Notice2021-25898
Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Energy Sector Supply Chain Review
Primary source
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Published
November 29, 2021
Issuing agencies
Energy Department
Abstract
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Undersecretary for Science and Energy and Office of Policy (OP) request information on energy sector supply chains. This request for information (RFI) seeks input from all stakeholders involved directly and indirectly in the supply chains of energy, energy systems and technologies, and energy efficiency technologies from raw materials, processed materials, subcomponents, final products, to end-of-life material recovery and recycling--including but not limited to U.S. industry, researchers, academia, local governments, and civil society. This stakeholder input will inform the Department's efforts in building an energy sector industrial base that is diverse, resilient, and competitive while meeting economic, national security, and climate objectives.
Full Text
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[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 226 (Monday, November 29, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67695-67703]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2021-25898]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Energy Sector Supply
Chain Review
AGENCY: Undersecretary for Science and Energy and Office of Policy
(OP); Department of Energy (DOE).
ACTION: Request for information.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Undersecretary for Science
and Energy and Office of Policy (OP) request information on energy
sector supply chains. This request for information (RFI) seeks input
from all stakeholders involved directly and indirectly in the supply
chains of energy, energy systems and technologies, and energy
efficiency technologies from raw materials, processed materials,
subcomponents, final products, to end-of-life material recovery and
recycling--including but not limited to U.S. industry, researchers,
academia, local governments, and civil society. This stakeholder input
will inform the Department's efforts in building an energy sector
industrial base that is diverse, resilient, and competitive while
meeting economic, national security, and climate objectives.
DATES: Responses will be reviewed and considered on a rolling basis but
are due no later than 5 p.m. (ET) on January 15, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties are to submit comments online (Strongly
Preferred): Submit all electronic public comments to
<a href="http://www.regulations.gov/docket/DOE-HQ-2021-0020">www.regulations.gov/docket/DOE-HQ-2021-0020</a>. Click on the ``Comment''
icon, complete the required fields, and enter or attach your comments.
If you are unable to submit online, you may submit by email to
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a4d7d1d4d4c8ddc7ccc5cdcae4ccd58ac0cbc18ac3cbd2"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3b484e4b4b574258535a52557b534a155f545e155c544d">[email protected]</span></a> and include ``RFI: Supply Chain Review'' in the
subject line of the email. Email attachments can be provided as a
Microsoft Word (.docx) file or an Adobe PDF (.pdf) file, prepared in
accordance with the detailed instructions in the RFI. Documents
submitted electronically should clearly indicate which topic areas and
specific questions are being addressed and should be limited to no more
than 25MB in size. The complete RFI document is located at
<a href="http://www.energy.gov/policy">www.energy.gov/policy</a>. Please refer to the Disclaimer and Important
Note section at the end of this RFI on how to submit business sensitive
and/or confidential information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions may be addressed to
Tsisilile Igogo at 202-586-0048. Please direct media inquiries to
Jennifer Mosley through <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c5afa0ababaca3a0b7eba8aab6a9a0bc85adb4eba1aaa0eba2aab3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="117b747f7f787774633f7c7e627d74685179603f757e743f767e67">[email protected]</span></a>. Further
instructions can be found in the RFI document posted at <a href="http://www.energy.gov/policy">www.energy.gov/policy</a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Executive Order 14017 ``America's Supply Chains'' directs the
Secretary of Energy to ``submit a report on supply chains for the
energy sector industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of
Energy)'' within one year of the date of the order 86 FR 11849
(February 24, 2021). This RFI seeks public input to inform DOE on
approaches and actions needed to build resilient supply chains for the
energy sector. Resilient supply chains as defined by the Executive
Order 14017 means ``supply chains that are secure and diverse--
facilitating greater domestic production, a range of supply, built-in
redundancies, adequate stockpiles, safe and secure digital networks,
and a world-class American manufacturing base and workforce.''
