Rule2022-19743
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2022, Report and Order
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Published
September 14, 2022
Effective
September 14, 2022
Issuing agencies
Federal Communications Commission
Abstract
In this document, the Commission revises its Schedule of Regulatory Fees to recover $381,950,000 that Congress has required the Commission to collect for its fiscal year (FY) 2022. Sections 9 and 9A of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act or Communications Act), provides for the annual assessment and collection of regulatory fees by the Commission.
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 177 (Wednesday, September 14, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56494-56557]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-19743]
[[Page 56493]]
Vol. 87
Wednesday,
No. 177
September 14, 2022
Part II
Federal Communications Commission
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47 CFR Part 1
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2022,
Report and Order; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 87 , No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2022
/ Rules and Regulations
[[Page 56494]]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 1
[MD Docket No. 22-223; MD Docket No. 22-301; FCC 22-68; FR ID 103797]
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year
2022, Report and Order
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission revises its Schedule of
Regulatory Fees to recover $381,950,000 that Congress has required the
Commission to collect for its fiscal year (FY) 2022. Sections 9 and 9A
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act or Communications
Act), provides for the annual assessment and collection of regulatory
fees by the Commission.
DATES: Effective September 14, 2022. To avoid penalties and interest,
regulatory fees should be paid by the due date of September 28, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roland Helvajian, Office of Managing
Director at (202) 418-0444.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order, FCC 22-68, MD Docket No. 22-223 and MD Docket No. 22-301,
adopted on September 1, 2022 and released on September 2, 2022. The
full text of this document is available for public inspection by
downloading the text from the Commission's website at <a href="http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0906/FCC-17-111A1.pdf">http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0906/FCC-17-111A1.pdf</a>.
I. Administrative Matters
A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, the
Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)
relating to this Report and Order. The FRFA is located at the end of
this document.
B. Final Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis
2. This document does not contain new or modified information
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA), Public Law 104-13. In addition, therefore, it does not contain
any new or modified information collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees, pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4).
C. Congressional Review Act
2. The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget, concurs that these rules are non-major under the Congressional
Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of this
Report and Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
II. Report and Order
3. Each year, the Commission must adopt a schedule of regulatory
fees to be collected by the end of September. FY 2022, the Commission
is required to collect $381,950,000 in regulatory fees, pursuant to
sections 9 and 9A of the Communications Act, and the Commission's FY
2022 Appropriations Act. In this Report and Order, the we adopt the
regulatory fee schedule, as set forth in Tables 4 and 5 for FY 2022, to
collect $381,950,000 in regulatory fees as required by Congress.
A. Allocating Full-Time Equivalents (FTE or FTEs)
4. We will continue to apportion regulatory fees across fee
categories based on the number of non-auction direct FTEs in each core
bureau (i.e., the Wireline Competition Bureau, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, the Media Bureau, and the International
Bureau) and taking into account factors that are ``reasonably related
to the benefits provided to the payor of the fee by the Commission's
activities.'' We expect that the work of the non-auctions FTEs in the
four core bureaus with oversight and regulation of Commission licensees
and regulatees will remain focused on the industry segment regulated by
each of those bureaus. For this reason, the Commission closely follows
the statutory mandate to start with FTE counts and then potentially
adjust fees to reflect other factors related to the benefits provided
to the payor of the fee by the Commission's activities. As the
Commission stated in the FY 2019 Report and Order, given the Act's
requirement that fees must reflect FTE time before adjusting fees to
take into account other factors, we continue to find FTE counts by far
the most administrable starting point for regulatory fee allocations.
5. NAB and the Joint Broadcasters question our methodology and
argue that the Commission assigns a disproportionate share of the costs
of the 343 indirect FTEs to the Media Bureau without any analysis
performed as to what portion of those indirect FTEs actually work on
Media Bureau issues. Specifically, the Joint Broadcasters argue that
Media Bureau regulatees' regulatory fees are inflated in order to cover
costs for staff time not spent on broadcast-related issues. The Joint
Broadcasters contend that the proportional allocation methodology,
whereby regulatory fees are allocated based on the number of direct
FTEs in the core bureaus, leads to fundamentally unfair results and
that broadcasters subsidize the costs of the Commission's indirect
bureaus and offices.
6. These commenters fail to recognize the fundamental task assigned
to the Commission. The Commission must recover the full S&E
appropriation through an offsetting collection. The S&E appropriation
does not solely fund staff time spent directly regulating regulatory
fee payors. The S&E appropriation funds all non-auctions-related costs,
such as salaries and expenses of all non-auctions funded staff;
indirect costs, such as overhead functions; statutorily required tasks
that do not directly equate with oversight and regulation of a
particular regulatee but instead benefit the Commission and the
industry as a whole; support costs, such as rent, utilities, and
equipment; and the costs incurred in regulating entities that are
statutorily exempt from paying regulatory fees (i.e., governmental and
nonprofit entities, amateur radio operators, and noncommercial radio
and television stations), entities with total annual assessed fees
below the de minimis threshold, and entities whose regulatory fees are
waived. For that reason, we do not examine whether all indirect FTEs
work on Media Bureau issues or on any other core bureau issues.
Instead, we recognize that the indirect FTEs' work may not directly
address oversight and regulation of just one particular regulatory fee
category and may instead cover many different regulatory fee categories
or issues not pertaining to any regulated industries. The statute
requires the full collection of an amount equal to the annual S&E
appropriation and requires that the mechanism used to apportion the
collection is based on FTE burden. Thus, all Commission non-auctions
FTEs must be accounted for in our regulatory fee assessments because,
pursuant to section 9 of the Act, regulatory fees must reflect the
``full-time equivalent number of employees within the bureaus and
offices of the Commission, adjusted to take into account factors that
are reasonably related to the benefits provided to the
[[Page 56495]]
payor of the fee by the Commission's activities.'' In order to allocate
regulatory fees based on all the non-auctions FTEs in the Commission's
bureaus and offices, the Commission bases this calculation on the
number of FTEs within the Commission's core bureaus, i.e., those
bureaus that conduct oversight and regulation of issues that benefit
the fee payors.
7. The State Broadcasters Associations contend that it is likely
that throughout the Commission there are identifiable groups of
indirect FTEs working in non-core bureaus and offices, or
collaboratively across bureaus and offices, whose work in oversight and
regulation can be identifiably shown to only benefit some but not all
regulatory fee payors. Accordingly, the State Broadcasters Associations
argue that such indirect FTEs, whether handling Universal Service Fund
or broadband internet access service issues, should be excluded from
the indirect FTEs proportionally allocated to media services
categories. Thus, the State Broadcasters Associations propose creating
a third regulatory fee category, which they label as ``Intersectional
FTE.'' They propose that this third regulatory category cover FTEs in
the non-core bureaus and those in core bureaus who work on similar
issues regulated by various bureaus but benefit a discrete group of
regulatees. The State Broadcasters Associations argue that the work of
indirect FTEs working on long-standing priorities of the Commission,
such as Universal Service Fund program issues and broadband internet
access service, unfairly burdens regulatory fee payors who do not
benefit from these programs yet are required to pay regulatory fees
that cover a proportion of such indirect FTEs. Essentially, the State
Broadcasters Associations are of the opinion that there are some
indirect FTEs who do not work on broadcast issues, and therefore
broadcasters should not be assessed regulatory fees that include such
indirect FTEs, i.e., their regulatory fees should be reduced.
8. Additionally, the Satellite Coalition claims that regulatory
fees are especially burdensome for the satellite industry, as some
satellite companies pay millions of dollars per year solely to cover
indirect FTE costs. The Satellite Coalition contends that by
undertaking a reassessment of whether FTEs currently classified as
indirect can be assigned directly to one or more categories of fee
payors, the Commission can greatly improve the fee structure's
fairness. Similarly, NAB contends that our regulatory fee methodology
and allocation of indirect FTEs results in a system that is arbitrary
and capricious, inequitable, and unlawful.
9. Again, we note that the regulatory fees must cover the entire
appropriation, including those FTEs who may work on issues for which we
do not have regulatory fee categories. We therefore continue to find
that, consistent with section 9 of the Act, regulatory fees are not
based on a precise allocation of specific employees with certain work
assignments each year and instead are based on a higher-level approach.
As the Commission has explained previously, indirect FTE time covers a
wide range of issues; the variety of issues handled by the indirect
FTEs in non-core bureaus may also include services that are not
specifically correlated with one core bureau, let alone one specific
category of regulatees. Indirect FTE work also includes matters that
are not specific to any regulatory fee category, and many Commission
attorneys, engineers, analysts, and other staff work on a variety of
issues during a single fiscal year. For example, indirect FTEs that
devote time to broadband internet access services or Universal Service
Fund issues may also work on a variety of other issues during the
fiscal year. Thus, we affirm the longstanding holding that the non-
auctions work of certain bureaus and offices within the Commission are
properly designated as indirect. Even if we could calculate indirect
FTE time assignments at a granular level with accuracy, using any
particular window of time less than the full year would not be accurate
for the entire fiscal year. Moreover, we note that basing regulatory
fees on specific assignments, instead of overall FTE time, would result
in significant unplanned shifts in regulatory fees as assignments
change over time.
10. Further, much of the work that could be assigned to a single
category of regulatees is likely to be interspersed with the work that
FTEs do on behalf of many entities that do not pay regulatory fees,
e.g., governmental entities, non-profit organizations, and regulatees
that have an exemption. Indirect FTE time covers matters that are not
specifically related to a regulated service, but instead support the
Commission generally. Additionally, indirect FTE time is devoted to
issues that are not specifically limited to one type of regulated
industry. Finally, we note that regulatory fees are a zero-sum
situation, so any decrease to the fees paid by one category of
regulatees, such as broadcasters, necessitates an increase in fees for
others. For this reason, there must be a very strong rationale for
changing the manner of proportionally allocating indirect FTEs to
certain fee categories based on direct FTEs because any such changes
will impact the fees of other regulatory fee categories. We disagree
with the commenters' contention that our methodology is arbitrary and
capricious, inequitable, and unlawful. Instead, we conclude that our
methodology is consistent with the requirements of section 9 of the Act
that ``fees reflect the full-time equivalent number of employees within
the bureaus and offices of the Commission.''
11. Additionally, we find that even if the State Broadcasters
Associations' proposal were consistent with section 9 of the Act, it
would not be administrable given the resources it would take to
calculate and the resulting constantly shifting nature of the
regulatory fee burdens. The State Broadcasters Associations' proposal
would require resources of both staff and presumably information
technology devoted to this proposed new system. Additionally, it would
require a close monitoring and analysis of all the work of all indirect
FTEs in the Commission over the course of the entire year. As NCTA
states, ``the idea that the Commission should undertake an analysis of
hundreds of employees' daily undertakings, monitoring them and changing
their indirect allocation to different fee categories as the employees
receive new assignments and work on different issues throughout the day
is nonsensical.'' Thus, we do not believe that added granularity would
change the overall result, or improve our regulatory fee methodology,
but would simply consume more staff resources and increase the indirect
FTE time devoted to regulatory fee administration. Even if we could
conduct such a monitoring accurately, it would still be unable to
account for the vast majority of indirect FTE time that cannot be
allocated specifically to regulatory fee categories. This proposal
would result in attributing some indirect FTE time to various
regulatory fee categories in a manner that would fluctuate constantly,
depending on the work done in bureaus and offices during the year, and
others that could not be so attributed at all. We are not adopting a
regulatory fee methodology that would result in dramatic swings in fees
from one year to the next; instead we take a higher level approach for
consistency as well as administrability. Our approach is most accurate
when we look at the work of a larger group such as a division, office,
or bureau, consistent with the language of section 9 of the Act that
``fees reflect the full-time equivalent number of employees within the
bureaus and offices of the Commission.''
[[Page 56496]]
12. NAB argues that the Media Bureau regulatees have a high
regulatory fee burden because, unlike other core bureaus, the
Commission has not reclassified any Media Bureau FTEs as indirect. This
is inaccurate. In FY 2019, we had such reclassifications from core
bureaus, including the Media Bureau. The Commission reassigned staff
from other bureaus and offices to the new Office of Economics and
Analytics, effective December 11, 2018. This resulted in the
reassignment of 95 FTEs (of which 64 were not auctions-funded) as
indirect FTEs because all FTEs in the Office of Economics and Analytics
are indirect. The Commission also reassigned Equal Employment
Opportunity enforcement staff from the Media Bureau to the Enforcement
Bureau, effective March 15, 2019, resulting in a reduction of seven
direct FTEs in the Media Bureau. These reassignments resulted in a
reduction in direct FTEs in the Wireline Competition Bureau (from 123
FTEs to 100.8 FTEs), Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (from 89 FTEs
to 80.5 FTEs), and Media Bureau (from 131 FTEs to 115.1 FTEs).
13. NAB also argues that the Commission should ensure that
broadcasters bear no responsibility for the 84 direct FTEs in the Media
Bureau that the Commission has stated to Congress are working to
promote a 100% broadband policy, and that these 84 Media Bureau FTEs
should be reclassified as indirect. The statement to Congress to which
NAB refers is the description of the Commission's Strategic Goals and
the distribution of FTEs for each Strategic Goal. The goal NAB refers
to is the Commission's Strategic Goal to ``Pursue a ``100 Percent''
Broadband Policy.'' The other goals are to Promote Diversity, Equity,
Inclusion, and Accessibility; Empower Consumers; Enhance Public Safety
and National Security; Advance America's Global Competitiveness; and
Foster Operational Excellence. The Commission, like every other federal
agency, adopts strategic goals as part of its long term planning
process pursuant to federal financial management requirements. The
financial reporting statutes also require agencies to identify the
resources that support such strategic goals. The strategic goals are
not aligned with a particular regulatory fee category and the exercise
is guided by a wholly distinct statutory scheme. In addition, such
strategic goals are intended to align with higher level priority goals
of the overall federal government. As such, a notation that staff
support a specific strategic goal is not a sound rationale for
reassigning staff from direct to indirect or vice versa. We therefore
reject NAB's contention that planning documents guided by a wholly
different statutory scheme form the basis to reassign most or all of
the Media Bureau FTEs as indirect.
14. Thus, we decline, at this time, to change the methodology by
which we allocate FTEs. Currently, there are 943 indirect FTEs. The
indirect FTEs are the FTEs in the Enforcement Bureau (187), Consumer
and Governmental Affairs Bureau (111), Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau (98), Chairwoman's and Commissioners' offices (22),
Office of the Managing Director (136), Office of General Counsel (70),
Office of the Inspector General (47), Office of Communications Business
Opportunities (10), Office of Engineering and Technology (66), Office
of Legislative Affairs (8), Office of Workplace Diversity (4), Office
of Media Relations (12), Office of Economics and Analytics (78), and
Office of Administrative Law Judges (4), along with some FTEs in the
Wireline Competition Bureau (38) and the International Bureau (52) that
the Commission has previously classified as indirect for regulatory fee
purposes.
15. The number of direct FTEs are determined within each core
bureau and a percentage of the total amount to be collected in
regulatory fees for a given fiscal year is calculated. There are 329
direct FTEs: $32.70 million (8.56% of the total FTE allocation, 28
direct FTEs) in fees from International Bureau regulatees; $81.74
million (21.40% of the total FTE allocation, 70 direct FTEs) in fees
from Wireless Telecommunications Bureau regulatees; $129.62 million
(33.94% of the total FTE allocation, 111 direct FTEs) from Wireline
Competition Bureau regulatees; and $137.89 million (36.10% of the total
FTE allocation, 120 direct FTEs) from Media Bureau regulatees. The
regulatory fees we adopt here are based on the established methodology,
applied to the allocated FTEs, and based on the Commission's
appropriation amount of $381,950,000.
B. Space Station and Submarine Cable Regulatory Fees
1. Non-Geostationary Orbit System (NGSO) Regulatory Fees
16. We adopt fee rates for NGSO space stations for FY 2022 and
decline to create additional regulatory fee categories for FY 2022. In
the Report and Order attached to the FY 2022 NPRM, we adopted a
methodology for calculating the regulatory fee for small satellites and
small spacecraft (together, small satellites) based on 1/20th (5%) of
the average of the non-small satellite NGSO space station regulatory
fee rates from the current fiscal year on a per license basis. In the
FY 2022 NPRM, we sought comment on the proposed regulatory fee rates
for the subcategories of NGSO--small satellite, NGSO--less complex
space stations, and NGSO--other space stations for FY 2022, and
addressed regulatory fee proposals in the record regarding spacecraft
performing on-orbit servicing (OOS) and rendezvous and proximity
operations (RPO). We also tentatively concluded that the addition of a
new regulatory fee category for OOS and RPO operations would be
premature, but sought further comment on whether and how to assess fees
for these types of spacecraft, and other types of satellites servicing
other satellites, which operate near to the geostationary orbit (GSO)
arc.
17. NGSO Fee Allocation. We maintain the 20/80 allocation between
``less complex'' and ``other'' NGSO space station fees, respectively,
within the NGSO fee category. In 2020, the Commission adjusted the
allocation of FTEs among GSO and NGSO space station and earth station
operators. The Commission noted the disparity in the number of units
between GSO space stations (98) and NGSO systems (seven), and observed
that many satellites can be operated under a single NGSO license while
counting as a single unit for regulatory fee purposes, but only one
satellite can be operated per GSO space station license. To ensure that
regulatory fees more closely reflected the FTE oversight and regulation
for each space station category, the Commission allocated 80% of space
station regulatory fees to GSOs and 20% of the space station regulatory
fees to NGSOs. In 2021, the Commission adopted two new fee
subcategories: ``less complex'' NGSO systems and all other NGSO systems
identified as ``other'' NGSO systems, both under the broader category
of ``Space Stations (Non-Geostationary Orbit).'' ``Less complex'' NGSO
systems are defined as NGSO satellite systems planning to communicate
with 20 or fewer U.S. authorized earth stations that are primarily used
for Earth Exploration Satellite Service (EESS) and/or Automatic
Identification System (AIS). ``Less complex'' NGSO fees and ``other''
NGSO fees were split within the broader NGSO fee category on a 20/80
basis.
