Proposed Rule2022-16443
Installation and Operation of Flightdeck Installed Physical Secondary Barriers on Transport Category Airplanes in Part 121 Service
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Published
August 1, 2022
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration
Abstract
This proposed rule would implement a mandate in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring that certain airplanes used to conduct domestic, flag, or supplemental passenger-carrying operations have an installed physical secondary barrier that protects the flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck door is opened.
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 146 (Monday, August 1, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 46892-46903]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16443]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 146 / Monday, August 1, 2022 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 46892]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 25 and 121
[Docket No.: FAA-2022-0772; Notice No. 22-05]
RIN 2120-AL59
Installation and Operation of Flightdeck Installed Physical
Secondary Barriers on Transport Category Airplanes in Part 121 Service
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would implement a mandate in the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring that certain airplanes used to
conduct domestic, flag, or supplemental passenger-carrying operations
have an installed physical secondary barrier that protects the
flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck door is
opened.
DATES: Send comments on or before September 30, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2022-0772
using any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> and
follow the online instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
<bullet> Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140,
West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
<bullet> Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
<bullet> Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
<a href="http://www.dot.gov/privacy">www.dot.gov/privacy</a>.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a> at any time. Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Jacquet, AIR-626, Human-Machine
Interface Section, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation
Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone (206) 231-3208; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4a0e2b24232f2664002b293b3f2f3e0a2c2b2b642d253c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="befadfd0d7dbd290f4dfddcfcbdbcafed8dfdf90d9d1c8">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in Subtitle
VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General Requirements.''
Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations and
minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This
regulation is within the scope of that authority.
In addition, section 336, ``Secondary Cockpit Barriers,'' of the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Public Law 115-254 (Oct. 5, 2018),\1\
directs the Administrator of the FAA to issue an order requiring
installation of a secondary flightdeck barrier on ``each new aircraft
that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air carrier in the
United States operating under the provisions of part 121 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations.''
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\1\ Referred to as ``the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018'' in
this rule.
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I. Overview of Proposed Rule
This proposed rule would implement \2\ Section 336 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by proposing to require the installation
and use of an installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that would be
deployed (closed and locked) whenever the flightdeck door is opened
while the airplane is in flight. The purpose of this IPSB would be to
impede unauthorized access to the flightdeck. The IPSB would be
required to resist intrusion and meet certain physical standards, but
still permit line-of-sight visibility between the flightdeck door and
the cabin.
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\2\ The FAA determined that an informal rulemaking proceeding
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act is appropriate
to prospectively apply these requirements on certain newly-
manufactured airplanes.
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This proposal would affect operators conducting passenger-carrying
operations under 14 CFR part 121 with transport category airplanes
operating in the United States by requiring the operators to use the
IPSB, when installed, as part of their procedures for opening the
flightdeck door. This proposed rule would apply to transport category
airplanes manufactured two years after the effective date of a final
rule.
II. Background
A. Congressional Mandate
On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018. Section 336 of the Act states:
(a) SHORT TITLE.--This section may be cited as the ``Saracini
Aviation Safety Act of 2018.''
(b) REQUIREMENT.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall issue an order requiring installation of a
secondary flightdeck barrier on each new aircraft that is
manufactured for delivery to a passenger air carrier in the United
States operating under the provisions of part 121.
B. History
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA adopted
standards for
[[Page 46893]]
flightdeck security in January 2002 by adding 14 CFR 25.795 and
amending Sec. 121.313.\3\ Those amendments were intended to make the
flightdeck resistant to forcible intrusion and small firearms, and
prevent unauthorized entry into the flightdeck. These requirements were
based on International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards,\4\
and recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee \5\
(ARAC), which were developed by the Design for Security Harmonization
Working Group. ARAC includes representatives of aircraft owners and
operators, airmen and flight crewmembers, airports, aircraft
maintenance providers, aircraft manufacturers, public citizen and
passenger groups, training providers, and labor organizations.
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\3\ Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on
Transport Category Airplanes, 67 FR 2117 (January 15, 2002).
\4\ Adopted by Amendment 97 to Annex 8 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation on March 12, 1997.
\5\ See Advisory and Rulemaking Committees--ICAO Amendment 97 to
Annex 8 and Resistance to Intrusion Complete File (Design for
Security HWG, TAE), <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/342">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/342</a>.
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Even a strong and secure flightdeck door, however, must
occasionally be opened, in order to provide for necessary events such
as lavatory breaks and meal service. Between the time of opening and
closing the flightdeck door (door transition), the open flightdeck has
some degree of vulnerability to attack. Such an attack could happen
quickly, and arguably leave insufficient time for the cabin crew to
react.
Therefore, in 2007, the FAA promulgated requirements \6\ to address
the security of the flightdeck when the flightdeck door was opened,
however briefly. Specifically, the FAA adopted Sec. Sec. 121.584 and
121.587 to require that the flightdeck door be locked when the airplane
is in operation, unless it is necessary to open it to permit access by
authorized persons, and require compliance with FAA-approved procedures
for opening the door.
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\6\ Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting
Systems, 72 FR 45629 (August 15, 2007).
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As a result of these new requirements, air carriers and type design
holders developed various methods and designs, including use of
crewmembers and equipment and, in limited cases, IPSBs,\7\ to help
secure the flightdeck during the period when the flightdeck door was
open during flight. To provide guidance and recommendations for these
different methods and designs, RTCA, Inc.\8\ formed a committee to
develop recommended procedures and standards for airplane secondary
barriers. In 2011, RTCA produced DO-329, ``Aircraft Secondary Barriers
and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures.'' DO-329 describes
various means of addressing the times when the flightdeck door must be
opened. In this context, these means can be combinations of people,
procedures and/or equipment. The document does not recommend one of
these means over another, but provides advice on the use of each one to
meet the objective of a secure flightdeck. Subsequently and based on
the RTCA's report, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-110,
``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternate Flight Deck Security
Procedures,'' in 2015. That AC references various means of compliance
with Sec. 121.584(a)(1), which prohibits the flightdeck door from
being unlocked during flight unless the operator has an approved
procedure and visual device to verify that the area outside the
flightdeck door is secure.
