Notice2022-16573
Record of Decision for the Final Versatile Test Reactor Environmental Impact Statement
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
August 3, 2022
Issuing agencies
Energy Department
Abstract
The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this record of decision (ROD) for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) pursuant to the Final Versatile Test Reactor Environmental Impact Statement (VTR EIS) (DOE/EIS-0542). DOE prepared the VTR EIS to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of alternatives for constructing and operating a VTR and the associated facilities required for post-irradiation examination of test and experimental fuels and materials. DOE has decided to implement its Preferred Alternative, to construct and operate a VTR at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, and to establish, through modification and construction, co-located facilities for post-irradiation examination of test products and for management of spent VTR driver fuel at INL. The VTR will operate as a national user facility, providing a fast-neutron-spectrum test capability for the testing and development of advanced nuclear technologies. DOE has not decided whether to establish VTR driver fuel production capabilities at the INL Site, the Savannah River Site (SRS), or a combination of the two sites. Once a preferred alternative or option for VTR driver fuel production is identified, DOE will announce its preference in a Federal Register (FR) notice. DOE would then publish a ROD no sooner than 30 days after its announcement of a preferred alternative/option for VTR driver fuel production.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 148 (Wednesday, August 3, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 3, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47400-47406]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16573]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[DOE/EIS-0542]
Record of Decision for the Final Versatile Test Reactor
Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Idaho Operations Office, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this record of
decision (ROD) for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) pursuant to the
Final Versatile Test Reactor Environmental Impact Statement (VTR EIS)
(DOE/EIS-0542). DOE prepared the VTR EIS to evaluate the potential
environmental impacts of alternatives for constructing and operating a
VTR and the associated facilities required for post-irradiation
examination of test and experimental fuels and materials. DOE has
decided to implement its Preferred Alternative, to construct and
operate a VTR at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, and to
establish, through modification and construction, co-located facilities
for post-irradiation examination of test products and for management of
spent VTR driver fuel at INL. The VTR will operate as a national user
facility, providing a fast-neutron-spectrum test capability for the
testing and development of advanced nuclear technologies. DOE has not
decided whether to establish VTR driver fuel production capabilities at
the INL Site, the Savannah River Site (SRS), or a combination of the
two sites. Once a preferred alternative or option for VTR driver fuel
production is identified, DOE will announce its preference in a Federal
Register (FR) notice. DOE would then publish a ROD no sooner than 30
days after its announcement of a preferred alternative/option for VTR
driver fuel production.
ADDRESSES: Questions or comments should be sent to Mr. James Lovejoy,
VTR EIS Document Manager, by mail at U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho
Operations Office, 1955 Fremont Avenue, MS 1235, Idaho Falls, Idaho
83415; or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a4f2f0f68ae1edf7e4cad1c7c8c1c5d68ac1cac1d6c3dd8ac3cbd2"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1b4d4f49355e52485b756e78777e7a69357e757e697c62357c746d">[email protected]</span></a>. The Final VTR EIS and
this ROD are available for viewing or download at <a href="https://www.energy.gov/nepa/nepa-documents">https://www.energy.gov/nepa/nepa-documents</a> and <a href="https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies/versatile-test-reactor">https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies/versatile-test-reactor</a>.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information regarding the VTR
Project, the Final VTR EIS, or the ROD, visit <a href="https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies/versatile-test-reactor">https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies/versatile-test-reactor</a>; or contact Mr.
James Lovejoy at the mailing address listed in ADDRESSES or via email
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#732527215d363a20331d06101f1612015d161d1601140a5d141c05"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="095f5d5b274c405a49677c6a656c687b276c676c7b6e70276e667f">[email protected]</span></a>; or call (208) 526-6805. For general
information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process,
contact Mr. Jason Anderson at the mailing address listed in ADDRESSES
or via email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f9afadabd7bcb0aab9978c9a959c988bd79c979c8b9e80d79e968f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="8cdad8dea2c9c5dfcce2f9efe0e9edfea2e9e2e9feebf5a2ebe3fa">[email protected]</span></a>; or call (208) 526-6805.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
DOE's mission includes advancing the energy, environmental, and
nuclear security of the United States (U.S.) and promoting scientific
and technological innovation in support of that mission. DOE's 2014 to
2018 Strategic Plan states that DOE will ``support a more economically
competitive, environmentally responsible, secure and resilient U.S.
energy infrastructure.'' The plan further indicates that DOE will
continue to explore advanced concepts in nuclear energy. The advanced
concepts may lead to new types of reactors that improve safety, lower
environmental impacts, and reduce proliferation concerns.