18. In the Report and Order attached to the FY 2022 NPRM, the
Commission adopted a fee methodology for the ``small satellites'' and
decided that, as the ``small satellite'' fee is calculated, considering
that ``small satellites'' are NGSO space stations, the fees generated
[[Page 56497]]
from this ``small satellite'' fee category will be deducted from the
fee amount to be collected from the total NGSO space stations fees, and
the remainder of the NGSO space stations fees will continue to be
allocated on a 20/80 basis between ``less complex'' and ``other'' NSGO
space stations respectively.
19. The Satellite Coalition first claims that the ``Commission no
longer can assume that EESS systems are less complex because they
communicate with fewer than 20 U.S. earth stations.'' The Satellite
Coalition contends that distinguishing ``less complex'' and ``other''
NGSOs based on the number of earth stations is no longer accurate
because two of the best-known EESS systems, Spire Global and Planet
Labs, already communicate with more than 20 FCC-licensed antennas. The
Satellite Coalition also observes that EESS systems are developing
substitutes for dedicated, proprietary earth station networks, with
some EESS systems relaying data via satellite systems that have
established ground infrastructure, others associating with ``ground
station-as-a-service'' organizations, and others downlinking data
directly to user terminals, including more ubiquitous mobile terminals.
The Satellite Coalition contends that the Commission should require
licensees of EESS systems to report the total number of FCC-licensed
antennas with which their systems communicate.
20. The EESS Coalition disagrees with the Satellite Coalition and
argues that in the year since the Commission's 2021 decision there are
``no new arguments or developments'' that warrant the alterations to
the NGSO fee categories sought by the Satellite Coalition. The EESS
Coalition further argues that considerations regarding the number of
earth stations as a proxy for the complexity of a system have not
altered. The EESS Coalition contends that, under our rules, an ``earth
station'' could not be defined as a single antenna. The EESS Coalition
further disagrees that the fee allocation needs to be altered as EESS
systems may begin to require more earth stations to meet demand because
the Commission previously clarified that systems planning to
communicate with greater than 20 earth stations would not meet the
definition of ``less complex.'' Likewise, the EESS Coalition contends
that the fact that EESS systems have been improving their technology is
not a reason to change the fee allocation when the Satellite Coalition
provides no explanation of how or why the introduction of new use cases
that are not directly regulated by the Commission, or the use of third-
party ground stations, support the conclusion that there are additional
burdens on the Commission's responsibilities.
21. As an initial matter, we emphasize that we previously concluded
that 20 or fewer planned earth stations is an accurate proxy to
determine whether a primarily AIS and/or EESS system is ``less
complex'' and that EESS systems are less burdensome to regulate than
other types of services, such as NGSO FSS systems, when those EESS
systems plan to communicate with 20 or fewer earth stations. We will
address the Satellite Coalition's comments to the extent that it raises
new arguments.
22. We find that distinguishing ``less complex'' EESS systems based
on whether those systems plan to communicate with 20 or fewer earth
stations is still an accurate proxy. The Satellite Coalition argues
that the Commission meant to define earth stations as antennas.
Notwithstanding the assertions of the Satellite Coalition, a single
call sign, not an antenna, equates to a single earth station license.
The Commission's definition of ``earth station,'' which incorporates
the Commission's definition of ``station,'' demonstrates that an
antenna is merely part of an ``earth station.'' A ``station'' includes
``[o]ne or more transmitters or receivers or a combination of
transmitters and receivers, including the accessory equipment,
necessary at one location for carrying on a radiocommunication
service[.]'' While an antenna may be an important piece of equipment in
transmitting or receiving signals, additional accessories are needed to
successfully carry out a radiocommunication, which, together with one
or more antennas, constitute a ``station.'' Moreover, it is not
apparent how the number of antennas at a particular earth station
location supports a conclusion that there are additional burdens on the
Commission's responsibilities for regulatory fee purposes.
23. In addition, we disagree that we should change the 20/80
allocation now because EESS systems are developing substitutes for
dedicated, proprietary earth station networks. While in the future this
may result in our reconsideration of planned 20 earth stations as the
dividing line between a ``less complex'' and ``other'' system, for FY
2022, we agree with the EESS Coalition that we do not have evidence
that ``less complex'' systems' new technology has made those NGSO
systems more burdensome to regulate. Based on our current experience,
the 20/80 split continues to be accurate and closely reflect the
percentage of the FTE time spent to regulate less complex NGSO space
stations and ``other'' NGSO space stations.
24. Finally, we remind all operators that the fee payors have an
obligation to pay the correct fee amount corresponding to their actual
fee category. If a non-small satellite NGSO system is listed as ``less
complex'' but actually communicates with more than 20 earth stations,
such fee payor has an obligation to correct that listing mistake to be
billed the fee amount that correspond to ``other'' NGSO space station
fee category. In the FY 2022 NPRM, we listed systems in various
categories and gave the fee payors a chance to verify and correct any
mistakes in our space stations list. Based on the information we
received, we believe all operational ``less complex'' space stations
are now listed in the appropriate category. We note that the public
record in the International Bureau Filing System (IBFS) contains the
call signs of FCC-licensed earth stations with which ``less complex''
systems presently communicate, with the particular NGSO system listed
as a point of communication. Since we also include earth stations that
have been authorized by other U.S. federal government agencies when
determining the total number of earth stations with which a ``less
complex'' system communicates, and such information is not typically in
IBFS, if needed, we may consider other options to verify the
information, including an annual reporting requirement regarding the
number of earth stations for future fiscal years, to aid in the
administrability of and increase transparency in our maintenance of the
list of ``less complex'' space station systems.
25. Second, the Satellite Coalition also argues that the
characteristics that the Commission previously noted that make EESS
systems distinct from other NGSO systems, such as those NGSO systems
providing fixed-satellite service (FSS), are breaking down. The
Satellite Coalition asserts that EESS systems now are developing a
global presence and have significant spectrum needs and use multiple
bands, while the significance of processing rounds has been diminished.
The Satellite Coalition contends that the Commission should not be
assessing radically different regulatory fees for NGSO systems that are
becoming functionally indistinct and competing for the same or similar
customers.
26. The EESS Coalition counters that many of the developments to
EESS systems to which the Satellite Coalition cites took place prior to
the FY 2021 regulatory fee proceeding during which
[[Page 56498]]
the 20/80 allocation was adopted. The EESS Coalition further posits
that the distinctions between the two regulatory fee categories remain
consistent with those analyzed in the FY 2021 Report and Order. For
example, processing rounds have not become less intensive. Similarly,
EESS systems have not increased their global presence with activities
to the extent that the Commission would be required to expend
significant staff resources for representation at international forums
and multilateral coordination. We conclude that the 20/80 allocation
among ``less complex'' and ``other'' NGSOs remains fair and our
definition of ``less complex'' does not need to be modified. At this
time, we are not persuaded that EESS systems communicating with 20 or
fewer earth stations have increased in complexity as to justify a
change in our definition or the 20/80 allocation. As the EESS Coalition
points out, the work involving the processing rounds remains at around
the same level, ``less complex'' systems' global presence has not
increased the FTEs' work at a level that justifies a change, and in
some cases the use of spectrum despite increased use of bandwidth of
``less complex'' systems remains the same. Although the Satellite
Coalition argues that some ``less complex'' EESS operators do not meet
the criteria of ``less complex'' because their systems communicate with
greater than 20 planned FCC-licensed antennas, the criteria we
identified in the Report and Order attached to the FY 2021 NPRM remain
valid. If EESS operators communicate with more than 20 earth stations,
they would no longer be considered ``less complex.'' Given that we
determine the complexity of the NGSO system based on the system design
provided at the NGSO space station application stage, and that none of
our already designated ``less complex'' systems actually communicate
with greater than 20 earth stations, we find that the Satellite
Coalition's examples of ``less complex'' systems that we have already
designated as ``less complex'' do not establish a sufficient basis upon
which to change the 20/80 allocation at this time. While we acknowledge
that the technology associated with ``less complex'' EESS system is
changing, and this in some instances involves changes including
increases in bandwidth, number of earth stations, amount of time in
which spectrum is used, or other such changes, the changes identified
appear at this time to be expected incremental changes consistent with
the general characteristics identified for less complex systems.
Accordingly, we find that the 20/80 allocation still fairly represents
Commission resources spent and benefits received by operators.
27. Third, the Satellite Coalition argues that adoption of a fee
category for small satellites should result in a re-evaluation of the
regulatory fees between ``less complex'' systems and ``other'' NGSO
systems. The Satellite Coalition argues that, because Commission
resources devoted to the regulation and oversight of ``small
satellites'' is minimal, ``small satellites'' are the least complex
NGSO systems among the types of constellations that formerly were
included in the ``less complex'' NGSO fee category, and now that
``small satellites'' have their own fee category, only systems that
demand relatively more Commission oversight remain in the ``less
complex'' fee category for FY 2022 and going forward. The EESS
Coalition disagrees because the Commission previously ``note[d] that
while there may be overlap in the types of services being provided in
some instances, there are also important differences between small
satellites and `less complex' and `other' NGSO space station systems.''
28. We decline to reconsider the ``less complex'' fee allocation
due to the adoption of a small satellite fee category. A new regulatory
fee category was created for small satellites in 2019. The 20/80 fee
allocation among ``less complex'' NGSO systems and ``other'' NGSO
systems was not proposed until 2021. As a result, parties had notice
that small satellites would be assessed fees separately when we
accepted comments regarding the 20/80 NGSO fee allocation. Even when we
adopted the 20/80 NGSO fee allocation, we left open the question as to
how we would integrate the small satellite fee category into the
overall space stations fee category rather than guaranteeing that the
fee would be integrated into the ``less complex'' NGSO fee category. We
also did not yet have any operational small satellites that were
assessed fees in FY 2021, so small satellite licenses were not factored
into the ``less complex'' allocation. As such, we see no need to
reconsider the 20/80 allocation following integration of the small
satellite fee category into the overall NGSO space station fee category
at this time.
29. Small Satellite Regulatory Fees. We decline to broaden the
definition of ``small satellites'' for regulatory fee purposes. In the
Small Satellite Report and Order, the Commission adopted a new,
optional licensing process for small satellites and spacecraft, a type
of NGSO space station. In that proceeding, the Commission also adopted
a small satellite regulatory fee category for licensed and operational
space stations authorized under the process adopted in that proceeding.
The Commission found that these actions would enable such applicants to
choose a streamlined licensing procedure resulting in an easier
application process, a lower application fee and a shorter timeline for
review than exists for non-small satellite applicants. Satellites
licensed through the streamlined process have characteristics that
distinguish them from traditional NGSO satellite space stations, such
as having a lower mass, shorter duration missions, more limited
spectrum needs, and detailed certifications that must be submitted by
the applicant.
30. We are assessing regulatory fees for small satellites for the
first time in FY 2022 because there were five licenses for operational
space stations in this small satellite regulatory fee category as of
the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2021. We are using the
methodology adopted in the Report and Order attached to the FY 2022
NPRM to calculate the regulatory fee for small satellites. The fee is
based on 1/20th (5%) of the average of the non-small satellite NGSO
space station regulatory fee rates from the current fiscal year on a
per license basis. This accommodates fluctuations in the number of NGSO
space stations fee payors and results in an appropriately low
regulatory fee for small satellites. In addition, this averaging
methodology provides a middle ground and an opportunity to gain more
experience in regulating small satellites, while also recognizing that
small satellites are part of a separate fee category and not within
either the ``less complex'' or ``other'' NGSO space stations fee
categories. Our small satellite methodology also takes into account our
expectation that FTEs will spend approximately twenty times more time
on regulating one non-small NGSO space station system compared to the
time spent for regulating one small satellite license.
31. OSK requests that we broaden the definition of ``small
satellites'' for the purposes of regulatory fee assessment to include
all systems that meet the criteria enumerated in the Small Satellite
Report and Order, regardless of whether they seek license processing
under the small satellite processing rules of section 25.122. OSK
contends that the substantial difference in regulatory fee treatment
between ``small satellites'' and NGSO--``less complex'' (almost
$130,000 per year) has significant ramifications for small satellite
operators, such as OSK, who elect not
[[Page 56499]]
to utilize the Commission's new regulatory scheme for small satellites.
According to OSK, if we assess regulatory fees based on the actual
characteristics of the system, rather than the licensing treatment
sought, we can increase efficiency and ensure equitable treatment for
similarly situated systems. By not assessing regulatory fees based on
the actual characteristics of the system, OSK contends that small
satellite operators will be forced to contort their constellations to
fit under the section 25.122 framework in order to avoid unreasonable
fee burdens, thereby removing all optionality the Commission sought to
provide through the streamlined licensing regime.
32. SIA responds that OSK's proposal should be rejected because it
would require the Commission to individually determine whether every
satellite system that applies for Commission authorization meets the
criteria enumerated in the Small Satellite Report and Order, regardless
of whether they seek license processing under section 25.122, which
would significantly add to the administrative burden of the Commission.
SIA adds that, rather than changing the definition of a fee category,
applicants with individual licensing issues should make use of the
existing processes available for regulatees who are concerned about
their fees by petitioning for waiver, deferral, or fee determinations.
33. We decline to broaden the definition of ``small satellites''
for the purposes of regulatory fee assessment and conclude that only
space stations licensed pursuant to the streamlined small satellite
licensing process under sections 25.122 and 25.123 of our rules are
eligible to be assessed the small satellite regulatory fee. As we noted
in the FY 2022 NPRM, the streamlined small satellite rules are designed
to lower the regulatory burden and reduce staff resources required for
licensing, but the rules also restrict the benefits received by these
licensees. For example, license terms are limited to six years,
including deorbit time, and only 10 satellites are permitted on a
single license. In the Small Satellite Report and Order, the Commission
made clear that the licensing process for small satellites is
``optional.'' The Commission further adopted a new category in the
regulatory fee schedule that is separate from the existing fee
categories for satellites licensed pursuant the streamlined process and
stated that the small satellite fee subcategory would apply to licensed
and operational satellite systems ``authorized under the new process
adopted in this proceeding.'' Therefore, licensees that could be
eligible to receive authorization pursuant to the streamlined small
satellite licensing process but choose not to seek authorization
pursuant to the streamlined small satellite licensing process have
sufficient awareness that the regulatory fee category associated with
licenses obtained through small satellite licensing process is
separate. Such licensees must pay the regulatory fees associated with
non-small satellites, which in turn reflect a higher regulatory
oversight cost and significantly greater benefits for the fee payors.
34. FY 2022 NGSO Space Stations Regulatory Fee Rates. We adopt the
below regulatory fee rates for NGSO space stations, as follows for FY
2022:
Table 1--Non-Geostationary Space Station FY 2022 Fee Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NGSO--less
NGSO--other complex space
NGSO--small satellite FY 2022 fee space station station FY 2022
(per license) FY 2022 fee fee (per
(per system) system)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$12,215............................... $340,005 $141,670
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Spacecraft Performing On-Orbit Servicing and Rendezvous and
Proximity Operations
35. Due to the nature of the OOS and RPO, or more generally in-
space servicing industries, we will continue to evaluate each such
spacecraft on a case-by-case basis until we gain more experience in
understanding how such spacecraft fit into our regulatory structure. In
the FY 2022 NPRM, we sought comment on adopting regulatory fee
categories for spacecraft performing OOS and RPO. We noted that there
have been a limited number of such operations and except for GSO
servicing missions. We previously stated that we expect that most OOS
and RPO operations will be NGSO. We tentatively concluded that it is
too early to identify exactly where operations, such as those in low-
Earth orbit (LEO), might fit into the regulatory fee structure in the
future.
36. SIA supports our earlier conclusion that it is premature to
adopt new fee categories for OOS and RPO, as there is currently too
much variation in the industry, and such operations continue to require
a case-by-case review. SIA also notes that even Astroscale, which
supports a fee for RPO operations, acknowledges that such operations
are part of a ``nascent infrastructure.''
37. Other commenters favor the creation of a new fee category and
propose how we may define the services that may be contained in this
new category. Spaceflight argues that OOS missions are a new industry
sector involving relatively low-cost systems and a high regulatory fee
could limit the commercial applications for such systems. Spaceflight
states that OOS might support NGSO or GSO satellites and should be
their own category. Spaceflight observes that until recently the fact
that these missions have been authorized under Special Temporary
Authority (STA) has made Commission regulatory fees a non-issue, but
now that the Commission is requiring some of these missions to be
licensed under part 25, the issue of the appropriate regulatory fees
must be decided. Spaceflight also recommends that the Commission define
``OOS Missions'' as spacecraft whose primary function is to provide
OOS, including concepts of operations such as deployment via orbital
transfer vehicle (OTV), hosting, or RPO. Turion adds that the proposed
OOS regulatory fee category should include space situational awareness
(SSA) and space domain awareness (SDA) and, in the absence of an OOS
regulatory fee category, SSA and SDA should fall under a new regulatory
fee category, separate from the standard NGSO fee category. Astroscale
requests that, rather than using the terms OOS and RPO when discussing
the creation of a new fee category, we use the term ``in-space
servicing'' to correlate the language with the In-Space Servicing,
Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) National Strategy. Astroscale
suggests ``in-space servicing'' be defined as activities in space ``by
a servicer spacecraft or servicing agent on a client space object which
require rendezvous and/or proximity operations.'' Astroscale also
contends that the Commission must not continue to regulate in-space
servicing systems on a mission-by-mission basis and notes that three
distinct ISAM operators have multiple granted or pending full part 25
licenses and 15 STAs have been granted to support commercial ISAM
activities since 2016. Astroscale adds that a fee category for in-space
servicing is needed to solve existing ambiguity and because ISAM
operations challenge the current fee structure established by orbital
regime since an in-space servicing spacecraft can change between NGSO
and GSO operations over their servicing lifetime.
38. Two commenters support an interim regulatory fee at the same
amount as the small satellite fee. Spaceflight and Turion observe that
many of the factors used in determining the small satellite regulatory
fee, such as interference protection, limited duration, smaller
investment, less
[[Page 56500]]
adjudication, multiple licenses or market grants, and limited number of
missions overall, are also present in missions involving their own
spacecraft, as well other OOS spacecraft. Spaceflight and Turion
propose that an interim regulatory fee should apply per OOS mission
license, i.e., 1/20th (5%) of the average of the non-small satellite
NGSO and non-OOS regulatory fee rates from the current fiscal year.
Turion argues that, if the Commission should label OOS spacecraft as
standard NGSOs, despite their meeting the small satellite criteria and
not operating as conventional satellites, then they should receive
similar regulatory fee treatment to small satellite missions. SIA
responds that an interim regulatory fee schedule is unnecessary, as the
assessment of how OOS services fit into the current regime at the
licensing stage is sufficient for the time being.