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\7\ Relatively few such IPSBs were installed, relative to the
total number of airplanes in scheduled service, and most have since
been removed. The FAA is not aware of the reasons for removal. In
addition, the FAA has no data regarding whether those varying
installations would have met the requirements of this proposal.
\8\ RTCA was formerly the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics and an Advisory Committee to the FAA.
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C. ARAC Report
On June 20, 2019, to facilitate the implementation of the mandate
in Section 336 to require secondary barriers on certain aircraft, the
FAA tasked ARAC \9\ to recommend standards for IPSB. The ARAC formed
the Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group, under the Transport
Airplane and Engine Subcommittee, to carry out the tasks. The Working
Group included representatives from manufacturers, air carriers, and
pilot and flight attendant unions. On February 27, 2020, the Working
Group submitted its ``Recommendation Report to Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee for Implementation of Section 336 of Public Law 115-
254'' (the Report) \10\ to ARAC. ARAC accepted the Report in March of
2020 and forwarded it to the FAA.\11\
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\9\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Tasking Notice (June 20,
2019), <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=3943">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=3943</a>.
\10\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barriers Working Group Report,
available in the docket for this rulemaking and at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=4342">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=4342</a>.
\11\ See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Meeting
(June 18, 2020), <a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20June%202020%20Meeting%20Packet.pdf">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20June%202020%20Meeting%20Packet.pdf</a>.
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The Report contained 21 recommendations, most of which were by
consensus. This NPRM incorporates those consensus recommendations.\12\
The Report included suggestions on the scope and potential cost of the
requirement for IPSB, as well as the performance standards that the FAA
should include in a proposed rule. The FAA carefully considered all
recommendations and plans to address certain recommendations
appropriately through guidance. The following summarized
recommendations are pertinent to this regulatory proposal.
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\12\ The Report also included three recommendations on which the
Working Group could not agree, but it provided alternatives.
Recommendation 19 suggested either a full risk assessment by the FAA
and air carriers of the secondary barriers currently in use, or the
continuous evaluation in the future by air carriers of such
secondary barrier systems under their Safety Management Systems.
Recommendation 20 suggested either requiring two flight attendants
onboard every aircraft, or a more particularized assessment of the
effectiveness of the relevant operational procedures, when only one
flight attendant is on board. Finally, Recommendation 21 suggested
implementation times of either 18 or 36 months.
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The Report recommended that:
--The FAA promulgate a part 25 design standard for IPSB to resist a
600-pound push load (toward the flightdeck), and a 250-pound pull load
(away from the flightdeck), applied at certain critical locations.
--The FAA require these load requirements only to be static, rather
than the more conservative dynamic, because the purpose of the IPSB is
to delay access to the flightdeck door for only the time necessary for
the door to be shut and locked.
--The IPSB be able to resist an intrusion attempt for five seconds, so
as to provide a two-second margin above the expected three-second time
needed to close and lock the flightdeck door.
--The FAA require the IPSB to be designed such that it would not be
possible for a 50th percentile male to reach through the IPSB and grab
an open flightdeck door.
--The IPSB be sufficiently transparent, whether through open space or
transparent material, to provide situational awareness between the
vestibule area (outside the flightdeck) and the passenger cabin, and
that the FAA's design requirements for the IPSB account for human
needs, that is, providing room for crew changes, meal service, etc.
--That the FAA take any actions needed for the IPSB to be certified to
existing
[[Page 46894]]
part 25 standards.\13\ Such actions could, according to the Report,
include excepting a proposed IPSB from conflicting part 25 regulations,
such as those relating to emergency evacuation and aisle width. Such an
exception would not, according to the Report, have a meaningful adverse
impact on safety, due to the limited time during flight that the IPSB
would be deployed.
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\13\ Part 25 contains the airworthiness standards (i.e., design
requirements) for transport category airplanes.
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--That the FAA require part 121 certificate holders to incorporate the
IPSB's use into their procedures for opening the flightdeck door of
newly-manufactured airplanes, and impose compliance times of 18 or 36
months \14\ for when the use of the IPSB would be required as part of
the certificate holder's operation of newly-manufactured airplanes.
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\14\ These varying times were based on different estimates of
the amount of time that would be necessary to develop and certify
the IPSB. Report, pp. 23-25.
Lastly, the Report recommended the FAA not impose a similar
requirement for all-cargo operations or operations conducted under 14
CFR part 129.\15\ The Report suggested the FAA consider whether the
operational rule should account for smaller airplanes, because such
airplanes may only have one cabin crewmember and flights of lesser
duration, and the flightdeck door may be less likely to be opened.
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\15\ Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either
within the United States, or who operate solely outside the United
States but with airplanes registered in the United States.
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III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. Proposed Part 25 Requirement for IPSB
The FAA proposes to require installation of an IPSB on certain
airplanes used by air carriers to conduct passenger-carrying flights
and for which the applicable operating rules (14 CFR 121.313(f))
require a reinforced flightdeck door.\16\ Such IPSBs would be required
to meet certain new design requirements, which would be set forth in a
new paragraph (4) to Sec. 25.795(a).
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\16\ Part 121 of title 14 establishes minimum operating
standards for part 119 certificate holders who wish to conduct
domestic, flag, or supplemental operations.
