10) milliseconds after the most recent quote instability determination
that resulted in the order being price adjusted, the order will either
be canceled or re-priced to the less aggressive of the order's limit
price or the NBB (for a buy order) or NBO (for a sell order), as
specified by the User.
Additionally, displayed D-Limit orders that re-price to the NBB
(for a buy order) or the NBO (for a sell order) will be subject to
IEX's Display-Price Sliding rule,\23\ and will be displayed at the
``most aggressive permissible price'' without locking or crossing a
Protected Quotation \24\ of an away market, which means they will be
priced one MPV less aggressive than the locking \25\ or crossing \26\
price. Non-displayed D-Limit orders that re-price to the NBB (for a buy
order) or the NBO (or a sell order) will be subject to IEX's Non-
Displayed Price Sliding rule, which means they will be able to post at
the locking or crossing price.\27\
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\23\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(h)(1).
\24\ See IEX Rule 1.160(bb).
\25\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(h)(3)(A)(ii).
\26\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(h)(3)(B)(ii).
\27\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(h)(2).
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Specifically, IEX proposes to add a new subsection (E) to IEX Rule
11.190(b)(7), to provide as follows:
(E) Cancel/Re-price Functionality. Users may attach an optional
instruction to a Discretionary Limit order to either re-price or
cancel an order that was price adjusted pursuant to subparagraphs
(A)-(D) above if the buy (sell) order is resting at a price that is
less aggressive than the NBB (NBO) ten (10) milliseconds after the
most recent quote instability determination, pursuant to paragraph
(g) of this IEX Rule 11.190, that resulted in the order being price
adjusted pursuant to subparagraphs (A)-(D) above, as set forth in
subparagraph (i) or (ii) below.
(i) Re-price. A buy (sell) order with the optional re-price
instruction will be automatically re-priced to the less aggressive
of the order's limit price or the NBB (NBO).
(ii) Cancel. An order with the optional cancel instruction will
be automatically canceled.\28\
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\28\ See Proposed IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)(E).
IEX also proposes to renumber subparagraph (E) of IEX Rule
11.190(b)(7) as subparagraph (F) of the rule, and to amend the new
subparagraph (F) to reflect that price adjusted D-Limit orders will
remain at the adjusted price, ``unless subject to another automatic
adjustment pursuant to subparagraphs (C)-(D) above, or the optional re-
price functionality described in subparagraph (E), above.'' \29\
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\29\ See Proposed IEX Rule 11.190(b)(7)(F).
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In determining how long to wait before applying the optional cancel
or re-price functionality to a D-Limit order, IEX considered how long
it would take for a User to cancel or re-price a D-Limit order itself
after receiving and processing a restatement message. Specifically, IEX
selected a time frame that would not give Users utilizing the proposed
cancel or pre-price functionality any speed advantage over Users
handling the cancel or re-price process themselves. IEX notes that all
outbound messages sent from the Exchange to Users are subject to 37
microseconds of latency,\30\ and all inbound messages sent from Users
to the Exchange are subject to 350 microseconds latency, totaling 387
microseconds.\31\ This ``round trip'' latency is more than nine (9)
milliseconds less than the 10-millisecond time than the time frame
proposed by IEX to trigger the optional cancel or re-price
functionality as described herein. IEX believes that this time
differential is materially longer than the amount of time needed for a
User to ingest and process the restatement message and determine
whether to cancel or re-price its D-Limit order. The timing
differential is designed to ensure that orders canceled or re-priced by
IEX have no advantage over orders canceled or repriced by a User that
processed the restatement message. To the contrary, the Exchange would
cancel or re-price orders more slowly than orders canceled or re-priced
by a User.
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\30\ See IEX Rule 11.510(a).
\31\ See IEX Rule 11.510(a).
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Additionally, IEX considered the fact that each time the CQI
determines that a quote is unstable, that period of quote instability
can last as long as two (2) milliseconds but that most price changes
within the predicted direction happen within ten (10) milliseconds
after the determination.\32\ Thus, IEX believes that a ten (10)
millisecond waiting period before a D-Limit order that was subject to
an automatic price adjustment is canceled or re-priced, if the User
included the optional cancel or re-price instruction with the order, is
reasonable. As noted above, this amount of time is materially longer
than it would take for a User to adjust the terms of an order subject
to price adjustment on its own, but not so long a time period that it
would leave an impacted order at
[[Page 72525]]
a less competitive \33\ price for an extended period of time. Moreover,
based on informal feedback from Members that indicated they might use
the proposed functionality, IEX believes that this time frame is
consistent with their D-Limit trading strategies.