DOE recognizes that meeting U.S. jobs, economic, and emissions
goals (which include a 50-52% reduction in emissions by 2030 from a
2005 baseline and net zero greenhouse gas emissions economy-wide by no
later than 2050), will require a significant number of clean energy
(and clean energy enabling) technologies to be deployed at a
dramatically increasing scale at a time when other countries are
expanding their clean energy sectors. DOE has identified technologies
and crosscutting topics for analysis in the timeframe set by the
Executive Order. The list of the selected technology sectors includes
solar photovoltaic (PV); wind; electric grid, including transformers
and high-voltage direct current (HVDC); energy storage; hydropower,
including pumped
[[Page 67696]]
storage hydropower (PSH); nuclear energy; fuel cells and electrolyzers;
semiconductors; neodymium magnets; platinum group metals and other
catalysts; and carbon capture materials. Crosscutting topics include
cybersecurity and digital components, and commercialization and
competitiveness. DOE has additional ongoing supply chain analysis on
other technologies and topics as well. For this effort, DOE is
reviewing the full supply chain--from raw materials, processed
materials, subcomponents, final products, to end-of-life material
recovery and recycling--for each technology. DOE is taking an in-depth
assessment in each of the selected technologies, including:
[cir] Mapping the supply chains;
[cir] Identifying existing and future threats, risks, and
vulnerabilities;
[cir] Identifying major barriers, including financial and
commercial, scientific, technical, regulatory and market;
[cir] Identifying conditions needed to help incentivize energy
sector companies and communities to both transfer energy manufacturing
back to and scale up supply chains in the United States.
[cir] Identifying areas where collaboration between the government
and private sector, as well as between government entities (federal,
state, local, and Tribal), is necessary to expand the energy industrial
base, what private sector leadership might look like in this area, and
where or how government can help; and
[cir] Identifying specific actions to address threats, risks, and
vulnerabilities and help build resilient supply chains.
This RFI seeks input from all stakeholders involved directly and
indirectly in the supply chains of energy and energy efficiency
technologies--including but not limited to U.S. industry, researchers,
academia, local governments, labor organizations, and civil society.
This stakeholder input will inform the Department's efforts to build an
energy sector industrial base that is diverse, resilient, and
competitive while meeting economic, national security, and climate
objectives.
This RFI seeks responses on the energy sector industrial base and
individual technologies as well as crosscutting topics. Specifically,
DOE is interested in gathering information relevant to the following
topic areas:
1. Crosscutting topics relating to the energy sector industrial base
2. Solar PV Technology
3. Wind Energy Technology
4. Energy Storage Technology
5. Electric Grid--Transformers and HVDC
6. Hydropower and Pumped Storage Technology
7. Nuclear Energy Technology
8. Fuel Cells and Electrolyzers
9. Semiconductors
10. Neodymium Magnets
11. Platinum Group Metals and other materials used as Catalysts
12. Carbon Capture, Storage, and Transportation Materials
13. Cybersecurity and Digital Components
14. Commercialization and Competitiveness
Questions for Input
This RFI is an initial step in improving DOE understanding of
interests, concerns, challenges, and policy needs of the private sector
and communities at large, with respect to manufacturing supply chains
of the evolving energy sector industrial base. This RFI is a general
solicitation for public input, which sets forth topics for discussion
and comment. Specific questions to which responses are requested for
each focus area are listed below. Respondents may provide input
regarding any or all the topic areas and may address any or all the
questions.
Area 1: Crosscutting Topics Relating to the Energy Sector Industrial
Base
The concept of the ``energy sector industrial base'' as a defined
group of critical industry partners does not currently exist in the
same way that it does for the Defense Industrial Base. The one-year
reports responding to Executive Order 14017 present an opportunity to
define the energy sector industrial base.
This section targets crosscutting/technology neutral input; for
technology specific comments, please respond in the respective
technology in Area 2 to Area 13.
1. How would you define the energy sector industrial base? For the
purposes of informing comprehensive supply chain policies--including
promoting supply chain resilience--what entities are included or not
included in the energy sector industrial base?
2. For adoption of clean energy technologies in the United States,
what are the crosscutting vulnerabilities and gaps in the supply chain
and manufacturing capabilities given the likely ramp-up in demand for
these technologies?
3. What are opportunities to expand domestic energy-related
manufacturing in the United States? What conditions will lead
manufacturers to reshore or expand domestic clean energy manufacturing?
4. How can the government partner with the private sector and
communities to build domestic energy manufacturing capabilities? What
investments and other policy mechanisms are needed to enable these
partnerships?
5. How can policies and programs that support domestic energy
manufacturing also support workforce opportunities and the creation of
competitive, long-term manufacturing careers, especially for
communities impacted by energy transition?
