Notice2022-22739
Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans
Primary source
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Published
October 19, 2022
Issuing agencies
Homeland Security Department
Abstract
This notice describes a new effort designed to immediately address the increasing number of encounters of Venezuelan nationals along the southwest border (SWB), as the Administration continues to implement its broader, multi-pronged and regional strategy to address the challenges posed by irregular migration. Venezuelans who do not avail themselves of this process, and instead enter the United States without authorization between POEs, will be subject to expulsion or removal. As part of this effort, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will implement a process--modeled on the successful Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) parole process--for certain Venezuelan nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner. To be eligible, individuals must have a supporter in the United States who agrees to provide housing and other supports as needed; must pass national security and public safety vetting; and must agree to fly at their own expense to an interior U.S. port of entry (POE), rather than entering at a land POE. Individuals are ineligible if they have been ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years or have entered unauthorized into the United States between POEs, Mexico, or Panama after the date of this notice's publication.
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 201 (Wednesday, October 19, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63507-63517]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-22739]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans
AGENCY: Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: This notice describes a new effort designed to immediately
address the increasing number of encounters of Venezuelan nationals
along the southwest border (SWB), as the Administration continues to
implement its broader, multi-pronged and regional strategy to address
the challenges posed by irregular migration. Venezuelans who do not
avail themselves of this process, and instead enter the United States
without authorization between POEs, will be subject to expulsion or
removal. As part of this effort, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) will implement a process--modeled on the successful Uniting for
Ukraine (U4U) parole process--for certain Venezuelan nationals to
lawfully enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner. To be
eligible, individuals must have a supporter in the United States who
agrees to provide housing and other supports as needed; must pass
national security and public safety vetting; and must agree to fly at
their own expense to an interior U.S. port of entry (POE), rather than
entering at a land POE. Individuals are ineligible if they have been
ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years or
have entered unauthorized into the United States between POEs, Mexico,
or Panama after the date of this notice's publication.
DATES: DHS will begin accepting online applications for this process on
October 18, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ihsan Gunduz, Office of Strategy,
Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland Security, 2707 Martin Luther
King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-0445, (202) 282-9708.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background--Venezuela Parole Process
This notice describes the implementation of a new parole process
for certain Venezuelan nationals announced by the Secretary of Homeland
Security on October 12, 2022,\1\ including the eligibility criteria and
filing process. The parole process is intended to enhance border
security by reducing the record levels of Venezuelan nationals entering
the United States between POEs, while also providing a process for
certain such nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe
and orderly manner.
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\1\ DHS Announces New Migration Enforcement Process for
Venezuelans, October 12, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/10/12/dhs-announces-new-migration-enforcement-process-venezuelans">https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/10/12/dhs-announces-new-migration-enforcement-process-venezuelans</a>.
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The Secretary's announcement followed detailed consideration of a
wide range of relevant facts and alternatives, as reflected in the
Secretary's decision memorandum dated October 12, 2022.\2\ The complete
reasons for the Secretary's decision are included in that memorandum.
This Federal Register notice is intended to provide appropriate context
and guidance for the public regarding the policy and relevant
procedures associated with this policy.
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\2\ See Memorandum for the Secretary from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Commissioner and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services Director, Parole Process for Certain Venezuelan Nationals
(Oct. 12, 2022).
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A. Overview
The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-pronged, regional
strategy to address the challenges posed by irregular migration. The
strategy--a shared endeavor with partner countries--focuses on
addressing the root causes of migration, which currently are fueling
unprecedented levels of irregular migration, and creating safe and
orderly processes for migration throughout the region. This strategy
will reduce regional irregular migration in the mid- to long-term, but
we anticipate continued substantial pressures along the southwest
border over the coming months.
In light of this reality, DHS is implementing an immediate effort
to address the increasing number of encounters of Venezuelan nationals
at the SWB as we continue to implement the broader and long-term
strategy. We anticipate that this new effort would reduce the record
levels of Venezuelan nationals seeking to irregularly enter the United
States between POEs along the SWB, while also providing a process for
certain such nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe
and orderly manner.
With the cooperation of the Government of Mexico (GOM), and
potentially other governments, this effort is intended to serve as a
deterrent to irregular migration by providing a meaningful alternative
to irregular migration and by imposing immediate consequences on
Venezuelan nationals who choose to not avail themselves of the new
process and instead seek to irregularly enter the United States
[[Page 63508]]
between POEs. It will also provide an incentive for Venezuelans to
avoid the often dangerous journey to the border altogether, by putting
in place a safe and orderly process for Venezuelan nationals to travel
to the United States to seek a discretionary, case-by-case grant of
parole into the United States, based on significant public benefit and
urgent humanitarian reasons.\3\ Venezuelan nationals who irregularly
enter the United States between POEs after October 19, 2022 are subject
to expulsion or removal from the United States; those who enter
irregularly into the United States, Mexico, or Panama will also be
found ineligible for a discretionary grant of parole under this
process. Only those who meet specified criteria and pass national
security and public safety vetting would be eligible for consideration
for parole under this process.
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\3\ See INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
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Implementation of the parole process is conditioned on Mexico
continuing to accept the expulsion or removal of Venezuelan nationals
seeking to irregularly enter the United States between POEs. As such,
this new process will couple a meaningful incentive to seek a lawful,
safe and orderly means of traveling to the United States with the
imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter irregularly.
The new policy is modeled on Uniting for Ukraine (U4U), the
successful parole process that was put in place in the wake of Russia's
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, when thousands of Ukrainian migrants
spontaneously arrived at SWB POEs. Once U4U was implemented, such
spontaneous arrivals fell sharply, and travel shifted to a safe and
orderly process. This new process is procedurally similar to U4U, in
which certain Ukrainians with U.S.-based supporters who meet specified
eligibility criteria have been able to travel to the United States to
seek a discretionary, case-by-case grant of parole for up to two years.
As in U4U, applications using this parole process will be initiated by
a supporter in the United States who would apply on behalf of a
Venezuelan individual and commit to providing the beneficiary housing
and other financial support, as needed, for the duration of their
parole.
In addition to the supporter requirement, Venezuelan nationals are
required to meet several eligibility criteria, as outlined in more
detail later in this notice, to receive advance authorization to travel
to the United States and be considered for parole, on a case-by-case
basis. Importantly, individuals are ineligible if they have been
ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years;
they are also ineligible if they have crossed into the United States
between POEs, or entered Mexico or Panama without authorization, after
October 19, 2022. Only those who pass national security and public
safety vetting and agree to fly to an interior POE, as opposed to
entering between POEs, and who meet all specified criteria below will
be eligible to receive advance authorization to travel to the United
States and be considered for parole, on a case-by-case basis, under
this process.