Advanced reactors that operate in the fast-neutron \1\ spectrum
offer the potential to have inherent safety characteristics
incorporated into their designs. They can operate for long periods
without refueling and reduce the volume of newly generated nuclear
waste. Effective testing and development of advanced reactor
technologies requires the use of fast neutrons comparable to those that
would occur in actual advanced reactors. A high flux of fast neutrons
allows accelerated testing, meaning that a comparatively short testing
period would accomplish what would otherwise require many years to
decades of exposure in a test environment with lower energy neutrons, a
lower flux, or both. This accelerated testing would contribute to the
development of materials and fuels for advanced reactors and generate
data allowing advanced reactor developers, researchers, DOE, and
regulatory agencies to improve performance, understand material
properties, qualify improved materials and fuels, evaluate reliability,
and ensure safety. Accelerated testing capabilities would also benefit
these same areas for the current generation of light-water reactors.
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\1\ Fast neutrons are highly energetic neutrons (ranging from
0.1 million to 10 million electron volts [MeV] and travelling at
speeds of thousands to tens of thousands kilometers per second)
emitted during fission. The fast-neutron spectrum refers to the
range of energies associated with fast neutrons.
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Many commercial organizations and universities are pursuing
advanced nuclear energy fuels, materials, and reactor designs that
complement DOE and its laboratories' efforts to advance nuclear energy.
These designs include thermal \2\ and fast-spectrum reactors that
target improved fuel resource utilization and waste management, and the
use of materials other than water for cooling. Their development
requires an adequate infrastructure for experimentation, testing,
design evolution, and component qualification. Available irradiation
test capabilities are aging (most are over 50 years old). These
capabilities are focused on testing materials, fuels, and components in
the thermal neutron spectrum and do not have the ability to support the
needs for fast reactors (i.e., reactors that operate
[[Page 47401]]
using fast neutrons). Only limited fast-neutron-spectrum testing
capabilities, with restricted availability, exist outside the U.S.
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\2\ Thermal neutrons are neutrons that are less energetic than
fast neutrons (generally, less than 0.25 electron volt and
travelling at speeds of less than 5 kilometers per second), having
been slowed by collisions with other materials such as water. The
thermal neutron spectrum refers to the range of energies associated
with thermal neutrons.
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A number of studies evaluating the needs and options for a fast-
neutron spectrum test reactor have been conducted. The Advanced
Demonstration and Test Reactor Options Study identified a strategic
objective to ``provide an irradiation test reactor to support
development and qualification of fuels, materials, and other important
components/items (e.g., control rods, instrumentation) of both thermal
and fast neutron-based . . . advanced reactor systems.'' The DOE
Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee (NEAC) issued an Assessment of
Missions and Requirements for a New U.S. Test Reactor, confirming the
need for fast-neutron testing capabilities in the U.S. and
acknowledging that no such facility is readily available domestically
or internationally. Developing the capability for large-scale testing,
accelerated testing, and qualifying advanced nuclear fuels, materials,
instrumentation, and sensors is essential for the U.S. to modernize its
nuclear energy infrastructure and to develop transformational nuclear
energy technologies that re-establish the U.S. as a world leader in
nuclear technology commercialization.
DOE's Mission Need Statement for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR)
Project, A Major Acquisition Project embraces the development of a
well-instrumented, sodium-cooled, fast-neutron-spectrum test reactor in
the 300 megawatt-thermal power level range. The deployment of a sodium-
cooled, fast-neutron-spectrum test reactor is consistent with the
conclusions of the test reactor options study and the NEAC
recommendation.
As required by the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of
2017 (NEICA) (Pub. L. 115-248), DOE assessed the mission need for a
VTR-based fast-neutron source to serve as a national user facility.
Having identified the need for the VTR, NEICA directs DOE ``to the
maximum extent practicable, complete construction of, and approve the
start of operations for, the user facility by not later than December
31, 2025.'' The Energy Act of 2020, within the Consolidated
Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 116-68), directs the Secretary of Energy to
provide a fast-neutron testing capability, authorizes the necessary
funding, and revises the completion date from 2025 to 2026. To this
end, DOE prepared an EIS in accordance with NEPA and the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and DOE NEPA regulations (40 CFR parts 1500
through 1508 \3\ and 10 CFR part 1021, respectively).
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\3\ On July 16, 2020, the CEQ published an ``Update to the
Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act'' (85 FR 43304). CEQ clarified that these
regulations apply to NEPA processes begun after the effective date
of September 14, 2020, and gave agencies the discretion to apply
them to ongoing NEPA processes (40 CFR 1506.13). This VTR EIS was
started prior to the effective date of the revised CEQ regulations,
and DOE has elected to complete the EIS pursuant to the regulations
in effect prior to September 14, 2020 (1978 regulations).