Area 2: Solar PV Technology
1. What are the current and future supply chain gaps and
vulnerabilities as we scale up the adoption and use of solar PV
technologies? Of these gaps and vulnerabilities, which are the most
crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
2. Where in the solar PV supply chain does it make sense for the
U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and the
long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities
for the U.S. to build durable domestic capabilities of solar PV
manufacturing? For areas in the supply chain where U.S. opportunities
to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, which foreign
countries or regions should the U.S. government prioritize for
engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, and what actions
should the government take to help ensure resilience in these areas of
the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize
opportunities to build domestic solar PV manufacturing? What conditions
are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the solar PV
supply chains to build and expand domestic manufacturing capabilities?
4. How can government (federal, state, local, and Tribal) help the
private sector and communities involved in solar PV manufacturing build
and expand domestic solar PV manufacturing in the U.S.? What investment
and policy actions are needed to support domestic manufacturing of
solar PV?
5. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the
solar PV manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills, which ones are
lacking in current education/training programs? What resources
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the solar PV
workforce? What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and
other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training
[[Page 67697]]
activities? What new education programs should be included (developed?)
to prepare the workforce?
6. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 3: Wind Energy Technology
The following questions may have different applicability to land-
based wind and offshore wind. In your response, please note whether the
response is applicable to land-based wind, offshore wind, or both.
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as
we scale up the adoption and use of wind energy technologies? Of these
vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the U.S. to address and
focus on and why?
2. Where in the wind energy technology supply chain does it make
sense for the U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the
short-term and the long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you
see opportunities for the U.S to build domestic capabilities of wind
energy technology manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should
the U.S. not prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic
manufacturing capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain
where U.S. opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities
are limited, which foreign countries or regions should the U.S.
government prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable
partnerships, and what actions should the government take to help
ensure resilience in these areas of the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these
opportunities to attract or expand land-based or offshore wind energy
technology manufacturing in the U.S.? What conditions are needed to
help incentivize companies involved in the wind energy technology
supply chains to both attract and expand wind energy technology
manufacturing in the U.S.?
4. How can the federal government help the private sector and
interested communities attract and expand land-based or offshore wind
energy technology manufacturing in U.S.? What investment and policy
actions are needed to support domestic manufacturing of wind energy
technologies?
5. In implementing policy to support expansion of the domestic wind
energy technology supply chain, how should the federal government
prioritize tier 1 (major components such as nacelles, blades, towers,
or offshore foundations) and lower-tier (other components,
subcomponents, raw and processed material inputs) manufacturing? Do you
agree with this tiering? If not, why?
6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support
wind (onshore and offshore) energy technology manufacturing supply
chains? Of those skills, which ones are lacking in current education/
training programs? What resources (including time) and structures would
be needed to train the wind energy workforce? What worker groups,
secondary education facilities, and other stakeholders could be
valuable partners in these training activities? What new education
programs should be included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
7. How can the federal government most effectively expand and
improve logistics networks for large wind energy technology components,
both land-based and offshore? For land-based wind energy technology,
how could the federal government ease transportation of large
components across jurisdictions (e.g., R&D to modularize components,
funding for permit harmonization, funding for specific infrastructure
improvements to allow for greater throughput and/or movement of larger
components)? For offshore wind energy technology, how can the federal
government best support the development of Jones Act-compliant vessels
and necessary port infrastructure?
8. How can the federal government most effectively support
increasing circularity (collection and reuse, remanufacturing or
refurbishing, and recycling) in wind energy technologies and supply
chains, especially for rare-earth element magnets and hard-to-recycle
components such as blades?
9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 4: Energy Storage Technology
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as
we scale up the adoption and use of energy storage technologies? Of
these vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the U.S. to
address and focus on and why?
2. Which storage technologies have the greatest chance of achieving
long-duration storage targets (>10 hours) and what specific supply
chain vulnerabilities are present for these technologies?
3. Where in the energy storage technology supply chain does it make
sense for the U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the
short-term and long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see
opportunities for the U.S to build domestic capabilities of energy
storage technology manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should
the U.S. not prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic
manufacturing capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain
where U.S. opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities
are limited, which foreign countries or regions should the U.S.
government prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable
partnerships, and what actions should the government take to help
ensure resilience in these areas of the supply chain?
4. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these
opportunities to build domestic energy storage technology
manufacturing? What conditions are needed to help incentivize companies
involved in the energy storage technology supply chains to build and
expand domestic manufacturing capabilities?