Any discretionary grants of parole will be for a temporary period
of up to two years. During this two-year period, the United States will
continue to build on the multi-pronged and long-term strategy and
engage with our foreign partners throughout the region. These efforts
are intended to support conditions that would decrease irregular
migration, work to improve refugee processing and other lawful
immigration pathways in the region, and allow for increased removals of
those who continue to migrate irregularly and lack a valid claim of
asylum or other lawful basis to remain in the United States. The two-
year period will also enable individuals to seek humanitarian relief or
other immigration benefits for which they may be eligible, and to work
and contribute to the U.S. economy as they do so. Those who are not
granted asylum or other immigration benefits will need to leave the
United States at the expiration of their authorized period of parole or
will generally be placed in removal proceedings after the period of
parole expires.
The temporary, case-by-case parole of qualifying Venezuelan
nationals pursuant to this process will provide a significant public
benefit for the United States, while also addressing the urgent
humanitarian reasons that Venezuelan nationals are fleeing, to include
repression and unsafe conditions in their home country. Most
significantly, we anticipate that parole will: (i) enhance the security
of our SWB by reducing irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals;
(ii) enhance border security and national security by vetting
individuals prior to their arrival at a United States POE; (iii) reduce
the strain on DHS personnel and resources; (iv) minimize the domestic
impact of Venezuelan irregular migration; (v) disincentivize a
dangerous irregular journey that puts migrant lives and safety at risk
and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill important foreign
policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in the hemisphere. The
process is capped at 24,000 beneficiaries. After this cap is reached,
DHS will not approve additional beneficiaries, absent a Secretary-level
decision, at the Secretary's sole discretion, to continue the process.
B. Conditions at the Border
1. Trends and Flows: Increase of Venezuelan Nationals Arriving at the
Southwest Border
The last decades have yielded a dramatic increase in encounters at
the SWB and a dramatic shift in the demographics of those encountered.
Throughout the 1980s and into the first decade of the 2000s, encounters
along the SWB routinely numbered in the millions per year. By the early
2010s, three decades of investments in border security and strategy
contributed to reduced border flows, with border encounters averaging
fewer than 400,000 per year from 2011-2017.\4\ These gains were
subsequently reversed, however, as border encounters more than doubled
between 2017 and 2019, and--following a steep drop in the first months
of the COVID-19 pandemic--continued to increase at a similar pace in
2021 and 2022.
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\4\ Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of historic
CBP data.
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Shifts in demographics have also had a significant effect on
irregular migration. Border encounters in the 1980s and 1990s consisted
overwhelmingly of single adults from Mexico, most of whom were
migrating for economic reasons. Beginning in the 2010s, a growing share
of migrants have been from Northern Central America \5\ (NCA) and,
since the late 2010s, from countries throughout the Americas. Migrant
populations from these newer source countries have included large
numbers of families and children, many of whom are traveling to escape
violence and political oppression and for other non-economic
reasons.\6\
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\5\ Northern Central America refers to El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.
\6\ Prior to 2013, the overall share of encounters who were
processed for expedited removal and claimed fear averaged less than
2 percent annually. Between 2013 and 2018, the share rose from 8 to
20 percent, before dropping with the surge of family unit encounters
in 2019 (most of whom were not placed in expedited removal) and the
onset of Title 42 expulsions in 2020. As the same time, between 2013
and 2021, among those placed in expedited removal, the share making
fear claims increased from 16 to 82 percent. OIS analysis of
historic CBP and USCIS data and OIS Enforcement Lifecycle through
June 30, 2022.
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The most recent rise in the numbers of encounters at the border has
been driven in significant part by a surge in
[[Page 63509]]
migration of Venezuelan nationals. Unique encounters of Venezuelan
nationals increased throughout fiscal year (FY) 2021, totaling 47,328.
More than 25% of Venezuela's population has left the country. The
United States is seeing a rising rate of Venezuelans encountered at our
border over the past two years, which has surged in the last few
months. Average monthly unique encounters of Venezuelan nationals at
the land border totaled 15,494 in FY 2022,\7\ rising further to over
25,000 in August and 33,000 in September, compared to a monthly average
of 127 unique encounters from FY 2014-2019.\8\ Of note, unique
encounters of Venezuelan nationals rose 293 percent between FY 2021 and
FY 2022, while unique encounters of all other nationalities combined
increased by 45 percent. Panama is currently seeing more than 3,000
people, mostly Venezuelan nationals, crossing into its territory from
Colombia via the Dari[eacute]n jungle each day.
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\7\ FY 2022 CBP data cited in this notice is based on internal
reporting to date. CBP releases official data in regular intervals;
final FY 2022 figures may differ to some degree from the figures
cited here.
\8\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through
August 31, 2022 and OIS analysis of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) data from Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) as of
October 6, 2022. Unique encounters include encounters of persons at
the Southwest Border who were not previously encountered in the
prior 12 months. Throughout this notice unique encounter data are
defined to also include OFO parolees and other OFO administrative
encounters.
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In recent months, this surge in irregular migration of Venezuelan
nationals has been accelerating. Nationals from Venezuela accounted for
25,130 unique encounters in August 2022, and the Office of Immigration
Statistics (OIS) estimates that there were 33,500 unique encounters in
September, more than Mexico and more than all three NCA countries
combined.\9\
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\9\ OIS Persist Dataset based on data through August 31, 2022
and OIS analysis of CBP UIP data as of October 6, 2022.
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2. Push and Pull Factors
DHS assesses that the high--and rising--number of Venezuelan
encounters has three key causes: First, the deteriorating conditions in
Venezuela, including repression, instability, and violence, are pushing
large numbers to leave their home country. Second, the lack of safe and
orderly migration alternatives throughout the entire region, including
to the United States, means that those seeking refuge outside of
Venezuela have few lawful options. Third, the United States faces
significant limits on the ability to return Venezuelan nationals to
Venezuela or elsewhere, as described below; absent such a return
ability, more individuals are willing to take a chance that they can
come--and stay.
a. Factors Pushing Migration From Venezuela
A complex political, humanitarian, and economic crisis; the
widespread presence of non-state armed groups; crumbling
infrastructure; and the repressive tactics of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro
have caused nearly 7 million Venezuelans to flee their country.\10\
Maduro has arbitrarily banned key opposition figures from participating
in the political process, detained hundreds of political prisoners,
employed judicial processes to circumscribe political parties, and
denied opposition political representatives equal access to media
coverage and freedom of movement in the country.\11\ In a February 2022
report, Amnesty International reported that ``[c]rimes under
international law and human rights violations, including politically
motivated arbitrary detentions, torture, extrajudicial executions and
excessive use of force have been systematic and widespread, and could
constitute crimes against humanity.'' \12\ Amnesty International
further reported that ``trends of repression in Venezuela have been
directed against a specific group of people: those perceived as
dissidents or opponents'' of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro.\13\
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\10\ UNHCR, Venezuela Situation, available at: <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html">https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html</a> (last visited Sept. 24,
2022).
\11\ 2021 Country Reports of Human Rights Practices: Venezuela,
U.S. Department of State, Apr. 12, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/venezuela/">https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/venezuela/</a> (last visited Sept. 24, 2022).
\12\ Venezuela: Calculated repression: Correlation between
stigmatization and politically motivated arbitrary detentions,
Amnesty International, p. 11, Feb. 10, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/">https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/</a> (last visited Sept.
25, 2022).