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Purpose and Need for Agency Action
The purpose of this DOE action is to establish a domestic,
versatile, reactor-based fast-neutron source and associated facilities
that meet identified user needs (e.g., providing a high neutron flux of
at least 4 x 10 \15\ neutrons per square centimeter per second and
related testing capabilities). Associated facilities include those for
the preparation of VTR driver fuel and test/experimental fuels and
materials and those for the ensuing examination of the test/
experimental fuels and materials; existing facilities would be used to
the extent possible. The U.S. has not had a viable domestic fast-
neutron-spectrum testing capability for almost three decades. DOE needs
to develop this capability to establish the U.S. testing capability for
next-generation nuclear reactors--many of which require a fast-neutron
spectrum for operation--thus enabling the U.S. to regain technology
leadership for the next generation nuclear fuels, materials, and
reactors. The lack of a versatile fast-neutron-spectrum testing
capability is a significant national strategic risk affecting the
ability of DOE to fulfill its mission to advance the energy,
environmental, and nuclear security interests of the U.S. and promote
scientific and technological innovation. This testing capability is
essential for the U.S. to modernize its nuclear energy industry.
Further, DOE needs to develop this capability on an accelerated
schedule to avoid further delay in the U.S. ability to develop and
deploy advanced nuclear energy technologies. If this capability is not
available to U.S. innovators as soon as possible, the ongoing shift of
nuclear technology dominance to other nations will accelerate, to the
detriment of the U.S. nuclear industrial sector.
Proposed Action
DOE proposes to construct and operate the VTR at a suitable DOE
site. DOE would use or expand existing, co-located, post-irradiation
examination capabilities as necessary to accomplish the mission. DOE
would also use or expand existing facility capabilities to produce VTR
driver fuel and to manage radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel.
The DOE facilities would be capable of receiving test articles from the
user community, as well as fabricating test articles for insertion in
the VTR.\4\
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\4\ As a user facility, the VTR would provide experimental
capabilities for entities outside of DOE. These other entities could
also fabricate test items for placement in the reactor. The VTR
project would develop procedures for the acceptance of test items
for use in the VTR. All test item and assembly designs would be
reviewed and verified to ensure that the VTR would perform as
designed and would meet all core performance and safety requirements
before the test assembly could be inserted into the reactor core.
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Candidate sites for construction and operation of the VTR include
the INL Site near Idaho Falls, Idaho, and the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL), near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. DOE would perform most
post-irradiation examination in existing, modified, or new facilities
near the VTR, although there may be instances when test items would be
sent to another location for evaluation. DOE would produce VTR driver
fuel at the INL Site or SRS near Aiken, South Carolina.
Alternatives and Options Analyzed in the Final VTR EIS
DOE proposes to use the GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) Power
Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM), a pool-type reactor, as the
basis for VTR's design under both action alternatives. The PRISM design
would require several changes, notably the elimination of electricity
production and the accommodation for experimental locations within the
core. The PRISM design \5\ of a sodium-cooled, pool-type reactor
satisfies the need to use a mature technology. The VTR would be an
approximately 300-megawatt (thermal) reactor based on and sharing many
of the design and passive safety features of the GEH PRISM. It also
would incorporate technologies adapted from previous sodium-cooled fast
reactors (e.g., the Experimental Breeder Reactor II [EBR-II] and the
Fast Flux Test Facility). The VTR's reactor, primary heat removal
system, and safety systems would be similar to those of the PRISM
design. VTR, like PRISM, would use
[[Page 47402]]
metallic alloy fuels. The conceptual design for the first VTR driver
fuel core is an alloy of 70 percent uranium (uranium enriched to 5
percent uranium-235 \6\), 20 percent plutonium, and 10 percent
zirconium (by weight).
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\5\ The PRISM design is based on the EBR-II reactor, which
operated for over 30 years. The PRISM design most like the VTR is
the 471-megawatt thermal MOD-A design. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission review of the PRISM reactor, as documented in NUREG-1368,
Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report for the Power Reactor
Innovative Small Module (PRISM) Liquid-Metal Reactor, concluded that
``no obvious impediments to licensing the PRISM design had been
identified.''
\6\ Enriched refers to the concentration of the isotope uranium-
235, usually expressed as a percentage, in a quantity of uranium.
Low-enriched uranium (LEU), highly enriched uranium (HEU) and high
assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) are all enriched forms of
uranium. Depleted uranium is a byproduct of the enrichment process
and refers to uranium in which the percentage of uranium-235 is less
than occurs naturally.
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The major facilities in the VTR complex include an electrical
switchyard, the reactor facility, 10 large sodium-to-air heat
exchangers, and an operational support facility. The reactor facility
would be about 180 feet by 280 feet. The reactor vessel, containing the
core of the VTR, would extend 90 feet below grade. Other below-grade
elements of the facility include the reactor head access area (over the
core), secondary coolant equipment rooms, test assembly storage areas,
and fuel cask pits. The reactor and experiment hall operating area that
extends 90 feet above grade would allow the receipt and movement of
fuel and experiments into and out of the core and storage areas.