5. How can government help the private sector and communities
involved in energy storage technology manufacturing build and expand
domestic manufacturing? What investment and policy actions are needed
to support domestic manufacturing of energy storage technologies?
6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the
energy storage technology manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills,
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the
energy storage technology workforce? What worker groups, secondary
education facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners
in these training activities? What new education programs should be
included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
7. How can the government help increase the market demand for
responsibly sourced materials (e.g., sustainable or recycled) for
energy storage technologies? What mechanisms exist to encourage the use
of these materials and recycling/reuse solutions? How can the federal
government most effectively support increasing circularity (collection,
reuse or processing, and recycling) in energy storage technologies and
supply chains?
8. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
[[Page 67698]]
Topic Area 5: Electric Grid--Transformers and HVDC
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities
given the anticipated growth in demand for electric grid technologies
to support decarbonization, particularly large power transformers (LPT)
and high-voltage, direct current technology (HVDC)? Of the
vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the U.S. to address and
focus on and why?
2. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S to
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and the long-
term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for
the U.S to build domestic capabilities of LPT and HVDC manufacturing?
What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not prioritize for
attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing capabilities, and
why? For areas in the supply chain where U.S. opportunities to build
domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, which foreign
countries or regions should the U.S. government prioritize for
engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, and what actions
should the government take to help ensure resilience in these areas of
the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these
opportunities to build domestic LPT and HVDC manufacturing? What
conditions are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the LPT
and HVDC supply chains to build and expand domestic manufacturing
capabilities?
4. How can government help the private sector and communities
involved in energy storage manufacturing build and expand domestic
manufacturing capabilities? What investment and policy actions are
needed to support domestic manufacturing of LPT and HVDC?
5. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the
LPT and HVDC manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills, which ones
are lacking in current education/training programs? What resources
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the LPT and
HVDC workforce? What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and
other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training
activities? What new education programs should be included (developed?)
to prepare the workforce?
6. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 6: Hydropower and Pumped Storage Technology
* Hydropower refers to hydropower and pumped storage hydropower.
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities
given the anticipated growth in demand for hydropower technology to
support decarbonization? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the most
crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
2. Are there any hydropower generation plant components that are
critical to operations and depend on extended supply chains (e.g., long
time needed to procure a replacement for the component)? Do any of the
critical-to-operation components with extended supply chains have a
high risk of failure or the potential to negatively impact entire plant
operations? Which components are harder to procure domestically
(meaning domestically manufactured) and typically need to be imported?
3. Do you have concerns about ``extinct'' supply chains where
components need to be produced on an ad hoc basis from bespoke
component developers? Are there components that have a long lead time
because they have to be fabricated? Are components (e.g., programmable
logic controllers (PLCs)) being replaced before the end of their useful
life because of supply chain risks (e.g., manufacturers no longer
supporting certain legacy equipment, not producing replacement parts
for it anymore)?
4. For components that are not unique to hydropower plants (e.g.,
batteries, transformers), have there been shortages or difficulties for
hydropower plants to secure the components due to competition from
other uses within the electric generation sector (e.g., wind and solar
generation, batteries for grid storage)?
5. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S to
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and long-term,
and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for the
U.S. to build the domestic supply chain of hydropower technology
component manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S.
not prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing
capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain where U.S.
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited,
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships,
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience
in these areas of the supply chain?
6. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these
opportunities for domestic hydropower technology component
manufacturing in the U.S.? What conditions are needed to help
incentivize companies involved in the hydropower technology components
manufacturing to build and expand operations in the U.S.?
7. How can government help the private sector and communities
involved in hydropower components manufacturing onshore and scale up
hydropower components manufacturing in the U.S.? What investment and
policy actions are needed to support domestic manufacturing of
hydropower technology component manufacturing?
8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the
hydropower technology manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills,
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the
hydropower workforce? What worker groups, secondary education
facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these
training activities? What new education programs should be included
(developed?) to prepare the workforce?
9. How are hydropower plant components disposed of at the end of
their operational life? Are there practices already in place or being
considered to contribute to a circular economy \1\ approach involving
recycling? What barriers are associated with recycling and reuse of
hydropower components? How can the federal government most effectively
support increasing circularity (collection, reuse or processing, and
recycling) of hydropower components?