\13\ Venezuela: Calculated repression: Correlation between
stigmatization and politically motivated arbitrary detentions,
Amnesty International, p.52, Feb. 10, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/">https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/</a> (last visited Sept.
25, 2022).
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According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Venezuela has become the second-largest external displacement crisis in
the world, following Syria.\14\ At least in the short term, the crisis
is expected to continue, thus continuing to push Venezuelans to seek
alternatives elsewhere. As described above, Panama is currently seeing
more than 3,000 people, mostly Venezuelan nationals, crossing into its
territory from Colombia via the Dari[eacute]n jungle each day.
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\14\ UNHCR, Venezuela Situation, available at: <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html">https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html</a> (last visited Sept. 24,
2022).
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b. Return Limitations
At this time, there are significant limits in DHS's ability to
expel or return Venezuelans who enter the United States without
authorization in between POEs. DHS is currently under a court-ordered
obligation to implement the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention's (CDC) Title 42 public health Order, under which covered
noncitizens may be prevented entry or expelled to prevent the spread of
communicable disease.\15\ But Venezuela does not presently allow
repatriations via charter flights, which significantly limits DHS's
ability to return those subject to the Title 42 Order or who are
ordered removed. To date, other countries, including Mexico, have
generally been reluctant to accept Venezuelans as well. As a result,
DHS was only able to repatriate a small number of Venezuelan nationals
to Venezuela in FY 2022.
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\15\ Louisiana v. CDC,--F. Supp. 3d--, 2022 WL 1604901 (W.D. La.
May 20, 2022).
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c. Overall Effect
DHS assesses that the combination of the country conditions in
Venezuela, the lack of safe and orderly lawful pathways, and the
present inability to expel or remove Venezuelan nationals engaged in
irregular migration, has significantly led to the significant increase
in irregular migration among Venezuelan nationals. Conversely, DHS
assesses that the return of a significant portion of Venezuelans who
enter irregularly at the border, coupled with an alternative process
pursuant to which Venezuelans could enter the United States lawfully,
would meaningfully change the incentives for those intending to
migrate--leading to a decline in the numbers of Venezuelans seeking to
irregularly cross the SWB.
This prediction is based on prior experience: CBP saw rapidly
increasing numbers of encounters of Guatemalan and Honduran nationals
from January 2021 until August 2021, when these countries began
accepting the direct return of their nationals. In January 2021, CBP
encountered an average of 424 Guatemalan nationals and 362 Honduran
nationals a day. By August 4, 2021, the 30-day average daily encounter
rates had climbed to 1,249 Guatemalan nationals and 1,502 Honduran
nationals--an increase of 195 percent and 315 percent, respectively. In
the 60 days immediately following the resumption of routine flights,
average daily encounters fell by 37
[[Page 63510]]
percent for Guatemala and 42 percent for Honduras, as shown in Figure 1
below.\16\
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\16\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through
August 31, 2022.
Figure 1: Daily Encounters of Guatemalan and Honduran Nationals, May 1-
November 1, 2021.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN19OC22.007
Note: Figure depicts 30-day average of daily encounters.
Source: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset.
Returns alone, however, are not sufficient. While the numbers of
encounters of Guatemalan and Honduran nationals have fallen, CBP is
currently encountering a total of around 1,000 nationals from these two
countries each day. The process thus seeks to combine a consequence for
Venezuelan nationals who seek to enter the United States irregularly at
the land border with an incentive to use the lawful process to request
authorization to travel by air to and enter the United States, without
making the dangerous journey to the border.
This effort is informed by the way that similar incentives and
disincentives worked in the U4U process. In the two weeks prior to
U4U's implementation, DHS encountered a daily average of 940 nationals
of Ukraine at the U.S.-Mexico land border seeking to enter the United
States. After the new parole process launched and approved Ukrainians
could fly directly into the United States--whereas those who sought to
enter irregularly were subject to expulsion pursuant to the Title 42
public health Order--daily encounters dropped to fewer than twelve per
day.\17\ Mexican officials also reported seeing a similar decline in
the number of inbound Ukrainian air passengers.
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\17\ OIS Persist Dataset based on data through August 31, 2022.
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3. Impact on DHS Resources and Operations
To respond to the increase in encounters along the SWB since FY
2021--an increase that has accelerated in FY 2022, driven in
significant part by the number of Venezuelan nationals encountered--DHS
has taken a series of extraordinary steps. Largely since FY 2021, DHS
has built and now operates 10 soft-sided processing facilities, which
cost $688 million in FY 2022. It has detailed 3,770 officers and agents
from CBP and ICE to the SWB. In FY 2022, DHS had to utilize its above
threshold reprogramming authority to identify approximately $281
million from elsewhere in the Department to address SWB needs, to
include facilities, transportation, medical care, and personnel costs.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent $260
million in FYs 2021 and 2022 on grants to non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and state and local entities through the Emergency
Food and Shelter Program--Humanitarian (EFSP--H) to assist with the
reception and onward travel of irregular migrants arriving at the SWB.
This spending is in addition to $1.4 billion in FY 2022 one-year surge
funding for SWB enforcement and processing capacities.\18\
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\18\ DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness,
DHS Memorandum for Interested Parties, Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security, Apr. 26, 2022.
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The impact has been particularly acute in certain border sectors.
The increased flows of Venezuelan nationals are disproportionately
occurring within the remote Del Rio, El Paso, and Yuma sectors, all of
which are at risk of operating, or are currently operating, over
capacity. In FY 2022, 93 percent of unique encounters of Venezuelan
nationals occurred in these three sectors, with the trend rising to 98
percent in September 2022.\19\ In FY 2022, the Del Rio, El Paso, and
Yuma sectors encountered almost double the number of migrants as
compared to FY 2021 (an 87 percent increase), and a ten-fold increase
over the average for FY 2014-FY 2019, primarily as a result of
increases in Venezuelans and other non-traditional sending
countries.\20\
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\19\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset through August 31, 2022
and CBP UIP data for September 1-30, 2022.
\20\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset through August 31,
2022.
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The focused increase in encounters in those three sectors is
particularly challenging. Yuma and Del Rio sectors are geographically
remote, and because--until the past two years--they have never been a
focal point for large numbers of individuals entering irregularly, they
have limited infrastructure and personnel in place to safely process
the elevated encounters
[[Page 63511]]
that they are seeing. El Paso sector has relatively modern
infrastructure for processing noncitizens encountered at the border,
but is far away from other CBP sectors, which makes it challenging to
move individuals elsewhere for processing during surges.
In an effort to decompress sectors that are experiencing surges,
DHS deploys lateral transportation, using buses and flights to move
noncitizens to other sectors with capacity to process. In just one week
(between September 22-September 28), El Paso and Yuma sectors operated
a combined 79 decompression buses staffed by Border Patrol agents to
neighboring sectors.\21\ In that same week, El Paso and Yuma sectors
also operated 29 combined lateral decompression flights, redistributing
noncitizens to other sectors with additional capacity.\22\
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\21\ Data from SBCC, as of September 29, 2022.
