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Proposed Rule2022-13878

Advanced Methods To Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor

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Published

July 18, 2022

Issuing agencies

Federal Communications Commission

Abstract

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) proposes and seeks comment on a number of actions aimed protecting consumers from illegal calls. The document proposes and seeks comment on a number of steps to protect American consumers from all illegal calls, whether they originate domestically or abroad. Specifically, this document proposes to require domestic intermediate providers that are not gateway providers in the call path to apply STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication to calls. It also seeks comment on a number of robocall mitigation requirements, enhancements to enforcement, clarifications on certain aspects of STIR/SHAKEN, and limitations on the use of U.S. North American Numbering Plan (NANP) numbers for foreign-originated calls and indirect number access.

Full Text

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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 136 (Monday, July 18, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 136 (Monday, July 18, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 42670-42690]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-13878]

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 64

[CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97; FCC 22-37; FR ID 92926]

Advanced Methods To Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call
Authentication Trust Anchor

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) proposes and seeks comment on a number of actions
aimed protecting consumers from illegal calls. The document proposes
and seeks comment on a number of steps to protect American consumers
from all illegal calls, whether they originate domestically or abroad.
Specifically, this document proposes to require domestic intermediate
providers that are not gateway providers in the call path to apply
STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication to calls. It also seeks comment on
a number of robocall mitigation requirements, enhancements to
enforcement, clarifications on certain aspects of STIR/SHAKEN, and
limitations on the use of U.S. North American Numbering Plan (NANP)
numbers for foreign-originated calls and indirect number access.

DATES: Comments are due on or before August 17, 2022, and reply
comments are due on or before September 16, 2022. Written comments on
the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed information collection
requirements must be submitted by the public, Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), and other interested parties on or before September 16,
2022.

ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and
reply comments on or before the dates indicated in this document.
Comments and reply comments may be filed using the Commission's
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of
Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998). Interested
parties may file comments or reply comments, identified by CG Docket
No. 17-59 and WC Docket No. 17-97 by any of the following methods:
<bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing ECFS: <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/">https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/</a>.
<bullet> Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
<bullet> Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by
first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
<bullet> Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
<bullet> U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority
mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
<bullet> Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings.
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2788 (March 19, 2020),
<a href="https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy">https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy</a>.
<bullet> People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#92d4d1d1a7a2a6d2f4f1f1bcf5fde4">[email&#160;protected]</a> or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.

[[Page 42671]]

For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, please
contact either Jonathan Lechter, Attorney Advisor, Competition Policy
Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#175d787976637f7679397b72747f6372655771747439707861">[email&#160;protected]</a> or
at (202) 418-0984, or Jerusha Burnett, Attorney Advisor, Consumer
Policy Division, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, at
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1c76796e696f747d327e696e727968685c7a7f7f327b736a">[email&#160;protected]</a> or at (202) 418-0526. For additional
information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed information
collection requirements contained in this document, send an email to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f2a2a0b3b2949191dc959d84">[email&#160;protected]</a> or contact Cathy Williams at (202) 418-2918.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: You may submit comments, identified by the
Commission's Seventh Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CG Docket
No. 17-59 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WC Docket
No. 17-97, FCC 22-37, adopted on May 19, 2022, and released on May 20,
2022. The full text of this document is available for public inspection
at the following internet address: <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-37A1.pdf">https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-37A1.pdf</a>. To request materials in accessible formats
for people with disabilities (e.g., Braille, large print, electronic
files, audio format, etc.), send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="99fffafaaca9add9fffafab7fef6ef">[email&#160;protected]</a> or call the
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), or
(202) 418-0432 (TTY).
In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy of any
comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed information collection
requirements contained herein should be submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0f5f5d4e4f696c6c21686079">[email&#160;protected]</a> and to Cathy
Williams, FCC, via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a7e4c6d3cfde89f0cecbcbcec6cad4e7c1c4c489c0c8d1">[email&#160;protected]</a>.

Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

This document contains proposed information collection
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public to comment on the
information collection requirements contained in this document, as
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.
Public and agency comments are due September 16, 2022.
Comments should address: (a) whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c)
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information
collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents, including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (e)
way to further reduce the information collection burden on small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In addition, pursuant
to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198,
see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks specific comment on how
it might further reduce the information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

Synopsis

Seventh Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Fifth Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking

1. In the final rule regarding gateway providers (Gateway Provider
Order) (FCC 22-37), published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal
Register, the Commission takes steps to protect American consumers from
foreign-originated illegal calls by adopting a number of rules that
focus on gateway providers as the entry point onto the U.S. network. In
this further notice of proposed rulemaking (FNPRM), the Commission
further proposes and seeks comment on expanding some of these rules to
cover other providers in the call path, along with additional steps to
protect American consumers from all illegal calls, whether they
originate domestically or abroad.
2. First, the Commission proposes to extend its caller ID
authentication requirement to cover domestic intermediate providers
that are not gateway providers in the call path. Second, the Commission
seeks comment on extending some, but not all, of the robocall
mitigation duties the Commission adopts in the Gateway Provider Order
to all domestic providers in the call path. These mitigation duties
include: expanding and modifying its existing affirmative obligations;
requiring downstream providers to block calls from non-gateway
providers when those providers fail to comply; the general mitigation
standard; and filing a mitigation plan in the Robocall Mitigation
Database regardless of STIR/SHAKEN implementation status. The
Commission also seeks comment on additional measures to address illegal
robocalls, including: ways to enhance the enforcement of its rules;
clarifying certain aspects of its STIR/SHAKEN regime; and placing
limitations on the use of U.S. NANP numbers for foreign-originated
calls and indirect number access.
3. Because the TRACED Act defines ``voice service'' in a manner
that excludes intermediate providers, our authentication and Robocall
Mitigation Database rules use ``voice service provider'' in this
manner. Our call blocking rules, many of which the Commission adopted
prior to adoption of the TRACED Act, use a definition of ``voice
service provider'' that includes intermediate providers. In that
context, use of the TRACED Act definition of ``voice service'' would
create inconsistency with our existing rules. To avoid confusion, for
purposes of this item, we use the term ``voice service provider''
consistent with the TRACED Act definition and where discussing caller
ID authentication or the Robocall Mitigation Database. In all other
instances, we use ``provider'' and specify the type of provider as
appropriate. Unless otherwise specified, we mean any provider,
regardless of its position in the call path.
4. The Commission anticipates that the impact of its proposals will
account for another large share of the annual $13.5 billion minimum
benefit the Commission originally estimated in the First Caller ID
Authentication Report and Order, 85 FR 22029 (April 21, 2020), and
FNPRM, 85 FR 22099 (April 21, 2022), for eliminating unlawful
robocalls, in addition to the collective impact of the rules the
Commission adopts in the Gateway Provider Order and the rules adopted
earlier in these proceedings. While each of the proposed requirements
on their own may not fully accomplish that goal, viewed collectively,
the Commission expects that they will achieve a large share of the
annual $13.5 billion minimum benefit. The Commission also expects that
this share of benefits will far exceed the costs imposed on providers.
The Commission seeks comment on this analysis and on the possible
benefits of the requirements the Commission proposes.

Extending Authentication Requirement to All Intermediate Providers

5. To further combat illegal robocalls consistent with the rules
the Commission adopts in the Gateway Provider Order, the Commission
proposes to require that all U.S. intermediate providers authenticate
caller ID information consistent with

[[Page 42672]]

STIR/SHAKEN for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) calls that are
carrying a U.S. number in the caller ID field and to require all
providers to comply with the most recent version of the standards as
they are released. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals.
6. As the Commission has previously explained, application of
caller ID authentication by intermediate providers ``will provide
significant benefits in facilitating analytics, blocking, and traceback
by offering all parties in the call ecosystem more information.'' At
the time the Commission reached this conclusion, given the concerns
that an authentication requirement on all intermediate providers ``was
unduly burdensome in some cases,'' the Commission established that
instead of authenticating unauthenticated calls, intermediate providers
could ``register and participate with the industry traceback consortium
as an alternative means of complying with [its] rules.''
7. Since the Commission established those requirements in the
Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, 85 FR 73360 (Nov. 17,
2020), in the Fourth Call Blocking Order, 86 FR 17726 (April 6, 2021),
the Commission subsequently required all providers in the call path--
including gateway providers and other intermediate providers--to
respond fully and in a timely manner to traceback requests. This rule
has effectively mooted the choice given to intermediate providers in
the earlier Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order to
authenticate calls or cooperate with traceback requests. Evidence shows
that robocalls are a significant and increasing problem. To further
strengthen the STIR/SHAKEN regime and protect consumers and the
integrity of the U.S. telephone network, the Commission proposes that
all intermediate providers should be required to authenticate
unauthenticated SIP calls that they receive. The Commission seeks
comment on this proposal.
8. Intermediate providers could play a crucial role in further
promoting effective, network-wide caller ID authentication. Requiring
all intermediate providers to authenticate caller ID information for
all unauthenticated SIP calls will provide information to downstream
providers that will facilitate analytics and promote traceback efforts.
SHAKEN verification, even ``C-level'' attestation, provides relevant
and helpful information to downstream providers, particularly as the
STIR/SHAKEN regime becomes even more ubiquitous. Adopting this proposal
would bring all U.S. providers within the STIR/SHAKEN regime and
prevent gaming by providers, allowing ``for more robust abilities to
either trust the caller or perform traceback because an illegal caller
can be more easily identified.'' Indeed, STIR/SHAKEN becomes more
useful the more providers there are that employ it.
9. The Commission believes this proposal is in line with commenter
assertions that expanding call authentication requirements will have a
``significant impact in curtailing illegal robocalls'' and that
imposing these obligations ``on more providers will promote fewer
spoofed calls overall.'' The Commission anticipates that its expansion
of the STIR/SHAKEN regime may spur other countries and regulators to
develop and adopt STIR/SHAKEN, further increasing the standards'
benefit. The Commission seeks comment on this analysis and on the
possible benefits of the requirement the Commission proposes. Are there
reasons the Commission should not require all intermediate providers to
implement STIR/SHAKEN for SIP calls? Should the Commission specifically
target providers that are most responsible for illegal robocalls? Are
there any downsides to only targeting specific providers?
10. The Commission also seeks comment on the proposal's
implementation costs and burdens. Acknowledging that many intermediate
providers are also gateway providers to some degree and are now
required to implement STIR/SHAKEN per the Gateway Provider Order, do
the benefits of an intermediate provider authentication requirement
outweigh the costs and burdens? Certain commenters assert that gateway
providers are in a unique position to ``arrest the flow of harmful scam
calls and illegal robocalls.'' Would it be a greater burden to impose
this obligation on non-gateway intermediate providers? Indeed, a
majority of commenters oppose expanding authentication requirements,
even to gateway providers, saying that the implementation costs would
be significant without additional benefits. While the Commission
previously acknowledged these claims and ``thus offer[ed] an
alternative method of compliance,'' it further noted that ``[p]roviding
this option . . . further allows for continued evaluation of the role
intermediate providers play in authenticating the caller ID information
of the unauthenticated calls that they receive amid the continued
deployment of the STIR/SHAKEN framework.'' Has the intervening
experience with the entirety of the Commission's caller ID
authentication requirements and illegal robocalls shed further light on
the role of intermediate providers in preventing these calls from
reaching consumers?
11. The Commission does not anticipate that its proposal to expand
this requirement to the remaining intermediate providers will be
unusually costly or unduly burdensome compared to gateway providers and
voice service providers that are already required to authenticate
unauthenticated SIP calls as commenters have not provided detailed
support for assertions that such a requirement will cost significant
time and resources to implement. Further, many of the remaining
intermediate providers are also gateway providers that will have
already implemented STIR/SHAKEN in at least some portion of their
networks, likely lowering their compliance costs to meet the
requirement the Commission proposes. Does this fact undercut the
argument that expanding the authentication requirement would impose an
undue burden on those providers? In the accompanying Gateway Provider
Order, the Commission finds that the benefits of a gateway
authentication requirement outweigh the burdens. Should the
Commission's rationale differ regarding the remaining intermediate
providers? The Commission reiterates that as more and more providers
implement STIR/SHAKEN, the Commission anticipates that technology and
solutions will be more widely available and less costly to implement.
The Commission seeks comment on this analysis. Is there any reason to
believe that authentication is more costly for the remaining
intermediate providers as compared to other providers or that the
benefit of lower-level attestations would be limited?
12. Requirement. The Commission proposes that to comply with the
requirement to authenticate calls, all intermediate providers must
authenticate caller ID information for all SIP calls they receive with
U.S. numbers in the caller ID field for which the caller ID information
has not been authenticated and which they will exchange with another
provider as a SIP call. This would replace the existing rule under
which intermediate providers have the option to authenticate rather
than cooperate with traceback efforts and supplement the rule for
gateway providers the Commission adopts in the accompanying Gateway
Provider Order. The Commission seeks comment on this approach, as well
as on whether and how to modify this proposal.

