Notice2021-13406
Record of Decision for the Long Range Discrimination Radar Operations at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska
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Published
June 24, 2021
Issuing agencies
Defense Department
Abstract
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), as lead agency, and the Department of the Air Force (DAF), as a cooperating agency, are issuing this joint Record of Decision (ROD) to implement changes in operational concept for the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) located at Clear Air Force Station (CAFS), Alaska. This decision includes modification of the LRDR operational requirements and procedures to reflect continuous operations in response to emerging threats. This action will enable the MDA to meet its congressional mandate to fully support the primary mission of the layered Missile Defense System (MDS) to provide continuous and precise tracking and discrimination of long- range missile threats launched against the United States (U.S.).
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 86 Issue 119 (Thursday, June 24, 2021)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 119 (Thursday, June 24, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33240-33243]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2021-13406]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Record of Decision for the Long Range Discrimination Radar
Operations at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska
AGENCY: Missile Defense Agency, Department of Defense (DoD).
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), as lead agency, and the
Department of the Air Force (DAF), as a cooperating agency, are issuing
this joint Record of Decision (ROD) to implement changes in operational
concept for the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) located at
[[Page 33241]]
Clear Air Force Station (CAFS), Alaska. This decision includes
modification of the LRDR operational requirements and procedures to
reflect continuous operations in response to emerging threats. This
action will enable the MDA to meet its congressional mandate to fully
support the primary mission of the layered Missile Defense System (MDS)
to provide continuous and precise tracking and discrimination of long-
range missile threats launched against the United States (U.S.).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the LRDR
CAFS Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or this ROD, please
contact Mr. Ryan Keith, MDA Public Affairs, at 256-450-1599 or by email
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ccf0adeca4bea9aaf1" http: lrdr.info">lrdr.info</a>@mda.mil"><a href="http://lrdr.info">lrdr.info</a>@mda.mil</a>. Downloadable electronic versions of the Final EIS
and ROD are available on MDA's website at <a href="https://www.mda.mil/system/lrdr">https://www.mda.mil/system/lrdr</a>.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This ROD documents the following:
<bullet> The decision;
<bullet> The alternatives considered in reaching the decision and
the alternative considered to be environmentally preferable;
<bullet> Relevant factors that were considered among the
alternatives and how those factors entered into the decision; and
<bullet> Whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize
environmental impacts resulting from the selected alternative have been
adopted, and if not, why they were not.
A. MDA and DAF Decision
The MDA and the DAF are issuing this ROD, selecting the Proposed
Action as described in the LRDR CAFS EIS to operate the LRDR on a
continuous basis. The operational concept would change from the initial
concept to maintain the LRDR in a readiness posture with limited
operations and no additional airspace restrictions. The change in LRDR
operations will create a hazard in areas of the National Airspace
System where high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) will exceed Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) certification standards for aircraft
electrical and electronic systems. Therefore, the DAF, on behalf of the
MDA, requested the FAA to expand the existing restricted airspace at
CAFS, as described in the LRDR CAFS Final EIS, to address this hazard.
B. FAA Role
The FAA is a cooperating agency on the LRDR CAFS EIS because it has
special expertise and jurisdiction by law, pursuant to 49 U.S. Code
(U.S.C.) Sec. 40101 et seq., for aviation and regulation of air
commerce in the interests of aviation safety and efficiency. The MDA
will request the FAA, as a cooperating agency, to consider and adopt,
in whole or in part, the Final EIS as the required National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation to support FAA decisions
on the establishment of Restricted Areas. The airspace associated with
the Proposed Action and alternative lies within the jurisdiction of the
FAA Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center.
FAA proposes to establish six new restricted areas and make related
changes in airspace management. FAA will issue a separate ROD
addressing its actions related to restricting the flight of aircraft.
