Notice2021-20399
Reassignment of Schedules at Newark-Liberty International Airport
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
September 20, 2021
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Aviation Administration
Abstract
By this notice, the U.S. Department of Transportation (Department or DOT), including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), provides notice of its intention to approve schedule plans, for a single low-cost carrier (LCC) or ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC), to operate the 16 peak afternoon and evening runway timings previously approved for operation by Southwest Airlines, Inc. (Southwest) at Newark-Liberty International Airport (EWR or Newark). The Department is seeking comment on the proposed process as well as the proposed eligibility and evaluation criteria described below. Comments are due no later than September 27, 2021.
Full Text
<html>
<head>
<title>Federal Register, Volume 86 Issue 179 (Monday, September 20, 2021)</title>
</head>
<body><pre>
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 179 (Monday, September 20, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52285-52289]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2021-20399]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DOT-OST-2021-0103]
Reassignment of Schedules at Newark-Liberty International Airport
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed reassignment of schedules at Newark Liberty
International Airport.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: By this notice, the U.S. Department of Transportation
[[Page 52286]]
(Department or DOT), including the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), provides notice of its intention to approve schedule plans, for
a single low-cost carrier (LCC) or ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC), to
operate the 16 peak afternoon and evening runway timings previously
approved for operation by Southwest Airlines, Inc. (Southwest) at
Newark-Liberty International Airport (EWR or Newark). The Department is
seeking comment on the proposed process as well as the proposed
eligibility and evaluation criteria described below. Comments are due
no later than September 27, 2021.
DATES: Submit comments on or before September 27, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments to docket DOT-OST-2021-0103.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Homan, Director, Office of
Aviation Analysis, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590 or
(202) 366-5903; or Al Meilus, Manager, Slot Administration, AJR-G,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-2822; email
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e9a885c7a48c80859c9aa98f8888c78e869f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c988a5e784aca0a5bcba89afa8a8e7aea6bf">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice and the actions the Department
is proposing are in response to the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Spirit Airlines v. DOT, et al., and in
furtherance of the whole of government approach to competition embodied
in the President's Executive Order 14036.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Executive Order issued July 9, 2021, available at
<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
In 2010, United Airlines, Inc. (United) and Continental Airlines,
Inc. (Continental) announced plans to merge. In response to concerns
raised by the Department of Justice (DOJ) over the transaction and its
potential anticompetitive effects, particularly where Continental was
the dominant carrier, United agreed to transfer 36 of its take-off and
landing rights (operating authorizations or slots) at EWR to Southwest
Airlines, Inc. (Southwest). DOJ found that, ``[t]he transfer of slots
and other assets at Newark to Southwest, a low cost carrier that
currently has only limited service in the New York metropolitan area
and no Newark service, resolves the department's principal competition
concerns and will likely significantly benefit consumers on overlap
routes as well as on many other routes.'' \2\ United and Continental
carried out their merger and the post-merger United became the dominant
carrier at EWR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``United Airlines and Continental Airlines Transfer Assets
to Southwest Airlines in Response to Department of Justice's
Antitrust Concerns'', United States Department of Justice Press
Release, August 27, 2010, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-airlines-and-continental-airlines-transfer-assets-southwest-airlines-response">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-airlines-and-continental-airlines-transfer-assets-southwest-airlines-response</a>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time of the merger, EWR was an FAA-designated Level 3 (slot-
coordinated) airport, meaning that, in order to perform a take-off or
landing during most hours, an air carrier needed an FAA-allocated slot
for the time of the operation. Under then-applicable rules, carriers
that held slots could trade or lease them to other carriers.\3\ In
2016, as the result of improved operational metrics, FAA re-designated
EWR a Level 2 (schedule facilitated) airport.\4\ Under Level 2, slots
are not allocated. Rather, carriers submit schedule requests for the
upcoming season to FAA, and FAA works cooperatively with carriers to
seek voluntary schedule adjustments from carriers to alleviate delays
and other operational issues. Once agreed upon, FAA approves each
carrier's schedule. Under Level 2, carriers generally retain schedule
priority based on actual operations conducted as approved in the
previous corresponding season, but such schedule approvals are not
transferrable like slots (i.e., carriers cannot trade or lease their
approved schedules to other carriers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Operating Limitations at Newark Liberty International
Airport, 74 FR 51648 (Oct. 7, 2009).