[[Page 42673]]

13. Consistent with the Commission's existing intermediate provider
authentication obligation where such a provider chose the
authentication route, and the rule adopted for gateway providers in the
accompanying Gateway Provider Order, the Commission proposes that an
intermediate provider satisfies its authentication requirement if it
adheres to the three Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
(ATIS) standards that are the foundation of STIR/SHAKEN--ATIS-1000074,
ATIS-1000080, and ATIS-1000084--and all documents referenced therein.
The Commission also proposes that compliance with the most current
versions of these standards as of the compliance deadline set in the
Gateway Provider Order released concurrently with this FNPRM, including
any errata as of that date or earlier, represents the minimum
requirement to satisfy its rules.
14. Compliance Deadline. The Commission seeks comment on when the
Commission should require all intermediate providers' authentication
obligation to become effective, balancing the public interest of prompt
implementation by these providers with the need for these providers to
have sufficient time to implement the proposed obligations. The
Commission notes that voice service providers were previously able to
meet the 18-month deadline to authenticate all unauthenticated SIP
calls carrying U.S. NANP numbers, but the Commission found a shorter
deadline to be reasonable for gateway providers in the accompanying
Gateway Provider Order. The Commission's rules adopted pursuant to the
TRACED Act grant certain providers exemptions and extensions from this
deadline. Should the Commission require all intermediate providers to
authenticate all unauthenticated SIP calls carrying U.S. NANP numbers
within six months after the Commission adopts an order released
pursuant to this FNPRM? Given that there is only a small group of
remaining providers that have not already been required to implement
STIR/SHAKEN, can implementation be accomplished in six months? Is a
shorter deadline reasonable because the industry has much more
experience with implementation than when the Commission originally
required voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN, and there is
evidence that STIR/SHAKEN implementation costs have dropped since the
Commission first adopted the requirement for voice service providers?
Would imposing a shorter deadline on all intermediate providers
unnecessarily impose greater costs and burdens that would not be fully
offset by associated benefits? Are there any reasons to impose a longer
deadline?
15. The Commission also anticipates that the current token access
policy will not present a material barrier to intermediate providers
meeting their authentication obligation and that the Secure Telephone
Identity Governance Authority (STI-GA) can address any concerns before
these providers are required to authenticate calls. Do commenters
agree? Additionally, to ensure that these providers are not unfairly
penalized and are eligible for the same relief, in line with the
Commission's current rules for voice service providers, and now gateway
providers, the Commission proposes to provide a STIR/SHAKEN extension
to intermediate providers that are unable to obtain a token due to the
STI-GA token access policy. Does this extension alleviate
implementation concerns?
16. The Commission also proposes, consistent with its requirement
for voice service providers and gateway providers, that all
intermediate providers have the flexibility to assign the level of
attestation appropriate to the call based on the applicable version of
the standards and the available call information. As discussed in the
accompanying Gateway Provider Order, there are significant benefits to
be gained from higher attestation levels. The Commission seeks comment
on this proposal. Should the Commission modify this proposal? If so,
how should the Commission change it and what would be the impacts on
costs and benefits?
17. Authentication Obligations for All Providers. The Commission
also seeks comment on requiring all providers to comply with the
current version of the STIR/SHAKEN standards (ATIS-1000074, ATIS-
1000080, and ATIS-1000084) and any other internet Protocol (IP)
authentication standards adopted as of the compliance deadline. The
Commission concludes that mandating a single version of the standards
across providers will promote uniformity and ensure that providers are
using the most up-to-date caller ID authentication tools. The
Commission seeks comment on this conclusion. Is there any reason the
Commission should not require providers to comply with updated versions
of the standards? The Commission also seeks comment on a streamlined
mechanism for the Wireline Competition Bureau or other appropriate
Bureau to require providers to comply with future versions of the STIR/
SHAKEN standard as they are developed and made available. Should the
Commission delegate to the Wireline Competition Bureau authority to
require all providers to implement a newly available updated standard
through notice and opportunity to comment? Should the Commission
incorporate the most recent STIR/SHAKEN standards and any updates the
Commission requires in its rules? What are the pros and cons of these
approaches?
18. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should require all
providers to adopt a non-IP caller ID authentication solution. A number
of commenters filed specific proposals in the record for authentication
on non-IP networks for gateway providers as well as voice service
providers, and some of these solutions work on both IP and non-IP
networks. Should the Commission adopt any of these proposals as set
forth in the comments or in some modified form? What are the respective
benefits and burdens of these specific proposals? Should the Commission
adopt any of the time division multiplex (TDM) call authentication
solutions developed by ATIS? Are there any other alternative proposals
that the Commission should consider for all domestic providers in the
call path? Should the Commission require compliance with the most
recent version of a non-IP standard available at the time an order is
released pursuant to this FNPRM? Should the Commission delegate
authority to the Wireline Competition Bureau or other Bureau to require
compliance with newly available versions of the adopted standard
through notice and comment and incorporate by reference that standard
in its rules? Voice service providers and gateway providers currently
have a choice whether to implement a non-IP caller ID authentication
solution or, in the alternative, participate with a working group,
standards group, or consortium to develop a solution. In the event the
Commission moves forward with requiring a non-IP solution for all
providers, the Commission seeks comment on eliminating this alternative
obligation as moot because the selected standard would have been
developed and its implementation required.

Extending Certain Mitigation Duties to All Domestic Providers

19. The Commission seeks comment on broadening the classes of
providers subject to certain mitigation obligations, including some of
the obligations it adopts in the accompanying Gateway Provider Order
for gateway providers. The Commission's existing rules, including the
``reasonable steps''

[[Page 42674]]

robocall mitigation duty, the Robocall Mitigation Database
certification and mitigation program adoption and submission
requirements, and the affirmative obligations for providers, do not
currently apply to all domestic providers, with the exception of the
requirement to respond to traceback. Prior to the adoption of the
Gateway Provider Order, the ``reasonable steps'' mitigation duty and
the requirement to adopt and submit a mitigation plan and certification
applied only to originating providers, and the mitigation duty and plan
submission requirements only applied to the extent that those providers
had not yet fully implemented STIR/SHAKEN. Similarly, the rules that
require effective mitigation or blocking following Commission
notification require any provider that receives such a notification to
investigate and respond to the Commission, but only requires
originating and gateway providers to take specific action to prevent
illegal traffic.
20. In the accompanying Gateway Provider Order, the Commission
adopts several new or enhanced robocall mitigation obligations for
gateway providers, as well as one for providers immediately downstream
in the call path from the gateway provider. The Commission also extends
the robocall mitigation program and certification requirements to
gateway providers, regardless of whether they have implemented STIR/
SHAKEN. Once these rules become effective, some providers will remain
outside the scope of these requirements. To close this loophole, the
Commission seeks comment on requiring all domestic providers,
regardless of whether they have implemented STIR/SHAKEN, to comply with
certain robocall mitigation requirements.

Enhancing the Existing Affirmative Obligations for All Domestic
Providers

21. In the prior Fourth Call Blocking Order, the Commission adopted
three affirmative obligations for providers to better protect consumers
from illegal calls. In the Gateway Provider Order, the Commission
enhanced two of these obligations for gateway providers and adopted a
related know-your-upstream-provider requirement. Here, the Commission
seeks comment on expanding two of those enhanced obligations, as well
as enhancing the existing requirement for a provider to take
affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing customers
from using its network to originate illegal calls.
22. 24-hour Traceback Requirement. The Commission seeks comment on
extending the requirement to respond to traceback requests from the
Commission, civil and criminal law enforcement, and the industry
traceback consortium within 24 hours of receipt of the request to all
U.S.-based providers in the call path. In the Gateway Provider Order
the Commission requires gateway providers to respond to traceback
requests within 24 hours due to the need for quick responses when
foreign providers are also involved. Would requiring all domestic
providers to respond within 24 hours provide additional benefit? Are
there alternative reasons to require a 24-hour response when calls are
wholly domestic?
23. If the Commission extends this requirement to cover all U.S-
based providers in the call path, how should it address situations
where providers may not be able to respond within 24 hours? The
Commission recognizes that providers that do not receive many requests
may be less familiar with the process, and that smaller providers in
particular may struggle to respond quickly. Are there alternative
approaches to the Commission's standard waiver process that would
better address the needs of providers that cannot reliably respond
within 24 hours?
24. In particular, the Commission seeks comment on whether it
should adopt an approach to traceback based on volume of requests
received, rather than position in the call path or size of provider.
For example, should the Commission adopt a tiered approach that:
requires providers with fewer than 10 traceback requests a month to
respond ``fully and in a timely manner,'' without the need to respond
within 24 hours; requires providers that receive from 10 to 99
traceback requests a month to maintain an average 24-hour response
time; and requires providers with 100 or more traceback requests a
month to always respond within 24 hours, barring exceptional
circumstances that warrant relief through a waiver under the ``good
cause'' standard of Sec. 1.3 of the Commission's rules? These
circumstances could include sudden unforeseen circumstances that
prevent compliance for a limited period or for a limited number of
calls. The Commission cautions that any applicant for waiver ``faces a
high hurdle even at the starting gate.'' Would different thresholds be
more appropriate for the tiers? Should the thresholds be based on the
prior six months' average number of traceback requests or some other
metric?
25. The Commission believes that, at least with regard to smaller
providers, the number of requests received is indicative of whether a
particular provider contributes significantly to the illegal call
problem. The Commission seeks comment on this belief. Are there
instances where a smaller provider might receive a high volume of
traceback requests despite that provider being a good actor in the
calling ecosystem? The Commission acknowledges that adopting requests-
per-month thresholds will likely mean that larger providers will be
required to respond within 24 hours even when those providers are good
actors. However, the Commission believes that larger providers are well
positioned to meet a 24-hour response requirement and, in fact, already
generally do so. The Commission seeks comment on this belief. Are there
any substantial cost issues or other issues the Commission should
consider in adopting such a requirement?
26. Blocking Following Commission Notification. The Commission
seeks comment on requiring all domestic providers in the call path to
block, rather than simply effectively mitigate, illegal traffic when
notified of such traffic by the Commission, regardless of whether that
traffic originates abroad or domestically. The Commission believes that
having a single, uniform rule may provide additional benefits and
reduce the overall burden. The Commission seeks comment on this belief.
Are there benefits to having a single, uniform requirement for all
domestic providers? Alternatively, are there benefits to maintaining
the Commission's existing approach and allowing non-gateway providers
to effectively mitigate, rather than block, such traffic?
27. If the Commission extends this requirement and require non-
gateway providers to block, should it consider any modifications to the
rule? The Commission's effective mitigation rule requires a different
response if the provider is an originating provider than if the
provider is an intermediate or terminating provider. Specifically, the
originating provider must effectively mitigate the traffic, while an
intermediate or terminating provider must only notify the Commission of
the source of the traffic and then, if possible, take steps to mitigate
the traffic. As a result, there are four possible ways in which the
Commission could enhance this rule: (1) it could require all providers,
regardless of position in the call path, to block illegal traffic when
notified of such traffic by the Commission; (2) it could requiring
originating providers to block traffic when notified by the Commission,
but only require intermediate and terminating providers to effectively

