Notice2021-11606
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Establish OCC's Persistent Minimum Skin-In-The-Game
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Published
June 3, 2021
Issuing agencies
Securities and Exchange Commission
Full Text
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<title>Federal Register, Volume 86 Issue 105 (Thursday, June 3, 2021)</title>
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[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 105 (Thursday, June 3, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29861-29864]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [<a href="http://www.gpo.gov">www.gpo.gov</a>]
[FR Doc No: 2021-11606]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-92038; File No. SR-OCC-2021-003]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Establish OCC's Persistent
Minimum Skin-In-The-Game
May 27, 2021.
I. Introduction
On February 10, 2021, the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change SR-OCC-2021-003, (``Proposed Rule Change'')
pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 \2\ thereunder to establish a
persistent minimum level of skin-in-the-game that OCC would contribute
to cover default losses or liquidity shortfalls.\3\ The Proposed Rule
Change was published for public comment in the Federal Register on
March 2, 2021.\4\ The Commission has received comments regarding the
proposal described in the Proposed Rule Change.\5\ This Order approves
the Proposed Rule Change.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ See Notice of Filing infra note 4, 86 FR at 12237.
\4\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 91199 (Feb. 24, 2021),
86 FR 12237 (Mar. 2, 2021) (File No. SR-OCC-2021-003) (``Notice of
Filing''). OCC also filed a related advance notice (SR-OCC-2021-801)
(``Advance Notice'') with the Commission pursuant to Section
806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, entitled the Payment, Clearing, and
Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i) under the
Exchange Act. 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1). 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) and 17 CFR
240.19b-4, respectively. The Advance Notice was published in the
Federal Register on March 1, 2021. Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 91184 (Feb. 23, 2021), 86 FR 12057 (Mar. 1, 2021) (File No. SR-
OCC-2021-801). A Notice of No Objection to the Advance Notice was
published in the Federal Register on April 12, 2021. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 91491 (Apr. 7, 2021), 86 FR 19061 (Apr. 12,
2021) (File No. SR-OCC-2021-801).
\5\ Comments on the Proposed Rule Change are available at
<a href="https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm">https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm</a>.
Since the proposal contained in the Proposed Rule Change was
also filed as an advance notice, all public comments received on the
proposal are considered regardless of whether the comments are
submitted on the Proposed Rule Change or the Advance Notice.
Comments on the Advance Notice are available at <a href="https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-801/occ2021801.htm">https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-801/occ2021801.htm</a>.
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II. Background <SUP>6</SUP>
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\6\ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the
meanings specified in OCC's Rules and By-Laws, available at <a href="https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp">https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp</a>.
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``Skin-in-the-game,'' as a component of financial risk management,
entails a covered clearing agency choosing, upon the occurrence of a
default or series of defaults and application of all available assets
of the defaulting participant(s), to apply its own capital contribution
to the relevant clearing or guaranty fund in full to satisfy any
remaining losses prior to the application of any (a) contributions by
non-defaulting members to the clearing or guaranty fund, or (b)
assessments that the covered clearing agency require non-defaulting
participants to contribute following the exhaustion of such
participant's funded contributions to the relevant clearing or guaranty
fund.\7\
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\7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (Sep. 28,
2016), 81 FR 70786, 70806 (Oct. 13, 2016) (S7-03-14) (``Covered
Clearing Agency Standards'').
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OCC's skin-in-the-game component of its financial risk management
regime is described in its current rules, which provide for the use of
OCC's own capital to mitigate losses arising out of a Clearing Member
default.\8\ Specifically, OCC's rules provide for the offsetting of
default losses remaining after the application of a defaulted Clearing
Member's margin deposits and Clearing Fund contributions with OCC's
capital in excess of 110 percent of the Target Capital Requirement at
the time of the default.\9\ OCC's rules also provide for charging
losses remaining after the application of OCC's excess capital to OCC
senior management's deferred
[[Page 29862]]
compensation \10\ as well as non-defaulting Clearing Members.\11\
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\8\ See Securities Exchange Release No. 88029 (Jan. 24, 2020),
85 FR 5500, 5502 (Jan. 30, 2020) (File No. SR-OCC-2019-007) (``CMP
Approval Order'').