\4\ See ``Change of Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR)
Designation'', 81 FR 19861, April 6, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 25, 2019, Southwest announced that it would cease
operations at EWR effective November 3, 2019.\5\ As Southwest could not
lease its approved runway timings to another carrier under Level 2
rules, upon its cessation of service, Southwest's approved runway
timings reverted to FAA. Sixteen of these operations were in peak
afternoon and evening hours (specifically, the period from 14:00-21:59
Eastern Time) at EWR when schedule approvals were generally not
otherwise available. These operations were also in hours when approved
schedules were generally at or above the 79/hour operational cap
imposed by FAA, on average and considering offsets in adjacent periods.
In an effort to improve performance at EWR, FAA lowered the scheduling
limit effective with the summer 2018 season that commenced in March
2018.\6\ Following this change, FAA approved flights above the 79/hour
limit only if operated in the previous corresponding season by the same
carrier and dating back to the higher limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Southwest Reports Record Second Quarter Revenues And
Earnings Per Share'', Southwest Airlines Press Release, July 25,
2019, <a href="https://www.swamedia.com/releases/release-424146113c6f2a2eebe84fb61d59a4ff-southwest-reports-record-second-quarter-revenues-and-earnings-per-share?query=newark">https://www.swamedia.com/releases/release-424146113c6f2a2eebe84fb61d59a4ff-southwest-reports-record-second-quarter-revenues-and-earnings-per-share?query=newark</a>.
\6\ See Notice of Submission Deadline for the Summer 2018
Scheduling Season, 82 FR 45938 (Oct. 2, 2017). The winter season
limits were already at 79 per hour based on winter season capacity
analyses. See also Notice of Submission Deadline for the Winter 2018
Scheduling Season, 83 FR 21335 (May 9, 2018). The FAA had also
previously targeted a scheduling limit of 79 operations per hour in
the initial transition from Level 3 slot controls to Level 2
schedule facilitation at EWR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a letter dated August 12, 2019, the Assistant Attorney General
for the Antitrust Division stated that, ``[Southwest's] decision
implicates the relief we negotiated with United Airlines as a condition
of its merger with Continental in 2010. We are therefore committed to
working with the DOT and FAA to evaluate how best to reallocate
Southwest's capacity at the airport in a manner consistent with our
enforcement decision in that matter.'' The letter goes on to state:
Those divestitures indeed facilitated important competition at
the airport. Southwest used the slots to introduce new low-fare
competition to United on multiple routes resulting in substantially
lowered fares and increased service . . . Given that United already
holds approximately 66% of authorizations at Newark, and that
competition for United is already in short supply at the airport
(e.g., 81 of 148 routes at the airport are monopoly routes operated
by United), we believe the DOT and FAA should seek to resolve the
reallocation issue in a way that preserves competition at the
airport. To do otherwise would undermine the goal of the remedy the
DOJ negotiated with United as a condition of its merger with
Continental.
On October 2, 2019, as part of a routine scheduling notice, FAA
announced that it would not replace or ``backfill'' all of Southwest's
operations in the EWR schedule to the extent such operations exceeded
the scheduling limits for purposes of the summer 2020 scheduling
season.\7\ However, FAA also stated that it planned to assess the
impacts of the peak period Southwest reductions and other schedule
changes at EWR on performance, as well as the impacts on competition in
close coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Transportation,
in the upcoming Winter 2019/2020 and Summer 2020 scheduling seasons.\8\
[[Page 52287]]
Ultimately, for the 36 slots that were the subject of the 2010 United/
Continental divestiture, FAA reallocated 20 of Southwest's operations,
but did not ``backfill'' 16 peak-hour operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See ``Submission Deadline for Schedule Information for
Newark Liberty International Airport for the Summer 2020 Scheduling
Season'', 84 FR 52580, October 2, 2019, at 52582.