\22\ Data from SBCC, as of September 29, 2022.
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Because these assets are finite, using DHS air resources to operate
lateral flights impacts DHS's ability to operate international
repatriation flights to receiving countries, leaving noncitizens in
custody for longer and further taxing DHS resources. This is concerning
given the correlation between DHS's ability to operate return flights
to non-contiguous home countries and encounters at the border, as
described above. DHS assesses that a reduction in the flow of
Venezuelans arriving at the SWB would reduce pressure on overstretched
resources and enable the Department to more quickly process and, as
appropriate, return or remove those who do not have a lawful basis to
stay.
II. DHS Parole Authority
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) provides the
Secretary of Homeland Security with discretionary authority to parole
noncitizens into the United States temporarily, under such reasonable
conditions that the Secretary may prescribe, on a case-by-case basis
for ``urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.'' \23\
Parole is not an admission of the individual to the United States, and
a parolee remains an ``applicant for admission'' during the period of
parole in the United States.\24\ DHS may set the duration of the parole
based on the purpose for granting the parole request and may impose
reasonable conditions on parole.\25\ Individuals may be granted advance
authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole.\26\ DHS
may terminate parole in its discretion at any time.\27\ Individuals who
are paroled into the United States generally may apply for employment
authorization.\28\
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\23\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 6
U.S.C. 202(4) (charging the Secretary with the responsibility for
``[e]stablishing and administering rules . . . governing . . .
parole'').
\24\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
\25\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
\26\ See 8 CFR 212.5(f).
\27\ See 8 CFR 212.5(e).
\28\ See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11).
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This effort will combine a consequence for those who seek to enter
the United States irregularly between POEs with a significant incentive
for Venezuelan nationals to remain where they are and use a lawful
process to request authorization to travel by air to and ultimately
enter the United States for the purpose of seeking a discretionary
grant of parole for up to two years.
III. Justification for the Process
A. Significant Public Benefit
The case-by-case parole of Venezuelan nationals pursuant to this
process--which combines consequences for those who seek to enter the
United States irregularly between POEs with an opportunity for eligible
Venezuelan nationals to seek advance authorization to travel to the
United States to seek discretionary parole, on a case-by-case basis, in
the United States--will serve a significant public benefit for
multiple, intersecting reasons. Specifically, as noted above, we assess
that the parole of eligible individuals pursuant to this process will
result in the following: (i) enhancing the security of our border by
reducing irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals; (ii) enhancing
border security and national security by vetting individuals before
they arrive at our border; (iii) reducing the strain on DHS personnel
and resources; (iv) minimizing the domestic impact of Venezuelan
irregular migration; (v) disincentivizing a dangerous irregular journey
that puts migrant lives and safety at risk and enriches smuggling
networks; and (vi) fulfilling important foreign policy goals to manage
migration collaboratively in the hemisphere and, as part of those
efforts, to establish additional processing pathways from within the
region to discourage irregular migration.
1. Enhancing the Security of Our Border by Reducing Irregular Migration
of Venezuelan Nationals
Implementation of the parole process is contingent on the GOM
agreeing to accept the return of Venezuelan nationals encountered
irregularly entering the United States without authorization between
POEs. While DHS remains under the court order to implement the CDC's
Title 42 public health Order, these returns will take the form of
expulsions. Once Title 42 is no longer in place, DHS will engage the
GOM to effectuate Title 8 removals of individuals subject to expedited
removal who cannot be returned to Venezuela or elsewhere. The ability
to effectuate returns to Mexico will impose a consequence on irregular
entry that currently does not exist.
As described above, Venezuelan nationals make up a significant and
growing number of those encountered seeking to cross between POEs
irregularly. We assess that without additional and more immediate
consequences imposed on those who seek to do so, together with a safe
and orderly parole process, the numbers will continue to grow. By
pairing a consequence on those seeking to irregularly cross between the
POEs with the incentive provided by the opportunity to apply for
advance authorization to travel to the United States to seek a
discretionary grant of parole, this process will create a combination
of incentives and disincentives that will lead to a substantial decline
in irregular migration by Venezuelans to the SWB.
As also described above, this expectation is informed, in part, by
past experience with respect to the ways that flows of irregular
migration decreased from NCA countries once nationals from those
countries were returned to their home countries and shifts that took
place once the U4U process was initiated. These experiences provide
compelling evidence of the importance of coupling effective
disincentives for irregular entry with incentives for lawful entry as a
way of addressing migratory surges.
2. Enhance Border Security and National Security by Vetting Individuals
Before They Arrive at Our Border
The Venezuelan parole process described above will allow DHS to vet
potential beneficiaries for national security and public safety
purposes before they travel to the United States. It is important to
note that all noncitizens DHS encounters at the border undergo thorough
vetting against national security and public safety databases during
their processing, and that individuals who are determined to pose a
national security or public safety threat are detained pending removal.
Venezuelan nationals seeking parole via this process will still be
subject to this vetting upon their arrival at the POE. That said, there
are distinct advantages to being able to conduct some vetting actions
before an individual arrives at the border to prevent individuals who
[[Page 63512]]
could pose threats to national security or public safety from even
traveling to the United States.
As described above, the vetting will require prospective
beneficiaries to upload a live photograph via a mobile application.
This will substantially enhance the scope of the pre-travel vetting--
thereby enabling DHS to better identify those with criminal records or
other disqualifying information of concern and deny them an advance
authorization to travel before they arrive at our border.
3. Reduce the Burden on DHS Personnel and Resources
As discussed above, the impact of the increased migratory flows has
strained the DHS workforce in ways that have been particularly
concentrated in certain sectors along the SWB. By reducing encounters
of Venezuelan nationals at the SWB, and channeling decreased flows of
Venezuelan nationals to interior POEs through this streamlined process,
we anticipate the process will relieve some of this burden. This will
free up resources, including those focused on decompression of border
sectors, which in turn could enable an increase in removal flights--
enabling the removal of more noncitizens with final orders of removal
faster and reducing the number of days in DHS custody. While the
process will also draw on DHS resources within USCIS and CBP to process
requests for discretionary parole on a case-by-case basis and conduct
vetting, these requirements involve different parts of DHS and require
minimal resources as compared to the status quo.
4. Minimize the Domestic Impact
The increase in irregular migration, including the change in
demographics, has put a strain on domestic resources, which is felt
most acutely by border communities. As the number of arrivals
increases, thus necessitating more conditional releases, the strains
are shared by others as well. Given the current inability to return or
repatriate Venezuelans in substantial numbers, Venezuelan nationals
account for a significant percentage of the individuals being
conditionally released pending their removal proceedings or the
initiation of such proceedings after being encountered and processed
along the SWB.
State and local governments, along with NGOs, are providing
services and assistance to the Venezuelans and other noncitizens who
have arrived at our border, including by building new administrative
structures, finding additional housing facilities, and constructing
tent shelters to address the increased need.\29\ DHS also has worked
with Congress to make approximately $290 million available since FY
2019 through FEMA's EFSP to support NGOs and local governments that
provide initial reception for migrants entering through the SWB. This
funding has allowed DHS to support building significant NGO capacity
along the SWB, including a substantial increase in available shelter
beds in key locations.