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Part 25 prescribes airworthiness standards for the issuance of type
certificates, and changes to those certificates, for transport category
airplanes.\17\ Each person who applies for such a certificate or change
for such airplanes must show compliance with the applicable
requirements in part 25. As such, the proposed part 25 revisions
establish the IPSB performance standards, but do not specify which
aircraft need IPSB installed, or that the IPSB must be used when
showing compliance with Sec. 121.584. This is accomplished by proposed
changes to part 121.\18\
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\17\ Transport category airplanes are airplanes for which a type
certificate is applied for under part 21 in the transport category
and that meet the transport category airworthiness requirements.
Multi-engine airplanes with more than 19 seats or a maximum takeoff
weight greater than 19,000 lbs must be certificated in the transport
category.
\18\ The FAA authorizes scheduled air service by issuing a part
119 certificate for operations under part 121. Air carriers
authorized to operate under part 121 are generally large, U.S.-based
airlines, regional air carriers, and certain cargo operators.
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The IPSB would need to resist intrusion and meet certain strength
and other standards, as described below.
1. Intrusion Resistance
The proposed requirement for resisting intrusion into the
flightdeck must meet three criteria. First, the IPSB must be
``physical,'' i.e., an object rather than only procedures. Second, the
IPSB must be a ``barrier,'' in that it must occupy sufficient space
that it cannot be avoided (i.e., by going over, under, or around it) to
get access to the flightdeck door. Third, to resist intrusion, the IPSB
must impede physical force in the event a person tries to overcome the
IPSB, including by attempting to open or push through it.
2. Proposed Load Requirements
The IPSB would be required to resist certain intrusion loads
applied in both the direction of the flightdeck and the direction of
the passenger cabin,\19\ at the most critical locations on the IPSB.
Given the variety of IPSB designs and failure modes that are possible,
this rule would require application of the loads at the most critical
locations for the particular design. For each load requirement, an
applicant would have to identify and justify the most critical
locations to apply these loads for its particular design. The applied
loads would be considered ultimate loads.\20\
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\19\ For purposes of this preamble, the terms passenger
``cabin'' and passenger ``compartment'' refer to the same area of
the airplane and therefore are used synonymously.
\20\ Design loads are typically expressed in terms of limit
loads, which are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5,
to determine ultimate loads. See 14 CFR 25.301, 25.303, and 25.305.
In this proposal, the design loads would be expressed as ultimate
loads, and no additional safety factor would be applied.
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The FAA proposes the use of static, rather than dynamic, loads \21\
for this requirement. Specifically, the FAA proposes a 600-pound static
load in the direction of the flightdeck. This proposal is consistent
with Recommendation 1 of the Report, which was derived from Working
Group discussions regarding the potential means available on board
(i.e., persons) to exert such loads, coupled with the proprietary
results of intrusion testing conducted by airframe manufacturers.
Regarding the need to resist intrusion loads applied in the direction
of the passenger cabin i.e., by a person pulling on the barrier, the
IPSB and the flightdeck door are effectively the same. Therefore, an
acceptable load of 250 pounds in the direction of the passenger cabin
would correspond to the constant 250-pound tensile load requirement in
Sec. 25.795(a)(2) for the flightdeck door. This would allow some
commonality with testing of the flightdeck door.
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\21\ In this context, ``static'' means a load that is constant
and the rate of load application is not important; ``dynamic'' means
a load for which both the magnitude and the rate of load application
with respect to time are important.
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The FAA proposes static rather than dynamic loads for these
performance standards because the purpose of the IPSB is to provide
resistance to intrusion during the comparatively short time necessary
for the flightdeck door to be reopened by the flightcrew member and
then closed and locked. This is in contrast to a barrier such as a
flightdeck door, which must provide near-continuous security throughout
the flight. For such barriers, the required dynamic loads of Sec.
25.795(a)(1) are designed to simulate how the door may have to respond
in service. For the IPSB, a simpler assessment--of static strength (as
assessed by its ability to withstand applied loads)--in combination
with the other proposed requirements, provides an acceptable way to
determine that the IPSB resists access. Because dynamic load testing is
generally more conservative than static load testing, an applicant
could choose to use dynamic testing in order to demonstrate compliance
with the static load performance requirements.
The FAA's proposed guidance on methods of testing these static load
requirements is in proposed AC 25.795-X, which is discussed in the
``Proposed Guidance'' section of this document.
3. Proposed Delay Requirement
This proposed rule would require the IPSB be designed to slow the
time by which a person could reach the flightdeck for at least the time
required to open and reclose the flightdeck door, but no less than 5
seconds. This is the time cited in Recommendation 18 of the Report.
This duration is reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the
IPSB.
[[Page 46895]]
The proposed requirement that the IPSB need only resist intrusion to
the flightdeck when the flightdeck door is opened would permit the IPSB
to be deployed as needed and stowed when not needed.
4. Proposed Visibility Requirement
The FAA proposes that the IPSB provide enough line-of-sight
visibility to allow crewmember situational awareness of the area
between the passenger cabin and the entry to the flightdeck. Due to the
physical nature of the IPSB, maintaining situational awareness of the
area between the passenger cabin and the vestibule area when the IPSB
is deployed is important if crewmembers on either side of the IPSB need
to act. The proposed design would be evaluated during certification to
assess whether it meets the above performance standard. For example,
such visibility could be accomplished via the type of material used to
construct the IPSB or via open space (e.g., holes, slots, or other
openings) in the IPSB. This visibility requirement would be codified in
new Sec. 121.313(l).
5. Proposed Reach-Through Requirement
Such openings, however, could defeat the purpose of the IPSB if
they allowed a person to reach through the barrier and grab the open
flightdeck door. Therefore the FAA proposes to require, in new Sec.
25.795(a)(4), that the IPSB prevent a person from doing so. The FAA
would provide compliance guidance in Advisory Circular 25.795-X. This
guidance would allow an applicant to show compliance using methods that
include anthropometric reference values of a 50th percentile male,
coupled with a maximum recommended spacing for any openings in the
barrier.\22\
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\22\ As noted above, ARAC recommended the FAA prevent reach-
through by a 50th percentile male, but the FAA proposes that a
regulation which prevents a ``person'' from reaching through would
be understandable and consistent with FAA regulatory practice, and
can be explained in the relevant guidance material.