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\1\ ``Circular economy--is an industrial system that is
restorative or regenerative by intention and design.'' Circular
economy aims to reduce waste of resources by maximizing use,
recovery, reuse, and recycling of products. <a href="https://reports.weforum.org/toward-the-circular-economy-accelerating-the-scale-up-across-global-supply-chains/from-linear-to-circular-accelerating-a-proven-concept/">https://reports.weforum.org/toward-the-circular-economy-accelerating-the-scale-up-across-global-supply-chains/from-linear-to-circular-accelerating-a-proven-concept/</a>.
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10. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 7: Nuclear Energy Technology
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as
we continue operation of existing commercial nuclear reactors and
accelerate the deployment of new reactor technologies? Of these
vulnerabilities, which are the most
[[Page 67699]]
crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
2. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S. to
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and long-term,
and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for the
U.S. to build domestic capabilities of nuclear energy technology
manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not
prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing
capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain where
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited,
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships,
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience
in these areas of the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these
opportunities to build the domestic nuclear energy technology supply
chain? What conditions are needed to help incentivize companies
involved in the nuclear energy technology supply chain to build and
expand domestic manufacturing capabilities?
4. How can government help the private sector and communities
involved in nuclear energy technology manufacturing build and expand
domestic manufacturing? What investment and policy actions are needed
to support onshoring the nuclear energy supply chain?
5. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the
nuclear energy technology supply chain? Of those skills, which ones are
lacking in current education/training programs? What resources
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the nuclear
energy technology workforce? What worker groups, secondary education
facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these
training activities? What new education programs should be included
(developed?) to prepare the workforce?
6. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 8: Fuel Cells & Electrolyzers
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities for
fuel cells and electrolyzers? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the
most crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
2. Where in the fuel cell and electrolyzer supply chain does it
make sense for the U.S to focus and prioritize its efforts in the
short-, medium-, and long-term and why? Where in the supply chain do
you see opportunities for the U.S. to build domestic capabilities of
fuel cell and electrolyzer manufacturing? What areas of the supply
chain should the U.S. not prioritize for attraction or expansion of
domestic manufacturing capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply
chain where U.S. opportunities to build domestic manufacturing
capabilities are limited, which foreign countries or regions should the
U.S. government prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable
partnerships, and what actions should the government take to help
ensure resilience in these areas of the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the ability to expand domestic fuel cell
and electrolyzer manufacturing capacity?
4. What conditions (economic drivers, policies, or investment) are
needed to help incentivize companies involved in the fuel cell and
electrolyzer supply chains to build and expand domestic manufacturing
capabilities? What will be needed to double and eventually increase
manufacturing capacity by an order of magnitude?
5. What conditions (economic drivers, policies, or investment) are
needed to ensure the long-term health of domestic fuel cell and
electrolyzer supply chains? What will be needed to prevent future
issues in that supply chain?
6. How can the U.S. government help the fuel cell and electrolyzer
industry build and expand domestic manufacturing capabilities? What
economic drivers, investment, and policy actions will help accelerate
domestic fuel cell and electrolyzer manufacturing?
7. What conditions (economic drivers, policies, or investment) are
needed to increase recycling/re-use of critical materials and
components for fuel cells and electrolyzers and minimize supply
disruptions? How can the U.S. government facilitate the reduction of
critical material requirements and increase recyclability at end-of-
life for fuel cells and electrolyzers?
8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the
fuel cell and electrolyzer supply chain? Of those skills, which ones
are lacking in current education/training programs? What resources
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the fuel cell
and electrolyzer technology workforce? What worker groups, secondary
education facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners
in these training activities? What new education programs should be
included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 9: Semiconductors
1. What is the current state of U.S. and global supply chains for
both conventional semiconductors used in data and sensor applications
related to the energy sector and wide bandgap semiconductors used for
controlling power flow in power electronics applications? What are the
current and future semiconductor supply chain vulnerabilities as we
scale up our efforts to transform the energy sector (energy supply,
energy efficiency, demand technologies, grid, fuels, etc.) to support
decarbonization? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial
for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
2. For both conventional and wide bandgap semiconductors used in
the energy sector, where in the supply chain does it make sense for the
U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and the
long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities
for the U.S. to build domestic capabilities for semiconductors
manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not
prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing
capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain where U.S.