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\29\ Aya Elamroussi and Adrienne Winston, Washington, DC,
approves creation of new agency to provide services for migrants
arriving from other states, CNN, Sept. 21, 2022, available at:
<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/us/washington-dc-migrant-services-office">https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/us/washington-dc-migrant-services-office</a> (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
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Despite these efforts, local communities have reported strain on
their ability to provide needed social services.\30\ Local officials
and NGOs report that the temporary shelters that house migrants are
quickly reaching capacity due to the high number of arrivals,\31\ and
stakeholders in the border region have expressed concern that shelters
will eventually reach full bed space capacity and not be able to host
any new arrivals.\32\ The parole process will address these concerns by
diverting flows of Venezuelan nationals to interior POEs through a safe
and orderly process and ensuring that those who do arrive in the United
States have support during their period of parole. The effort is
intended to yield a decrease in the numbers arriving at the SWB.
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\30\ Lauren Villagran. El Paso struggles to keep up with
Venezuelan migrants: 5 key things to know. Sep. 14, 2022, available
at: <a href="https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2022/09/14/venezuelan-migrants-el-paso-what-to-know-about-their-arrival/69493289007/">https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2022/09/14/venezuelan-migrants-el-paso-what-to-know-about-their-arrival/69493289007/</a> (last
visited Sept. 29, 2022); Uriel J. Garcia. El Paso scrambles to move
migrants off the streets and gives them free bus rides as shelters
reach capacity. Sept. 20, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2022/09/20/migrants-el-paso-texas-shelter/">https://www.texastribune.org/2022/09/20/migrants-el-paso-texas-shelter/</a>
(last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
\31\ Email from City of San Diego Office of Immigration Affairs
to DHS, Sept. 23, 2022.
\32\ Denelle Confair, Local migrant shelter reaching max
capacity as it receives hundreds per day, KGUN9 Tucson, Sept. 23,
2022, available at: <a href="https://www.kgun9.com/news/local-news/local-migrant-shelter-reaching-max-capacity-as-it-receives-hundreds-per-day">https://www.kgun9.com/news/local-news/local-migrant-shelter-reaching-max-capacity-as-it-receives-hundreds-per-day</a> (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
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Moreover, and critically, beneficiaries will be required to fly to
the interior, rather than arriving at the SWB, absent extraordinary
circumstances. They will only be authorized to come to the United
States if they have a supporter who has agreed to receive them and
provide basic needs, including housing support. Beneficiaries also will
be eligible to apply for work authorization, thus enabling them to
support themselves. We anticipate that this process will help reduce
the burden on communities, state and local governments, and NGOs that
currently support the reception and onward travel of migrants arriving
at the SWB.
5. Disincentivize a Dangerous Journey That Puts Migrant Lives and
Safety at Risk and Enriches Smuggling Networks
In FY 2022, more than 750 migrants died attempting to enter the
United States across the SWB,\33\ an estimated 32 percent increase from
FY 2021 (568 deaths) and a 195 percent increase from FY 2020 (254
deaths).\34\ The approximate number of migrants rescued by CBP in FY
2022 (almost 19,000 rescues) \35\ increased 48 percent from FY 2021
(12,857 rescues), and 256 percent from FY 2020 (5,336 rescues).\36\
Although exact figures are unknown, experts estimate that about 30
bodies have been taken out of the Rio Grande River each month since
March 2022.\37\ CBP attributes these rising trends to increasing
numbers of migrants, as evidenced by increases in overall U.S. Border
Patrol encounters.\38\ The increased rates of both migrant deaths and
those needing rescue at the SWB demonstrate the perils of the journey.
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\33\ Priscilla Alvarez, First on CNN: A record number of
migrants have died crossing the US-Mexico border, Sept. 7, 2022,
available at: <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html</a> (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
\34\ Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains, Fiscal Year 2022
Report to Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
\35\ Priscilla Alvarez, First on CNN: A record number of
migrants have died crossing the US-Mexico border, Sept. 7, 2022,
available at: <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html</a> (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
\36\ Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains, Fiscal Year 2022
Report to Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
\37\ Valerie Gonzalez, The Guardian, Migrants risk death
crossing treacherous Rio Grande river for `American dream,' Sept. 5,
2022, available at: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/05/migrants-risk-death-crossing-treacherous-rio-grande-river-for-american-dream">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/05/migrants-risk-death-crossing-treacherous-rio-grande-river-for-american-dream</a> (last visited Oct. 11, 2022).
\38\ Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains, Fiscal Year 2022
Report to Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
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Meanwhile, these numbers do not account for the countless incidents
of death, illness, and exploitation migrants experience during the
perilous journey north. Migrants are increasingly traveling to the SWB
from South America through the Dari[eacute]n Gap, an incredibly
dangerous and grueling 100-kilometer stretch of dense jungle between
Colombia and Panama. Women and children are particularly vulnerable.
Children are particularly at risk for diarrhea, respiratory diseases,
dehydration, and other ailments that
[[Page 63513]]
require immediate medical attention.\39\ According to Panama migration
authorities, of the over 31,000 migrants passing through the
Dari[eacute]n Gap in August 2022, 23,600 were Venezuelan.\40\
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\39\ UNICEF, 2021 Records Highest Ever Number of Migrant
Children Crossing the Darien Towards the U.S., Oct. 11, 2021,
available at: <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/2021-records-highest-ever-number-migrant-children-crossing-darien-towards-us">https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/2021-records-highest-ever-number-migrant-children-crossing-darien-towards-us</a> (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
\40\ Panam[aacute] Migraci[oacute]n, Irregulares en
Tr[aacute]nsito Frontera Panam[aacute]--Colombia 2022, available at:
<a href="https://www.migracion.gob.pa/inicio/estadisticas">https://www.migracion.gob.pa/inicio/estadisticas</a>
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These migration movements are in many cases facilitated by numerous
human smuggling organizations that treat the migrants as pawns.\41\
These organizations exploit migrants for profit, often bringing them
through across inhospitable jungles, rugged mountains, and raging
rivers, often with small children in tow. Upon reaching the border
area, noncitizens seeking to cross the United States generally pay
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to coordinate and guide
them along the final miles of their journey. Tragically, a significant
number of individuals perish along the way. The trailer truck accident
that killed 55 migrants in Chiapas, Mexico last December, and the
tragic incident in San Antonio, Texas on June 27, 2022, in which 53
migrants died of the heat in appalling conditions, are just two
examples of many in which TCOs engaged in human smuggling prioritize
profit over safety.\42\
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\41\ DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness,
DHS Memorandum for Interested Parties, Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security, Apr. 26, 2022.