The VTR core design would differ from that of PRISM because it
needs to meet the requirement for a high-flux test environment that
accommodates several test and experimental assemblies. Experiments
would be placed in some locations normally occupied by driver fuel in
the PRISM. Heat generated by the VTR during operation would be
dissipated through a heat rejection system consisting of intermediate
heat exchangers within the reactor vessel, a secondary sodium-cooling
loop, and air-cooled heat exchangers. This system and the Reactor
Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) would provide shutdown and
emergency cooling. The RVACS would remove decay heat from the sodium
pool by transferring the thermal energy through the reactor vessel and
guard vessel walls to naturally circulating air being drawn down
through the inlets of four cooling chimneys, through risers on the
exterior of the guard vessel, and up through the outlets of the cooling
chimneys. The RVACS chimneys would be about 100 feet tall, extending
above the experiment support area. No water would be used in either of
the reactor cooling systems.
The core of the VTR would comprise 66 driver fuel assemblies. The
core would be surrounded by rows of reflector assemblies (114 total
assemblies), which would be surrounded by rows of shield assemblies
(114 total assemblies). Non-instrumented experiments (containing test
specimens) could be placed in multiple locations in the reactor core or
in the reflector region, by replacing a driver fuel or reflector
assembly (test pins may also be placed within a driver fuel assembly).
Instrumented experiments, which would provide real-time information
while the reactor is operating, would require a penetration in the
reactor cover for the instrumentation stalk and could only be placed in
six fixed locations. One of these six locations can accommodate a
``rabbit'' test apparatus that would allow samples to be inserted and/
or removed while the reactor is in operation. The number of
instrumented test locations, plus the flexibility in the number and
location of non-instrumented tests would strengthen the versatility of
the reactor as a test facility.
The VTR mission requires capabilities to examine the test specimens
after irradiation in the VTR to determine the effects of a high flux of
fast neutrons. Highly radioactive test specimens would be removed from
the VTR after a period of irradiation ranging from days to years. Test
specimens would then be transferred to a fully enclosed, radiation-
shielded facility where they could be remotely disassembled, analyzed,
and evaluated. The examination facilities are ``hot cell'' facilities.
These hot cells include concrete walls and multi-layered, leaded-glass
windows several feet thick. Remote manipulators allow operators to
perform a range of tasks on test specimens within the hot cell while
protecting them from radiation exposure. An inert atmosphere is
required in some hot cells. An inert atmosphere of argon would be used
\7\ in the hot cell to which test assemblies are initially transferred
after removal from the VTR. The inert atmosphere may be necessary to
prevent test specimen degradation or unacceptable reactions (e.g.,
pyrophoric) that could occur in an air atmosphere. The post-irradiation
hot cell facilities would be in close proximity to the VTR. After
initial disassembly and examination in the inert atmosphere hot cell,
test specimens may be transferred to other post-irradiation examination
facilities for additional analysis.
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\7\ Not all test specimens would require an inert atmosphere
during disassembly, analysis, and evaluation. However, separate
facilities are not proposed for test specimens that do not require
initial post-irradiation examination in an inert atmosphere.
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The VTR would generate up to 45 spent nuclear fuel assemblies per
year.\8\ DOE would use existing or new facilities at the locations
identified in the site-specific alternatives for the management of
spent driver fuel. DOE will not separate, purify, or recover fissile
material from VTR spent nuclear fuel. Spent driver fuel assemblies
would be temporarily stored within the reactor vessel for about 1 year.
Upon removal from the reactor vessel, surface sodium coolant would be
washed off the assembly, and the assembly would be transported in a
transfer cask to a new onsite spent fuel pad. After several years (at
least 3 years), during which time the radioactive constituents would
further decay, the assemblies would be transferred in a cask to a spent
nuclear fuel conditioning facility. The sodium that was enclosed within
the spent driver fuel pins to enhance heat transfer would be removed
using a melt-distill-package process. The spent nuclear fuel would be
chopped, and the chopped material consolidated, melted, and vacuum
distilled to separate the sodium from the fuel. To meet safeguards
requirements, diluent would be added to the remaining spent fuel to
reduce the fissile material concentration. The resulting material would
be packaged in containers and temporarily stored in casks on the spent
fuel pad, pending transfer to an offsite storage or disposal facility.
Currently, there is not a repository for disposal of spent nuclear
fuel, but the conditioned spent driver fuel from the VTR is expected to
be compatible with the acceptance criteria for any interim storage
facility or permanent repository.
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\8\ Typically, less than a quarter of the VTR driver fuel
assemblies would be replaced at the end of a test cycle. However,
there could be atypical conditions when it would be necessary to
replace a larger number of assemblies after a test cycle. In such
instances, more than 45 assemblies could be removed from the core in
a single year.
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No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative, DOE would not pursue the
construction and operation of a VTR. To the extent they are capable and
available for testing in the fast-neutron-flux spectrum, DOE would
continue to make use of the limited capabilities of existing
facilities, both domestic and foreign. Domestic facilities that would
likely be used, without modification, would include the INL Advanced
Test Reactor and the ORNL High Flux Isotope Reactor. DOE would not
construct new or modify any existing post-irradiation examination or
spent nuclear fuel conditioning facilities to support VTR operation.
