Notice2021-18997
Positive Train Control Interface Design Issue With Locomotive and Cab Car Braking Systems
Primary source
Metadata and text below are from the Federal Register, a public-domain U.S. government work. Always verify the official published version before relying on it for any legal matter.
Published
September 2, 2021
Issuing agencies
Transportation DepartmentFederal Railroad Administration
Abstract
FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2021-01 to make the rail industry, including railroads and railroad employees, aware of a recently identified interface design issue relating to how positive train control (PTC) systems in use throughout the United States interface with locomotive and cab car braking systems. This recently identified interface design issue allows a train crewmember to circumvent a PTC enforcement by manually cutting out the pilot valve/ brake stand, commonly known as the cut-out valve, prior to the PTC system initiating the brakes. This interface design issue poses a significant safety risk by allowing a PTC system to be disabled and unable to initiate the brakes to prevent a train-to-train collision, over-speed derailment, incursion into an established work zones, or the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position. This Safety Advisory recommends that all railroads operating with PTC systems immediately remind crewmembers that circumventing a PTC enforcement is subject to civil penalty or disqualification for the locomotive engineer or conductor responsible; audit the designs of PTC systems as implemented on all types of locomotives and cab cars; assess the extent to which the design of the system could allow a locomotive or cab car's PTC system to be circumvented by a crewmember; develop and implement a plan to mitigate and/or correct this design issue; and provide FRA with a schedule for completion of the identified actions.
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 86 Issue 168 (Thursday, September 2, 2021)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 168 (Thursday, September 2, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49410-49411]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2021-18997]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2021-01]
Positive Train Control Interface Design Issue With Locomotive and
Cab Car Braking Systems
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2021-01 to make the rail
industry, including railroads and railroad employees, aware of a
recently identified interface design issue relating to how positive
train control (PTC) systems in use throughout the United States
interface with locomotive and cab car braking systems. This recently
identified interface design issue allows a train crewmember to
circumvent a PTC enforcement by manually cutting out the pilot valve/
brake stand, commonly known as the cut-out valve, prior to the PTC
system initiating the brakes. This interface design issue poses a
significant safety risk by allowing a PTC system to be disabled and
unable to initiate the brakes to prevent a train-to-train collision,
over-speed derailment, incursion into an established work zones, or the
movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position. This
Safety Advisory recommends that all railroads operating with PTC
systems immediately remind crewmembers that circumventing a PTC
enforcement is subject to civil penalty or disqualification for the
locomotive engineer or conductor responsible; audit the designs of PTC
systems as implemented on all types of locomotives and cab cars; assess
the extent to which the design of the system could allow a locomotive
or cab car's PTC system to be circumvented by a crewmember; develop and
implement a plan to mitigate and/or correct this design issue; and
provide FRA with a schedule for completion of the identified actions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gabe Neal, Staff Director, Signal,
Train Control and Crossings Division, Office of Railroad Systems and
Technology, at telephone: (816) 516-7168 or email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4621272423682823272a0622293268212930"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5e393f3c3b70303b3f321e3a312a70393128">[email protected]</span></a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Positive train control (PTC) systems must be designed to prevent
train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into
established work zones, and the movement of a train through a switch
left in the wrong position.\1\ PTC accomplishes this by using
technology to monitor train speed and train locations, provide warnings
for the traincrew to take action, and automatically initiate braking if
the traincrew does not take action.
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\1\ 49 CFR 236.1005.
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FRA is aware of a recently identified design issue relating to how
PTC systems in use throughout the United States interface with
locomotive and cab car braking systems. This interface design issue
allows a crewmember to circumvent a PTC enforcement by manually cutting
out the pilot valve/brake stand, commonly known as the cut-out valve,
prior to the PTC system initiating the brakes. If a PTC system is
allowed to be disabled by the actions of a crewmember, the PTC system
can no longer prevent a train-to-train collision, over-speed
derailment, incursion into an established work zone, or the movement of
a train through a switch left in the wrong position.