\42\ Jacob Garcia, Reuters, Migrant truck crashes in Mexico
killing 54, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-immigration-mexico-accident-idUKKBN2IP01R">https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-immigration-mexico-accident-idUKKBN2IP01R</a> (last visited Sept. 29,
2022); Mica Rosenberg, Kristina Cooke, Daniel Trotta, The border's
toll: Migrants increasingly die crossing into U.S. from Mexico, July
25, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-immigration-border-deaths/the-borders-toll-migrants-increasingly-die-crossing-into-u-s-from-mexico-idUSL4N2Z247X">https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-immigration-border-deaths/the-borders-toll-migrants-increasingly-die-crossing-into-u-s-from-mexico-idUSL4N2Z247X</a> (last visited Oct.
2, 2022).
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This new process, which will incentivize intending migrants to use
a safe and orderly means to access the United States via commercial air
flights, cuts out the smuggling networks. DHS anticipates it will save
lives and undermine the profits and operations of the dangerous TCOs
that put migrants' lives at risk for profit.
6. Fulfill Important Foreign Policy Goals To Manage Migration
Collaboratively in the Hemisphere
Promoting a safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy
throughout the Western Hemisphere has been a top foreign policy
priority for the Administration. This is reflected in three policy-
setting documents: the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of
Migration in Central America (Root Causes Strategy); the Collaborative
Migration Management Strategy (CMMS); and the Los Angeles Declaration
on Migration and Protection (L.A. Declaration), which was endorsed in
June 2022 by 21 countries. The CMMS and the L.A. Declaration call for a
collaborative and regional approach to migration. Countries that have
endorsed the L.A. Declaration are committed to implementing programs
and processes to stabilize communities that host migrants, or that have
high outward migration. They commit to humanely enforcing existing laws
regarding movements across international boundaries, especially when
minors are involved, taking actions to stop migrant smuggling by
targeting the criminals involved in these activities, and providing
increased regular pathways and protections for migrants residing in or
transiting through the 21 countries. The L.A. Declaration specifically
lays out the goal of collectively ``expand[ing] access to regular
pathways for migrants and refugees.'' \43\
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\43\ L.A. Declaration.
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This new process helps achieve these goals by providing an
immediate and temporary safe and orderly process for Venezuelan
nationals to lawfully enter the United States while we work to improve
conditions in sending countries and expand more permanent lawful
immigration pathways in the region, including refugee processing, and
other lawful pathways into the United States and other Western
Hemisphere countries. It thus enables the United States to lead by
example.
The process also responds to an acute foreign policy need. The
current surge of Venezuelan nationals transiting the Dari[eacute]n Gap
is impacting every country between Colombia and the SWB. Colombia,
Peru, and Ecuador are now hosting almost 4 million displaced
Venezuelans among them. The Government of Panama has repeatedly
signaled that it is overwhelmed with the number of migrants, a
significant portion of whom are Venezuelan, emerging from harrowing
journeys through the Dari[eacute]n Gap.
Reporting indicates that in the first six months of 2022, 85
percent more migrants, primarily Venezuelans, crossed from Colombia
into Panama through the Dari[eacute]n Gap than during the same period
in 2021--including approximately 40,000 Venezuelans in September
alone.\44\ Again, Dari[eacute]n Gap migrant encounters now average more
than 3,000 each day, predominantly comprised of Venezuelan nationals.
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\44\ The Department of State Cable, 22 Panama 624.
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Figure 2 shows that the number of Venezuelan nationals processed by
Panama after entering irregularly from Colombia increased by almost 30-
fold from the week of April 1, 2022 to the week of October 1, 2022.
Figure 2: Panamanian Encounters of Venezuelan Nationals in the
Dari[eacute]n Gap, February-September 2022
[[Page 63514]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN19OC22.008
Note: September figure is a preliminary estimate.
Source: Panama Migration Report, September 24, 2022.
Key allies throughout the region--including the Governments of
Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama, all of which are also affected by the
increased movement of Venezuelan nationals--have been seeking greater
action to address these challenging flows for some time. Meanwhile, the
GOM has consistently expressed concerns with policies, programs, and
trends that contribute to large populations of migrants, many of whom
are Venezuelan, entering Mexico. These entries strain local
governmental and civil society resources in Mexican border communities
in both the south and north, and have at times led to violence, crime,
and unsafe and unhealthy encampments.
The United States is already taking key steps to address some of
these concerns. On June 10, 2022, the Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) announced $314 million in new funding
for humanitarian and development assistance for refugees and vulnerable
migrants across the hemisphere, including support for socio-economic
integration and humanitarian aid for Venezuelans in 17 countries of the
region.\45\ And on September 22, 2022, PRM and USAID announced nearly
$376 million in additional humanitarian assistance, which will provide
essential support for vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela, as well
as urgently needed assistance for migrants, refugees, and host
communities across the region. This funding will further address
humanitarian needs in the region.\46\
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\45\ The United States Announces More Than $314 Million in New
Stabilization Efforts and Humanitarian Assistance for Venezuelans
and Other Migrants at the Summit of the Americas, June 10, 2022,
available at: <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jun-10-2022-united-states-announces-more-314-million-new-stabilization-efforts-venezuela">https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jun-10-2022-united-states-announces-more-314-million-new-stabilization-efforts-venezuela</a> (last visited Oct. 11, 2022).
\46\ The United States Announces Nearly $376 Million in
Additional Humanitarian Assistance for People Affected by the
Ongoing Crisis in Venezuela and the Region, Sept. 22, 2022,
available at: <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/sep-22-2022-the-us-announces-nearly-376-million-additional-humanitarian-assistance-for-people-affected-by-ongoing-crisis-in-venezuela">https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/sep-22-2022-the-us-announces-nearly-376-million-additional-humanitarian-assistance-for-people-affected-by-ongoing-crisis-in-venezuela</a> (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
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This new process adds to these efforts and enables the United
States to lead by example. It is a key mechanism to advance the larger
domestic and foreign policy goals of this Administration to promote a
safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy throughout our
hemisphere. It also lays the foundation for the United States to press
regional partners to undertake additional actions with regards to these
populations, many of which are already taking important steps.
Colombia, for example, is hosting more than 2.4 million displaced
Venezuelans and has provided temporary protected status for more than
1.5 million of them. Costa Rica is developing plans to renew temporary
protection for Venezuelans. And on June 1, 2022, the Government of
Ecuador--which is hosting more than 500,000 Venezuelans--authorized a
second regularization process that would provide certain Venezuelans a
two-year temporary residency visa.\47\ Any effort to meaningfully
address the crisis in Venezuela will require continued efforts by these
and other regional partners.
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\47\ Venezuela Regional Crisis--Complex Emergency, June 14,
2022, available at: <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-06-14_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_3.pdf">https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-06-14_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_3.pdf</a> (last
visited Sept. 29, 2022).
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Importantly, the United States will not implement the new parole
process without the ability to return Venezuelan nationals to Mexico
who enter irregularly. The United States' ability to execute this
process thus requires the GOM to accept the return of Venezuelan
nationals who bypass this new process and enter the United States
irregularly between POEs.