Existing post-irradiation
[[Page 47403]]
examination and spent nuclear fuel conditioning facilities would
continue to support operation of the existing reactors. Because there
would not be a VTR under the No Action Alternative, there would be no
need to produce VTR driver fuel. Therefore, no new VTR driver fuel
production capabilities would be pursued. The No Action Alternative
would not meet the purpose and need identified for the VTR.
Idaho National Laboratory Versatile Test Reactor Alternative
Under the INL VTR Alternative, DOE would site the VTR adjacent to
and east of the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) at the INL Site and
use existing hot cell and other facilities at the MFC for post-
irradiation examination and conditioning spent nuclear fuel (i.e.,
preparing it for disposal). The VTR complex would occupy about 25
acres. Additional land would be disturbed during the construction of
the VTR complex for such items as temporary staging of VTR components,
construction equipment, and worker parking. In total, construction
activities (anticipated to last 51 months) would result in the
disturbance of about 100 acres, inclusive of the 25 acres occupied by
the completed VTR complex.
The MFC is the location of the Hot Fuel Examination Facility
(HFEF), the Irradiated Materials Characterization Laboratory (IMCL),
and the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF). The HFEF and IMCL (and other
analytical laboratory facilities) would be used for post-irradiation
examination and the FCF for spent nuclear fuel conditioning. The
existing Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS)
security fencing around the Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) and the
Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) would be extended to encompass most
of the VTR facility.
Following irradiation, test and sample articles would be
transferred to the HFEF first. The HFEF, a Hazard Category 2 nuclear
facility,\9\ contains two large hot cells. HFEF hot cells provide
shielding and containment for remote examination (including destructive
and non-destructive testing), processing, and handling of highly
radioactive materials.
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\9\ DOE defines hazard categories of nuclear facilities by the
potential impacts identified by hazard analysis and has identified
radiological limits (quantities of material present in a facility)
corresponding to the hazard categories. Hazard Category 1--Hazard
Analysis shows the potential for significant offsite consequences
(reactors fall under this category). Hazard Category 2--Hazard
Analysis shows the potential for significant onsite consequences
beyond localized consequences. Hazard Category 3--Hazard Analysis
shows the potential for only significant localized consequences.
Below (Less Than) Hazard Category 3 applies to a nuclear facility
containing radiological materials with a final hazard categorization
less than Hazard Category 3 facility thresholds.
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The IMCL, a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility, has a modular
design that provides flexibility for future examination of nuclear fuel
and materials. The IMCL would be used for the study and
characterization of radioactive fuels and materials at the micro- and
nanoscale to assess irradiation damage processes.
Existing facilities within the MFC would need minor modifications
to support fabrication of test articles or to support post-irradiation
examination of irradiated test specimens withdrawn from the VTR. These
types of activities are ongoing within the MFC.
A new spent fuel pad would be constructed within the VTR site. The
spent fuel pad would consist of an approximately 11,000-square foot
concrete slab with a 2,500-square foot approach pad. Spent driver fuel
would be temporarily stored at the VTR within the reactor vessel,
followed by a period of storage on the spent fuel pad. After the fuel
cools sufficiently, it would be transferred in a cask to FCF. FCF is a
Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility located within a PIDAS. At FCF, the
fuel would be conditioned using a melt-distill-package process. The
fuel would be chopped, using existing equipment at the FCF. The chopped
material would be consolidated, melted, and vacuum distilled to
separate the sodium from the fuel. Following addition of a diluent, the
mixture would be packaged in containers, placed in storage casks, and
temporarily stored on the new spent fuel pad until shipped to an
offsite location (an interim storage facility or a permanent repository
when either becomes available for VTR fuel).
Under the conceptual design, the existing infrastructure, including
utilities and waste management facilities, would be used to support
construction and operation of the VTR. The current infrastructure is
adequate to support the VTR with minor upgrades and modifications.
Radioactive wastes would be shipped off site for treatment and/or
disposal.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory Versatile Test Reactor Alternative
Under the ORNL VTR Alternative, the VTR would be sited at ORNL at a
site previously considered for other projects, about a mile east of the
ORNL main campus. The major structures for the VTR would be the same as
those described for the INL VTR Alternative. At ORNL, a new hot cell, a
joint post-irradiation examination and spent nuclear fuel conditioning
facility, would be constructed adjacent to the VTR. Although there are
facilities with hot cells at ORNL that would be used for post-
irradiation examination of test materials, none of the available hot
cells operates with an inert atmosphere. A new spent fuel pad of the
same dimensions as described under INL VTR Alternative would also be
constructed.