[[Page 42675]]

mitigate that traffic; (3) it could require originating providers to
block illegal traffic when notified, but only require intermediate and
terminating providers to identify the source of the traffic and, if
possible, block; or (4) it could require originating providers to
effectively mitigate illegal traffic, and require intermediate and
terminating providers to block. In all of these cases, gateway
providers would be required to block consistent with the rule the
Commission adopted in the Gateway Provider Order. Are there particular
benefits to any of these approaches? Are there any other approaches the
Commission could take? Are there any cost difficulties or other issues
the Commission should consider?
28. Effective Measures to Prevent New and Renewing Customers from
Originating Illegal Calls. The Commission seeks comment on whether, and
if so how, it should further clarify its rule requiring providers to
take affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing
customers from using their network to originate illegal calls. In the
Fourth Call Blocking Order, the Commission allowed providers
flexibility to determine how best to comply with this requirement.
Should the Commission now modify this approach? If so, what steps
should the Commission require providers to take with regard to their
customers? If the Commission should maintain its flexible approach, is
there value in providing further guidance as to how providers can best
comply? If so, what might this guidance include? Should the Commission
extend a similar requirement to all providers in the call path, in
place of or in addition to its existing requirement.
29. The Commission seeks comment on requiring originating providers
to ensure that customers originating non-conversational traffic only
seek to originate lawful calls. For example, should the Commission
require originating providers to investigate such customers prior to
allowing them access to high-volume origination services? If so, should
the Commission require originating providers to take certain, defined
steps as part of this investigation, or allow flexibility? Should the
Commission require originating providers to certify, either in the
Robocall Mitigation Database or through some other means, that they
have conducted these investigations and determined that their customers
are originating illegal calls? If a customer nonetheless uses an
originating provider's network to place illegal calls, should the
Commission adopt a strict liability standard, or allow the provider to
terminate or otherwise modify its relationship with the customer and
prevent future illegal traffic?
30. ZipDX states that ``non-conversational traffic'' is ``traffic
that has an average call duration of less than two minutes.'' The
Commission seeks comment on this proposed definition. While some
illegal calls are ``conversational,'' many are not; the Commission
believes that stopping non-conversational illegal calls would
significantly reduce the number of illegal calls consumers receive. The
Commission seeks comment on this belief. Is a focus on non-
conversational traffic appropriate, or should the Commission maintain
its broader focus on illegal calls generally? Alternatively, could the
Commission focus on both: maintaining its existing requirement as to
illegal calls generally, but adding enhanced obligations for non-
conversational traffic?
31. The Commission believes that originating providers, as the
providers with a direct relationship to callers, are in the best
position to know what traffic a caller seeks to originate. The
Commission seeks comment on this belief. Is the Commission's focus on
originating providers correct, or should it include other providers,
such as intermediate providers, as ZipDX suggests? If the Commission
includes intermediate or terminating providers, should the requirement
be the same, or modified? The Commission notes that there is wanted,
and even important, non-conversational traffic. The Commission does not
want emergency alerts, post-release follow up calls by hospitals,
credit card fraud alerts, or similar important communication to be
prevented by an intermediate or terminating provider that is not
comfortable with potential liability for carrying non-conversational
traffic. How could the Commission tailor its rules to allow this
traffic to continue while still preventing illegal non-conversational
traffic? Finally, the Commission seeks comment on alternative
approaches. Should the Commission adopt all or some of ZipDX's specific
proposals, which would impose obligations across the network, including
requiring providers that choose to accept non-conversational traffic to
meet certain obligations such as requiring A-level attestation for such
calls, limiting of transit routes for these calls, and Robocall
Mitigation Database certification? Are there any other approaches the
Commission should consider?

Downstream Provider Blocking

32. The Commission seeks comment on requiring intermediate and
terminating providers to block traffic from bad-actor providers,
regardless of whether or not the bad actor is a gateway provider,
pursuant to the Commission notification process it adopt in the Gateway
Provider Order for providers downstream from the gateway. As discussed
above, the Commission does not currently require any providers other
than gateway or originating providers to block or effectively mitigate
illegal traffic when notified by the Commission. In the Gateway
Provider Order the Commission further requires the intermediate or
terminating provider immediately downstream to block all traffic from
the identified provider when notified by the Commission that the
gateway provider failed to block. There is also an existing safe harbor
for any provider to block traffic from a bad-actor provider. The
Commission is concerned that the lack of consistency across all
provider types could allow for unintended loopholes and it believes
that having a single, uniform rule may provide additional benefits and
reduce the overall burden. The Commission seeks comment on this belief.
Are there any situations where the Commission should not require
downstream providers to block all traffic from a bad-actor provider
that has failed to meet its obligation to block or effectively
mitigate? For example, if the Commission requires originating providers
to block calls upon Commission notification, but only require
intermediate and terminating providers to effectively mitigate such
traffic, should its downstream provider blocking rule treat the
originating provider for that traffic differently from an intermediate
provider? If so, how? Are there risks to expanding this requirement to
cover all domestic providers? If so, do the benefits justify these
risks and their associated costs? If not, should the Commission take
another approach to ensure that bad-actor providers cannot continue to
send illegal traffic to American consumers? If the Commission extends
the requirement, should it use the process described in the Gateway
Provider Order or modify that process in some way? Are there any other
issues the Commission should consider?

General Mitigation Standard

33. In line with the rule for voice service providers that have not
implemented STIR/SHAKEN due to an extension or exemption and the
general mitigation standard the Commission adopts in the Gateway
Provider Order for gateway providers, in addition to specific
mitigation requirements for

[[Page 42676]]

which the Commission seeks comment above, the Commission proposes to
extend a general mitigation standard to voice service providers that
have implemented STIR/SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks and
to all intermediate providers. This standard would be the general duty
to take ``reasonable steps'' to avoid originating or terminating (for
voice service providers) or carrying or processing (for intermediate
providers) illegal robocall traffic. This obligation would include
filing a mitigation plan along with a certification in the Robocall
Mitigation Database. In line with the Commission's rules for voice
service providers and the rules it adopts for gateway providers in the
accompanying Gateway Provider Order, the Commission proposes that such
a plan is ``sufficient if it includes detailed practices that can
reasonably be expected to substantially reduce the origination [or
carrying or processing] of illegal robocalls.'' The Commission also
proposes that a program is insufficient if a provider ``knowingly or
through negligence'' serves as the originator or carries or processes
calls for an illegal robocall campaign. Similar to the Commission's
reasoning related to gateway providers, the Commission anticipates that
a general mitigation obligation on all domestic providers would serve
as ``an effective backstop to ensure robocallers cannot evade any
granular requirements [the Commission] adopt[s].'' Are there reasons
the Commission should not extend to all domestic providers the same
general mitigation standard it adopts in the accompanying Gateway
Provider Order? To the extent providers' networks are non-IP based, the
Commission recognizes that they do not currently have an obligation to
implement STIR/SHAKEN and thus already have an existing mitigation
requirement. Should the Commission alter the general mitigation
standard for all remaining providers in any way? If so, what should
those modifications be?
34. The Commission anticipates that extending these requirements to
all domestic providers would ease administration because U.S.-based
providers would then be subject to the same obligations for all calls,
regardless of the providers' respective roles in the call path.
Regulatory symmetry would obviate the need for a carrier to engage in a
call-by-call analysis to determine the role the provider plays for any
given call--e.g., an intermediate provider may serve as a gateway
provider for some calls but not for others--and ``ensure the
accountability of all providers that touch calls to U.S. consumers,
regardless of whether they originate, serve as the gateway provider, or
simply [carry or process] illegal robocalls.'' Some commenters have
asserted this is very difficult and burdensome. Are there additional
benefits of imposing these requirements on all domestic providers? Are
there any significant burdens if the Commission imposes these
requirements on all domestic providers?
35. For the same reasons the Commission describes in the
accompanying Gateway Provider Order, the Commission proposes adopting
the ``reasonable steps'' standard for providers that have implemented
STIR/SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks rather than a standard
building upon the obligation for providers to mitigate traffic by
taking ``affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing
customers from using their network to originate illegal calls'' adopted
in the Fourth Call Blocking Order. The Commission reiterates that the
``affirmative, effective measures'' standard does not apply to existing
customers and focuses on call origination. Regardless, under the
current rules and the rules the Commission adopts in the Gateway
Provider Order, providers must still comply with the requirements to
know the upstream provider or to take affirmative, effective measures
to prevent new and renewing customers from using the network to
originate illegal calls, as applicable, and steps a provider takes to
meet one standard could meet the other, and vice versa.
36. Strengthening the Definition of ``Reasonable Steps.'' Rather
than encouraging providers to regularly consider whether their current
measures are effective and make adjustments accordingly to comply with
the ``reasonable steps'' standard, the Commission seeks comment on
whether it should instead define ``reasonable steps'' to require all
domestic providers to take specific mitigation actions. What would such
a definition look like? Is the Commission's standards-based approach
sufficient? If not, what, if any, are specific ``reasonable steps'' the
Commission can prescribe to avoid origination, carrying, and processing
of illegal robocall traffic other than prohibiting providers from
accepting traffic from providers that have not submitted a
certification in the Robocall Mitigation Database or have been de-
listed from the Robocall Mitigation Database pursuant to enforcement
action?
37. Certain commenters assert that more prescriptive rules will
ensure that providers take reasonable steps to stop illegal robocalls.
For example, should the Commission require traffic monitoring for
upstream service or any other specific type of traffic monitoring?
Should any particular traffic monitoring metrics be used? Should
providers be required to take any other specific actions to show
compliance with their robocall mitigation plan to meet this standard?
Should there be a higher burden for voice over internet protocol (VoIP)
providers to meet the ``reasonable steps'' standard? If so, what would
such a higher burden look like? Are other specific modifications to the
``reasonable steps'' standard appropriate?
38. The Commission believes it is important to close any existing
loopholes and ensure that all domestic providers are subject to the
same requirements regardless of their place in the call path, even
though the Commission previously declined to follow a ``one-size-fits-
all'' approach to mitigation. The Commission believes the benefits of
such an approach would outweigh any burdens on providers. Are these
expectations correct? What are the benefits of clarifying and expanding
the Commission's requirements to all domestic providers? What are the
costs or burdens associated with doing so?
39. Compliance Deadline. The Commission seeks comment on an
appropriate deadline for all domestic providers not covered by the
existing requirements for voice service providers or the requirements
it adopts in the accompanying Gateway Provider Order for gateway
providers to comply with the proposed ``reasonable steps'' standard.
Would 30 or 60 days after the effective date of any order the
Commission may adopt imposing this requirement on these providers be
sufficient? Are there any reasons the Commission should subject any
remaining providers to a longer or shorter deadline? The Commission
seeks comment on an appropriate deadline that is consistent with the
time and effort necessary to implement the standard, balanced against
the public benefit that will result in rapid implementation of the
standard. What, if any, are the benefits and drawbacks of a shorter
deadline? What, if any, are the benefits and drawbacks of a longer
deadline?

