Special Conditions: Vector Aerospace Helicopter Services USA, Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 Helicopters; Stability Augmentation System and Automatic Flight Control System
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Issuing agencies
Abstract
These special conditions are issued for the Airbus Helicopters (Airbus) Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters. These helicopters, as modified by Vector Aerospace Helicopter Services USA (Vector), will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for helicopters. This design feature is the installation of a stability augmentation system and automatic flight control system (SAS/AFCS). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 6 (Monday, January 10, 2022)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 6 (Monday, January 10, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1068-1070]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2022-00096]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. FAA-2021-0705; Special Conditions No. 27-056-SC]
Special Conditions: Vector Aerospace Helicopter Services USA,
Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 Helicopters; Stability
Augmentation System and Automatic Flight Control System
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus Helicopters
(Airbus) Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters. These helicopters, as
modified by Vector Aerospace Helicopter Services USA (Vector), will
have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of
technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for helicopters.
This design feature is the installation of a stability augmentation
system and automatic flight control system (SAS/AFCS). The applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety
standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary
to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the
existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: These special conditions are effective January 10, 2022. Send
comments on or before February 24, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by Docket No. FAA-2021-0705 using
any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/">http://www.regulations.gov/</a> and follow the online instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
<bullet> Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590-0001.
<bullet> Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
<bullet> Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as
described in the following paragraph, and other information as
described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received
without change to <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/">http://www.regulations.gov/</a>, including any personal
information you provide. The FAA will also post a report summarizing
each substantive verbal contact received about this document.
Confidential Business Information: CBI is commercial or financial
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552),
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to
this document contain commercial or financial information that is
customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and
that is relevant or responsive to this document, it is important that
you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each
page of your submission containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will
treat such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and the
indicated comments will not be placed in the public docket of this
document. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Marie Hogestad,
Aircraft Information Systems Section, AIR-620, Technical Innovation
Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 S 216th Street, Des
Moines, WA 98198; telephone 206-231-3157; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a4e9c5d6cdc18aeccbc3c1d7d0c5c0e4c2c5c58ac3cbd2"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="93def2e1faf6bddbfcf4f6e0e7f2f7d3f5f2f2bdf4fce5">[email protected]</span></a>.
Comments the FAA receives, which are not specifically designated as
CBI, will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov/">http://www.regulations.gov/</a> at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marie Hogestad, Aircraft Information
Systems Section, AIR-620, Technical Innovation Policy Branch, Policy
and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal
Aviation Administration, 2200 S 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone 206-231-3157; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#95d8f4e7fcf0bbddfaf2f0e6e1f4f1d5f3f4f4bbf2fae3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="460b27342f23680e292123353227220620272768212930">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption
The FAA has determined, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B)
and 553(d)(3), that notice of, and opportunity for prior public comment
hereon are unnecessary because substantially identical special
conditions have been previously subject to the public comment process
in several prior instances such that the FAA is satisfied that new
comments are unlikely. For the same reason, the FAA finds that good
cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The
FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views
that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities
for comment.
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking
by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date for
comments. The FAA may change these special conditions based on the
comments received.
Background
On February 21, 2019, Vector applied for a supplemental type
certificate for the installation of SAS/AFCS on the Airbus Model
AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters. The Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3
helicopters are 14 CFR part 27 normal category, single turbine
[[Page 1069]]
engine, conventional helicopters designed for civil operation. These
helicopters can carry up to six passengers with one pilot and have a
maximum takeoff weight of up to 6,173 pounds, depending on the model
configuration. The major design features include a three-blade main
rotor, an anti-torque tail rotor system, skid landing gear, and a
visual flight rule basic avionics configuration. Vector proposes to
modify these model helicopters by installing the Thales Compact
Autopilot System (CAPS), which is a 4-axis SAS/AFCS.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, Vector must show that the
Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters, as changed, continue to
meet the applicable provisions of the regulations listed in Type
Certificate No. H9EU or the applicable regulations in effect on the
date of application for the change, except for earlier amendments as
agreed upon by the FAA.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (e.g., 14 CFR part 27) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3
helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, special
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on the same type
certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature,
these special conditions would also apply to the other model under
Sec. 21.101.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Feature
The Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters will incorporate
the following novel or unusual design feature: SAS/AFCS. An AFCS is a
system used to control the trajectory of an aircraft without constant
input from the pilot. The AFCS allows the pilot to focus on other
aspects of the operation, such as weather and other systems. SAS is
another automatic control system; however, instead of maintaining the
aircraft on a predetermined attitude or flight path, the SAS will
reduce pilot workload by dampening the aircraft buffeting regardless of
the attitude or flight path.