39. We are unable to adopt a new regulatory fee for in-space
servicing operations for FY 2022 now, as we are required to notify
Congress at least 90 days prior to creating such a change to the
regulatory fee schedule. Moreover, even absent the notice requirement,
we find that the record is not sufficient to support such action at
this time. As such, we defer this issue to a future fiscal so that we
can more effectively address this issue once the regulatory framework
under which space stations performing in-space servicing operations,
including OOS, RPO, SSA, and SDA operations, and the scope of those
operations, is better understood. As SIA, Spaceflight, and Astroscale
acknowledge, in-space servicing is a relatively new industry. Missions,
which can include satellite refueling, inspecting and repairing in-
orbit spacecraft, capturing and removing debris, and transforming
materials through manufacturing while in space, have the potential to
benefit all space stations, the sustainability of the outer space
environment and the space-based services. We note that these systems
are still nascent. For FY 2022, only two in-space servicing spacecraft
were operating pursuant to full part 25 licenses, which is a marginal
number in comparison to the total number of systems operating pursuant
to full part 25 licenses that we are regulating during this fiscal
year. We need more experience with these operations and in
understanding the FTE time required to support them. At this time, we
do not have the experience or the robust record needed to establish
definitions and methodologies for a new fee category for these
operations that would fairly recover any costs that might be associated
with such services. For the same reasons, we decline to adopt an
interim fee, including one equivalent to the fee assessed for systems
authorized under the streamlined small satellite licensing process. As
we gain more experience in oversight and regulation of this industry,
we will better understand how to recover any regulatory costs and
benefits that might be associated with these operations. We also expect
to gain more insight into this industry through the record associated
with our Notice of Inquiry regarding commercial and other non-
governmental ISAM activities.
3. Submarine Cable Regulatory Fees
40. We reject the Submarine Cable Coalition's request to revise the
Commission's regulatory fee methodology for submarine cable operators,
which is based upon the lit capacity of the fiber-optic submarine
cable. We find that the Submarine Cable Coalition provides no
persuasive argument that the Commission's assessment of these
regulatory fees based on capacity is contrary to the Communications Act
and is not reasonably related to the benefits provided. In the 2009
Submarine Cable Order, based on a consensus proposal made by a large
number of submarine cable operators (Consensus Proposal), the
Commission adopted a new methodology for assessing International Bearer
Circuit (IBC) fees. Instead of assessing IBC fees based on 64 kbps
circuits for all types of IBCs, the Commission began assessing
regulatory fees for submarine cable operators on a per cable landing
license basis, with higher fees for larger capacity submarine cable
systems and lower fees for smaller capacity submarine cable systems.
The Commission adopted a five-tier structure for assessing fees on
submarine cables systems based on lit capacity. The Commission
explained that it will define operational submarine cable systems as
either ``large'' or ``small'' submarine cable systems based on the
capacity of each system and the ``small'' systems will be further
subdivided into additional subcategories. The Commission concluded that
this methodology served the public interest and was competitively
neutral because it included both common carrier and non-common carrier
submarine cable operators. The Commission also explained that the
methodology would be easier to administer and for submarine cable
operators to comply with. The Commission further stated that a lower
fee for licensees of smaller cable systems would mitigate concerns that
a flat fee may create a barrier to entry for new entrants. In the FY
2020 Report and Order, the Commission found that lit capacity was an
appropriate measure by which to assess IBC fees for submarine cables.
Subsequently, in the FY 2021 Report and Order, the Commission adopted
the same tiers for assessing fees on submarine cable operators for FY
2021 as in FY 2020, which are based on the lit capacity of the fiber-
optic submarine cable.
41. The Submarine Cable Coalition reiterates in this proceeding the
arguments rejected by the Commission in the FY 2020 and FY 2021
proceedings. The Submarine Cable Coalition contends that the
``regulatory fee structure based upon cable system capacity is contrary
to the mandate of the Communications Act, is overly burdensome, and is
disconnected from the Commission's responsibilities for regulatory
oversight of the submarine cable industry.'' The Submarine Cable
Coalition argues that our methodology ``fails to take into
consideration that the size of a system is not tied to the number of
customers, nor the amount of revenue that it will generate.'' According
to the Submarine Cable Coalition, ``[t]he location of the system, the
existence of competing systems, market demands, whether the system is
operated on a private basis, and various [other] system specific
factors [make] the assessment of the claimed `benefits' by the
Commission a highly nuanced and fact-specific endeavor.'' The Submarine
Cable Coalition further contends that ``the Commission must continue to
lower the burden on the submarine cable operators'' and ``[t]his
continued large increase on the top end of the scale remains
unjustified as the amount of regulatory work that is undertaken by the
Commission regarding submarine cable regulatees is fixed--the
procedures do not vary by the potential traffic the cable is able to
carry, nor has that level of regulatory work increased by any
significant metric in the preceding period.'' Lumen, on the other hand,
states that ``capacity is a reasonable way to distinguish those
submarine cable providers who benefit more from the Commission's
activities from those who benefit less.'' Lumen agrees that the fees
for IBCs as a group, which includes submarine cable systems, should be
reduced, but supports the Commission's longstanding practice of
assessing fees based on capacity.
42. We disagree with the Submarine Cable Coalition's contention
that the Commission's regulatory fee methodology is contrary to the
[[Page 56501]]
Communications Act and that the Commission has not developed regulatory
fees that are reasonably related to the benefits provided. The
Commission has long held that capacity is a reasonable basis to assess
regulatory costs among the submarine cable regulatees that benefit from
the Commission's work. As the Commission has previously stated, the fee
assessment on submarine cables covers the costs for regulatory activity
concerning submarine cables as well as the services provided over the
submarine cables. We find it reasonable to continue to assess higher
regulatory fees on licensees with larger facilities that benefit more
from the Commission's work and thus should pay a larger proportion of
the Commission's costs. We agree with Lumen's assessment that the
Commission's use of capacity to set fees for submarine cables satisfies
the requirement of the statute. As Lumen further states, the statute
``requires only that the Commission set fees `tak[ing] into account
factors that are reasonably related to the benefits provided to the
payor of the fee by the Commission's activities' '' and does not
require ``perfect alignment between fees and benefits.'' We find there
are no significant reasons in the record or changes in the marketplace
to modify our regulatory fee framework for submarine cable systems.
43. Since FY 2009, when the Commission adopted the new methodology
for assessing submarine cable fees, the level of lit capacity for
submarine cable systems has increased and the Commission has expanded
the different tiers to take into account this change and accommodate
for this rapid growth in capacity. However, the basic methodology for
calculating submarine cable fees based on capacity has not changed.
Submarine cable fees are still calculated on the basis of ``1'' unit,
``.5'' units, ``.25'' units and so forth. Furthermore, we note that the
regulatory fees for FY 2022 have been reduced from those assessed in FY
2021; the assessment per unit is now $137,715 compared to $151,910 in
FY 2021. As discussed above, lit capacity remains a reasonable basis to
apportion regulatory costs among the submarine cable regulatees that
benefit from the Commission's work, and our fee methodology with
respect to submarine cables continues to reasonably reflect the FTE
costs for our regulatory activity concerning submarine cables as well
as the services provided over the submarine cables. Accordingly, for FY
2022, we adopt the regulatory fees below for submarine cable systems.
Table 2--FY 2022 International Bearer Circuits--Submarine Cable Systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submarine cable systems (lit FY 2022
capacity as of December 31, 2021) Fee ratio regulatory fees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 50 Gbps................. .0625 Units $8,610
50 Gbps or greater, but less than .125 Units 17,215
250 Gbps.........................
250 Gbps or greater, but less than .25 Units 34,430
1,500 Gbps.......................
1,500 Gbps or greater, but less .5 Units 68,860
than 3,500 Gbps..................
3,500 Gbps or greater, but less 1.0 Unit 137,715
than 6,500 Gbps..................
6,500 Gbps or greater............. 2.0 Units 275,430
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Broadcaster Regulatory Fees for FY 2022
44. FY 2021 Broadband DATA Act. We decline to modify our
methodology to continue to exempt broadcasters' from the costs
associated with the Commission's broadband work. As part of our FY 2021
appropriation, Congress directed the Commission to assess and collect
$374 million in regulatory fees, of which $33 million was specifically
earmarked to be made available for implementing the Broadband DATA Act.
Among other things, the Broadband DATA Act required the Commission to
collect standardized, granular data on the availability and quality of
both fixed and mobile broadband internet access services, to create a
common dataset of all locations where fixed broadband internet access
service can be installed (the Fabric), and to create publicly available
coverage maps. As part of its collection of information, the Broadband
DATA Act required the Commission to include uniform standards for the
reporting of broadband internet access service data from ``each
provider of terrestrial fixed, fixed wireless, or satellite broadband
internet access service.'' The statute defines ``broadband internet
access service'' to mean ``the same meaning given the term in section
8.1(b) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor
regulation.'' That Commission rule, in turn, defines ``broadband
internet access service'' as ``a mass-market retail service by wire or
radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data
from all or substantially all internet endpoints, including any
capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the
communications service, but excluding dial-up internet access service''
and this term ``also encompasses any service that the Commission finds
to be providing a functional equivalent of the service.'' Congress
recognized that specific Commission resources would be utilized in
carrying out the requirements of the Broadband DATA Act. The Committee
Report provides that ``[t]he Committee provides significant funding for
upfront costs associated with implementation of the Broadband DATA Act.
The Committee anticipates funding related to the Broadband DATA Act
will decline considerably in future years and expects the FCC to
repurpose a significant amount of staff currently working on economic,
wireline, and wireless issues to focus on broadband mapping.''
45. In the FY 2021 Report and Order, we adjusted the Commission's
approach to assessing regulatory fees for broadcasters to account for
the unusual circumstances accompanying the Broadband DATA Act earmark.
In this limited instance, given the one-time nature and magnitude of
the earmark, the statutory text, the legislative history, and the
record in this proceeding, we excluded one group of regulatees--
broadcasters or ``Media Services'' licensees--from part of their share
of indirect costs. We concluded that, although we modified our
methodology with respect to the $33 million earmark, this one-time
modification was consistent with the Commission's longstanding goals of
implementing a fair, sustainable, and administrable regulatory fee
regime. The Commission therefore reduced broadcasters' regulatory fees
by approximately 8.88% for FY 2021 and adopted a lower fee factor for
full-service television broadcasters for FY 2021. In doing so, all
other fee payors within the core bureaus, including cable, DBS, and
IPTV providers regulated by the Media Bureau, had to absorb these
indirect
[[Page 56502]]
costs to ensure that the Commission collected the full annual
appropriation.
46. NAB argues that the Commission should continue to exempt
broadcasters from paying for the Commission's ongoing broadband data
mapping work. In FY 2022, however, Congress did not provide an earmark
for a particular purpose, and the accompanying direction regarding use
of staff resources. Thus, the reason for the methodology change in FY
2021 is not present for FY 2022. We therefore decline to make this
modification to our methodology for FY 2022. ``Media Services''
licensees will be assessed regulatory fees based on the current
allocation FTE percentage calculated for FY 2022. NAB also
mischaracterizes the Commission's modification in methodology in FY
2021 as a determination that broadcasters do not benefit from broadband
related activities. Instead, the Commission recognized that the earmark
was limited to a unique mapping task and Congress gave the Commission
direction regarding the staff resources it anticipated would be used to
carry out the discrete task, which did not include Media FTEs. The
Commission did not make a finding that any group of regulatees do not
benefit from broadband-related activities.
47. Commenters argue that broadcasters' regulatory fees have
increased by approximately 13% from FY 2021 to FY 2022 with no
explanation for such an increase by the Commission. This proposed
increase of 12%-13% between FY 2021 and FY 2022 regulatory fee rates
was due to the reduction in regulatory fee rates for broadcasters (AM,
FM, TV, LPTV) due to the Broadband DATA Act earmark in FY 2021. As
discussed below, however, these figures are no longer accurate due to a
correction to our allocation of direct FTEs that were previously
reassigned as indirect in 2017. That said, as we explained above,
because the amount the Commission must collect in an offsetting
collection changes each year, regulatory fees will typically change
each year as a mathematical consequence of the change in amount to be
collected in the current year, FTE allocations in the core bureaus, and
projected unit estimates. Thus, any regulatory fee increases may not
necessarily correlate to the Commission's overall increase in its
appropriation for a fiscal year.
48. The NJBA contends that we should consider an across-the-board
reduction of all fees for broadcasters given the ``emerging
technologies and the eloquent simplicity of regulating [the broadcast]
industry, along with broadcasters' longstanding special place in the
fabric of American society.'' Specifically, the NJBA states that the
broadcast industry has largely been governed by the market and enjoys a
prolific and symbiotic relationship with the public and, unlike the
other technologies competing for Commission resources, broadcasters do
not charge their audiences ever-increasing user charges, subscription
rates and fees for the services they provide. Commenters add that
broadcasters have been particularly hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic,
with severe reductions in advertisement revenues. Similarly, NAB
explains that broadcasters do not have a subscriber base to whom they
can pass on costs and they are required to provide a free service to
the public and are dependent on advertising revenues to cover their
costs.
49. We recognize that many entities, including broadcasters,
sustained economic losses during the COVID-19 pandemic. We also
recognize the broadcasters do not have a subscriber base to whom they
can pass through regulatory fees. However, we emphasize that we must
collect the full FY 2022 appropriation and cannot exempt regulatees
from regulatory fees unless they are expressly exempted under the
statute. As CTIA observes, pursuant to section 9 of the Act, regulatory
fees are based on the level of Commission staffing or staff activity
undertaken by the relevant core bureaus; neither Commission policy
objectives nor regulatee success in the marketplace are relevant
factors in calculating regulatory fees and fulfilling the statutory
charge of section 9 of the Act. Thus, we cannot reduce FY 2022 fees
across-the-board for one category of fee payor; we cannot re-apportion
the fees among categories based on, for example, relative ability to
pay, and we cannot exempt regulatees based on their financial
circumstances. As we indicated above, regulatory fees are a zero-sum
situation. If the Commission freezes one set of regulatees' fees, it
will need to increase another set of regulatees' fees to make up for
any resulting shortfall, and in doing so, the Commission would be
failing to base regulatory fees on FTEs as statutorily required. We
therefore decline to make such changes, requested by NAB and others,
based on policy considerations inconsistent with section 9 of the Act.
50. UHF/VHF Stations. We decline to adjust the Commission's
treatment of VHF stations for purposes of assessing regulatory fees.
NJBA observes that, while the Commission in 2014 determined that VHF TV
stations had become ``less desirable'' than UHF stations, the proposed
regulatory fee structure provides no acknowledgement of this nor any
discount to VHF stations. NJBA contends that many UHF stations are
paying less than VHF stations and that UHF stations can offer a variety
of services that traditional VHF stations cannot offer (especially low
band VHF stations). Therefore, NJBA states that it is more logical that
with the ability to offer a wider array of services and thereby obtain
greater revenues, UHF stations should be assessed greater regulatory
fees commensurate with these additional avenues of revenue attainment
that VHF stations that cannot secure.
51. The Commission previously discussed the treatment of VHF
stations. Specifically, the Commission observed that, in the FY 2020
NPRM, it declined to categorically lower regulatory fees for VHF
stations to account for signal limitations. The Commission concluded
that there is nothing inherent in VHF transmission that creates signal
deficiencies but that environmental noise issues can affect reception
in certain areas and situations. As such, the Commission recognized
that the Media Bureau had granted waivers to allow VHF stations that
demonstrate signal disruptions to exceed the maximum power level
specified for channels 2-6 in 73.622(f)(6) and for channels 7-13 in
73.622(f)(7)--and that it would not penalize such stations by assessing
them at their higher power levels needed to overcome such interference
but instead at the power levels authorized by our rules. As the
Commission determined at that time, such an approach more narrowly
targets the issue that NJBA complains about by ensuring that VHF
broadcasters that actually experience increased interference can get
the relief they need to reach consumers without sweeping other
broadcasters into the mix.
52. Methodology for Full Service TV Regulatory Fees. We will
continue to use the population-based methodology for full-service
television broadcasters as proposed for FY 2022. In FY 2020, the
Commission completed the transition to a population-based full-power
broadcast television regulatory fee, finding it to be more equitable.
As we stated in the FY 2022 NPRM, we do not reopen that decision
relating to these regulatory fees being based on population at this
time. In the FY 2022 NPRM, we sought comment on the use of population-
based fees for full-power broadcast television stations based on the
station's terrain-limited contour. We now adopt a factor of .84 of one
cent ($.008430) per population served for FY 2022 full-power broadcast
television
[[Page 56503]]
station fees. The population data for each licensee and the population-
based fee (population multiplied by the factor of $.008430) for each
full-power broadcast television station, including each satellite
station, is listed in Table 9. For those VHF stations whose power had
to be increased to obtain a clearer signal, the Commission will
continue to use a population count based on that station's lower VHF
power level rather than at the increased power level.
53. NJBA disagrees with this methodology and contends that a
population-based fee approach to assign regulatory fees is incongruent
with how a station should be assessed fees in correlation to the
revenue it achieves from its Nielsen DMA revenue share. NJBA argues
that the DMA approach is a more accurate approach to assessing fees
correlating with how stations derive revenue. NJBA's argument is that
its members had relatively low revenues compared to major network
stations in New York City. Essentially, NJBA appears to seek a waiver
for its members of a portion of the regulatory fee based on its
individual financial circumstances, i.e., advertising revenue, and we
decline to grant this blanket request. Under our rules, parties can
seek a waiver, reduction, or deferment on a case-by-case basis of the
fee, interest charge, or penalty ``in any specific instance for good
cause shown, where such action would promote the public interest.''
54. NJBA also notes that the term Noise Limited Contour (NLSC)
implies that it is the contour within which a perfect picture would
appear at each television receiver. NJBA contends that this approach
does not consider the effects on a signal that may result from the
distance it may travel; the effects of terrain; building blockages
which often occur in major city settings; and interference levels from
co-channel and adjacent channel signals. NJBA's argument is that
certain stations experience a high degree of interference from
environmental noise and signal blockage from tall buildings near its
transmitter. We recognize that in various parts of the country,
broadcasters may face such interference or signal blockage issues;
however, as we discussed in the FY 2020 Report and Order, adjudicating
the circumstances of every station in the context of a cross-
industrywide rulemaking would be administratively impractical, and the
Commission's rule already provides a more appropriate venue for relief.
