Notice2022-11791
Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards
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Published
June 2, 2022
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Abstract
PHMSA is issuing this updated advisory bulletin to remind owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, including supercritical carbon dioxide pipelines, of the potential for damage to those pipeline facilities caused by earth movement in variable, steep, and rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing subsurface geological conditions. Additionally, changing weather patterns due to climate change, including increased rainfall and higher temperatures, may impact soil stability in areas that have historically been stable. These phenomena can pose a threat to the integrity of pipeline facilities if those threats are not identified and mitigated. Owners and operators should consider monitoring geological and environmental conditions, including changing weather patterns, in proximity to their facilities.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 106 (Thursday, June 2, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 106 (Thursday, June 2, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33576-33579]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-11791]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2022-0063]
Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities
Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of updated advisory bulletin.
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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this updated advisory bulletin to remind
owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, including
supercritical carbon dioxide pipelines, of the potential for damage to
those pipeline facilities caused by earth movement in variable, steep,
and rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing subsurface
geological conditions. Additionally, changing weather patterns due to
climate change, including increased rainfall and higher temperatures,
may impact soil stability in areas that have historically been stable.
These phenomena can pose a threat to the integrity of pipeline
facilities if those threats are not identified and mitigated. Owners
and operators should consider monitoring geological and environmental
conditions, including changing weather patterns, in proximity to their
facilities.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary McDaniel at 202-366-4595 or
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#9dd0fcefe4b3d0fed9fcf3f4f8f1ddf9f2e9b3faf2eb"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4b062a39326506280f2a25222e270b2f243f652c243d">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The purpose of this updated advisory bulletin is to remind owners
and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, particularly those
with facilities located onshore or in inland waters, about the serious
safety-related issues that can result from earth movement and other
geological hazards. Additionally, changing weather patterns due to
climate change may result in heavier than normal rainfall and increased
temperatures causing soil saturation and flooding or soil erosion.
Either phenomenon may adversely impact the stability of soil
surrounding or supporting nearby pipeline facilities. The United States
Geological Survey (USGS) is a resource for pipeline owners and
operators in evaluating earth movement vulnerabilities of pipeline
facilities.
Gas and hazardous liquid pipelines are required to be designed to
withstand external loads including those that may be imposed by
geological forces. Specifically, gas pipelines must be designed in
accordance with 49 CFR 192.103 and hazardous liquid pipelines must be
designed in accordance with 49 CFR 195.110. To comply with these
regulations, the design of new pipelines, including repairs or
replacement, must consider the load that may be imposed by geological
forces.
Once operational, Sec. 192.317(a) states that for gas transmission
and part 192-regulated gathering pipelines ``[t]he operator must take
all practicable steps to protect each transmission line or main from
washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, or other hazards that may
cause the pipeline to move or to sustain abnormal loads. In addition,
the operator must take all practicable steps to protect offshore
pipelines from damage by mudslides, water currents, hurricanes, ship
anchors, and fishing operations.'' This advisory bulletin addresses
those protective requirements associated with damage caused by
geological factors.
In addition, Sec. 192.705 requires operators of gas transmission
lines, and applicable gas gathering lines, to have a patrol program to
observe surface conditions on and adjacent to the pipeline right-of-way
for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors
affecting safety and operation. The frequency of these patrols must be
based upon the size of the line, operating pressures, class locations,
terrain, seasonal weather conditions, and other relevant factors. One
of the primary reasons for this patrol requirement is to monitor
geological movement, both slowly occurring and acute changes, which may
affect the current or future safe operation of the pipeline.
Furthermore, for applicable gas pipelines Sec. 192.613(a) states
that ``each operator shall have a procedure for continuing surveillance
of its facilities to determine and take appropriate action concerning
changes in class location, failures, leakage history, corrosion,
substantial changes in cathodic protection requirements, and other
unusual operating and maintenance conditions.'' Section 192.613(b)
further states that ``[i]f a segment of pipeline is determined to be in
unsatisfactory condition but no immediate hazard exists, the operator
shall initiate a program to recondition or phase out the segment
involved, or, if the segment cannot be reconditioned or phased out,
reduce the maximum allowable operating pressure in accordance with
Sec. 192.619(a) and (b).''