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6. Proposed Exception From Incompatible Regulations
The FAA requests comment on its proposed method of certifying IPSB
installations. The FAA proposes that, during its certification of the
IPSB installation, the requirements of Sec. Sec. 25.365, 25.803,
25.813, 25.815, 25.1411, and 25.1447 would not apply to IPSBs in the
deployed configuration. An IPSB, when deployed to block access to the
flightdeck, cannot reasonably be expected to meet certain design
requirements for transport category airplanes, such as those relating
to rapid decompression, emergency evacuation, aisle width, and
accessibility to the emergency equipment. Moreover, because this rule
would not require that the IPSB be deployed during taxi, takeoff, and
landing, and because the IPSB should be immediately stowed after use,
the amount of time that the IPSB is deployed should be very brief in
comparison to the duration of the flight. This configuration-based
compliance method would be similar to the FAA's longstanding method of
certification of lavatory doors, in which the FAA considers the
position of the door when making compliance findings. Depending on the
proposed design, it may be necessary for an applicant to petition for
exemption from certain regulations during the certification process.
7. Proposed Human Factors Considerations
The FAA proposes that the design of the IPSB, whether deployed or
stowed, must allow for necessary crewmember activities. This would
include providing adequate space for activities that include crew
change-outs, restroom breaks, meal service, etc.
B. Proposed Part 121 Requirement to Use Installed Physical Secondary
Barriers (IPSB)
The FAA proposes a new paragraph (l) in Sec. 121.313 that would
require all airplanes that Sec. 121.313(f) requires to have a lockable
door, and all transport category airplanes that have a door installed
between the flightdeck and any other occupied compartment, to
incorporate an IPSB that meets the requirements of proposed Sec.
25.795(a)(4). This proposed requirement would apply to newly-
manufactured airplanes two years after the effective date of this rule.
This approach is consistent with the FAA's existing method of
implementing the requirements for reinforced flightdeck doors and is
discussed in more detail below. If the operating rules require a
flightdeck door on the airplane, Sec. 25.795, which currently
specifies the requirements for the flightdeck door, would add the
requirements for the IPSB.
An FAA requirement to simply install an IPSB would not necessarily
ensure that the IPSB is deployed. Therefore, the FAA also proposes that
operators incorporate the use of the IPSB into their flightdeck door
opening procedures required by Sec. 121.584. These procedures contain
requirements to verify, prior to unlocking or opening a flightdeck
door, that the area outside the flightdeck door is secure and, if
someone outside the flightdeck seeks to have the flightdeck door
opened, then that person is not under duress. New Sec. 121.584(a)(3)
would require an operator to deploy (close and lock) the IPSB, if one
was required to be installed on that airplane in accordance with new
Sec. 121.313(l), before opening the flightdeck door during flight.
An operational procedure included in the operator's methods of
compliance with Sec. 121.584 would apply to uses of the IPSB. Some or
all of the operator's existing procedures could be retained (e.g., the
procedure for a flight attendant to enter the flightdeck when one of
the flightcrew leaves, to meet the requirements of Sec. 121.587(b)),
while others may need to be removed or replaced (e.g., the use of a
serving cart as an improvised non-installed barrier). Depending on the
operator's procedures for opening the flightdeck door, an IPSB has the
potential benefit of requiring only one flight attendant to carry out
those procedures. One flight attendant could both deploy the secondary
barrier, and enter the flightdeck when a pilot leaves the flightdeck.
In contrast, typical current procedures for opening the flightdeck door
necessitate more than one flight attendant.
The requirements of Sec. 121.584 are only applicable when the
flightdeck door is to be unlocked or opened. To comply with Sec.
121.584 and protect the area just outside the flightdeck door,
deployment of the IPSB would occur prior to unlocking or opening the
flightdeck door. The FAA expects that the IPSB would remain deployed
until after the flightdeck door is closed and locked. Accordingly, the
IPSB would be in the stowed position during taxi, takeoff, landing, and
the majority of flight.
Any training for operation of the IPSB should be tailored to meet
operational requirements of various designs. Non-prescriptive examples
of procedures are found in appendix B of the Report.
1. Proposed Two-Year Compliance Time
The FAA proposes a compliance time of two years, after which any
transport category airplane manufactured and used in passenger-carrying
operations under part 121 would be required to have an IPSB meeting the
requirements of proposed Sec. 25.795(a)(4). The FAA proposes this 2-
year compliance time, rather than the 18 or 36 months recommended in
the Report, for several reasons. There are very few in-production IPSBs
currently in existence, so most designs would be new. The means of
showing compliance with proposed Sec. 25.795(a)(4) have not yet been
developed nor used previously for
[[Page 46896]]
any of the IPSB that do exist. Consequently, part of the compliance
time would be needed for both the applicant and the FAA's validation
and refinement of the methods of compliance for both current and new
designs. The requirements are complex and there are a large number of
different airplane models likely to be affected. Many airplanes that
would be required to have an IPSB will require design modification to
permit IPSB installation.
2. Date of Manufacture
For the purposes of this proposal, the FAA considers the date of
manufacture to be the date on which inspection records show that an
airplane is in a condition for safe flight. This is not necessarily the
date on which the airplane is in conformity with the approved type
design, or the date on which a certificate of airworthiness is issued,
because some items not relevant to safe flight, such as passenger
seats, might not be installed at that time. It could be earlier, but
would be no later, than the date on which the first flight of the
airplane occurs.\23\
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\23\ The FAA has used the term ``date of manufacture'' in
previous rulemakings. See the final rules entitled Improved
Flammability Standards for Materials Used in the Interiors of
Transport Category Airplane Cabins (60 FR 6616, 6617, February 2,
1995), and Improved Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic
Insulation Materials Used in Transport Category Airplanes (68 FR
45046, 45055, July 31, 2003).