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\32\ See IEX Rule 11.190(g). In June 2022, for all CQI
determinations where the relevant quote moved in the predicted
direction, 67% did so within 10 milliseconds (i.e., to a lower price
for an NBB determination or a higher price for an NBO
determination). After 10 milliseconds, IEX observed significantly
diminishing returns with respect to the rate of capturing additional
quote moves and therefore believes that 10 milliseconds is a
reasonable cutoff for the cancel/re-price functionality.
\33\ During periods of quote instability, D-Limit orders moved
to a price less aggressive than the NBB (NBO) for bids (offers) are
less likely to execute (although they could, for example, match with
a large Intermarket Sweep Order that clears out all liquidity
resting at more aggressive prices, see IEX Rule 11.190(b)(12)).
Under this proposal, 10 milliseconds after the last quote
instability determination, when the market for a particular security
is likely more stable, IEX will act on the User's instructions to
either re-price the D-Limit order to a more competitive price (the
NBB (NBO) for bids (offers)) or cancel the order back to the User.
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The following example, demonstrates how this functionality would
work:
<bullet> Market is $10.10 x $10.20.
<bullet> Order A, a non-displayed D-Limit buy order with limit
price of $10.11 (and re-price instruction) arrives, and books at
$10.11.
<bullet> Order B, a displayed D-Limit buy order with limit price of
$10.08 (and re-price instruction) arrives, and books at $10.08.
<bullet> Order C, a non-displayed D-Limit buy order with limit
price of $10.10 (and cancel instruction) arrives, and books at $10.10.
<bullet> IEX makes a quote instability determination for the bid
with a CQI Price of $10.10.
<bullet> Orders A and C are price adjusted to $10.09, one MPV less
than the CQI Price. Order B continues to rest at $10.08.
<bullet> After 3 milliseconds, the NBB drops to $10.09. No changes
to Orders A, B, or C.
<bullet> After 3 more milliseconds, the NBB returns to $10.10. No
changes to Orders A, B, or C.
<bullet> After 4 more milliseconds (i.e., 10 milliseconds after the
most recent quote instability determination that resulted in Orders A
and C being price adjusted) the NBB remains at $10.10. Orders A and C
are now resting at a price less aggressive than the NBB and therefore
subject to re-pricing or cancellation pursuant to the User
instructions. Order A re-prices to $10.10 (the less aggressive of the
NBB or its limit price) and Order C cancels. Order B remains unchanged
because it was never subject to an automatic price adjustment and, even
though resting at a price less aggressive than the NBB, is not subject
to re-pricing notwithstanding its User instruction.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with section 6(b) of the Act,\34\ in general, and furthers the
objectives of section 6(b)(5),\35\ in particular, in that it is
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged in facilitating transactions in
securities, and to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to
protect investors and the public interest. Specifically, the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the
protection of investors and the public interest because it is designed
to provide more flexibility and opportunities for Members to add both
displayed and non-displayed liquidity to the Exchange. As noted in the
Purpose section, the proposed rule change is responsive to informal
feedback from some Members, stating that they cannot readily configure
their trading systems to receive, process, and respond to D-Limit
restatement messages IEX transmits to Members after each price
adjustment. In these cases, the Members are unable to track whether
their D-Limit orders have been re-priced, and if so, the price at which
they are currently resting. Without this information, IEX understands
that such Members are hindered in their ability to timely cancel or
adjust the prices of their resting D-Limit orders to meet their trading
objectives. To address this issue, impacted Members have requested that
IEX provide optional functionality allowing a D-Limit order that has
been subject to an automatic price adjustment to be automatically
either canceled or re-priced in certain circumstances. Specifically,
this option would allow the User to elect to automatically cancel or
re-price the order when, ten (10) milliseconds following the most
recent quote instability determination that resulted in a price
adjustment, it is resting at a price less aggressive than the NBBO.
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\34\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\35\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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By providing additional functionality to enable Members to more
effectively manage D-Limit orders, IEX believes that the proposed rule
change will promote more aggressive pricing that may attract additional
liquidity to the Exchange and, to the extent it is successful in doing
so, will benefit all market participants, thereby supporting the
purposes of the Act to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism
of a free and open market and a national market system, and in general,
to protect investors and the public interest. Specifically, for Users
that utilize the proposed optional re-price functionality, their D-
Limit orders will be priced at more aggressive prices that are more
likely to execute during periods of quote stability. Similarly, IEX
believes that Users that utilize the proposed optional cancel
functionality are more likely to resubmit some or all of those orders
with more aggressive prices following cancelation, which are also more
likely to execute during periods of quote stability.