\8\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spirit Airlines sought review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, challenging FAA's decision not to backfill the 16 peak-
hour operations, claiming that FAA's decision was arbitrary and
capricious because FAA failed to consider the effect of its decision on
competition and did not explain why it could not use a less burdensome
tool (such as a schedule reduction meeting under 49 U.S.C. 41722), and
lacked substantial evidence for its decision. On May 21, 2021, the D.C.
Circuit vacated FAA's decision and remanded the matter to the agency to
address the issue of competition.\9\ In doing so, the D.C. Circuit
stated that ``the agency . . . ignored information about the
competitive situation at Newark'' and that the ``record provides
precious little insight into whether or how the FAA approached the
competition problem.'' \10\ The D.C. Circuit also highlighted the fact
that the agency did not discuss ``why it prefers miniscule reductions
in delay more than competition that could lower fares for passengers.''
\11\ Finally, the Court cautioned that ``[i]f the FAA again decides to
retire Southwest's peak-period slots, it should be prepared to provide
a reasoned explanation for preferring to cut travel time an average of
one minute rather than to cut the price of flying by as much as 45
percent on routes that would gain a second carrier.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Spirit Airlines Inc. v. DOT et al., 997 F.3d 1247, 1255
(D.C. Cir. 2021).
\10\ Id. at 1256.
\11\ Id.
\12\ Id. at 1257.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demand and Congestion at EWR
Consistent with the delay modeling results included in the
administrative record in Spirit Airlines v. DOT, et al. (D.C. Cir. 19-
1248), with demand at pre-pandemic levels, FAA estimates that
``backfilling'' the 16 runway timings previously held by Southwest in
peak afternoon and evening periods would increase delay at EWR by 5.9%,
or by an average of 1.2 minutes per operation throughout the day.
However, since the 16 runway timings are all in the peak afternoon and
evening period; the added delay would be concentrated in these hours.
EWR and LaGuardia Airport (LGA) are the two most delayed airports
in the National Airspace System (NAS) as reported through Aviation
System Performance Metrics (ASPM) delays compared to scheduled gate
departures/arrivals. Congestion at EWR should be considered in context
against the other NYC area airports as well as Philadelphia
International Airport (PHL), airports within similar operational and
passenger catchment areas.\13\ Compared to LGA, EWR has a slightly
higher completion rate,\14\ but also a higher rate of delayed
operations. In fiscal year (FY) 2019, EWR's completion rate (97.0%) was
lower than the NAS average, but similar to the completion rate at LGA
(96.8%) and PHL (97.4%). Also in FY 2019, EWR's rate of delayed flights
was 29.4% compared to schedule for gate departures and gate arrivals,
which is higher than LGA (26.1%), John F. Kennedy International Airport
(22.5%), and PHL (20.4%).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ An airport's catchment area is the geographic area from
which your airport can reasonably expect to draw commercial air
service passengers. See ``Defining Your Airport's Catchment Area''
available at: <a href="https://crp.trb.org/acrpwebresource1/defining-your-airports-catchment-area/">https://crp.trb.org/acrpwebresource1/defining-your-airports-catchment-area/</a>.
\14\ Completion Rate refers to the percentage of scheduled and/
or planned air carrier arrivals that were not cancelled. Calculated
as Metric Arrivals/(Metric Arrivals + Cancelled Arrivals). Cancelled
Arrivals are determined next day using air carrier flight plan
cancellation messages and scheduled flights not flown. Airline
Service Quality Performance (ASQP) cancellation data are used when
available. See ``ASPM Cancellations: Definitions of Variables''
available at: <a href="https://aspm.faa.gov/aspmhelp/index/ASPM_CancellationsDefinitions_of_Variables.html">https://aspm.faa.gov/aspmhelp/index/ASPM_CancellationsDefinitions_of_Variables.html</a>.