\9\ See OCC Rule 1006(e), available at <a href="https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d3854cd-b782-450f-bcf7-33169b0576ce/occ_rules.pdf">https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d3854cd-b782-450f-bcf7-33169b0576ce/occ_rules.pdf</a> (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021). See also CMP Approval Order at 5502.
\10\ Such deferred compensation is in trust with respect to
OCC's Executive Deferred Compensation Plan (``EDCP''). See OCC Rule
101(e)(1), available at available at <a href="https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d3854cd-b782-450f-bcf7-33169b0576ce/occ_rules.pdf">https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d3854cd-b782-450f-bcf7-33169b0576ce/occ_rules.pdf</a> (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021). The specific EDCP funds that comprise a
portion of OCC's skin-in-the-game are referred to in OCC's rules as
the ``EDCP Unvested Balance.'' See id.
\11\ See OCC Rule 1006(b), available at <a href="https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d3854cd-b782-450f-bcf7-33169b0576ce/occ_rules.pdf">https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d3854cd-b782-450f-bcf7-33169b0576ce/occ_rules.pdf</a> (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021). See also CMP Approval Order at 5502. The
application the EDCP Unvested Balance in parallel with non-
defaulting Clearing Members' Clearing Fund contributions would
necessarily occur before assessments related to the exhaustion of
OCC's Clearing Fund.
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OCC reviewed feedback received in connection with the initial
filing of its current rules, relevant papers from industry participants
and stakeholders concerning skin-in-the-game, and regulatory regimes in
jurisdictions outside the United States.\12\ OCC's current rules do
not, however, dedicate OCC's excess capital for use solely as skin-in-
the-game, or guaranty that OCC maintain a minimum amount of skin-in-
the-game.\13\
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\12\ See Notice of Filing, 86 FR at 12238-39. For example, OCC
is cognizant of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation's
expectation that skin-in-the-game be a minimum of 25 percent of the
central counterparty's regulatory capital requirement. See Notice of
Filing, 86 FR at 12239.
\13\ See Notice of Filing, 86 FR at 12239.
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Establishing the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC proposes to
establish a persistent minimum level of skin-in-the-game that OCC would
contribute to cover default losses or liquidity shortfalls. Such skin-
in-the-game would consist of a minimum amount of OCC's own pre-funded
resources that OCC would contribute prior to charging a loss to the
Clearing Fund (the ``Minimum Corporate Contribution'') and the EDCP
Unvested Balance.\14\ As proposed, funds comprising the Minimum
Corporate Contribution would be excluded from OCC's liquid net assets
funded by equity (``LNAFBE'') for purposes of meeting OCC's Target
Capital Requirement to ensure that OCC may maintain the Minimum
Corporate Contribution exclusively for default management.\15\
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\14\ OCC does not propose altering its rules regarding the use
or sizing of the EDCP Unvested Balance.
\15\ In addition to the Minimum Corporate Contribution, OCC
would continue to commit its LNAFBE greater than 110 percent of its
Target Capital Requirement prior to charging a loss to the Clearing
Fund. As proposed, OCC would apply the Minimum Corporate
Contribution to address default losses before applying its excess
LNAFBE.
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OCC proposes to define the Minimum Corporate Contribution to mean
the minimum level of OCC's own funds maintained exclusively to cover
credit losses or liquidity shortfalls, the level of which OCC's Board
of Directors (the ``Board'') shall determine from time to time. To
facilitate implementation of OCC's proposal, the Board approved an
initial Minimum Corporate Contribution at such a level that OCC's total
skin-in-the-game (i.e., the sum of the Minimum Corporate Contribution
and OCC's current EDCP Unvested Balance) would equal 25 percent of
OCC's Target Capital Requirement. OCC stated that, in setting the
initial Minimum Corporate Contribution, the Board considered factors
including, but not limited to, the regulatory requirements in each
jurisdiction in which OCC is registered or in which OCC is actively
seeking recognition, the amount similarly situated central
counterparties commit of their own resources to address participant
defaults, the EDCP Unvested Balance, OCC's LNAFBE greater than 110
percent of its Target Capital Requirement, projected revenue and
expenses, and other projected capital needs.\16\
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\16\ See Notice of Filing, 86 FR at 12239-40.