We recognize that the population-based methodology increases fees for
some licensees and reduces fees for others, but in the end the
population-based metric better conforms with the actual service
authorized here--broadcasting television to the American people. NJBA
members can seek a waiver, reduction, or deferment on a case-by-case
basis of the fee, interest charge, or penalty ``in any specific
instance for good cause shown, where such action would promote the
public interest.''
D. De Minimis Threshold
55. We decline to increase the de minimis threshold amount above
$1,000. Section 9(e)(2) of the Act permits the Commission to exempt a
party from paying regulatory fees if ``in the judgment of the
Commission, the cost of collecting a regulatory fee established under
this section from a party would exceed the amount collected from such
party.'' A regulatee's de minimis status is not a permanent exemption
from regulatory fees. Rather, each regulatee will need to reevaluate
annually to determine whether its total liability for annual regulatory
fees falls at or below the de minimis threshold given any changes that
the Commission may make in its regulatory fees each fiscal year. As we
explained in the FY 2022 NPRM, the Commission's process for collecting
delinquent regulatory fee debt involves a number of steps, including
data compilation, preparation, and validation; invoicing; debt transfer
for third party collection; responding to debtor questions and
disputes; and processing payments. The Commission periodically
calculates its collection costs for purposes of determining the de
minimis threshold by estimating the number of FTE hours spent on each
collection task times the value of FTE time expended on the task, to
arrive at the estimated total cost of each task. The totals for each
task are then added together to determine the total estimated cost of
collection. The total estimated cost of collection divided by the
estimated number of delinquent regulatory fee debts for that fiscal
year yields the average cost of collecting an unpaid regulatory fee.
56. For FY 2019, the last year the Commission reviewed the de
minimis threshold, the Commission concluded that its average cost of
collection did not exceed $1,000 and, therefore, the $1,000 de minimis
threshold was still appropriate. In the FY 2022 NPRM, we sought comment
on NAB's proposal to increase the annual $1,000 de minimis threshold.
We asked commenters advocating for a higher de minimis threshold to
discuss how we should calculate our collection costs and the steps in
the Commission's regulatory fee process that should be included in the
calculation. For example, we asked whether the calculation should begin
when the Commission collects data on a payor's regulatory fee status,
prior to the regulatory fee due date, rather than when the regulatory
fee becomes delinquent, as is our current practice, and whether the
calculation should include the Commission's cost of processing waiver
and installment payment requests.
57. NAB, SIA, and the State Broadcasters Associations support a
review of the $1,000 de minimis threshold. SIA suggests that, in light
of inflation and other economic changes since 2019 when the Commission
last addressed the de minimis threshold, the Commission's cost of
collecting regulatory fees may have increased. NAB and the State
Broadcasters Associations support expanding the Commission's
calculation of its regulatory fee collection costs to include the cost
of collecting payor fee data, costs incurred prior to the regulatory
fee due date and the cost of processing and resolving waiver and
installment payment requests. Specifically, NAB, SIA, and Richards each
suggest that an appropriate factor in setting the de minimis threshold
is to provide a higher threshold of relief to smaller broadcasters. To
that end, NAB proposes that the de minimis threshold be increased to
$1,200 to ensure that radio broadcasters that were below the de minimis
threshold last year, but facing higher FY 2022 regulatory fees, will
still be exempt in FY 2022. Richards suggests increasing the de minimis
threshold to $3,000 in order to exempt most AM and FM stations serving
populations under 500,000, which are the stations Richards believes
will be hardest hit by the increase in FY 2022 regulatory fees.
58. We acknowledge that the de minimis threshold has the collateral
effect of providing financial relief to some regulatees. However, it
does not follow from the wording of section 9(e)(2) of the Act that
providing relief for financially strapped regulatees is a factor that
can be considered in setting this threshold. Moreover, raising the
threshold on such a basis would result in exempting classes or
categories of fee payors in a manner contrary to the limited waiver
provisions for regulatory fees. Nothing in the text of the statute
supports using policy factors outside of the cost of collection in
establishing the de minimis threshold. Thus, in response to commenters'
request for a review of the de minimis threshold, we calculated the
average cost of collecting FY 2021 regulatory fees and included the
cost of collecting payor fee data and the cost of
[[Page 56504]]
processing waiver and installment plan requests, as both NAB and the
State Broadcasters Associations suggest. Even including the additional
costs (without determining whether they are appropriately included in
this calculation), the Commission's average cost of collection has not
increased above the $1,000 de minimis threshold. Thus, we conclude that
the cost of collecting regulatory fees, including the costs of
collecting payor fee data and processing waiver and installment
requests, does not justify an increase to the existing $1,000 de
minimis threshold.
59. Both NAB and the State Broadcasters Associations suggest that
the Commission define the ``cost of collection'' to encompass all
annual costs of administering the regulatory fee program. While we
agree with NAB that section 9(e)(2) of the Act does not provide a
definition of costs of collection, we do not agree that the cost of
collecting a regulatory fee should be expanded to include all of the
Commission's costs of administering the regulatory fee program each
year. We believe that a common sense interpretation of the language of
section 9(e)(2) of the Act includes only those costs incurred by the
Commission once the Commission has established that the annual fees are
owed, which occurs when the Commission's regulatory fee Report and
Order is released. In making this determination, we rely in part on the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, as amended, 31 U.S.C. 3701 et
seq. (DCIA), which governs the federal administrative debt collection
process for most federal agencies, including the Commission. Under the
DCIA, collection of debt begins after an agency has determined that the
debt is due. Thus, we would here include costs once the regulatory fee
becomes a debt, which occurs when the annual regulatory fee report and
order is released. We therefore hold that the Commission's cost of
collection for the purpose of establishing a de minimis threshold under
section 9(e)(2) of the Act means collection costs incurred by the
Commission after the Commission's regulatory fee Report and Order is
released, including the costs the Commission incurs collecting payor
fee data and processing waiver and installment plan requests.
E. Reclassification of FTEs
60. Universal Service Fund Activities. We decline, at this time, to
reclassify certain indirect FTEs as direct FTEs for regulatory fee
purposes. Nevertheless, we correct the manner in which we apportion the
38 previously reallocated core bureau FTEs in order to advance the
overall implementation of our proportional methodology. In 2017, the
Commission allocated as indirect, for regulatory fee purposes, 38 FTEs
in the Wireline Competition Bureau who work on non-high cost programs
of the Universal Service Fund. The Commission determined that changes
in the Universal Service Fund regulatory landscape required it to
reexamine whether the FTEs working on universal service issues as
Wireline Competition Bureau direct FTEs should be reallocated as
indirect. The FTE count was based on an analysis by the Office of
Managing Director and Wireline Competition Bureau staff of the number
of FTE hours dedicated to working on each of the Universal Service Fund
programs. In the FY 2022 NPRM, we sought comment generally on whether
prior reclassifications of FTEs from direct to indirect produce a more
accurate regulatory fee assessment.
61. Initially, Universal Service Fund programs were focused on
wireline services; however, as the Commission observed, by 2017,
wireless carriers and broadband providers were also involved in the E-
Rate, Lifeline, and Rural Healthcare programs. In addition, the E-Rate,
Lifeline, and Rural Healthcare programs tie funding eligibility to the
beneficiary, i.e., a school, a library, a low-income individual or
family, or a rural health care provider, and not to Commission
regulatees. The Commission observed that wireless carriers serve a
substantial, if not majority, of Lifeline subscribers. Also, satellite
operators, Wi-Fi network installers, and fiber builders can all receive
funding through the E-Rate and Rural Health Care universal service
programs. Similarly, Multichannel Video Programming Distributors
(MVPDs) that also provide supported services, receive universal service
funding because they provide telecommunications and broadband internet
access services that are eligible for support in those programs. The
Commission further noted that contributions to the Universal Service
Fund are required from service providers using any technology that has
end-user interstate telecommunications. Moreover, applicants in these
programs are not regulatees, they are schools and libraries and health
care providers; the bulk of the Commission's oversight and regulation
of these programs (i.e., the Commission's FTE costs) are not generated
by regulatees. The Commission therefore concluded that ITSPs were no
longer the sole or even majority contributors or beneficiaries of these
three programs. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that
reallocating these Wireline Competition Bureau FTEs as indirect FTEs
would also be more consistent with how FTEs working on Universal
Service Fund issues were treated elsewhere in the Commission.
62. NAB contends that this reclassification of 38 FTEs is a
wholesale abandonment of the statutory requirement that fees be
adjusted to reflect benefits received by the payor by the Commission's
activities. According to NAB, broadcasters have been unfairly forced to
pay for a portion of the 38 FTEs in the Wireline Competition Bureau
that the Commission determined were working on Universal Service Fund
programs. NAB claims that, at a minimum, the Commission must ensure
that broadcasters bear no responsibility for the 38 FTEs working on
non-high cost USF programs in the Wireline Competition Bureau. NAB
further argues that over the last five years broadcasters have likely
paid more than $25 million in regulatory fees to support the activities
of FTEs that, according to NAB, the Commission agrees do not benefit or
regulate broadcasters.
63. We disagree that this example of 38 indirect FTEs who work on
non-high cost Universal Service Fund issues was an improper assignment
of FTEs under section 9 of the Act. Indirect FTEs work on issues that
may include more than one regulated service or work on matters that are
not related to services regulated by the Commission. All costs that are
not directly related to regulation and oversight by the core bureaus
must also be recovered by regulatory fees. This includes salaries and
expenses, overhead functions, statutorily required tasks that do not
directly equate with oversight and regulation of a particular regulatee
but instead benefit the Commission and the industry as a whole, support
costs such as rent, utilities, and equipment, and the costs incurred in
regulating entities that are statutorily exempt from paying regulatory
fees (i.e., governmental and nonprofit entities, amateur radio
operators, and noncommercial radio and television stations), entities
with total annual assessed fees below the de minimis threshold, and
entities whose regulatory fees are waived. Indirect FTEs in the
Commission devote their time to a large variety of issues, some of
which may not directly affect every Commission regulatee, including
broadcasters.
64. With that said, while we continue to find that the Commission
was supported in its decision in 2017 to reassign the 38 FTEs in the
Wireline
[[Page 56505]]
Competition Bureau who work on non-high cost programs of the Universal
Service Fund as indirect, we agree with broadcast commenters that the
method for calculating the fees associated with these indirect FTEs
should be corrected given the record in this proceeding, as well as the
Commission's prior findings. The Commission has previously
acknowledged, in 2016, that broadcasters receive no oversight,
regulation, or other benefits of the nature we typically consider
relevant for our regulatory fee analysis when looking at the activity
of these indirect Universal Service Fund FTEs. Indeed, when the
Commission reassigned these 38 non-high-cost Universal Service Fund
FTEs in 2017, it dismissed the burden on broadcasters based on the
general difficulty in precisely allocating every FTE without revisiting
its 2016 acknowledgment. In short, despite these acknowledgments that
broadcasters did not benefit from Universal Service Fund activities,
the Commission failed to take appropriate measures to ensure that the
proportional fee allocation methodology was not adversely impacted by
the reassignment of the 38 non-high-cost FTEs. We remedy that today.
While we adhere to the principle that our analysis here does not
require scientific precision and need only be reasonable, in this
instance, the record, the Commission's own prior findings, and our own
review clearly substantiate the view that broadcasters do not benefit
from these Universal Service Fund-related activities. Furthermore, we
have prior experience implementing this type of change given our
decision last year to exclude broadcasters from paying regulatory fees
associated with the implementation of the Broadband DATA Act. We also
note that Commission decisions to reallocate direct FTEs to indirect
FTEs without also moving the FTEs into a non-core bureau or office are
rare and are only warranted when unique circumstances support
refinement of the Commission's general methodology for calculating
regulatory fees. As such, we are not routinely faced with circumstances
in which updates to our general methodology should be considered. While
we acknowledge that other commenters in this proceeding have raised
arguments about the Commission's allocation of indirect FTEs more
generally, we find that the record currently before us is not
sufficiently developed to support affording similar relief to other
regulatory fee payors based upon indirect FTE areas of work at this
time. However, we believe that these issues would benefit from
additional comment, as set forth in the accompanying Notice of Inquiry.
65. Therefore, we will exclude ``Media Services'' licensees from
recovery of the funds associated with the 38 indirect FTEs who work on
non-high cost Universal Service Fund issues. We find that this
correction to the manner in which we apportion the 38 previously
reallocated core bureau FTEs is supported given the nature of this FTE
reassignment; the weight of the record with respect to this issue; and
the unusual position of broadcasters vis-[agrave]-vis other Commission
regulatees in this instance. Furthermore, once implemented, this
correction is easily repeatable each year, so long as the FTE
reassignment remains warranted. In excluding ``Media Services''
licensees from the recovery of the funds associated with the 38
indirect FTEs who work on non-high cost Universal Service Fund issues,
we recognize that all other fee payors within the core bureaus,
including cable, DBS and IPTV providers regulated by the Media Bureau,
will need to absorb these indirect costs because we are required by
Congress to collection the full annual appropriation.
66. Office of Economics and Analytics. In FY 2019, the Commission
reassigned staff from other bureaus and offices to establish the Office
of Economics and Analytics (OEA), effective December 11, 2018. This
resulted in the reassignment of 95 FTEs (of which 64 were not auctions-
funded) as indirect FTEs. SIA contends that in any given year the
rulemaking proceedings reviewed by OEA are not distributed across
bureaus proportionally based on the number of direct FTEs and thus, the
benefits from the work of OEA do not necessarily accrue proportionally
to all payors. We note that all Commission-level drafts from core and
non-core bureaus are reviewed by OEA, and OEA is also responsible for
other economic-related activities that benefit the Commission. This
function, assisting all bureaus and offices in the Commission with
economic analysis, is appropriately considered indirect. CTIA observes
that SIA's suggestion, that the Commission allocate OEA FTEs among
certain core bureaus based on the type of rulemakings and other matters
during a given year, would not proffer accurate FTE time allocations,
and it would fail to reflect the wide variety of issues OEA reviews
from non-core bureaus.
67. SIA also contends that a large portion of the FTE time in OEA
involves auctions and is therefore outside the scope of International
Bureau payors and International Bureau regulatees should not be
responsible for this portion of indirect FTEs. As we have previously
stated, all auctions expenses are separately funded and are not part of
the Commission's annual S&E appropriation supported by regulatory fees.
Pursuant to statute, the Commission recovers the costs of developing,
implementing, and maintaining its section 309(j) spectrum auctions
program as an offsetting collection against auction proceeds and
subject to an annual cap which is articulated in the annual S&E
appropriation. Thus, time devoted to developing and implementing
auctions is tracked separately from other non-auctions work performed
by FTEs, and is offset by the auction proceeds that the Commission is
permitted to retain pursuant to section 309(j)(8) of the Act and the
Commission's annual appropriation statute. For this reason, auctions
FTEs are not included in the calculation of regulatory fees, and the
Commission's methodology excludes all auctions-related FTEs and their
overhead from the regulatory fee calculations. To the extent that FTE
time within core bureaus is spent on auctions issues and on non-
auctions issues, only the non-auctions portion is reflected in the core
bureau's FTE count. Thus, only direct non-auctions FTE time is used in
the calculation of the regulatory fee rate and consequently impact the
overall regulatory fee calculations.
68. Further, SIA suggests that the Commission allocate the indirect
FTEs in OEA's Auction Division to regulatory fee payors who benefit
from auctions; and classify OEA's Associate Chief, Wireline, and
Associate Chief, Media as direct FTEs allocated to Media and Wireline,
respectively, and then divide the Associate Chief, Wireless and
Spectrum indirect FTEs among the remaining core licensing bureaus. We
reject this proposal. As an initial matter, we note that an FTE is a
full-time equivalent, not an employee, and is based on the hours of
work devoted to the regulation and oversight of the fee categories and
not a particular job title. Further, the FTE time working on auctions
issues is not included in our regulatory fee calculations and is funded
separately. The OEA FTEs numbers attributed to non-auctions work derive
from FTE levels in the Data Division, Economic Analysis Division, and
Industry Analysis Division, as well as in OEA's Front Office. Staff in
OEA review all Commission-level items, from all the Commission's
bureaus and offices, including the International
[[Page 56506]]
Bureau, as well as providing economic analysis to the Commission and
drafting white papers. The FTEs in OEA provide economic and data
analysis to the entire Commission and are appropriately allocated as
indirect FTEs.
F. Commenters' Proposals for New Regulatory Fee Categories
69. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking attached to the FY 2021
Report and Order, the Commission sought comment on adopting new
regulatory fee categories and on ways to improve our regulatory fee
process regarding any and all categories of service. The Commission
asked commenters supporting such new fees how to define any new fee
category and how to calculate and assess such fees on an annual basis.
In the FY 2022 NPRM, we sought additional comment on these issues.
Commenters supporting new regulatory fee categories advocate such fees
for holders of experimental licenses; broadband internet access
service; holders of equipment authorizations; database administrators
that charge fees to enable unlicensed operations; and entities using
spectrum on an unlicensed basis, including large technology companies.
As we discuss below, we reject these proposals to create these new
regulatory fee categories. Given the record developed in response to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking attached to the FY 2021 Report and
Order and in response to the FY 2022 NPRM, we find that there is an
insufficient basis for adding these new regulatory fee categories at
this time.
1. Holders of Experimental Licenses
70. The Satellite Coalition and SIA propose that the Commission
adopt a regulatory fee category for holders of experimental licenses
and state that this would involve the same process used for other
licensed entities: the Commission would calculate the number of FTEs
engaged in experimental licensing activities to determine the
percentage of the total regulatory fee revenue requirement associated
with experimental licensees (including direct and indirect costs) and
then divide that amount among experimental license holders. CTIA
disagrees and observes that the FTEs in the Office of Engineering and
Technology (OET) that work on experimental licenses are appropriately
classified as indirect because their duties affect multiple core
bureaus and their regulatees, including satellite regulatees authorized
by the International Bureau. We are not convinced that an experimental
license is the same as other Commission licenses and that it should be
subject to a regulatory fee.