For its part, the GOM has made clear that in order to effectively
manage the migratory flows that are impacting both countries, the
United States needs to provide additional safe and orderly processes
for migrants who seek to enter the United States. As the GOM makes a
unilateral decision whether to accept returns of third country
nationals at the border and how best to manage migration within Mexico,
it is closely watching the United States' approach to migration
management and whether the United States is delivering on its plans in
this space. Initiating and managing this process--which is dependent on
the GOM's actions--will require careful, deliberate, and regular
assessment of the GOM's responses to unilateral U.S. actions and
ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.
This process is responsive to the GOM's desire to see more lawful
pathways to the United States and is aligned with broader
Administration
[[Page 63515]]
domestic and foreign policy priorities in the region. It will couple a
meaningful incentive to seek a lawful, orderly means of traveling to
the United States with the imposition of consequences for those who
seek to enter irregularly. The goal of this process is to reduce the
irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals throughout the hemisphere
while we, together with partners in the region, work to improve
conditions in sending countries and create more lawful immigration and
refugee pathways in the region, including to the United States.
B. Urgent Humanitarian Reasons
The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this
process will address the urgent humanitarian reasons faced by so many
Venezuelans subject to the repressive regime of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro.
This process provides a safe and orderly mechanism for Venezuelan
nationals who seek to leave their home country to enter the United
States without having to make the dangerous journey to the United
States.
IV. Eligibility To Participate in the Process and Processing Steps
A. Supporters
U.S.-based supporters will initiate an application on behalf of a
Venezuelan national \48\ by submitting a Form I-134, Declaration of
Financial Support, to USCIS for each beneficiary. Supporters can be
sole individuals, individuals filing on behalf of a group, or
individuals representing an entity. To serve as a supporter under the
process, an individual must:
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\48\ Certain non-Venezuelans may use this process if they are an
immediate family member of a Venezuelan beneficiary and traveling
with that Venezuelan beneficiary. For purposes of this process,
immediate family members are limited to a spouse, common-law
partner, and/or unmarried child(ren) under the age of 21.
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<bullet> be a U.S. citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident;
hold a lawful status in the United States; or be a parolee or recipient
of deferred action or Deferred Enforced Departure;
<bullet> pass security and background vetting, including for public
safety, national security, human trafficking, and exploitation
concerns; and
<bullet> demonstrate sufficient financial resources to receive,
maintain, and support the intended beneficiary whom they commit to
support for the duration of their parole period.
B. Beneficiaries
In order to be eligible to request and ultimately be considered for
a discretionary issuance of advance authorization to travel to the
United States to seek a discretionary grant of parole at the POE, such
individuals must:
<bullet> be outside the United States;
<bullet> be a national of Venezuela or be a non-Venezuelan
immediate family member \49\ of and traveling with a Venezuelan
principal beneficiary;
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\49\ See the preceding footnote.
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<bullet> have a U.S.-based supporter who filed a Form I-134 on
their behalf that USCIS has vetted and confirmed;
<bullet> possess a passport valid for international travel;
<bullet> provide for their own commercial travel to an air POE and
final U.S. destination;
<bullet> undergo and pass required national security and public
safety vetting;
<bullet> comply with all additional requirements, including
vaccination requirements and other public health guidelines; and
<bullet> demonstrate that a grant of parole is warranted based on
significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons, as described
above, and that a favorable exercise of discretion is otherwise
merited.
A Venezuelan national is ineligible to be considered for parole
under this process if that person is a permanent resident or dual
national of any country other than Venezuela, or currently holds
refugee status in any country.\50\
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\50\ This limitation does not apply to immediate family members
traveling with a Venezuelan national.
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In addition, a potential beneficiary is ineligible for advance
authorization to travel to the United States as well as parole under
this process if that person:
<bullet> failed to pass national security and public safety vetting
or is otherwise deemed not to merit a favorable exercise of discretion;
<bullet> has been ordered removed from the United States within the
prior five years or is subject to a bar based on a prior removal order;
\51\
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\51\ See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A).
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<bullet> has crossed irregularly into the United States, between
the POEs, after October 19, 2022;
<bullet> has irregularly crossed the Mexican or Panamanian borders
after October 19, 2022; or
<bullet> is under 18 and not traveling through this process
accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, and as such is a child whom
the inspecting officer would determine to be an unaccompanied
child.\52\
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\52\ As defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Children under the age of
18 must be traveling to the United States in the care and custody of
their parent or legal guardian to be considered for parole at the
POE under the process.
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Travel requirements: Beneficiaries who receive advance
authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole into the
United States will be responsible for arranging and funding their own
commercial air travel to the United States.
Health Requirements: Beneficiaries must follow all applicable
requirements, as determined by DHS's Chief Medical Officer, in
consultation with CDC, with respect to health and travel, including
vaccination and/or testing requirements for diseases including COVID-
19, polio, and measles. The most up-to-date public health requirements
applicable to this process will be available at <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/venezuela">https://www.uscis.gov/venezuela</a>.
C. Processing Steps
Step 1: Financial Support
A U.S.-based supporter will submit a Form I-134, Declaration of
Financial Support with USCIS through the online myUSCIS web portal to
initiate the process. The Form I-134 identifies and collects
information on both the supporter and the beneficiary. The supporter
must submit a separate Form I-134 for each beneficiary they are seeking
to support, including Venezuelans' immediate family members and minor
children. The supporter will then be vetted by USCIS to protect against
exploitation and abuse, and to ensure that the supporter is able to
financially support the individual and any immediate family members
whom they agree to support. Supporters must be vetted and confirmed by
USCIS, at USCIS' discretion, before moving forward in the process.
Step 2: Submit Biographic Information
If a supporter is confirmed by USCIS, the listed beneficiary will
receive an email from USCIS on how to create an account with myUSCIS
and instructions on next steps for completing the application. The
beneficiary will be required to confirm their biographic information in
myUSCIS and attest to meeting the eligibility requirements.
As part of confirming eligibility in their myUSCIS account,
individuals who seek authorization to travel to the United States will
need to confirm that they meet public health requirements, including
certain vaccination requirements.
Step 3: Submit Request in CBP One Mobile Application
After confirming biographic information in myUSCIS and completing
required eligibility attestations, the beneficiary will receive
[[Page 63516]]
instructions through myUSCIS on how to access the CBP One mobile
application. The beneficiary must then enter limited biographic
information into CBP One and submit a live photo.
Step 4: Approval To Travel to the United States
After completing Step 3, the beneficiary will receive a notice to
their myUSCIS account confirming whether CBP has, in CBP's discretion,
provided the beneficiary advance authorization to travel to the United
States to seek a discretionary grant of parole on a case-by-case basis.
If approved, this authorization is generally valid for 90 days, and
beneficiaries are responsible for securing their own travel via
commercial air to the United States.\53\ Approval of advance
authorization to travel does not guarantee parole into the United
States at a U.S. POE. That parole is a discretionary determination made
by CBP at the POE.
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\53\ Air carriers can validate an approved and valid travel
authorization submission using the same mechanisms that are
currently in place to validate that a traveler has a valid visa or
other documentation to facilitate issuance of a boarding pass for
air travel.
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All of the steps in this process, including the decision to grant
or deny advance travel authorization and the parole decision at the
POE, are entirely discretionary and not subject to appeal on any
grounds.