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Replenishing the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC proposes that,
in the event it were to apply a portion of the Minimum Corporate
Contribution to address losses or shortfalls arising out of a Clearing
Member default, the size of the Minimum Corporate Contribution would be
temporarily reduced, for a period of 270 days, to the amount remaining
after its application.\17\ Each application of the Minimum Corporate
Contribution would trigger a new 270-day period.\18\ Under the
proposal, OCC would be obligated to notify Clearing Members of any such
reduction of the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC believes that 270
calendar days, or approximately nine months, is sufficient time for OCC
to accumulate the funds necessary to reestablish the Minimum Corporate
Contribution.\19\
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\17\ For example, if the Minimum Corporate Contribution were
$100 million and OCC applied $25 million to address default losses,
then the Minimum Corporate Contribution would be temporarily set at
$75 million.
\18\ For example, if OCC were to contribute a portion of the
Minimum Corporate Contribution on day 1 and another portion 100 days
later, the Minimum Corporate Contribution would remain temporarily
reduced until day 370.
\19\ See Notice of Filing, 86 FR at 12240. OCC stated that the
analysis on which its belief is based is the same analysis on which
OCC relied to set various thresholds related to OCC's plan for
replenishing its regulatory capital. See id.
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OCC proposes change to its Rules, Capital Management Policy,
Default Management Policy, Clearing Fund Methodology Policy, and
Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plan to effectuate the changes described
above.
III. Discussion and Commission Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to such organization.\20\ After carefully
considering the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission finds that the
proposal is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and
the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to OCC. More
specifically, the Commission finds that the proposal is consistent with
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act \21\ and Rule17Ad-22(e)(2)
thereunder.\22\
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\20\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
\21\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\22\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
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Before addressing the relevant portions of the Exchange Act and
rules and regulations thereunder, however, we address a part of the
comment submitted by Susquehanna International Group (``SIG'') not
related to Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act or Rule17Ad-
22(e)(2) thereunder.\23\ SIG argued, as one of its concerns, that OCC's
fees, dues, and other charges would be per se unreasonable, and
therefore inconsistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(D) of the Exchange Act,
because funding the proposal with clearing fees would facilitate a
shareholder windfall.\24\ We do not address these issues in this order
because OCC has not proposed to change any fees, dues, or other charges
in the Proposed Rule Change.\25\ The
[[Page 29863]]
reasonability of OCC's existing fees, dues, or other charges pursuant
to Section 17A(b)(3)(D) of the Exchange Act is therefore beyond the
scope of this Proposed Rule Change.
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\23\ See letter from Richard J. McDonald, SIG, dated March 30,
2021, to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary, Commission (``SIG Letter''),
available at <a href="https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm">https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm</a>. In its comment letter, SIG argues that the
Proposed Rule Change is inconsistent with Sections 17A(b)(3)(D) and
(F) of the Exchange Act. The Commission's consideration of SIG's
concerns pertaining to Section 17A(b)(3)(F) is addressed in section
III.A. below.
\24\ SIG Letter at 3-4.
SIG also (i) expresses concern regarding OCC's current
retention of $325 million in capital; (ii) indicates that OCC should
focus on reducing clearing fee rates; and (iii) suggests that the
current organization of OCC's shareholders as for profit entities
creates a misalignment of interests. SIG Letter at 2. Because these
issues do not bear on the grounds for approval or disapproval
applicable to the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission does not
address them in this order.
\25\ Another commenter read SIG's comment to imply that the
inclusion of fees as part of the proposed skin-in-the-game would
incentivize OCC members to increase their charges for providing
clearing services as a method of mitigating the risk of their actual
skin-in-the-game. See comment submitted by CJ Chou (April 8, 2021),
available at <a href="https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm">https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-occ-2021-003/srocc2021003.htm</a>. As the Commission understands it, SIG's argument
pertains to the size and use of OCC's fees, not changes in fees
imposed on clients by the Clearing Members absent a fee increase by
OCC.