The Exchange further believes that the proposed rule change is
consistent with the Act because it would be available to all Members on
a fair, equal and nondiscriminatory basis regardless of their
technological sophistication. Moreover, the proposal is designed to
incentivize the entry of additional D-Limit orders by providing the
additional optional functionality to support Members' ability to manage
such orders. To the extent that such incentive is successful, all
market participants, including takers of liquidity, will benefit.
The Exchange also believes that the proposed rule change is
consistent with the protection of investors and the public interest
because the circumstances under which a D-Limit order will be adjusted
are narrowly tailored, transparent, and predictable, as described in
the Purpose section.
Further, the Exchange believes that the proposed functionality is
similar to existing functionality on IEX and other exchanges wherein
the price of an order is adjusted based on user instructions. These
include price sliding and cancellation provisions to address locked and
crossed markets, LULD bands,\36\ Regulation SHO,\37\ anti-
internalization, and pegged orders. As described more fully below, it
is well established that exchanges can permit market participants to
enter orders with a forward-looking instruction whereby the exchange
will re-price or cancel an order in the future, under specified
circumstances. IEX believes that the proposed rule change is
substantially similar to these existing functionalities.
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\36\ See IEX Rules 11.190(h)(5) and 11.280(e)(5)(B) (displayed
and non-displayed limit orders priced above (below) the upper
(lower) Limit Up-Limit Down (``LULD'') bands are automatically re-
priced to the upper (lower) LULD price band.
\37\ See IEX Rule 11.190(h)(4) (short sale orders not marked
short exempt that cannot be executed or displayed in compliance with
Rule 201 of Regulation SHO are re-priced to a price equal to one MPV
above the current NBB).
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IEX and other exchanges accept certain types of users' order
instructions to prevent an incoming displayed order
[[Page 72526]]
from locking or crossing an away market's Protected Quotation. While
all exchanges have rules designed to prevent an incoming displayed
order locking or crossing an away market's Protected Quotation, as
required by Regulation NMS, some exchanges also provide users with
various options for price adjusting or canceling an order that would
otherwise lock or cross an away market. For example, MEMX LLC
(``MEMX'') and MIAX PEARL LLC (``PEARL'') allow users to specify that a
displayed order subject to price sliding will be cancelled upon entry
to avoid crossing the market, instead of being re-priced.\38\
Additionally, MEMX and PEARL offer an optional ``multiple price
sliding'' instruction for displayed orders. If one of their members
does not opt in to ``multiple price sliding'', MEMX or PEARL will
adjust the order's price two times to prevent a lock or cross of an
away market Protected Quotation, after which time it will cancel the
order if a third re-pricing is required by changes in the NBBO.\39\ But
if the User includes the ``multiple price sliding'' instruction, both
MEMX and PEARL will continue to adjust the price indefinitely as
required by NBBO changes.\40\ This logic also applies to displayed
orders that are priced outside of the LULD Bands. Based on a user's
instructions, MEMX or PEARL will cancel an order priced outside of the
LULD bands, re-price the displayed order up to two times and cancel the
order if a third re-pricing is required by changes in the NBBO (if the
order does not have a ``multiple price sliding'' instruction), or
continue to adjust the order's price.\41\
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\38\ See MEMX Rule 11.6(j)(A)(i) and PEARL Rule 2614(g)(1)(C).
\39\ See supra note 38.
\40\ See supra note 38.
\41\ See MEMX Rule 11.16(e)(5)(B) and PEARL Rule 2622(e).
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Further, IEX and other exchanges permit entry of a non-displayed
order with a minimum quantity instruction to cancel remaining, which
means a partial execution will result in the order being canceled if
the number of shares remaining do not satisfy the order's minimum
quantity requirement.\42\
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\42\ See, e.g., IEX Rule 11.190(b)(11)(G)(i); see also MEMX
Rule 11.6(f); PEARL Rule 2614(c)(7).
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Additionally, some exchange order types allow a user to submit an
order with specific instructions about how much the order's price can
be adjusted to match with contra-side interest. For example, Cboe BZX
Exchange, Inc. (``BZX'') has a discretionary order type that is a
displayed or non-displayed limit order with a user submitted
``discretionary price,'' which is a non-displayed offset amount at
which the user is willing to buy or sell.\43\ The aggressiveness of the
user-selected discretionary price will impact the likelihood that a
discretionary order will execute. Similarly, Cboe EDGX Exchange Inc.