Step 5: Seeking Parole at the POE
Upon their arrival at a POE, each individual arriving under this
process will be inspected by CBP and considered for a grant of
discretionary parole for a period of up to two years on a case-by-case
basis.
As part of the inspection, beneficiaries will undergo additional
screening and vetting, to include additional fingerprint biometric
vetting consistent with the CBP inspectional process. Individuals who
are determined to pose a national security or public safety threat or
otherwise do not warrant parole pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), and as a matter of discretion upon
inspection, will be processed under an appropriate processing pathway
and may be referred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
for detention.
Step 6: Parole
If granted parole pursuant to this process, each individual
generally will be paroled into the United States for a period of up to
two years, subject to applicable health and vetting requirements, and
will be eligible to apply for employment authorization under existing
regulations. Individuals may request authorization to work from USCIS.
USCIS is leveraging technological and process efficiencies to minimize
processing times for requests for work authorization. All individuals
two years of age or older will be required to complete a medical
screening for tuberculosis, including an IGRA test, within 90 days of
arrival to the United States.
D. Sunset, Renewal, and Termination
The process is capped at 24,000 beneficiaries. After this cap is
reached, the program will sunset absent a decision by the Secretary to
continue the process, based on the Secretary's sole discretion. The
Secretary also retains the sole, unreviewable discretion to terminate
the process at any point.
E. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
This process is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements on multiple grounds, and is therefore amenable to
immediate issuance and implementation.
First, the Department is merely adopting a general statement of
policy,\54\ i.e., a ``statement[ ] issued by an agency to advise the
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to
exercise a discretionary power.'' \55\ As section 212(d)(5)(A) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), provides, parole decisions are made by the
Secretary of Homeland Security ``in his discretion.''
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\54\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).
\55\ Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quoting
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979)).
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Second, even if this process were considered to be a legislative
rule that would normally be subject to requirements for notice-and-
comment rulemaking and a delayed effective date, the process is exempt
from such requirements because it involves a foreign affairs function
of the United States.\56\ In addition, although under the APA,
invocation of this exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking does
not require the agency to show that such procedures may result in
``definitely undesirable international consequences,'' some courts have
required such a showing,\57\ and DHS can make one here.
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\56\ 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1).
\57\ See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir.
2008).
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As described above, this process is directly responsive to requests
from key foreign partners--including the GOM--to provide a lawful
process for Venezuelan nationals to enter the United States. The United
States will not implement the new parole process without the ability to
return Venezuelan nationals who enter irregularly to Mexico, and the
United States' ability to execute this process thus requires the GOM's
willingness to accept into Mexico those who bypass this new process and
enter the United States irregularly between POEs. Thus, initiating and
managing this process will require careful, deliberate, and regular
assessment of the GOM's responses to this unilateral U.S. action and
ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.
Delaying issuance and implementation of this process to undertake
rulemaking would undermine the foreign policy imperative to act now and
result in definitely undesirable international consequences. It also
would complicate broader discussions and negotiations about migration
management. For now, Mexico has indicated it is prepared to make a
unilateral decision to accept a substantial number of Venezuela
returns. That willingness to accept the returns could be impacted by
the delay associated with a public rulemaking process involving advance
notice and comment and a delayed effective date. Additionally, making
it publicly known that we plan to return nationals of Venezuela to
Mexico at a future date would likely result in a surge in migration, as
migrants rush to the border to enter before the rule becomes final--
which would adversely impact each country's border security and further
strain their personnel and resources deployed to the border.
Moreover, this process is not only responsive to the request of
Mexico and key foreign partners--and necessary for addressing migration
issues requiring coordination between two or more governments--it is
also fully aligned with larger and important foreign policy objectives
of this Administration and fits within a web of carefully negotiated
actions by multiple governments (for instance in the L.A. Declaration).
It is the view of the United States that the implementation of this
process will advance the Administration's foreign policy goals by
demonstrating U.S. partnership and U.S. commitment to the shared goals
of addressing migration through the hemisphere, both of which are
essential to maintaining a strong bilateral relationship.
The invocation of the foreign affairs exemption here is also
consistent with Department precedent. For example, in 2017 DHS
published a notice eliminating an exception to expedited removal for
certain Cuban nationals, which explained that the change in
[[Page 63517]]
policy was consistent with the foreign affairs exemption because the
change was central to ongoing negotiations between the two
countries.\58\
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\58\ See 82 FR 4902 (Jan. 17, 2017).
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Third, DHS assesses that there is good cause to find that the delay
associated with implementing this process through notice-and-comment
rulemaking would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest
because of the need for coordination with the GOM described above, and
the urgent border and national security and humanitarian interests in
reducing and diverting the flow of irregular migration.\59\ It would be
impracticable to delay issuance in order to undertake such procedures
because--as noted above--maintaining the status quo, which involves
record numbers of Venezuelan nationals currently being encountered
attempting to enter irregularly at the SWB, coupled with DHS's
extremely limited options for processing, detaining, or quickly
removing such migrants, unduly impedes DHS's ability to fulfill its
critical and varied missions. At current rates, a delay of just a few
months to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking would effectively
forfeit an opportunity to reduce and divert migrant flows in the near
term, harm border security, and potentially result in scores of
additional migrant deaths. Undertaking such procedures would also be
contrary to the public interest because an advance announcement of this
process would seriously undermine a key goal of the policy by
incentivizing even more irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals
seeking to enter the United States before the process would take
effect.
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\59\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
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F. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all
Departments are required to submit to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), for review and approval, any new reporting requirements
they impose. The process announced by this notice requires changes to
two collections of information, as follows.
First, OMB has approved a revision to USCIS Form I-134, Declaration
of Financial Support (OMB control number 1615-0014) under the PRA's
emergency processing procedures at 5 CFR 1320.13. USCIS is making some
changes to the online form in connection with the implementation of the
process described above. These changes include: requiring two new data
elements for U.S.-based supporters (``Sex'' and ``Social Security
Number''); adding a third marker (``X'') in addition to ``M'' and ``F''
in accordance with this Administration's stated gender equity goals;
and adding Venezuela as an acceptable option for the beneficiary's
country of origin. USCIS has submitted and OMB has approved a request
for emergency authorization of the required changes (under 5 CFR
1320.13) for a period of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, USCIS will
immediately begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA.
Second, OMB has approved an emergency request under 5 CFR 1320.13
for a new information collection from CBP entitled Advance Travel
Authorization. OMB has approved the emergency request for a period of 6
months and will assign a control number to the collection. This new
information collection will allow certain noncitizens from Venezuela,
and their qualifying immediate family members, who lack United States
entry documents to submit information through the newly developed CBP
ATA capability within the CBP One<SUP>TM</SUP> application as part of
the process to request an advance authorization to travel to the United
States to seek parole. Within the next 90 days, CBP will immediately
begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA. More information about
both collections can be viewed at <a href="http://www.reginfo.gov">www.reginfo.gov</a>.
Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2022-22739 Filed 10-18-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on October 19, 2022.
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