Notice2022-07667
Secretarial Determination of No Adverse Impact on the Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries To Support Mo-99 Production
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Published
April 11, 2022
Issuing agencies
Energy DepartmentNational Nuclear Security Administration
Abstract
On November 24, 2021, the Secretary of Energy issued a determination ("Secretarial Determination") covering the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 kilograms uranium (kgU) of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) (above 5 but less than 20 wt. percent uranium- 235) per calendar year to support the development and establishment of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) production capabilities. For the reasons set forth in the Department's "Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries," which is incorporated into the Secretarial Determination, the Secretary determined that these transactions will not have an adverse material impact on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industry.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 69 (Monday, April 11, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 69 (Monday, April 11, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21113-21116]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-07667]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
Secretarial Determination of No Adverse Impact on the Domestic
Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries To Support Mo-99
Production
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Department of
Energy (DOE).
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: On November 24, 2021, the Secretary of Energy issued a
determination (``Secretarial Determination'') covering the sale, lease,
or transfer of up to 750 kilograms uranium (kgU) of high-assay low
enriched uranium (HALEU) (above 5 but less than 20 wt. percent uranium-
235) per calendar year to support the development and establishment of
molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) production capabilities. For the reasons set
forth in the Department's ``Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain
Uranium Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and
Enrichment Industries,'' which is incorporated into the Secretarial
Determination, the Secretary determined that these transactions will
not have an adverse material impact on the domestic uranium mining,
conversion, or enrichment industry.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information
may be sent to Brett Cox: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a7c8c1c1cec4c2c8c1c4c8c9d1c2d5d4cec8c9e7c9c9d4c689c3c8c289c0c8d1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="610e07070802040e07020e0f17041312080e0f210f0f12004f050e044f060e17">[email protected]</span></a> or (202) 287-
5191.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority and Background
The Department of Energy (``the Department'') holds limited
inventories of uranium in various forms and quantities that have been
declared as excess and are not dedicated to U.S. national security
missions. Within DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) manages these inventories. NNSA down-blends excess highly-
enriched uranium (HEU) to high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU)-- a
subset of low enriched uranium (LEU), enriched above the commercial
level of 5 wt-% and below 20 wt-% of the isotope U-235. Common
applications of such high-assay materials are as fuels for domestic and
foreign research reactors and as target materials for the production of
medical isotopes.
This notice involves the sale, lease, or transfer of HALEU to
support domestic molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) producers. These sales, leases,
and transfers fulfill a directive in the American Medical Isotopes
Production Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-239, Division C, Title XXXI,
Subtitle F, 42 U.S.C. 2065) for the Department to establish a program
to make HALEU available, through lease contracts, for the production of
Mo-99 for medical uses. These sales, leases, and transfers also support
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, by down-blending HEU and
encouraging the use of LEU in civilian applications in lieu of HEU.
These sales, leases or transfers are conducted in accordance with
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., ``AEA''), as
amended, and other applicable law. Specifically, Title I, Chapters 6
and 14 of the AEA authorize DOE to sell or transfer special nuclear
material, including HALEU. The United States Enrichment Corporation
(USEC) Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-
[[Page 21114]]
134, 42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.) places certain limitations on DOE's
authority to sell or transfer uranium from its excess uranium
inventory. Specifically, under section 3112(d) of the USEC
Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10(d)), DOE may make certain sales
or transfers of natural uranium or LEU if the Secretary determines that
the sales or transfers ``will not have an adverse material impact on
the domestic uranium mining, conversion or enrichment industry, taking
into account the sales of uranium under the Russian Highly Enriched
Uranium Agreement and the Suspension Agreement.''
On November 23, 2021, the Secretary of Energy issued a
determination covering the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 kgU of
HALEU per calendar year to support the development and establishment of
Mo-99 production capabilities. For the reasons set forth in the
Department's ``Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium
Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment
Industries,'' which is incorporated into the Secretarial Determination,
the Secretary determined that these transactions will not have an
adverse material impact on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, or
enrichment industry. In accordance with section 306(a) of Division D,
Title III of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2015 (Pub. L. 113-235)), this determination is valid for no more
than two calendar years following the date of the Secretarial
Determination.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on April 5,
2022, by Corey Hinderstein, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of
Energy. The document with the original signature and date is maintained
by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE
Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit
the document in electronic format for publication, as an official
document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on April 6, 2022.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
Set forth below is the full text of the Secretarial Determination.
