Notice2021-25269
Department of Energy Final Decision and Reasoning Response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements
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Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
November 19, 2021
Issuing agencies
Energy Department
Abstract
On June 1, 2021, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued the reaffirmation and revision of Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements, to the Department of Energy. In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 the following represents the Secretary of Energy's final decision and the reasoning for such decision on the recommendation.
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 86 Issue 221 (Friday, November 19, 2021)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 221 (Friday, November 19, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64918-64921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2021-25269]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Department of Energy Final Decision and Reasoning Response to
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear
Safety Requirements
AGENCY: Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, Department
of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: On June 1, 2021, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
issued the reaffirmation and revision of Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear
Safety Requirements, to the Department of Energy. In accordance with
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 the following represents the Secretary of
Energy's final decision and the reasoning for such decision on the
recommendation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Mark Do, Office of the
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC
20585, or telephone number (301) 903-6460, or email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#561b37243d781239163e277832393378313920"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c489a5b6afea80ab84acb5eaa0aba1eaa3abb2">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 1, 2021, the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board issued the reaffirmation and revision of
Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements, to the Department
of Energy. In accordance with section 315 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286d(e)), the Secretary of Energy's final decision and
the reasoning for such decision pertaining to Recommendation 2020-1 are
printed in full at the conclusion of this notice.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on November
15, 2021, by Joe Olencz, Departmental
[[Page 64919]]
Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Office
of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, pursuant to delegated
authority from the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original
signature and date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes
only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of the Department of Energy. This
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on November 16, 2021.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
Summary: This notice, together with its attachments, memorializes
the Secretary of Energy's final decision and reasoning for such
decision pertaining to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB
or Board) Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements.
Discussion: The Board issued Recommendation 2020-1 on February 21,
2020. The Recommendation was published in the Federal Register on March
13, 2020 (85 FR 14658). The Secretary of Energy responded to the DNFSB
in the letter dated June 11, 2020, indicating that the Department of
Energy (DOE) partially accepted Recommendation 2020-1. DOE's response
was published in the Federal Register on June 19, 2020 (85 FR 37086).
In response to DOE's partial acceptance, the DNFSB revised and
reaffirmed Recommendation 2020-1 on June 1, 2021. In this revision and
reaffirmation, the Board acknowledged DOE's completion of the
rulemaking for 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear
Safety Management, and made a number of revisions to specific sub-
recommendations within Recommendation 2020-1.
In a letter to the DNFSB dated September 8, 2021, the Secretary of
Energy accepted Recommendation 2020-1, and provided details of the
reasoning for this acceptance. This response constitutes the
Secretary's final decision for the Recommendation. The Secretary of
Energy's final decision and reasoning are included as attachments to
this notice.
This notice is in accordance with 42 United States Code (U.S.C.)
Section 2286d paragraph (e), which states:
If the Secretary of Energy, in a response under subsection
(c)(1), rejects (in whole or part) any recommendation made by the
Board under section 2286a of this title, the Board shall either
reaffirm its original recommendation or make a revised
recommendation and shall notify the Secretary of its action. Within
30 days after receiving the notice of the Board's action under this
subsection, the Secretary shall consider the Board's action and make
a final decision on whether to implement all or part of the Board's
recommendations. Subject to subsection (i), the Secretary shall
publish the final decision and the reasoning for such decision in
the Federal Register and shall transmit to the Committees on Armed
Services, Appropriations, and Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services,
Appropriations, and Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a
written report containing that decision and reasoning.
Attachment 1
September 8, 2021
The Honorable Joyce Connery
Chair, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004
Dear Chair Connery:
The Department of Energy (DOE) acknowledges receipt of your letter
dated June 1, 2021, which both reaffirms and revises Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety
Requirements. The initial issuance of Recommendation 2020-1, dated
February 21, 2020, asserted that DOE's August 2018 proposed revisions
to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety
Management, would erode DOE's nuclear safety regulatory framework. In
its June 11, 2020, response which states that ``the changes to 10 CFR
part 830 will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DOE's nuclear
safety framework while continuing to ensure adequate protection of
public and worker health and safety across the DOE complex,'' DOE
disagreed with the DNFSB's assertions. On October 19, 2020, DOE
published the Final Rule amending 10 CFR part 830, addressing and
incorporating comments from the DNFSB and members of the public as part
of the formal rulemaking process. (85 FR 66201).