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited,
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships,
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience
in these areas of the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize
opportunities to build domestic semiconductor manufacturing? What
conditions are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the
semiconductor supply chains to build domestic manufacturing
capabilities and scale up manufacturing? How do these challenges and
conditions differ between conventional and wide bandgap semiconductors?
4. How can government help private sector and communities involved
in semiconductor manufacturing build domestic manufacturing
capabilities and scale up semiconductor manufacturing? What specific
government policies or investments will be most important in supporting
semiconductor manufacturing and supply chain resilience?
[[Page 67700]]
5. What are opportunities for improving energy efficiency in
semiconductors? How can the government help the private sector achieve
competitive advantages in domestic manufacturing of more energy
efficient semiconductors?
6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support
semiconductor manufacturing? Of those skills, which ones are lacking in
current education/training programs? What resources (including time)
and structures would be needed to train the semiconductor technology
workforce? What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and
other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training
activities? What new education programs should be included (developed?)
to prepare the workforce?
7. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 10: Neodymium Magnets
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as
we scale up our efforts to the transform the energy sector to support
decarbonization (such as significant increases in demand for magnets in
direct drive or hybrid wind turbines and traction motors for electric
vehicles)? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the
U.S. to address and focus on and why? Are there supply chain
vulnerabilities associated with manufacturing equipment, and, if so,
what are they?
2. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S. to
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and long-term
and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for the
U.S. to build domestic capabilities for manufacturing neodymium
magnets--with an emphasis on the manufacturing of sintered neodymium-
iron-boron magnets used in electric vehicle traction motors and wind
turbine drives? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not
prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing
capabilities, and why? For areas in supply chain where U.S.
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited,
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships,
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience
in these areas of the supply chain?
3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these
opportunities to build domestic neodymium magnets manufacturing? What
conditions are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the
neodymium magnets supply chains to build and expand domestic
manufacturing capabilities?
4. What factors are necessary to promote resiliency in different
stages of the magnet supply chain for neodymium magnets, and how can
the U.S. government incentivize these factors?
5. How can government help the private sector and communities
involved in neodymium magnet manufacturing build and expand domestic
manufacturing capabilities? What specific government policies or
investments will be most important in supporting neodymium magnets
manufacturing and supply chain resilience?
6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support
magnet manufacturing? How long does it take to train this workforce? Of
those skills, which ones are lacking in current education/training
programs? What resources (including time) and structures would be
needed to train the magnet technology workforce? What worker groups,
secondary education facilities, and other stakeholders could be
valuable partners in these training activities? What new education
programs should be included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
7. What happens to neodymium magnets when associated end products
reach the end-of-life? What barriers, if any, exist in collection of
magnets containing products for eventual recycling or recovery? How can
the federal government most effectively support increasing circularity
(collection, reuse or processing, and recycling) of neodymium magnets?
8. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 11: Platinum Group Metals Catalysts
1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities of
platinum group metals (PGM) catalysts as we scale up the adoption and
use of industrial decarbonization technologies and energy storage
technologies, including fuel cell, electrolyzer, and chemical
manufacturing technologies?
2. Where in the PGM catalysts supply chain does it make sense for
the U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in short-term and
long-term and why?
3. If the U.S. had domestic PGM separation capacity, to what extent
would this improve the ability of domestic mines (or secondary
producers) to be competitive? To what extent would this improve the
ability of domestic catalyst producers to be more competitive?
4. How can government help private sector and communities scale up
the production of PGM catalysts needed for manufacturing in the U.S.?
What specific government policies or investments will be most important
in supporting PGM catalysts manufacturing for industrial
decarbonization technologies, energy storage applications, and supply
chain resilience?
5. How do the compositions and manufacturing processes of PGM
catalysts for fuel cells and electrolyzers differ from those of PGM
catalysts used in catalytic converters? How difficult is it for
catalyst manufacturing facilities to produce multiple types of
catalysts?
6. What is the recovery and reuse potential of PGM used in
catalytic converter, fuel cell, electrolyzer, and chemical
manufacturing technologies? What technological challenges exist to
recover PGM from catalysts and incorporate PGM into different
applications of catalysts? What are the areas of opportunities for the
U.S. to onshore the supply chain of PGM manufacturing for catalytic
applications, including catalytic converters, fuel cells, electrolyzer
technologies, and chemical manufacturing?