71. OET typically grants over 2,000 experimental licenses each
year, including Special Temporary Authority (STA). Many commercial
services and technologies deployed today were first tested under the
experimental licensing program. Where such technologies result in new
licensing frameworks or services, the resultant services usually are
subject to regulatory fees. The experimental radio service permits
broad experimentation, including assessing equipment intended to
operate in existing Commission services, proof of concept testing and
evaluation of new radio technologies, equipment designs, radio wave
propagation characteristics, and service concepts related to the use of
the radio spectrum. Thus, many experimental licenses are filed by
universities, research and development companies, technology
manufacturers, and medical institutions which often are non-profit
entities.
72. The Commission issues a variety of experimental licenses that
range in duration from a few days to six months for STAs, generally two
years for conventional experimental licenses, five years for
experimental program licenses, and 10 years for experimental licenses
in spectrum bands above 95 GHz. There is no renewal process for STAs.
Further, applicants seeking extension of conventional experimental
licenses must include sufficient justification for continued
experimentation; otherwise, such applicants are referred to the
appropriate service bureau to seek a service license. If service rules
for the applicable spectrum are needed, applicants may petition the
Commission for rulemaking to modify allocations or service rules in
such a way as to permit the tested technology to obtain a license to
operate. Experimental licenses (except for above 95 GHz licenses) are
not permitted to be used to offer commercial service. However, market
trials are permitted under certain circumstances to allow applicants to
evaluate product performance and customer acceptability prior to the
production stage. Further, experimental licenses are issued on a
limited, non-harmful interference basis for operation within a band in
which (typically) regulatory fee payors enjoy primary or secondary use.
Additionally, experimental licenses do not provide the holder with any
vested spectrum use rights and the Commission can require licensees to
discontinue experimental operations at any time without undertaking any
further administrative process, such as an adjudication.
73. OET's experimental authorization processes thus are distinct
from authorization processes applicable to other types of licenses and
the regulated entities holding them, and essentially fall under OET's
functions of evaluating evolving technology for interference potential,
facilitating the introduction of nascent technologies, and maintaining
the U.S. Table of Frequency Allocations. As such, in reviewing those
applications, OET ensures that experimental uses will not interfere
with the primary and secondary users in the relevant bands, who, unlike
experimental license holders, do have spectrum rights associated with a
license in an authorized service. Where the core bureaus regulate the
regulatory fee payors, they also provide the benefit of protecting such
primary and secondary uses of the spectrum. Thus, while Commission
resources are expended on processing experimental applications, these
licenses are approved for a proposed experiment or range of
experiments, and not for an actual operational service under
established service rules providing some level of interference
protection. Experimental licensing is often an important option for
academic researchers on restricted budgets who are developing new
technological solutions. Therefore, imposing regulatory fees on these
licensees potentially could stifle a Commission function and policy
objective of promoting new, efficient technology by precluding some
academic researchers or small start-up technology developers from
developing and testing new technologies and systems. Moreover,
experimental authorizations present challenges in determining a fair,
administrable, and sustainable regulatory fee system. As a starting
point, many experimental license applicants are exempt from regulatory
fees under the statute. Additionally, given the transient nature of
such authorizations, determining what operational period is sufficient
to merit assessment of regulatory fees would require significant
analysis. Given the varying types of experimental authorizations, and
the limited authority granted, it is likely we would have to consider
multiple regulatory fee categories and multiple ways of allocating
proportional fees to such categories. Commenters have not provided any
analysis of the experimental authorizations in the record to allow us
to make such determinations here. Moreover, in addition to the exempt
status of many applicants, it is likely we would find
[[Page 56507]]
that many experimental authorizations, if subject to regulatory fees,
do not result in any collection because the payor's total assessment
falls under the de minimis threshold. Thus, we find that the record
here is not sufficient for the Commission to establish a fair and
administrable system for assessing regulatory fees for such
experimental licenses.
74. Further, as we stated previously, OET provides engineering and
technical expertise to the Commission as a whole and supports each of
the agency's four core bureaus. FTEs within OET are appropriately
classified as indirect because the FTE time devoted to OET work affects
multiple core bureaus within the Commission and its regulatees. Because
the experimental license typically is not used for a commercial
service, and OET oversight helps to ensure that experimental licensees
do not interfere with other (non-experimental) licensees, ``it is
consistent with the principles of section 9 of the Communications Act
for other (non-experimental) licensees to pay the costs of OET's work
on experimental licenses. OET's FTE work on experimental licenses
already is captured under the Commission's current regulatory fee
framework. Moreover, we find that the Satellite Coalition's and SIA's
proposals for such a new fee category could discourage communications
industry innovation, and thus undermine the rationale for the
Experimental Radio Service. We therefore decline to adopt a new
regulatory fee category for holders of experimental licenses.
2. Broadband Internet Access Service
75. We also decline to create a new regulatory fee category for
broadband internet access services at this time. There is no specific
bureau or office in the Commission with oversight of all broadband
services, because these oversight activities are spread out among all
core bureaus, and broadband issues are a part of a variety of
Commission initiatives and proceedings. NAB and Satellite Coalition
argue that the Commission should expand the base of regulatory fee
categories to include a broadband internet access service fee category
to which the Commission should allocate all broadband-related costs.
76. Specifically, NAB contends that the Commission should revise
its methodology to reallocate broadband costs among only those fee
payors that benefit from the Commission's broadband activities. NAB
argues that requiring broadcasters to pay for these costs is unfair
since broadcasters do not benefit from the Commission's broadband
activities. NAB suggests that the Commission modify its existing
information collection systems to obtain the data necessary to assess
regulatory fees on either a subscription or revenue basis. NAB contends
that broadband internet access service providers began submitting data,
including subscription counts, in the annual Broadband Data Collection
and that the Commission could use this information to assess fees on a
per-subscriber basis. NAB further proposes that we place this
regulatory fee category within the Wireline Competition Bureau and
reallocate FTEs that work primarily on broadband related issues in the
other core and noncore bureaus and offices of the Commission to this
fee category, to the extent necessary.
77. In the FY 2021 Report and Order, in addressing the assessment
of regulatory fees to cover the costs of implementation of the
Broadband DATA Act as part of the Commission's FY 2021 appropriation,
we specifically stated that we do not have sufficient information to
form the basis of designating a new broadband regulatory fee category.
We indicated the information that we do not presently possess but that
would be important in designating a new regulatory fee category and
determining the unit measure within a fee category would include the
amount of broadband internet access services offered by entities that
also provide services subject to existing regulatory fees and by
entities that provide broadband internet access services that are not
currently subject to regulatory fees. Commenters still have not
provided us with this information or identified Commission regulatory
efforts involving FTEs specific to this industry segment to support a
separate regulatory fee category for this service.
78. Further, we are unconvinced that a broadband internet access
service regulatory fee category is necessary or that such a category
appropriately belongs in the Wireline Competition Bureau. Broadband
internet access services are offered through various technical means
and by widely differing entities and to distinct user groups, e.g.,
wireless service providers, wireline service providers (including
VoIP), cable operators, and satellite operators, to consumers and
businesses, on both a retail and a wholesale basis. This service is not
only offered by different types of providers, but is also delivered to
end users in different ways. Commenters have not shown that a
particular group of FTEs within the Commission is providing oversight
and regulation for broadband internet access services and that other
parties (besides these broadband internet access service providers) are
responsible for all of the regulatory fees associated with those FTEs.
It appears that the contrary is true: broadband internet access
services are involved in many Commission initiatives and proceedings
and such services are offered by service providers regulated by all the
core bureaus and already responsible for regulatory fees. Therefore, to
include this proposed regulatory fee category under the Wireline
Competition Bureau, as suggested by NAB, would increase the Wireline
Competition Bureau's regulatory fee contribution based on time spent
not only by staff in the Wireline Competition Bureau on broadband
matters, but by staff in the other offices and bureaus within the
Commission.
79. The Satellite Coalition, in arguing that the Commission adopt a
broadband internet access service regulatory fee category, contends
that the Commission has already calculated that 550 FTEs across a wide
variety of offices and bureaus work on the Commission's broadband
policy as part of its Strategic Goal to bring affordable, high-speed
broadband to 100% of the country. We do not agree with Satellite
Coalition's contention that the 2022 Strategic Goals apply to assessing
regulatory fees. The Commission's Strategic Goals do not pertain to any
specific regulatory fee category, but rather are developed and used as
part of planning exercises mandated by a wholly unrelated statutory
scheme. As we indicated above, such strategic goals are intended to
align with higher level priority goals of the overall federal
government. Thus, staff support of a specific strategic goal is not a
sound rationale for adopting a new regulatory fee category.
80. Additionally, NAB argues that broadening the base of regulatory
fee payors to include broadband internet access service providers would
ensure a more fair and sustainable regulatory fee system. However,
NAB's proposal does not establish a sufficient basis for the creation
of such a category and that a broadband internet access services
regulatory fee category, if adopted, would be fair, administrable, or
sustainable for the reasons elaborated above. As NCTA notes, the
Commission has taken historic actions to discount broadband internet
access service for those who cannot afford it and now would not be the
time to unravel that work by adopting a new set of regulatory fees that
would increase the cost-burden of these services. We also are not
persuaded that such a new
[[Page 56508]]
regulatory fee category, if adopted, would reduce broadcasters'
regulatory fees. Given the various uncertainties, we find it unlikely
that adding a new fee category for broadband internet access service
would make a significant difference in the broadcasters' regulatory
fees. The total amount we collect from each core bureau is based on the
number of non-auctions FTEs in each bureau, and adding a new broadband
internet access fee category or categories would not change the number
of Media Bureau FTEs working on broadcast issues. Moreover, as
indicated above, broadband internet access services are a part of many
Commission initiatives and proceedings and such services are offered by
service providers regulated by all the core bureaus (and these
providers already pay regulatory fees on their regulated services). For
these reasons, particularly due to the lack of information in the
record to support the need for adoption of such a new regulatory fee
category, we are not creating a new fee category for broadband internet
access services at this time. Specifically, we find that section 9 of
the Act does not require creation of this category and commenters have
not shown, on the basis of the record in this proceeding, that such a
category would satisfy the factors that the Commission has relied on
when it has found a basis to create a new regulatory fee category.
3. Holders of Equipment Authorizations
81. We decline to adopt the Satellite Coalition's proposal that the
Commission adopt a regulatory fee category for holders of equipment
authorizations. Satellite Coalition argues that the costs associated
with equipment authorizations can be assessed on equipment
manufacturers that benefit from Commission staff who implement policies
designed to ensure compliance with relevant regulatory standards. We
find, however, that OET FTE time on equipment authorizations is
appropriately classified as indirect because such work affects multiple
core bureaus and their regulatees, including satellite regulatees
authorized by the International Bureau. OET provides engineering and
technical expertise to the Commission as a whole and supports each of
the four core bureaus. Notably, part of OET's role is to participate in
matters ``not within the jurisdiction of any single bureau'' or
``affecting more than one bureau,'' similar to other offices with
indirect FTEs such as the Office of General Counsel and the Office of
Economics and Analytics. Some of OET's duties and responsibilities that
affect multiple core bureaus and their regulatees include maintaining
the U.S. Table of Frequency Allocations; managing the Experimental
Licensing and Equipment Authorization programs; regulating the
operation of devices; and conducting engineering and technical studies.
The matters handled by OET benefit the Commission's work as a whole as
well as all service sectors to which the Commission's core bureaus
devote FTE resources.
82. The equipment authorization program is one of the principal
ways the Commission ensures that radio frequency devices operate
effectively without causing harmful interference and otherwise comply
with the Commission's rules. The Commission's equipment authorization
program promotes efficient use of the radio spectrum and addresses
various responsibilities associated with certain treaties and
international regulations, while ensuring that radio frequency (RF)
devices in the United States comply with the Commission's technical
requirements before they can be marketed in or imported to the United
States. As a general matter, for an RF device to be marketed or
operated in the United States, it must have been authorized for use by
the Commission, although a limited number of categories of RF equipment
are exempt from this requirement. The Commission's equipment
authorization program provides for two pathways: certification and
supplier's declaration of conformity (SDoC). Applicants for equipment
certification are required to file their applications, which must
include certain specified information, with an FCC-recognized
Telecommunications Certification Body (TCB). The Commission, through
its Office of Engineering and Technology (OET), oversees the
certification process, and provides guidance to applicants, TCBs, and
test labs with regard to required testing and other information
associated with certification procedures and processes, including
guidance provided via correspondence or found in pre-approval guidance
or OET's knowledge database system (KDB). The SDoC procedures, which
are available for specific equipment generally considered to have
reduced potential to cause RF interference, provide for equipment to be
authorized based on the responsible party's self-declaration that the
equipment complies with the pertinent Commission requirements. Because
the SDoC process is based on self-declaration, there is no direct
oversight of that process by OET staff. As we noted in the FY 2021
Report and Order, OET FTE resources for equipment authorizations are
typically limited to overseeing the equipment authorization program.
83. Because there are multiple categories of equipment
authorization procedures, including exemption and self-authorization,
the implementation of regulatory fees assessed to holders of equipment
authorizations presents challenges in determining a fair,
administrable, and sustainable fee system.. Additionally, equipment
authorization generally applies to the functionality of a particular
device, not the production of each unit (i.e., an entity needs to
complete the equipment authorization process only once for a device
regardless of how many units of such devices are produced). Thus,
unlike licenses, equipment authorizations are obtained once and are not
subject to validity for a defined time period. Further, the equipment
authorization procedures that are applicable to RF devices permitted to
be imported or marketed into the U.S. do not require the Commission to
collect information from or communicate directly with the manufacturer
of every device. Commenters have not provided sufficient analysis in
the record to allow us to determine a fair, administrable, and
sustainable regulatory fee system for the holders of equipment
authorization. For these reasons, we find that the OET FTEs are
appropriately categorized as indirect and we reject the proposal to
adopt a new fee category for holders of equipment authorizations.
4. Operators of Databases of Spectrum Used on an Unlicensed Basis
84. We also decline to adopt the Satellite Coalition's proposal
that the Commission adopt a new regulatory fee category for database
operators that charge fees to enable unlicensed use of certain
frequency bands. The Satellite Coalition asserts that these operators
benefit from Commission rulemakings that enable them to administer
unlicensed use of spectrum, and thus, that they should contribute their
share to the Commission's budget. It argues that pursuant to the RAY
BAUM'S Act we are no longer limited to looking at FTEs in core bureaus
when determining regulatory fees. The Wi-Fi Alliance disagrees and
contends that the proposal to impose fees on operators of databases
would impede use of 6 GHz spectrum, which in many cases will require
access to an automated frequency coordination operator and its
database.
85. As we have previously discussed, pursuant to section 9 of the
Act,
[[Page 56509]]
regulatory fees are to be derived by determining ``the full-time
equivalent number of employees within the bureaus and offices of the
Commission, adjusted to take into account factors that are reasonably
related to the benefits provided to the payor of the fee by the
Commission's activities.'' Specifically, section 9 of the Act directs
the Commission to consider ``factors that are reasonably related to the
benefits provided to the payor of the fee by the Commission's
activities.'' The Commission's FTE activities for these database
operators includes the establishment of database rules and ensuring
that database administrators have the technical expertise to develop
and operate the relevant databases. After a database is set up,
Commission involvement with the operator is generally sporadic. The
function of the databases is to prevent harmful interference from
occurring to incumbent licensed operations by unlicensed use of certain
frequency bands thereby enabling the more efficient use of radio
spectrum. The services provided by operators of databases are
essentially available to any user of the relevant frequency bands on an
unlicensed basis. We note that users of those databases pay operators
to access the databases, and are required to use such databases to
prevent harmful interference to other users. The Commission often
recognizes multiple database administrators. In those cases, users can
patronize any database administrator and there is no guarantee how
much, if any, coordination a particular database administrator will
undertake and, thus, no guarantee that a database administrator will
even receive benefits from its relationship with the Commission.
86. Moreover, the suggestion that we create a regulatory fee
category for only these database administrators ignores the fact that,
under the Commission's rules, there are a variety of database
administrators and spectrum coordinators (e.g., television white space
devices, 6 GHz devices, and fixed, personal/portable, and mobile
devices). Thus, focusing only on database administrators enabling the
use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis would result in indirectly
assessed regulatory fees on certain users of spectrum on an unlicensed
basis. As explained below, we decline to create a regulatory fee
category for users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis, either directly
or indirectly.
87. Further, the Commission's FTE activities related to operators
of databases of spectrum on an unlicensed basis benefit a wide variety
of industry segments, both licensed and unlicensed, and is consistent
with the treatment of these FTEs, which work primarily in the Office of
Engineering and Technology, as indirect. Thus, we do not find that
there are sufficient benefits (i.e., FTE work in oversight or
regulation) provided each fiscal year to these database operators by
the Commission's activities of such a magnitude that it warrants
creation of a regulatory fee category for database operators at this
time. We acknowledge that in establishing the regime that allows for
such database operators to support Commission licensees, FTE time is
devoted to adopting a regulatory regime that allows for the database
operators to perform a such functions. This is, however, generally a
one-time effort and it would arbitrary to assess fees year after year
based on such one-time efforts. We therefore decline to adopt a new
regulatory fee category for operators of these databases.
5. Users of Spectrum on an Unlicensed Basis
88. We decline to adopt NAB's proposal to adopt a new regulatory
fee category for users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis, including
large technology companies. Commenters generally oppose NAB's proposal.
The Wi-Fi Alliance states that there is no basis for creating a new fee
category to include, directly or indirectly, users of spectrum on an
unlicensed basis, and doing so would not be fair, administrable, or
sustainable. Other commenters also oppose the proposal to adopt a
regulatory fee category for the use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis.
NCTA observes that no commenter has even clarified who they think falls
into the fee category, let alone presented any type of proposal or
detailed explanation of how the Commission might assess such fees.