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3. Not Applicable to Part 129 Operations
The FAA proposes to apply the requirements of proposed Sec.
121.313(l) to passenger-carrying, transport category airplanes
operating under part 121, and not to those airplanes operating under 14
CFR part 129.
Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either within the
United States, or who operate solely outside the United States, but
with airplanes registered in the United States.\24\ When the FAA
adopted the reinforced flightdeck door requirements in part 121, the
agency was concerned that aircraft operations subject to part 129 would
be more attractive targets for terrorist actions if security was not
similarly improved. Therefore, in June of 2002 the FAA adopted 14 CFR
129.28 \25\ to require foreign air carriers to have the same level of
flightdeck security as domestic air carriers. In this case, the
requirement for an IPSB would be applicable to newly-manufactured
airplanes only. The portion of the total fleet made up by airplanes
that are both newly manufactured, and subject to part 129, is very
small, so the difference in risk between the domestic fleet and the
international fleet would not be significant under this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Currently there are approximately 3,400 airplanes eligible
for operation in accordance with part 129 that are of the types that
have a secure flightdeck door. This is approximately 35% of the part
121/129 fleet. Imposition of the requirement could have the effect
of reducing the number of airplanes that operators choose make
available for operation in part 129. Given that, in ten years, less
than half of the part 121 fleet would have been equipped by IPSBs,
the relevance to this rule of the number of part 129 airplanes would
remain marginal.
\25\ Security Considerations for the Flightdeck on Foreign
Operated Transport Category Airplanes (67 FR 42449, June 21, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, after September 11, 2001, the need to require reinforced
flightdeck doors was recognized internationally, and civil aviation
authorities throughout the world worked together, and with ICAO, to
establish uniform standards.\26\ The FAA's requirements were mirrored
by the civil aviation authorities of most other countries. In contrast,
at this time neither ICAO nor other countries are imposing an IPSB
requirement. An FAA requirement levied on foreign air carriers for an
IPSB would therefore be un-harmonized, and as noted above, would not
significantly change the composition of the international fleet since
it would only apply to newly-produced airplanes. The FAA anticipates
that, if there are no changes in fleet composition, by the time full
adoption of IPSBs among the part 121 fleet occurs, approximately 35% of
the part 121/129 fleet will lack an IPSB. Should the fleet change, or
an IPSB requirement become an international standard, the FAA may
reconsider its current position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ 15 March 2002, Amendment 27 to Annex 6, Part I the
International Standards and Recommended Practices, International
Civil Aviation Organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Size and Range
The FAA invites comments on applying proposed Sec. 121.313(l) to
all transport category airplanes, as well as to all airplanes with a
flightdeck door. During a short flight, the flightdeck door may not
need to be opened. ARAC therefore recognized that, for short flights,
the IPSB may not provide the intended benefit. However, there is no
obvious design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross
weight, which correlates with short flights. Also, the maximum range of
all of the airplane models that would be covered by this proposed rule
exceeds the maximum flight time at which opening the flightdeck is
unlikely. Therefore, this proposal does not consider an airplane's size
or range, or duration of flight, but invites comment on whether any
such limitations are appropriate.
C. Proposed Guidance
The FAA developed proposed AC 25.795-X, ``Installation of Physical
Secondary Barriers for Transport Category Airplanes.'' This proposed AC
would provide guidance on acceptable means, but not the only means, of
showing compliance with proposed Sec. 25.795(a)(4).
In addition, the FAA has proposed revisions to AC 120-110,
``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternate Flight Deck Security
Procedures,'' dated April 14, 2015, to add discussion regarding the
installation of IPSB and address other operational issues.
The FAA will post these two proposed ACs to the docket for comment.
The FAA will also post them to its ``Aviation Safety Draft Documents
Open for Comment'' web page at <a href="http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/">www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/</a>.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's
analysis of the impacts of the proposed rule. The FAA provides a
detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis in the docket of this rulemaking.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this proposed
rule (1) has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is not an
economically ``significant
[[Page 46897]]
regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866; (3) would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities; (4) would not create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and (5) would
not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments,
or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold identified above.
These analyses are summarized below.
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
1. Benefits
During many flights, the flightdeck door must be opened for
lavatory breaks, meal service, rest periods, crew changes, etc. Between
the time of opening and closing the flightdeck door (door transition),
the open flightdeck has some degree of vulnerability to attack. This is
especially the case for transcontinental and international flights.
During these openings, an attack on the flightdeck could happen
quickly; this could leave insufficient time for passengers and cabin
crew to react. However, there have been no breaches of a flightdeck
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The purpose and functional benefit of IPSBs, which Congress
directed the FAA to require by mandate, is to enhance the flightdeck
security procedures of 14 CFR 121.584 by slowing the time by which an
unauthorized person could reach the flightdeck by at least the time
required to open and reclose the flightdeck door.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Report, pp. 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Briefing Note \28\ (Stewart and Mueller, 2019) provided to the
ARAC Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group by one of the members,
applied an engineering technique--reliability analysis--to the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) ``Layers of Security''
\29\ to estimate the benefits of secondary barriers in reducing the
vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet to a 9/11-like terrorist
attack. This approach requires estimates of ``disruption rates'' for
the various TSA layers of security and also requires an estimate of the
probability of a 9/11-like terrorist attack. Estimates of security
layer disruption rates are very difficult to make and, accordingly, are
highly uncertain. For example, Stewart and Mueller estimate a
disruption rate of 15% for the TSA Airport Checkpoint Screening
security layer, whereas Martonosi and Barrett \30\ estimate the
disruption rate to be 50%. Estimating the probability of a 9/11-like
terrorist attack is also difficult since there has been only one such
event. Consequently, estimating quantified benefits of the proposed
IPSB requirements is problematic. Accordingly, the FAA does not endorse
the analysis or conclusions of this Briefing Note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, ``Security Risk and Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,'' Centre for
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, The University of
Newcastle, Australia (2019), <a href="http://nova.newcastle.edu">nova.newcastle.edu</a>.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/uon:35881.