The new hot cell facility would be approximately 172 feet by 154
feet, four levels, and would rise to about 84 feet above grade. The
facility would house four hot cells: two for post-irradiation
examinations and two for spent nuclear fuel conditioning. Construction
would occur in parallel with the construction of the VTR and be
completed in the same 51-month period. Construction activities would
result in disturbance of about 150 acres, with the completed VTR
complex, including the hot cell facility, occupying less than 50 acres.
The VTR facility, hot cell facility, and spent fuel pad would be
located within a single PIDAS.
In addition to the new hot cell facility, existing facilities at
ORNL within the Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory (Building 3525)
and the Irradiated Material Examination and Testing Facility (Building
3025E) would be used to supplement the capabilities of the new post-
irradiation examination facility. The Irradiated Fuels Examination
Laboratory is a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility and contains hot
cells that are used for examination of a wide variety of fuels. The
Irradiated Material Examination and Testing Facility is a Hazard
Category 3 nuclear facility and contains hot cells that are used for
mechanical testing and examination of highly irradiated structural
alloys and ceramics. In addition, the Low Activation Materials Design
and Analysis Laboratory would be used for the examination of materials
with low radiological content that do not require remote manipulation.
Spent driver fuel would be managed the same as described under the
INL VTR Alternative--temporarily stored at the VTR reactor vessel,
stored on the spent fuel pad, then conditioned and packaged.
Conditioning spent nuclear fuel in preparation for disposal would occur
in an inert atmosphere hot cell located in the new hot cell facility
adjacent to VTR. Containerized spent nuclear fuel would be placed in
storage casks and temporarily stored on the new spent fuel pad until
shipped to an offsite location (an interim storage facility or a
permanent repository when either becomes available for VTR fuel).
[[Page 47404]]
Under the conceptual design, the existing ORNL infrastructure would
be extended to the VTR site. The location selected for the VTR is
relatively undeveloped and does not have sufficient infrastructure
(e.g., roads, utilities, security) to support construction and
operation of the VTR. Radioactive waste would be shipped off site for
treatment and/or disposal. Waste management capabilities provided by
the project (e.g., treatment or packaging of radioactive liquid waste)
and facilities within ORNL would be used to support waste management
during construction and operation of the VTR.
Reactor Fuel Production Options
The VTR design envisions the use of metallic fuel. The initial VTR
core would consist of a uranium/plutonium/zirconium alloy (U/Pu/Zr)
fuel that would be 70 percent uranium (uranium enriched to 5 percent
uranium-235), 20 percent plutonium, and 10 percent zirconium--a blend
identified as U-20Pu-10Zr. VTR driver fuel used in later operations
could consist of these elements in different ratios and could use
plutonium with uranium of varying enrichments, including depleted
uranium or uranium enriched up to 19.75 percent. Annual heavy metal
requirements would be approximately 1.8 metric tons of fuel material
(between 1.3 metric tons and 1.4 metric tons of uranium and between 0.4
and 0.54 metric tons of plutonium, depending on the ratio of uranium to
plutonium).\10\ Feedstock for this fuel could be acquired from several
existing sources.
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\10\ The cited quantities are those for finished fuel as it is
placed in the reactor and correspond to fuel that is from 20 to 27
percent plutonium. Accounting for additional material that ends up
in the waste during the reactor fuel production process, up to 34
metric tons of plutonium could be needed for startup and 60 years of
VTR operation.
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DOE's plan for providing uranium for fabricating VTR driver fuel is
to acquire metallic uranium from a domestic commercial supplier. If
another source of uranium were to be selected, DOE would conduct a
review to determine if additional NEPA analysis would be needed. Other
possible sources are DOE managed inventories of excess uranium acquired
from many sources, including U.S. defense programs and the former DOE
uranium enrichment enterprise. Some of the uranium is enriched and
could be down-blended for use in VTR driver fuel.
Existing sources of U.S. excess plutonium \11\ managed by DOE and
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would be sufficient
to meet the needs of the VTR project. Potential DOE/NNSA plutonium
materials include surplus pit \12\ plutonium (i.e., metal), other
plutonium metal, oxide, and plutonium from other sources. If the U.S.
sources cannot be made available for the VTR project or to supplement
the domestic supply, DOE has identified potential sources of plutonium
in Europe.
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\11\ Excess plutonium includes pit and non-pit plutonium that is
no longer needed for U.S. national security purposes.
\12\ A pit is the central core of a primary assembly in a
nuclear weapon and is typically composed of plutonium metal (mostly
plutonium-239), enriched uranium, or both, and other materials.
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VTR driver fuel production evaluated in the EIS involves two steps
or phases: feedstock preparation and fuel fabrication. Depending on the
impurities of the source material, a polishing process, or a
combination of processes, would be required. These processes would be
performed in a series of gloveboxes \13\ to limit worker radiological
exposure.
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\13\ Gloveboxes are sealed enclosures with gloves that allow an
operator to manipulate materials and perform other tasks while
keeping the enclosed material contained. In some cases, remote
manipulators may be installed in place of gloves. The gloves, glass,
and siding material of the glovebox are designed to protect workers
from radiation contamination and exposure.