\15\ See docket for ASPM data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA made significant progress smoothing and balancing the
schedule at EWR under the Level 2 construct just prior to the COVID-19
pandemic. The sudden, drastic disruption caused by COVID-19 affects the
analysis and relevant long-term effects of operational, performance,
and demand-related changes at EWR, including those changes resulting
from Southwest leaving the airport. Access to EWR and the New York City
area generally remains coveted, and schedule requests for flights at
EWR have exceeded the desired scheduling limits in multiple hours.
While the FAA would accommodate the reassignment of the 16 peak
afternoon and evening operations as proposed in this notice, the FAA
would continue to seek voluntary cooperation from all carriers to
adjust schedules at EWR in an effort to manage the operation within the
desired scheduling limits.
FAA notes that the COVID-19 public health emergency has created
uncertainty about the ultimate recovery of demand back to pre-COVID
levels or the potential for a ``new normal'' in demand levels at EWR as
the public's travel patterns have, and continue, to evolve, and
carriers restructure their networks to accommodate this dynamic. Given
this evolving situation, FAA will continue to monitor performance at
EWR and review its capacity evaluation and targeted scheduling limits
at EWR in the future. However, at the current time, the desired hourly
scheduling limit at EWR remains at 79 operations per hour and 43
operations per half-hour.\16\ Based on historical demand and an
increase in operations in ``shoulder'' periods adjacent to the busiest
hours before the COVID-19 public health emergency, most hours are now
at the desired hourly scheduling limits. To help with a balance between
arrivals and departures, the desired maximum number of scheduled
arrivals or departures, respectively, is 43 in an hour and 24 in a
half-hour. This would allow some higher levels of operations in certain
periods (not to exceed the hourly limits) and some recovery from lower
demand in adjacent periods. FAA will seek to work in coordination with
the awarded carrier to adjust schedules within the peak afternoon and
evening period, including minor changes between adjacent half hours, in
the interest of optimizing efficiency and accommodating the carrier's
schedule plans, consistent with the usual Level 2 process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See 86 FR 24448 (May 6, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Reassignment
As stated above, FAA estimates that, in a pre-COVID-19 environment,
reassigning the 16 peak-hour operations would result in additional
delays, for all EWR operations, of approximately 1.2 minutes per
operation throughout the day. United, by far the largest carrier at EWR
by several measures, operates many routes on a monopoly basis. The
Department has previously found that introducing LCC services in
competition on monopoly routes significantly reduces fares on those
routes.\17\ One study found that the presence of LCCs and ULCCs causes
a decrease in average one-way fares of between $15-$36.\18\ Absent
introduction of these LCC services, it is highly unlikely that there
will be any significant reduction in fares. These potential savings to
[[Page 52288]]
consumers are important objectives of the President's Executive Order
on competition, particularly in a concentrated market. There are many
benefits of competition, including lower fares, more throughput, higher
utilization of scarce assets, more opportunities to develop flexible or
common use airport facilities, and reduced opportunities for
exclusionary behavior such as ``babysitting.'' That will not change
unless we introduce the LCC services and at the same time, seek
necessary adjustments by incumbent carriers to mitigate the potential
delays. The Department believes that the benefits of lower fares
significantly outweigh the impacts of additional delays.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See ``U.S. DOT/FAA--Notice of a Petition for Waiver and
Solicitation of Comments on Grant of Petition with Conditions'',
FAA-2010-0109-0097, Jul. 21, 2011, at 33-34.
\18\ Wittman, Michael D.; Swelbar, William S. (August 2013).
Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of
Competition, Consolidation, and Low-Cost Carriers at 20; see also
Bennett, Randall D.; Craun, James M. (May 1993). The Airline
Deregulation Evolution Continues: The Southwest Effect. Office of
Aviation Analysis, U.S. Department of Transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the court's decision, ongoing competition issues at EWR, and
Executive Order 14036, the Department believes that it is necessary to
reintroduce the competition that was previously provided by Southwest
at EWR even though this will increase delays at EWR. Pursuant to the
Department and FAA's authority under 49 U.S.C. 40101, 40103, and 41712,
the Department is initiating a proceeding to reassign the 16 peak-hour
runway timings at issue. The Department believes that reassigning these
schedule plans to operate in the 16-peak hour runway timings, in a
manner that would continue to satisfy DOJ's competition remedy related
to the United/Continental merger, and as quickly as possible, best
satisfies the public interest and addresses the concerns of the D.C.