The commenter also expressed difficulty in obtaining
quantitative data regarding clearing fee refunds and how much,
proportionally, fees would contribute to the minimum skin-in-the-
game under the Proposed Rule Change. Id. With regard to quantitative
data describing clearing fee refunds, the audited financial
statements that OCC posts annually include a line item for
refundable clearing fees where applicable. See e.g., OCC's 2020
Financials at page 5, available at <a href="https://www.theocc.com/getattachment/9f5d22ff-d810-4690-948d-f9a207df083d/attachment.aspx">https://www.theocc.com/getattachment/9f5d22ff-d810-4690-948d-f9a207df083d/attachment.aspx</a>.
With regard to how much, proportionally, fees would contribute to
the minimum skin-in-the-game under the Proposed Rule Change, the
Commission t notes that OCC has publically stated that its revenues
primarily consist of clearing fee revenues. Id. at 7.
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act requires, among other
things, that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to assure the
safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the custody or
control of the clearing agency or for which it is responsible and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest.\26\ Based on its
review of the record, the Commission finds the proposal is consistent
with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act.
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\26\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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The Commission continues to regard skin-in-the-game as a potential
tool to align the various incentives of a covered clearing agency's
stakeholders, including management and clearing members.\27\ OCC's
current rules provide for the application of excess capital as skin-in-
the-game. The Commission believes that OCC's proposal to set aside
capital to maintain a minimum amount of skin-in-the-game strengthens
OCC's existing skin-in-the-game rules. OCC's current rules align senior
management's personal economic incentives with OCC's overall risk
management incentives,\28\ but do not guaranty that an amount of OCC
capital would be set aside to ensure a pre-determined minimum level of
skin-in-the-game.
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\27\ Covered Clearing Agency Standards, 81 FR at 70805-06.
\28\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87257 (Oct. 8,
2019), 84 FR 55194, 55199 (Oct. 15, 2019) (File No. SR-OCC-2019-
805).
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The Commission believes that holding a defined Minimum Corporate
Contribution, as opposed to an undefined amount of excess capital,
would incentivize OCC further to maintain the appropriate amount of
resources to manage a Clearing Member default because failure to do so
would result in a direct cost to OCC. Incentivizing OCC to maintain an
appropriate amount of resources, in turn, could reduce the potential
losses charged to the Clearing Fund contributions of non-defaulting
Clearing Members in the event of a Clearing Member default, which in
turn would help assure the safeguarding of the Clearing Fund
contributions of non-defaulting Clearing Members.
In its comment letter, SIG argues that the Proposed Rule Change
contravenes the protection of investors and the public interest.\29\
SIG states that OCC was established as a monopoly organization in order
to serve as a market utility \30\ and that it has always been
recognized and accepted by concerned parties that monies held as excess
OCC capital are excess fees not yet rebated, as opposed to retained
earnings.\31\ In support of its argument that OCC should not retain
earnings generated through clearing fees, SIG states that OCC has not
previously had to draw on such funds to address a shortfall.\32\
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\29\ SIG Letter at 4.
\30\ SIG Letter at 1.
\31\ SIG Letter at 2.
\32\ SIG Letter at 2.
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The Commission is not persuaded by SIG's arguments with regard to
Section 17A(b)(3)(F). As discussed above, the Commission believes that
holding a defined Minimum Corporate Contribution would incentivize OCC
further to maintain the appropriate amount of resources to manage a
Clearing Member default. Aligning OCC's incentives with risk management
considerations, such as default management, supports the public
interest because it supports OCC's role as a utility for clearing and
settling U.S. listed options. Further, OCC's rules do not require OCC
to distribute retained earnings in excess of expenses.\33\
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\33\ If OCC's capital exceeds 110 percent of its Target Capital
Requirement, rules authorize, but does not require, OCC's Board to
reduce the cost of clearing. See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
88029 (Jan. 24, 2020), 85 FR 5500, 5502 (Jan. 30, 2020) (File No.
SR-OCC-2019-007). If the Board chooses to reduce the cost of
clearing, it is authorized to do so by lowering fees or declaring a
fee holiday as well as issuing refunds. See Id.