Secretarial Determination for the Sale, Lease, or Transfer of Certain
High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium for the Next Two Years
I determine that the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 kgU of
high-assay low enriched uranium (above 5 but less than 20 wt. percent
uranium-235) per calendar year to support the development and
establishment of molybdenum-99 production capabilities will not have an
adverse material impact on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, or
enrichment industry. I base my conclusions on the Department's Analysis
of Potential Impacts of Uranium Transfers on the Domestic Uranium
Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries, which is incorporated
herein. As explained in that document, I have considered, inter alia,
the requirements of the USEC Privatization Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 2297h
et seq.), the nature of uranium markets, and the current status of the
domestic uranium industries. I have also taken into account the sales
of uranium under the Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement and the
Suspension Agreement.
Date: November 23, 2021
Jennifer Granholm,
Secretary of Energy
Set forth below is the full text of the ``Analysis of Potential
Impacts of Certain Uranium Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining,
Conversion, and Enrichment Industries.''
Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium Transactions on the
Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries
I. Introduction
A. Legal Authority
The Department of Energy (DOE) manages its excess uranium inventory
in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.) (AEA), as amended, and other applicable laws. Specifically, Title
I, Chapters 6 and 14 of the AEA authorize DOE to sell or transfer
special nuclear material. Low enriched uranium (LEU) is a type of
special nuclear material.
The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Privatization Act
(Pub. L. 104-134, 42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.) places certain limitations
on DOE's authority to sell or transfer uranium from its excess uranium
inventory. Specifically, under section 3112(d) of the USEC
Privatization Act, DOE may make certain sales or transfers of natural
uranium or LEU if the Secretary determines that the sales or transfers
``will not have an adverse material impact on the domestic uranium
mining, conversion or enrichment industry, taking into account the
sales of uranium under the Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement
and the Suspension Agreement.'' (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10(d)(2)(B)). The
validity of any determination under this section is limited to no more
than two calendar years subsequent to the determination.\1\ The USEC
Privatization Act also covers sales or transfers of enriched uranium
for governmental purposes under section 3112(e), which are not subject
to the same limitations of section 3112(d).
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\1\ See section 306(a) of Division D, Title III of the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub.
L. 113-235).
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B. Transactions Considered in This Analysis
Two types of potential transactions are considered in this
analysis: (1) The lease of certain high-assay low enriched uranium
(HALEU) (LEU enriched above 5 weight (wt.) % U-235, but less than 20
wt. % U-235) for the production of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99); and (2) the
sale or transfer of HALEU to producers for use in medical isotope
research, development, and production.
The first type of transaction is authorized under the American
Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012 \2\ (AMIPA). AMIPA directs the
Department to establish a Uranium Lease and Take Back (ULTB) program to
lease LEU for irradiation to produce Mo-99 in the United States without
the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The leased material would be
used as either driver fuel for reactors employed in medical isotope
production, as target material for irradiation and extraction of Mo-99,
or both. The exact uses and designs vary by producer, but fission-based
production usually involves fabrication of uranium targets for
irradiation in a reactor, followed by chemical processing to extract
the Mo-99 for packaging into a generator and delivery to a
radiopharmacy.
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\2\ Public Law 112-239, Division C, Title XXXI, Subtitle F, 42
U.S.C. 2065.
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The second type of transaction considered in this analysis is a
sale or transfer of HALEU to producers for use in medical isotope
research and production processes that are not under the ULTB program
and do not meet the criteria of section 3112(e)(3) of the USEC
Privatization Act. Such uranium
[[Page 21115]]
sales or transfers would require a Secretarial Determination under
section 3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC Privatization Act as well as meeting
the other criteria of section 3112(d)(2).
The materials considered in this analysis would be transferred
during calendar years 2021 through 2023 and consist of no more than 750
kg of HALEU in any calendar year. Based on semi-annual LEU demand
surveys conducted to determine domestic producers' material needs,
DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) increased the
amount being assessed in this Determination from 500 kg per calendar
year for the last Determination (2019 to 2021), to 750 kg of HALEU per
calendar year during this Determination period. Assuming a tails assay
of 0.20 wt. % U-235, this quantity would be equivalent to approximately
28,700 kgU of natural uranium hexafluoride and approximately 33,850
separative work units (``SWU'') to produce 750 kg of HALEU at 19.75 wt.
% U-235.\3\
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\3\ The calculation is based on the Y-12 Standard Specification
for LEU Metal Supply for Mo-99 Isotope Production, which assumes
deliveries of quantities of 19.75 wt. % LEU. If any sale, lease, or
transfer includes material at an assay other than 19.75 wt. %, the
amount will be converted so that the total amount in any calendar
year is equivalent to no more than 750 kgU at 19.75 wt. %.