For hazardous liquid pipelines, Sec. 195.401(b)(1) states that
``[w]henever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely
affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it must correct the
condition within a reasonable time. However, if the condition is of
such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard to persons or
property, the operator may not operate the affected part of the system
until it has corrected the unsafe condition.'' Section 195.401(b)(2)
further states that ``[w]hen an operator discovers a condition on a
pipeline covered under [the integrity management requirements in] Sec.
195.452, the operator must correct the condition as prescribed in Sec.
195.452(h).'' Land movement, soil instability due to saturation, severe
flooding, river scour, and river channel migration are the types of
conditions that can adversely affect the safe operation of a pipeline
and require corrective action under Sec. Sec. 192.613(a) and
195.401(b). Additional guidance for identifying risk factors and
mitigating natural force
[[Page 33577]]
hazards on pipeline segments that could affect high consequence areas,
are outlined in Appendix C, section I, subsection B, to part 195.
PHMSA integrity management regulations require operators to take
additional preventative and mitigative measures to prevent, and to
mitigate the consequences of, failures on gas transmission lines in
high consequence areas (Sec. 192.935) and hazardous liquid pipelines
that are in or which could affect a high consequence area (Sec.
195.452(i)). An operator must base the additional measures on the
threats the operator has identified for each pipeline segment. If an
operator determines there is a threat to the pipeline, such as outside
force damage (e.g., earth movement or floods), the operator must take
steps to prevent a failure and to minimize the consequences of a
failure under these regulations.
PHMSA is aware of recent earth movement and other geological-
related incidents and accidents and safety-related conditions
throughout the country. Some of the more notable events, including
those discussed in a prior advisory bulletin (ADB-2019-02; 84 FR 18919,
05/02/2019) are briefly described below:
<bullet> On March 11, 2022, a 22-inch hazardous liquid pipeline
spilled 3,900 barrels of crude oil adjacent to the Cahokia Creek
approximately 15 miles east of St. Louis, Missouri. Preliminary
information indicates land movement may have contributed to this
failure. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation
into the cause continues as of the date of this notice.
<bullet> On May 30, 2021, a hazardous liquid pipeline spilled 640
barrels of gasoline in Greens Bayou affecting high consequence areas
near Houston, Texas. The operator's reported cause indicated earth
movement/progressive ground movement over time on a bayou bank.
<bullet> On February 19, 2021, 22,318 one thousand cubic feet \1\
(Mcf) of natural gas was released from a Type A gathering pipeline
system in Belmont, Ohio. A third-party subject matter expert determined
the proximate cause of this incident was land movement, or slip, that
exerted force on the pipe causing a circumferential crack in an area
where evidence of stress corrosion cracking and general corrosion were
found.
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\1\ Mcf stands for one thousand cubic feet. The ``M'' is
representative of the roman numeral for one thousand.
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<bullet> On December 23, 2020, 4,450 Mcf natural gas was released
from a gas distribution main line in the City of Newport News,
Virginia. The operator report indicated that the apparent cause was
pipe stress created by ground settlement which caused misalignment of a
flange resulting in a pinhole leak on gasket.
<bullet> On November 19, 2020, a pipeline spilled 17.50 barrels of
crude oil east of I-5 in Kern, California during routine start-up. A
metallurgical analysis determined the root cause to be related to
external factors (i.e., historical land movement, terrain, and cyclic
weather patterns around this pipeline segment). There is a history of
land movement in the area, all of which contributed to unintentional
bending of the pipeline causing the circumferential cracking found at
the leak site.