7. What happens to PGM catalysts when fuel cells and electrolyzers
reach the end-of-life? Are there any known barriers to recycling
materials from electrolyzers and fuel cells at the end-of-life? How
does recycling of PGM from electrolyzers and fuel cells differ from
recycling PGM from catalytic converters? How can the federal government
most effectively support increasing circularity (collection, reuse or
processing, and recycling) of PGM catalysts?
8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support PGM
catalyst manufacturing? Of those skills, which ones are lacking in
current education/training programs? What resources (including time)
and structures would be needed to train the PGM catalyst workforce?
What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and other
stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training activities?
What new education programs should be included (developed?) to prepare
the workforce?
9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
[[Page 67701]]
Area 12: Carbon Capture, Conversion, Transport, and Storage Materials
1. Which materials do you consider critical for carbon capture,
conversion, transport, and storage technologies? Will this change as
the U.S. scales up deployment over the next 30 years? Are there
substitutes for these materials, and can they be ready for large scale
deployment in 10, 20 years? What policies or government actions can
help incentivize domestic production of these critical materials as
well as production of substitutes?
2. For carbon capture, what materials are needed for the commercial
and emerging separation process and balance of plant? What is the
current domestic and global capacity to manufacture these materials,
and is growth reasonable to meet demand in the next 10 to 20 years?
3. For carbon conversion, what materials are necessary for the
transformation of CO<INF>2</INF> into other products? Are catalysts and
reactants readily available in the market? Are there known barriers to
the availability or scaling up for the market to provide the materials
if adopted at scales necessary to decarbonize?
4. For transport, are there specific critical materials necessary
for the coating and compressors for pipeline infrastructure systems?
Are there supply chain issues related to obtaining these materials?
5. For carbon storage, what are the specific critical materials
necessary for non-reactive cements and well bore casings necessary to
meet the existing underground injection control regulations? Are there
barriers to increasing supply and manufacturing capacity for rapid
deployment of carbon capture and storage?
6. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as
the U.S. scales up the adoption and use of the carbon capture and
conversion technologies needed to transform the energy and
manufacturing sectors to a low carbon future? Of these vulnerabilities,
which are the most crucial for the U.S. to address and why?
7. Which carbon capture, conversion, transport, and storage
materials should the government focus and prioritize its efforts on
both in the short-term and the long-term, and why?
8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support
production of carbon capture, conversion, transport, and storage
materials or critical materials production in general? Of those skills,
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the
carbon capture and utilization technology workforce? What worker
groups, secondary education facilities, and other stakeholders could be
valuable partners in these training activities? What new education
programs should be included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?
Area 13: Cybersecurity and Digital Components
For purposes of this supply chain review, digital components in the
energy sector industrial base include firmware, software, virtual
platforms and service, data, and industrial control systems. Please
include any comments on this scoping in your response.
1. How should the government approach hardening of digital
component supply chains for the energy sector industrial base against
physical and virtual tampering and national security threats? How
should the federal government prioritize protection of digital
component supply chains?
2. Cyber threats to the critical infrastructure, including an
explosion in Ransomware attacks, is a growing national security concern
that can be enabled through digital component supply chain
vulnerabilities, and there are several national initiatives underway to
counter this threat. Are there energy sector-specific considerations or
priorities the government should consider to support hardening of
digital component supply chains against cyber threats including the use
of ransomware?
3. What steps should the government take to improve the
trustworthiness of digital components in the energy sector industrial
base and reduce reliance on untrusted software suppliers, integrators,
and maintenance?
4. Global digital component supply chains are highly dynamic and
complex. What policies should the government pursue to illuminate
provenance of digital components in energy sector systems? For example,
who developed software, or hosts digital platforms, or curated data
sets, and in what country? Who maintains these digital assets (if
anyone) and who may have continuing access for maintenance? How should
the government approach prioritizing digital components and/or systems
to illuminate or examine components to manage supply chain risk?
5. Providers of digital components may not have the same supply
chain security requirements as asset owners in the energy sector. Given
the interconnected nature and transitive risk among different digital
components that comprise energy sector systems, how should the
government address gaps and/or ensure consistency for supply chain
security requirements for digital components?
6. An increasing trend in the energy sector is remote operation of
systems. What policy steps should the government take to ensure the
supply chain security of platforms and services used to operate
critical functions in the energy sector?