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II. Analytical Approach
The analytical approach relied on for previous Secretarial
Determinations covering the sale, transfer, or lease of excess uranium
for Mo-99 research and production (80 FR 65728, Oct. 27, 2015), the
ULTB program (81 FR 1409, Jan. 12, 2016), and the Secretarial
Determination for the Sale, Lease or Transfer of Uranium (signed and
dated November 26, 2019) is repeated here and updated to the extent
necessary.
This analysis evaluates the state of the domestic uranium
industries and the relevant impacts if DOE goes forward with these
potential transactions. DOE has developed a set of factors that this
analysis considers in assessing whether DOE's uranium sales and
transfers will have an ``adverse material impact'' on the domestic
uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industry:
1. Prices
2. Production at existing facilities
3. Employment levels in the industry
4. Changes in capital improvement plans and development of future
facilities
5. Long-term viability and health of the industry
6. Russian HEU Agreement and Russian Suspension Agreement
While no single factor is dispositive of the issue, DOE believes
that these factors are representative of the types of impacts that the
proposed sale, lease, or transfer may have on the domestic uranium
industries. Not every factor will necessarily be relevant on a given
occasion or to a particular industry; DOE intends this list of factors
only as a guide to its analysis.
III. Assessment of Potential Impacts
1. Prices
There is currently no commercial supplier for HALEU. Therefore,
there is no established market price for HALEU. DOE sets a price for
HALEU based on a combination of commercial market price components for
LEU, plus a charge for the separative work above the 5% LEU limit
reflecting the historical cost to DOE to produce this material.
The market value of 4.95% enriched LEU has risen 64% from its low
point in October 2017. Industry analysts forecast a continued increase
in the market value of LEU.\4\ The relatively small quantities of HALEU
provided by DOE have not impacted the price increases in this market.
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\4\ Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI-2006-2101/June 2021.
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Further, with no commercial provider for HALEU, the DOE sales and
leases of HALEU would not displace production or affect prices among
the commercial domestic uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment
industries, and even if it did, the amount would be so small that the
effects would be minimal.
2. Production at Existing Facilities
An analysis of the impact of the proposed sales and leases based on
an assessment of production at existing facilities is straightforward.
There is currently no commercial supplier of HALEU in the United
States. Due to the lack of a sufficient near-term market, owners and
operators of enrichment facilities have not developed commercial HALEU
enrichment capability to produce uranium enriched to 19.75 wt. % U-235.
With the closing of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 2013, the
only operational uranium enrichment facility in the United States is
the URENCO USA facility operated by Louisiana Energy Services, LLC, in
Eunice, New Mexico, which is currently licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to possess uranium only up to 5.5 wt. % U-235.\5\
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\5\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Materials License.
License Number SNM-2010, Amendment 57, Docket Number 70-3103.
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Further, it is not feasible for commercial Mo-99 producers to use
commercially available assays of LEU (i.e., LEU enriched to 5 wt. % U-
235 or less) instead of HALEU. Given the specialized uses, designs, and
regulatory requirements of the fuels and targets used for these isotope
production purposes, use of commercial-assay LEU would prevent the
reactor or target from achieving the same performance or efficiency and
thus from being used for their intended purposes.
Although the DOE sales and leases of HALEU would not displace
production among the commercial domestic uranium mining, conversion, or
enrichment industries, even if it did, the amount would be so small
that the effects would be minimal. With respect to these industries, to
produce the amount of HALEU in the proposed sales and leases from
primary production would require approximately 75,000 pounds of uranium
concentrates (U<INF>3</INF>O<INF>8</INF>), 28,700 kgU of conversion
services, and 33,850 SWU of enrichment services. By comparison, the
entire domestic fleet of nuclear reactors in 2020 required
approximately 43 million pounds of U<INF>3</INF>O<INF>8</INF>, 16.2
million kgU of conversion services, and about 14.8 million SWU.\6\
Therefore, the feed, conversion, and SWU content of the DOE material
represents 0.18%, 0.18%, and 0.23% of annual domestic requirements,
respectively.
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\6\ The global requirements information comes from an analysis
prepared by Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI-2006-2101/June 2021.
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The domestic conversion industry consists of only one facility that
historically produced between 10 million kgU and 12 million kgU per
year and reduced its capability to 7 million kgU in 2017. Honeywell,
the owner of the sole domestic conversion facility, suspended operation
in 2018, but recently announced that the plant would be restarted and
projected that production would begin in early 2023.\7\ Thus, although
there is currently no conversion occurring in the United States, there
are signs of the market improving given this recent announcement.
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\7\ Conversion Services Market update, Energy Resources
International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply and Price
Report, ERI-2006-2101/June 2021.
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As mentioned above, there is only one currently operating
commercial enrichment facility, URENCO USA's subsidiary, Louisiana
Energy Services (LES), LLC in the United States. The total capacity of
that facility is 4.9 million SWU.