Circuit.
This action is not a routine approval of schedule plans that would
typically be handled under FAA's standard schedule facilitation
procedures. The Department notes that this proceeding arises out of an
unusual circumstance, where Southwest stopped operating at EWR, thus
returning a large number of operations that Southwest acquired as a
condition of the United-Continental merger. Thus, the Department is
treating this matter as the reassignment and continuation of the DOJ-
approved competition remedy to the United-Continental merger. As such,
the Department proposes to evaluate proposals from eligible carriers
that can effectively carry out the goals of that competition remedy,
namely to provide price and service competition to United, the dominant
hub carrier at EWR, and for FAA to approve the peak-hour schedule plans
of the carrier chosen based on that evaluation. In order to maintain
the effect of the 2010 competition remedy, the Department has
tentatively concluded that the schedule plans to operate in the 16
peak-hour runway timings should be approved as a package to a single
carrier able to provide the type and magnitude of competitive
discipline at EWR contemplated by the DOJ remedy.
Previously, DOJ found that the divestiture to Southwest of 36 slots
at Newark (i.e., United's pre- merger holdings), including the 16 peak
afternoon and evening period slots at issue in this notice, resolved
its competition concerns with the transaction. By divesting all of the
slots to a single carrier with a proven track record and the capability
to provide a competitive pattern of frequent service in markets
operated by United-Continental, DOJ was able to minimize the number of
slots divested while maximizing the competitive impact of the remedy.
Based upon current competitive conditions, the Department finds
that, in order to provide price discipline for the services of a hub
carrier in particular, the LCC or ULCC approved to operate in the 16
peak-hour runway timings needs to have a sufficient pattern of service
to achieve economies of scale in its operations at the airport
consistent with its low-cost or low-fare business model, to protect
itself from potential anticompetitive behavior from the dominant
carrier(s), and to have sufficient incentive and ability to compete
head to head with dominant carriers.\19\ Furthermore, we have
previously found that a single carrier offering a broader competitive
alternative to the hub carrier's customer proposition at the airport
can extend the benefits of the low-fare service even in markets without
LCC or ULCC services by changing passengers' perception of what a fair
price is for a particular itinerary.\20\ When fares are substantially
higher, customers tend to look for cheaper alternatives at other
airlines or nearby airports to avoid paying ``above market'' prices.
This ``halo effect'' tends to discipline high fares charged by the
incumbent even in markets where the LCC does not operate, at the
margin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``Restricting eligibility to these . . . carriers would
assist new or small non-aligned carriers in defending themselves
against increasingly dominant competitors, which, with the benefit
of additional slot interests, could pursue anticompetitive
strategies such as significantly increasing existing services in any
new entrant/limited incumbent/low-cost/non-aligned carrier market.''
Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled
Operations at LaGuardia Airport, 75 FR 7306, February 18, 2010 at
7310.
\20\ See Bennett, Randall D.; Craun, James M. (May 1993). The
Airline Deregulation Evolution Continues: The Southwest Effect.
Office of Aviation Analysis, U.S. Department of Transportation; and
Wittman, Michael D.; Swelbar, William S. (August 2013). Evolving
Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of Competition,
Consolidation, and Low-Cost Carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, the Department proposes to approve, as a package
to an eligible LCC or ULCC, schedule plans to operate in the 16 peak-
hour runway timings previously approved for operation by Southwest. The
Department seeks to finalize this process to enable a carrier to begin
operations as soon as possible, as early as the start of the Winter
2021/2022 scheduling season. To determine eligibility, the Department
is proposing several criteria, described below.