Although FRA has found that all PTC systems are potentially
impacted by this interface design issue, FRA notes that only some
interface designs between the PTC system and the locomotive or cab car
braking system allow a PTC enforcement to be disabled. FRA believes
that the interface designs of most concern are limited to a number of
older locomotives equipped with mechanical braking systems, and the
interface design is likely not an issue on most newer locomotives
equipped with electronic braking systems. On PTC-equipped locomotives
and cab cars with interface designs with this issue, manually cutting
out the pilot valve/brake stand disables the PTC system enforcement
capability. FRA recognizes that a locomotive or cab car PTC system is
considered a ``safety device'' under FRA's regulations \2\ and that it
is unlawful for a railroad employee to operate the equipment with such
a safety device disabled without authorization. Accordingly, a system
that allows such interference in its operation does not comply with the
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.\3\ In addition, a PTC
system that allows such interference presents a significant safety risk
in that it can no longer perform its required functions.
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\2\ 49 CFR part 218.
\3\ 49 CFR 236.1005.
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FRA became aware of this issue through three recent events:
<bullet> On May 27, 2021, during testing of the Advanced Civil
Speed Enforcement System II (ACSES II) PTC system aboard a freight
train, an FRA PTC Specialist witnessed an engineer circumvent a penalty
brake application while operating in an overspeed condition. The
engineer placed the pilot valve/brake stand in the cut-out position
prior to PTC system enforcement of the overspeed condition. When the
overspeed condition no longer existed, the pilot valve/brake stand was
returned to the cut-in position, and the train continued without a PTC
system penalty.
<bullet> On July 13, 2021, during testing of the Interoperable
Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) PTC system on a freight
locomotive, FRA conducted a test in which a zero speed temporary speed
restriction (TSR) was issued to the train and the pilot valve/brake
stand was placed into the cut-out position prior to PTC system
enforcement of the TSR. This action allowed the train to circumvent PTC
system enforcement.
<bullet> On July 21, 2021, during testing of the ACSES II PTC
system on a passenger train, FRA conducted a similar test in which a
zero speed temporary speed restriction (TSR) was issued to the train
and the pilot valve/brake stand was placed into the cut-out position
prior to PTC system enforcement of the TSR. This action achieved
similar results, allowing the train to circumvent the PTC system
enforcement with one exception; after placing the pilot valve/brake
stand back into the cut-in position, the train encountered a PTC
penalty brake application.
Safety Advisory 2021-01
As shown by the incidents described above, rail operations face a
safety risk due to the interface design issue that allows PTC
enforcement to be circumvented by cutting out the pilot valve/brake
stand. Such risks must be addressed to provide for the safety of train
operations, and thus FRA recommends that railroads do the following:
(1) Immediately remind railroad crewmembers that, along with the
unauthorized disabling of a PTC system, circumventing PTC enforcement
by manually cutting out the pilot valve/brake stand when not authorized
is a revocable event for the locomotive engineer or conductor
responsible, and
[[Page 49411]]
subjects any other crewmember responsible to individual liability
proceedings, including disqualification and/or civil penalties. See 49
CFR 240.117(e)(5), 240.305(a)(5), and 242.403(b) and (e)(5).
(2) Immediately conduct a complete audit of the PTC onboard design
of all locomotives and cab cars equipped with PTC to determine how the
onboard PTC equipment is integrated into each railroad's locomotive and
cab car's braking system, to ascertain what percentage of the
locomotive and cab car fleet is subject to the interface design issue
described above;
(3) Within ten (10) days of the publication of this Safety
Advisory, provide FRA, via the SIR site, with a report of the number
and type of locomotives and cab cars that have this interface design
issue;
(4) Upon completion of item (2) above, determine the mitigating
measures and/or corrective actions necessary to address the safety risk
presented by the design issue, and provide FRA, via the SIR site, with
a report documenting the planned measures and/or actions, including a
schedule for completion; and
(5) Immediately commence implementation of the planned measures
and/or actions to address the safety risk presented by the design issue
per the documented schedule, and provide FRA, via the SIR site,
confirmation of completion.
Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2021-18997 Filed 9-1-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
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