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3. Employment Levels in the Industry
As stated above, DOE sales and leases of HALEU would not displace
production among the commercial domestic uranium mining, conversion, or
enrichment industries, and therefore will not affect employment levels
in these industries.
4. Changes in Capital Improvement Plans and Development of Future
Facilities
Although there is currently no domestic uranium enrichment
capability to produce HALEU, there have been recent noteworthy
developments. In 2019, the Department entered into a cost-shared
contract for a HALEU Demonstration Program with American Centrifuge
Operating, LLC (ACO), a subsidiary of the U.S. company, Centrus Energy
Corp. (``Centrus''). The Program has objectives to deploy a 16-machine
cascade of AC-100 M centrifuges in Piketon, Ohio to produce 19.75 wt. %
U-235 with US-origin enrichment technology that will result in a small
quantity of HALEU for use in research and development. In June 2021,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved ACO's license
amendment request to produce HALEU with an enrichment assay of up to 20
wt. % U-235 at the Piketon facility.\8\
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\8\ American Centrifuge Plant and HALEU, from an analysis
prepared by Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI-2006-2101/June 2021.
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In another recent development, URENCO USA provided a notice to the
NRC in April 2021 of its intent to amend the URENCO USA license to
increase the enrichment level up to 10 wt. % U-235. Submittal of the
initial license amendment request is expected later in 2021. URENCO USA
expects to have capability to deliver HALEU up to 10 wt. % U-235 in
2024. URENCO USA also has longer term plans to produce up to 19.75 wt.
% U-235.\9\
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\9\ High-Assay LEU, Urenco, from an analysis prepared by Energy
Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply and
Price Report, ERI-2006-2101/June 2021.
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However, the relatively small amounts of material covered by this
Determination have no impact on capital improvement plans and
development of future facilities including mines, conversion
facilities, and enrichment plants.
5. Long-Term Viability and Health of the Industry
There is currently no commercial supplier of HALEU in the United
States. Therefore, there is no long-term industry impact to assess. As
noted above, DOE is working with Centrus to establish a technology base
which could provide greater amounts of HALEU if commercialized. Long
term impacts of DOE material provided to the market will be assessable
when Centrus or another HALEU enricher are closer to entering the
nuclear fuel market.
6. Russian HEU Agreement and Russian Suspension Agreement
The Russian HEU Agreement ended in December 2013. The Russian
Suspension Agreement (``Suspension Agreement'') was extended on October
5, 2020 (85 FR 64112) and remains in force through 2040 with annual
export limits on Russian enriched uranium product sold to U.S.
utilities at commercially available assays (e.g., 5 wt. % U-235)
through FY2027 (85 FR 64112).\10\ The Suspension Agreement allows for
the sale of up to the following amounts of U-235 per year in 2021,
2022, and 2023 respectively: 26,254 kg, 21,543 kg, and 25,471 kg. The
relatively small amount of material covered by this Determination is
minimal compared to domestic needs for LEU and imports from the Russian
Federation.
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\10\ 2020 Amendment to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping
Investigation on Uranium From the Russian Federation, Federal
Register/Vol. 85, No. 197/Friday, October 9, 2020/Notices <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/09/2020-22431/2020-amendment-to-the-agreement-suspending-the-antidumping-investigation-on-uranium-from-the-russian">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/09/2020-22431/2020-amendment-to-the-agreement-suspending-the-antidumping-investigation-on-uranium-from-the-russian</a>.
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IV. Conclusion
With respect to the six factors listed above to assess market
impacts:
1. The relatively small amounts of material covered by this
Determination have no impact on the price of HALEU, for which there is
currently no commercial market price.
2. There are new developments in the industry, but licensing and
production timelines will not be impacted in the timeframe for this
Determination.
3. The relatively small amounts of material covered by this
Determination have no impact on employment levels in the mining,
conversion, or enrichment industries.
4. New market developments will not mature during this
Determination period to a point where the market could be impacted by
DOE sales or leases.
5. The relatively small amounts of material covered by this
Determination have no impact on the long-term viability and health of
the mining, conversion, and enrichment industries.
6. The Russian HEU Agreement and Russian Suspension Agreement are
not factors because there is no HALEU currently being imported from
Russia to the United States.
Thus, DOE concludes that the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750
kg of HALEU per calendar year to support the research, development, and
production of Mo-99 and other isotopes will not have an adverse
material impact on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, or
enrichment industry, taking into account the ended Russian HEU
Agreement and extended Russian Suspension Agreement.
[FR Doc. 2022-07667 Filed 4-8-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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