While approving an LCC or ULCC's schedule plans to operate in these
16 peak-hour runway timings is necessary to address ongoing competition
issues at EWR, the Department is not concluding by virtue of this
process that such action will be sufficient to resolve all of those
issues. In addition, the Department notes that, aside from this
proceeding to reassign 16 operations historically approved for
operation by Southwest, usual policies and procedures for Level 2
schedule facilitation at EWR continue to apply.\21\ The FAA intends to
provide responses to all pending schedule requests for the Winter 2021/
2022 scheduling season as soon as possible following issuance of this
notice. Once this reassignment proceeding has been completed, the FAA
will take action to approve the 16 additional operations for the
benefit of the awarded carrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See e.g., Notice of Submission Deadline for Winter 2021/
2022 Scheduling Season, 86 FR 24428 (May 6, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eligibility and Evaluation Criteria
In airline transactions involving constrained markets, where market
concentration is at issue, the Department has found that LCCs and ULCCs
have the greatest competitive impact upon entry by their ability to
dramatically lower fares and increase the volume of passengers in a
market.\22\ In the 2010 United/Continental divestiture, DOJ was
satisfied that its competition concerns had been addressed by the
transfer to Southwest, a LCC, of United's EWR slots and other assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See ``Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order
Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Airport'', 76 FR 63702,
October 13, 2011 at 63705, and, Order 2016-11-2 at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given competitive conditions at Newark--including United's ongoing
dominance at EWR and the relatively small number of operating
authorizations being reassigned--the Department tentatively believes
that continuing to limit eligibility to LCC or ULCC carriers would best
serve the public interest by providing the
[[Page 52289]]
maximum level of competition with the available public assets.
In determining which LCC or ULCC would provide the maximum
competition, the Department tentatively proposes to consider, among
other factors, carriers' business model and track record to ensure that
they have the ability and stamina to provide the level of competition
required. The business model and track record will be determined by
analysis of revenue, traffic, and schedule data. More specifically, the
Department will consider:
<bullet> Business model and product offering that allow the carrier
to effectively compete, including the extent to which offering low
fares to large numbers of travelers is core to its business proposition
across markets;
<bullet> Record of entering and effectively competing in markets
like those served by dominant carrier(s) at Newark;
<bullet> Staying power and track record in highly competitive
markets, especially vis-[agrave]-vis the specific hub carrier and at
network carrier hubs and focus cities where the competitive responses
from incumbent airlines to new entry by price competitors may be
particularly aggressive; and
<bullet> Ability to appeal to a broad cross section of passengers
by offering a competitive schedule with (at least) minimum levels of
daily and weekly frequency appropriate for the market(s) at issue,
along with reasonably competitive onboard products and services and the
ability to deliver them to customers consistently over time.
The Department tentatively proposes to evaluate eligible carriers
based on the above criteria.
Comments Requested
The Department requests comments on various aspects of the proposed
process outlined in this notice. Specifically, the Department seeks
comments on its tentative decision to approve schedule plans, for a
single carrier, to operate in the 16 peak-hour runway timings as soon
as possible; its tentative decision to limit eligibility to LCC and
ULCC carriers; and its proposed evaluation criteria. The Department
will consider comments outside of the scope of this request as
nonresponsive. Comments must be filed in this docket and are due not
later than September 27, 2021.
Since the issuance of the D.C. Circuit's decision, the Department
has received letters from interested stakeholders. Any correspondence
related to the specific issues discussed in this notice have been
included in the docket.
The Department will consider all responsive comments received and
issue a further notice finalizing its decision and soliciting proposals
from eligible carriers. If no responsive comments are received, the
Department may proceed directly to issuing a notice requesting
proposals and providing instruction for doing so.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The Department will solicit proposals on a confidential
basis given the sensitive commercial information that they are
likely to contain.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 16, 2021.
Carol Annette Petsonk,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs, U.S.
Department of Transportation.
Virginia T. Boyle,
Vice President, System Operations Services, Federal Aviation
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2021-20399 Filed 9-16-21; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>Indexed from Federal Register on September 20, 2021.
This is legal information, not legal advice. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change frequently. Always verify current law with official sources and consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction for advice on your specific situation.