Robocall Mitigation Database

40. Robocall Mitigation Database Filing Obligation. In line with
the requirement the Commission adopts in the Gateway Provider Order for
gateway providers, it proposes to require all intermediate providers to
submit a certification to the Robocall Mitigation

[[Page 42677]]

Database describing their robocall mitigation practices and stating
that they are adhering to those practices, regardless of whether they
have fully implemented STIR/SHAKEN. The Commission notes that all
intermediate providers previously were imported into the Robocall
Mitigation Database from the rural call completion database's
Intermediate Provider Registry. The Commission now proposes to have
these imported intermediate providers affirmatively file in the
Robocall Mitigation Database. The Commission also proposes to require
voice service providers that have already filed a certification to
submit a robocall mitigation plan to the extent they previously were
not required to do so due to fully implementing STIR/SHAKEN.
41. The Commission proposes to conclude that certification,
operating in conjunction with the previous rules and new robocall
mitigation obligations it adopts in the Gateway Provider Order, would
encourage compliance and facilitate enforcement efforts and industry
cooperation to address problems. A number of commenters recommended
this proposal. Similar to the Commission's findings for gateway
providers above, the Commission does not anticipate that a filing
requirement would be more costly for other providers than it is for
voice service providers that already have an obligation to file in the
Robocall Mitigation Database. Are there reasons that all intermediate
providers should not be required to submit a certification? Do the
remaining providers face additional costs as compared to providers
already subject to this requirement under the Commission's existing
rules and the rule it adopts in the Gateway Provider Order that the
Commission should consider? Are there other possible filing obligations
that the Commission should impose instead of the requirement to file a
certification in the Robocall Mitigation Database?
42. The Commission also proposes that all intermediate providers
submit the same information that voice service providers, and now
gateway providers, are required to submit under the Commission's rules.
Specifically, the Commission proposes that all intermediate providers
must certify to the status of STIR/SHAKEN implementation and robocall
mitigation on their networks; submit contact information for a person
responsible for addressing robocall mitigation-related issues; and
describe in detail their robocall mitigation practices. The Commission
proposes that voice service providers that were not previously required
to submit a robocall mitigation plan describe in detail their robocall
mitigation practices. Should these providers be subject to the
additional obligation that the Commission adopts for gateway providers
in the Gateway Provider Order, i.e., should the Commission require all
domestic providers to explain what steps they are taking to ensure that
the immediate upstream provider is not using their network to transmit
illegal calls? Is it useful for all remaining providers to include this
information? Should the Commission modify the identifying information
that all domestic providers must file (both providers with a current
certification obligation and those without)? The Commission anticipates
that the burden is limited if it does not adopt a requirement for how
detailed this explanation must be. Are there any reasons the Commission
should require a more detailed explanation of the steps a provider has
taken to meet their robocall mitigation obligations? Again, the
Commission anticipates the Commission and public will benefit from
understanding how these providers choose to comply with this specific
duty because compliance is critical to stopping the carrying or
processing of illegal robocalls.
43. In line with the new rules applicable to gateway providers, the
Commission proposes to delegate to the Wireline Competition Bureau the
authority to specify the form and format of any submissions. The
Commission further proposes that this would include whether providers
with more than one role in the call path may either submit a separate
certification and plan or amend their current certification and any
plan and that providers amending their current plan to cover different
roles in the call path explain the mitigation steps they undertake as
one type of provider and what mitigation steps they undertake as a
different type of provider, to the extent they are different.
44. The Commission also proposes to extend to all domestic
providers the duty to update their certification within 10 business
days of ``any change in the information'' submitted, ensuring that the
information is kept up to date, in line with the existing and new
requirements for voice service providers and gateway providers,
respectively. Is another time period appropriate for some or all of the
information the Commission requires? Should the Commission establish a
materiality threshold for circumstances in which an update is necessary
for remaining providers, and, if so, what threshold should it set? In
the Gateway Provider FNPRM, 86 FR 59084 (Oct. 26, 2021), the Commission
sought comment regarding whether it should require gateway providers to
inform the Commission through an update to the Robocall Mitigation
Database filing if the provider is subject to a Commission, law
enforcement, or regulatory agency action, investigation, or inquiry due
to its robocall mitigation plan being deemed insufficient or
problematic, or due to suspected unlawful robocalling or spoofing
activity. In the Gateway Provider Order, the Commission declines to
adopt this proposal so that it may more broadly ask the question
regarding all domestic providers. Thus, the Commission now seeks
comment on this proposal for all domestic providers.
45. Compliance Deadline. The Commission also seeks comment on an
appropriate deadline for all domestic providers to submit a
certification and mitigation plan to the Robocall Mitigation Database
attesting to compliance with the proposed ``reasonable steps''
standard. Is 30 days following publication in the Federal Register of
notice of approval by OMB of any associated Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) obligations sufficient, as many intermediate providers are
already required to mitigate call traffic? What are the benefits and
drawbacks of a longer deadline? The Commission seeks comment on an
appropriate deadline that is consistent with the time and effort
necessary to implement this requirement, balanced against the public
benefit that will result in rapid implementation of the requirement. If
the Commission adopts an earlier deadline than the requirement to
implement STIR/SHAKEN, should it require that, if a provider has not
yet implemented STIR/SHAKEN at that time, the provider must file its
certification by the deadline and indicate that it has not yet fully
implemented STIR/SHAKEN and that it then update the filing within 10
business days of STIR/SHAKEN implementation, in line with its existing
rule for updating such a filing? Are there any other filing deadline
issues the Commission should consider? The Commission seeks comment on
any modifications it should make to the filing process for these
remaining providers.
46. Additional Identifying Information. While the Commission sought
comment in the Gateway Provider FNPRM on whether all Robocall
Mitigation Database filers should submit additional identifying
information, the Commission does not act on this issue in the
accompanying Gateway Provider Order so that it may

[[Page 42678]]

both develop a more fulsome record at the same time it considers
imposing other obligations on all domestic providers, including the
obligation for all intermediate providers to file a certification in
the Robocall Mitigation Database. The Commission thus seeks further
comment on requiring all filers to include additional identifying
information. While the Commission sought comment in the Gateway
Provider FNPRM on including information such as a Carrier
Identification Code, Operating Company Number, and/or Access Customer
Name Abbreviation, is this information still relevant given that the
September 2021 blocking deadline has now passed? Is there other
additional information the Commission should require? For example, the
Commission proposes to require filers to add information regarding
principals, known affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies. The
Commission seeks comment on this proposal. Will such information help
identify bad actors and further the Commission's enforcement efforts,
such as by identifying bad actors previously removed from the Robocall
Mitigation Database that continue to be affiliated with other entities
filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database? Will such information ease
and enhance compliance by facilitating searches within the Robocall
Mitigation Database and cross-checking information within the Robocall
Mitigation Database against other sources? If the Commission requires
all domestic providers to submit additional identifying information,
how long should providers already in the database have to update
information, or should such a requirement be applied on a prospective-
only basis? Does the benefit of additional information outweigh the
burden of asking a high number of providers to refile? What are the
benefits of a prospective-only approach? Would this approach still be
beneficial if only some filers submitted this information? Are there
any categories of filer, such as foreign voice service providers that
use NANP resources that pertain to the United States in the caller ID
field, that are unlikely to have this identifying information? If so,
how should any new requirements address these filers? Should the
Commission require providers to submit information demonstrating that
they are foreign or domestic, and should the Commission modify its
provider definitions to address this issue? Alternatively, should the
Commission consider making the submission of this additional
information voluntary to avoid a refiling requirement and account for
filers that do not possess the information? Or would submission on a
voluntary basis provide little benefit? If the Commission requires
submission of additional information by some or all filers, what
deadline for filing should it set?
47. The Commission also seeks comment on any potential changes it
should make to the Robocall Mitigation Database to make the filing
process easier for providers and to facilitate searches by the
Commission. For example, should the Commission allow providers who
indicate they are ``fully compliant with STIR/SHAKEN'' to still submit
additional information regarding their compliance (e.g., if they
obtained their own token or if they are relying on another
arrangement)? Should the database allow for any other explanations or
voluntary information submissions? What other changes to the database
or filing process would make compliance easier or more efficient for
providers? If revising a filing is burdensome, what steps can the
Commission take to reduce that burden? Is the burden of requiring
revisions outweighed by the benefits to be obtained from the additional
information?
48. Specific Areas to Be Described in Robocall Mitigation Plan. The
Commission seeks comment on whether a robocall mitigation program
should be considered sufficient if it only ``includes detailed
practices that can reasonably be expected to significantly reduce the
origination of illegal robocalls. Does this requirement need to be
further articulated? The Commission seeks comment on specific areas or
topics to be described in the mitigation plan submitted to the Robocall
Mitigation Database. What, if any, specific types of mitigation must be
described in plans submitted to the database? For example, should
providers be required to ``describe with particularity'' in their
robocall mitigation plans the processes providers follow ``to know the
identities of the upstream service providers they accept traffic from
and to monitor those service providers for illegal robocall traffic''?
That is, should the Commission require all domestic providers to
describe their ``know-your-upstream provider'' processes? Should
providers indicate whether they use analytics providers and/or describe
the analytics they use? Should all domestic providers describe any
contractual requirements for upstream providers? Should all domestic
providers include ``the process and the actions'' they take when they
``become aware of it, including when alerted of such traffic by the
Commission or the traceback consortium'' regarding illegal traffic on
their network, as suggested by USTelecom? Would taking any or all of
these actions better protect U.S. consumers from illegal robocalls?
49. Certifications and Data from Intermediate Providers Previously
Imported into the Robocall Mitigation Database. The Commission proposes
to delegate decisions regarding the certifications and data of
intermediate providers previously imported into the Robocall Mitigation
Database to the Wireline Competition Bureau, as the Commission does for
gateway providers that were previously imported into the database as
intermediate providers in the accompanying Gateway Provider Order. If
the Commission takes this approach, should it provide any additional
guidance to the Wireline Competition Bureau and what would such
additional guidance look like? Some commenters indicate that
intermediate providers previously imported into the Robocall Mitigation
Database should only have to ``supplement their [Robocall Mitigation
Database] entry by submitting a mitigation plan without having to
completely refile,'' while others assert that intermediate providers'
imported data should be deleted from the database. Should the
Commission instead adopt one of these proposals and direct the Wireline
Competition Bureau to remove or update these imported certifications
and data from the database? What are the benefits and burdens of
allowing these providers to update their data versus having them
completely refile?
50. Intermediate Provider Blocking Obligation. The Commission
proposes to require downstream providers to block traffic received
directly from all intermediate providers that are not listed and have
not affirmatively filed a certification in the Robocall Mitigation
Database or have been removed through enforcement action. Doing so will
close a loophole in the Commission's rules by ensuring that any
provider's traffic will be blocked if its certification does not appear
in the Robocall Mitigation Database. It will also obviate any concerns
regarding how downstream providers can determine if an upstream
provider is a voice service provider, gateway provider, or other
domestic intermediate provider. There was record support for this
approach, which will equalize treatment of all domestic providers. The
Commission seeks comment on doing so. What, if any, are the unique
costs and benefits to applying this rule to domestic intermediate
providers' traffic? Are there any modifications the Commission

[[Page 42679]]

should make when applying this rule to intermediate providers other
than gateway providers? In the Order, the Commission requires
downstream providers to block traffic from an immediate upstream
provider where the upstream provider had not affirmatively filed in the
Robocall Mitigation Database and they had a reasonable basis to believe
that the immediate upstream provider was either a voice service
provider or a gateway provider for some calls. The Commission proposes
to eliminate this requirement as moot if it adopts the proposed
requirement for downstream providers to block traffic from domestic
intermediate providers that have not affirmatively filed in the
Robocall Mitigation Database; downstream providers will no longer need
to determine the upstream provider type before making a blocking
determination. The Commission seeks comment on this approach.
51. The Commission proposes that downstream providers be required
to block traffic from non-gateway intermediate providers that have not
submitted a certification in the Robocall Mitigation Database 90 days
following the deadline for intermediate providers to file a
certification. This proposed deadline is consistent with both the rule
the Commission adopted in the accompanying Gateway Provider Order and
the rule for voice service providers. The Commission seeks comment on
this proposal and whether an alternative deadline is appropriate.