7. Aggregated and curated data has become a valuable global
commodity (e.g., data as a service) and is now a critical part of
global digital supply chains. Data presents a cyber supply chain risk
similar to that posed by software; specifically, malicious manipulation
can cause significant and nearly impossible-to-detect system failures.
With the increasing application of artificial intelligence/machine
learning capabilities to energy sector systems, what policy steps could
the government take to manage the cyber supply chain risk of data?
8. How can the government encourage and/or incentivize private
sector owners and operators of energy sector critical infrastructure to
include more national security risk considerations in their business
risk decisions?
9. What specific skills are needed to develop and increase the
workforce to support building, operating, and maintaining secure
digital components for the energy sector industrial base? For example,
is there a skills gap and/or supply gap in the workforce that develops
and maintains software for industrial control systems? Of those skills,
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the
cybersecurity workforce? What worker groups, secondary education
facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these
training activities? What new education programs should be included
(developed?) to prepare the workforce?
10. What other input the should the federal government be aware of
to support a resilient supply chain of cybersecurity and digital
components?
Area 14: Commercialization and Competitiveness
1. What data, methodologies, and metrics can help assess current
and future competitive advantages for clean energy technologies?
2. What existing economic and market analysis do you rely on to
assess current
[[Page 67702]]
and projected technology market demand?
3. Where do you see opportunities for government actions to shift
business-as-usual investment and market trends in a way that is
supportive of resilient domestic supply chains?
4. For what clean technologies and applications does the U.S.
currently have a competitive advantage over other countries?
5. For what clean technologies and applications is the U.S.
significantly at a disadvantage over other countries? What moves are
other governments making to increase their advantage over the U.S.?
6. Where might additional federal investment or policy support U.S.
leadership in particular clean technology categories or sectors in the
next ten years? What specific investment or policy action will be
needed to support these technologies?
7. What frameworks can help assess the relative competitiveness and
commercialization potential of various clean technologies?
8. What do you see as important nascent markets and technologies
that may see significant growth in the next 10-15 years? What specific
policies can help support U.S. leadership in these technologies and
sectors?
9. Given the complexity of global supply chains, how do you assess
the costs and benefits of various global supply chain patterns and
dynamics, including concentrations of supply and demand?
10. How do U.S. trade policies impact the commercialization and
competitiveness of clean technologies in the U.S.? Where might changes
to trade policy positively impact U.S. competitiveness in clean tech
sectors?
11. What new and innovative actions can the government take to
encourage commercialization of U.S. innovation and increase U.S.
competitiveness?
12. What non-economic and non-financial factors are most
significant in determining U.S. competitiveness in a given clean
technology sector?
Response Preparation and Transmittal Instructions
Submit all electronic public comments to this RFI to
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Disclaimer and Important Note
This RFI is not a Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA), prize, or
any other type of solicitation; therefore, DOE is not accepting
applications at this time. DOE may issue a FOA or other solicitation in
the future based on or related to the content and responses to this
RFI; however, DOE may also elect not to issue a FOA or solicitation.
There is no guarantee that a FOA or solicitation will be issued as a
result of this RFI. Responding to this RFI does not provide any
advantage or disadvantage to potential applicants if DOE chooses to
issue a FOA regarding the subject matter. Final details, including the
anticipated award size, quantity, and timing of DOE funded awards, will
be subject to Congressional appropriations and direction.
Any information obtained as a result of this RFI is intended to be
used by the Government on a non-attribution basis for planning and
strategy development. This RFI does not constitute a formal
solicitation for proposals or abstracts. Your response to this notice
will be treated as information only. DOE will review and consider all
responses in its formulation of program strategies for the identified
materials of interest that are the subject of this request. DOE will
not provide reimbursement for costs incurred in responding to this RFI.
[[Page 67703]]
Respondents are advised that DOE is under no obligation to acknowledge
receipt of the information received or provide feedback to respondents
with respect to any information submitted under this RFI. Responses to
this RFI do not bind DOE to any further actions related to this topic.
Confidential Business Information: Pursuant to 10 CFR 1004.11, any
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It is DOE's policy that all comments may be included in the public
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Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on November
18, 2021, by Carla Frisch, Acting Executive Director and Principal
Deputy Director, Office of Policy, pursuant to delegated authority from
the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and
date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in
compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on November 23, 2021.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2021-25898 Filed 11-26-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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