<bullet> On October 4, 2020, an intrastate gas transmission
pipeline in Goodrich, Texas released 118,724 Mcf of natural gas below
the Trinity River. While no definitive root cause was determined, the
operator used the geological, meteorological, site-gathered information
and historical data in its computer modeling and identified earth
movement of the soil surrounding the pipe as the most plausible cause
of the rupture. Circumferential stress corrosion cracking may have been
a contributing factor to the failure.
<bullet> On May 19, 2020, 447 Mcf was released from a gas
distribution main pipeline in Edenville Township, Michigan due to heavy
rain fall. An investigation confirmed a 4-inch steel pipeline was
severed when significant flooding in the area caused a road washout/
scouring.
<bullet> On May 4, 2020, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline ruptured
and ignited near Hillsboro, Kentucky. Preliminary information indicates
land movement may have contributed to this failure. The NTSB
investigation into the cause continues as of the date of this notice.
<bullet> On February 22, 2020, a carbon dioxide pipeline failed
approximately one mile southeast of Satartia, Mississippi, releasing
approximately 30,000 barrels of liquid carbon dioxide that immediately
began to vaporize at atmospheric conditions. The pipeline failed on a
steep embankment which had subsided adjacent to a local highway. Heavy
rains are believed to have triggered a landslide, which created axial
strain on the pipeline and resulted in a full circumferential girth
weld failure.
<bullet> On January 29, 2019, a pipeline ruptured near the town of
Lumberport in Harrison County, West Virginia. The rupture was located
at a girth weld of an elbow on the 12-inch interstate pipeline. The
root cause investigation concluded that a landslide about 150 yards
from the rupture moved the pipeline approximately 10 feet from its
original location causing excessive stress on the pipe resulting in the
rupture.
<bullet> On January 21, 2019, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline
ruptured and ignited near Summerfield, Ohio. A metallurgical analysis
indicates a girth weld failed due to ductile overload from a
longitudinal tensile or bending force, likely from land movement.
<bullet> On June 7, 2018, a 36-inch pipeline ruptured in a rural,
mountainous area near Moundsville, West Virginia, resulting in the
release of approximately 165,000 Mcf of natural gas. According to a
metallurgical analysis, the rupture was caused by earth movement on the
right-of-way due to a single overload event. Overloading of the
pipeline likely resulted from a series of lateral displacements with
accompanying bending.
<bullet> On April 30, 2018, an 8-inch intrastate pipeline failed in
a remote mountainous region of Marshall County, West Virginia resulting
in the release of 2,658 barrels of propane. The failure was caused by
lateral movement of the pipeline due to earth movement along the right-
of-way.
<bullet> On January 31, 2018, a 24-inch interstate pipeline
ruptured near the city of Summerfield, Ohio releasing approximately
23,500 Mcf of natural gas in a rural forested area. A root cause
analysis concluded that the girth weld failure was caused by axial
stress due to movement of the pipe that exceeded the cross-sectional
tensile strength of the net section weld zone surrounding the crack
initiation location.
<bullet> On January 9, 2018, a 22-inch transmission pipeline failed
in Montecito, California. The incident resulted in a fire and explosion
and the release of an estimated 12,000 Mcf of natural gas. Heavy rains
and localized flooding contributed to the pipe failure.
<bullet> On December 5, 2016, approximately 14,400 barrels of crude
oil were spilled into an unnamed tributary to Ash Coulee Creek, Ash
Coulee Creek itself, the Little Missouri River, and their adjoining
shorelines in Billings County, North Dakota. The metallurgical and root
cause failure analysis indicated the failure was caused by compressive
and bending forces due to a landslide impacting the pipeline. The
landslide was the result of excessive moisture within the hillside
creating unstable soil conditions.
<bullet> On October 21, 2016, a pipeline release of over 1,238
barrels of gasoline spilled into the Loyalsock Creek in Lycoming
County, Pennsylvania. The release was caused by extreme localized
flooding and soil erosion.