Enforcement

52. The Commission's rules are only as effective as its
enforcement. To that end, the Commission proposes to: (1) impose
forfeitures for failures to block calls on a per-call basis and
establish a maximum forfeiture amount for such violations; (2) impose
the highest available forfeiture for failures to appropriately certify
in the Robocall Mitigation Database; (3) establish additional bases for
removal from the Robocall Mitigation Database, including by
establishing a ``red light'' feature to notify the Commission when a
newly-filed certification lists a known bad actor as a principal,
parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate; and (4) subject repeat
offenders to proceedings to revoke their section 214 operating
authority and to ban offending companies and/or their individual
company owners, directors, officers, and principals from future
significant association with entities regulated by the Commission.
53. Failure to Block Calls. Mandatory blocking is an important tool
for protecting American consumers from illegal robocalls. Penalties for
failure to comply with the Commission's existing or newly adopted
mandatory blocking requirements must be sufficient to ensure that
entities subject to its mandatory blocking requirements suffer a
demonstrable economic impact. Given that bad actors profit from illegal
robocalls, the Commission tentatively concludes that it should impose
forfeitures for failure to block after Commission notice on a per-call
basis. For example, if ABC Provider fails to block 100 calls, it will
be subject to the maximum forfeiture amount for each of those 100
calls. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. What are the pros
and cons of the Commission's proposal? If adopted, should it be
applicable to all domestic providers? Should the Commission exclude
certain types of mandatory blocking from this approach? For example,
should the Commission take a different approach for blocking based on a
reasonable do-not-originate (DNO) list? Is there any reason why this
last approach would be impracticable or unreasonable?
54. The Commission proposes to authorize that forfeitures for
violations of its mandatory blocking rules be imposed on a per-call
basis, with a maximum forfeiture amount for each violation of the
proposed mandatory blocking requirements of $22,021 per violation. This
is the maximum forfeiture amount the Commission's rules permit it to
impose on non-common carriers. While common carriers may be assessed a
maximum forfeiture of $220,213 for each violation, the Commission
proposes to find that it should not impose a greater penalty on one
class of providers than another for purposes of the mandatory blocking
requirements. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. Is there
any reason to permit a higher maximum forfeiture for violation of the
blocking requirements by providers that the Commission has determined
to qualify as common carriers? Is one class of providers more likely
than another to violate these rules? If so, is that a basis for
imposing different forfeiture amounts? Are there particular aggravating
or mitigating factors the Commission should take into consideration
when determining the amount of a forfeiture penalty? Are the
aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the Commission's rules
sufficient? Should failure to block calls to emergency services
providers or public safety answering points (PSAPs) or to numbers on a
reasonable DNO list constitute aggravating factors to be considered in
calculating a forfeiture amount?
55. Provider Removal from the Robocall Mitigation Database. The
Commission's voice service provider rules provide that if the
Commission ``finds a certification is deficient in some way, such as if
the certification describes a robocall mitigation program that is
ineffective'' or ``that a provider nonetheless knowingly or negligently
originates illegal robocall campaigns,'' the Commission ``may take
enforcement action as appropriate.'' These enforcement actions may
include, among others, removing a defective certification from the
database after providing notice to the voice service provider and an
opportunity to cure the filing. The Commission may, of course, impose a
forfeiture in addition to removing the provider from the Robocall
Mitigation Database. The Commission seeks comment on whether
intermediate providers (other than gateway providers), in addition to
voice service providers and gateway providers, should be subject to the
removal of provider certifications from the Robocall Mitigation
Database. Are there any other reasons the Commission should de-list or
exclude providers from the Robocall Mitigation Database? The Commission
proposes to expand its delegation of authority to the Enforcement
Bureau codified in the Gateway Provider Order to de-list or exclude a
provider from the Robocall Mitigation Database so that it applies to
all providers. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. Should
the Commission automatically exclude providers or start an enforcement
action for providers that look suspicious due to multiple traceback
requests? Should the Commission automatically remove a provider from
the database for its prior illegal or bad actions related to and/or
unrelated to robocalling? Should the Commission automatically remove a
provider from the database for bad actions by an affiliate provider
related or unrelated to robocalling? What other provider actions would
warrant removal from the Robocall Mitigation Database? Under the
Commission's current rules, when a voice service provider is removed
from the Robocall Mitigation Database, downstream providers must block
that provider's traffic. Should the Commission deviate from this
approach?
56. Continued violations. The Commission proposes to find that
individuals and entities that engage in continued violations of its
robocall mitigation rules raise substantial questions regarding their
basic qualifications to engage in the provision

[[Page 42680]]

of interstate common carrier services. The Commission thus proposes
that such entities be subject to possible revocation of their section
214 operating authority, where applicable, and that any principals
(either individuals or entities) of the bad actor entity be banned from
serving, either directly or indirectly, as an attributable principal or
as an officer or director in any entity that applies for or already
holds any FCC license or instrument of authorization for the provision
of a regulated service subject to Title II of the Communications Act of
1934 (the Act) or of any entity otherwise engaged in the provision of
voice service for a period of time to be determined. For purposes of
any such revocation, the Commission proposes to define ``attributable
principal'' as: (1) in the case of a corporation, a party holding 5% or
more of stock, whether voting or nonvoting, common or preferred; (2) in
the case of a limited partnership, a limited partner whose interest is
5% or greater (as calculated according to the percentage of equity paid
in or the percentage of distribution of profits and losses); (3) in the
case of a general partnership, a general partner; and (4) in the case
of a limited liability company, a member whose interest is 5% or
greater. The Commission seeks comment on these proposals and on any
alternative proposals or attribution criteria. For purposes of the
definition of ``attributable principal,'' is 5% stock ownership or
interest an appropriate threshold? For purposes of determining foreign
ownership limits under section 310(b)(4) of the Act (regarding common
carrier wireless licenses or media licenses), an applicant must
disclose any individual foreign investor or group acquiring a greater
than 5% voting or equity interest in the licensee. This reflects ``the
Commission's longstanding determination, in both the broadcast and
common carrier contexts, that a shareholder with a less than five
percent interest does not have the ability to influence or control core
decisions of the licensee.'' Would 10% stock ownership or interest or
some lesser or higher threshold be more appropriate?
57. Many of the providers that would come within the purview of
this proposed rule may not be classified as common carriers and thus
may not operate subject to the blanket section 214 authority applicable
to domestic interstate common carriers under Sec. 63.01 of the
Commission's rules. Interconnected VoIP providers are required to file
applications to discontinue service under section 214 of the Act and
Sec. 63.71 of the Commission's rules. Providers not classified as
common carriers may hold other Commission-issued authorizations or
certifications. The Commission proposes to find that such carriers that
have an international section 214 authorization, have applied for and
received authorization for direct access to numbering resources, or are
designated as eligible telecommunications carriers under section 214(e)
of the Act in order to receive federal universal service support hold a
Commission authorization sufficient to subject them to the Commission's
jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing its rules pertaining to
preventing illegal robocalls. Finally, The Commission proposes to find
that providers not classified as common carriers registered in the
Robocall Mitigation Database hold a Commission certification such that
they are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission seeks
comment on these proposed findings and whether they serve as sufficient
legal authority for the Commission to seek either revocation of an
individual or entity's section 214 operating authority or to impose a
ban on an individual or entity from operating in the telecommunications
space as described above. Are there any other bases for jurisdiction or
legal authority for the Commission to take such action?

Obligations for Providers Unable To Implement STIR/SHAKEN

58. The Commission seeks comment on whether additional clarity is
needed regarding the Commission's rules applicable to certain providers
lacking facilities necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN. The Commission
has previously clarified that the STIR/SHAKEN implementation
requirement ``do[es] not apply to providers that lack control of the
network infrastructure necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN.'' The
Commission notes that it accelerated the STIR/SHAKEN implementation
deadline for another class of providers (i.e., non-facilities-based
small voice service providers). A provider is non-facilities-based if
it ``offers voice service to end-users solely using connections that
are not sold by the provider or its affiliates.'' The Commission
clarifies that some ``non-facilities-based'' small providers may also
meet the definition of a provider that does not have control of the
necessary infrastructure to implement STIR/SHAKEN. If so, that provider
does not have a STIR/SHAKEN implementation obligation. The Small
Provider Order, 87 FR 3684 (Jan. 25, 2022), did not expand or contract
the universe of providers required to implement STIR/SHAKEN on the IP
portions of their network; it only accelerated the implementation
deadline for a subset of providers already subject to an implementation
obligation. In the time since, however, the Commission has granted
certain providers extensions, as well as established the Robocall
Mitigation Database filing requirement. Should the Commission further
clarify to whom the STIR/SHAKEN implementation requirement does not
apply?
59. Given that providers must block traffic from originating
providers not listed in the Robocall Mitigation Database, some
providers, including resellers, have filed, irrespective of any
obligation to do so. The Commission observes that the Robocall
Mitigation Database portal does not prevent these providers from
filing. To address this issue, should the Commission amend its rules to
deem providers that lack control of the necessary infrastructure to
implement STIR/SHAKEN as instead having a continuing extension? The
Commission's rules require that voice service providers granted an
extension perform robocall mitigation. Should the providers identified
above be required to perform robocall mitigation, at least to the
extent that they are able despite their lack of control over network
infrastructure? If not, why not?
60. These providers may possess information about their customers
that the underlying provider (in the case of resellers) may not be
aware of or privy to. Should the Commission impose a know-your-customer
obligation on these providers, even though they do not have an
obligation to implement STIR/SHAKEN, or are its existing requirements
outside of the STIR/SHAKEN context sufficient? Is the Commission's
existing flexible approach sufficient, or should the Commission impose
more specific requirements? Should such providers be required to
communicate relevant information about their customers to underlying
providers, and to what extent?

Satellite Providers

61. The Commission seeks comment on whether the TRACED Act applies
to satellite providers, and, if so, whether it should grant such
providers an extension for implementing STIR/SHAKEN. The Commission's
rules, consistent with the TRACED Act, provide that a ``voice service''
is ``any service that . . . furnishes voice communications to an end
user using resources from the North American Numbering Plan.'' The
Satellite Industry Association (SIA) argues that the

[[Page 42681]]

Commission's STIR/SHAKEN rules should not apply to satellite providers
because their voice services do not satisfy the definition set out in
its rules and in the TRACED Act. SIA asserts that their services ``rely
on non-NANP resources for their originating numbers'' and that they use
U.S. NANP resources only ``to forward calls to a small satellite
[provider] subscriber's non-NANP number, or direct assignment of NANP
numbers to a very small subset of small satellite customers.'' Does the
Commission's authority under the TRACED Act extend to satellite
providers that do not use NANP resources? Does the Commission's
authority to require satellite providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN apply
to all satellite providers regardless of the scope of the TRACED Act?
What about to the extent any satellite providers use NANP numbers for
the limited purposes described by SIA? Does use of NANP resources for
forwarding calls to non-NANP numbers render that service a ``voice
service'' within the TRACED Act's? Do a de minimis number of satellite
provider subscribers use NANP resources only as SIA describes above, or
are there ways these subscribers use NANP resources that SIA does not
describe? Should there be a de minimis exception to the Commission's
rules? If so, how should the Commission define de minimis for this
purpose?
62. In addition to satellite providers' apparently limited use of
U.S. NANP resources that SIA argues is generally outside the scope of
the TRACED Act, SIA contends that requiring implementation of STIR/
SHAKEN would pose an undue hardship due to unique economic and
technological challenges the industry faces. Would requiring satellite
providers, irrespective of their use of U.S. NANP resources, to
implement STIR/SHAKEN pose an undue hardship? Is it technically
feasible for satellite providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN? To what
extent are satellite providers the source of illegal robocalls? Do they
account for enough of the $13.5 billion cost to American consumers to
outweigh the burden on them posed by having to implement STIR/SHAKEN?
The Commission has previously provided small voice services providers,
including satellite providers, an extension from STIR/SHAKEN
implementation until June 30, 2023. When the Wireline Competition
Bureau reevaluated this extension in 2021, it declined to grant a
request from SIA for an indefinite extension and stated that it would
seek further comment on SIA's request before the June 30, 2023
extension expires. The TRACED Act requires that the Commission, 12
months after the date of the TRACED Act's enactment, and thereafter
``as appropriate,'' assess burdens or barriers to implementation of
STIR/SHAKEN. The TRACED Act further provides the Commission discretion
to extend compliance with the implementation mandate ``upon a public
finding of undue hardship.'' Not less than annually thereafter, the
Commission must consider revising or extending any delay of compliance
previously granted and issue a public notice regarding whether such
delay of compliance remains necessary. The Commission directed the
Wireline Competition Bureau to make these annual assessments and to
reevaluate the Commission's granted extensions and revise or extend
them as necessary. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should
grant SIA's request for an indefinite extension for satellite
providers. In the alternative, should satellite providers be granted a
continuing extension? If so, how long should such an extension be?