\29\ ``Inside Look: TSA Layers of Security,'' <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/08/01/inside-look-tsa-layers-security">www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/08/01/inside-look-tsa-layers-security</a>.
\30\ Susan E. Martonosi & Arnold Barnett. 2006. ``How Effective
is Security Screening of Airline passengers?,'' Interfaces 36(6):
545, 550.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, based on estimates of costs of the 9/11 attacks, we have
conducted a break-even analysis. An authoritative study \31\ of the
costs to New York City of the 9/11 attacks provides an estimate of
$26.6 billion in physical capital and short-term earnings losses,\32\
which amounts to $38.86 billion in 2021 dollars.\33\ What remains is to
estimate the cost of the 2,763 lives lost in the 9/11 attacks. Using
DOT's $11.8 million dollar estimate of the Value of Statistical Life
(VSL),\34\ that loss is $32.60 billion, which added to the physical
capital and earnings losses, makes the total New York City costs to be
$71.46 billion. We estimate the cost of a single-airplane 9/11-type
attack (and the value of an averted attack) to be half that at $35.73
billion. The break-even analysis estimates what the annual probability
of a single-airplane 9/11-type attack must be in order for the proposed
rule to break even, i.e., for the benefits of the proposed rule to be
equal to its costs. Dividing the $236.5 million cost \35\ of the
proposed rule by the $35.7 billion averted attack value yields the
break-even annual probability of an attack to be 0.66%. Multiplying
this calculated break-even probability of attack times the $35.7
billion averted attack value necessarily returns the $236.5 million
break-even expected value of averting an attack. Such a break-even
analysis implicitly assumes that the proposed rule is completely
effective. Thus, here the proposed rule breaks even under the
assumptions that the probability of an attempted attack is as high as
0.66 percent per year and that the proposed rule would be 100%
effective in thwarting any such attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport. 2002.
``Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York
City,'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 8:2
(November).
\32\ $21.6 bn in physical capital losses plus the $5 bn average
of $3.6-$6.4 bn in short-term earnings losses.
\33\ $26.6 bn inflated by ratio of 2021 and 2002 GDP Price
Deflators. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ``Table 1.1.4
Price Indexes for GDP.'' Click ``Modify'' icon and refresh table
with first and last years of period.
\34\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Transportation
Policy. ``Departmental Guidance on the Value of a Statistical
Life,'' <a href="http://www.dot.gov/policy/transportation-policy/economy">www.dot.gov/policy/transportation-policy/economy</a>. Effective
Date: March 24, 2022.
\35\ Assumes 7 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA requests comments on the incremental benefits of this
proposed rule, including additional information and data to quantify
benefits.
2. Costs
The FAA uses the cost estimate of $35,000 provided by the Report
for the purchase and installation of an IPSB. Costs are estimated in
two stages since this proposed rule would require IPSBs be installed on
each new airplane that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air
carrier operating under part 121. First-stage costs are calculated for
the 25-year period, 2023-2047, during which the fleet operating under
part 121 gradually becomes fully equipped with IPSBs. Second-stage
costs are calculated to include in the analysis a full 25-year airplane
life cycle (2048-2072) for which the entire part 121 fleet is equipped
with IPSBs.
(a) Stage One Costs
In the preliminary analysis of the proposed rule, the FAA estimates
the rule would begin to apply to new airplanes operating under part 121
by the end of 2023. The FAA uses its Aerospace Forecast 2020-2040 to
estimate the annual increase in the passenger fleet operating under
part 121.\36\ The sum of the forecast increase in the fleet and the
number of retirements determines the annual increase in new airplanes
operating under part 121 and therefore the annual number of IPSBs that
would be installed in airplanes destined for part 121 operations.
Annual retirements are estimated assuming a retirement rate (3.57%)
that is consistent with the 2020-2040 forecast of the number of
airplanes in part 121 operations. A similar analysis is done to
determine the IPSB training costs of pilots and flight attendants,
except that training costs
[[Page 46898]]
apply to current as well as future pilots and flight attendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ FAA Forecast FY 2020-2040, Table 21: ``US Mainline Air
Carriers--Passenger Jet Aircraft,'' & Table 25: ``Regional Air
Carriers--Passenger Aircraft.'' Since some regional air carriers
operate under part 135 as well as part 121, the estimate of
airplanes operating under part 121 is improved by excluding
airplanes with less than 20 passenger seats. Estimates for the
period 2040-2047 are made assuming the growth rate (1.74%) implied
by the FAA part 121 airplane numbers for 2030 and 2040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Stage Two Costs
As previously noted, second-stage costs are calculated in order to
include a full 25-year airplane life cycle (2048-2072) for which the
entire part 121 fleet is equipped with IPSBs. For this second stage,
the FAA is well beyond the terminal date of the FAA forecast and,
accordingly, assumes a constant growth rate for the part 121 fleet. The
constant growth rates for pilots and flight attendants are as before.
(c) Other Potential Costs
Stewart and Mueller also discuss potential added risks associated
with IPSBs, including, for example, that crew vigilance and
responsiveness might be reduced in the presence of an IPSB. The FAA
notes that it does not find significant downsides to the installation
of the ISPBs if all other relevant regulations are complied with.
(c) Total Costs of the Rule
Table 1 summarizes the total costs of the proposed rule by
combining stage one and stage two costs. At a seven percent discount
rate, the present value total costs of the proposed rule are $236.5
million with annualized costs at $20.3 million. At a three percent
discount rate, the present value total costs of the proposed rule are
$505.0 million with annualized costs at $ 29.0 million.