89. NAB has not provided a sufficient basis, consistent with
section 9 of the Act, for the adoption of a new regulatory fee category
for users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis. The Commission has
adopted new fee categories based in part on the benefits to the payor,
i.e., FTE work in oversight and regulation, on several occasions. In
those instances, the Commission determined that significant FTE
resources of a core bureau were being spent on oversight and regulatory
activities with respect to a specific service necessitating a new
regulatory fee category. Those circumstances are not present here. As
noted above, FTEs in OET, which is responsible for oversight and
regulation of spectrum used on an unlicensed basis, have historically
been classified as ``indirect'' FTEs because OET's work benefits the
Commission and the industry as a whole and is not specifically focused
on the regulatees and licensees of a core bureau. Even when we consider
only FTE time working on oversight and regulation of spectrum used on
an unlicensed basis and devices capable of operating wholly or in part
on such spectrum, the treatment of such costs as indirect is
appropriate. Many devices, including those operating wholly or in part
on an unlicensed basis, are exempt from equipment authorization
requirements. Moreover, devices that are not exempt are tested by third
party labs and, if certification is required, certified by
Telecommunications Certification Bodies. As such, OET's oversight
requires only a portion of FTE resources, thus supporting our continued
treatment of such costs as part of overall OET indirect costs, as
opposed to segregable direct costs, and the Commission's current
regulatory framework does not include an easy way to distinguish
devices that operate on an unlicensed (as opposed to licensed) basis.
90. In interpreting and applying section 9 of the Act, the
Commission has developed a framework to ensure that the resulting fee
category fee schedules are fair, administrable, and sustainable. Thus,
in evaluating new regulatory fee categories, we consider if assertion
of our authority would be fair, administrable, and sustainable while
examining any ``benefit'' provided to the payor by the Commission's FTE
activities in oversight and regulation. On the basis of the record
developed here, we find that NAB's proposal for a new fee category for
users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis does not satisfy these
factors.
91. The Commission has explained that a regulatory fee category is
unfair if it combines either uses or users that are too different from
one another. The Commission bases regulatory fee categories on services
or facilities used. Use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis is nearly
ubiquitous in modern-day society, and confers widespread benefits.
Because of the large variety of uses of spectrum on an unlicensed
basis, including for non-communications purposes, there is no specific
user, service, or facility using this spectrum that could form the
basis for a regulatory fee category of similar services. Entities use
spectrum on an unlicensed basis in a variety of ways, including
healthcare, security systems, thermostats, alarm systems, baby
monitors, fitness trackers, home appliances, garage door openers,
[[Page 56510]]
cordless phones, in-vehicle rear seat passenger detection systems,
wireless power transfer, law enforcement radars, microwave ovens, Wi-Fi
networks, Bluetooth speakers, Internet of Things (IoT) industrial
networks, and other consumer devices. Chip makers, component makers,
device makers, device users, internet providers, content providers,
mobile network operators, vendors, enterprise users, and consumers all
use spectrum on an unlicensed basis in various ways and such users
include individuals, state and local governments, corporations, non-
profit organizations, schools, libraries, and other groups. The variety
of users and spectrum bands used on an unlicensed basis creates a broad
group of potential payors. Moreover, the Commission itself does not
distinguish between these numerous and expanding uses of spectrum on an
unlicensed basis in its regulations. Thus, grouping all users of
spectrum on an unlicensed basis together, including devices such as
baby monitors, garage door openers, field disturbance sensors, medical
imaging systems, cordless phones, Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth speakers,
Internet of Things (IoT) industrial networks, and consumer devices
would not result in a fair or rational way to assess regulatory fees.
92. Second, we find that such a fee for users of spectrum on an
unlicensed basis would be virtually impossible to define or administer,
based on the record developed in this proceeding. To adopt a fee on the
use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis would be imposing a fee on
billions of devices related to a wide variety of applications and
industries, a base which continually grows and evolves over time. As
commenters observe, because of the large variety of uses of spectrum on
an unlicensed basis, it is difficult to determine who would be
responsible for paying such regulatory fees as the Commission has no
way of identifying the owner and user of the unlicensed devices using
this spectrum, and there is no specific service with which to form a
regulatory fee category of similar services. We find that the variety
of uses of spectrum on an unlicensed basis creates such a broad group
of potential payors as to render it virtually meaningless to attempt to
identify them because it would be hard to find a consumer or a business
that does not use spectrum on an unlicensed basis nearly every day. As
the Wi-Fi Alliance observes, imposing new regulatory fees on users of
spectrum on an unlicensed basis could affect an unreasonably wide range
of entities and individuals, including consumers.
93. With such a large group of users of spectrum on an unlicensed
basis, adopting a new regulatory fee category for these users would be
the equivalent of asking every industry and consumer to pay this fee,
resulting in a regulatory fee scheme far more extensive than our
current regulatory fee system and would reach all households and
businesses. Such a fee would be logistically infeasible to collect, at
least on the basis of this record.
94. NAB argues that users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis place
a significant ongoing burden on Commission resources in furtherance of
their businesses because the Commission will be involved in amending
and monitoring the spectrum use process, responding to requests from
the innovation economy to use spectrum in new ways and for new
technologies, and enforcing its rules, not only to prevent interference
to licensed users, but to ensure the end user can actually use the
devices and products. We are not convinced that the mere fact that FTE
time involved in oversight and regulation of such spectrum use is a
sufficient reason to adopt a new regulatory fee category. As discussed
above, there is no particular service, industry, or other discrete
group of potential regulatory fee payors for the use of spectrum on an
unlicensed basis, because essentially all consumers and manufacturers
have devices that use spectrum on an unlicensed basis. Moreover, the
Commission previously has observed that regulatees rely on consistency
of treatment in regulatory fees from year to year and thus the
Commission has hesitated to make changes which would result in rapid
shifts in regulatory fees. We therefore find that, in this instance,
creating such categories does not serve the Commission's goal of having
an administrable framework.
95. Additionally, a regulatory fee category related to use of
spectrum on an unlicensed basis, assessed on devices, if adopted, would
not be sustainable for the same reasons elaborated above. Ever-changing
technology results in increased use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis
over time and the Commission would have to continually re-assess this
regulatory fee category to ensure that it is being implemented in a
fair and equitable manner among all regulatory fee payors. With respect
to the logistics of imposing an annual regulatory fee on users of
devices capable of using spectrum on an unlicensed basis, it is unclear
whether and how device manufacturers or distributors would be
responsible for paying such a fee. The Commission establishes rules for
and administers the equipment authorization program to ensure that RF
devices used in the United States operate effectively without causing
harmful interference and otherwise comply with the Commission's rules.
However, under the current equipment authorization regime, the
Commission does not collect information from or communicate with all
device manufacturers because, many devices only require SDoC s or are
exempt from authorization because they pose a limited potential of
causing harmful interference. Further, the Commission has no reasonable
means by which to comprehensively identify each and every individual
user of RF devices on an unlicensed basis. Thus, it would be nearly
impossible for the Commission to annually assess and collect the
regulatory fees each year in a fair and sustainable manner consistent
with section 9 of the Communications Act.
96. Finally, NAB contends that the Commission cannot continue to
place the burden of paying for use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis
on broadcasters who are forced to compete with some of the world's
largest technology companies unencumbered by regulatory fee burdens in
the name of administrative simplicity. Some ``Big Tech'' companies are
a subset of the users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis. Thus, our
above reasons for declining to adopt a regulatory fee category for
users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis apply equally to any such
``Big Tech'' companies on the sole basis of being users of spectrum on
an unlicensed basis, as proposed by commenters.
97. Further, we decline to create a new regulatory fee category for
the use of spectrum on an unlicensed basis premised on competitive
considerations in the advertising industry. We have described above the
record evidence demonstrating the broad and varied universe of users of
spectrum on an unlicensed basis. There is no evidence in the record of
any discernable and practicable overlap between the universe of users
of spectrum on an unlicensed basis and the advertising industry, and
commenters do not explain how the Commission separately regulates or
expends FTE resources on those that might be competing with
broadcasters for advertising revenues. Thus, competition for
advertising revenues is not a sufficient basis for creating a new
regulatory fee category under section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, as we
discussed above, we find that a
[[Page 56511]]
new regulatory fee category for users of spectrum on an unlicensed
basis, on the basis of the instant record, is not statutorily required
and would be inconsistent with section 9 of the Act and the
Commission's precedent thereunder, and we decline to adopt such
regulatory fee categories at this time. We recognize the value in
encouraging the development and innovation of technologies and decline
to take such unprecedented action without a sufficient basis for making
this change to the regulatory fee schedule.
G. Advancing Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility
98. In the FY 2022 NPRM, we sought comment on how our proposals may
promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility, as well the scope of the Commission's relevant legal
authority. NCTA raises some concerns that establishing new regulatory
fee categories for users of spectrum on an unlicensed basis or on
broadband internet access services could interfere with the
Commission's efforts to advance diversity, equity, inclusivity, and
accessibility. NCTA also asserts that establishing these new regulatory
fee categories will frustrate the Commission's efforts to encourage the
creation of innovative technologies and foster diversity in ownership
of communications facilities and services. While we recognize the
concerns raised by NCTA, we emphasize that such diversity and equity
considerations do not impact our methodology for establishing
regulatory fee rates. Such considerations do not allow the Commission
to shift fees from one party of fee payors to another nor to raise fees
for any purpose other than as an offsetting collection in the amount of
our annual S&E appropriation, consistent with the requirements of
section 9 of the Act. Moreover, because we decline to adopt these new
regulatory fee categories proposed by commenters in this item, for
reasons previously discussed in prior sections, we need not address the
concerns raised by NTCA in this proceeding.
H. Flexibility for Regulatory Payors Due to COVID-19 Pandemic
99. In 2020 and 2021, we provided relief to regulatees experiencing
financial hardship caused or exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In
light of the ongoing pandemic and the likely continuing economic effect
on certain Commission regulatees, we find good cause exists to provide
again the following temporary relief measures for FY 2022. We
anticipate that many regulatees will avail themselves of these
measures, as they did in FY 2020 and FY 2021, and that implementing the
measures will provide needed relief to those regulatees. First, we
waive the requirement under section 1.1166 of the Commission's rules
that regulatees seeking waiver (or reduction) and deferral of their
regulatory fees on financial grounds related to the pandemic file
separate pleadings for each form of relief sought. Instead, regulatees
may combine their requests for relief in a single pleading. Second, we
waive the paper filing requirement under section 1.1166 and instruct
regulatees to instead file their requests electronically, to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6c1e090b0a09091e090005090a2c0a0f0f420b031a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5c2e393b3a39392e393035393a1c3a3f3f723b332a">[email protected]</span></a>. Third, parties seeking to pay their regulatory
fees over time may submit their installment payment requests to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#344651535251514651585d5152745257571a535b42"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2d5f484a4b48485f484144484b6d4b4e4e034a425b">[email protected]</span></a>, and combine their installment payment requests
with requests for waiver, reduction and deferral, in a single pleading.
Fourth, OMD will continue to exercise its delegated authority to
partially waive section 1.1910 of the Commission's rules (i.e., the
red-light rule) to allow regulatees on red light and experiencing
financial hardship to nonetheless request waiver, reduction, deferral,
and/or installment payment of their FY 2022 regulatory fees. In doing
so, we maintain the requirement that such regulatees resolve all
delinquent debt they owe to the Commission in advance of the
Commission's decision on their relief requests. Fifth, OMD will
continue to use its existing authority to reduce the interest rate
normally charged on installment payment of regulatory fee debt owed to
the Commission to a nominal rate and forgo the down payment normally
required to grant installment payment requests. Finally, we partially
waive the requirement that fee payors submit all documentation
supporting a request for waiver, deferral or reduction of regulatory
fees at the same time the underlying request is submitted. This allows
fee payors to provide supplemental documents if requested by OMD as
necessary to render decisions on regulatees' requests for relief. We
direct the Managing Director to release one or more public notices
describing in more detail the relief we have described herein.
100. We remind regulatees that we cannot relax the standard for
granting a waiver or deferral of fees, penalties, or other charges for
late payment of regulatory fees under section 9A of the Act. Under the
statute, the Commission may only waive a regulatory fee, penalty, or
interest charge if it finds there is good cause for the waiver and that
the waiver is in the public interest. The Commission has only granted
financial hardship waivers when the requesting party has shown it
``lacks sufficient funds to pay the regulatory fees and to maintain its
service to the public.'' Other statutory limitations include that the
Commission must act on waiver requests individually, and cannot extend
the deadline we set for payment of fees beyond September 30.
III. Procedural Matters
101. Included below are procedural items as well as our current
payment and collection methods.
102. Credit Card Transaction Levels. In accordance with Treasury
Financial Manual, Volume I, Part 5, Chapter 7000, Section 7055.20--
Transaction Maximums, the highest amount that can be charged on a
credit card for transactions with federal agencies is $24,999.99.
Transactions greater than $24,999.99 will be rejected. This limit
applies to single payments or bundled payments of more than one bill.
Multiple transactions to a single agency in one day may be aggregated
and treated as a single transaction subject to the $24,999.99 limit.
Customers who wish to pay an amount greater than $24,999.99 should
consider available electronic alternatives such as Visa or MasterCard
debit cards, ACH debits from a bank account, and wire transfers. Each
of these payment options is available after filing regulatory fee
information in the CORES system. Further details will be provided
regarding payment methods and procedures at the time of FY 2022
regulatory fee collection in Fact Sheets, <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/regfees">https://www.fcc.gov/regfees</a>.
103. Payment Methods. During the fee season for collecting
regulatory fees, regulatees can pay their fees by credit card through
<a href="http://Pay.gov">Pay.gov</a>, ACH, debit card, or by wire transfer. Additional payment
instructions are posted on the Commission's website at <a href="http://transition.fcc.gov/fees/regfees.html">http://transition.fcc.gov/fees/regfees.html</a>. The receiving bank for all wire
payments is the U.S. Treasury, New York, NY (TREAS NYC). Any other form
of payment (e.g., checks, cashier's checks, or money orders) will be
rejected. For payments by wire, an FCC Form 159-E should still be
transmitted via fax so that the Commission can associate the wire
payment with the correct regulatory fee information. The fax should be
sent to the Commission at (202) 418-2843 at least one hour before
initiating the wire transfer (but on the same business day) so as not
to delay crediting their account. Regulatees
[[Page 56512]]
should discuss arrangements (including bank closing schedules) with
their bankers several days before they plan to make the wire transfer
to allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed
before the deadline. Complete instructions for making wire payments are
posted at <a href="http://transition.fcc.gov/fees/wiretran.html">http://transition.fcc.gov/fees/wiretran.html</a>.
104. De Minimis Regulatory Fees, Section 9(e)(2) Exemption. Under
the de minimis rule, and pursuant to our analysis under section 9(e)(2)
of the Act, a regulatee is exempt from paying regulatory fees if the
sum total of all of its annual regulatory fee liabilities is $1,000 or
less for the fiscal year. The de minimis threshold applies only to
filers of annual regulatory fees, not regulatory fees paid through
multi-year filings, and it is not a permanent exemption. Each regulatee
will need to reevaluate the total annual fee liability each fiscal year
to determine whether it meets the de minimis exemption.
105. Standard Fee Calculations and Payment Dates. The Commission
will accept fee payments made in advance of the window for the payment
of regulatory fees. The responsibility for payment of fees by service
category is as follows:
<bullet> Media Services: Regulatory fees must be paid for initial
construction permits that were granted on or before October 1, 2021 for
AM/FM radio stations and VHF/UHF broadcast television stations.
Regulatory fees must be paid for all broadcast facility licenses
granted on or before October 1, 2021.
<bullet> Wireline (Common Carrier) Services: Regulatory fees must
be paid for authorizations that were granted on or before October 1,
2021. In instances where a permit or license is transferred or assigned
after October 1, 2021, responsibility for payment rests with the holder
of the permit or license as of the fee due date. Audio bridging service
providers are included in this category. For Responsible Organizations
(RespOrgs) that manage Toll Free Numbers (TFN), regulatory fees should
be paid on all working, assigned, and reserved toll free numbers as
well as toll free numbers in any other status as defined in section
52.103 of the Commission's rules. The unit count should be based on
toll free numbers managed by RespOrgs on or about December 31, 2021.
<bullet> Wireless Services: CMRS cellular, mobile, and messaging
services (fees based on number of subscribers or telephone number
count): Regulatory fees must be paid for authorizations that were
granted on or before October 1, 2021. The number of subscribers, units,
or telephone numbers on December 31, 2021 will be used as the basis
from which to calculate the fee payment. In instances where a permit or
license is transferred or assigned after October 1, 2021,
responsibility for payment rests with the holder of the permit or
license as of the fee due date.
<bullet> Wireless Services, Multi-year fees: The first seven
regulatory fee categories in our Schedule of Regulatory Fees pay
``small multi-year wireless regulatory fees.'' Entities pay these
regulatory fees in advance for the entire amount period covered by the
ten-year terms of their initial licenses, and pay regulatory fees again
only when the license is renewed, or a new license is obtained. We
include these fee categories in our rulemaking to publicize our
estimates of the number of ``small multi-year wireless'' licenses that
will be renewed or newly obtained in FY 2022.
<bullet> Multichannel Video Programming Distributor Services (cable
television operators, CARS licensees, DBS, and IPTV): Regulatory fees
must be paid for the number of basic cable television subscribers as of
December 31, 2021. Regulatory fees also must be paid for CARS licenses
that were granted on or before October 1, 2021. In instances where a
permit or license is transferred or assigned after October 1, 2021,
responsibility for payment rests with the holder of the permit or
license as of the fee due date. For providers of DBS service and IPTV-
based MVPDs, regulatory fees should be paid based on a subscriber count
on or about December 31, 2021. In instances where a permit or license
is transferred or assigned after October 1, 2021, responsibility for
payment rests with the holder of the permit or license as of the fee
due date.
<bullet> International Services (Earth Stations and Space
Stations): Regulatory fees must be paid for (1) earth stations, (2)
geostationary orbit space stations and non-geostationary orbit
satellite systems, and 3) small satellite space stations that were
licensed and operational on or before October 1, 2021. In instances
where a permit or license is transferred or assigned after October 1,
2021, responsibility for payment rests with the holder of the permit or
license as of the fee due date.
<bullet> International Services (Submarine Cable Systems,
Terrestrial and Satellite Services): Regulatory fees for submarine
cable systems are to be paid on a per cable landing license basis based
on lit circuit capacity as of December 31, 2021. Regulatory fees for
terrestrial and satellite IBCs are to be paid based on active (used or
leased) international bearer circuits as of December 31, 2021 in any
terrestrial or satellite transmission facility for the provision of
service to an end user or resale carrier. When calculating the number
of such active circuits, entities must include circuits used by
themselves or their affiliates. For these purposes, ``active circuits''
include backup and redundant circuits as of December 31, 2021. Whether
circuits are used specifically for voice or data is not relevant for
purposes of determining that they are active circuits. In instances
where a permit or license is transferred or assigned after October 1,
2021, responsibility for payment rests with the holder of the permit or
license as of the fee due date.
106. Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) and Mobile Services
Assessments. The Commission compiled data from the Numbering Resource
Utilization Forecast (NRUF) report that is based on ``assigned''
telephone number (subscriber) counts that have been adjusted for
porting to net Type 0 ports (``in'' and ``out''). We have included non-
geographic numbers in the calculation of the number of subscribers for
each CMRS provider in Table 4 and the CMRS regulatory fee rate. CMRS
provider regulatory fees are calculated and should be paid based on the
inclusion of non-geographic numbers. CMRS providers can adjust the
total number of subscribers, if needed. This information of telephone
numbers (subscriber count) will be posted on the Commission's
electronic filing and payment system (Fee Filer).
107. A carrier wishing to revise its telephone number (subscriber)
count can do so by accessing Fee Filer and follow the prompts to revise
their telephone number counts. Any revisions to the telephone number
counts should be accompanied by an explanation or supporting
documentation. The Commission will then review the revised count and
supporting documentation and either approve or disapprove the
submission in Fee Filer. If the submission is disapproved, the
Commission will contact the provider to afford the provider an
opportunity to discuss its revised subscriber count and/or provide
additional supporting documentation. If we receive no response from the
provider, or we do not reverse our initial disapproval of the
provider's revised count submission, the fee payment must be based on
the number of subscribers listed initially in Fee Filer. Once the
timeframe for revision has passed, the telephone number counts are
final and are the basis upon which CMRS regulatory fees are to be paid.
Providers can view their
[[Page 56513]]
final telephone counts online in Fee Filer. A final CMRS assessment
letter will not be mailed out.
108. Because some carriers do not file the NRUF report, they may
not see their telephone number counts in Fee Filer. In these instances,
the carriers should compute their fee payment using the standard
methodology that is currently in place for CMRS Wireless services
(i.e., compute their telephone number counts as of December 31, 2020),
and submit their fee payment accordingly. Whether a carrier reviews its
telephone number counts in Fee Filer or not, the Commission reserves
the right to audit the number of telephone numbers for which regulatory
fees are paid. In the event that the Commission determines that the
number of telephone numbers that are paid is inaccurate, the Commission
will bill the carrier for the difference between what was paid and what
should have been paid.
109. Effective Date. Providing a 30-day period after Federal
Register publication before this Report and Order becomes effective as
normally required by 5 U.S.C. 553(d) will not allow sufficient time to
collect the FY 2022 fees before FY 2022 ends on September 30, 2022. For
this reason, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), we find there is good
cause to waive the requirements of section 553(d), and this Report and
Order will become effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
Because payments of the regulatory fees will not actually be due until
late September, persons affected by the Report and Order will still
have a reasonable period in which to make their payments and thereby
comply with the rules established herein.
IV. List of Tables
Table 3--List of Commenters
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name of commenter Abbreviated name Date filed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama Broadcasters Association, Alaska Broadcasters State Broadcasters Associations... 7/5/22
Association, Arizona Broadcasters Association, Arkansas
Broadcasters Association, California Broadcasters
Association, Colorado Broadcasters Association, Connecticut
Broadcasters Association, Florida Association of
Broadcasters, Georgia Association of Broadcasters, Hawaii
Association of Broadcasters, Idaho State Broadcasters
Association, Illinois Broadcasters Association, Indiana
Broadcasters Association, Iowa Broadcasters Association,
Kansas Association of Broadcasters, Kentucky Broadcasters
Association, Louisiana Association of Broadcasters, Maine
Association of Broadcasters, MD/DC/DE Broadcasters
Association, Massachusetts Broadcasters Association,
Michigan Association of Broadcasters, Minnesota
Broadcasters Association, Mississippi Association of
Broadcasters, Missouri Broadcasters Association, Montana
Broadcasters Association, Nebraska Broadcasters
Association, Nevada Broadcasters Association, New Hampshire
Association of Broadcasters, New Jersey Broadcasters
Association, New Mexico Broadcasters Association, The New
York State Broadcasters Association, Inc., North Carolina
Association of Broadcasters, North Dakota Broadcasters
Association, Ohio Association of Broadcasters, Oklahoma
Association of Broadcasters, Oregon Association of
Broadcasters, Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters,
Radio Broadcasters Association of Puerto Rico, Rhode Island
Broadcasters Association, South Carolina Broadcasters
Association, South Dakota Broadcasters Association,
Tennessee Association of Broadcasters, Texas Association of
Broadcasters, Utah Broadcasters Association, Vermont
Association of Broadcasters, Virginia Association of
Broadcasters, Washington State Association of Broadcasters,
West Virginia Broadcasters Association, Wisconsin
Broadcasters Association, and Wyoming Association of
Broadcasters.
Cable & Wireless Networks; GlobeNet Cabos Submarinos Submarine Cable Coalition......... 7/5/22
Americas, Inc.; GU Holdings, Inc. (wholly-owned subsidiary
of Google LLC); Hawaiki Submarine Cable USA LLC; SETAR;
Tata Communications (Americas), Inc.
Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA); INCOMPAS, CCIA, and DiMA.......... 7/5/22
Digital Media Association (DiMA), INCOMPAS, and Internet
Association.
K. M. Richards.............................................. Richards.......................... 6/6/22
National Association of Broadcasters........................ NAB............................... 7/5/22
New Jersey Broadcasters Association......................... NJBA.............................. 7/5/22
Orbital Sidekick, Inc....................................... OSK............................... 7/5/22
O3b Limited; SES Americom, Inc.; Telesat Canada; and WorldVu Satellite Coalition............... 7/5/22
Satellites Limited d/b/a OneWeb.
Satellite Industry Association.............................. SIA............................... 7/5/22
Spaceflight, Inc............................................ Spaceflight....................... 7/5/22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reply Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGM California, Inc.; AGM Nevada, LLC; Alabama Media, LLC; Joint Broadcasters................ 7/18/22
Brayden Madison Broadcasting, L.L.C.; Coxswain Media, LLC;
Davis Broadcasting Inc. of Columbus; Equity Communications,
LP; Florida Keys Media, LLC; Galaxy Syracuse Licensee LLC;
Galaxy Utica Licensee LLC; Golden Isles Broadcasting; Gulf
South Radio, Inc.; Heh Communications, LLC; Holladay
Broadcasting of Louisiana, LLC; Inland Empire Broadcasting
Corp.; Jam Communications, Inc.; Kensington Digital Media,
L.L.C.; Kensington Digial Media Of Indiana, L.L.C.; KLAX
Licensing, Inc.; KLOS Radio Holdings, LLC; KPWR Radio
Holdings, LLC; KRZZ Licensing, Inc.; KWHY-22 Broadcasting,
LLC; KXOL Licensing, Inc.; KXOS Radio Holdings, LLC; L.M.
Communications, Inc.; L.M. Communications of Kentucky, LLC;
L.M. Communications of South Carolina, Inc.; Meridian Media
Group, LLC; Meruelo Radio Holdings, LLC; Mississippi
Broadcasters, LLC; New South Radio, Inc.; Partnership
Radio, L.L.C.; Pathfinder Communications Corporation; QBS
Broadcasting, LLC; Sarkes Tarzian, Inc.; SBR Broadcasting
Corporation; Serge Martin Enterprises, Inc.; Spanish
Broadcasting System Holding Company, Inc.; Talking Stick
Communications, L.L.C.; WCMQ Licensing, Inc.; Winton Road
Broadcasting Co., LLC; WKLC, Inc.; WLEY Licensing, Inc.;
WMEG Licensing, Inc.; WPAT Licensing, Inc.; WPYO Licensing,
Inc.; WRMA Licensing, Inc.; WRXD Licensing, Inc.; WSBS
Licensing, Inc.; WSKQ Licensing, Inc.; WSUN Licensing,
Inc.; WXDJ Licensing, Inc.
[[Page 56514]]
American Lighting Association, Association of Equipment Joint Manufacturers............... 7/18/22
Manufacturers, Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers,
National Electrical Manufacturers Association, North
American Association of Food Equipment Manufacturers,
Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, Plumbing Manufacturers
International, Power Tool Institute, and Wi-SUN Alliance.
Astroscale U.S.............................................. Astroscale........................ 7/18/22
CTIA--The Wireless Association[supreg]...................... CTIA.............................. 7/18/22
Lumen....................................................... Lumen............................. 7/18/22
Maxar Technologies Inc.; Amazon Web Services, Inc.; Planet EESS Coalition.................... 7/18/22
Labs PBC; BlackSky Global LLC; Care Weather Technologies,
Inc.; Hedron Space Inc.; HawkEye 360, Inc.; Spire Global
Inc.; Astro Digital US, Inc.; Umbra Lab, Inc.; and Loft
Orbital Solutions Inc.
National Association of Broadcasters........................ NAB............................... 7/18/22
National Religious Broadcasters............................. NRB............................... 7/13/22
NCTA--The Internet & Television Association................. NCTA.............................. 7/18/22
O3b Limited; SES Americom, Inc.; Telesat Canada; and WorldVu Satellite Coalition............... 7/18/22
Satellites Limited d/b/a OneWeb.
Satellite Industry Association.............................. SIA............................... 7/18/22
Spaceflight, Inc............................................ Spaceflight....................... 7/18/22
TechFreedom................................................. TechFreedom....................... 7/18/22
Turion Space Corp........................................... Turion............................ 7/18/22
Wi-Fi Alliance[supreg]...................................... Wi-Fi Alliance.................... 7/18/22
WISPA--Broadband Without Boundaries......................... WISPA............................. 7/18/22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ex Partes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name or abbreviated name of Filer Ex Parte filing Date filed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAB........................................... Letter from Rick Kaplan, Chief Legal Officer and 7/27/22
Executive Vice President, NAB, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
NAB........................................... Letter from Rick Kaplan, Chief Legal Officer and 7/28/22
Executive Vice President, NAB, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
OneWeb, SES, and Telesat...................... Letter from Karis A. Hastings, SatCom Law, LLC, 8/5/22
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
OneWeb, SES, and Telesat...................... Letter from Karis A. Hastings, SatCom Law, LLC, 8/8/22
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
NAB........................................... Letter from Rick Kaplan, Chief Legal Officer and 8/9/22
Executive Vice President, NAB, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
Telesat....................................... Letter from Elisabeth Neasmith, Director, 8/12/22
Telesat, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
East Arkansas Broadcasters.................... Letter from Bobby Caldwell, CEO, East Arkansas 8/12/22
Broadcasters, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC.
WNRP (AM)..................................... Letter from David E. Hoxeng, Owner, WNRP (AM), 8/12/22
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
State Broadcasters Associations............... Letter from Lauren Lynch Flick, attorney for the 8/12/22
State Broadcasters Associations, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
Wheeler Broadcasting.......................... Letter from Leonard Wheeler, President, Wheeler 8/15/22
Broadcasting, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC.
South Seas Broadcasting and Delta Radio....... Letter from Larry Fuss, owner, South Seas 8/15/22
Broadcasting and Delta Radio, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
State Broadcasters Associations............... Letter from Lauren Lynch Flick, attorney for the 8/15/22
State Broadcasters Associations, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
State Broadcasters Associations............... Letter from Lauren Lynch Flick, attorney for the 8/15/22
State Broadcasters Associations, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
NAB........................................... Letter from Rick Kaplan, Chief Legal Officer and 8/15/22
Executive Vice President, NAB, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
Bryan Broadcasting............................ Letter from Ben Downs, Vice President and 8/15/22
General Manager, Bryan Broadcasting, to Marlene
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
Bustos Media.................................. Letter from Amador S. Bustos, President, Bustos 8/18/22
Media Holdings, LLC, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC.
Kaspar Broadcasting........................... Letter from Russ Kaspar, President, Kaspar 8/18/22
Broadcasting Co., Inc. to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC.
State Broadcasters Associations............... Letter from Lauren Lynch Flick, attorney for the 8/19/22
State Broadcasters Associations, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC.
Cromwell Radio................................ Letter from Bayard H. Walters, President, 8/22/22
Cromwell Group, Inc., to Jessica Rosenworcel,
Chairwoman, FCC.
Mountain Top Media............................ Letter from Cindy May Johnson, President, 8/22/22
Mountain Top Media, LLC, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 56515]]
Table 4--Calculation of FY 2022 Revenue Requirements and Pro-Rata Fees
[Regulatory fees for the categories shaded in gray are collected by the Commission in advance to cover the term of the license and are submitted at the
time the application is filed.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2021 Pro-rated FY Computed FY
Fee category FY 2022 payment Yrs revenue 2022 revenue 2022 Rounded FY Expected FY
units estimate requirement regulatory fee 2022 reg. fee 2022 revenue
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLMRS (Exclusive Use)........................ 750 10 75,000 187,500 25.00 25 187,500
PLMRS (Shared use)........................... 12,500 10 990,000 1,250,000 10.00 10 1,250,000
Microwave.................................... 18,000 10 4,750,000 4,500,000 25.00 25 4,500,000
Marine (Ship)................................ 6,900 10 922,500 1,035,000 15.00 15 1,035,000
Aviation (Aircraft).......................... 4,200 10 390,000 420,000 10.00 10 420,000
Marine (Coast)............................... 210 10 16,000 84,000 40.00 40 84,000
Aviation (Ground)............................ 350 10 110,000 70,000 20.00 20 70,000
AM Class A \1\............................... 62 1 290,745 316,755 5,109 5,110 316,820
AM Class B \1\............................... 1,443 1 3,610,880 3,930,011 2,724 2,725 3,932,175
AM Class C \1\............................... 825 1 1,291,125 1,407,030 1,706 1,705 1,406,625
AM Class D \1\............................... 1,421 1 4,267,835 4,648,721 3,271 3,270 4,646,670
FM Classes A, B1 and C3 \1\.................. 3,125 1 8,886,395 9,804,141 3,137 3,135 9,796,875
FM Classes B, C, C0, C1 and C2 \1\........... 3,137 1 11,100,080 12,005,143 3,827 3,825 11,999,025
AM Construction Permits \2\.................. 5 1 3,660 3,275 655 655 3,275
FM Construction Permits \2\.................. 16 1 58,850 18,320 1,145 1,145 18,320
Digital Television \5\ (including Satellite 3.283 billion 1 25,416,380 27,674,061 .0084303 .008430 27,673,145
TV)......................................... population
Digital TV Construction Permits \2\.......... 4 1 20,400 20,800 5,199 5,200 20,800
LPTV/Class A/Translators FM Trans/Boosters... 5,466 1 1,649,920 1,799,713 329.3 330 1,803,780
CARS Stations................................ 135 1 233,250 231,341 1,714 1,715 231,525
Cable TV Systems, including IPTV and DBS..... 66,500,000 1 76,244,000 76,851,478 1.1557 1.16 77,140,000
Interstate Telecommunication Service $27,700,000,000 1 120,400,000 125,327,520 0.004524 0.00452 125,204,000
Providers...................................
Toll Free Numbers............................ 34,700,000 1 4,020,000 4,306,310 0.12410 0.12 4,164,000
CMRS Mobile Services (Cellular/Public Mobile) 535,000,000 1 75,600,000 73,140,629 0.1367 0.14 74,900,000
CMRS Messaging Services...................... 1,500,000 1 136,000 120,000 0.0800 0.080 120,000
BRS \3\...................................... 1,225 1 756,250 722,750 590 590 722,750
LMDS......................................... 350 1 206,910 206,500 590 590 206,500
Per Gbps circuit Int'l Bearer Circuits. 12,000 1 468,700 467,047 38.92 39 468,000
Terrestrial (Common and Non-Common) and
Satellite (Common and Non-Common)...........
Submarine Cable Providers (See chart at 64.438 1 8,839,554 8,873,891 137,713 137,715 8,874,010
bottom of Appendix C) \4\...................
Earth Stations............................... 2,900 1 1,785,000 1,798,221 620.1 620 1,798,000
Space Stations (Geostationary)............... 139 1 17,177,685 17,244,609 124,062 124,060 17,244,340
Space Stations (Non-Geostationary, Other).... 10 1 3,435,550 3,400,062 340,006 340,005 3,400,050
Space Stations (Non-Geostationary, Less 6 1 858,865 850,015 141,669 141,670 850,020
Complex)....................................
Space Stations (Non-Geostationary, Small 5 1 0 61,075 12,215 12,215 61,075
Satellite)..................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
****** Total Estimated Revenue to be ................ ....... 373,920,077 384,066,626 .............. .............. 384,549,196
Collected...............................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
****** Total Revenue Requirement..... ................ ....... 374,000,000 381,950,000 .............. .............. 381,950,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difference....................... ................ ....... (79,923) 2,116,626 .............. .............. 2,599,196
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes on Table 2
\1\ The fee amounts listed in the column entitled ``Rounded New FY 2022 Regulatory Fee'' constitute a weighted average broadcast regulatory fee by class
of service. The actual FY 2022 regulatory fees for AM/FM radio station are listed on a grid located at the end of Table 3.
\2\ The AM and FM Construction Permit revenues and the Digital (VHF/UHF) Construction Permit revenues were adjusted, respectively, to set the regulatory
fee to an amount no higher than the lowest licensed fee for that class of service. Reductions in the Digital (VHF/UHF) Construction Permit revenues,
and in the AM and FM Construction Permit revenues, were offset by increases in the revenue totals for Digital television stations by market size, and
in the AM and FM radio stations by class size and population served, respectively.
\3\ The MDS/MMDS category was renamed Broadband Radio Service (BRS). See Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and 101 of the Commission's Rules to
Facilitate the Provision of Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Educational and Other Advanced Services in the 2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz Bands,
Report & Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 14165, 14169, para. 6 (2004).
\4\ The chart at the end of Table 3 lists the submarine cable bearer circuit regulatory fees (common and non-common carrier basis) that resulted from
the adoption of the Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2008, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24
FCC Rcd 6388 (2008) and Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2008, Second Report and Order, 24 FCC Rcd 4208 (2009). The
Submarine Cable fee in Table 2 is a weighted average of the various fee payers in the chart at the end of Table 3.
\5\ The actual digital television regulatory fees to be paid by call sign are identified in Table 7.