Following our recent evaluation of your updated Recommendation
2020-1, the Department continues to conclude that its current
regulatory framework, as revised by the October 2020 rulemaking,
provides adequate protection of public and worker health and safety
across the DOE complex. However, I accept Recommendation 2020-1, as
detailed in the enclosure, which constitutes my Final Decision for this
Recommendation. DOE agrees with addressing the technical concerns
raised by the Board, but DOE cannot commit to a specific outcome in a
future rulemaking and will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate
whether any changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through a
future rulemaking process.
The enclosure updates DOE's June 11, 2020, response for several
sub-recommendations to reflect revisions to Recommendation 2020-1. We
believe DOE's implementation plan will meet the safety improvement
objectives of the DNFSB's Recommendation.
DOE appreciates the Board's advice and will continue working
closely with the Board and its staff to continuously improve DOE's
nuclear safety regulatory framework in a manner that meets our shared
objective to ensure the continued safe, effective, and efficient
execution of DOE's mission.
To ensure that our implementation plan will meet the underlying
safety improvement objectives of the DNFSB's Recommendation, DOE will
engage in frequent staff level interactions during the preparation of
the plan. The Board cited these constructive interactions during the
most recent preparation of an implementation plan as a potential best
practice, and we look forward to enhancing and improving our
interactions during this process as well.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Matthew Moury,
Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety and Security,
at 202-586-1285.
Sincerely,
Jennifer Granholm
Enclosure
Attachment 2
Enclosure--Department of Energy Response to DNFSB Recommendation 2020-
1, Nuclear Safety Requirements
The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) has evaluated the
reaffirmed and revised Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB
or Board) Recommendation 2020-1, dated June 1, 2021. The following
discussion presents a detailed response for each DNFSB sub-
recommendation, which reflects the Department's acceptance of
Recommendation 2020-1, and constitutes the Secretary's Final Decision
for this Recommendation.
As described in DOE's June 11, 2020, initial response to
Recommendation 2020-1, DOE disagreed with the DNFSB's assertion that
the revisions proposed in the August 8, 2018, Notice
[[Page 64920]]
of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) for 10 CFR part 830, Nuclear Safety
Management, will erode DOE's nuclear safety regulatory framework.
Rather, DOE believes that these proposed changes will improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of the framework while continuing to
ensure adequate protection of environment, public, and worker health
and safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities. On October 19, 2020, DOE
published the Final Rule amending 10 CFR part 830, addressing and
incorporating comments from the DNFSB and members of the public as part
of the formal rulemaking process. (85 FR 66201).
The DNFSB's June 1, 2021, letter both revises and reaffirms DNFSB
Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements, in response to
DOE's June 11, 2020, response and to DOE's completion of the
rulemaking. Given the revisions made to the Recommendation, the
following reflects DOE's revised response.
While accepting Recommendation 2020-1, DOE accepts sub-
recommendations 3.c, 5.d, and 5.e with the understanding that DOE
cannot commit to a specific outcome in a future rulemaking as doing so
would be inconsistent with its requirements under the Administrative
Procedure Act. DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate
whether changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be pursued through a future
rulemaking effort.
Sub-Recommendation 1: Aging Infrastructure
Sub-Recommendation 1.a. Develop and implement an integrated
approach--including requirements--for the management of aging
infrastructure that includes formal processes to identify and perform
infrastructure upgrades necessary to ensure facilities and structures,
systems, and components can perform their safety functions.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE believes its nuclear
safety regulatory framework has requirements in place to ensure
facilities and safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs), both
active and passive, perform their safety functions. In the Department's
December 17, 2019, response to the Draft Recommendation, the Department
included an extensive discussion regarding DOE's expectations for the
performance of safety SSCs within DOE's policy documents. At the
highest level, compliance with 10 CFR part 830, including the
requirement in 10 CFR 830.204(b)(4) to ``. . . demonstrate the adequacy
of these [hazard] controls to eliminate, limit, or mitigate identified
hazards . . .'', is required for all Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3
nuclear facilities, and applies to new and existing facilities.