Table 1--Total Costs of Secondary Barriers Proposed Rule
[$ millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present value Annualized Present value Annualized
costs (7%) costs (7%) costs (3%) costs (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023-2047....................................... $186.0 $16.0 $296.5 $17.0
2048-2072....................................... 50.4 4.3 208.6 12.0
---------------------------------------------------------------
2023-2072....................................... 236.5 20.3 505.0 29.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Present values discounted to 2021 at 7% and 3% discount rates.
2. Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.
3. Discussion of Alternatives
(a) Alternative 1--Extending the Proposed Rule To Include Foreign
Carriers Operating Under Part 129 \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either
within the United States, or who operate solely outside the United
States, but with airplanes registered in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At this time neither other countries nor ICAO have identified
secondary barriers as a security priority. Therefore, extending the
IPSB requirement to foreign air carriers would be un-harmonized. After
the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA did apply the hardened
flightdeck door requirement to foreign air carriers, but the need for
hardened flightdeck doors was recognized internationally and the FAA's
standards were reflected in the requirements of most other countries.
The FAA estimates that by the time IPSBs are fully adopted among part
121 aircraft, 35% of operating commercial passenger aircraft (parts 121
and 129) will not have an IPSB.
(b) Alternative 2--Exempting the Proposed Rule for Short Duration
Flights
ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door may
not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the
intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify any airplane
design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross weight
that correlates with short flights. Also, the range of all the airplane
models that would be affected by this proposed rule exceeds the maximum
flight length at which opening the flightdeck door is unlikely.
Therefore, this proposal does not address an airplane's size or range,
or duration of flight, but invites comment on whether any such
limitations are appropriate.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, Public Law 96-354, 94
Stat. 1164 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857, Mar. 29, 1996) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L.
111-240, 124 Stat. 2504, Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal agencies to
consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and
other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact.
The term ``small entities'' comprises small businesses and not-for-
profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are
not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000.
The FAA is publishing this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(IRFA) to aid the public in commenting on the potential impacts to
small entities from this proposal. The FAA invites interested parties
to submit data and information regarding the potential economic impact
that would result from the proposal. The FAA will consider comments
when making a determination or when completing a Final Regulatory
Flexibility Assessment.
Under sections 603(b) and (c) of the RFA, an IRFA must contain the
following:
(1) A description of the reasons why the action by the agency is
being considered;
(2) A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis for,
the proposed rule;
(3) A description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number
of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply;
(4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and
other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an
estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
(5) An identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant
Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule; and
(6) A description of any significant alternatives to the proposed
rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and
which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on
small entities.
1. Reasons the Action Is Being Considered
Publication of the rule will satisfy the requirements of section
336 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. This law requires that the
FAA issue an order for the installation of Secondary Cockpit Barriers
on each new airplane that is manufactured for delivery to a
[[Page 46899]]
passenger air carrier in the United States operating under title 14
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 121.
2. Objectives and Legal Basis of the Proposed Rule
The objective of the proposed rule is to require all airplanes in
part 121 passenger operations to have an Installed Physical Secondary
Barrier (IPSB). The IPSB would be deployed between the flightdeck and
passenger compartments before the flightdeck door was opened so as to
protect the flightdeck during the time that the door was opened and
closed. This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
Requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing
regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of
airplanes that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air
commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority.
3. All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
There are no relevant Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or
conflict with the proposed rule.
4. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities
The FAA used the definition of small entities in the RFA for this
analysis. The RFA defines small entities as small businesses, small
governmental jurisdictions, or small organizations. In 5 U.S.C. 601(3),
the RFA defines ``small business'' to have the same meaning as ``small
business concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. The Small
Business Act authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to
define ``small business'' by issuing regulations.
SBA has established size standards for various types of economic
activities, or industries, under the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS).\38\ These size standards generally
define small businesses based on the number of employees or annual
receipts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards
(2019). <a href="http://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards">www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS has classified certificate holders operating under part 121
in either NAICS 481111, Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation or NAICS
481211, Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger Air Transportation, or both.
Since the size standard for either industry is the same at 1500
employees, it is of no concern in which of the two industries they are
classified.
In the regulatory impact analysis for this rulemaking, a total of
43 operators operating under part 121 were identified in the FAA's
National Vital Information Subsystem (NVIS) data base. Table 2 lists 23
of these operators identified in this study as having less than 1500
employees and therefore potentially subject to consideration under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. Twelve of these operators were identified
as small based on airline employment data (Table 2, col. 3) from the
DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics.\39\ The remaining eleven
operators were identified as having less than 1500 total employees on
the basis of their numbers of operations and maintenance employees
(also from the NVIS database). One of the small operators, Piedmont
Airlines, was excluded from the regulatory flexibility analysis as it
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines. Since the remaining
22 small operators are more than 50% of the part 21 operator
population, the FAA estimates that a substantial number of small firms
are affected by this rulemaking.
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\39\ <a href="http://Transtats.bts.gov">Transtats.bts.gov</a>.
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BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
[[Page 46900]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU22.022
[[Page 46901]]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
Since the secondary barriers proposed rule would apply to only new
airplanes entering the fleet, the analysis assumes that each operator's
current fleet is replaced immediately even though the fleet airplanes
generally will be replaced only when they are retired. Though airplanes
could be retired any time over the next 25 years depending on the age
of the airplane, the analysis assumes immediate replacement to ensure
that the economic impact is not underestimated. The regulatory impact
analysis assumes that the average retirement age of transport category
airplanes is 25 years.
The economic impact is assessed using 11 of the 22 small operators
for which revenue data is available from Cirium's (formerly
FlightGlobal) FlightFleets Analyzer. The analysis uses average revenue
for the five-year period 2015-2019. Revenue figures for the 11
operators are available for an average of 3.45 years. For an operator,
the economic impact is measured as the estimated $35,000 cost of an
FAA-certified IPSB times number of airplanes, as a percentage of the
average revenue. The number of airplanes is from the SPAS database as
of January 9, 2020. The regulatory impact analysis also considers
training costs for flight attendants and pilots, but these costs are
not included here as they have a trivial effect on the results.