(``EDGX'') offers a midpoint discretionary order (``MDO'') with
optional quote depletion protection (``QDP'').\44\ A MDO behaves like
IEX's Discretionary Peg order type \45\ in that the order is usually
able to exercise discretion up to the Midpoint Price.\46\ However, EDGX
users may submit their MDO orders with the optional QDP instruction,
which will prevent the MDO from exercising any discretion for a period
of two milliseconds after the best bid (offer) displayed on EDGX's
order book is executed for less than one round lot.\47\ Therefore, the
EDGX user submitting the MDO order can instruct the exchange to not let
the order execute at more aggressive prices under specific market
conditions unknown to the user at the time the order was submitted.
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\43\ See BZX Rule 11.9(c)(10).
\44\ See EDGX Rule 11.8(g).
\45\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(10).
\46\ See IEX Rule 1.160(t).
\47\ See EDGX Rule 11.8(g)(10). By contrast an IEX Discretionary
Peg order will never exercise discretion during a period of quote
instability as defined in IEX Rule 11.190(b)(10)(K).
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Finally, pegged orders such as Midpoint Peg \48\ and Primary Peg
\49\ orders, which peg to the Midpoint Price \50\ and one MPV less
aggressive than the NBB (NBO) for buy (sell) orders, respectively, are
examples of an IEX User instructing the Exchange to re-price orders in
response to future changes in the NBBO. IEX believes that the proposed
optional re-pricing functionality is analogous because, as with pegging
orders, the re-pricing is to the best bid or best offer. And IEX notes
that several other exchanges have displayed order types that are pegged
to the NBBO and thus subject to price adjustments as the NBBO
changes.\51\
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\48\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(9).
\49\ See IEX Rule 11.190(b)(8).
\50\ See IEX Rule 1.160(t).
\51\ See, e.g., Cboe EDGA, Inc. Equity (``EDGA'') Rule 11.8(e)
and the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq'') Rule 4703(g).
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IEX believes that these examples described above demonstrate there
is precedent for exchanges providing an ability for market participants
to enter orders with a forward-looking instruction whereby the exchange
will re-price or cancel an order in the future, under specified
circumstances. IEX further believes that the proposed rule change is
consistent with these exchanges' rule-based practices. As proposed, an
IEX Member would simply be able to optionally instruct the Exchange to
re-price or cancel a D-Limit order under specified circumstances.
Accordingly, based on the forgoing, the Exchange does not believe
that the proposed rule change raises any novel issues not already
considered by the Commission.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on intermarket competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. To the contrary,
the proposal is designed to enhance IEX's competitiveness with other
markets by further enhancing IEX's D-Limit order type functionality. As
discussed in the Purpose section, the proposal is designed to
incentivize the entry of additional liquidity providing orders on IEX
by offering Members the flexibility of including an optional
instruction to either cancel or re-price a D-Limit order that has been
price adjusted during a period of quote instability, if 10 milliseconds
after the most recent quote instability determination that resulted in
a price adjustment, the order is priced less aggressively than the NBB
(NBO) for buy (sell) orders. By giving more opportunities to Members to
make their D-Limit orders more competitive (if not canceled) after a
period of quote instability ends, IEX believes this proposal will
enhance opportunities for price discovery and increase the overall
displayed (and non-displayed) liquidity profile on the Exchange, to the
benefit of all market participants.
The Exchange also does not believe that the proposed rule change
will impose any burden on intramarket competition that is not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. All Members
would be eligible to include the optional cancel or re-price
instruction on any or all of their D-Limit orders in the same manner.
Moreover, the proposal would provide potential benefits to all Members
to the extent that there is more liquidity available on IEX as a result
of increased use of D-Limit orders attributable to the ability to enter
such orders with optional cancellation or re-pricing instructions.
[[Page 72527]]
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days of such
date (i) as the Commission may designate if it finds such longer period
to be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as
to which the Exchange consents, the Commission shall: (a) by order
approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or (b) institute
proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule change should be
disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
<bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (<a href="http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>); or
<bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5624233a337b35393b3b333822251625333578313920"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6311160f064e000c0e0e060d1710231006004d040c15">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include
File Number SR-IEX-2022-10 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
<bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-IEX-2022-10. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (<a href="http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml">http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml</a>).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection
and copying at the principal offices of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying
information from comment submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-IEX-2022-10, and should be submitted on
or before December 16, 2022.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\52\
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\52\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-25663 Filed 11-23-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on November 25, 2022.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.