C. Background
Within the DoD, MDA is responsible for developing, testing, and
fielding an integrated, layered MDS to defend the U.S. and its deployed
forces, allies, and friends against all ranges of enemy missile threats
in all phases of flight. The layered MDS is a defensive system
consisting of land-, sea-, space-, and air-based weapon, sensor,
communications, and command and control elements that are used to
detect and defeat incoming missile threats. As part of the layered MDS,
the LRDR will be the lead sensor in a new class of radars optimized to
identify threat objects in complex, dense target environments, and to
enhance efficient deployment of MDS weapons to intercept such threats.
In response to the congressional mandate to deploy the LRDR, MDA
completed a siting analysis that selected CAFS out of 50 candidate
Department of Defense installations in Alaska. In June 2016, MDA and
DAF prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) to evaluate the potential
environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of
the LRDR at CAFS. The 2016 EA resulted in a Finding of No Significant
Impact (FONSI), and construction of the LRDR began in July 2017. The
operational concept for the LRDR analyzed in the 2016 EA and FONSI was
to maintain the LRDR in a readiness posture. Since that time, due to
emerging threats, MDA identified a need to modify the LRDR operational
requirements and procedures to reflect continuous operations.
D. NEPA Process
The LRDR CAFS EIS complies with NEPA, as amended; the Council on
Environmental Quality Regulations for implementing NEPA; and agency-
specific NEPA-implementing policies and procedures for the MDA, DAF,
and FAA.\1\
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\1\ Note: This EIS was ongoing prior to the 14 September 2020
effective date of the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's)
final rule updating its regulations for implementing the procedural
provisions of NEPA. Accordingly, the revised CEQ regulations were
not used for this action pursuant to 40 Code of Federal Regulations
Sec. 1506.13.
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The MDA initiated a 45-day formal scoping period by publishing a
Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register on May 17,
2019. The MDA held public scoping meetings in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and
Anderson, Alaska. Forty-two formal comments were received during the
scoping comment period. The scoping comments focused primarily on
aviation navigational safety; added flight times and expense; human
safety; and potential impacts on private airstrips, Clear Airport, and
the U.S. Air Force Auxiliary Civil Air Patrol Alaska Wing Glider
Academy (CAP Glider Academy) for youth. These topics were addressed in
the Draft EIS.
The Notice of Availability (NOA) for the LRDR CAFS Draft EIS was
published in the Federal Register on October 28, 2020, announcing a 52-
day comment period beginning October 30, 2020. During this time, public
comment meetings were held virtually and consisted of an online open
house and a telephone public meeting. The MDA received comments on the
Draft EIS from 10 parties, which included individuals, agencies, and
organizations. Commenters requested changes to the proposed Restricted
Areas, more information about communication methods if Restricted Areas
are activated at unscheduled times, and mitigation for climate change
and air quality impacts. The comments were taken into consideration
during preparation of the Final EIS. The NOA for the LRDR CAFS Final
EIS was published in the Federal Register on May 7, 2021 (86 FR 24599-
24600). This ROD is the culmination of the NEPA process.
E. Alternatives Considered
1. Proposed Action--Continuous LRDR Operation and FAA Actions
The Proposed Action consists of both MDA and FAA actions. Due to
emerging threats, the MDA proposes to modify the LRDR operational
requirements and procedures to reflect continuous operations. The
operational concept would change from the initial concept to maintain
the LRDR in a readiness posture with limited operations and no
additional airspace restrictions. Because of the proposed changes to
LRDR
[[Page 33242]]
operations, airspace restrictions at CAFS are necessary to ensure that
aircraft would not encounter HIRF resulting from the LRDR operations
that exceed FAA's HIRF certification standards for aircraft electrical
and electronic systems. The proposed airspace restrictions include
expanding the existing Restricted Area (R-2206) at CAFS by adding six
new Restricted Areas. If necessary, the FAA would implement temporary
flight restrictions (TFRs) until those Restricted Areas are in effect.
The FAA also proposes changes to federal airways and instrument flight
procedures to accommodate the new Restricted Areas.
2. No Action Alternative
Under the No Action Alternative, the MDA would operate the LRDR in
a manner that would contain HIRF within the existing R-2206 such that
the FAA would not need to take new actions to limit aircraft flight.