[[Page 33578]]
Within its rulemaking entitled ``Safety of Gas Transmission
Pipelines: Repair Criteria, Integrity Management Improvements, Cathodic
Protection, Management of Change, and Other Related Amendments'' (RIN
2137-AF39), PHMSA notes that it is considering adopting revisions to
Sec. 192.613 that would oblige operators of gas transmission pipelines
to conduct inspections on their facilities following an extreme weather
event to ensure timely identification and remediation of damage to
those facilities. In addition, the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) recently issued interim guidance underscoring the importance of
the evaluation of, and emergency planning for, geohazards for safe
operation of carbon dioxide and other pipeline facilities.\2\
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\2\ CEQ, ``Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration
Guidance,'' 87 FR 8808, 8810 (Feb. 16, 2022).
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II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2022-01)
Advisory: All owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid
pipelines, including supercritical carbon dioxide pipelines, are
reminded that earth movement, particularly in variable, steep, and
rugged terrain and terrain with varied or changing subsurface
geological conditions, can pose a threat to the integrity of a pipeline
if those threats are not identified and mitigated. Additionally,
changing weather patterns due to climate change may result in heavier
than normal rainfall and higher temperatures, resulting in soil
saturation and flooding or soil erosion, each of which may adversely
impact soil stability surrounding or supporting nearby pipeline
facilities.
Pipeline operators should consider taking the following actions to
ensure pipeline safety:
1. Identify areas surrounding the pipeline that may be prone to
large earth movement, including but not limited to slope instability,
subsidence, frost heave, soil settlement, erosion, earthquakes, and
other dynamic geologic conditions that may pose a safety risk.
2. Use geotechnical engineers during the design, construction, and
ongoing operation of a pipeline system to ensure that sufficient
information is available to avoid or minimize the impact of earth
movement on the integrity of the pipeline system. At a minimum,
operators should consider soil strength characteristics, ground and
surface water conditions, propensity for erosion or scour of underlying
soils, and the propensity of earthquakes or frost heave.
3. Develop design, construction, and monitoring plans and
procedures for each identified location, based on the site-specific
hazards identified. When constructing new pipelines, develop and
implement procedures for pipe and girth weld designs to increase their
effectiveness for taking loads, either stresses or strains, exerted
from pipe movement in areas where geological subsurface conditions and
movement are a hazard to pipeline integrity.
4. Monitoring plans may include provisions related to the
following:
<bullet> Ensuring during construction of new pipelines that
excavators do not steepen, load (including changing the groundwater
levels) or undercut slopes which may cause excessive ground movement
during construction or after operations commence.
<bullet> Conducting periodic visits and site inspections. Increased
patrolling may be necessary due to potential hazards identified and
existing/pending weather conditions. Right-of-way patrol staff must be
trained on how to detect and report conditions that may lead to or
exhibit ground movement to appropriate staff.
<bullet> Identifying geodetic monitoring points (i.e., survey
benchmarks) to track potential ground movement.
<bullet> Installing slope inclinometers to track ground movement at
depth which may otherwise not be detectable during right-of-way
patrols.
<bullet> Installing standpipe piezometers to track changes in
groundwater conditions that may affect slope stability.
<bullet> Evaluating the accumulation of strain on the pipeline by
installing strain gauges.
<bullet> Conducting stress/strain analysis utilizing in-line
inspection tools equipped with inertia mapping unit technology and high
resolution deformation in-line inspection for pipe bending and denting
from movement.
<bullet> Utilizing aerial mapping light detection and ranging or
other technology to track changes in ground conditions.
5. Develop mitigation measures to remediate the identified
locations.
6. Monitor environmental conditions and changing weather patterns
in proximity to their facilities and evaluate soil stability that may
have been adversely impacted.
<bullet> The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
National Centers for Environmental Information has excellent
information publicly available. For example, see the National
Temperature and Precipitation Maps at the National Centers for
Environmental Information (<a href="https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/us-maps/">https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/us-maps/</a>).
7. Use available data and information resources to assess pipeline
facility vulnerability relative to landslides and other types of earth
movement.