Restrictions on Number Usage and Indirect Access

63. The Commission seeks comment on possible changes to its
numbering rules to prevent the misuse of numbering resources to
originate illegal robocalls, particularly calls originating abroad. In
the Direct Access FNPRM, 86 FR 51081 (Sept. 14, 2021), the Commission
sought comment placing limitations on interconnected VoIP providers'
use of numbering resources obtained pursuant to direct access
authorizations the Commission grants. The Commission now seeks comment
on whether it should implement broader limitations in order to prevent
illegal robocalls and whether other countries' regulations may provide
a useful roadmap for its own.
64. Restrictions on Use of U.S. NANP Numbers for Foreign-Originated
Calls. The Commission seeks comment on whether it should adopt
restrictions on the use of domestic numbering resources for calls that
originate outside of the United States for termination in the United
States. The Commission notes that, according to providers and foreign
regulators, other countries, such as Singapore and South Korea, have
placed limitations on the use of domestic numbering resources for
foreign-originated calls that terminate domestically. The Infocomm
Media Development Authority of Singapore (IMDA) has required operators
to add a ``+'' prefix to international incoming calls, and IMDA is
working with operators to block known numbers with the new prefix used
for scams, especially +65 (Singapore's country code). Australia has a
similar rule. Should the Commission adopt a similar restriction? Should
the Commission, as YouMail argues, establish a specific area code for
foreign-originated calls? If so, should the Commission require
providers block or otherwise restrict calls from all other area codes
or place heightened due diligence or mitigation obligations on gateway
providers receiving calls from such an area code? Is assignment of a
valuable numbering resource--an area code--an efficient use of such
resource? The Commission seeks comment on the approach taken in
Germany, where if a call originating outside of Germany carries a
German number, the number must not be displayed to a German end user
unless the call is an international mobile roaming call. According to
providers, Japan has similar restrictions. Would this or a similar
mandated call-labelling approach be appropriate for some or all
foreign-originated calls carrying U.S. numbers?
65. Should the Commission only impose restrictions in those cases
where the call is not authenticated? For example, France requires that
operators block calls with a French number in the caller ID from an
operator outside of France unless the operator assigning, depositing,
or receiving the number is able to guarantee the authenticity of the
caller ID or the call is an international mobile roaming call of a
French operator's end user. Under a similar approach, any calls
carrying a U.S. NANP number that arrive in the United States with a
STIR/SHAKEN authentication would not be automatically blocked. The
Commission seeks comment on such an approach.
66. The Commission seeks comment on the effect that any of these
restrictions or limitations would have on foreign call centers of U.S.
corporations that make foreign-originated calls to U.S. customers. In
particular, how do call centers operate when calling into countries
that bar the foreign origination of calls into the domestic market
carrying domestic caller ID information? The Commission seeks comment
on the burden that these restrictions may have on providers and other
entities such as call centers as well as the benefit that would result
from bright-line restrictions on the use of U.S. NANP numbers for
foreign-originated calls.
67. Indirect Access Restrictions. The Commission seeks comment on
whether it should impose any restrictions on indirect access to U.S.
NANP numbers

[[Page 42682]]

to prevent their use by foreign or domestic robocallers. In the Direct
Access FNPRM, the Commission sought comment on steps it could take to
ensure that VoIP providers obtaining direct access to numbers did not
use those numbers to facilitate illegal robocalls. It also asked
whether the Commission should require applicants for direct access to
numbers to certify that the numbers they apply for will only be used to
provide interconnected VoIP services and whether interconnected VoIP
providers that receive direct access to numbers must use those numbers
for interconnected VoIP services. Some commenters in that proceeding
noted that indirect access is common and that unscrupulous providers
may be doing so for nefarious purposes, including illegal robocalling.
The Commission notes that some illegal robocallers do not spoof numbers
but instead obtain numbers from providers that themselves either
obtained the number directly from the North American Numbering Plan
Administrator (NANPA) or from another provider.
68. While the Commission does not prejudge the outcome of the
Direct Access FNPRM, it seeks comment here on a broader bar on indirect
access. Should the Commission adopt any restrictions on indirect access
to numbers by interconnected VoIP providers and carriers or
specifically for use in foreign-originated calls to reduce the ability
of robocallers to do so? If so, what should those restrictions be?
Should they be modeled after limitations other countries have put in
place? The Commission notes that some countries limit the number of
times a number can be transferred after it is obtained directly from
the numbering administrator or completely bar number sub-assignment
(indirect access). Would a similar rule be appropriate here? Does a
less restrictive approach make sense? For example, in Portugal, further
sub-assignment is permitted, but only if the provider that obtained the
initial sub-assignment has allocated 60% of the numbers received to its
end users. Instead of or in addition to limiting indirect access, could
the Commission hold providers that obtain numbers directly from NANPA
strictly liable for illegal robocalling undertaken by any entity that
obtains the number through indirect access? Would such an approach be
enforceable and, if so, how would the Commission enforce it? Does
direct access to numbers by VoIP providers reduce or eliminate the need
for numbers to be readily available through indirect access? Should the
Commission, on its own or in concert with NANPA, instead establish a
system for tracking the number of times that a number has been
transferred via indirect access, to whom, and who has the right to use
a number at a particular time? The Commission seeks comment on the
costs and administrative hurdles of establishing such a system, as well
as the benefits and burdens. Could such a tracking system also assist
in the enforcement of the Commission's robocall rules generally? For
example, like STIR/SHAKEN, it would allow a downstream provider to
determine whether the originating party (or at least the upstream
provider) was authorized to use a number. How could providers use that
information, particularly in concert with STIR/SHAKEN data?

STIR/SHAKEN by Third Parties

69. The Commission seeks comment on whether certain of its rules
regarding caller ID authentication and attestation in the Robocall
Mitigation Database require clarification. The Commission's rules
require that a voice service provider ``[a]uthenticate caller
identification information for all SIP calls it originates and . . .
transmit that call with authenticated caller identification information
to the next voice service provider or intermediate provider in the call
path.'' TransNexus asserts that some originating providers have had
underlying (in the case of resellers) or downstream providers
authenticate calls on the originating provider's behalf. Should the
Commission allow a third party to authenticate caller identification
information to satisfy the originating provider's obligation?
Conversely, should the Commission amend its rules regarding filing in
the Robocall Mitigation Database to require attestation of STIR/SHAKEN
implementation by the originating provider itself--i.e., require all
domestic providers to have their own token from the STI-GA for purposes
of authentication? As to both questions, why or why not? Is third-party
authentication proper in certain circumstances but improper in others?
Is third-party authentication consistent with the standards underlying
the STIR/SHAKEN framework? And does authentication by someone other
than the originating provider undercut STIR/SHAKEN? The Commission
seeks comment on whether the Commission needs to amend its current
rules in order to account for this practice, whether to prohibit or
allow it.

Differential Treatment of Conversational Traffic

70. The Commission seeks comment on stakeholders' argument that
certain traffic is unlikely to carry illegal robocalls and thus should
be treated differently under its rules from other voice traffic.
Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on whether cellular roaming
traffic (i.e., traffic originated abroad from U.S. mobile subscribers
carrying U.S. NANP numbers terminated in the U.S.) should be treated
with a lighter touch. The Commission does not adopt a rule in the
Gateway Provider Order regarding this traffic because the record is not
sufficiently developed on this point. Are these commenters' concerns
valid? Is cellular roaming traffic unlikely to carry illegal robocalls?
What percentage of cellular roaming traffic is signed? What percentage
of unsigned cellular roaming traffic consists of illegal calls? If the
Commission treats cellular roaming differently, could robocallers
disguise traffic as cellular roaming traffic in order to take advantage
of any ``lighter touch'' regulatory regime the Commission adopts? Is it
technically feasible for the gateway provider or downstream providers
to clearly identify legitimate cellular roaming traffic for compliance
purposes? Several commenters suggest that they are able to do so, but
is that true for all domestic providers in the call path and is it
realistic for them to do so? For example, ZipDX implies that roaming
traffic would need to be placed on separate trunks for it to be
practically subject to a different set of rules from other traffic and
that segregation currently does not occur in all cases. The Commission
seeks comment on this assertion and cellular roaming routing practices
in general. Should the Commission modify its rules applicable to some
or all domestic providers to take these differences in traffic into
account? What, if any, regulatory carve-outs for the Commission's
robocalling rules would be appropriate for any traffic that falls
within this category? What would be the costs of distinguishing
legitimate roaming traffic from illegal robocalls subject to the
Commission's robocall protection requirements? Should the Commission
treat calls originated from domestic cellular customers carrying U.S.
NANP numbers with a similarly light touch? Are there other categories
of traffic that should be subject to greater or lesser scrutiny than
other voice traffic under the Commission's rules? If so, what are those
categories of traffic and what rules should apply?

[[Page 42683]]

Legal Authority

71. The Commission proposes to adopt any of the foregoing
obligations largely pursuant to the legal authority it relied upon in
prior caller ID authentication and call blocking orders, including
authority it relied upon in the accompanying Gateway Provider Order.
The Commission seeks comment on this approach.
72. Caller ID Authentication. Gateway providers are a subset of
intermediate providers. In the Gateway Provider Order, the Commission
relies upon 251(e) of the Act and the Truth in Caller ID Act to require
gateway providers to authenticate unauthenticated calls. In the Second
Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, the Commission relied on
this authority when requiring intermediate providers to either
authenticate unauthenticated calls or cooperate with the industry
traceback consortium and respond to traceback requests. The Commission
therefore proposes to rely upon the same authority to require all
intermediate providers to authenticate unauthenticated calls. The
Commission seeks comment on this approach; is there any reason it may
not rely on the same authority here? The Commission also seeks comment
on whether there are alternative sources of authority it should rely
on.
73. Robocall Mitigation and Call Blocking. In adopting the
Commission's robocall mitigation and call blocking rules for gateway
providers in the accompanying Gateway Provider Order, the Commission
relied upon sections 201(b), 202(a), 251(e); the Truth in Caller ID
Act; and its ancillary authority. The Commission proposes to rely on
this same authority in adopting additional robocall mitigation and call
blocking requirements for all domestic providers, as described above.
The Commission seeks comment on this approach and whether there are
other sources of authority it should consider.
74. The Commission seeks specific comment on its ancillary
authority. The Commission anticipates that the proposed regulations
applicable to all domestic providers are ``reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's effective performance of its . . . responsibilities.''
Providers not classified as common carriers interconnect with the
public switched telephone network and exchange IP traffic, which
clearly constitutes ``communication by wire and radio.'' The Commission
believes that requiring these providers to comply with its proposed
rules is reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance
of its statutory responsibilities under sections 201(b), 202(a),
251(e), and the Truth in Caller ID Act as described above. With respect
to sections 201(b) and 202(a), absent application of the Commission's
proposed rules to providers not classified as common carriers,
originators of robocalls could circumvent the Commission's proposed
regulatory scheme by sending calls only to providers not classified as
common carriers to reach their destination. The Commission seeks
comment on this analysis and any other basis of its ancillary authority
here.
75. Enforcement. The Commission also proposes to adopt its
additional enforcement rules above pursuant to sections 501, 502, and
503 of the Act. These provisions allow the Commission to take
enforcement action against common carriers as well as providers not
classified as common carriers following a citation. The Commission also
proposes to rely on the existing authority in Sec. 1.80 of its rules
regarding forfeiture amounts. The Commission seeks comment on this
proposed authority and any other sources of its enforcement authority.
76. Numbering Restrictions. To adopt any of the foregoing numbering
restrictions, the Commission proposes to rely on section 251(e) and its
grant to the Commission of authority over numbering resources as well
as sections 201 and 251(b). The Commission has repeatedly relied on
these sections in adopting its numbering rules. The Commission also
proposes to rely on its ancillary authority. The Commission believes
that placing restrictions on numbering access for providers not
classified as common carriers would be reasonably ancillary to the
Commissions' performance under these three sections. Access to numbers
is necessary to ensure a level playing field and foster competition by
eliminating barriers to, and incenting development of, innovative IP
services. The Commission thus proposes to conclude that, for these or
other reasons, imposing numbering restrictions on providers not
classified as common carriers is reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's responsibilities to ensure that numbers are made available
on an ``equitable'' basis, to advance the number-portability
requirements of section 251(b), or to help ensure just and reasonable
rates and practices for telecommunications services regulated under
section 201. The Commission also seeks comment on other possible bases
for the Commission to exercise ancillary authority here.

Digital Equity and Inclusion

77. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance
digital equity for all, including people of color and others who have
been historically underserved, marginalized, and adversely affected by
persistent poverty and inequality, invites comment on any equity-
related considerations and benefits (if any) that may be associated
with the proposals and issues discussed herein. The Commission defines
the term ``equity'' consistent with Executive Order 13985 as the
consistent and systematic fair, just, and impartial treatment of all
individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved
communities that have been denied such treatment, such as Black,
Latino, and Indigenous and Native American persons, Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders and other persons of color; members of religious
minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+)
persons; persons with disabilities; persons who live in rural areas;
and persons otherwise adversely affected by persistent poverty or
inequality. Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on how its
proposals may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility.
78. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis as required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), the Commission
has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the
possible significant economic impact on small entities by the policies
and rules proposed in this FNPRM. The Commission requests written
public comments on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses
to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments provided in
the DATES section of the FNPRM. The Commission will send a copy of the
FNPRM, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the FNPRM and IRFA
(or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.

Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

79. In order to continue the Commission's work of protecting
American consumers from illegal calls, regardless of their provenance,
the FNPRM proposes to expand some of the Commission's existing rules to
cover other providers in the call path and provides additional options
to further protect American consumers, regardless of whether illegal
calls originate

[[Page 42684]]

domestically or abroad. Specifically, the FNPRM proposes to extend the
Commission's STIR/SHAKEN authentication requirement to cover all
domestic providers in the call path. The FNPRM also seeks comment on
extending some of the robocall mitigation duties the Commission adopts
in the Gateway Provider Order to all domestic providers in the call
path. These mitigation duties include: expanding and modifying the
Commission's existing affirmative obligations; requiring downstream
providers to block calls from non-gateway providers when those
providers fail to comply; the general mitigation standard; and filing a
mitigation plan in the Robocall Mitigation Database regardless of STIR/
SHAKEN implementation status. The FNPRM also seeks comment on
additional measures to address illegal robocalls, including: ways to
enhance the enforcement of the Commission's rules; clarifying certain
aspects of its STIR/SHAKEN regime; placing limitations on the use of
U.S. NANP numbers for foreign-originated calls and indirect number
access, and treating cellular roaming traffic differently.

Legal Basis

80. The FNPRM proposes to find authority largely under those
provisions through which it has previously adopted rules to stem the
tide of robocalls. Specifically, the FNPRM proposes to find authority
under sections 201(b), 202(a), 251(b) and (e), 501, 502, and 503 of the
Act, Sec. 1.80 of the Commission's rules regarding forfeiture amounts,
the Truth in Caller ID Act, and, where appropriate, ancillary
authority. The FNPRM solicits comment on these proposals.

Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the
Proposed Rules Will Apply

81. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules and by the rule revisions on which the
FNPRM seeks comment, if adopted. The RFA generally defines the term
``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small-business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small-business concern'' is one which: (1) is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
82. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental
Jurisdictions. The Commission's actions, over time, may affect small
entities that are not easily categorized at present. The Commission
therefore describes here, at the outset, three broad groups of small
entities that could be directly affected herein. First, while there are
industry specific size standards for small businesses that are used in
the regulatory flexibility analysis, according to data from the Small
Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Advocacy, in general a small
business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.
These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in
the United States, which translates to 32.5 million businesses.
83. Next, the type of small entity described as a ``small
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.''
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000
or less to delineate its annual electronic filing requirements for
small exempt organizations. Nationwide, for tax year 2020, there were
approximately 447,689 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting
revenues of $50,000 or less according to the registration and tax data
for exempt organizations available from the IRS.
84. Finally, the small entity described as a ``small governmental
jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities,
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' U.S. Census
Bureau data from the 2017 Census of Governments indicate that there
were 90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general
purpose governments and special purpose governments in the United
States. Of this number there were 36,931 general purpose governments
(county, municipal and town or township) with populations of less than
50,000 and 12,040 special purpose governments--independent school
districts with enrollment populations of less than 50,000. Accordingly,
based on the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments data, the Commission
estimates that at least 48,971 entities fall into the category of
``small governmental jurisdictions.''

Wireline Carriers

85. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau
defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text,
sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of
technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired
telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a
variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP
services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and
wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments
providing satellite television distribution services using facilities
and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry.
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline
carriers or fixed local service providers.
86. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 providers
that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,737
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities
87. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically
applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services
include both incumbent and competitive local exchange service
providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry
with an SBA small business size standard. Wired Telecommunications
Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local
service providers. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of

[[Page 42685]]

December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 providers that reported they were
fixed local exchange service providers. Of these providers, the
Commission estimates that 4,737 providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard,
most of these providers can be considered small entities.
88. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard
specifically for incumbent local exchange carriers. Wired
Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small
business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 1,227 providers
that reported they were incumbent local exchange service providers. Of
these providers, the Commission estimates that 929 providers have 1,500
or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size
standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of incumbent local
exchange carriers can be considered small entities.
89. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs). Neither
the Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small
businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services.
Providers of these services include several types of competitive local
exchange service providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA
small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers
classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census
Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in
this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated
with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data
in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31,
2020, there were 3,956 providers that reported they were competitive
local exchange service providers. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 3,808 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of
these providers can be considered small entities.
90. The Commission has included small incumbent LECs in this
present RFA analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the
RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small-business size
standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or
fewer employees) and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The
SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. The Commission has
therefore included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although
it emphasizes that this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses
and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts.
91. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for
Interexchange Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA
small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers
classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census
Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in
this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated
with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data
in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31,
2020, there were 151 providers that reported they were engaged in the
provision of interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 131 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority of providers in this industry
can be considered small entities.
92. Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard). The
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size standard for
small cable system operators, which classifies ``a cable operator that,
directly or through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than
one percent of all subscribers in the United States and is not
affiliated with any entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in
the aggregate exceed $250,000,000,'' as small. As of December 2020,
there were approximately 45,308,192 basic cable video subscribers in
the top Cable multiple system operators (MSOs) in the United States.
Accordingly, an operator serving fewer than 453,082 subscribers shall
be deemed a small operator if its annual revenues, when combined with
the total annual revenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed $250
million in the aggregate. Based on available data, all but five of the
cable operators in the Top Cable MSOs have less than 453,082
subscribers and can be considered small entities under this size
standard. The Commission notes however, that the Commission neither
requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250
million. Therefore, the Commission is unable at this time to estimate
with greater precision the number of cable system operators that would
qualify as small cable operators under the definition in the
Communications Act.
93. Other Toll Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has
developed a definition for small businesses specifically applicable to
Other Toll Carriers. This category includes toll carriers that do not
fall within the categories of interexchange carriers, operator service
providers, prepaid calling card providers, satellite service carriers,
or toll resellers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest
industry with an SBA small business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020,
there were 115 providers that reported they were engaged in the
provision of other toll services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 113 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of
these providers can be considered small entities.

Wireless Carriers

94. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular

[[Page 42686]]

services, paging services, wireless internet access, and wireless video
services. The SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business
as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year. Of that number, 2,837 firms employed
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020,
there were 797 providers that reported they were engaged in the
provision of wireless services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 715 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of
these providers can be considered small entities.
95. Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this
industry classifies a business with $35 million or less in annual
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 71 providers that reported they were
engaged in the provision of satellite telecommunications services. Of
these providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 48
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, a little more than of these providers can
be considered small entities.

Resellers

96. Local Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have
developed a small business size standard specifically for Local
Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with an
SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers
industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and
network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications
networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services
(except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)
are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for
Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire
year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 293
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of local
resale services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 289
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities.
97. Toll Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have
developed a small business size standard specifically for Toll
Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with an
SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers
industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and
network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications
networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services
(except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)
are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for
Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire
year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 518
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of toll
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 495
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities.
98. Prepaid Calling Card Providers. Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for
prepaid calling card providers. Telecommunications Resellers is the
closest industry with an SBA small business size standard. The
Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises establishments engaged
in purchasing access and network capacity from owners and operators of
telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless
telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and
households. Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications;
they do not operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile
virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. The
SBA small business size standard for Telecommunications Resellers
classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S.
Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 1,386 firms in this industry
provided resale services for the entire year. Of that number, 1,375
firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 58 providers that reported they were
engaged in the provision of payphone services. Of these providers, the
Commission estimates that 57 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of
these providers can be considered small entities.

Other Entities

99. All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of
establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of
internet services (e.g. dial-up internet service providers (ISPs)) or
voice over internet protocol (VoIP) services, via client-supplied
telecommunications connections are also included in this industry. The
SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies firms
with annual receipts of $35

[[Page 42687]]

million or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
there were 1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire
year. Of those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. Based
on this data, the Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other
Telecommunications'' firms can be considered small.

Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities

100. The FNPRM proposes to impose several obligations on various
providers, many of whom may be small entities. Specifically, the FNPRM
proposes to require all U.S. intermediate providers to authenticate
caller ID information consistent with STIR/SHAKEN for SIP calls that
are carrying a U.S. number in the caller ID field and to require all
providers to comply with the most recent version of the standards as
they are released. The FNPRM also seeks comment on extending certain
mitigation duties to all domestic providers, including: (1) extending
the requirement to respond to traceback requests from the Commission,
civil and criminal law enforcement, and the industry traceback
consortium within 24 hours of receipt of the request to all U.S.-based
providers in the call path; (2) requiring all domestic providers in the
call path to block, rather than simply effectively mitigate, illegal
traffic when notified of such traffic by the Commission; and (3)
requiring the intermediate provider or terminating provider immediately
downstream from an upstream provider that fails to block, or
effectively mitigate if the Commission declines to extend the blocking
requirement further, illegal traffic when notified by the Commission.
It also seeks comment on whether and how to clarify the Commission's
rule requiring providers to take affirmative, effective measures to
prevent new and renewing customers from using their network to
originate illegal calls. The FNPRM also proposes to extend a general
mitigation standard to voice service providers that have implemented
STIR/SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks and to all domestic
intermediate providers. The FNPRM also proposes to require all domestic
intermediate providers to submit a certification to the Robocall
Mitigation Database describing their robocall mitigation practices and
stating that they are adhering to those practices, regardless of
whether they have fully implemented STIR/SHAKEN.
101. With regard to the Commission's enforcement of these proposed
rules, the FNPRM proposes to: (1) impose forfeitures for failures to
block calls on a per-call basis and establish a maximum forfeiture
amount for such violations; (2) impose the highest available forfeiture
for failures to appropriately certify in the Robocall Mitigation
Database; (3) establish additional bases for removal from the Robocall
Mitigation Database, including by establishing a ``red light'' feature
to notify the Commission when a newly-filed certification lists a known
bad actor as a principal, parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate; and
(4) subject repeat offenders to proceedings to revoke their section 214
operating authority and to ban offending companies and/or their
individual company owners, directors, officers, and principals from
future significant association with entities regulated by the
Commission.
102. The FNPRM seeks comment on whether certain of the Commission's
rules regarding caller ID authentication and attestation in the
Robocall Mitigation Database require clarification, specifically
whether the Commission should allow a third party to authenticate
caller identification information to satisfy the originating provider's
obligation, and whether the Commission's rules regarding filing in the
Robocall Mitigation Database should be amended to require attestation
of STIR/SHAKEN implementation by the originating provider itself. The
FNPRM also seeks comment on whether additional clarity is needed
regarding the Commission's rules about certain providers lacking
facilities to implement STIR/SHAKEN.
103. The FNPRM also seeks comment on whether the TRACED Act applies
to satellite providers, and, if so, whether the Commission should grant
such providers an extension for implementing STIR/SHAKEN.
104. The FNPRM seeks comment on possible changes to the
Commission's numbering rules to prevent the misuse of numbering
resources to originate illegal robocalls, particularly those
originating abroad, including: (1) whether the Commission should adopt
restrictions on the use of domestic numbering resources for calls that
originate outside of the United States for termination in the United
States; and (2) whether the Commission should impose any restrictions
on indirect access to U.S. NANP numbers to prevent their use by foreign
or domestic robocallers.
105. Lastly, the FNPRM seeks comment on stakeholders' argument that
cellular roaming traffic (i.e., traffic originated abroad from U.S.
mobile subscribers carrying U.S. NANP numbers terminated in the U.S.)
should be treated with a ``lighter touch'' because it is unlikely to
carry illegal robocalls.

Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

106. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach,
which may include the following four alternatives (among others): (1)
the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rules for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities.
107. The FNPRM seeks comment on the particular impacts that the
proposed rules may have on small entities. In particular, it seeks
comment on the impact on small providers of extending the requirement
to respond to traceback requests from the Commission, civil and
criminal law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium within
24 hours of receipt of the request to all U.S.-based providers in the
call path. The FNPRM recognizes that providers that do not receive many
requests may be less familiar with the process, and that smaller
providers in particular may struggle to respond quickly, and it seeks
comment on whether the waiver process established in the Gateway
Provider Order is sufficient to address the needs of all providers, or
whether it should be modified to allow greater flexibility. In
particular, the FNPRM seeks comment on whether the Commission should
adopt an approach to traceback based on volume of requests received,
rather than position in the call path or size of provider. For example,
the FNPRM asks whether the Commission should adopt a tiered approach
that requires providers with fewer than 10 traceback requests a month
to respond ``fully and timely,'' without the need to maintain an
average response time of 24 hours; requires providers that receive from
10 to 99 traceback requests a month to respond within 24 hours or
request a waiver and maintain an average response time of 24 hours; and
requires providers with 100 or more traceback requests a month to
always respond within 24 hours, barring exceptional circumstances. The
FNPRM also seeks comment on whether the TRACED Act applies to satellite
providers and, if so, whether the Commission should grant

[[Page 42688]]

such providers an extension for implementing STIR/SHAKEN. The FNPRM
seeks comment on whether a de minimis number of satellite provider
subscribers use NANP resources, and whether there should thus be a de
minimis exception to the Commission's rules. The FNPRM notes that the
Commission has previously provided small voice services providers,
including satellite providers, an extension from STIR/SHAKEN
implementation until June 30, 2023, and seeks comment on whether the
Commission should grant an indefinite extension for satellite providers
or, in the alternative, a defined continuing extension.

Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules

108. None.

Procedural Matters

109. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As required by the
RFA, the Commission has prepared an IRFA of the possible significant
economic impact on small entities of the policies and rules addressed
in this FNPRM. The IRFA is set forth above. Written public comments are
requested on the IRFA. Comments must be filed by the deadlines for
comments on the FNPRM indicated on the first page of this document and
must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses
to the IRFA. The Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,
Reference Information Center, will send a copy of this FNPRM, including
the IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA.
110. Paperwork Reduction Act. The FNPRM contains proposed new and
revised information collection requirements. The Commission, as part of
its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general
public and OMB to comment on the information collection requirements
contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C
3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks specific comment on how it might
further reduce the information collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
111. Ex Parte Presentations--Permit-But-Disclose. The proceeding
this FNPRM initiates shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose''
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons
making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written
presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within
two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline
applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex
parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the
presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings
(specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data
or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with Sec. 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules. In
proceedings governed by Sec. 1.49(f) of the Commission's rules or for
which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing,
written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte
presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the
electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and
must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt,
searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize
themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

Ordering Clauses

112. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j),
201, 202, 217, 227, 227b, 251(b), 251(e), 303(r), 501, 502, and 503 of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 154(j),
201, 202, 217, 227, 227b, 251(b) 251(e), 303(r), 501, 502, and 503,
this FNPRM is adopted.
113. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference information Center, shall send a
copy of this FNPRM, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA), to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.

List of Subjects

47 CFR Part 0

Authority delegations (Government agencies), Communications,
Communications common carriers, Classified information, Freedom of
information, Government publications, Infants and children,
Organization and functions (Government agencies), Postal Service,
Privacy, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Sunshine Act,
Telecommunications.

47 CFR Part 1

Administrative practice and Procedure, Civil rights, Claims,
Communications, Communications common carriers, Communications
equipment, Cuba, Drug abuse, Environmental impact statements, Equal
access to justice, Equal employment opportunity, Federal buildings and
facilities, Government employees, Historic preservation, Income taxes,
Indemnity payments, Individuals with disabilities, internet,
Investigations, Lawyers, Metric system, Penalties, Radio, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Satellites, Security measures,
Telecommunications, Telephone, Television, Wages.

47 CFR Part 64

Carrier equipment, Communications common carriers, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Proposed Rules

The Federal Communications Commission proposes to amend parts 0, 1,
and 64 of title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 0--COMMISSION ORGANIZATION

Subpart A--Organization

0
1. The authority citation for part 0, subpart A, continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 155, 225, and 409,
unless otherwise noted.

0
2. Amend Sec. 0.111 by revising paragraph (a)(28) to read as follows:

Sec. 0.111 Functions of the Bureau.

(a) * * *
(28) Take enforcement action, including de-listing from the
Robocall Mitigation Database, against any provider:
(i) Whose certification described in Sec. 64.6305(c) through (e)
of this chapter is deficient after giving that provider

[[Page 42689]]

notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiency; or
(ii) Who accepts calls directly from a domestic voice service
provider, domestic intermediate provider, gateway provider, or foreign
provider not listed in the Robocall Mitigation Database in violation of
Sec. 64.6305(f) of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 1--PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

0
3. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. chs. 2, 5, 9, 13; 28 U.S.C. 2461 note,
unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A--General Rules of Practice and Procedure

0
4. Amend Sec. 1.80 by:
0
a. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(9) through (11) as paragraphs (b)(10)
through (12);
0
b. Adding a new paragraph (b)(9);
0
c. In newly redesignated paragraph (b)(10), removing ``paragraphs
(b)(1) through (8) of this section'' and adding ``paragraphs (b)(1)
through (9) of this section'' in its place;
0
d. In newly redesignated paragraph (b)(11):
0
i. Redesignating tables 1 through 4 to paragraph (b)(10) as tables 1
through 4 to paragraph (b)(11);
0
ii. In footnote 1 of newly redesignated table 4 to paragraph (b)(11),
removing ``paragraph (b)(10)'' and adding ``paragraph (b)(11)'' in its
place;
0
iii. Redesignating note 2 to paragraph (b)(10) as note 2 to paragraph
(b)(11); and
0
iv. In newly redesignated note 2 to paragraph (b)(11), removing ``this
paragraph (b)(10)'' everywhere it appears and adding ``this paragraph
(b)(11)'' in its place and removing ``paragraph (b)(11)'' and adding
``paragraph (b)(12)'' in its place; and
0
e. In newly redesignated paragraph (b)(12), redesignating table 5 to
paragraph (b)(11)(ii) as table 5 to paragraph (b)(12)(ii) and note 3 to
paragraph (b)(11) as note 3 to paragraph (b)(12).
The addition reads as follows:

Sec. 1.80 Forfeiture proceedings.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(9) Forfeiture penalty for a failure to block. Any person
determined to have failed to block illegal robocalls pursuant to Sec.
64.6305(e) of this chapter shall be liable to the United States for a
forfeiture penalty of no more than $22,021 for each violation, to be
assessed on a per-call basis. In addition to the mitigating and
aggravating factors set forth in table 1 to paragraph (b)(11) of this
section, other factors to be considered in calculating a forfeiture
amount under this paragraph shall include whether the violation
includes failure to block calls to emergency services providers or
public safety answering points or to numbers on a reasonable do-not-
originate list.
* * * * *

PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

0
5. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220,
222, 225, 226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 255, 262,
276, 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 616, 620, 716, 1401-1473, unless otherwise
noted; Pub. L. 115-141, Div. P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091.

Subpart HH--Caller ID Authentication

0
6. Amend Sec. 64.6302 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:

Sec. 64.6302 Caller ID authentication by intermediate providers.

* * * * *
(b) Authenticate caller identification information for all calls it
receives that use North American Numbering Plan resources that pertain
to the United States in the caller ID field and for which the caller
identification information has not been authenticated and which it will
exchange with another provider as a SIP call.
0
7. Amend Sec. 64.6304 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:

Sec. 64.6304 Extension of implementation deadline.

* * * * *
(b) Voice service providers and intermediate providers that cannot
obtain an SPC token. Voice service providers that are incapable of
obtaining an SPC token due to Governance Authority policy are exempt
from the requirements of Sec. 64.6301 until they are capable of
obtaining a SPC token. Intermediate providers, including gateway
providers, that are incapable of obtaining an SPC token due to
Governance Authority policy are exempt from the requirements of Sec.
64.6302(b) regarding call authentication.
* * * * *
0
8. Amend Sec. 64.6305 by:
0
a. Revising the heading of paragraph (a) and paragraphs (a)(1) and
(c)(2) introductory text;
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c)(4)(iv) and (v) as paragraphs (c)(4)(v)
and (vi);
0
c. Adding a new paragraph (c)(4)(iv);
0
d. Redesignating paragraphs (d)(4)(iv) and (v) as paragraphs (d)(4)(v)
and (vi);
0
e. Adding a new paragraph (d)(4)(iv);
0
f. Redesignating paragraph (e) as paragraph (f);
0
g. Adding a new paragraph (e); and
0
h. Revising newly redesignated paragraph (f).
The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec. 64.6305 Robocall mitigation and certification.

(a) Robocall mitigation program requirements for voice service
providers and intermediate providers (other than gateway providers).
(1) Except those subject to an extension granted under Sec.
64.6304(b), any voice service provider and intermediate provider, not
including gateway providers, shall implement an appropriate robocall
mitigation program with respect to calls that use North American
Numbering Plan resources that pertain to the United States in the
caller ID field.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) A voice service provider shall include a robocall mitigation
program consistent with paragraph (a) of this section and shall include
the following information in its certification in English or with a
certified English translation:
* * * * *
(4) * * *
(iv) All known principals, affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent
companies of the intermediate provider;
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(4) * * *
(iv) All known principals, affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent
companies of the intermediate provider;
* * * * *
(e) Certification by intermediate providers (other than gateway
providers) in the Robocall Mitigation Database. (1) An intermediate
provider shall certify to one of the following:
(i) It has fully implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication
framework across its entire network and all calls it carries or
processes are compliant with Sec. 64.6302(b);
(ii) It has implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework on
a portion of its network and calls it carries or processes on that
portion of its network are compliant with Sec. 64.6302(b); or
(iii) It has not implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication
framework on any portion of its network for carrying or processing
calls.
(2) An intermediate provider shall include the following
information in its

[[Page 42690]]

certification, in English or with a certified English translation:
(i) The specific reasonable steps the intermediate provider has
taken to avoid carrying or processing illegal robocall traffic as part
of its robocall mitigation program, including a description of how it
has complied with the know-your-upstream provider requirement in Sec.
64.1200(n)(4).
(ii) A statement of the intermediate provider's commitment to
respond fully and in a timely manner to all traceback requests from the
Commission, law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium, and
to cooperate with such entities in investigating and stopping any
illegal robocallers that use its service to carry or process calls.
(3) All certifications made pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this
section shall:
(i) Be filed in the appropriate portal on the Commission's website;
and
(ii) Be signed by an officer in conformity with 47 CFR 1.16.
(4) An intermediate provider filing a certification shall submit
the following information in the appropriate portal on the Commission's
website:
(i) The intermediate provider's business name(s) and primary
address;
(ii) Other business names in use by the intermediate provider;
(iii) All business names previously used by the intermediate
provider;
(iv) All known principals, affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent
companies of the intermediate provider;
(v) Whether the intermediate provider or any affiliate is also a
foreign voice service provider; and
(vi) The name, title, department, business address, telephone
number, and email address of one person within the company responsible
for addressing robocall mitigation-related issues.
(5) An intermediate provider shall update its filings within 10
business days of any change to the information it must provide pursuant
to paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this section, subject to the
conditions set forth in paragraphs (c)(5)(i) and (ii) of this section.
(f) Intermediate provider and voice service provider obligations--
(1) Accepting traffic from domestic voice service providers.
Intermediate providers and voice service providers shall accept calls
directly from a domestic voice service provider only if that provider's
filing appears in the Robocall Mitigation Database in accordance with
paragraphs (c) of this section and that filing has not been de-listed
pursuant to an enforcement action.
(2) Accepting traffic from foreign providers. Beginning 90 days
after the deadline for filing certifications pursuant to paragraph
(d)(1) of this section, intermediate providers and voice service
providers shall accept calls directly from a foreign voice service
provider or foreign intermediate provider that uses North American
Numbering Plan resources that pertain to the United States in the
caller ID field to send voice traffic to residential or business
subscribers in the United States, only if that foreign provider's
filing appears in the Robocall Mitigation Database in accordance with
paragraph (c) of this section and that filing has not been de-listed
pursuant to an enforcement action.
(3) Accepting traffic from domestic intermediate providers.
Intermediate providers and voice service providers shall accept calls
directly from:
(i) A gateway provider, only if that provider's filing appears in
the Robocall Mitigation Database in accordance with paragraph (d) of
this section, showing that the gateway provider has affirmatively
submitted the filing, and that the filing has not been de-listed
pursuant to an enforcement action.
(ii) Beginning 90 days after the deadline for filing certifications
pursuant to paragraph (e) of this section, a domestic intermediate
provider, only if that provider's filing appears in the Robocall
Mitigation Database in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section,
showing that the intermediate provider has affirmatively submitted the
filing, and that the filing has not been de-listed pursuant to an
enforcement action.

[FR Doc. 2022-13878 Filed 7-15-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

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