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Three potential feedstock preparation processes are under
consideration: an aqueous capability, a pyrochemical capability, and a
combination of the two. In the aqueous process, the plutonium feed
(containing impurities) is dissolved in a nitric acid solution and
through a series of extraction and precipitation steps, a polished
plutonium oxide is produced. The oxide is converted to a metal in a
direct oxide reduction process. In one form of the pyrochemical process
(molten salt extraction), the metallic plutonium feed is combined with
a salt and the mixture raised to the melting point. Impurities (e.g.,
americium) react with the salt, and the polished plutonium is collected
at the bottom of the reaction crucible. If the pyrochemical process
were selected, a direct oxide reduction process would also be required
to convert plutonium dioxide feeds to plutonium metal. If a combination
of the two processes were to be selected, a smaller aqueous line to
prepare this fuel could be incorporated into the pyrochemical process.
Fuel fabrication would use an injection casting process to combine
and convert the metallic ingots into fuel slugs. In a glovebox, a
casting furnace would be used to melt and blend the three fuel
components: uranium, plutonium, and zirconium. The molten alloy then
would be injected into quartz fuel slug molds. After cooling, the molds
would be broken, and the fuel slugs retrieved. Fuel pins would be
created, using stainless steel tubes (cladding) into which a slug of
solid sodium would be inserted, followed by the alloy fuel slugs. The
fuel slugs and sodium would occupy about half of the volume of the fuel
pin with the remainder containing argon gas at near atmospheric
pressure. The ends of the tubes would be closed with top and bottom end
plugs. These activities would take place in gloveboxes with inert
atmospheres. Once fully assembled, the fuel pins would be heated
sufficiently to melt the sodium and create the sodium bond with the
fuel. The sodium-bonded fuel would fill about half the length of the
fuel pin. Fuel pins would be assembled into a fuel assembly with each
fuel assembly containing 217 fuel pins. Sodium bonding and producing
the fuel assemblies would be performed in an open environment. No
gloveboxes would be required.
Operationally, the feedstock preparation and fuel fabrication
capabilities would need to generate about 66 fuel assemblies for the
initial VTR core. Thereafter, the capabilities would need to produce up
to 45 fuel assemblies per year.
The EIS evaluates the INL Site and SRS as potential locations for
performing the activities necessary for driver fuel production for the
VTR. Independently, DOE would establish and operate all or part of the
fuel fabrication capability at either site. DOE is not making a
decision regarding driver fuel production in this ROD.
Potential Environmental Impacts
Implementation of either the INL VTR Alternative or the ORNL VTR
Alternative would generally have small environmental consequences.
Overall, the environmental consequences would be smaller at the INL
Site for several reasons. The total area that would be temporarily
disturbed and the area that would be permanently occupied by the VTR
complex would be smaller at the INL Site because of the need to build a
new hot cell facility if the VTR were located at ORNL. Unlike the INL
Site, the ORNL location abuts wetlands that would have to be avoided or
managed in accordance with Clean Water Act and State of Tennessee
regulations. The removal of trees at the ORNL location would also
result in the loss of roosting habitat for sensitive bat species. The
potential radiological impacts would be small at both locations but
would be smaller at the INL Site because the VTR would be further from
the site boundary and the population density is lower near the INL Site
than near ORNL.
[[Page 47405]]
Implementation of the reactor fuel production options at either the
INL Site or SRS would generally have small environmental consequences.
At both locations, existing facilities would be modified or adapted to
provide capabilities for feedstock preparation and fuel fabrication.
Disturbance of a minimal area (up to 3 acres) would occur at SRS.
Because there is existing staff at the INL Fuel Manufacturing Facility,
fewer new employees would need to be hired for fuel fabrication at the
INL Site. Potential radiological impacts would be small at both sites,
but due to differences in population density and distribution,
potential impacts would be somewhat smaller at the INL Site.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
The No Action Alternative would be the Environmentally Preferable
Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, DOE would not pursue the
construction and operation of a VTR. To the extent they are capable and
available for testing in the fast-neutron-flux spectrum, DOE would
continue to make use of the limited capabilities of existing
facilities, both domestic and foreign. Construction and operation of a
VTR and associated support facilities would not occur, resulting in
less impacts than under the Action Alternatives. However, the No Action
Alternative would not meet the purpose and need for a domestic fast-
neutron-spectrum testing capability.
Comments on Final VTR EIS
DOE made more than 1,850 notifications of the completion and
availability of the Final VTR EIS to Congressional members and
committees; states, including Idaho, Tennessee, and South Carolina;
Tribal governments and organizations; local governments; other Federal
agencies; non-governmental organizations; and individuals. Following
issuance of the Final VTR EIS, DOE received four letters and/or emails.