<bullet> The USGS has excellent information publicly available
regarding land movement. For example, see the Landslide Hazards Maps at
the USGS website (<a href="https://www.usgs.gov/programs/landslide-hazards/maps">https://www.usgs.gov/programs/landslide-hazards/maps</a>).
8. Consider the findings and recommendations of pertinent research
projects, studies, and reports on the impact of changing weather
patterns on soil stability.\3\ PHMSA also notes that industry and
academic materials could be informative regarding relevant
considerations and strategies for ensuring pipeline integrity in areas
of land movement or soil subsidence.
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\3\ For example, PHMSA has funded the following research and
development projects on the impact of soil movement and pipeline
monitoring: Pipeline Integrity Management for Ground Movement
Hazards (<a href="https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=202">https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=202</a>);
Combined Vibration, Ground Movement, and Pipe Current Detector
(<a href="https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=655">https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=655</a>);
Definition of Geotechnical and Operational Load Effects on Pipeline
Anomalies (<a href="https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=561">https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=561</a>);
and Fiber Optic Sensors for Direct Pipeline Monitoring Under
Geohazard Conditions (<a href="https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=889">https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/PrjHome.rdm?prj=889</a>).
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9. Mitigation measures should be based on site-specific conditions
and may include:
<bullet> Re-routing the pipeline right-of-way prior to construction
to avoid areas prone to large ground movement such as unstable slope
areas, earthquake fault zones, permafrost movement, or scour.
<bullet> Utilize properly designed horizontal directional drilling
to go below areas of potential land movement.
<bullet> Installation of drainage measures in the trench to
mitigate subsurface flows and enhance surface water draining at the
site including streams, creeks, runs, gullies, or other sources of
surface run-off that may be contributing surface water to the site or
changing groundwater levels that may exacerbate earth movement.
<bullet> Reducing the steepness of potentially unstable slopes,
including installing retaining walls, soldier piles, sheet piles, wire
mesh systems, mechanically stabilized earth systems and other
mechanical structures.
<bullet> Installing trench breakers and slope breakers to mitigate
trench seepage and divert trench flows along the surface to safe
discharge points off the site or right-of-way.
<bullet> Building retaining walls and/or installing steel piling or
concrete caissons to stabilize steep slope areas as
[[Page 33579]]
long as the corrosion control systems are not compromised.
<bullet> Reducing the loading on the site by removing and/or
reducing the excess backfill materials to off-site locations. Soil
placement should be carefully planned to avoid triggering earth
movement in other locations.
<bullet> Compacting backfill materials at the site to increase
strength, reduce water infiltration, and achieve optimal moisture
content.
<bullet> Drying the soil using special additives such as lime-kiln
dust or cement-kiln to allow the materials to be re-used and worked at
the site. Over-saturated materials may require an extensive amount of
time and space to dry.
<bullet> Regrading the pipeline right-of-way to minimize scour and
erosion.
<bullet> Bringing the pipeline above ground and placing it on
supports that can accommodate large ground movements (e.g., transitions
across earthquake fault zones or unstable slopes, without putting
excessive stress or strain on the pipeline).
<bullet> Reducing the operating pressure temporarily or shutting-in
the affected pipeline segment completely.
<bullet> Re-routing the pipeline when other appropriate mitigation
measures cannot be effectively implemented to maintain safety.
Pipeline safety regulations require reporting of certain conditions
that impair the serviceability of a pipeline, as noted in Sec. Sec.
191.23 and 195.55.
PHMSA encourages pipeline operators to enhance their preparations
and procedures beyond the minimum Federal standards and to address the
unique threats, vulnerabilities, and challenges of each individual
pipeline facility. Pipeline operators, Federal and state regulators,
and the public have a common goal of no damage and no releases from
pipeline infrastructure. Working together will better achieve our goal
of zero incidents and releases.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 26, 2022, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2022-11791 Filed 6-1-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
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