Table 5--FY 2022 Schedule of Regulatory Fees
[Regulatory fees for the categories shaded in gray are collected by the
Commission in advance to cover the term of the license and are submitted
at the time the application is filed.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual regulatory fee
Fee category (U.S. $s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLMRS (per license) (Exclusive Use) (47 CFR 25.
part 90).
Microwave (per license) (47 CFR part 101).. 25.
Marine (Ship) (per station) (47 CFR part 15.
80).
Marine (Coast) (per license) (47 CFR part 40.
80).
Rural Radio (47 CFR part 22) (previously 10.
listed under the Land Mobile category).
PLMRS (Shared Use) (per license) (47 CFR 10.
part 90).
Aviation (Aircraft) (per station) (47 CFR 10.
part 87).
[[Page 56516]]
Aviation (Ground) (per license) (47 CFR 20.
part 87).
CMRS Mobile/Cellular Services (per unit) .14.
(47 CFR parts 20, 22, 24, 27, 80 and 90)
(Includes Non-Geographic telephone
numbers).
CMRS Messaging Services (per unit) (47 CFR .08.
parts 20, 22, 24 and 90).
Broadband Radio Service (formerly MMDS/MDS) 590.
(per license) (47 CFR part 27).
Local Multipoint Distribution Service (per 590.
call sign) (47 CFR, part 101)
AM Radio Construction Permits.............. 655.
FM Radio Construction Permits.............. 1,145.
AM and FM Broadcast Radio Station Fees..... See Table Below.
Digital TV (47 CFR part 73) VHF and UHF $.008430. See Appendix G
Commercial Fee Factor. for fee amounts due, also
available at <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/fees/regulatory-fees">https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/fees/regulatory-fees</a> fees.
Digital TV Construction Permits............ 5,200.
Low Power TV, Class A TV, TV/FM Translators 330.
and FM Boosters (47 CFR part 74).
CARS (47 CFR part 78)...................... 1,715.
Cable Television Systems (per subscriber) 1.16.
(47 CFR part 76), Including IPTV and
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS).
Interstate Telecommunication Service .00452.
Providers (per revenue dollar).
Toll Free (per toll free subscriber) (47 .12.
CFR section 52.101 (f) of the rules).
Earth Stations (47 CFR part 25)............ 620.
Space Stations (per operational station in 124,060.
geostationary orbit) (47 CFR part 25) also
includes DBS Service (per operational
station) (47 CFR part 100).
Space Stations (per operational system in 340,005.
non-geostationary orbit) (47 CFR part 25)
(Other).
Space Stations (per operational system in 141,670.
non-geostationary orbit) (47 CFR part 25)
(Less Complex).
Space Stations (per license/call sign in 12,215.
non-geostationary orbit) (47 CFR part 25)
(Small Satellite).
International Bearer Circuits--Terrestrial/ 39.
Satellites (per Gbps circuit).
Submarine Cable Landing Licenses Fee (per See Table Below.
cable system).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2022 Radio Station Regulatory Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FM Classes A, FM Classes B,
Population served AM Class A AM Class B AM Class C AM Class D B1 & C3 C, C0, C1 & C2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<=25,000................................................ $1,050 $755 $655 $720 $1,145 $1,310
25,001-75,000........................................... 1,575 1,135 985 1,080 1,720 1,965
75,001-150,000.......................................... 2,365 1,700 1,475 1,620 2,575 2,950
150,001-500,000......................................... 3,550 2,550 2,215 2,435 3,870 4,430
500,001-1,200,000....................................... 5,315 3,820 3,315 3,645 5,795 6,630
1,200,001-3,000,000..................................... 7,980 5,740 4,980 5,470 8,700 9,955
3,000,001-6,000,000..................................... 11,960 8,600 7,460 8,200 13,040 14,920
>6,000,000.............................................. 17,945 12,905 11,195 12,305 19,570 22,390
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2022 International Bearer Circuits--Submarine Cable Systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2022
Submarine cable systems (capacity Fee ratio Regulatory
as of December 31, 2021) fees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 50 Gbps................. .0625 Units......... $8,610
50 Gbps or greater, but less than .125 Units.......... 17,215
250 Gbps.
250 Gbps or greater, but less than .25 Units........... 34,430
1,500 Gbps.
1,500 Gbps or greater, but less .5 Units............ 68,860
than 3,500 Gbps.
3,500 Gbps or greater, but less 1.0 Unit............ 137,715
than 6,500 Gbps.
6,500 Gbps or greater............. 2.0 Units........... 275,430
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 6--Sources of Payment Unit Estimates for FY 2022
In order to calculate individual service fees for FY 2022, we
adjusted FY 2021 payment units for each service to more accurately
reflect expected FY 2022 payment liabilities. We obtained our updated
estimates through a variety of means and sources. For example, we used
Commission licensee data bases, actual prior year payment records and
industry and trade association projections, where available. The
databases we consulted include our Universal Licensing System (ULS),
International Bureau Filing System (IBFS), Consolidated Database System
(CDBS), Licensing and Management System (LMS) and Cable Operations and
Licensing System (COALS), as well as reports generated within the
Commission such as the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau's Numbering
Resource Utilization Forecast. Regulatory fee payment units are not all
the same for all fee categories. For most fee categories, the term
``units'' reflect licenses or permits that have been issued, but for
other fee categories, the term ``units'' reflect quantities such as
subscribers, population counts, circuit counts, telephone numbers, and
revenues. As more current data is received after the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) is released, the
[[Page 56517]]
Commission sometimes adjusts the NPRM fee rates to reflect the new
information in the Report and Order. This is intended to make sure that
the fee rates in the Report and Order reflect more recent and accurate
information.
We sought verification for these estimates from multiple sources
and, in all cases, we compared FY 2022 estimates with actual FY 2021
payment units to ensure that our revised estimates were reasonable.
Where appropriate, we adjusted and/or rounded our final estimates to
take into consideration the fact that certain variables that impact on
the number of payment units cannot yet be estimated with sufficient
accuracy. These include an unknown number of waivers and/or exemptions
that may occur in FY 2022 and the fact that, in many services, the
number of actual licensees or station operators fluctuates from time to
time due to economic, technical, or other reasons. When we note, for
example, that our estimated FY 2022 payment units are based on FY 2021
actual payment units, it does not necessarily mean that our FY 2022
projection is exactly the same number as in FY 2021. We have either
rounded the FY 2022 number or adjusted it slightly to account for these
variables.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fee category Sources of payment unit estimates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Land Mobile (All), Microwave, Based on Wireless Telecommunications
Marine (Ship and Coast), Aviation Bureau (WTB) projections of new
(Aircraft and Ground), Domestic applications and renewals taking
Public Fixed. into consideration existing
Commission licensee data bases.
Aviation (Aircraft) and Marine
(Ship) estimates have been adjusted
to take into consideration the
licensing of portions of these
services on a voluntary basis.
CMRS Cellular/Mobile Services..... Based on WTB projection reports, and
FY 2021 payment data.
CMRS Messaging Services........... Based on WTB reports, and FY 2021
payment data.
AM/FM Radio Stations.............. Based on CDBS data, adjusted for
exemptions, and actual FY 2021
payment units.
Digital TV Stations (Combined VHF/ Based on LMS data, fee rate adjusted
UHF units). for exemptions, and population
figures are calculated based on
individual station parameters.
AM/FM/TV Construction Permits..... Based on CDBS data, adjusted for
exemptions, and actual FY 2021
payment units.
LPTV, Translators and Boosters, Based on LMS data, adjusted for
Class A Television. exemptions, and actual FY 2021
payment units.
BRS (formerly MDS/MMDS)LMDS....... Based on WTB reports and actual FY
2021 payment units. Based on WTB
reports and actual FY 2021 payment
units.
Cable Television Relay Service Based on data from Media Bureau's
(CARS) Stations. COALS database and actual FY 2021
payment units.
Cable Television System Based on publicly available data
Subscribers, Including IPTV sources for estimated subscriber
Subscribers. counts, trend information from past
payment data, and actual FY 2021
payment units.
Interstate Telecommunication Based on FCC Form 499-A worksheets
Service Providers. due in April 2022, and any data
assistance provided by the Wireline
Competition Bureau.
Earth Stations.................... Based on International Bureau
licensing data and actual FY 2021
payment units.
Space Stations (GSOs and NGSOs)... Based on International Bureau data
reports and actual FY 2021 payment
units.
International Bearer Circuits..... Based on assistance provided by the
International Bureau, any data
submissions by licensees, adjusted
as necessary, and actual FY 2021
payment units.
Submarine Cable Licenses.......... Based on International Bureau
license information, and actual FY
2021 payment units.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7--Factors, Measurements, and Calculations That Determine Station
Signal Contours and Associated Population Coverages
AM Stations
For stations with nondirectional daytime antennas, the theoretical
radiation was used at all azimuths. For stations with directional
daytime antennas, specific information on each day tower, including
field ratio, phase, spacing, and orientation was retrieved, as well as
the theoretical pattern root-mean-square of the radiation in all
directions in the horizontal plane (RMS) figure (milliVolt per meter
(mV/m) @ 1 km) for the antenna system. The standard, or augmented
standard if pertinent, horizontal plane radiation pattern was
calculated using techniques and methods specified in sections 73.150
and 73.152 of the Commission's rules. Radiation values were calculated
for each of 360 radials around the transmitter site. Next, estimated
soil conductivity data was retrieved from a database representing the
information in FCC Figure R3. Using the calculated horizontal radiation
values, and the retrieved soil conductivity data, the distance to the
principal community (5 mV/m) contour was predicted for each of the 360
radials. The resulting distance to principal community contours were
used to form a geographical polygon. Population counting was
accomplished by determining which 2010 block centroids were contained
in the polygon. (A block centroid is the center point of a small area
containing population as computed by the U.S. Census Bureau.) The sum
of the population figures for all enclosed blocks represents the total
population for the predicted principal community coverage area.
FM Stations
The greater of the horizontal or vertical effective radiated power
(ERP) (kW) and respective height above average terrain (HAAT) (m)
combination was used. Where the antenna height above mean sea level
(HAMSL) was available, it was used in lieu of the average HAAT figure
to calculate specific HAAT figures for each of 360 radials under study.
Any available directional pattern information was applied as well, to
produce a radial-specific ERP figure. The HAAT and ERP figures were
used in conjunction with the Field Strength (50-50) propagation curves
specified in 47 CFR 73.313 of the Commission's rules to predict the
distance to the principal community (70 dBu (decibel above 1 microVolt
per meter) or 3.17 mV/m) contour for each of the 360 radials. The
resulting distance to principal community contours were used to form a
geographical polygon. Population counting was accomplished by
determining which 2010 block centroids were contained in the polygon.
The sum of the population figures for all enclosed blocks represents
the total population for the predicted principal community coverage
area.
[[Page 56518]]
Table 8--Satellite Charts for FY 2022 Regulatory Fees
[U.S.-licensed space stations]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Licensee Call sign Satellite name Type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2922.................... SKY-B1................ GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2640.................... DIRECTV T11........... GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2711.................... DIRECTV RB-1.......... GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2632.................... DIRECTV T8............ GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2669.................... DIRECTV T9S........... GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2641.................... DIRECTV T10........... GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2797.................... DIRECTV T12........... GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2930.................... DIRECTV T15........... GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2673.................... DIRECTV T5............ GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S2133.................... SPACEWAY 2............ GSO.
DIRECTV Enterprises, LLC............ S3039.................... DIRECTV T16........... GSO.
DISH Operating L.L.C................ S2931.................... ECHOSTAR 18........... GSO.
DISH Operating L.L.C................ S2738.................... ECHOSTAR 11........... GSO.
DISH Operating L.L.C................ S2694.................... ECHOSTAR 10........... GSO.
DISH Operating L.L.C................ S2740.................... ECHOSTAR 7............ GSO.
DISH Operating L.L.C................ S2790.................... ECHOSTAR 14........... GSO.
EchoStar Satellite Operating S2811.................... ECHOSTAR 15........... GSO.
Corporation.
EchoStar Satellite Operating S2844.................... ECHOSTAR 16........... GSO.
Corporation.
EchoStar Satellite Services L.L.C... S2179.................... ECHOSTAR 9............ GSO.
ES 172 LLC.......................... S2610.................... EUTELSAT 174A......... GSO.
ES 172 LLC.......................... S3021.................... EUTELSAT 172B......... GSO.
Horizon-3 Satellite LLC............. S2947.................... HORIZONS-3e........... GSO.
Hughes Network Systems, LLC......... S2663.................... SPACEWAY 3............ GSO.
Hughes Network Systems, LLC......... S2834.................... ECHOSTAR 19........... GSO.
Hughes Network Systems, LLC......... S2753.................... ECHOSTAR XVII......... GSO.
Intelsat License LLC/ViaSat, Inc.... S2160.................... GALAXY 28............. GSO.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2414.................... INTELSAT 10-02........ GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2972.................... INTELSAT 37e.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2854.................... NSS-7................. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2409.................... INELSAT 905........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2405.................... INTELSAT 901.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2408.................... INTELSAT 904.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2804.................... INTELSAT 25........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2959.................... INTELSAT 35e.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2237.................... INTELSAT 11........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2785.................... INTELSAT 14........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2380.................... INTELSAT 9............ GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2831.................... INTELSAT 23........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2915.................... INTELSAT 34........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2863.................... INTELSAT 21........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2750.................... INTELSAT 16........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2715.................... GALAXY 17............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2154.................... GALAXY 25............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2253.................... GALAXY 11............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2381.................... GALAXY 3C............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2887.................... INTELSAT 30........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2924.................... INTELSAT 31........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2647.................... GALAXY 19............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2687.................... GALAXY 16............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2733.................... GALAXY 18............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2385.................... GALAXY 14............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2386.................... GALAXY 13............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2422.................... GALAXY 12............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2387.................... GALAXY 15............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2704.................... INTELSAT 5............ GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2817.................... INTELSAT 18........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2960.................... JCSAT-RA.............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2850.................... INTELSAT 19........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2368.................... INTELSAT 1R........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2988.................... TELKOM-2.............. GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2789.................... INTELSAT 15........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2423.................... HORIZONS 2............ GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2846.................... INTELSAT 22........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2847.................... INTELSAT 20........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2948.................... INTELSAT 36........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2814.................... INTELSAT 17........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2410.................... INTELSAT 906.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2406.................... INTELSAT 902.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2939.................... INTELSAT 33e.......... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2382.................... INTELSAT 10........... GSO.
Possession.
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S2751.................... NEW DAWN.............. GSO.
Possession.
[[Page 56519]]
Intelsat License LLC, Debtor-in- S3023.................... INTELSAT 39........... GSO.
Possession.
Leidos, Inc......................... S2371.................... LM-RPS2............... GSO.
Ligado Networks Subsidiary, LLC..... S2358.................... SKYTERRA-1............ GSO.
Ligado Networks Subsidiary, LLC..... AMSC-1................... MSAT-2................ GSO.
Novavision Group, Inc............... S2861.................... DIRECTV KU-79W........ GSO.
Satellite CD Radio LLC.............. S2812.................... FM-6.................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2415.................... NSS-10................ GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2162.................... AMC-3................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2347.................... AMC-6................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2826.................... SES-2................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2807.................... SES-1................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2892.................... SES-3................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2180.................... AMC-15................ GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2445.................... AMC-1................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2135.................... AMC-4................. GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2713.................... AMC-18................ GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S2433.................... AMC-11................ GSO.
SES Americom, Inc./Alascom, Inc..... S2379.................... AMC-8................. GSO.
Sirius XM Radio Inc................. S2710.................... FM-5.................. GSO.
Sirius XM Radio Inc................. S3033.................... XM-7.................. GSO.
Sirius XM Radio Inc................. S3034.................... XM-8.................. GSO.
Skynet Satellite Corporation........ S2933.................... TELSTAR 12V........... GSO.
Skynet Satellite Corporation........ S2357.................... TELSTAR 11N........... GSO.
ViaSat, Inc......................... S2747.................... VIASAT-1.............. GSO.
XM Radio LLC........................ S2617.................... XM-3.................. GSO.
XM Radio LLC........................ S2616.................... XM-4.................. GSO.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-U.S.-Licensed Space Stations--Market Access Through Petition for Declaratory Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Licensee Call sign Satellite common name Satellite type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABS Global Ltd...................... S2987.................... ABS-3A................ GSO.
DBSD Services Ltd................... S2651.................... DBSD G1............... GSO.
Empresa Argentina de Soluciones S2956.................... ARSAT-2............... GSO.
Satelitales S.A.
European Telecommunications S3031.................... EUTELSAT 133 WEST A... GSO.
Satellite Organization.
Eutelsat S.A........................ S3056.................... EUTELSAT 8 WEST B..... GSO.
Gamma Acquisition L.L.C............. S2633.................... TerreStar 1........... GSO.
Hispamar Sat[eacute]lites, S.A...... S2793.................... AMAZONAS-2............ GSO.
Hispamar Sat[eacute]lites, S.A...... S2886.................... AMAZONAS-3............ GSO.
Hispasat, S.A....................... S2969.................... HISPASAT 30W-6........ GSO.
Inmarsat PLC........................ S2932.................... Inmarsat-4 F3......... GSO.
Inmarsat PLC........................ S2949.................... Inmarsat-3 F5......... GSO.
Intelsat License LLC................ S3058.................... HISPASAT 143W-1....... GSO.
New Skies Satellites B.V............ S2756.................... NSS-9................. GSO.
New Skies Satellites B.V............ S2870.................... SES-6................. GSO.
New Skies Satellites B.V............ S3048.................... NSS-6................. GSO.
New Skies Satellites B.V............ S2828.................... SES-4................. GSO.
New Skies Satellites B.V............ S2950.................... SES-10................ GSO.
Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.... S2695.................... EUTELSAT 113 WEST A... GSO.
Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.... S2926.................... EUTELSAT 117 WEST B... GSO.
Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.... S2938.................... EUTELSAT 115 WEST B... GSO.
Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.... S2873.................... EUTELSAT 117 WEST A... GSO.
SES Satellites (Gibraltar) Ltd...... S2676.................... AMC 21................ GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S3037.................... NSS-11................ GSO.
SES Americom, Inc................... S29
[…truncated; see source link]Indexed from Federal Register on September 14, 2022.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.