3. Two-Tier Alternative
Under the two-tier alternative, the existing R-2206 would be
expanded with two new Restricted Areas. The two-tier alternative was
presented during the scoping process but was eliminated from further
analysis.
F. Environmental Impacts
The LRDR CAFS EIS analyzed the impacts of the Proposed Action and
No Action Alternative within 14 environmental categories: Airspace
management; air quality; biological resources; climate; hazardous
materials, solid waste, and pollution prevention; historical,
architectural, archaeological, and cultural resources; land use;
natural resources and energy supply; noise and compatible land use;
safety; socioeconomics and environmental justice; subsistence; visual
effects; and water resources. The potential for cumulative impacts was
also evaluated in the EIS.
Under the No Action Alternative, the MDA would operate the LRDR in
such a way that would contain HIRF within the existing R-2206, except
during a national security crisis. No new actions would be taken to
limit use of affected airspace, with the exception of temporary
measures during a national security crisis. The No Action Alternative
would not result in any new impacts associated with the environmental
categories. However, the LRDR would not meet current operational
requirements for the MDS and would not have the ability to adapt to
rapidly evolving adversary tactics and technologies.
MDA's proposed change in LRDR operations would have no impact or
negligible adverse impacts on all of the environmental categories
except airspace management, which would have negligible to minor
adverse impacts. The change to continuous LRDR operations would create
a hazard in areas of the National Airspace System where the HIRF would
exceed FAA certification standards for aircraft electrical and
electronic systems, necessitating the FAA to take actions to restrict
the flight of aircraft in this airspace.
The proposed changes related to restricting the flight of aircraft
would have no impact or negligible adverse impacts on all environmental
categories except airspace management and socioeconomics, which would
have minor adverse impacts. Although overall adverse impacts on
socioeconomics would be negligible to minor, relocation of the CAP
Glider Academy from Clear Airport to another airport would result in
moderate adverse impacts, based on currently available information and
conservative assumptions.
The following is a brief summary of the Proposed Action's impacts
on airspace management and socioeconomics.
1. Airspace Management
The primary impact of MDA's continuous operation of the LRDR would
be to increase the airspace at CAFS where the HIRF would exceed FAA
certification standards for aircraft electrical and electronic systems.
To address this hazard, the FAA would expand the existing Restricted
Area (R-2206) by adding six new Restricted Areas (R-2206B through R-
2206G) to create a total of seven Restricted Areas at CAFS. Four of the
Restricted Areas would be active continuously. The remaining three (R-
2206D, R-2206E, and R-2206F) would be active only from 2:00 a.m. to
4:00 a.m. local Alaska time every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday; at
other prescheduled times by Notice to Airmen; and as necessary in
response to national security events.
Based on current air traffic and accounting for growth of aviation
activity, the FAA estimates up to five daily (1,825 annual) instrument
flight rule (IFR) flights would be affected by the proposed Restricted
Areas. Those five flights are calculated from accumulated daily
activity across the following: Airway J-125, airway V-436, and direct
flights that depart Anchorage headed toward Deadhorse, Alaska. Up to an
estimated 10 daily (3,650 annual) visual flight rule (VFR) flights
would be affected. If TFRs are necessary before Restricted Areas are in
effect, the affected IFR flights would be rerouted by air traffic
control, VFR aircraft would detour to avoid the TFRs, some instrument
flight procedures would not be available, and air traffic control would
need to manually direct the affected IFR flights. Once the amended
procedures and redesigned airways are established, air traffic control
would cease to manually direct IFR flights through the area. Some
flight paths would be longer, resulting in slight increases in flight
times and operation costs as well as slight increases in air emissions
and fuel use.
