Notice2022-18504
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Administrative Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Involving Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
August 29, 2022
Issuing agencies
State Department
Abstract
Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has imposed administrative debarment under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 166 (Monday, August 29, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 166 (Monday, August 29, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52834-52835]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-18504]
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 11842]
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Administrative Debarment
Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Involving Ryan
Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has
imposed administrative debarment under the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) on Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke.
DATES: Debarment imposed as of August 29, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jae E. Shin, Director, Office of
Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, Department of State (202) 632-2107.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 127.7(c)(2) of the ITAR authorizes
the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to
debar any person who has been found pursuant to part 128 of the ITAR to
have committed a violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or
when such violation is of such character as to provide a reasonable
basis for the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to believe that the
violator cannot be relied upon to comply with the AECA or ITAR in the
future. Such debarment prohibits the subject from participating
directly or indirectly in the export of defense articles or defense
services for which a license or other approval is required by the ITAR.
Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in
activity regulated under the ITAR (see, e.g., Sec. 120.1(c) and (d),
Sec. 126.7, Sec. 127.1(c), and Sec. 127.11(a)). The Department of
State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for
approvals that involve any debarred person.
Between January 2016 and November 2019, Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and
Daniel Gericke (``Respondents'') were employed by DarkMatter Group
(DarkMatter), a privately held technology and cyber services company
headquartered and organized in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that
furnished cyber services to the UAE government. Prior to working at
DarkMatter, a foreign corporation registered in the UAE, Respondents
were employed by CyberPoint International LLC (CyberPoint) a U.S.-based
company that furnished cyber services to the UAE government pursuant to
ITAR licenses or other approvals, including technical assistance
agreements. CyberPoint and DarkMatter were competitors, and in late
2015 and early 2016, the UAE government transitioned its contracts for
cyber services from CyberPoint to DarkMatter. During this time period,
DarkMatter hired certain U.S.-person former managers of CyberPoint,
including Respondents.
Respondents possessed computer network exploitation (CNE) expertise
that included the development, maintenance, deployment, and operation
of software and hardware designed to obtain unauthorized access to
electronic devices and accounts. Respondents used their CNE expertise
to provide and support CNE services to persons and entities in the UAE
and the UAE government on behalf of DarkMatter.
Among their other activities, Respondents created certain zero-
click computer hacking and intelligence gathering systems that
Respondents specially designed, developed, maintained, and operated to
allow its users access to tens of millions of devices for the UAE
government's intelligence purposes. The services Respondents performed
in connection with the relevant systems constituted furnishing defense
services under U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XI(d) because: (a)
the relevant systems were electronic systems, equipment, or software
that were specially designed for intelligence purposes that collect,
survey, monitor, exploit, analyze, or produce information from the
electromagnetic spectrum as described in USML Category XI(b); and (b)
Respondents assisted foreign persons in the use, design, development,
engineering, production, modification, testing, maintenance,
processing, or operation of the relevant systems. Respondents did not
have a license or other approval to furnish such ITAR-controlled
defense services.
As a result of these violations, on July 7, 2022 (Adams and Baier)
and August 5, 2022 (Gericke), the Department of State and Respondents
entered into Consent Agreements that administratively debarred
Respondents until July 7, 2025 and August 5, 2025, respectively, and
pursuant to order of the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs they are administratively debarred. Reinstatement after July 7,
2025 and August 5, 2025 is not automatic but contingent on full
compliance with the terms of the July 7, 2022 and August 5, 2022,
Consent Agreements and evidence that the underlying problems that gave
rise to the violations have been corrected. At the end of the debarment
period, Respondents may apply for reinstatement. Until licensing
privileges are reinstated, Respondents will remain administratively
debarred.
This notice is provided to make the public aware that the persons
listed above are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly
in any brokering activities and in any export from or temporary import
into the United States of defense articles, related technical data, or
defense services in all situations covered by the ITAR.
Exceptions may be made to this denial policy on a case-by-case
basis at the discretion of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
However, such an exception would be granted only after a full review of
all circumstances, paying particular attention to the following
factors: whether an exception is warranted by overriding U.S. foreign
policy or national security interests; whether an exception would
further law enforcement concerns that are consistent with foreign
policy or national security interests of the United States; or whether
other compelling circumstances exist that are consistent with the
foreign policy or national security interests of the United States, and
law enforcement concerns.
This notice involves a foreign affairs function of the United
States encompassed within the meaning of the military and foreign
affairs exclusion of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because the
exercise of this foreign affairs function is highly discretionary,
[[Page 52835]]
it is excluded from review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Kevin E. Bryant,
Acting Director, Office of Directives Management, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022-18504 Filed 8-26-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-25-P
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</html>Indexed from Federal Register on August 29, 2022.
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