DOE will benchmark existing successful aging management processes,
such as the Extended Life Program at Y-12, and infrastructure upgrade
programming systems, such as Science-based Infrastructure Stewardship,
to enhance its processes to identify, prioritize, and plan safety-
related infrastructure upgrades at Defense Nuclear Facilities. DOE will
ensure funding necessary to complete upgrades designated through these
evaluation and prioritization processes is clearly identified as part
of the federal budgeting process. Given the multiple government-wide
priorities that are considered as part of the budgeting process, DOE
recognizes that not all upgrades are likely to be able to be funded in
any given budgeting cycle. DOE will continue its risk-based budgeting
prioritization approach and will continue taking other mitigating
steps, as appropriate, to continue to maintain adequate safety. The
Implementation Plan will further describe the steps that will be taken
to address this sub-recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 2: Hazard Categories
Sub-Recommendation 2.a. Revise DOE Standard 1027-2018 to address
the deficiencies noted in the Board's letter dated January 19, 2021.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. During the DNFSB staff's
recent 2020 review of the content and technical basis of DOE Standard
1027-2018, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear
Facilities, DOE and the DNFSB staff had multiple meetings to discuss
the DNFSB staff's questions and concerns. The DNFSB staff's outstanding
issues were identified in the Board's letter dated January 19, 2021.
The letter was provided to DOE for information. DOE has reviewed this
letter and will work with the Board staff to further understand these
concerns as part of future work on DOE Standard 1027 (as described in
response to sub-Recommendation 2.b, below). Further, it should be noted
that as a result of the Board's review of hazard categorization, NNSA
Supplemental Directive (SD) Guide (G)-1027, Admin Change 2, was issued
on May 10, 2021, that clarified the use of the calculated threshold
quantities and provided additional historical perspective on use of
International Commission for Radiation Protection (ICRP) guidance. DOE
believes that the changes address some of the Board's concerns
identified in the letter.
Sub-Recommendation 2.b. Mandate use of the updated version of DOE
Standard 1027 when performing facility hazard categorization of new
defense nuclear facilities.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE plans future work on DOE
Standard 1027, including an evaluation of DOE-STD-1027-2018, a
potential revision of the Standard, and a potential revision to 10 CFR
part 830 to incorporate Standard(s) used by the Department for hazard
categorization. This work will inform any requirements to be considered
for the future. As part of this effort DOE will perform a regulatory
analysis to evaluate potential changes to the Rule.
DOE's current approach is consistent with 10 CFR part 830, which
allows updates to DOE-STD-1027, such as in DOE-STD-1027-2018, that are
consistent with the methodology of DOE-STD-1027-92, Change Notice 1. In
DOE's June 11, 2020 response, we noted that if DOE were to propose a
new methodology for categorization, DOE would need to undertake a new
rulemaking effort that would include proposing the revised methodology
for public comment and reference the new Standard that includes the
methodology. This remains the case. The Implementation Plan will
further describe the steps that will be taken to address this sub-
recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 2.c. Review existing hazard category 3 and below
hazard category 3 defense nuclear facilities to confirm they are
appropriately categorized.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. The DNFSB's review does not
provide sufficient data, nor has DOE's oversight indicated that use of
the hazard categorization standards has led to under categorization
that would necessitate additional reviews. However, concurrent with
DOE's resolution to sub-Recommendation 2.b, DOE will evaluate the
nuclear safety management framework (i.e., DOE directives and technical
standards) to determine the best approach to establish requirements
that would provide greater confidence that defense nuclear facilities,
including below hazard category 3 facilities, are appropriately
categorized. The Implementation Plan will identify the specific steps
that will be taken to address this sub-recommendation.