The lowest floor of the proposed Restricted Areas would be 400 feet
above ground level (AGL) (1,000 feet mean sea level at CAFS). VFR
aircraft would be able and allowed to fly beneath the proposed
Restricted Areas, although aircraft are allowed to fly below 500 feet
AGL only if taking off or landing. The six privately owned airstrips
beneath the proposed Restricted Areas would remain accessible. Pilots
would still be able to use Windy Pass for transiting between Interior
Alaska and Southcentral Alaska. Additionally, except for the periods
during which R-2206D, R-2206E, and R-2206F would be active, aircraft
would be able to navigate along Parks Highway, which is used as a
visual navigation aid, as long as they stay below an altitude of 2,600
feet AGL (3,200 feet mean sea level) within 0.5 nautical mile of the
highway.
Access to Clear Airport would normally be unavailable from the
north and west during the times when R-2206D, R-2206E, and R-2206F are
active. While prescheduled restrictions would be unlikely to affect
users, provisions would be in place to allow emergency aircraft and
medical evacuation flights, as well as aircraft in emergency
circumstances, into and out of Clear Airport during these times. The
MDA is also working with the DoD, FAA, and DAF to identify appropriate
notification procedures to alert aircraft when Restricted Areas are
activated outside of prescheduled periods, including methods of rapidly
notifying pilots of changes in Restricted Area status. Potential
notification options being considered include a combination of radio
broadcast on a common traffic advisory frequency and high-intensity
warning lights. This notification process would be addressed in a
Letter of Procedure.
2. Socioeconomics
FAA's actions related to restricting the flight of aircraft would
result in
[[Page 33243]]
slightly increased flight times, which would result in increased costs
to aircraft operators both during the interim phase, if necessary, and
once the redesigned airways are established. These economic impacts
would be spread across the entire potentially affected aviation
industry in Alaska. FAA's actions would not affect the provision of
public services associated with aviation in the study area communities.
The CAP Glider Academy could no longer conduct its glider
instruction at Clear Airport due to the proposed Restricted Areas and
would have to relocate to another airport such as Ladd Army Airfield or
Fort Greely. The impacts of relocation would be minimized if the Civil
Air Patrol is able to negotiate a long-term arrangement for operation
of the Glider Academy that provides participants with no-cost lodging
or camping options and discounted meal service. Arrangements for
relocating the CAP Glider Academy have not been completed, and costs
associated with the new location are not known.
G. Mitigation Measures and Monitoring
Since development of the initial concept for expanding the
restricted airspace at CAFS, as described in the LRDR CAFS Final EIS,
the design of the proposed Restricted Areas has been refined to further
minimize impacts on the aviation community based on feedback from pilot
associations, public safety organizations and first responders, and
airspace user groups. The MDA did not identify any significant
environmental impacts arising from the Proposed Action and, therefore,
is not identifying specific mitigation measures. All practicable means
to mitigate impacts associated with the decision have been considered.
H. Environmentally Preferred Alternative
Based on the findings of the EIS, the No Action Alternative would
be the environmentally preferred alternative because the existing
Restricted Area at CAFS would not need to be expanded. The operations
at Clear Airport would not be affected, and FAA's proposed
modifications to federal airways and instrument flight procedures would
not be necessary. However, the LRDR would not meet current operational
requirements for the layered MDS and would not have the ability to
adapt to rapidly evolving adversary tactics and technologies, nor would
it satisfy the purpose or need for the Proposed Action.
I. Decision
In accordance with NEPA, we have considered the information
contained within the LRDR CAFS EIS, comments from the public, input
from regulatory agencies, LRDR system capabilities, the analysis of the
missile threat to the U.S., layered MDS performance and operational
effectiveness, and other relevant factors in deciding whether to
operate the LRDR continuously at CAFS.
We have decided to select the Proposed Action over the No Action
Alternative. Although the No Action Alternative would have fewer
environmental impacts, it would not fully support the primary mission
of the layered MDS to provide continuous and precise tracking and
discrimination of missile threats launched against the U.S. The LRDR
would not meet current operational requirements for the MDS and would
not have the ability to adapt to rapidly evolving adversary tactics and
technologies.
Dated: June 11, 2021.
Aaron T. Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2021-13406 Filed 6-23-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
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