As Table 2 shows, the economic impact ranges from .06% and 1.13% of
sales, which averages to 0.60%. On a 2% criterion that the economic
impact is significant only if the IPSB cost is at least 2% of a small
firm's annual revenues, there is no significant economic impact for any
small firm. On a 1% criterion, the economic impact is barely
significant for just 2 of the 11 firms which data is available. Bearing
in mind that these estimates are very conservative, the FAA concludes
that there is not a significant impact on a substantial number of small
firms. The FAA requests comments on these estimates and whether or not
they represent a significant economic impact on the small firms
affected by this proposed rule.
6. Significant Alternatives Considered that Minimize Economic Impacts
on Small Entities
The FAA evaluated alternatives to this rulemaking that could
minimize impacts on small entities. The FAA identified only alternative
2 of its regulatory impact analysis as potentially minimizing such
impacts. Specifically, the FAA considered exempting short duration
flights from the proposed rule as a means of reducing economic impacts
on small entities. ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the
flightdeck door may not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would
not provide the intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify
any airplane design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane
gross weight that sufficiently correlates with short flights. Also, the
range of all the airplane models that would be affected by the proposed
rule exceeds the maximum flight length at which opening the flightdeck
door is unlikely. The FAA requests comments on this and other
alternatives that would minimize economic impacts of the proposed rule
on small entities.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and
has determined that it would have a legitimate domestic objective, in
that it would increase the safety of the United States from terrorist
attacks on U.S.-operated airplanes. This proposed rule would not
operate in a manner as to directly affect foreign trade and, therefore,
would have little or no effect on foreign trade.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155.0 million in lieu of $100
million.
This rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this proposed rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable.
The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices that correspond to these proposed regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
In accordance with the provisions of regulations issued by the
Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), FAA Order
1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded from
preparation of an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this NPRM action
qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 5-
6.6(d) because no significant impacts to the environment are expected
from publication of this NPRM and it involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism (64 FR 43255, August 10,
1999). The agency has determined that this action would not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship between
the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government, and,
therefore, would not have Federalism implications.
[[Page 46902]]
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (66 FR 28355, May 18, 2001). The agency has
determined that it would not be a ``significant energy action'' under
the executive order and would not be likely to have a significant
adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation (77 FR 26413, May 4, 2012), promotes international
regulatory cooperation to meet shared challenges involving health,
safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues and to reduce,
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements. The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the
policies and agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609, and has
determined that this proposed rule would have no effect on
international regulatory cooperation.
VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The most
helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain
the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To
ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters
should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed
electronically, commenters should submit only one time.
Except for the confidential business information described in the
next paragraph, the FAA will file in the docket all comments it
receives, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before
acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives
on or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider
comments filed after the comment period has closed if it is possible to
do so without incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this
proposal in light of the comments it receives.
Confidential Business Information: Confidential Business
Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both
customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from
public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or
responsive to this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the
submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed
in the public docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be
sent to Dan Jacquet, AIR-626, Human-Machine Interface Section,
Technical Innovation Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation Division,
Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200
South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198.
Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not specifically
designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
internet by--
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (<a href="http://www.regulations.gov">www.regulations.gov</a>);
2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at
<a href="http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies">www.faa.gov/regulations_policies</a> or
3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at
<a href="http://www.GovInfo.gov">www.GovInfo.gov</a>.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA) requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this
document may contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. To find
out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety,
Charter flights, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Safety, Transportation.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and
44704; Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat 3281 (49 U.S.C. 44903 note).
0
2. In Sec. 25.795, add paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.795 Security considerations.
(a) * * *
(4) An installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) must be
installed to resist intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the
flightdeck door is opened. In addition, when deployed, the IPSB must:
(i) Resist a 250 pound (1,113 Newtons) static load in the direction
of the passenger cabin applied at the most critical locations on the
IPSB;
(ii) Resist a 600 pound (2,669 Newtons) static load in the
direction of the flightdeck applied at the most critical locations on
the IPSB;
(iii) Delay a person attempting to access the flightdeck by at
least the time required for a crewmember to open and reclose the
flightdeck door, but no less than 5 seconds;
(iv) Prevent a person from reaching through and touching the flight
deck door; and
(v) Allow for necessary crewmember activities.
* * * * *
[[Page 46903]]
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 121 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40119,
41706, 42301 preceding note added by Pub. L. 112-95, sec. 412, 126
Stat. 89, 44101, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-
44717, 44722, 44729, 44732; 46105; Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348
(49 U.S.C. 44701 note); Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat 62 (49 U.S.C. 44732
note); Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat 3281 (49 U.S.C. 44903 note).
0
4. In Sec. 121.313, add paragraph (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 121.313 Miscellaneous equipment.
* * * * *
(l) For airplanes required by paragraph (f) of this section to have
a door between the passenger and pilot or crew rest compartments, and
for transport category airplanes that have a door installed between the
pilot compartment and any other occupied compartment, that were
manufactured after [DATE TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
FINAL RULE], an installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that
provides line-of-sight visibility between the flightdeck door and the
cabin, and meets the requirements of Sec. 25.795(a)(4) in effect on
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
0
5. In Sec. 121.584, add paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:
Sec. 121.584 Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck
door.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(3) If the airplane is in flight, any installed physical secondary
barrier required by 121.313(l) has been deployed, and;
* * * * *
Issued under authority provided by Public Law 115-254 and 49
U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and 44703 in Washington, DC, on July 27,
2022.
David W. Hempe,
Deputy Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-16443 Filed 7-29-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.