DOE considered the comments received following issuance of the Final
VTR EIS and finds that they do not present ``significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its impacts'' within the meaning of
40 CFR 1502.9(c) and 10 CFR 1021.314(a), and therefore do not require
preparation of a supplement analysis or a supplemental EIS.
DOE addressed two of the emails received--a press inquiry and a
process question--directly with the people who submitted them.
A third email/letter received included multiple comments on a
variety of topics. One related to the author's Freedom of Information
Act request and has no bearing on or relevance to the environmental
impacts evaluated in the EIS. It also contained another question of
whether the Office of Nuclear Energy would have the ability and funds
to establish a VTR fuel fabrication project at SRS. As appropriate, the
VTR EIS evaluated the potential environmental impacts of a fuel
fabrication capability at SRS; the administrative and funding items are
factors DOE would consider when it makes a decision regarding fuel
fabrication.
Other comments posed questions about the plutonium for VTR driver
fuel fabrication, a nonproliferation assessment, and management of
transuranic waste resulting from fuel fabrication activities. Similar
topics were raised in comments on the Draft VTR EIS. DOE responded to
these comment topics in Volume 3 of the Final VTR EIS and revised the
EIS as necessary to fully address these topics commensurate with the
stage of project development.
This third letter/email also incorrectly stated that the VTR had
been ``terminated'' and the ``EIS [was] improperly issued after
termination.'' Additionally, it requested ``that no Record of Decision
(ROD) be issued on the project.'' While it is correct that Congress did
not appropriate funds for VTR in fiscal year 2022, the Energy Act of
2020, included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 116-68),
authorized full funding for the VTR project. DOE is following Council
on Environmental Quality guidance to integrate NEPA into the planning
process early to ensure planning and decisions reflect environmental
values, to avoid delays, and to head off potential conflicts. By
issuing the Final VTR EIS and ROD, DOE is taking important steps,
consistent with the Energy Act of 2020, by deciding whether and where
to construct the VTR. In accordance with its authorization in the
Energy Act of 2020, DOE will work with Congress to obtain the funding
needed to execute this important project.
The fourth letter/email recommended that DOE clarify management
approaches for spent driver fuel beyond January 1, 2035. As indicated
in the response to comments received from the State of Idaho and as
revised in the Final VTR EIS, prior to issuing this ROD, DOE committed
to exploring potential approaches with the State of Idaho to clarify
and, as appropriate, address potential issues concerning management of
VTR spent nuclear fuel beyond January 1, 2035; those discussions are
ongoing. Spent driver fuel from the VTR, regardless of whether it was
generated before or after January 1, 2035, would be stored within the
VTR reactor vessel until decay heat generation is reduced to a level
that would allow fuel transfer and storage of the fuel assemblies with
passive cooling. After allowing time for additional radioactive decay,
the spent fuel would be transferred to a spent nuclear fuel
conditioning facility. At the facility, the spent fuel would be
chopped, melted, and vacuum distilled to remove the sodium, after which
the fuel would be diluted and placed in canisters ready for future
disposal. The canisters would be placed in dry storage casks and stored
on site in compliance with all regulatory requirements and agreements.
This VTR spent nuclear fuel would be managed at the site until it is
transported off site to an interim storage facility or a permanent
repository.
Decision
DOE has decided to implement its Preferred Alternative as described
in the Final VTR EIS. DOE's Preferred Alternative is to construct and
operate a VTR at INL, and to establish, through modification and
construction, co-located facilities for post-irradiation examination of
test products and for management of spent VTR driver fuel at INL.
DOE has not decided whether to establish VTR driver fuel production
capabilities for feedstock preparation and fuel fabrication at the INL
Site, SRS, or a combination of the two sites. Once a preferred
alternative/option for VTR driver fuel production is identified, DOE
will announce its preference in an FR notice. DOE would publish a
record of decision no sooner than 30 days after its announcement of a
preferred alternative/option for VTR driver fuel production.
Basis for the Decision
The Final VTR EIS provided the DOE decision-maker with important
information regarding potential environmental impacts of alternatives
and options for satisfying the purpose and need. In addition to
environmental information, DOE considered other factors including
public comments, statutory responsibilities, strategic objectives,
technology needs, safeguards and security, cost, and schedule, when
making its decision.
Mitigation Measures
No potential adverse impacts were identified that would require
additional
[[Page 47406]]
mitigation measures beyond those required by regulation and agreements
or achieved through design features or best management practices.
However, the INL VTR Alternative has the potential to affect one or
more resource areas. If during implementation, mitigation measures
above and beyond those required by regulations are identified to reduce
impacts, they would be developed, documented, and executed.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on July 22,
2022, by Robert Boston, Manager, Idaho Operations Office, Office of
Nuclear Energy, pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of
Energy. That document with the original signature and date is
maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance
with the requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as
an official document of the Department of Energy. The administrative
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on July 29, 2022.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2022-16573 Filed 8-2-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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