[[Page 64921]]
Sub-Recommendation 3: DOE Approvals
Sub-Recommendation 3.a. Establish requirements in DOE Standard 1104
for timely periodic DOE reviews of facility safety bases to ensure they
meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE commits to evaluating DOE
Standard 1104 or other DOE directive(s) and revising directives and
technical standards, as necessary, to incorporate DOE's expectations
for the review of facility safety bases to ensure they meet the
requirements of 10 CFR part 830. The Implementation Plan will further
describe the steps that will be taken to address this sub-
recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 3.b. Establish clear requirements in DOE
Standard 1104 for DOE approval of JCOs and ESSs for PISAs that result
in a positive USQ determination.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. The Implementation Plan will
further describe the steps that will be taken to address this sub-
recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 3.c. Update 10 CFR 830 to incorporate the
requirements established per items 3.a and 3.b.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation with the understanding that
while the Department has accepted sub-recommendations 3.a and 3.b, any
future resulting requirements can be implemented in several policy
documents (i.e., DOE rules, directives, or technical standards) and DOE
cannot commit to a specific outcome in a future rulemaking. However,
DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate whether any changes
to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through a future rulemaking
process.
Sub-Recommendation 4: Evaluation of DSA Preparation and Review
Processes
Sub-Recommendation 4.a. Conduct an independent review of contractor
and federal processes to identify and evaluate the underlying issues
that prevented the annual submittal and approval of high-quality safety
basis documents, and use the findings to improve the relevant
processes.
DOE accepts this sub-Recommendation. This sub-Recommendation is
related to the Board's concerns with the deletion of the requirement
for review and approval of the annual updates to the DSA in the recent
10 CFR part 830 Rulemaking (final Rule published October 19, 2020, 85
FR 66201). DOE's acceptance of this sub-Recommendation does not
constitute its agreement that there is a safety concern associated with
the October 19, 2020, final Rule, nor that there were underlying safety
issues with the annual submittal and approval of high-quality safety
basis documents. However, DOE is committed to continuous improvement
and will conduct an independent review of the current safety basis
development processes to determine whether improvements may be made for
future submittals.
Sub-Recommendation 5: Safety Basis Process and Requirements
Sub-Recommendation 5.a. Establish clear requirements for USQs and
JCOs in an order or invoked standard, including elevation of key
concepts and guidance from DOE Guide 424.1-1. While developing these
requirements, address issues discussed in the Board's letter dated July
10, 2020.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE will evaluate the nuclear
safety management framework (i.e., DOE directives and technical
standards) to determine the best approach to establish requirements for
USQs and JCOs. The Board's July 10, 2020, letter will be considered as
part of this effort. The Implementation Plan will further describe the
steps that will be taken to address this sub-recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 5.b. Establish clear requirements for TSRs in an
order or invoked standard, including elevation of key concepts and
guidance from DOE Guide 423.1-1. While developing these requirements,
address issues discussed in DNFSB Technical Report 45, Violations of
the Nuclear Safety Basis.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE will evaluate the nuclear
safety management framework (i.e., DOE directives and technical
standards) to determine the best approach to establish requirements for
Technical Safety Requirements. The Board's Technical Report 45 will be
considered as part of this effort. The Implementation Plan will further
describe the steps that will be taken to address this sub-
recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 5.c. Establish requirements for SACs by invoking
DOE Standard 1186 in an appropriate DOE order.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE will evaluate the nuclear
safety management framework (i.e., DOE directives and technical
standards) to determine the best approach to establish requirements for
Specific Administrative Controls. The Implementation Plan will further
describe the steps that will be taken to address this sub-
recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 5.d. Update 10 CFR 830 to incorporate the
requirements established per items 5.a through 5.c.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation with the understanding that
while the Department has accepted sub-recommendations 5.a through 5.c,
any future resulting requirements can be implemented in several policy
documents (i.e., DOE rules, directives, or technical standards) and DOE
cannot commit to a specific outcome in a future rulemaking effort.
However, DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate whether any
changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through an additional
rulemaking process.
Sub-Recommendation 5.e. Establish requirements in 10 CFR 830
regarding the concept of defense-in-depth.
DOE accepts this sub-recommendation with the understanding that
while the Department agrees to evaluate the need for additional
requirements regarding the concept of defense-in-depth, DOE cannot
commit to a specific outcome in a future rulemaking process. However,
DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate whether any changes
to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through an additional rulemaking
process.
[FR Doc. 2021-25269 Filed 11-18-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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