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In addition to providing those services customarily provided by
clearing houses of national securities exchanges,\34\ OCC is a Covered
Clearing Agency registered with the Commission.\35\ As a Covered
Clearing Agency, OCC is obligated to comply with risk management
standards that the Commission adopted under Section 805(a)(2) of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 \36\
and Section 17A of the Exchange Act (the ``Clearing Agency
Rules'').\37\ The Clearing Agency Rules address having policies and
procedures regarding, inter alia, the maintenance of assets to address
losses attributable to Clearing Member defaults \38\ as well as general
business risk losses.\39\
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\34\ See Fourth Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of OCC, Section III, available at <a href="https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d7754f6-99ca-4d69-a934-a6fa996c9c16/OCC_Certificate_of_Incorporation.pdf">https://www.theocc.com/getmedia/9d7754f6-99ca-4d69-a934-a6fa996c9c16/OCC_Certificate_of_Incorporation.pdf</a>.
\35\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(15).
\36\ 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
\37\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22. See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
68080 (Oct. 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (Nov. 2, 2012) (S7-08-11). See
also Covered Clearing Agency Standards, 81 FR 70786. OCC is a
``covered clearing agency'' as defined in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5).
\38\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4).
\39\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(15).
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SIG argues further that OCC's proposal puts only the public's skin
in the game. SIG states that market participants bear the risk
imprudent decisions by the exchanges in their capacity as the OCC
shareholders and of their designee board members because such
participants would be denied a rebate of excess fees.\40\
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\40\ SIG Letter at 3.
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The Commission is not persuaded by this argument either. SIG's
argument assumes that OCC's Clearing Members have a right to clearing
fee revenues not applied to operating costs in a given year, but, as
noted above in this section, OCC's rules, as approved by the
Commission, do not require OCC to distribute retained earnings in
excess of expenses. SIG's argument also assumes, without support, that
OCC's five Exchange Directors would not only be willing to make
``imprudent decisions to the detriment of OCC's Clearing Members,'' but
that the Exchange Directors would be able to enlist sufficient support
among OCC's nine Member Directors to force such ``imprudent decisions''
through the Board approval process.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission believes that the Proposed
Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of Section 17A(b)(3)(F)
of the Exchange Act.\41\
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\41\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) Under the Exchange Act
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) under the Exchange Act requires that a covered
clearing agency establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to provide for governance
arrangements
[[Page 29864]]
that, among other things, are clear and transparent; clearly prioritize
the safety and efficiency of the covered clearing agency; and support
the public interest requirements of the Exchange Act.\42\ In adopting
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2), the Commission discussed comments it received
regarding the concept of skin-in-the-game as a potential tool to align
the various incentives of a covered clearing agency's stakeholders,
including management and clearing members.\43\ And, while the
Commission declined to include a specific skin-in-the-game requirement
in the rule, it stated its belief that ``the proper alignment of
incentives is an important element of a covered clearing agency's risk
management practices,'' and noted that skin-in-the-game ``may play a
role in those risk management practices in many instances.'' \44\ OCC's
current rules require the application management compensation and
excess capital as skin-in-the-game, which in turn should help further
align the interests of OCC's stakeholders, including OCC management and
Clearing Members.\45\
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\42\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
\43\ Covered Clearing Agency Standards, 81 FR at 70805-06.
\44\ Covered Clearing Agency Standards, 81 FR at 70806.
\45\ See CMP Approval Order at 5507.
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As described above, OCC's proposal would not reduce the resources
OCC would apply to address default losses or remove the current skin-
in-the-game component of OCC's rules. Rather, OCC proposes to set aside
a defined amount of capital for the sole purpose of absorbing losses
and shortfalls arising out of a Clearing Member default. OCC has
clearly stated the factors that the Board would consider when
determining the amount of resources to hold as skin-in-the-game, a
portion of which would comprise the Minimum Corporate Contribution. OCC
also proposes to establish a clear process for addressing reductions in
the Minimum Corporate Contribution arising out of a Clearing Member's
default. Accordingly, the Commission believes that the proposed changes
to establish a persistent minimum level of skin-in-the-game are
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) under the Exchange Act.\46\
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\46\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
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IV. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the requirements of the
Exchange Act, and in particular, the requirements of Section 17A of the
Exchange Act \47\ and the rules and regulations thereunder.
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\47\ In approving this Proposed Rule Change, the Commission has
considered the proposed rules' impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
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It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act,\48\ that the Proposed Rule Change (SR-OCC-2021-003) be,
and hereby is, approved.
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\48\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\49\
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\49\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-11606 Filed 6-2-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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