Discussion
The Thales CAPS (SAS/AFCS) utilizes serial and parallel actuators
installed in each control axis to provide an enhancement to basic
aircraft stability and handling qualities and allow fully automatic
vertical and lateral autopilot coupling. Consequently, the Thales CAPS
installed in the Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters may
include failure modes that could prevent continued safe flight and
landing.
When Sec. 27.1309(b) and (c) were promulgated, it was not
envisioned that this type of rotorcraft would use systems whose
failures could result in ``Catastrophic'' or ``Hazardous/Severe-Major''
failure conditions, or complex systems whose failures could result in
``Major'' failure conditions, as defined in FAA Advisory Circular 27-1B
Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft (AC 27-1B). Accordingly,
the crew's interaction with these types of systems and awareness of
their behavior and operating condition was not addressed. Paragraph (c)
of these special conditions addresses the crew's interaction with
information concerning unsafe system operating conditions. An unsafe
system operating condition would cause serious injuries or fatalities.
Therefore, 14 CFR 27.1309 (b) and (c) do not adequately address the
safety requirements to certify this type of system installation.
The Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters type certification
basis as modified by Vector does not contain adequate airworthiness
standards for the SAS/AFCS. Therefore these special conditions require
Vector to provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for
the final SAS/AFCS installation configuration to adequately address the
safety objectives established by the functional hazard assessment (FHA)
required by Sec. 27.1309. This process will ensure that Vector
adequately address all failure conditions and effects for the installed
SAS/AFCS.
The SSA process is part of the overall safety assessment process
discussed in AC 27-1B and Society of Automotive Engineers document
Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761, Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
Equipment.
These special conditions require that the SAS/AFCS installed on
Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters meet the requirements to
address the failure effects identified by the FHA adequately and
subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity
requirements.
Failure conditions are classified according to the severity of
their effects on the rotorcraft. Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document DO-178C, Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, provides software design
assurance levels most commonly used for the major, hazardous/severe-
major, and catastrophic failure condition categories. The SAS/AFCS
equipment should be qualified for the expected installation
environment. The FAA recognizes the test procedures prescribed in RTCA
Document DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for
Airborne Equipment, as acceptable methodologies for finding compliance
with the environmental requirements. Equivalent environment test
standards may also be acceptable.
The environmental qualification provides data to show that the SAS/
AFCS can perform its intended function under the expected operating
condition. Some of the main considerations for environmental concerns
are installation locations and the resulting exposure to environmental
conditions for the SAS/AFCS equipment, including considerations for
other equipment that may also be affected environmentally by the SAS/
AFCS equipment installation. The level of environmental qualification
must be related to the severity of the considered failure conditions
and effects on the rotorcraft.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters with the SAS/AFCS
installed. Should Vector apply at a later date for a supplemental type
certificate to modify any other model included on Type Certificate No.
H9EU to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these
special conditions would apply to that model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only a certain novel or unusual design feature
on the Airbus Model AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters. It is not a rule
of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to
the FAA for approval of these features on these helicopters.
[[Page 1070]]
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Authority Citation
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702,
44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for the Airbus Helicopters (Airbus) Model
AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters, as modified by Vector Aerospace
Helicopter Services USA.
For certification of the stability augmentation system and
automatic flight control system (SAS/AFSC) installed on Airbus Model
AS350B2 and AS350B3 helicopters, instead of the requirements of 14 CFR
27.1309(b) and (c), the following must be met:
(a) These systems and their equipment must be designed and
installed so that they do not adversely affect the safety of the
rotorcraft or its occupants.
(b) These systems and their associated components considered
separately and in relation to other systems must be designed and
installed so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is
extremely improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any hazardous failure condition is extremely
remote; and
(3) The occurrence of any major failure condition is remote.
(c) Information concerning an unsafe system operating condition
must be provided in a timely manner to the crew to enable them to take
appropriate corrective action. An appropriate alert must be provided if
immediate pilot awareness and immediate or subsequent corrective action
are required. These systems and their controls, including indications
and annunciations, must be designed to minimize crew errors that could
create additional hazards.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on January 4, 2022.
Patrick R. Mullen,
Manager, Technical Innovation Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-00096 Filed 1-7-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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